y 

i.3 

)r 

0 

if 

j] 
h 


OVER  SIX  MILLIONS 


-.©1. 


Appalling  Total  of  Germany's 
<     Casualtiss 

Copen^iagan,  Wddnesday. 
The    "  Vorwacrts"    learns   from   a  reliable 
sojvrce  that  up  to  October  3.1  the  Gennan  wjur 
casiiiattiasi  wero  asi  follows:-— 

Killed    1,580.000 

Woimdod     'IX'00.000 

MisRiug    260,000 

PriBoners      490.000 


Tlie  London  Herald  was  the  first  Eng- 
lish newspaper  to  employ  a  war  corre- 
spondent. This  was  Mr.  George  Borrow, 
who  wrote  of  'the  Carlist  fightiug  in 
Spain    in    1839. 


"Himney-P'^''- 


SHIPS  SUNK  LAST  MONTH 


-,, .  ■  .«ig^i     II. 

Submarines  Less  Active ;  Only 

177,000  Tons  Destroyed 

The  Adrairalty  makes  tha  followijig 
announcement ;— ^ 

The  losses  of  Briiiah,  Allied,  and  Neutral 
merchant  tcnruige  due  ta  enemy  action  and 
Tnariiie  risks  duiing  the  nioiith  of  October, 
1918,  compared  -with  the  preceding  periods, 
aro  set  out  as  below : — 


Period 


1017 


Sept.  . 
Oct.  .. 
Nov.  . 
Dec.  ., 
1013 
.T«n  .. 
Feb.  .. 
Mnrch 
April  . 
May  .. 
June  . 
July  .. 
Aug.  . 
Rerit.  . 
Get.  ... 


Gross  Toauage 


British 


Allied 

and 

Neutral 


Total 


Month       Month        Month       Quarter 


209,212 

2S3,9V3 

236,555 

25^?  303 
ra4,7'Wt 
253,<J,?/ot 
231.737 

182  52'! 

175,854t 

152.65?,t 

83,S52 

t 


isa.gag 

187,36rt 
135.E30 
155,707 

l'-W,842! 
150,629? 

r«,i97f 

85,6!5«f 

I3<!,755t 

112.705t 

142,34<?t 

16'1,475| 

!)6;6S4t 

S3,S82 

Adjusted. 


565,161 
487,357 
333,445 
'i52,06S 

359,463  r 
38-1, 932  f 
598,9411 
5i7,U0t 
?56,543t 
278,3541 
524,838? 
54i,5S3t 

17'/ .534 


1.464,473 


1,272,843 


11,145,336 


t362,007l 


t315,513 


AMERICAN   CASUALTIES 


CJ 


Over  50,000  Killed,  snd  More 
than  170,000  'bounded     ' 

WaRh/n.gt*n,  Saturday . 
In  an  interview  Generaj  ^la^cl   8t.attd  that^ 
the  Ajnsrican  casnaltia?     *n  the  v/a*     were  a^j 
foilowK  ■ — 

Killed  or  died  of  woimda 

Died     o.   disease  

Death.'   nncertifie''     ...   ... 

Woundec     ..    ... 

Prisoner?  ,  ... 

Missing    

The  Americans  car'  44,000    pri:'oner 

a«.d  l-40(  gxins,  ] 

DpniobJlisat  on  from  the  America;      camp: 
WSJ  proceedinr-  witi   eigh    divisio".       of  rs^i"*^ 
ment."  o;    coa?^     artillery     and  tw(     ol     fiiilr 
artiilory. — (Exchange,!^ 


J 


35,154^®', 
14,811  f 
2.204  '^^  i 
17£  625  ^^5  ' 
2,162-  "»*' 
1,15C 


lEN    ROUTE    FkOM    RUHLI^Bbti 

Copenhagen    riaturday.  'l 
I      The  transport  home  of  Ifritrlfb  ifuh-jeti.-    wln' 
|'w\;-r<5  interned  in  cavnj:'  a,-'   FGnhleb»>    i    no-'   iii 
^.'full  pfoginss.     The  first  of  che  Iwc    iefre-an.ers 
enr.ployed  for  the  purp.  «e  arnveo         Copen  ) 
hagen      to-nigiit      with     *beut         .iO     civil 
prisoners  on  boanrd. 

The  British  prisoners  broke  «ut  int*  lead 
cheers  as  their  steamer  drew  alongside  the 
quay.  Presently  they  began  to  sing:  "  It's  a 
long,  locg  vvay*to  Tippefayv." 

-i' 


J7  4.J 

1  wp  SS' 

Iz/jc.^  ^^^c^^^^ 


/ 


/ 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2011  with  funding  from 

Boston  Library  Consortium  IVIember  Libraries 


http://www.archive.org/details/modernwar01derr 


MODERN  WAR. 


BY 


V.  derre:cagaix,^ 

COLONEL  D'rNFANTERIE   BREVETE, 

Commandant  en  Second  I'Ecole  Superieure  de  Guerre,  Paris. 


TRANSIvATED  BY  C.  W.  FOSTER. 

[authorized  TRANSIvATION.J 


PART    I. 

STRATEGY 


WASHINGTON: 

JAMES  J.  CHAPMAN,  agt. 

1888. 


BO^N  cotuGE  mmr 


COPYRIGHT  BY 
C.  W.  FOSTER, 

1888. 


71463 


TRANSLATOR'S  RRKKACE, 


The  original  of  this  work  was  written  with  a  view  to 
inform  the  French  army  upon  the  art  of  war  as  it  is  to- 
da)'.  The  Author  does  not  address  a  victorious  army, 
but  one  that  is  endeavoring  to  recover  from  the  con- 
vulsive shock  experienced  in  1870.  The  strain  of  lofty 
and  urgent  patriotism  that  pervades  the  treatise  will 
therefore  be  easily  understood.  Moreover,  the  influence 
of  this  ardent  tone  upon  the  reader  can  not  fail  to  be 
salutary  by  quickening  answering  sentiments.  It  may 
be  said  also  that  nothing  could  be  more  fully  calculated 
to  impress  the  Author  with  an  earnest  sense  of  responsi- 
bility in  discharging  his  important  task,  than  the  feel- 
ings in  which  his  patriotic  language  has  its  origin. 
They  have  set  a  watchful  guard  over  his  judgment 
against  the  introduction  of  erroneous  instruction. 

In  his  treatment  of  the  subject  of  modern  war,  he  has 
avoided  the  extreme  views  of  those  partisans  who  on  the 
one  hand  contend  that  there  are  absolute  rules  of  war 
incapable  of  the  least  vibration,  and  of  those  on  the 
other  who  deny  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  an  "art  of 
war. "  He  recognizes  the  value  of  certain  general  truths 
in  the  conduct  of  warlike  operations,  but  is  equally  ex- 
plicit in  declaring  that  their  applications  change  with 
the  shifting  conditions  of  warfare. 

He  begins  his  work   by   giving   the  strength,   com- 

(iii) 


iv  translator's  preface. 

position,  and  organization  of  the  principal  European 
armies  ;  passes  to  that  great  body  of  measures  in  prepar- 
ation for  war,  so  essential  to  be  known  and  followed 
to-day ;  and  then  enters  upon  the  more  active  part  of 
his  subject  by  considering,  with  appropriate  explanation 
and  illustration,  the  various  operations  of  war — mobili- 
zation, concentration,  attack  of  frontiers,  marches,  and 
battles. 

While  putting  in  distinct  relief  the  principles  of  the 
past  that  are  suited  to  the  requirements  of  the  present, 
he  has  not  hesitated  to  point  out  those  precepts  that  have 
been  discredited  by  experience  ;  and  no  one  can  fail  to 
note  with  what  clearness  he  has  drawn  new  principles 
from  the  masses  of  facts  created  by  recent  wars — prin- 
ciples which  under  various  forms  will  be  powerful 
directing  agencies  in  the  campaigns  of  the  future. 

In  addition  to  setting  forth  the  material  aspects  of  the 
art  of  war,  he  continually  impresses  upon  his  readers  the 
importance  of  the  psychologic  elements  in  determining 
success.  He  indicates  the  ways  in  which  the  moral 
pulse  of  armies  may  be  raised  and  sustained.  He  speci- 
fies the  means  of  arousing  and  quickening  that  military 
ardor  which  is  the  forerunner  of  victory. 

Since  the  publication  of  this  work  in  the  original, 
several  changes  have  taken  place  in  the  strength  of 
European  armies.  These  have  been  duly  recorded 
under  the  heading,  "Supplementary  Notes." 


In  1867,  three  years  before  our  disasters,  General 
Trocliu  wrote:  "We  have  reached  one  of  those  transi- 
tion periods  in  the  existence  and  functions  of  armies, 
marking  the  end  of  certain  methods  employed  in  past 
wars,  and  inaugurating  others  for  use  in  the  future. 

"It  was  Prussia's  well-merited  fortune  in  1866,  as  for- 
merly in  the  time  of  the  great  Frederick,  to  have  fore- 
seen the  new  evolution  in  the  ways  and  means  of 
warfare,  to  have  very  attentively  studied  its  conditions 
during  a  long  peace,  for  the  most  part  with  success, 
and  to  have  opportunely  and  resolutely  applied  the 
results. ' ' 

To-day,  all  serious  minds  recognize  the  remarkable 
advance  which  improvements  in  fire-arms  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  applications  of  steam  and  electricity  on 
the  other,  have  brought  about  in  the  art  of  war. 

Two  events  of  considerable  importance,  the  wars  of 
1866  and  1870,  have  arisen  to  give  validity  to  these  new 
methods. 

Two  great  nations,  Austria  and  France,  have  paid  in 
blood,  treasure,  and  influence,  for  their  failure  to  quickly 
enough  comprehend  the  extent  of  this  progress,  and  to 
adopt  in  time  the  changes  made  necessary  by  it. 

It  was  only  after  bitter  and  cruel  lessons  of  defeat,  that 
these  States  awoke  to  the  necessity  of  modifying  their 

(v) 


VI  PREF'ACE. 

military  institutions  and  of  copying  those  of  the  con- 
queror. 

Since  then  they  have  persuaded  themselves  that 
enough  has  been  done  for  national  honor  and  security 
in  adopting  with  the  Prussian  organization,  arms  of 
great  power,  and  service  rules  in  harmony  with  the  new 
methods  of  warfare. 

These  innovations  are,  however,  graduated  to  too 
small  a  scale. 

The  Germans,  with  their  diligent  habits,  with  their 
intellectual  forces  constantly  directed  toward  the  prac- 
tical side  of  things,  make  no  mistake  about  the  matter. 
In  their  view,  the  operations  of  war  have  also  changed. 

The  grand  principles  upon  which  the  genius  of  great 
captains  has  impressed  a  character  of  good  sense  and 
simplicity  have  certainly  not  been  varied;  but  their  ap- 
plications, as  various  in  their  forms  as  the  manifold 
problems  in  the  life  of  nations,  have  been  deeply  modi- 
fied. These  applications  are  even  improving  from  day 
to  day,  and  it  is  only  by  following  them  with  attention 
continually  on  the  alert,  that  a  State  may  reasonably 
hope  to  keep  abreast  of  its  neighbors  in  warlike  prep- 
aration. 

These  are  the  new  processes  which  constitute  inodern 
war. 

Where  is  the  Frenchman,  where  the  soldier,  who  has 
not  been  impressed  by  the  unbroken  chain  of  our  re- 
verses in  1870?  Where  is  he  who  has  not  asked  the 
cause  of  these  unrelieved  defeats?  And  where  are  those 
who,  in  default  of  a  plausible  explanation,  have  not  been 
tempted  to  say  to  themselves,  as  well  as  to  others:  It  is 
fate!     Fate!  paltry  excuse  of  minds  without  resourcesi 


PREFACE.  VI 1 

No,  it  is  not  fate  that  has  overwhehned  this  people 
with  such  niisfortunes.  It  owes  them  to  its  own  infirm- 
ities, to  its  mental  and  physical  organization,  perhaps, 
— to  that  impressible  and  brilliant  character  peculiar  to 
its  origin  and  race,  which  prevents  it  at  times  from  go- 
ing to  the  bottom  of  things  and  seizing  the  lessons  to 
be  drawn  from  the  great  facts  of  history.  It  owes  them 
especially  to  its  ignorance  of  the  new  processes  of  war. 

In  1871,  immediately  after  onr  reverses,  it  seemed  to 
us  fitting  to  write:  "The  hour  has  come  for  the  thirty- 
six  millions  of  French  people  who  survive,  to  awaken 
to  a  sense  of  their  duty  and  set  to  work.  Ambition 
must  give  place  to  devotion,  discouragement  to  hope, 
selfishness  to  self-denial,  and  illusion  to  reality.  But 
in  order  that  the  labor  may  be  fruitful,  we  must  com- 
mence by  looking  for  the  cause  of  our  misfortunes,  and 
the  specific  adapted  to  their  cure." 

To-day  the  experiment  has  been  tried.  Every  one 
has  applied  himself  to  the  task,  and  important  results 
ha^'e  been  reached.  The  generous  efforts  put  forth, 
prompted  by  love  of  country  and  reverence  for  the  flag, 
have  regenerated  our  army.  A  new  spirit  and  a  new 
discipline,  drawing  strength  from  the  performance  of 
duty  and  from  devotion  to  the  land  of  our  birth,  have 
penetrated  our  ranks;  and  from  the  general-in-chief  to 
the  lowest  subaltern,  all  the  officers  of  the  army,  putting 
zeal  before  the  mean  ambitions  and  deceits  of  life,  have 
borne  their  part  in  the  work  of  reorganization  inaugur- 
ated in  1871. 

It  is  these  efforts  and  the  improvements  of  all  kinds 
brought  about  in  our   military  institutions,    that  have 


Vlll  PREFACE. 

effected  a  restoration  of  the  guaranties  of  national  secur- 
ity and  independence  which  had  become  for  France  a 
condition  of  her  existence. 

Yet  all  this  is  not  enough. 

It  is  essential  that  we  now  analyze,  probe  to  the  bot- 
tom, and  expound,  the  methods  of  warfare  which  have 
given  victory  to  our  enemies.  It  is  especially  necessary 
that  we  develop  general  principles  and  conclusions  in 
our  researches,  which  shall  fix  these  new  methods  in  our 
minds,  and  enable  us  in  the  hour  of  conflict  to  struggle 
with  hope  of  success  in  our  turn. 

This  book  has  no  other  aim.  It  will  therefore  be  a 
study,  and  nothing  more. 


"TABIvK  OK  CONTENTS. 


Page 

Introduction i 

I. — Division  of  tlie  Work ,  i 

2. — Aim  of  the  Work 13 


PART  FIRST.-STRATEGY. 


FIRST  CHAPTER— Organization  of  Armies. 

I  I. — War ,   • 21 

^  2. — Elements  Constituting  the  Power  oif  Armies  ....  28 

§  3. — Changes  Brought   About  in   the  Organization  oe 

Armies  in  Our  Epoch 30 

I. — General  Principles  Governing  Existing  Military  Institutions.  33 

II. — Outline  of  the  Military  Development  of  Prussia 34 

III. — Changes  Imposed  by  the  Battle  of  Koniggratz 36 

§  4. — Mii,iTARY  Organization  of  Germany 39 

§  5. — Organization  oe  the  Principai,  European  Armies  .  .  45 

I  6. — The  Command 53 

I. — Unity  in  Command 53 

II. — Qualities  Essential  for  the  Exercise  of  Command 65 

III.— Assistants  to  the  Command 75 

§  7. — Formation  oe  Armies 88 

I.— The  Effective  Strength  of  Armies 88 

II. — Army  Subdivisions 96 

(ix) 


X  TABLE   OF  CONTENTS. 

Page 

§  8. — Composition  OF  the;  Army  Corps 113 

I. — Armjr  Corps  of  the  Principal  Powers . '  .  117 

II. — Corps  Subdivisions    . 119 

III. — Composition  of  Infantry  Divisions 123 

IV. — Corps  Artillery 125 

^  9. — Cavax.ry  Divisions 129 

I.- — Bodies  of  Reserve  Cavalry 129 

II. — Independent  Cavalry  Divisions 131 

1 10. — Organization  of  thf  Headquarters 135 

SECOND  CHAPTER.— Preparation  for  War. 

§  I. — Topography  of  Theatres  of  Operations 155 

I. — Communications 160 

The  Use  of  Railroads  in  War 160 

Ordinary  Roads 166 

River  Communications. — Campaigns  of  1S05  and  1813    .  172 

II. — Natural  Obstacles 176 

ist — Water  courses 176 

Passage  of  the  Rhine  in  1796 ; 179 

—  —        Ticino  in  1859 179 

—  —        Moselle  in  1870 180 

—  —        Danube  in  1877 181 

2d — Mountain  Ranges 187 

Hilly  Regions 188 

Woody  Regions 189 

Military  Positions 190 

III. — Artificial  Obstacles 193 

Cities 193 

Fortifications 193 

Defensive  Organization  of  Frontiers  • 195 

IV. — Limits  of  Theatres  of  Operations 200 

V. — Statistical  Resources 202 

^  2. — Strategic  Vai,ue  of  Theatres  of  Operations    ....  203 

I. — Strategic  Points ,    .  203 

Objectives.     Campaigns  of  1866,  1870,  1S77 203 

—  Campaign  of  1849  i^  Hungary        ....  207 
II. — Strategic  Lines 210 

1st — Bases  of  Operations 210 

Supply  Centres  of  the  German  Armies  in  1870   ....  212 

Bases  of  Operations  of  the  German  Armies  in  1870  .    .  214 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS:  XI 

Page 

Definition  of  Bases 215 

Direction  of  Bases  of  Operations 216 

Napoleon's  Bases  in  1805  and  1806 216 

Campaign  of  1800 218 

French  Frontier  in  1815 222 

German  Base  in  a  War  with  Russia 223 

Extent  of  Bases  of  Operations 224 

2d — Fronts  of  Operations 227 

3d — Lines  of  Operations 229 

[a)  Direction  of  the  Lines  of  Operations 230 

Campaign  of  1800  in  Italy 232 

Operations  in  the  East  in  1871 236 

(<^)  Unit}' of  Lines  of  Operations 244 

Campaign  of  1795  in  Germany 244 

—  ■              —  1796  —        —           ■  .    .  245 

—  —  ^797  —  Italy 253 

(c)  Interior  Lines 269 

Campaign  of  1796  in  Italy 270 

(d)  Lines  of  Operations  of  the  Belligerent  Armies  in 
1866 283 

{e)  Lines  of  Operations  in  1870 287 

[J')  Conclusions 290 

4th — Lines  of  Communications 294 

Importance  of  Lines  of  Communications 295 

Changing  Lines  of  Communications 297 

Sherman's  Campaign  in  Georgia  in  1864 301 

Lines  of  Communications  of  the  German  Armies  in  1870.  308 
Present  Organization  of  the  Lines  of  Communications.  316 

5th — Defensive  Lines 320 

III.—  Objectives  and  Lines  of  Operations  of  the  German  Armies 

in  1870 .323 

§  3. — Projets  of  Operations 329 

I  4. — Projet  of  Operations  of  the  Prussians  in  1870    .    .   .    339 

§  5. — Projet  of  Operations  of  the  French  in  1870 .  .   .   .^  .    346 

Character  of  the  Eastern  Frontier 347 

The  German  Lines  of  Invasion 348 

Defense  of  Lower  Alsace. — Woerth  as  a  Position   ....  350 

Defense  of  Lorraine — Cadenbronn  as  a  Position  ....  351 

Successive  Retreats  upon  Luneville  and  Langres  ....  352 

I  6. — Projet  of  Operations  of  the  Austrian  Army  in  1866  .    357 

I  7. — Projet  of  Operations  of  the  Archduke  Ai,bert  in 

1866 362 


Xll  TABLE   OF  CONTENTS. 

THIRD  CHAPTER.— Operations.  page 

§  I.— Offensive 368 

?  2. — Mobilization 374 

I. — Mobilization  of  the  German  Armies  in  1870 378 

1st — System  of  Mobilization 378 

2d. — Mobilization  of  1870 384 

II. — Mobilization  of  the  French  Army  in  1870 399 

1st — Mode  of  Calling  out  the  Reserves 399 

2d — Passage  to  a  War  Footing 406 

3d — Formation  of  the  Various  Army  Corps 413 

^  3. — Concentration 429 

■  I. — Concentrations  of  Armies 429 

1st — Selection  of  the  Zone  of  Concentration 429 

Concentration  of  the  French  Array  in  1809 430 

2d — Protection  of  Concentrations 435 

Concentration  of  the  Russian  Army  in  1807 436 

Concentration  of  the  French  Army  in  1815 437 

Concentrations  of  the  ist  Army  of  the  Loire  and  the 

Army  of  the  North  in  1870 440 

3d-  Scope  of  Concentrations  at  the  Present  Time.    .    .    .  440 

II. — Transports 443 

1st — Plan  of  Concentration  and  Transportation 443 

2d — Duration  of  Concentrations 444 

III. — Strategic  Deployment 447 

Protection  of  the  Frontiers 449 

IV. — Concentrations  of  Modern  Armies 452 

1st — Concentration  of  the  Prussian  Armies  in  1866.  .    .    .  452 

2d — Concentration  of  the  German  Armies  in  1870     .    .    .  464 

I  4. — Attack  of  Frontiers 470 

I. — Character  of  this  Operation 470 

II. — Exploration  of  Frontier  Zones 471 

III. — Attack  of  the  Bohemian  Frontier  in  1866 474 

IV. — Attack  of  the  Alsacian  Frontier  in  1870 475 

1st — Dispositions  Made  by  the  Germans      475 

2d — Dispositions  Made  by  the  French 478 

3d — Combat  at  Wissembourg,  August  4,  1870 482 

V. — Attack  of  the  Sarre  Frontier  in  1870 492 

1st — March  of  the  II.   German  Army  in   1870,   from  its 

Zone  of  Concentration  toward,  the  Frontier 492 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS.  XI 11 

Page 

2(i — Movements  of  the  French  Army  on  the  Sarre  in  1870.  504 

3d — Battle  of  vSpichei-en,  Au.e^ust  6,  1870.  . 512 

Positions  of  the  I.  and  II.  German  Armies,  August  5   .  512 

Positions  of  the  French  Army,  August  5 514 

Preliminaries  of  the  Attack 516 

Preliminaries  of  the  Defense 519 

Attack  and  Defense  of  the  Position 521 

First  Period 522 

Second  Period. — Issue  of  the  Attack 524 

Results  of  the  Battle 527 

Comments 528 

2  5. — Strategic  Marches 533 

I. — Definition  of  Marches 533 

II. — March  Objectives  and  Directions 535 

1st — Campaigns  of  1805  and  1806 535 

2d — Campaign  of  1807 537 

3d — Campaign  of  1849  in  Dombardy 543 

4th — March  of  the  Prussian  Armies  from  the  Elbe  to  the 

Danube  in  1866 545 

III. — Errors  of  Direction  in  Marches 560 

ist — Campaign  of  1798  in  the  Roman  States 560 

2d — Campaign  of  1866  in  Italy.    ... 564 

3d — March  of  the  Army  of  Chalons  upon  Sedan  in  1870  .  570 

IV. — Character  of  Orders  Relating  to  Marches 576 

1st — Campaign  of  1806 576 

2d — Campaign  of  1870 583 

3d — German  Orders  in  1870 588 

V. — Dispositions  for  the  March 593 

1st — Moreau's  Campaign  upon  the  Danube  in  1800  .    .    .  595 

2d — Marches  of  the  III.  German  Army  in  August,  1870  .  598 

3d — March  of  the  German  Armies  upon  Paris  in  1870  .    .  605 

?  6. — The  Defensive 608  ■ 

I. — Conditions  of  the  Defensive 608 

II. — Concentration 612 

III. — Movements  after  Concentration    ..., 615 

IV. — Defensive  Operations  after  the  First  Encounters 619 

V. — Defense  of  Argonne  in  1792 — First  Invasion 623 

VI. — Defense  of  France  in  1793  and  1794 634 

VII. — Defense  of  France  in  1814 — Second  Invasion 642 

VIIL— Third  Invasion,  1815 651 

IX. — Defense  of  France  in  1 870-1. — Fourth  Invasion 654 


XIV  TABLE   OF  CONTENTS. 

Page 

X. — Defense  of  Bohemia  in  1866 661 

Mobilization  of  the  Army  of  the  North 662 

Concentration 663 

Protection  of  the  Frontier. — First  Defensive  Operations.  663 

The  March  from  Olmutz  to  the  Elbe 667 

Operations  upon  the  Iser 669 

Operations  upon  the  Elbe 670 

Comments 672 

XI. — Conclusions 676 


ERRATA. 


Page  213,   fourth  line  from  bottom,  for  " stations  de  transiton'"''  read 

"stations  de  transition.''^ 
Page  226,  eleventh  line,  for  "Thrinville"  read  " Thionville. " 
Page  263,  eleventh  line,  for  "d'Pallieres"  read  "Pallieres." 
Page  2S8,  twelfth  line  from  bottom,  omit  *. 
Page  353,  fourth  line,  for  "the  two  railroads  of  the  Vosges-Saint-Die 

and  Epinal ' '  read  ' '  the  two  railroads  of  the  Vosges — Saint-Die  and 

Epinal." 
Page  3S6,  fourth  line,  for  "reversists"  read  "reservists." 
Page  402,  sixteenth  line,  for  "or"  read  "and." 

Page  568,  twelfth  line  from  bottom,  for  "Brescia"  read  "Brescello." 
Page  594,  tenth  line  from  bottom,  insert  "to"  before  "be." 
Page  619,  fourth  line  from  bottom,  for  "an"  read  "my." 


INTRODUCTION. 


I.   DIVISION   OK  TOE  WORK. 

In  principle,  a  treatise  upon  the  art  of  war  should  con- 
stitute a  body  of  doctrines,  and  form  an  ensemble  capa- 
ble of  informing  the  mind  of  the  reader  with  precision 
upon  the  various  questions  which  it  embraces. 

Unfortunately,  the  task  of  preparing  such  a  work, 
difficult  at  all  times,  is  in  our  day  much  more  so  than 
formerly. 

Immediately  following  our  reverses,  after  the  brilliant 
triumph  which  Germany  had  won,  the  secret  of  victory 
was  sought  upon  all  sides.  Confidence  in  the  theories 
of  the  past  had  been  rudely  staggered.  Even  those 
held  in  esteem  in  the  Napoleonic  age  could  no  longer 
be  followed  with  safety.  As  an  effect  of  Prussia's  ex- 
ample in  forcing  all  European  powers  to  transform  their 
military  institutions  and  arm  every  able-bodied  man, 
and  on  account  of  improvements  in  fire-arms  and  the  de- 
velopment of  rail  and  electrical  communications,  it  was 
perceived  that  the  rules  of  the  military  art  had  been 
subjected  to  changes  which  were  becoming  more  pro- 
nounced every  day,  and  which  placed  armies  in  a  veri- 
table state  of  transition. 

To-day  they  are  no  longer  the  same  as  in  1870,  and 
the  future  no  doubt  reserves  still  further  surprises. 

And  yet,  in  the  midst  of  these  incessant  transforma- 
tions, some  principles,  as  eternal  as  the  logic  which  es- 
tablished them,  have  remained  unshaken.  Their  appli- 
cation,   however,  has    required    new    methods,   and    in 

(I) 


2  INTRODUCTION. 

practice  presents  combinations  as  numerous  and  as 
varied  as  the  caprices  of  destiny  or  the  suggestions  of 
the  human  inind. 

There  thus  results  a  mode  of  learning  the  art  of  war 
which  is  not  that  pursued  in  former  times. 

It  is  highly  important  then  that  we  define  this  system, 
and  endeavor  to  search  out  the  rules  which  to-day  cor- 
respond to  the  most  usual  circumstances  of  field  service; 
so  that  after  having  studied  them,  one  can  say  to  him- 
self, in  presence  of  a  given  situation:  This  is  the  proper 
thing  to  be  done. 

At  the  outset,  it  is  appropriate  that  we  set  forth  the 
method  to  be  followed  in  this  treatise.  This  will  serve 
to  give  the  reader  a  clear  idea  of  the  subjects  that  are  to 
be  presented,  the  order  of  their  development,  the  aim  of 
the  work,  and  especially  its  utility. 

A  study  of  the  miliary  art  necessarily  embraces  ques- 
tions of  military  history,  strategy,  and  grand  tactics. 
We  thus  have  three  orders  of  facts,  and  a  natural  divis- 
ion of  the  subject  into  three  parts. 

But  this  classification  may  be  simplified.  First,  mil- 
itary history  should  especially  serve  to  demonstrate  the 
principles  of  strategy  and  grand  tactics!  Under  this 
form,  the  facts  which  it  discloses  most  forcibly  strike  the 
mind.  Instead,  therefore,  of  considering  it  separately, 
it  will  be  more  advantageous  to  distribute  its  teachings 
throughout  the  whole  of  the  work. 

As  to  strategy  and  grand  tactics,  they  form  two 
branches  of  the  same  science,  and  rest  upon  principles 
whose  elucidation,  to  insure  clearness,  requires  a  deter- 
minate order.  These  principles  present  two  series  of 
distinct  ideas,  the  one  relating  to  operations,  the  other  to 
battles.  The  first,  which  are  ordinarily  the  prelude  to 
the  conflict,  belong  generally  to  the  domain  of  strategy; 
the  second  relate  to  grand  tactics. 

It  will  be  logical,  therefore,  to  divide  the  work  into 
two  parts:  Strategy  and  Grand  Tactics. 


INTRODUCTION.  3 

They  will  aim  at  explaining  the  methods  adopted  in 
our  times  to  set  in  motion  the  military  forces  of  a  state: 
what  the  Germans  call  the  elements  of  zvar  {Kriegsinit- 
tebi)  and  the  combat  forces  {Streitkrafte).  It  will  be 
necessary  at  first  then  to  become  acquainted  with  these 
forces,  and  to  precede  the  study  of  strategy  and  grand 
tactics  by  some  observations  upon  the  organization  of 
armies. 


STRATKGY. 


Definitions. — During  the  past  few  years,  different  authors 
have  framed  numerous  definitions  of  strategy  and  tactics. 
Some,  desirous  of  finding  in  new  arguments  a  remedy 
for  past  mistakes,  have  sought  new  theories  upon  the 
art  of  war.  Others  have  denied  that  there  is  such  a 
thing  as  strategy,  and  attributed  all  the  results  of  war 
to  tactics.  For  a  small  number,  strategy  is  the  concep- 
tion, and  tactics  the  execution.  According  to  some 
writers,  strategy  is  the  science  of  operations ;  tactics, 
that  of  battles.  The  Germans,  following  the  Archduke 
Charles,  call  strategy  the  art  of  the  general-in- chief 
According  to  M.  Thiers,  ^''Strategy  should  conceive  the 
plan  of  campaign,  take  in  with  a  single  sweep  the 
whole  of  the  probable  theatre  of  war,  mark  out  the 
line  of  operations,  and  direct  the  masses  upon  the  de- 
cisive points.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  tactician  to  regu- 
late the  order  of  marches,  to  place  the  forces  for  battle 
at  the  various  points  indicated  by  the  strategist,  to  en- 
ter upon  the  action,  sustain  it,  and  manoeuvre  so  as  to 
attain  the  end  proposed." 

For  us,  it  is  important  that  we  be  not  misled  by  ver- 


4  INTRODUCTION. 

bal  distinctions.  The  main  thing  is  to  adopt  a  logical 
definition,  and  to  indicate  plainly  the  ideas  forming  the 
starting  point  in  our  studies. 

We  shall  therefore  consider  with  Jomini  that  strategy 
is  the  art  of  manoeuvring  armies  in  the  theatre  of  opera- 
tions;  tactics^  the  art  of  disposing  them  upon  the  battle- 
field. 

This  definition  has  the  advantage  of  indicating  the 
natural  order  of  development  in  a  treatise  of  this  char- 
acter. It  shows  that  such  a  work  ought  to  commence 
by  a  study  of  the  composition  of  armies,  pass  to  the  the- 
atres of  operations,  and  then  to  the  operations  them- 
selves. 

The  most  logical  way  to  introduce  clearness  into 
the  treatment  of  this  subject,  is  to  pursue  the  order  ap- 
proaching nearest  the  reality  of  factfe  in  war  ;  that  is 
to  say,  to  follow  an  army  in  the  principal  events  of  its 
career,  consequently  to  study  its  organization,  its  pre- 
paration for  war,  its  mobilization,  its  transport  service, 
its  deployment  upon  the  frontier,  its  strategic  marches, 
and  finally,  its  offensive  and  defensive  operations. 

Organization  of  Annies. — Without  reviewing  the  opin- 
ions contained  in  special  works,  it  will  be  useful,  in 
order  to  enlist  a  sounder  appreciation,  to  recall  the 
changes  in  armies  which  have  occurred  in  our  age  ;  to 
examine  the  constitution  of  the  command,  and  the  ele- 
ments that  come  to  its  aid  ;  to  investigate  the  principles 
serving  for  a  basis  in  the  composition  of  army  groups, 
armies  proper,  and  grand  armies,  and  those  directing 
these  masses  in  time  of  war.  We  shall  thus  succeed  in 
getting  a  clear  idea  of  the  part  played  by  each  of  these 
elements  in  the  field. 

Finally,  in  order  to  understand  the  real  value  of  an 
army,  we  must  take  into  account  its  moral  strength,  the 
means  of  creating  and  developing  this  quality,  and  the 


INTRODUCTION.  5 

importance  which  it  acquires  amidst  the  tests  of  actual 
war.  We  must  bring  forward  the  practical  reasons 
which  have  made  the  present  compositions  of  armies 
preferable  to  those  of  the  past,  especially  in  case  of  the 
nations  with  which  France  may  be  called  upon  to  meas- 
ure herself. 

After  the  organization  of  armies,  will  come  an  account 
of  their  functions  in  time  of  war. 

The  strategic  role  of  an  army  comprises  a  period  of 
preparation  and  a  period  of  execution. 

Preparation  for  War. — Preparation  for  war  includes  a 
preliminary  study  of  the  theatre  of  operations  and  of  the 
resources  of  the  enemy,  and  the  adoption  of  a  projet  of 
operations. 

Study  of  Theatres  of  Operations. — Theatres  of  operations 
require  special  attention.  It  is  upon  their  study  and 
the  more  or  less  favorable  conditions  which  they  pre- 
sent, that  the  choice  of  lines  of  operations,  and  the  com- 
binations of  a  campaign  depend.  The  changes  which 
they  have  undergone  in  recent  years  and  the  conse- 
quences resulting  therefrom,  ought  especially  to  be  made 
prominent. 

To  give  an  idea  of  these  changes,  it  will  suffice  to  recall 
that  the  methods  of  army  transportation  and  supply,  the 
conditions  attending  the  protection  of  the  communica- 
tions, and  the  mode  of  transmitting  orders  relating  to 
the  needs  of  an  army  and  those  directing  its  movements, 
have  all  been  more  or  less  modified. 

From  another  point  of  view,  these  modifications  have 
exercised  an  influence  upon  the  defensive  organization 
of  theatres  of  operations ;  and  while  improvements  in 
fire-arms  have  given  new  forms  to  fortifications  and 
more  powerful  means  of  resistance,  the  rules  governing 
the  selection  of  defensive  positions  have  also  been  sub- 
jected to  material  changes. 


6  INTRODUCTION. 

It  may  then,  in  general,  be  said  that  the  progress  of 
modern  industry  has  altered  the  character  of  bases  of 
supply,  lines  of  defense,  strategic  points,  and  even  some 
of  the  objectives,  as  well  as  the  directions  of  manoeuvres. 

The  study  of  theatres  of  operations  will  aim  at  setting 
forth  these  transformations. 

Study  of  the  Resources  of  the  Enemy. — The  attention  be- 
stowed upon  the  resources  of  the  enemy,  has  for  some 
years  experienced  an  extraordinary  growth  among  all 
the  powers.  This  study  is  everywhere  considered  as 
essential  for  forming  the  projet  of  operations  as  is  a  stud}' 
of  the  theatre  of  operations  itself.  It  will  be  proper, 
therefore,  to  notice  it  and  to  show  the  improvements  of 
which  it  is  susceptible. 

A  thorough  knowledge  of  theatres  of  operations  and 
of  the  resources  of  the  enemy,  will  permit  us  to  pass  to 
a  consideration  of  -brojets  of  operations. 

Projets  of  Operations. — This  part  of  strategy  was  for- 
merly called  the  plan  of  campaign ;  but  in  the  existing 
circumstances  of  war,  the  execution  of  the  plan  of  cam- 
paign is  beset  by  so  many,  contingencies,  and  limited  at 
the  outset  to  a  sphere  of  action  so  narrow,  that  it  ap- 
pears natural  to  give  it  the  more  modest  designation, 
projet  of  operations. 

When  a  state  is  obliged  to  make  war  upon  two  fron- 
tiers, its  armies  possess  two  distinct  fields  of  action, 
whence  result  two  projets  of  operations  and  a  projet  of 
the  whole  which  may  perhaps  be  called,  as  formerly,  the 
plan  of  campaign.  This  would  be  the  case  with  France 
if  attacked  by  Germany  and  Italy  ;  she  would  have  to 
defend  the  east  and  southeast. 

In  the  study  of  the  different  projets  of  operations, 
there  will  be  occasion  to  present  the  necessity  for  their 
preparation,  to  speak  of  their  tentative  character,  their 


INTRODUCTION  7 

limited  compass,  and  the  essential  points  which  lead  to 
their  adoption.  The  pi'ojets  will  vary  according  as  the 
campaign  is  to  be  offensive  or  defensive;  and  upon  them 
will  depend  the  plan  of  transportation,  the  choice  of  a 
zone  of  concentration,  and  the  lines  of  operations. 

Th^projeis  of  operations  being  formed,  we  enter  upon 
the  active  part  of  strategy,  the  execution.  The  moment 
has  then  arrived  to  commence  operations.  Now,  in 
reality,  war  has  but  two  forms:  attack  and  defense;  all 
others  are  directly  connected  with  these  or  deducible 
from  them. 

Between  these  two  forms,  the  attack  deserves  to  be 
considered  first.  We  shall  commence  then  with  the 
offensive. 

Offensive  Operations. — The  first  operation  of  an  army  is 
its  mobilization;  the  second,  its  transportation  to  the 
frontier.  This  study  ought  especially  to  comprehend 
the  systems  adopted  by  foreign  armies,  the  principles 
guiding  them,  the  improvements  atteinpted,  and  the  re- 
sults attained.  These  results  are  of  the  greatest  possible 
importance  to  us  when  they  concern  neighboring  armies. 
Once  the  transportation  to  the  frontier  is  effected,  the 
concentration  begins.  It  is  necessary  then  to  execute 
an  operation  which  formerly  did  not  exist,  but  which 
railroads  have  created,  and  for  which  the  Germans  have 
invented  a  new  term,  Aufmarsch.  This  is  the  strategic 
deployment.  Its  purpose  is  to  convey  the  army  corps 
from  the  detraining  stations  to  the  points  near  the 
enemy's  frontier  from  which  they  are  to  commence  their 
forward  marches. 

The  strategic  deployment  is  preceded  by  the  move- 
ment of  independent  cavalry  divisions  to  the  frontier. 
These  large  units  have  an  immediate  duty  of  a  peculiar 
character  to  perform  in  the  face  of  the  enemy — to  recon- 
noitre his  frontier.     When  the  army  taking  the  offensive 


8  INTRODUCTION. 

has  accomplished  its  strategic  deployment,  nothing  re- 
mains but  to  move  forward.  To  do  this,  it  must  under- 
take its  first  marches  in  proximity  to  the  enemy  and  his 
frontier,  at  a  time  when  his  projects  and  intentions  have 
not  yet  been  divined,  and  when  the  field  of  hypothesis 
is  frequently  unlimited.  The  only  thing  known  now  to 
a  certainty  is  that  an  act  of  hostility  is  about  to  take 
place, — the  consequence  of  modern  plans  of  army  trans- 
portation, and  the  general  military  system  in  vogue, — 
an  act  which  the  Germans  call  piercmg  the  frontier. 

Prudence  will  dictate  the  resulting  measures — marches 
often  cut  short,  march  fronts  {froftts  de  marche)  nar- 
rowly developed,  deep  formations  or  formations  in 
echelon. 

Of  this  character  were  the  first  marches  of  the  Ger- 
mans in  1866  and  1870,  in  which  their  good  fortune  at 
least  kept  pace  with  their  skill. 

Attack  of  the  Frontier. — The  arrival  upon  the  enemy's 
frontier  ordinarily  leads  to  the  first  engagements. 

To-day,  as  all  nations  have  adopted  the  same  general 
methods  of  mobilization  and  transportation,  it  is  prob- 
able that  the  concentrations  and  deployments  upon  the 
frontier  will  be  effected  at  the  same  time  by  the  oppos- 
ing armies.  In  any  case,  the  difference  will  not  exceed 
a  few  days — a  period  sufficient,  it  is  true,  to  reduce  one 
of  the  adversaries  to  the  defensive,  but  not  to  prevent 
his  opposing  the  passage  of  the  frontier. 

This   passage  can    then  be  effected  only  b)'  force  of 
arms.     Now,  combats  may  be  looked  for,  the  locality  of 
which  can  almost  be  determined  in  advance.     The  tac- 
tical dispositions  for  these,  as  well  as  their  consequences, 
should  be  examined  with  care. 

Strategic  Marches. — After  passing  the  frontier  and  driv- 
ing back   the  first  hostile  groups,  the  armies  find  the 


INTRODUCTION.  9 

way  comparatively  open.  The  enemy,  obliged  to  make 
new  dispositions  and  to  concentrate  his  forces,  retires  be- 
hind a  line  of  defense  or  iipon  a  point  of  snpport.  The 
assailant  will  then  nndertake  the  marches  conducting 
him  to  his  principal  objective  and,  probably,  to  his  first 
great  battle.  Marches  made  under  these  conditions  are 
essentially  strategic  marches,  and  they  are  always  of  the 
highest  importance. 

It  is  in  these  grand  manoeuvres  that  the  great  captains 
of  all  ages  have  developed  the  resources  of  their  genius. 
It  will  then  be  indispensable  to  study  them  both  in  past 
and  modern  times. 

Here  the  field  of  observation  expands.  The  essential 
point  will  be  to  draw  practical  instruction  from  them,  or 
at  least  conclusions  which  shall  lead  us  in  the  future  to 
avoid  the  disasters  of  the  last  war. 

The  most  interesting  strategic  marches  of  our  day  are 
those  which  led  to  the  battles  of  Koniggratz  [Sadowa], 
Rezonville,  and  Saint  Privat  [Gravelotte].  In  the  study 
of  their  most  striking  details,  of  the  combinations  of  the 
leaders  of  the  victorious  armies,  and  of  the  circumstances 
which  inspired  their  deliberations,  their  orders,  and 
their  decisions,  we  still  find  most  useful  instruction. 

When  the  strategic  marches  have  conducted  the 
armies  to  the  vicinity  of  the  enemy's  masses,  engage- 
ments are  imminent.  Tactics  then  governs  the  situation. 
Therefore  the  strategic  study  of  the  offensive  ought  to 
stop  at  this  point.  It  remains  to  examine  •  the  opera- 
tions of  an  army  reduced  to  the  defensive. 

Defensive  Operations. — The  advantages  and  disadvan- 
tages of  the  defensive,  the  dangers  to  which  it  gives  rise, 
the  rare  occasions  when  it  can  reasonably  hope  for  suc- 
cess, the  circumstances  which  oblige  an  army  to  adopt 
this  system  of  warfare,  are  so  many  essential  subjects  for 
study.     In  our  day,  it  is   usually  the  delays  attending 


lO  INTRODUCTION. 

mobilization  and  transportation  that  condemn  an  army 
to  the  defensive.  The.  cause  of  these  delays  and  the 
means  of  preventing  them  are  matters  entitled  to  exam- 
ination. 


Concentration  of  Armies. — The  concentration  of  armies 
upon  the  defensive  depends  upon  various  considerations, 
some  relating  to  the  choice  of  a  zone  of  concentration, 
others  to  the  grouping  of  the  armies. 

While  the  troops  are  still  leaving  the  transports  at  the 
military  disembarking  places  adopted  as  the  extreme 
limit  of  rail  transportation,  the  army  must  concern  it- 
self with  the  protection  of  the  frontier  against  the  at- 
tempts of  the  enemy.  This  is  an  urgent  necessity.  It 
is  essential  then  to  designate  the  troops  which  are  to 
form  the  defensive  screen,  and  define  the  duty  of  the 
cavalry  divisions  which  are  soon  to  supplement  their  ef- 
forts. This  cavalry  will  operate  very  differently  from 
that  which  precedes  the  army  of  the  offensive,  and  the 
distinction  ought  to  be  clearly  understood. 

Movements  after  Concentration. — The  concentration  ended, 
two  alternatives  present  themselves  to  the  defensive  : 
the  army  will  be  able  to  advance  and  meet  the  enemy, 
or  it  will  be  forced  to  await  him  in  position. 

The  first,  called  active  defense,  is  somewhat  analogous 
to  the  offensive,  with  this  difference,  that  the  defensive 
knows  the  ground  and  endeavors  to  draw  full  returns 
from  the  advantage. 

The  second  is  passive  defense,  and  leads  to  certain 
defeat.  Therefore  its  study  can  have  but  one  aim:  to 
learn  to  avoid  this  situation,  and  to  change  the  strug- 
gle as  soon  as  possible  into  an  active  defense. 

Passive  defense  admits  of  only  one  operation,  a  defen- 
sive battle^  which  belongs  to  the  domain  of  tactics. 


INTRODUCTION.  1 1 

PAKX  Second. 

ORAND    TACTICS. 

When  the  assailing  army  has  crossed  the  enemy's 
frontier,  won  the  preliminary  engagements,  and  accom- 
plished the  marches  conducting  it  within  reach  of  the 
adversary's  main  forces,  its  strategic  role  comes  to  an 
end  and  gives  place  to  tactical  functions.  At  the  mo- 
ment, indeed,  when  the  two  forces  are  brought  into  con- 
tact, when  daily  minor  engagements  foreshadow  a  battle 
near  at  hand,  the  armies  are  often  obliged  to  modify 
their  first  dispositions.  They  must  pass  from  an  ex- 
tended to  a  narrow  front,  form  this  front  in  angular  or 
in  eohelon  order,  according  to  the  case,  and  give  their 
marches  a  single  objective,  battle. 

The  movements  executed  under  these  circumstances 
are  called  nianceuvre-marches. 

Their  importance,  their  aim,  and  the  principles  gov- 
erning them,  require  special  consideration. 

At  this  important  juncture  the  role  of  the  cavalry  un- 
dergoes a  change,  of  which  an  accurate  idea  should  be 
formed.  Moreover,  a  variety  of  incidents  come  into 
view  at  this  critical  time,  either  in  the  marches  preced- 
ing foreseen  battles  or  in  those  leading  to  chance  eu' 
counters.  Thus  we  are  drawn  to  the  study  of  flank 
marches,  of  turning  movements  designed  to  menace  the 
enemy's  line  of  communications,  of  the  dispositions  to 
adopt  upon  nearing  the  enemy,  and  finally  of  those 
proper  to  employ  on  the  eve  of  battle. 

We  reach  then  the  crowning  operation  of  the  war, 
that  which  represents  both  the  first  objective  of  the 
armies  and  the  aim  of  all  their  movements — the  battle. 

Battles. — The  study  of  battles  has  rarely  been  made 
with  the  fullness  of  which  it  is  susceptible. 


12  INTRODUCTION. 

Formerly  they  were  divided  into  ten  or  twelve  classes. 
To-day,  practice  and  experience  have  led  to  the  aban- 
donment of  these  enumerations,  which  do  not  correspond 
to  the  reality  of  things. 

.  We  shall  here  accept  but  two  descriptions  of  battles, 
foreseen  and  chance  battles.  It  will  then  be  proper  to 
explain  their  points  of  difference,  the  movements  which 
decide  success,  the  circumstances  which  confirm  it,  and 
lastly,  the  dispositions  which  insure  decisive  results  to 
the  victor. 

Defensive  Battles. — Defensive  battles  are  always  foreseen 
actions.  Here  we  should  at  first  be  made  acquainted 
with  the  circumstances  rendering  them  necessary,  the 
proper  rules  for  their  preparation,  the  conditions,  of  a 
good  position,  the  measures  conducing  to  success,  the 
means  of  discerning  the  probable  point  of  principal  at- 
tack, and  the  dispositions  to  be  made  to  meet  it. 

We  shall  examine  then  the  means  of  preparing  to 
counter-attack  the  army  on  the  offensive, — an  operation 
which  can  alone  give  importance  to  the  results, — and  in 
the  last  place,  the  consequences,  often  disastrous,  which 
defensive  battles  entail. 

Pursuits. — Great  battles  create  new  situations  for  the 
belligerents.  The  role  of  each  is  simplified.  The  van- 
quished retires  upon  his  supports;  the  victor  has  only 
to  pursue. 

Two  cases  then  present  themselves:  the  first,  when 
the  enemy's  army  is  shattered;  the  second,  when  his 
forces  remain  intact.  In  both  instances,  it  is  indispen- 
sable to  study  the  aim  of  pursuits,  the  moment  to  begin 
them,  the  manner  of  their  execution,  the  choice  of 
directions,  the  proper  methods  of  attacking  columns 
in  retreat,  and  the  duties  of  the  different  arms.  In 
our  day,  pursuits  sometimes   take  on   the  character  of 


INTRODUCTION.  I3 

new  strateo-ic  marches.  The  pursuit  of  the  ist  and  5th 
Corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine  by  the  III.  German 
Army  in  1870  is  an  example  of  this. 

Retreats. — The  study  of  pursuits  leads  to  the  consider- 
ation of  retreats. 

It  will  be  appropriate  here  to  indicate  how  the  proper 
moment  for  commencing  the  retreat  is  to  be  determined, 
the  means  of  breaking  off  the  action  and  of  covering 
the  first  rearward  movements,  the  choice  of  direction, 
the  importance  of  this  choice  upon  the  results,  the 
means  of  protecting  the  columns,  and  finally  the  gen- 
eral features  of  its  execution. 

Retreats  usually  denote  the  end  of  the  operations. 
The  study  of  grand  tactics  should  then  come  to  a  close 
here. 

II.    AllS/1    OK    THE  WORK. 

To  study  applied  strategy  and  tactics  in  time  of  peace, 
is  to  study  the  records  of  the  acts  of  the  command  in 
the  conduct  of  armies,  and  commentaries  upon  the  re- 
sults to  which  they  lead.  Considered  in  this  view,  the 
utility  of  instruction  upon  these  subjects  has  no  need  of 
being  demonstrated.  Moreover,  it  would  be  difiScult  to 
render  intelligent  service  in  war  without  possessing  the 
ideas  furnished  by  such  instruction.  One  of  the  qual- 
ities most  essential  in  this  service  is  decision,  and  al- 
though often  given  by  nature,  this  faculty  cannot  be 
properly  exercised  without  the  aid  of  science. 

To  know  is  to  determine  is  as  true  as  that  to  determine 
is  to  be  able.  The  first  idea  completes  the  second,  and 
while  awaiting  the  experience  brought  by  years,  it  is 
instruction  strengthened  by  reasoning  which  alone  can 
replace  it. 

The  great  leaders  have  always  been  of  this  opinion, 
and  the  precepts  left  by  them  in  this  regard  will  serve, 
if  need  be,  to  give  fixity  to  our  ideas  in  the  matter. 


14  INTRODUCTION. 

The  estimate  which  Napoleon  placed  upon  this  sub- 
ject deserves  particular  attention. 

Extract  from   Obsej'vations  of  the  Emperor  Napoleon 
upon  the  Study  of  the  Military  Art. 

"  FiNKENSTEiN,  April  19,  1807. 

"A  proper  understanding  of  French  military  art 
would  necessitate  a  knowledge  of  the  various  plans  of 
campaign  adopted  in  the  different  periods  of  our  history, 
whether  for  invasion  or  defence;  the  origin  of  successes, 
the  cause  of  defeats,  the  authors  themselves,  the  memoirs 
in  which  may  be  found  the  details  of  the  facts  and  the 
evidences  of  the  results.  This  part  of  history,  interest- 
ing for  every  one,  has  a  peculiar  importance  for  military 
men.  In  the  special  school  of  the  engineer  may  be 
learned  the  art  of  attacking  and  defending  fortified 
places;  but  the  art  of  war  in  its  larger  aspects  cannot  be 
taught,  because  it  has  not  yet  been  created,  if  indeed  it 
ever  can  be;  nevertheless,  astudy  of  history  that  would 
make  known  to  us  how  our  frontiers  have  been  defended, 
in  different  wars,  by  celebrated  captains,  would  be  pro- 
ductive of  great  benefit.  I  have  studied  history  a  great 
deal,  and  often,  for  want  of  a  guide,  have  been  forced  to 
lose  considerable  time  in  useless  reading. 

"Without  this  study,  soldiers,  during  many  years  of 
their  career,  will  lack  the  means  of  profiting  by  the  mis- 
takes which  have  occasioned  reverses,  and  of  appreciat- 
ing the  dispositions  which  would  have  prevented  them. 
The  entire  war  of  the  Revolution  is  fertile  in  useful  les- 
sons; but  to  gather  them,  long  application  and  extended 
researches  are  often  requisite.  This  does  not  arise  from 
the  lack  of  a  detailed  record  of  the  facts,  for  they  have 
been  written  about  everywhere,  and  in  every  style;  but 
because  no  one  has  applied  himself  to  the  task  of  mak- 
ing the  research  easy,  and  of  pointing  out  the  way  to 
make  it  with  discrimination." 


INTRODUCTION.  .  15 

If  Napoleon  could  appear  among  us  to-day,  it  is  prob- 
able that  in  order  to  draw  profit  from  our  military  his- 
tory, he  would  no  longer  seek  to  return  to  that  distant 
period  when  our  arms,  our  formations,  our  tactical 
usages,  our  present  methods  of  carrying  on  war,  were 
unknown.  After  our  misfortunes  of  1870.  he  would  no 
doubt  say  to  us:  Meditate  especially  upon  the  cause  of 
your  defeats,  and  in  order  to  learn  to  conquer,  aim  to 
strengthen  in  you  the  qualities  which  at  all  times  have 
been  the  pledge  of  success — instruction  combined  with 
courage  and  discipline. 

Opinion  of  tlie  Committee  of  Public  Safety  upon  tlie  Necessity 
for  Instruction. — Under  the  First  Republic,  warlike  deeds 
alone  were  not  sufficient  to  give  pre-eminence  to  mili- 
tary leaders.  It  was  prescribed  that  particular  notice 
should  be  taken  of  military  acquirements;  and  the  fol- 
lowing directions  of  the  Committee  of  Public  Safety 
show  us  how  much  the  utility  of  substantial  military 
instruction  was  appreciated. 

The  Co7nniittee  of  Public  Safety  to  the  Gene?'als-in- Chief 

of  the  Arinies. 

"Paris,  2  Brumaire,  Year  III. 

"The  National  Convention  reserves  to  itself  the  dis- 
posal of  a  portion  of  the  vacancies  in  the  armies  for  the 
purpose  of  enabling  it  to  reward  the  worthiest  defenders 
of  their  country  by  promotion;  but  its  intention  is  not 
that  acts  of  valor  alone  shall  receive  the  prize.  It  wishes 
also  to  give  marks  of  its  approbation  to  obscure  merit,  to 
zeal,  to  knowledge,  to  talents  which  have  not  yet  had 
opportunity  to  appear  with  advantage.  Valor  is  the 
general  virtue  of  the  soldiers  of  the  Republic.  It  is  valor 
accompanied  by  attainments  and  moi'al  ivorth^  which 
should  characterize  the  commander. 

"The  Committee  of  Public  Safety  desires  that  you  be- 


l6  .  INTRODUCTION. 

come  thoroughly  penetrated  by  this  truth,  and  that  inde- 
pendent of  the  report  which  you  render  to  it  of  the 
exploits  of  the  country's  defenders,  you  make  known  to 
it  with  great  exactness,  the  worthy  soldiers  who  perform 
their  duties  in  silence  and  with  skill;  for  again  we  say 
to  you,  the-  service  of  the  Republic  requires  that  the  offi- 
cer join  to  courage  and  intrepidity  the  attainments  which 
promise  success,  and  the  qualities  of  character  which  in- 
spire consideration. 

"The  Committee  of  Public  Safety  invites  you  to  keep 
it  continually  informed  upon  the  matters  to  which  your 
attention  has  here  been  called."  * 

Opinion  of  General  Von  Peucker  upon  the  General  Character  of 
the  Study  of  the  Military  Art. — Nothing  can  give  a  more 
just  idea  of  the  necessity  for  instruction,  and  of  the  scope 
of  the  military  art,  than  the  opinion  expressed  by  one  of 
the  founders  of  the  Kriegsakademie  of  Berlin,  the  in- 
fantry general  Von  Peucker,  lately  deceased,  formerly 
inspector-general  of  the  establishments  for  military  in- 
struction: 

"The  general  character  of  this  study  should  consist 
in  the  adoption  of  a  practical  method;  that  is,  the  appli- 
cation of  theoretical  knowledge  to  all  military  questions 
which  can  present  themselves  in  practice. 

"  In  order  to  give  to  this  method  its  greatest  efficacy, 
it  is  essential  to  utilize  the  productive  capacity  of  the 
officers,  so  that  practice  may  be  benefited  by  scientific 
instruction,  and  that  the  developing  faculties  may  be 
judiciously  recognized.  In  time  of  war,  deeds  play  a 
more  important  part  than  words;  action  surpasses 
thought;  practice  dominates  theory. 

"It  is  not  sufficient  then  merely  to  grasp  principles; 
it  is  necessary  to  meditate  upon  them,  and  to  examine 
them  thoroughly  in  their  applications. 

*Pierrou,  Methodes  de  Guerre,  Vol.  I,  p.  8. 


INTRODUCTION.  1 7 

"*  *  *  *  There  is  a  considerable  interval  between 
knowledge  of  principles  and  the  faculty  of  making 
them  of  service  in  coming  to  a  decision.  The  method 
of  study  pursued  should  tend  to  abridge  this  interval. 

"*  *  *  *  It  is  by  this  method  that  an  officer  succeeds 
in  acquiring  the  energy  and  force  of  will  so  important 
in  actual  service. 

"Men  indued  with  only  ordinary  strength  of  character 
can  form  a  clear  and  energetic  decision  and  put  it  into 
practice  in  perplexing  situations,  if  they  have  acquired 
the  faculty  of  guiding  their  course  with  requisite  cir- 
cumspection and  dispatch  under  difficult  circumstan- 
ces. 

"The  possession  of  this  faculty  is  one  of  the  results  of 
study.  Lacking  it,  irresolute  persons,  when  thrown 
upon  their  own  resources,  display  an  entire  collapse  of 
the  moral  elements. 

"The  practical  method  should  aim  at  exciting  mental 
spontaneity  in  the  officer. 

"It  is  above  all  the  moral  qualities  of  character  which 
form  the  basis  of  an  officer's  aptitude  for  the  profession 
of  arms. 

"To  sura  up,  the  principal  aim  of  a  study  of  the  mili- 
tary art  is  to  improve  the  intelligence  and  judgment  of 
the  officer,  in  combining  instruction  with  the  widest 
exercise  of  his  moral  faculties. 

"This  end  is  reached  by  utilizing  the  lessons  of  ex- 
perience." 

Passing  then  from  the  general  character  of  a  work 
upon  the  military  art  to  a  consideration  of  its  various 
parts,  General  von  Peucker  thus  expresses  himself: 

Observations  upon  the  Study  of  Tactics. 
"This  study  should    aim    to  familiarize  the  officers, 
both  theoretically  and  practically,  with  the  multiplicity 
of  circumstances  that  may  present  themselves  in  actual 


1 8  INTRODUCTION. 

service,  and  to  give  them  the  faculty  of  acting  without 
hesitation  in  all  situations  that  may  arise. 

"Applied  tactics  constitutes  the  best  and  most  sub- 
stantial preparation  for  actual  practice  in  the  field. 

''An  attentive  research  into  the  results  of  recent  wars, 
ought  to  be  considered  an  important  factor  of  the  sci- 
ence." 

Observations  upon  Military  History. 

"Acquaintance  with  military  history  forms  the  most 
effectual  means  of  learning  the  science  of  war  in  time  of 
peace,  and  the  most  solid  basis  for  assimilating  its  great 
principles.  It  is  the  most  lively  source  of  all  branches 
of  military  knowledge. 

"The  study  of  military  history  should  take  into  ac- 
count the  large  operations  of  war  and  the  management 
of  armies.  It  should  bring  out  the  intimate  connection 
between  the  genius  of  great  captains  and  the  results 
reached  in  the  most  celebrated  wars. 

"Historical  studies  should  not  be  extended  to  the 
ages  which  can  offer  no  characteristic  lessons  upon  the 
methods  of  conducting  present  wars. 

"These  studies  should  embrace  the  military  art  of  the 
nineteenth  century;  familiarize  the  officers  with  the  real 
life  of  armies  in  the  field;  prepare  them  to  keep  a  clear 
head  and  warm  heart  in  danger;  and,  finally,  exalt  con- 
tinually the  sentiment  of  patriotism." 

We  must  conclude  from  these  quotations  that  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  art  of  war  is  indispensable  to  the  officer. 
It  was  by  placing  himself  in  this  point  of  view  that 
Marshal  Gouvion  Saint-Cyr  thus  characterized  it:  "The 
art  of  war  is  an  art  for  the  general^  a  science  for  the  offi- 
cer^ a  trade  for  the  soldier.^'' 

The  study  of  this  art,  then,  should  prepare  the  officer 
to  come  to  a  rapid  decision  in  difficult  situations  arising 
in  the  field,  less  perhaps  by  the  precepts  and  examples 


INTRODUCTION.  19 

with  which  it  acquaints  him,  than  by  the  methods  of 
reasoning,  the  force  of  will,  and  the  energy  which  it 
teaches  him  to  develop. 

It  will  especially  call  to  his  mind  that  all  instruction 
of  this  kind  has  in  our  army  an  importance  which  does 
not  exist  to  the  same  degree  in  the  armed  forces  of  other 
states.  It  will  make  him  feel  more  strongly  that  we 
do  not  live  in  ordinary  times;  that  like  the  Prussians  of 
1807,  we  are  still  in  the  morrow  of  our  disasters;  that 
duty  obliges  us  to  consider  national  independence,  nay, 
the  very  existence  of  our  country,  threatened  as  it  is  by 
nameless  hatreds,  by  unquenched  ambitions;  and  finally, 
that  each  should  work  without  pause  in  order  to  be  pre- 
pared to  defend  her  when  the  day  of  attack  shall  come. 
There  is  but  one  means  to  this  end :  to  profit  by  the  les- 
sons of  experience,  to  incessantly  reflect  upon  them,  and 
improve  ourselves  from  day  to  day — thus  to  keep  alive 
in  us  the  sacred  fire  of  the  soldier,  that  we  may  develop, 
in  the  highest  degree,  the  intellectual  and  manly  qual- 
ities which  shall  again  lead  us  to  victor)'. 


MODERN  WAR. 


Part  Kirsx. 


STRATEGY. 


FIRST    CHAPTER 


ORGANIZATION   OF   ARMIES. 

§  I.    WAR. 

In  France  we  have  rarely  attempted  to  define  the 
bloody  drama  in  the  life  of  nations  called  war.  This  is 
perhaps  an  errof,  for  the  art  of  waging  it  cannot  be  ser- 
iously learned  without  taking  into  account  its  aim  and 
scope.  This  act  of  violence  is  of  such  vital  importance 
to  the  existence  of  nations  and  the  efforts  of  armies,  that 
we  cannot  meditate  too  deeply  upon  it. 

At  the  present  time,  a  few  reflections  upon  this  subject 
will  be  the  more  useful  because  our  ideas  have  not  always 
been  in  accord  with  those  of  the  neighboring  nations. 
Moreover,  the  institutions  at  present  controlling  the  var- 
ious European  States  have  changed,  in  a  certain  measure, 
the  general  conditions  of  war;  and  the  struggles  of  the 
future  will  probably  not  resemble  those  of  the  past.  It 
is  necessary,  then,  to  thoroughly  study  these  conditions 
in  advance  in  order  to  know  what  should  be  feared  or 
avoided. 

Almost  everywhere  we  observe  that  compulsory  ser- 
vice is  adopted  as  a  national  custom.  We  see  it  applied 
even  by  representative  governments,  which  rest  upon 
more  or  less  enlarged  ideas  of  liberty. 

(21) 


22  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

On  the  one  hand,  national  defense  has  become  a  gen- 
eral obligation  ;  on  the  other,  the  weighty  questions 
deciding  peace  and  war  are  submitted  to  public  discus- 
sion. From  this  follow  two  results:  Wars  have  become 
absolutely  national;  secondly,  all  those  who  have  an  in- 
terest in  making  or  avoiding  them,  can  exercise  an  influ- 
ence upon  the  final  determination.  Wars  will  then  be 
rarer,  more  imposing,  and  more  impassioned.  The 
hatreds  which  they  stir  up  will  undoubtedly  be  more 
lasting;  but  as  each  individual  bears  a  share  in  the  re- 
sponsibility for  the  misfortunes  which  they  entail,  he 
will  be  so  much  the  less  disposed  to  see  his  country  rush 
into  these  terrible  enterprises. 

The  periods  of  peace  will  undoubtedly  be  longer;  and 
while  continuing,  a  community  of  interests,  an  increas- 
ing business  intercourse,  and  a  multiplicity  of  relations 
of  all  kinds,  with  greater  facility  for  their  exercise,  will 
probably  contribute  to  render  declarations  of  war  more 
and  more  serious,  and  more  and  more  difficult. 

The  consequences  of  struggles  of  large  dimensions  are 
also  worthy  of  our  attention.  Henceforth,  we  know 
that  a  war  between  two  great  nations  will  involve  the 
expenditure  of  billions.  During  its  progress,  it  will  be 
impossible  to  calculate  the  cost,  and  a  case  may  arise  in 
which  the  conquered  will  not  be  in  condition  to  indem- 
nify the  conquerer.  What  will  happen  then?  Will  the 
stronger  make  conquest  of  the  feebler?  This  is  doubt- 
ful. The  effect  would  often  be  to  cause  new  embarrass- 
ments and  to  create  enemies  more  formidable  still.  But 
it  is  reasonable  to  believe  that  such  a  war  will  entail  a 
forced  fusion  of  the  interests  of  the  two  peoples  until  the 
claims  of  the  conqueror  are  satisfied. 

Thence  will  arise  new,  painful  and  critical  situations, 
which  it  will,  perhaps,  be  possible  some  day  to  regulate 
in  advance,  within  possible  limits,  but  which  to-day  im- 
pose vigilance  and  constant  preparation  upon  nations 
menaced  by  the  enmity  of  their  neighbors. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.        23 

This  state  of  things  is  the  graver  from  the  fact  that 
the  normal  idea  of  the  rights  of  states  is  obscured  by 
the  proceedings  of  the  war  of  1870,  by  the  brutal  maxim 
thrown  then  in  the  face  of  the  world,  Might  is  superior 
to  right,  which  seems  to  have  become  the  only  law  re- 
cognized in  international  relations.  We  are  witnessing 
a  slow  transformation  of  nationalities  and  territories,  the 
prime  cause  of  which  is  the  diversion  of  the  industrial 
and  physical  forces  into  new  channels.  Civilization  will 
no  doubt  profit  from  this  change,  but  during  its  course 
entire  peoples  may  be  annihilated  or  crushed,  if  they 
cannot  bring  to  their  defense  a  sufficient  number  of 
trained  soldiers  and  effective  arms. 

It  is  more  than  ever  necessary,  then,  to  know  what 
war  is,  and  what  we  as  Frenchmen  ought  to  expect  from 
this  act  of  force  and  violence. 

Until  to-day,  the  definition  of  war  has  been  considered 
by  us  as  a  question  of  international  law.  This  teaches 
us  that  war  is  a  method  of  compulsion  used  by  07ie  nation 
against  another ;  that  it  is  a  terrible  but  necessary 
scourge;  that  it  should  be  resorted  to  only  after  all  means 
of  conciliation  have  been  exhausted;  that  violence  should 
never  be  used  unless  absolutely  necessary;  and  that  be- 
tween several  wa3^s  of  exercising  compulsion,  the  least 
rigorous  should,  so  far  as  possible,  be  used. 

Concerning  the  general  rules  upon  the  method  of  wag- 
ing war,  we  are  still  taught  that  the  rights  of  belligerents 
are  riot  unlimited,  and  that  not  all  means  are  lawful 
which  may  insure  victory. 

There  is,  indeed,  a  generally  recognized  Law  of  War 
which  forbids  the  killing  of  prisoners,  because  this  is  an 
act  of  barbarism;  which  prohibits  vengeance,  because 
this  is  odious;  which  teaches  nations  to  limit  war  to  the 
reparation  of  injury  or  to  the  guaranty  of  security;  which 
restrains  from  the  infliction  of  unnecessary  evils;  which 
directs  that  war  should  be  made  fairly,  with  proper  arms; 


24  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

which  condemns  burning  and  devastating-;  and    which 
requires  respect  for  all  the  sentiments  of  humanity. 

According  to  this  law,  the  pitiless  measures  formerly 
directed  against  private  individuals,  are  to-day  sup- 
pressed. Hostilities  have  lost  the  violent  character  of 
past  times,  and  the  application  of  the  war  right  should 
always  be  regulated  by  moderation.  The  obligation 
rests  upon  European  nations  to  avoid  unnecessary  cruel- 
ties, and  to  teach  their  enemies,  by  their  example,  the 
principles  of  a  law  of  war  more  humane  than  formerly. 

Non-combatants  are  no  longer  subject  to  the  rigors  of 
war,  and  should  neither  be  put  to  death  nor  reduced  to 
captivity. 

The  vanquished  justly  claim  the  right  of  being 
treated  with  consideration;  the  victors  should  be  gen- 
erous; prisoners  are  brothers  in  arms  whom  the  fate  of 
war  has  subdued,  and  they  should  receive  only  kind 
treatment. 

Movable  goods  should  never  be  turned  into  booty. 

Pillage  is  no  longer  permitted,  even  as  an  act  of  re- 
prisal. 

Wars  of  conquest  are  reprobated  by  civilization. 

Independent  of  the  fairness  and  good  faith  which  hos- 
tile armies  should  exercise  towards  each  other,  usage 
has  introduced  certain  practices  of  respect  and  politeness, 
some  of  which  have  acquired  the  force  of  recognized 
authority. 

Finally,  in  the  midst  of  war  the  sentiment  of  human- 
ity ought  never  to  become  obscured,  and  the  soldier 
should  not  forget  the  bonds  which  unite  him  to  his  fel- 
low-man. 

Such  are  the  theories  current  among  us,  and  such  are 
those  which  France  has  invariably  applied  during  the 
wars  of  the  last  two  centuries. 

These  principles,  equally  generous  and  humane,  as 
well  as  conformable  to  the  progress  of  civilization,  seem 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.        25 

to  be  officially  recognized  by  European  nations.  How- 
ever, the  severities  to  which  onr  people  were  obliged  to 
submit  in  1870,  the  acts  of  cruelty  and  pillage  which 
were  witnessed  on  various  sides,  show  us  that  in  reality 
the  case  is  quite  otherwise. 

It  is  certain,  indeed,  that  in  more  than  one  army,  hatred 
or  other  passions  assisting,  practice  very  often  fails  to 
correspond  to  theory.  Differences  are  presented  with 
which  we  should  be  acquainted  in  order  not  to  be  de- 
ceived by  them.  They  arise  not  only  from  the  more  or 
less  refined  condition  of  the  populations  among  which 
these  armies  are  recruited,  but  also  from  the  ideas  given 
on  this  subject  by  the  principal  military  authorities. 

The  opinions  which  follow  were  expressed  by  Clause- 
witz  at  the  beginning  of  the  century.  They  constitute 
the  foundation  of  the  convictions  held  by  the  German 
officers;  and  this  fact  of  itself  obliges  us  to  recognize 
their  force  in  our  turn,  under  penalty  of  being  one  day 
exposed  to  a  terrible  and  cruel  awakening  from  our  de- 
lusions. Moreover,  they  have  a  practical  side,  to  which 
we  cannot  close  our  eyes,  and  with  which  each  of  us 
ought  henceforth  to  be  thoroughly  imbued,  if  he  wishes 
to  be  prepared  for  the  requirements  of  the  future. 

' '  War  is  a  duel  between  natiojis. 

"It  is  an  act  of  violence,  as  natural  and  as  legitimate 
as  all  the  other  acts  resulting  from  international  rela- 
tionship, such  as  those  pertaining  to  commerce,  indus- 
try, etc. 

"  It  is  an  act  which  exalts  the  people  that  successfully 
engages  in  it. 

"War  has  only  07ie  aim:  to  overthrow  the  enemy  and 
render  him  incapable  of  continuing  resistance. 

"Under  another  aspect,  it  should  destroy  his  will,  and 
make  it  submissive  to  ours  by  the  annihilation  of  his 
moral  power.  But  in  order  to  impose  a  law  upon  the 
enemy,  it  is  essential  to  render  him  incapable  of  defend- 
ing himself. 


26  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

"War  has  but  one  means  of  action:  force.  No  other 
exists.  Its  exercise  should  be  manifested  only  by 
wounds,  death,  and  destruction. 

"Moral  force  should  serve  only  to  render  the  employ- 
ment of  physical  force  more  efficacious. 

"  The  use  of  force  in  war  is  absolute. 

"It  is  an  error  to  believe  in  other  means  of  action. 

"  For  armies,  ordinary  ri^/its  placQ  but  an  insignifi- 
cant restraint  upon  the  aims  and  rights  of  war. 

"  These  ordinary  rights  should  never  be  permitted  to 
weaken  its  energy. 

Every  idea  of  philanthropy  in  war  is  a  most  per- 


u 


nicious  errof 


He  who  uses  physical  force  to  its  fullest  extent, 
without  sparing  blood,  will  always  acquire  superiority 
over  the  adversary  who  does  not  act  in  the  same  way, 
and  will  impose  his  law  upon  the  latter. 

"  To  introduce  a  principle  of  moderation  into  the  phi- 
losophy of  war,  is  to  commit  an  absurdity. 

"If  civilized  nations  do  not  slay  their  prisoners,  nor 
destroy  cities  and  villages,  nor  burn  farm-houses,  etc., 
it  is  not  through  humanity;  it  is  because  intelligence  has 
more  part  in  the  conduct  of  war  than  formerly. 

"Civilization  has  developed  this  intelligence,  and  the 
latter  has  revealed  to  them  a  better  use  of  force;  that  is 
to  say,  by  the  contributions  raised  from  the  enemy  and 
the  treaties  which  he  is  forced  to  conclude,  victory  is 
made  to  yield  a  greater  profit. 

"  War  is  an  act  of  violence  in  the  employment  of  which 
there  are  no  limits. 

"The  operating  powers  in  war  are  force  of  will  and 
the  material  resources  at  disposal. 

"In  order  to  conquer,  these  forces  must  be  strained  to 
the  uttermost." 

Such  are  the  theories  of  Clausewitz — of  that  remarka- 
ble man  whom  the  Germans,  with  reason,  call  their  im- 


^09T0N  CX)LLEGE  l-IR||ARt 

dhfiSFNUT  HI).!..  v«»,.s. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.        27 

mortal  Claiisewitz,  but  whom  they  reproach  with  having 
introduced  a  little  too  much  poetry  into  his  Treatise  on 
War. 

These  principles  will  explain  many  of  the  events  of 
the  last  war,  many  of  the  acts,  the  recollection  of  which 
will  perpetually  weigh  upon  the  memory  of  the  con- 
queror, and  which  have  already  tarnished  the  lustre  of 
his  victories. 

In  our  turn,  we  also  must  know  them,  must  become 
thoroughly  penetrated  by  them;  and  as  they  are  essen- 
tially practical,  must  place  ourselves  in  condition  to 
apply  them  if  the  necessity  arises. 

Their  application,  combined  with  the  results  of  com- 
pulsory service,  must  one  day  lead  to  very  grave  conse- 
quences, of  which  it  is  proper  that  we  take  account  in 
advance. 

In  barbarous  times,  all  able-bodied  men  were  called 
upon  to  fight;  consequently,  all  members  of  the  oppos- 
ing nations  were  considered  belligerents. 

Henceforth  in  Europe  it  will  be  the  same.  In  all 
countries,  men  from  20  to  40  years  of  age,  or  even  from 
17  to  42,  as  in  Germany,  are  enrolled  in  the  army  in 
some  capacity.  It  is  not  then  beyond  the  region  of  pos- 
sibility that  a  rigorous  application  of  the  war  right,  as 
the  Germans  imderstand  it,  may  lead  a  victorious  army 
to  take  prisoner  and  transport  out  of  its  territory,  en 
masse^  the  entire  able-bodied  population  of  a  conquered 
country.  Thence  untold  miseries,  and  hatreds  which 
can  never  be  appeased.  The  war  of  1870  has  already, 
in  certain  cases,  presented  this  odious  character  of  cruelty 
to  individuals.  Moreover,  it  has  shown  us  a  mass  com- 
posed of  a  million  men  throwing  itself  upon  a  neighbor- 
ing country  and  removing  a  population  of  nearly  400,000 
citizens. 

This  example  has  aroused  similar  covetousness  among 
other  nations,  and  one  day,  perhaps,  this  greedy  spirit, 


28  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

put  in  force  upon  a  large  scale,  will  be  the  means  of 
causing  incalculable  misery. 

Such  are  the  evils  which  threaten  our  country.  They 
point  out  to  us  our  duty  ;  they  make  clear  to  us  the 
thoughts,  the  convictions  which  should  be  continually 
present  to  the  mind  in  studying  the  art  of  war;  they 
especially  give  us  the  exact  measure  of  the  force  of  will 
and  of  energy  which  we  must  henceforth  display  in  all 
the  acts  of  our  military  life. 

§2,    ELEMENTS  CONSTITUTING   THE  POWER   OF   ARMIES. 

An  array's  power  rests  upon  two  elements: 

1.  Its  material  strength^  which  depends  upon  its  or- 
ganization. The  character  of  the  latter  is  itself  depend- 
ent on: 

Recruiting ; 

The  constitutio7i  of  the  com^nand ; 

The  grouping  of  the  forces  ; 

The  effectives  ; 

The  compositio7i  of  the  cadres  ; 

The  armament ; 

Technical  instruction  ; 

Means  of  supply^  transports^  etc. 

2.  Its  moral  strength^  which  is  often  too  much  neg- 
lected, and  which  may  be  created  by  : 

A  national  spirit; 
Military  education  ; 
And  discipline. 
The  opinion  of  Jomini  upon  the  military  power  of  a 
state  will  complete  the  enumeration.* 

"The  general  causes  which  have  so  much  influence 
upon  the  destinies  of  nations, ' '  says  this  author,  ' '  exer- 
cise the  same  sway  over  their  military  condition.  Vic- 
tories spring  in  part  from  these  causes,  and  develop  alike 

*  Critical  and  Military  History  of  the  Wars  of  the  Revolution. 


a 


u 
u 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIE.S.         29 

the  talents  of  the  generals  and  the  courage  of  the  sol- 
diers. 

"Nevertheless,  it  cannot  be  concealed  that,  exclusive 
of  the  internal  condition  of  empires,  an  army  possesses 
within  itself  the  elements  of  its  superiority  or  inferiority 
only  through  the  nature  of  its  organization^  its  spirit^ 
and  the  character  of  its  leaders. 

The  real  strength  of  a  state  depends  then  upon  the 
quality  of  its  soldiers  and  officers ; 

The  means  of  recruiting ; 

The  organic  constitution  of  the  differ e7tt  units  co77tpos- 
ing  the  army  ; 

The  ability  and  instructio7t  of  the  staff ; 

The  genius  of  the  ge7terals  ; 

Fi7ially^  the  7iatio7ial  spirit  at  the  77io77te7tt  when  war 
breaks  out. 

"Great  results  are  obtained  only  by  the  union  of  these 
means.  For,  if  it  is  true  that  skill  on  the  part  of  the 
general-in-chief  is  the  first  pledge  of  success,  the  battles 
gained  will  be  without  result  if  the  nation  refuses  to 
make  necessary  sacrifices." 

To  form  an  exact  idea  of  the  real  power  of  armies,  it 
is  essential  then  to  know  precisely  the  elements  of  this 
power,  and  the  conditions  of  organization  which  pro- 
duce it. 

In  order  to  make  them  better  understood,  it  will  be 
well,  in  this  regard,  to  recall  the  changes  which  have  been 
brought  about  in  these  organizations  in  our  epoch;  and 
then  to  enter  upon  the  study  of  armies  by  considering  : 

The  constitution  of  the  command; 

The  formation  of  armies; 

The  grand  units  composing  them; 

The  duties  incumbent  upon  them  in  war; 
And,    finally,    the  i7tfiuence  of  the  77ioral  forces  upo7t 
them.,  a7id  upo7i  the  results  of  a  campaign. 


30  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

§3.    CHANGES    BROUGHT   ABOUT    IN    THE    ORGANIZATION 
OE   ARMIES   IN  OUR  EPOCH. 

No  age  perhaps  has  seen  such  great  changes  in  the  or- 
ganization of  armies  as  onrs. 

It  is  to  the  year  1866,  and  to  the  wars  which  have 
rendered  it  celebrated,  that  we  must  ascribe  the  origin  of 
this  transformation. 

Before  this,  European  nations  possessed  military  in- 
stitutions which  nearly  all  dated  from  the  end  of  the 
First  Empire,  and  which,  for  a  long  period  still,  would 
have  o-uaranteed  their  securitv,  if  one  of  them  had  not 
become  a  danger  to  the  others  by  the  number  of  its  ef- 
fective forces  and  the  extent  of  its  armaments. 

The  characteristic  feature  of  the  military  systems  then 
in  force,  was  the  conscription  of  certain  classes  for  mili- 
tary service  and  the  exemption  of  others;  in  the  one  case, 
the  designation  was  determined  by  lot,  in  the  other,  the 
the  purchase  of  substitutes  was  authorized. 

The  arms  used  were  yet  of  short  range  and  slow  of  fire. 

Instead  of  the  regional  method  of  recruiting  corres- 
ponding to  tactical  units,  there  existed  a  national  system 
of  recruitment  extending  to  the  entire  territory. 

In  France  there  were  besides: 

Depots  at  a  distance  from  their  regiments; 
Reserves    dispersed    over    the   whole    face   of    the 

country; 
A  grouping  of  the  forces  in  time  of  peace  bearing  no 
resemblance  to  the  disposition  required  by  a  state 
of  war; 

And,  finally,  as  a  consequence  of  these  institutions,  a 
sloiv  and  irregular  transition  to  a  war  footings  exposing 
the  country  to  the  dangers  of  the  defensive  and  the  mis- 
fortunes of  invasion,  in  the  presence  of  neighbors  more 
skillful  or  more  active. 

While  such  was  the  general  condition  of  affairs   in 


FIRST    CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION    OF   ARMIE.S.       3 1 

Other  states,  a  single  power,  Prussia,  assisted  by  events, 
guided  by  its  practical  bent  and  by  a  long  concealed 
ambition,  and  favored  by  a  strong  social  organization, 
had  maintained  and  perfected  a  military  system  which 
had  saved  it  at  the  commencement  of  the  century. 

The  other  nations,  blinded  like  France  by  the  lustre  of 
their  former  glory,  or  deceived  by  the  apparent  strength 
of  their  armies,  obstinately  believed  the  military  organ- 
ization of  the  Prussians  inferior  and  defective. 

The  war  in  Bohemia  in  1866,  in  which  we  saw  them 
triumph  so  rapidly  over  their  adversaries,  quickly  swept 
aside  all  deceptions. 

None  could  avoid  yielding  to  the  evidence. 

The  military  system  of  Prussia,  perfected  by  constant 
application,  encouraged  by  an  enlightened  government, 
placed  in  the  front  rank  of  national  institutions,  strength- 
ened by  maintaining  military  leaders  in  their  positions 
for  long  periods  and  by  deference  for  exalted  traditions, 
had  reached  such  a  development  that  it  enabled  her  to 
set  at  defiance  the  will  of  confederated  Germany,  and 
filially  to  bring  the  latter  into  submission. 

The  conquered  states  accepted  the  yoke  with  resigna- 
tion, some  of  them  even  with  enthusiasm.  The  new 
condition  of  things  was  presented  to  them  in  the  name 
of  fatherland,  in  the  name  of  national  unity.  That  was 
sufficient. 

The  other  powers,  surprised  by  these  events,  hastened 
to  make  a  critical  study  of  this  military  state  that  had 
just  arisen  with  such  brilliancy  in  the  centre  of  Burope, 

Its  organization  has  since  served  them  for  a  model  in 
placing  their  military  institutions  upon  new  foundations. 
But  it  is  not  the  prestige  of  Prussian  success  which  has 
driven  them  to  this. course.  They  have  been  forced  to 
it  by  the  fact  that  the  German  organization  had  by  en- 
larging its  means  of  action  become  a  menace  to  their 
independence. 


32  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

For  its  proper  defense,  a  state  is  always  obliged  to  pro- 
vide a  number  of  men,  small  arms,  and  cannon,  at  least 
equal  to  those  which  can  be  opposed  to  it  by  its  neigh- 
bors. It  should  be  able  to  put  these  in  readiness  in  at 
least  as  short  a  space  of  time  as  the  latter.  And,  like- 
wise, it  is  necessary  for  its  security  to  possess  arms  of  at 
least  equal  quality. 

Such  was  the  mainspring  of  the  military  changes 
brought  about  in  Europe  after  1866.  In  reality  it  was 
a  question  of  life  or  death. 

To-day,  with  the  exception  of  England,  which  is  pro- 
tected by  her  insularity,  and  with  the  further  exception 
of  a  few  small  states  whose  existence  is  guarantied  by 
treaties,  all  the  European  powers  have,  by  degrees, 
adopted  similar  military  systems. 

Results  of  these  Changes. — There  results  from  these 
changes  a  condition  of  affairs  which  is  not  without  a 
serious  aspect. 

Each  State  has  stretched  its  war  capacity  to  the  ut- 
most for  the  purpose  of  reaching  the  maximum  of  dis- 
posable effectives,  and  securing  the  greatest  rapidity  of 
mobilization,  the  most  perfect  armament,  and  the  most 
complete  defensive  system  possible.  With  all,  the  pro- 
ducts of  recruitment  are  utilized  to  the  fullest  extent. 
The  expenses  also  have  nearly  everywhere  reached  the 
extreme  limits  of  fiscal  resources. 

In  the  midst  of  these  excessive  preparations,  the  lesser 
powers,  unable  to  equal  the  forces  of  the  greater,  seem 
condemned  to  disappear,  or,  to  use  a  German  expression, 
to  enter  willingly   or    unwillingly  into    the    sphere    of 
action  of  their  formidable  neighbors. 

It  is  not  doubtful' that  in  the  end,  this  situation  will 
create  a  state  of  crisis,  the  more  grave  because  its  first 
effects  have  been  to  invalidate  treaties,  that  is  to  say, 
honorable  engagements,  bona  fide  compacts,  and  to  re- 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.        33 

place  them  by  the  employment  of  brute  force,  which 
man  knows  how  to  skillfully  utilize  to-day  for  the  ad- 
vancement of  his  interests  or  ambition. 

This  survey  will  give  a  clear  idea  of  the  point  to  which 
each  people  must  henceforth  go  in  the  improvement  of 
its  militar}^  condition,  especially  France,  whose  defeats 
have  isolated  her  in  the  midst  of  her  neighbors,  while 
exciting  hatred  and  a  spirit  of  rapacity  in  them  which 
still  endanger  her  possessions. 

I. — General  Principles  Governing  Existing  Military  Institutions. 

From  what  precedes,  we  see  that  existing  military  in- 
stitutions are  characterized  by: 
Compulsory  service; 

Reduction  of  the  time  spent  with  the  colors; 
Weakness  of  the  peace  forces; 
Increase  of  the  effective  war  forces. 

In  reality,  these  organizations  have  no  aim  except  to 
obtain,  as  in  the  case  of  Germany,  the  greatest  possible 
number  of  combatants. 

But  all  nations  do  not  succeed  in  this  with  the  same 
facility.  In  Germany,  for  instance,  the  increase  in 
population  is  so  rapid  that  each  year  assures  her  a  pre- 
ponderance more  and  more  pronounced. 

One  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  new  organ- 
izations, is  to  have  the  military  forces  grouped  during 
peace  in  the  same  manner  as  in  time  of  war,  and  the 
tactical  units  stationed  upon  the  territory  whence  their 
war  complement  of  men  is  to  be  drawn. 

The  vast  impulse  which,  upon  the  breaking  out  of  a 
war  between  great  States,  will  thus  suddenly  put  in 
motion  more  than  a  million  of  men,  will  be  found  to  be 
divided  in  advance,  into  a  multitude  of  local  movements 
of  limited  extent. 

The  complex  operation  which  results  is  consequently 
simplified  and  accelerated. 

3 


34  PART   FIRST.  —  STRATEGY. 

However,  regional  recruitment,  which  is  at  the  base 
of  this  simplification,  has  not  been  everywhere  adopted. 
In  France  it  gave  way  to  considerations  of  various  kinds. 
A  mixed  system  was  preferred,  leading  to  the  retention 
of  the  old  method  of  recruitment,  while  permitting  re- 
gional mobilization. 

In  order  to  understand  these  new  institutions,  it  is 
indispensable  to  have  a  thorough  insight  into  those 
which  have  distinguished  the  common  exemplar — those 
of  Prussia. 

II.— Outline  of  the  Military  Development  of  Prussia. 

In  order  to  trace  the  origin  of  the  Prussian  military 
system,  we  must  go  back  to  1806.  In  this  year,  the 
victor  of  Jena  reduced  the  vanquished  army  to  forty 
thousand  men. 

But  profiting  by  the  agitations  of  Europe,  Prussia  was 
able  to  recover  rapidly,  and  to  place  in  line  at  Bautzen, 
seven  years  after  her  defeat,  153  battalions  of  infantry 
and  124  squadrons  of  cavalry,  or  together  about  200,000 
men. 

In  the  following  year  (18 14),  an  organization  based 
upon  the  principle  of  compulsory  service,  assured  her  a 
field  force  of  330,000  men,  supported  by  the  second  call 
of  the  landwehr  and  140,000  depot  troops.  Thus,  eight 
years  after  Jena,  an  effective  army  of  520,000  soldiers  (a 
twentieth  part  of  the  entire  population  of  the  country) 
had  been  organized. 

Among  the  men  who  had  aided  in  this  transformation, 
and  in  demonstrating  its  influence  upon  the  destinies  of 
European  States,  was  a  young  second  lieutenant  of  the 
Guard,  who  more  than  all  his  comrades  had  suffered  by 
the  humiliations  of  his  country.  This  was  Prince  Fred- 
erick William  Louis  of  HohenzoUern,  who  in  187 1  be- 
came Emperor  of  Germany.  In  1814  he  began  his  mil- 
itary career  at    Bobigny,   near    Paris,  as  a  subordinate 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.        35 

officer  in  Bliicher's  army.  Called  to  the  regency  of  the 
kingdom  in  i860,  and  knowing  the  value  of  numbers, 
rigid  discipline,  and  well-selected  generals,  one  of  his 
first  cares  was  to  reorganize  the  army.  He  augmented 
it  by  117  battalions,  40  squadrons  and  5  groups  of  artil- 
lery; and  by  his  example  communicated  an  extraordi- 
nary military  impulse  to  the  entire  nation. 

Four  years  later,  in  1864,  this  circumstance  exercised 
a  singular  influence  upon  the  warlike  movement  which 
then  launched  Prussia  upon  a  career  of  sanguinary  strug- 
gles and  conquests. 

The  reorganization  of  i860  is  one  of  the  most  remark- 
able phases  of  her   military   development.     It   assured 
her  an  effective  force  upon  a  war  footing  of 
370,000  field  troops, 
110,000  depot  troops, 

150,000  troops  of  the  first  call  of  the  landwehr. 
In  all  630,000  men,  which,  by  a  regional  mobilization, 
skillfully  contrived,  could  assemble  within  two  or  three 
weeks  upon  either  of  her  frontiers. 

Thus,  in  less  than  sixty  years,  the  Prussian  army  passed 
from  40,000  to  630,000  men. 

The  increase  of  the  effective  force  was  not,  however, 
the  only  object  held  in  view  in  the  reorganizations  of 
1814  and  i860. 

The  first  attempted  simply  to  obtain  large  battalions 
with  a  comparatively  small  budget;  and  to  succeed  in 
this,  it  imposed  upon  the  army  a  defective  system  of 
mobilization; — this,  indeed,  was  subordinated  to  the  co- 
operation of  the  landwehr. 

The  reorganization  of  i860  liberated  it  from  this  re- 
straint, and  permitted  the  field  forces  to  assemble  by 
drawing  upon  the  reserve  only.  At  the  same  time  fire- 
arms were  improved. 

Prussia  could  thus  at  the  outbreak  of  war  add  su- 
periority of    fire-arms   to   numerical  ascendency;    then 


36  PART   FIRST. -^STRATEGY. 

by  means  of  her  ordinary  and  her  strategic  railroads,  she 
placed  herself  in  position  to  make  full  use  of  these  ad- 
vantages, and  to  take  the  field  before  any  of  her  neigh- 
bors. 

The  practical  importance  of  these  changes  should 
have  been  plainly  apparent  to  all  other  nations.  They 
gave  to  the  Prussian  army  qualities  for  the  offensive 
which,  supplemented  by  a  superior  system  of  technical 
training  and  military  education,  assured  her  supremacy. 

Instead  of  this,  these  nations  obstinately  clung  to 
time-worn  methods,  and  affected  to  see  in  these  troops 
only  a  kind  of  militia,  incapable  of  contending  with 
the  regular  forces  of  other  countries. 

The  victory  of  Koniggratz  resounding  throughout 
the  world,  opened  all  eyes,  and  dissipated  these  illusions. 

III.— Changes  Imposed  by  the  Battle  of  Koniggratz. 

The  changes  made  necessary  by  this  great  event  were 
considerable,  and  caused  all  governments  to  reflect. 
First,  from  an  historical  point  of  view,  the  Treaty  of 
Prague,  ratified  August  30,  1866,  sanctioned  the  dissolu- 
tion of  the  Germanic  Confederation,  suppressed  the  pre- 
ponderance of  Austria,  and  increased  Prussia  by  nearly 
25,000  square  miles  and  her  population  by  four  million 
souls. 

It  annexed  to  this  power  all  the  states  to  the  north  of 
the  Main,  subjected  those  to  the  south  to  its  authority, 
and  gave  to  it  a  perception  of  its  strength  and  a  confi- 
dence in  itself  unknown  before. 

In  brief,  it  spread  a  feeling  of  alarm,  and  inaugurated 
a  new  era  among  the  systems  of  European  states,  the 
importance  of  which  will  no  doubt  be  confirmed  by  time. 

From  all  these  points  of  view,  a  memorable  place  is 
assigned  in  history  to  the  3d  of  July,  1866,  the  date  of 
the  battle  of  Koniggratz. 

From    a   military   standpoint,    the   changes   brought 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.        37 

about  in  the  life  of  the  peoples  of  Europe,  and  in  the 
organization  of  their  armies  were  not  less  important. 
They  may  be  summed  up  thus  : 

Recognition  of  the  principle  of  compulsory  service; 
Necessity  of  increasing  the  effective  forces,  and  con- 
sequently of  adopting  a  military  system  similar 
to  Prussia's  ; 
Complete  change  in  the  peace  organization,  in  the 
mode  of  preparation  for  war,  in  mobilization,  in 
transport    service,    in    concentrations,   in    arma- 
ments, in  the  applications  of  the  military  art,  and 
in  the  defensive  S3^stems  of  the  different  states. 
Finally,  enormous  increase  in  military  budgets. 
This  was,  in  short,  a  revolution  in  the  military  institu- 
tions of  the  nations.      Its  extent  was  quickly  understood, 
and  each    power  immediately   began    to    transform   its 
military  organization  according  to  its  resources  and  the 
character  of  its  people. 

In  France,  the  reform  was  timidly  applied.  In  1868, 
a  mixed  system  was  adopted,  which  recognized  the  com- 
pulsory method,  without  daring  to  put  it  in  force. 

The  creation  of  the  garde  natio7iale  mobile  character- 
ized the  laws  passed  at  this  time.  This  new  element  of 
defense  existed  only  on  paper,  and  the  troops  which  com- 
posed it  had  really  not  to  serve  a  single  day  under  arms. 
The  illusion  of  maintaining  large  effective  forces  was 
thus  indulged,  at  the  same  time  that  the  systems  of  by- 
gone times  were  adhered  to. 

This  was  one  of  the  causes  of  French  reverses. 
In  Prussia,  on  the  contrary,  the  law  of  compulsory 
service   was    applied    to    forty    million   souls,    and    the 
masses  of  1866  were  doubled. 

In    1870,    1,183,000    combatants    were    put    on    foot 

by  Germany  in  eighteen  days,   and  forces  aggregating 

462,000  were  transported  to  the  frontier  in  the  same  time. 

This  numerical  superiority  was  the  more  crushing  for 


38  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

US,  from  the  fact  that  the  Germans  united  with  it  a  pre- 
ponderance of  artillery  and  an  almost  perfect  system  of 
practical  instruction. 

The  development  of  the  military  power  of  Germany 
could  not  fail  to  create  apprehensions  in  Europe,  which 
the  events  of  1870  sufficiently  justified.  These  mani- 
fested themselves  in  many  ways  after  the  Peace  of  Frank- 
fort, notably  in  a  brochure  published  in  Vienna  at  this 
time  and  attributed  to  the  Archduke  Albert.  *  We  there 
read: 

"So  long  as  Buropeah  international  law  shall  continue 
to  be  trampled  under  foot  and  replaced  by  violence,  no 
people  can  aspire  to  the  rank  of  a  great  power,  if  it  does 
not  possess  a  military  force  of  the  first  order,  so  well  or- 
ganized and  so  strong  that  no  other  nation  can  attack  it 
with  prospect  of  success. 

"Every  State  bordering  upon  Germany,  which  shall 
not  be  able,  at  least  approximately,  to  rival  her  in 
promptness  and  precision  of  mobilization,  will  hold  no 
assurance  against  invasion,  that  is  to  say,  be  secure  from 
destruction  of  its  prosperity  at  its  very  centre." 

Consequences. 

"i.  The  system  of  levies  en  7nasse^  organized  as  in 
Prussia,  must  be  adopted  in  principle,  then  put  into 
practice  as  speedily  as  possible  by  all  the  States^  each 
being  careful,  however,  to  introduce  into  it  the  changes 
necessitated  by  its  peculiar  characteristics. 

"2.  Every  State  which  neglects  this  precept  will  im- 
peril its  existence. 

"3.  The  experience  of  Prussia  during  the  last  sixty 
years,  and  the  improvements  effected  by  her  during  this 
period,  should  serve  as  a  means  of  avoiding  blunders  and 
deceptive  measures  of  all  kinds. 

*  Das  Jahr  iSjo,  U7id  die  Wehkraft  der  Monarchie,  u.  s.  w. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.         39 

"4.  It  may,  perhaps,  be  permissible  to  endeavor  to 
soften  such  of  the  rigors  of  the  Prussian  system  as  can 
be  thus  modified  without  endangering  rapidity  of  mobil- 
ization or  diminishing  the  proportion  of  troops  dispos- 
able at  the  outset  of  a  campaign. 

"This,  however,  should  be  attempted  only  with  ex- 
treme caution,  and  with  the  advice  of  the  most  com- 
petent and  most  eminent  military  experts ;  otherwise  it 
will  be  accompanied  by  dangerous  errors. 

"5.  To  repel  an  invasion,  all  the  effective  men  in  the 
country  should  unite  in  its  defense.  This  may  be  ac- 
complished in  several  ways.  But  it  is  necessary  that  in 
time  of  peace  all  should  be  prepared^  that  each  should 
become  familiar  with  his part^  and  that  evejy  able-bodied 
fnan  should  be  put  by  law  as  a  legitimate  combatant  un- 
der the  protection  of  the  international  code. 

"6.  The  more  the  defensive  strength  of  a  country  is 
increased  by  these  measures,  the  less  liable  will  it  be  to 
have  war  forced  upon  it.  Moreover,  the  greater  the 
strength  the  several  states  of  Europe  acquire,  the  better 
assured  will  be  the  general  peace. 

' '  7.  The  entire  population  should  consider  it  an  honor 
and  a  most  sacred  duty  to  co-operate  for  defence  of  the 
country.  It  is  essential  then,  that  during  peace,  each 
should  willingly  make  the  personal  sacrifices  requisite 
to  prepare  him  for  the  service  of  the  state  in  time  of 
war. ' ' 

The  first  consequence  of  these  observations  is  the  nec- 
essity for  a  thorough  acquaintance  with  the  organization 
of  the  German  army. 

§4.    MILITARY   ORGANIZATION   OF   GERMANY. 

The  last  military  law,  enacted  May  2,  1874,  was  mod- 
ified May  6,  1880.      It  is  a  reproduction  of  former  laws, 
and  regulates  the  organization  of  the  army  as  follows : 

Service  is  compulsory  from  17  to  42  years  of  age.  It 
includes  : 


40  PART    FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

3  years  with  the  colors; 

4  years  and  6  months  in  the  active  army  reserve; 

5  years  in  the  landwehr. 

The  latter  is  no  longer  a  territorial  but  an  active  force, 
mobilized  at  the  same  time  as  the  army,  and  organized 
in  advance  to  take  part  with  it  in  hostilities  under  the 
same  title.  In  reality,  under  a  disguised  form,  the 
Prussian  army  has  twelve  and  a  half  classes  disposable 
for  war.  The  rest  of  the  contingents  serve  to  form  the 
landsturm. 

The  dominating  idea  of  this  system,  a  practical  idea 
par  excellence^  is  to  have  as  many  instructed  men  as 
possible  in  the  first  line. 

Now  while  the  regulation  contingent  is  151,000  men, 
the  actual  number  is  160,000.  This  is  brought  about  in 
the  following  way :  For  the  purpose  of  instructing  the 
greatest  possible  number,  royal  furloughs  are  granted, 
which  enable  the  Minister  of  War  to  send  to  their  homes, 
at  the  expiration  of  one  or  two  years,  the  men  considered 
sufficiently  well  drilled,  and  to  replace  them  immedi- 
ately by  others  drawn  from  the  same  localities. 

In  1882,  159,000  were  passed  through  the  ranks.  It 
is  well  to  note,  moreover,  that  the  dimension  of  the  con- 
tingent is  continually  augmenting  with  the  increase  in 
population. 

In  France,  with  a  contingent  of  140,000  men,  only 
from  105,000  to  112,000  receive  four  years'  instruction; 
the  balance,  or  from  28,000  to  35,000,  remain  with  the 
colors  but  from  six  months  to  a  year. 

Moreover,  in  Germany,  with  the  uninstructed  bal- 
ance* of  the  valid  contingent,  120,000  men  of  the  sec- 
ond category  (those  who  on  account  of  some  physical 
deficiency  have  escaped  the  full  term  of  service),  and 
10,000  sole  supports  of  families,  there  is  each  year  formed 

*  About  10  per  cent,  of  the  entire  number — determined  by  lot. — Tr. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.        41 

a  recruiting  re  serve  ^^  of  from  130,000  to  140,000  men, 
divided  into  two  classes. 

The  first  class  includes  those  best  fitted  for  the  service 
of  arms.  They  are  utilized  to  fill  vacancies  in  the  field 
forces.  In  1880,  79,000  of  these  were  summoned  for 
this  purpose.  They  are  given  each  year  from  18  weeks' 
to  4  months'  instruction. 

The  second  class  is  called  out  only  in  time  of  war. 

The  remainder  of  the  national  force  constitutes  the 
landsturm,  composed  of  men  from  17  to  20  and  from 
32^  to  42  years  of  age. 

Germany  had  thus  in  the  spring  of  1883,  actually 
present  : 

Field.  Forces. 

Active  army:  3  contingents  of  151,000  men  each,  producing  436,000  men.! 
Reserve:         4             "              143,000  (3  yrs.  instr'n)    "        506,000     " 
I/andwehr:     5             "              143,000  men                     "        578,000     " 
One  year  vol- 
unteers:    12             "                 5,000  men                     "  52,000     " 
Recruiting  Reserve  (1881  and  1882) 55, 000     " 


1,627,000  men. 

Of  these  1,627,000  men,  there  are  1,520,000  who  (ex- 
cept two  contingents)  have  received  three  years'  instruc- 
tion. 

This  army  thus  comprises,  with  the  landsturm, 
2,655,000  men. 

As  to  the  principles  which  regulate  its  recruitment,  its 
composition,  and  its  formations,  it  will  be  sufiicient  to 
mention  them  in  brief. 

Recruiting  is  regional. 

The  army  is  composed  of  18  corps,  the  Guard  included, 
which  have  the  same  components  in  time  of  peace  as 
upon  a  war  footing. 

*The  Ersatz  reserve. — Tr. 

t  Increased  41,409  men  by  the  Septennate  Bill  of  March,  1887. — Tr. 


42  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Mobilization,  like  recruitment,  is  regional — an  essen- 
tial condition  of  rapidity. 

The  army  corps  is  the  principal  unit ;  it  comprises 
three  distinct  elements,  namely  :  two  divisions  of  in- 
fantry (each  with  its  proper  complement  of  other  arms) 
and  corps  artillery. 

Infantry. — There  are  2,7  divisions  of  infantry,  one  of 
which — a  Hessian  Division — is  in  addition  to  the  i8 
army  corps.  These  37  divisions  consist  of  75  brigades, 
or  161  regiments  of  3  battalions. 

In  time  of  war,  a  supplementary  force  may  be  counted 
upon,  composed  of  a  half  battalion  to  a  regiment;  that 
is,  I  battalion  to  a  brigade,  making  4  to  an  army  corps 
(except  in  Alsace  and  in  the  Guard),  or  for  the  16  corps 
64  fourth  battalions,  equaling  21  regiments,  or  2  new 
army  corps  and  a  division  of  5  regiments.  The  latter, 
joined  to  the  Hessian  Division,  completes  a  third  new 
corps. 

There  will  then  be  actually  21  army  corps  mobilizable 
at  the  first  call,  or  630,000  combatants  capable  of  being 
put  in  line  at  commencement  of  hostilities. 

Cavalry. — The  cavalry  comprises  93  regiments  of  5 
squadrons  each.  One  squadron  in  each  regiment  is  de- 
signed to  form  a  depot  in  time  of  war.  37  of  these  reg- 
iments are  attached  to  infantry  divisions,  and  56  form 
independent  cavalry  divisions. 

There  would  thus  be  9  divisions  of  independent  cav- 
alry of  3  brigades  each.  But  everything  leads  us  to 
believe  that  this  force  will  rather  be  formed  into  10 
divisions:  8  of  3  brigades  each,  and  2  of  2  brigades. 

Artillery. — The  artillery  embraces  37  regiments  of  field 
artillery  or  340  batteries,  294  of  which  are  composed 
of  pieces  of   9  centimetres,    and  46    (horse  batteries), 


FIRST  CHAPTf:r. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.        43 

of  giiiis  of  8   centimetres,   or  in  'all    2040  field    pieces. 
The  preponderance  of  guns  of  large  calibre  is  worthy  of 
notice. 

There  are,  in  addition,  14  regiments  of  garrison  artil- 
lery (each  of  2  battalions),  and  10  prepared  siege  equip- 
ages, with  1352  guns  of  heavy  calibre. 

Strength  of  Tactical  Units. — The  strength  of  the  tactical 
units  is  quite  well  known;  it  will  be  sufficient,  there- 
fore, to  review  it  briefly: 

Each  battalion  comprises  579  men  upon  a  peace  footing,  and  1,048 

men  (officers  included)  upon  a  war  footing. 
Each  regiment  comprises  3,165  men   (officers  included)  upon  a  war 

footing. 
Each  brigade  comprises  6,384  men  (officers  included)  upon  a  war  foot-  ' 

ing. 
Each  division  comprises  14,796  to  16,072  men  (officers  included)  upon 

a  war  footing. 

On  first  view,  these  troops  seem  to  represent  all  the 
field  forces;  but  there  must  be  added  to  them  the  land- 
wehr,  which  is  now  so  organized  as  to  form  in  time  of 
war — 

ist.  162  regiments  of  infantry  of  2  battalions  each 
(except  I  regiment).  These  comprise  139  mobile  and  23 
reserve  regiments,  each  corresponding  to  an  active  regi- 
ment ; 

2d.  37  regiments  of  reserve  cavalry,  plus  4  mobile 
squadrons; 

3d.  54  reserve  batteries,  capable  of  being  largely  in- 
creased. 

In  reality  the  landwehr  almost  doubles  the  dimensions 
of  the  active  army.  * 

*As  a  rule,  to  each  three-battalion  regiment  of  the  line  is  attached 
a  two-battalion  landwehr  regiment.  The  landwehr  regiments  during 
peace  exist  only  in  cadre,  that  is,  retain  in  active  service  only  a  com- 


44  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

This  development  of  the  military  organization  of  Ger- 
many was  decided  upon,  it  is  said,  in  consequence  of  the 
creation  of  our  territorial  army.  Our  neighbors  took  the 
matter  seriously,  considering  this  an  actual  army,  and 
endeavored  to  put  themselves  in  condition  to  face  the 
new  force.  Thus  the  formation  of  the  landwehr  into 
divisions  and  corps  is,  it  appears,  quite  in  a  state  of  read- 
iness. 

It  is  even  admitted  that  in  time  of  war  this  term  land- 
wehr will  disappear,  and  that  with  the  troops  of  this 
class  will  be  formed: 

Army  of  Field  Reserve. — ist.  An  army  called  a  field  re- 
serve^ comprising  366  battalions  (of  800  men  each),  122 
regiments,  61  brigades,  or  30  divisions.  However,  these 
divisions  are  not  grouped  into  army  corps;  they  are  then 
designed  to  form  separate  fractions. 

Their  office  will  no  doubt  consist  in  I'-einforcing  the 
armies  in  the  field^  or  in  discharging  some  special  duty, 
such  as  occupying  fortresses  or  guarding  frontiers.  Thus 
it  is  designed  to  have  one  division  at  Strasburg,  one  at 
Mayence,  two,  perhaps,  at  Berlin,  two  upon  each  fron- 
tier, etc. 


■) 


Army  of  Grarrison  Reserve. — 2d.  An  army  called  2^  garri- 
son reserve^  composed  of  129  battalions  (comprising  66 
battalions  of  landwehr,  23  of  landwehr  reserve,  and  40 
fourth  battalions)  with  certain  depot  troops. 

Finally  these  masses  are  supplemented  by  special 
troops,  such  a.s  feldjager^  trained  railroad  troops,  etc., 
an  account  of  which  inay  be  found  in  special  works. 

It  is  seen,  therefore,  that  the  character  of  this  army 
has  been  very  much  changed  since  1870,  and  that  in 

manditig  officer,  adjutant,  and  three  clerks  per  battalion,  and  a  ser- 
geant-major and  two  other  non-commissioned  officers  per  company. 
— Tr. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIKS.        45 

general  we  do  not  form  a  sufficiently  wide  conception  of 
its  material  strength. 

To  sum  up,  it  follows  from  the  preceding  that  in  Ger- 
many the  military  organization  is  regulated  by  an  attent- 
iveness,  a  persistency,  an  energy,  and  a  practical  good 
sense,  which  place  the  wants  of  the  army  before  all 
other  considerations. 

Two  ends  seem  constantly  to  be  pursued: 

ist.  To  have  in  first  line  the  greatest  number  of  men 
who  have  served  three  years.  * 

2d.  To  have  more  disposable  effectives  in  the  field 
than  her  neighbors. 

It  was  to  reach  this  result  that,  following  the  organiza- 
tion of  our  territorial  army,  the  Germans  formed  two 
reserve  armies,  the  one  to  act  in  concert  with  the  army 
in  the  field,  the  other  to  occupy  territory  in  rear. 

In  reality,  despite  our  own  efforts,  we  find  in  the 
twelve  and  a  half  contingents  at  the  disposal  of  the  Ger- 
man army,  and  in  the  manner  of  employing  the  land- 
wehr,  subjects  for  serious  reflection. 

§  5.    ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   PRINCIPAL   EUROPEAN 

ARMIES. 

Italy. — The  establishment  of  compulsory  service  in 
Italy  dates  from  1869. 

The  organization  of  the  army  was  so  contrived  as  to 
make  it  a  means  of  intermingling  the  different  popula- 
tions and  bringing  about  national  unit}^ 

The  principles  of  the  Prussian  military  system  were 
applied  in  1875,  but  the  fundamental  law,  modified  in 
1882,  has  not  been  in  force  for  a  sufficiently  long  period 
to  permit  a  fair  judgment  of  the  results. 

*This  field  force  contains  77  per  ct.  of  men  having  served  three 
years,  10  per  ct.  of  those  of  two  years'  service,  and  13  per  ct.  of  those 
having  served  but  a  single  year. 


46  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

The  war  forces  are,  however,  already  strong.  The 
field  forces  comprise  the  active  army  with  its  first  re- 
serve and  its  mobile  reserve^  which  are  composed  only 
of  instructed  troops,  namely: 

Active  Army :  3  contingents  of  75,000  men,  producing.  217,000  men. 
First  reserve  of  active  army,  3  contingents,  producing  .    328,000     " 

Total 545,000     " 

Mobile  Militia :  4  contingents 240,000  men. 

12  contingents  of  one  year  volunteers 10,000     " 

Total 795,000     " 

Of  whom  638,000  (about  80  per  cent.)  have  served  3  years. 
"  72,000  (about    9  per  cent.)  "  2  years  ; 

"  85,000  (about  10  per  cent.)  "  i  year; 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  great  majority  of  the  troops 
of  the  first  line  have  seen  three  years  of  service. 

We  observe,  then,  that  Italy  has  made  considerable 
effort  to  compensate  for  lack  of  numbers  in  her  first  line 
troops  by  improving  their  quality.  We  shall  also  see 
further  on,  that,  thanks  to  peculiar  circumstances,  she 
has  even  succeeded  in  organizing  a  kind  of  advanced- 
guard  army  which  remains  permanently  upon  a  relative 
war  footing,  the  presence  of  which  near  our  frontiers 
is  not  always  free  from  inconvenience. 

This  power  could  have  in  addition,  in  second  line — 

Troops  of  First  Category. 

Territorial  Militia :  7  contingents  having  served  3  years.  375,000  men. 
One  year  volunteers,  7  contingents  having  served  i  year.       7,000     " 


Total 382,000     " 

Troops  of  Second  Category. 

Second  reserve  of  the  active  army  or  troops  for  filling  vacaticies  in 
this  army  in  time  of  ivar :  5  contingents  of  44,000  men  having 
served  6  months 206,000  men. 

Reserves  of  mobile  militia  {troops  to  fill  vacancies  in  this 
force):  4  contingents  of  6  months'  service 150,000     " 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.         47 

Territorial  militia :  10  contingents  composed  of  troops 
of  6  months'  service 326,000  men. 

Total 682,000     " 

Troops  of  second  line  (first  category) 382,000     " 

Total 1,064,000     " 

However,  of  this  number,  the  troops  of  the  first  cate- 
gory only  can  form  combat  units;  the  others  will  serve 
but  to  fill  vacancies. 

Finally,  in  third  line  come  19  contingents  of  60,000 
men  each,  exempt  from  peace  service. 

Yet,  notwithstanding  these  figures,  Italy  could  rely 
for  her  field  force  only  upon  the  troops  of  the  active  army 
and  of  the  first  category;  but  the  number  of  these,  how- 
ever, already  reaches  the  respectable  proportions  of 
1,770,000  instructed  men. 

Austria. — In  Austria  the  application  of  compulsory 
service  dates  from  1868,  two  years  after  Koniggratz. 

The  law,  modified  in  1882,  gives  to-day  as  troops  of 
the  first  line: 

Active  army:  3  contingents  of  95,000  men  of  i,  2,  anci 

3  years'  service   (25,000  constantly  on  furlough)  .    .  275,000  men. 

Reserve:  7  contingents  of  94,000  men  of  3  years'  service.  565,000      " 

Landwehr:  2  contingents  of  94,000  men  of  3  years'  ser- 
vice   147,000      " 

One  year  volunteers:  12  contingents  of  3,500  men  .    .    .  37,000      " 

Total  troops  of  first  line 1,024,000      " 

Of  these  749,000  (or  73  per  ct.)  are  reservists  and  land- 

wehr  troops. 
Troops  of  second  category  and  of  second  line  (with  the 

recruiting  reserve  estimated  at  94,000  men)    ....      251,000      " 

In  all 1,275,000      " 

For  economical  reasons,  the  period  of  service  is  each 
year  shortened  in  the  case  of  about  25,000  men. 
Of  the  1,024,000  men  of  the  first  line: 


48  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

568,800  (or  55     per  ct.)  have  served  3  years. 
323,200  (or  30     per  ct. )  "  2      " 

132,000  (or  12.8  per  ct. )  "  i  year. 

In  the  Austrian  army,  then,  scarcely  one-half  of  the 
first  line  troops  have  served  three  years,  which  in  a  cer- 
tain measure  is  a  cause  of  weakness.  In  this  country, 
the  military  development  seems  to  have  arrived  at  the 
limit  of  fiscal  resources — a  limit  which  sooner  or  later 
will  be  reached  by  all  European  nations,  and  at  which 
they  will  be  obliged  to  call  a  halt. 

Russia. — In  Russia,  the  general  law  of  organization  was 
adopted  in  1874  and  supplemented  in  1876.  It  pre- 
scribes compulsory  service  from  the  twentieth  to  the 
fortieth  year. 

When  in  full  operation  it  will  yield: 

Active   army:  5   contingents  of  185,000  men  of  from  i 

to  5  years' instruction 869,000  men. 

Reserve  :  10  contingents  of  185,000  men  of  5  years' 
instruction 1,481,000      " 

Militia,  first  call:  4  contingents  of  185,000  men  of  5 
years' instruction      513,000      " 

Total 2,863,000      " 

Of  these, 

2,500,500  (or  87     per  ct.)  will  have  received  5  years'  instruction. 
177,500  (or    6     perct.)  "  2  " 

185,000  lor    6.4  perct.)  "  i  " 

In  the  above  total,  we  see  that  1,994,000  (69  per  ct.)  are  reservists 
and  militiamen. 

This  power  would  have  in  addition  340,000  second 
line  or  depot  troops,  having  received  one  year's  instruc- 
tion. These  would,  of  course,  be  susceptible  of  being 
enrolled  in  the  combat  units. 

Finally,  there  remain  1,619,000  uninstructed  men  who 
would  yet  be  available  for  military  purposes. 

This  gives  a  total  of  3,822,000  soldiers,  of  whom 
2,203,000  are  instructed. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.         49 

This  mass  of  troops  would  be  formidable  if,  in  esti- 
mating the  war  strength  of  this  nation,  it  was  not  neces- 
sary to  take  into  account  the  very  limited  number  of  its 
railroads,  compared  with  the  vastness  of  its  territory,  its 
incessant  struggles  in  Central  Asia,  and  the  large  detach- 
ments which  it  must  keep  permanently  upon  its  Asiatic 
frontiers. 

We  shall  see  later,  in  considering  the  subject  of  its 
mobilization  and  its  transport  service,  how  large  would  be 
the  effective  forces  disposable  for  a  European  campaign. 

England. — This  country  has  preserved  its  special  organ- 
ization of  voluntary  enlistment,  which  gives  to  its  army 
a  unique  character.  It  can,  under  its  last  law,  framed 
in  1881,  mobilize  in  Europe  238,000  men,  who  are  all 
well-drilled  and  efficient  except  the  class  of  recruits 
forming  a  part  of  the  184,000  troops  constituting  the 
regular  army.  But  this  state  is  obliged  to  detach  88,000 
men  to  guard  its  foreign  possessions.  There  will  then 
be  only  150,000  men  available  for  a  European  war,  sup- 
ported by  a  reserve  of  325,000  men,  who  have  received 
barely  a  few  days'  instruction.  The  latter,  moreover, 
can  be  employed  only  at  home. 

In  fact,  it  is  not  certain  that  this  nation,  whose  power 
is  especially  colonial  and  maritime,  could  bring  a  larger 
force  than  60,000  troops  into  the  field  in  case  of  a  con- 
tinental war. 

In  the  Crimea  it  engaged  to  keep  up  a  corps  of  40,- 
000  auxiliaries. 

In  Egypt,  in  1882,  the  English  army  mobilized  only 
25,000  men,  2,000  of  whom  were  from  the  militia  re- 
serve. These  troops  were  reinforced  by  a  mixed  divis- 
ion of  the  India  army  7,000  strong,  3,500  only  of  whom 
were  combatants. 

Finally,  there  remain  to  be  considered  the  war  forces 
of  a  nation  that  Germany  has  twice  endeavored,   not 

4 


50  PART  FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

without  success,  to  enlist  among  our  adversaries — oui 
immediate  neighbor,  Spain. 

Spain. — The  organic  military  law  dates  from  1882.  As 
in  Germany,  Italy,  and  Austria,  service  is  obligatory  for 
twelve  years. 

When  in  complete  operation,  this  system  will  give : 

Active  army  :  3  contingents  of  35,000  men  having  i,   2, 

and  3  years'  instruction 102,000  men. 

First  reserve  :  3  contingents  of  35,000  three  years'  instruc- 
tion men 93, 000     " 

Second  reserve  :  6  contingents  of  35,000  three  years'  in- 
struction men 171,000     " 

Total •  .    .    .  366,000  men. 

This  army  will  have,  moreover,  a  reserve  of  262,000 
uninstructed  men  who  will  form  a  territorial  force,  thus 
leaving  the  active  army  entirely  independent. 

The  state  of  instruction  of  this  army  is  difficult  to  es- 
timate, for  the  Minister  of  War  can  send  to  their  homes 
at  the  end  of  two  years  and  three  months,  all  infantry 
soldiers  considered  sufficiently  well  drilled. 

At  the  present  time  there  are  only  250,000  instructed 
men.  But  taking  into  consideration  the  military  quali- 
ties of  the  Spanish  people,  France  would  be  obliged,  in 
case  of  war,  to  maintain  a  like  force,  and  to  seriously 
undertake  the  defense  of  her  southern  frontier. 

France. — The  examination  of  these  military  forces 
would  be  without  much  utility,  if  we  did  not  compare 
them  with  our  own. 

At  the  outbreak  of  war,  France  would  have  as  troops 
of  the  first  line: 

Active   army:    5    contingents   of  140,000   men   having 

from  I  to  5  years'  instruction* 657,700  men. 

*The  annual  contingent  is  divided  by  lot  into  two  por lions,  the  first 
serving  the  full  term  of  five  years,  the  second  receiving  but  a  single 
year's  training. — Tr. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.        5 1 

Reserve:  4  coiitin.s^ents  of  140,000  men,  having  from  4 

to  5  years'  instruction 476,300  men. 

Total 1,134,000      "  ■ 

Permanent  part 120,000      " 

Total ...  1,254,000      " 

In  the  above  are  included  9  contingents  of  the  second 
portion;  9  contingents  each  of  5,000  volunteers  having 
one  year's  service  on  an  average;  and  i  entire  contingent 
of  the  first  year:  making  a  total  of  385,000  men,  or  about 
31  per  cent. 

But  by  subtracting  from  these  the  youngest  class, 
which  furnishes  depot  troops,  we  change  this  proportion 
to  18  per  cent. 

There  would  then  remain:  i  contingent  having  two 
years  with  the  colors,  or  8  per  cent;  -and  760,000  men, 
or  more  than  60  per  cent,  having  from  4  to  5  years' 
training. 

Resume  of  the  Preceding  Data. — The  foregoing  facts  offer 
instruction  upon  the  subject  of  the  solidity  and  cohesion 
of  armies  which  should  not  be  neglected. 

If,  indeed,  we  leave  out  of  view  Spain,  whose  army  is 
in  process  of  transformation,  and  England  with  her  dis- 
tinct system,  we  see  that  Russia  is  in  advance  of  all  the 
powers  in  the  possession  of  well-drilled  troops;  but  diffi- 
culties of  mobilization  present  a  counterpoise  to  this  ad- 
vantage. 

After  Russia,  come  Germany  and  Italy.  As  far  as 
possible  these  States  take  care  to  relegate  to  the  depot 
or  second  line  troops,  all  those  who  have  not  received 
complete  military  instruction,  with  a  service  of  at  least 
three  full  years.  In  this  connection,  the  military  power 
of  Germany,  favored  by  a  persistent  and  enlightened 
policy,  has  reached  a  remarkable  development.     France 


52  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

and  Austria  are  the  powers  whose  armies  of  the  first  line 
contain  the  least  number  of  thoroughly  trained  men; 
and  it  is  unfortunately  ours  which  has  among  its  war 
forces  the  largest  comparative  number  of  soldiers  hav- 
ing but  one  year's  service. 

As  regards  the  reservists,  we  can  form  no  adequate 
idea  of  their  influence  upon  the  effectiveness  of  the  first 
line  by  a  mere  statement  of  their  num'bers;  for,  instead 
of  comparing  them  with  the  total  number  of  mobiliz- 
able  men,  we  should  rather  see  in  what  proportion  they 
enter  into  the  tactical  units. 

In  this  regard  Germany  still  has  the  advantage.  Thus 
her  infantry  company,  which  in  time  of  peace  numbers  a 
real  effective  of  135  men,  receives,  in  order  to  pass  to  a 
war  footing,  only  115  reservists.  These  have  all,  more- 
over, spent  three  years  with  the  colors. 

Ours,  which  comprises  a  normal  effective  of  75  men, 
receives  175  reservists,  about  one-fifth  of  whom  have 
received  only  one  year's  instruction. 

This  is  not,  however,  the  only  point  of  view  from 
which  we  may  properly  compare  the  actual  strength  of 
European  armies. 

It  should  be  remembered  that  Germany  includes  in  her 
first  line  forces  twelve  and  a  half  classes,  averaging  about 
160,000  effectives  each;  that  there  is  no  longer  a  differ- 
ence, regarding  field  service,  between  her  active  army 
and  her  landwehr;  that  the  second  line  exists  in  cadre, 
and,  like  the  first,  is  grouped  into  grand  units:  whence 
the  war  forces  for  service  beyond  the  frontier,  to-day 
reach  the  extraordinary  figure  of  two  millions  of  men. 

Russia  has  fifteen  classes  of  247,000  men  each,  or, 
even  with  allowances  for  all  casual  decrements,  more 
than  three  millions. 

Austria  can  muster  twelve  contingents  of  123,500  each, 
or  1,400,000  men. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.        53 

Italy's  war  resources  are  twelve  classes  of  120,000  men 
each,  or  about  1,380,000  men. 

Finally,  France  has  but  nine  classes  of  140,000  men 
each,  giving  a  total,  after  allowing  for  contingencies,  of 
about  1,200,000  men.  This  deficiency  could  be  immedi- 
ately remedied  by  including  in  the  war  forces  which  can 
be  sent  beyond  the  frontier,  the  three  youngest  contin- 
gents of  the  territorial  army,  thus  giving  us  twelve 
classes. 

§6.    THE    COMMAND. 

The  skillful  organization  of  the  command  is  one  of  the 
prime  elements  of  an  army's  strength.  It  rests  upon  a 
fundamental  principle,  unity  in  the  comrnand^  or,' using 
Napoleon's  happy  expression,  unity  of  the  military 
thought. 

I.— Unity  in  Command. 

This  principle  constitutes  a  rule  without  exception. 
It  is  absolute.  In  peace  as  in  war,  it  is  the  basis  of  all 
good  army  organization.  But  it  is  especially  in  the 
field  that  its  neglect  may  cause  irreparable  disasters.  It 
has  been  many  times  proved  that  the  only  effect  of  mul- 
tiplying the  number  of  chiefs  called  to  deliberate  upon  a 
plan,  is  to  furnish  each  the  means  of  escaping  responsi- 
bility in  difficult  circumstances.  It  rarely  happens  that, 
in  the  hour  of  danger,  the  execution  does  not  suffer  by 
such  a  procedure. 

This  truth  is  so  clear  as  apparently  to  require  no 
demonstration.  However,  in  practice,  the  application 
of  the  principle  is  not  always  evident,  and  in  many  sit- 
uations the  command  is  surrounded  by  such  difficulties 
as  seem  to  make  its  employment  impossible. 

History  furnishes  us,  indeed,  many  examples  in  which 
the  neglect  of  this  rule  of  unity  in  command  has  proved 
fatal. 


54  PART   P^IRST. — STRATEGY. 

Division  of  the  Command  in  the  Case  of  the  Army  of  Italy  in 
1796. — In  the  spring  of  this  year,  when  Bonaparte,  scarcely 
27  years  of  age,  had  conquered  Lombardy,  the  Directory, 
fearing  his  prestige,  resolved  to  divide  the  army  of  Italy 
into  two  parts,  and  place  one  of  them  under  Keller- 
mann. 

Bonaparte  then  wrote  to  this  body  the  following  letter, 
which  caused  it  to  abandon  its  design.  It  contains  the 
complete  views  of  the  great  warrior  upon  the  subject  of 
unity  in  command: 

"Headquarters,  I^odi,  25  Floreal,  Year  IV. 
"I  have  just  received  the  dispatch  which  left  Paris  on 
the  8th. 

"I  believe  it  very  impolitic  to  divide  the  Army  of  Italy 
into  two  parts;  it  is  equally  contrary  to  the  interests  of 
the  Republic  to  place  two  different  generals  here. 

"The  expedition  to  lyeghorn,  Rome  and  Naples  is  a 
very  small  matter;  it  ought  to  be  made  by  divisions  in 
echelon,  so  that  they  might,  by  a  retrograde  march,  ap- 
pear against  the  Austrians  in  force  and  threaten  to  en- 
velop them  upon  their  first  attempt  at  moving. 

"Not  only  is  a  single  general  necessary  for  this,  but 
there  must  be  nothing  to  interfere  with  him  in  his 
marches  and  operations.  I  have  so  far  madQ  the  cam- 
paign without  consulting  any  one;  I  might  not  have 
succeeded  at  all  if  it  had  been  necessary  to  reconcile  my 
views  with  those  of  another  ***** 

"If  you  trammel  me  in  every  way;  if  I  must  refer  all 
my  projects  to  commissioners  of  the  Government;  if  they 
have  the  right  to  change  my  movements,  to  remove 
troops  from  my  command,  or  to  supply  them  at  their 
pleasure,  do  not  count  'upon  further  successes.  If  you 
weaken  your  means  by  dividing  your  forces,  if  you  in- 
terrupt in  Italy  the  unity  of  military  thought,  it  pains 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.        55 

me  to  say,  you  will  lose  your  most  brilliant  opportunity 
of  imposing  your  authority  upon  this  country. 

"In  the  present  condition  of  affairs  in  Italy,  it  is  in- 
dispensable that  you  should  have  a  general  possessing 
your  entire  confidence. 

"If  I  should  not  be  the  one,  I  shall  not  complain  01 
it;  but  shall  exert  myself  with  redoubled  zeal  to  merit 
your  esteem  in  any  post  intrusted  to  me.  Each  one  has 
his  own  method  of  carrying  on  war.  General  Keller- 
man  n  has  more  experience,  and  would  conduct  it  better 
than  I;  but  both  together  would  do  it  very  poorly." 

Bonaparte  on  the  same  day  supplemented  this  letter 
by  another,  equally  explicit,  addressed  to  Carnot: 

"I  am  writing  to  the  Directory  with  reference  to  the 
idea  of  dividing  the  army.  I  assure  you  that  in  my 
letter  I  have  had  only  the  country  in  view.  Moreover, 
you  will  always  find  me  in  the  straight  line.  I  owe  to 
the  Republic  the  sacrifice  of  all  my  own  ideas.  If  they 
try  to  put  me  in  a  bad  light  with  you,  my  reply  is  in  my 
heart  and  in  my  conscience, 

"As  it  is  possible  that  the  letter  to  the  Directory 
may  not  be  properly  interpreted,  and  as  you  have  given 
me  proof  of  your  friendship,  I  have  resolved  to  address 
it  to  you,  begging  you  to  make  whatever  use  of  it  your 
prudence  and  your  attachment  to  me  may  suggest  to 
you. 

"Kellermann  will  command  the  army  as  well  as  I,  for 
no  one  is  more  convinced  than  lam  that  our  victories  are 
due  to  the  courage  and  audacity  of  the  army;  but  I  be- 
lieve that  to  unite  Kellermann  and  myself  in  Italy,  is  to 
court  the  loss  of  everything. 

"I  cannot  willingly  serve  with  a  man  who  thinks 
himself  the  first  general  in  Europe;  and,  besides,  I  be- 
lieve it  would  be  better  to  have  one  poor  general  than  two 
good  ones.  War  is  like  g^overnment  —  it  is  a  matter  of 
tact." 


56  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Command  of  the  Armies  in  Spain  and  Portugal  in  1812. — In 
181 2,  however,  in  entire  forgetfulness  of  the  principle 
which  he  had  so  clearly  enunciated,  Napoleon  com- 
mitted the  mistake  of  ordering  the  Army  of  Northern 
Spain,  under  Bessieres,  to  go  to  the  assistance  of  the 
Army  of  Portugal,  under  command  of  Marmont,  with- 
out deciding  which  of  these  marshals  should  be  com- 
mander-in-chief. 

This  condition  of  affairs  created  serious  embarrass- 
ments, and  became  an  obstacle  to  successful  operations. 

Marmont  considered  it  his  duty  to  comment  upon  the 
situation  in  bitter  terms  in  a  letter  to  Major  General  Ber- 
thier: 

''His  Majesty  supposes  that  in  case  of  an  offensive 
movement  on  the  part  of  the  English,  the  Army  of  the 
North  will  support  that  of  Portugal  by  two  divisions;  but 
can  the  Bmperor  be  persuaded  that  in  the  existing  state 
of  affairs  these  troops  will  arrive  promptly  and  in  time? 

"The  enemy  is  taking  the  offensive:  the  one  who 
should  meet  him,  prepares  the  means  of  doing  so;  the 
one  who  should  act  conditionally,  waits  without  uneasi- 
ness, and  permits  precious  time  to  slip  away  as  a  pure 
loss.  The  enemy  approaches  me:  I  bring  my  troops 
together  in  a  methodical  and  precise  manner;  I  know, 
almost  to  a  day,  when  the  bulk  of  the  forces  will  be  in 
line,  when  the  rest  will  be  in  junction  with  me,  and  in 
conformity  with  these  circumstances,  determine  to  act 
or  delay.  But  I  can  make  these  calculations  only  for 
the  troops  that  are  purely  and  simply  under  my  orders. 
For  those  that  are  not,  what  tardiness,  what  uncertainty, 
what  loss  of  time! 

"I  give  notice  of  the  approach  of  the  enemy,  and  ask 
support:  I  am  answered  by  comments  upon  the  situa- 
tion ;  my  letter  reaches  its  destination  slowly,  because 
the  communications  are  difficult  in  this  country;  the 
second  reply  will  be  like  the  first,  and  the  enemy  will 
be  upon  me. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.         57 

"I  can  take  into  account  only  those  that  are  immedi- 
ately under  my  orders;  and,  since  the  troops  which  are 
not  so,  are  yet  necessary  in  order  to  give  battle,  and  are 
counted  as  part  of  the  force  which  I  should  oppose  to 
the  enemy,  I  am  in  a  false  position,  and  have  the  means 
of  doing-  nothing  systematically  and  understandingly. " 

This  condition  of  affairs  resulted  from  the  Emperor's 
habit  of  commanding  everything  in  person.  He  consid- 
ered himself,  even  at  Paris,  as  the  real  commander  of 
the  armies  of  the  Peninsula,  and  sent  his  orders  by  his 
chief-of-stafif,  who  also  resided  in  Paris. 

This  example  shows  not  only  that  unity  of  command 
should  be  maintained,  but  that  it  ought,  moreover,  to 
be  exercised  upon  the  very  theatre  of  operations  itself. 

Commaiid  of  Armies  Composed  of  Different  Nationalities. — The 
application  of  this  principle  presents  still  greater  diffi- 
culties in  the  case  of  armies  of  different  nationalities 
acting  together  in  the  same  cause,  or  operating  in  dis- 
tinct theatres  of  war. 

In  1813,  the  Allies  found  themselves  in  this  situation. 
When  their  forces  took  the  field,  nearly  all  the  army 
corps  were  composed  of  troops  of  different  nationalities. 
In  each  of  these  units  national  pride  was  over-inflamed, 
and  orders  given  for  common  execution  were  not  un- 
derstood in  the  same  way.  There  resulted  such  clash- 
ings  that  it  was  found  necessary  to  give  the  command- 
in-chief  to  a  generalissimo,  and  to  agree  that  the  rulers 
of  Russia,  Prussia  and  Austria  should  always  be  together 
at  headquarters. 

Good  fortune  or  foresight  led  to  the  ^choice,  for  this 
high  position,  of  an  Austrian  general  whose  rank  over- 
awed the  other  generals,  and  whose  tact,  kindliness  and 
gentleness,  says  Marmont,  dispelled  even  the  slightest 
traces  of  friction  throughout  the  command. 


58  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Command  ot  the  Allied  Armies  in  the  Crimea  in  1855. — In  this 
war  the  English,  Turkish,  Piedmontese,  and  French 
armies  were  operating  together  against  the  Russians, 
each  preserving  its  independence. 

So  many  obstacles  stood  in  the  way  of  co-operation, 
that  Marshal  Canrobert,  commander-in-chief  of  the 
French  army,  was  prompted  to  report  the  facts  to  the 
Minister  of  War  in  the  following  terms  :  * 

"To-day,  when  the  question  arose  of  definitely  decid- 
ing upon  the  basis  of  apportionment  of  troops.  Lord 
Raglan  did  not  appear  to  think  that  in  view  of  the 
necessity  of  holding  his  trenches,  protecting  Balaklava, 
etc.,  it  was  possible  for  him,  with  his  effectives  and  the 
Piedmontese  army,  to  form  a  corps  to  be  concentrated  at 
Baidar. 

"  Thus,  after  so  many  and  such  laborious  discussions, 
when  it  is  a  question  of  passing  from  theory  to  execu- 
tion, difidculties  arise  which,  since  the  commencement  of 
this  war,  have  been  incessantly  recurring,  disturbing  the 
situation  continually  and  delaying  the  conclusion  of  the 
struggle.  It  must  be  admitted,  however,  that  all  crim- 
ination would  be  unjust  and  out  of  place  here  :  equally 
with  myself.  Lord  Raglan  and  Omar  Pacha  bring  good- 
will, conciliatory  sentiments,  and  ardor  to  the  task  of 
advancing  the  success  of  the  common  cause.  But  the 
difficulty  of  introducing  harmony  into  our  views,  our 
various  prejudices,  and  our  instructions  (which  are  not 
absolutely  identical,  or  which  at  least  give  rise  to  diverg- 
ent opinions  in  their  interpretation),  is  one  of  the  great- 
est that  can  be  imagined  in  war.  It  is  necessary  to  add 
to  this  the  perplexities  which  are  presented  in  the  exe- 
cution of  any  plan,  on  account  of  the  very  different  in- 
stincts and  equally  different  dispositions  to  be  met  with 
in  troops  of  distinct  nationalities,  commanded  by  gen- 
erals possessing  equal  powers. 

*  General  Pierron,  Methodes  de  Guerre ^  vol.  i.,  p.  125. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.        59 

"I  could  produce  a  hundred  examples  drawn  from 
this  war  in  support  of  these  familiar  truths. " 

The  French  government  hastened  then  to  give  the 
command-in-chief  to  Marshal  Pelissier,  who  of  all  the 
generals  of  the  time  best  understood  how  to  impose  his 
authority  and  will. 

Parity  of  Grade. — One  of  the  most  serious  impediments 
in  the  way  of  unity  in  command  is  parity  of  grade. 

When  this  exists  between  different  leaders  in  an  army, 
it  is  only  by  force  of  character  that  the  commander-in- 
chief  can  compel  obedience.  To  avoid  these  difficulties, 
many  of  the  powers  have  created,  after  the  example  of 
Germany,  special  grades  for  corps  and  army  commanders. 
They  thus  have  four  grades  of  generals  :  major-generals 
for  brigades,  lieutenant-generals  for  divisions,  generals, 
properly  speaking,  for  corps,  and  field-marshals  for 
armies. 

Under  the  Consulate  we  also  had  chiefs  of  brigade, 
generals  of  divisions,  lieutenant-generals,  and  generals- 
in-chief.  The  lieutenant-generals,  however,  disappeared 
under  the  First  Empire.  From  that  time,  the  misunder- 
standings between  the  corps  commanders  and  the  mar- 
shals continually  increased;  and  the  presence  of  the  Em- 
peror was  almost  always  necessary  to  put  a  stop  to  them. 

One  of  the  most  striking  examples  of  these  dissen- 
sions is  afforded  by  the  conduct  of  Marshal  Ney  in  Por- 
tueal  in  1811.* 


*£5^ 


Command  of  the  Army  of  Portugal  in  1811. — In  this  year, 
when  Massena  was  forced  to  abandon  the  investment  of 
the  lines  of  Torres-Vedras,  and  to  return  to  Spain,  the 
situation  of  his  army  was  most  critical.  Privations  and 
lack  of  food  had  occasioned  many  acts  in  violation  of 

*  General  Vi&rron, Methodes  de  Guerre,  vol.  i.,  p.  133. 


6o  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

discipline.  Nevertheless,  by  the  end  of  March,  after  a 
skillful  retreat,  which  had  brought  back  a  certain  vigor 
to  his  troops,  Massena,  with  characteristic  stubbornness, 
resolved  to  take  the  offensive  on  the  Tasfus.  He  imme- 
diately  gave  his  orders  to  this  effect. 

The  disapprobation  of  his  lieutenants  then  manifested 
itself  in  the  most  disagreeable  manner,  and  Ney,  the 
only  marshal  among  them,  so  far  forgot  himself  as  to 
become  the  mouth-piece  of  the  general  complaints. 

On  the  2 2d  of  March,  he  addressed  to  his  chief  an  in- 
subordinate letter,  which  contained  an  express  refusal  of 
obedience.  Massena,  notwithstanding  his  strength  of 
character,  was  indulgent.  His  vigor  of  action  had,  too, 
become  in  a  measure  impaired,  perhaps,  by  his  long  and 
constant  service.  He  did  not  reply.  At  six  o'clock  on 
the  evening  of  the  same  day,  Ney  wrote  a  letter  in  which 
he  announced  his  resolution  to  leave  on  the  next  day 
with  his  corps,  in  a  direction  different  from  the  one  pre- 
scribed. 

Massena  hesitated  no  longer.  Yet,  mindful  of  his 
former  friendship  for  his  old  companion-in-arms,  he 
warned  the  latter  that  persistence  in  disobedience  would 
necessitate  the  adoption  of  suitable  measures  to  make 
his  authority  respected. 

Ney  had  gone  too  far  to  recede.  He  believed,  more- 
over, that  Massena  was  incapable  of  taking  vigorous 
action  against  him,  and  flattered  himself  that  he  would 
be  able  to  associate  the  troops  of  the  6th  Corps  with  his 
disobedience.  He  persisted  in  his  refusal.  Massena 
then  took  from  him  the  command  of  his  corps,  and  be- 
stowed it  upon  the  senior  division  commander;  forbade 
the  generals  of  division  to  obey  him;  enjoined  them  to 
conform  to  the  instructions  coming  directly  from  the 
general  staff;  made  them  personally  responsible  for  all 
infractions  of  his  own  orders;  and  commanded  Ney  to 
repair  to  Spain,  there  to  await  the  action  of  the  Em- 
peror. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES,         6l 

Ney  was  then  so  culpable  as  to  write  the  following 
letter  to  his  chief:  "The  Emperor  having  confided  to 
me  the  command  of  the  6th  Corps,  no  one  bnt  his  Maj- 
esty has  the  right  to  take  it  from  me.  I  again  protest 
against  this  new  disposition.  However,  if  the  division 
generals  of  the  6th  Corps  obey  you,  I  will  return  to 
Spain." 

The  generals  obeyed.  Massena,  on  his  part,  held  to 
his  decision,  notwithstanding  two  new  protestations  and 
the  pain  which  he  felt  in  the  matter.  Ney  was  obliged 
to  leave  the  army  and  go  back  to  Spain. 

Two  years  afterwards,  Ney,  being  himself  in  command 
in  lyusatia  of  three  army  corps  whose  commanders  were 
nearly  his  equals  in  rank,  was  unable  to  make  his 
authority  recognized,  and  felt  obliged  to  complain  of 
this  to  the  chief-of-stafF,  to  whom  he  wrote  the  following 
letter: 

"It  is  a  duty  which  I  owe  to  myself  to  declare  to 
your  Serene  Highness  that  it  is  impossible  to  make  use 
of  a  large  part  of  the  4th,  7th  and  12th  Corps,  in  the 
present  state  of  their  organization.  Nominally,  they  are 
united  in  a  single  body,  but  they  are  not  so  in  fact. 
Each  of  the  generals-in-chief  does  about  what  he  thinks 
proper  for  his  own  safety;  things  are  thus  at  such  a  pass 
that  it  is  very  difficult  to  act  effectively.  The  morale  of 
the  generals  and  of  the  officers  on  the  whole,  is  singu- 
larly unsettled.  To  command  under  these  circumstances, 
is  only  to  command  in  half,  and  I  would  rather  be  a 
grenadier. 

"I  beg  you  to  obtain  the  Emperor's  consent  that  I 
may  either  be  the  sole  commander-in-chief,  having  but 
the  division  generals  under  my  orders,  or  tliat  his  Majesty 
will  have  the  kindness  to  remove  me  from  this  hell.  I 
have  no  need,  I  believe,  to  speak  of  my  devotion,  I  am 
ready  to  shed  every  drop  of  my  blood,  but  it  must  be  to 
some  purpose. 


62  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 


u ' 


In  the  existing  state  of  affairs,  nothing  but  the  pres- 
ence of  the  Emperor  can  re-establish  unity,  for  all  wills 
bow  to  his  genius,  and  petty  vanities  disappear  before 
the  majesty  of  the  throne."* 

Rivalries  in  Command. — Rivalries  in  command  result  not 
only  from  equality  of  rank,  but  also  from  feelings  of 
selfishness  and  jealousy  which  exist  in  all  armies, 
whether  in  individuals,  in  certain  bodies  of  troops,  or 
in  certain  arms  of  the  service.  These  sentiments  are 
always  blameworthy.  They  cause  disorganization 
among  the  troops,  prevent  the  leaders  from  accepting 
proffered  aid  in  critical  moments,  or  from  hastening  by 
forced  marches  to  the  assistance  of  a  comrade  in  arms. 

In  1870,  at  the  commencement  of  operations,  these 
sentiments  more  than  once  contributed  to  our  reverses. 
There  is  then  no  doubt  of  this  :  in  an  army,  it  is  a  crime 
to  entertain  jealousies  arising  from  a  difference  in  the 
character  of  the  service  rendered. 

To  prevent  the  existence  of  such  tendencies,  it  is  a 
duty  to  keep  alive  in  the  corps  of  officers  a  sentiment  of 
comradeship  and  esteem,  based  upon  honor,  upon  pride 
in  a  noble  profession,  upon  the  conviction  that  the  offi- 
cers of  an  army  form  only  one  and  the  same  family, 
whose  imion  is  a  controlling  condition  of  success. 

Command  of  tlie  Army  of  the  Rhine  in  1870. — In  this  year, 
the  defective  organization  of  the  command-in-chief  of 
the  Army  of  the  Rhine  was  one  of  the  causes  of  our 
misfortunes. 

The  command  given  to  Marshal  Bazaine  on  the  13th 
of  August,  was  limited  exclusively  to  operations.  The 
Emperor  dispatched  orders  in  all  other  cases,  and  from 
this  resulted  great  embarrassments,  which  were  reflected 

*  General  Pierron,  Methodes  de  Guerre,  vol.  i.,  p.  136. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORCxANIZATlON  OF  ARMIES.        63 

upon  all  our  movements.  There  should  then  be  but  one 
head  to  an  army,  especially  in  the  field,  and  this  head 
should  always  be  upon  the  actual  theatre  of  operations. 

Civil  Commissioners  to  the  Armies. — Governments  have 
sometimes  conceived  the  idea  of  doubling  the  command- 
in-chief  by  the  appointment  of  a  civil  commissioner  in- 
vested with  independent  authority.  This  combination 
has  always  been  vexatious  and  injurious.  It  was  adopted 
under  the  first  Republic,  and  caused  reiterated  com- 
plaints, even  on  the  part  of  the  commissioners  them- 
selves. 

The  Committee  of  Public  Safety  thought,  in  1794,  to 
obviate  these  inconveniences,  by  defining  the  mission  of 
the  representatives  of  the  people  to  the  armies,  and  by  de- 
claring that  they  ought  to  encourage  the  generals  rather 
than  take  it  upon  themselves  to  give  the  latter  orders. 

This  purely  platonic  dictum  was  without  effect.  The 
embarrassments  still  continued.  Notwithstanding  this 
experience,  the  Government  of  National  Defence  was 
guilty  of  the  same  error  at  the  end  of  December,  1870. 
The  inconveniences  of  the  situation  thus  created  were 
not  long  in  manifesting  themselves;  and  by  the  2d  of 
January,  1871,  M.  de  Freycinet,  War  Delegate,  was 
forced  to  write  to  M.  de  Serre,  commissioner  to  the 
Army  of  the  East  under  command  of  General  Bourbaki, 
specifying  to  him  clearly  that  he  should  have  no  part  in 
the  command. 

Bodies  of  Troops  Independent  of  the  Commander-in-Chief — The 
principle  of  unity  of  command  is  also  opposed  to  the 
presence  of  independent  bodies  of  troops  within  the 
theatre  of  operations. 

Nevertheless,  in  1870,  we  saw  our  generals  sometimes 
obstructed  in  their  movements  by  bodies  of  francs- 
tireurs^  who  after  all  caused  the  enemy  more  apprehen- 
sion than  actual  damage. 


64  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

General  Chanzy  was  thus  forced  in  December,  1870, 
to  send  a  communication*  to  the  Minister  of  War  upon 
this  subject,  which  gives  an  exact  idea  of  the  confusion 
produced  by  these  independent  troops. 

"We  are  overrun  by  francs-tii^em^s  who  claim  to  have 
their  orders  direct  from  you,  who  will  obey  no  one,  who 
are  a  plague  to  the  inhabitants,  and  whom  I  long  to  see 
in  some  position  where  they  can  be  of  service.  I  ask 
authority  to  dispose  of  them  in  my  army's  zone  of  action, 
and  desire  to  know  exactly  what  are  the  orders  given  di- 
rectly to  Colonel  lyipowski,  and  what  is  the  special  mis- 
sion he  has  to  fill.  In  any  case,  I  shall  give  him  formal 
orders  to  leave  the  city  of  Mans.  He  would  have  been 
completely  organized  some  days  ago  if  he  had  not  lost 
so  much  time. ' ' 

The  Office  of  Second  in  Command. — The  principle  of  unity 
in  command  has  often  been  violated  by  the  creation  of 
the  office  of  second  in  command. 

The  consequences  of  this  innovation,  adopted  espe- 
cially in  monarchical  States,  have  always  been  pernicious. 

They  were  very  clearly  set  forth  by  Wellington  in  two 
letters,  which  are  worthy  of  citation,  f 

Wellington  to  Marshal Beresfoi^d. 

"Freneda,  December  2,  1812. 
"I  have  always  felt  the  inutility  and  inconvenience 
of  the  office  of  second  in  command.  It  has  a  great  and 
high-sounding  title,  without  duties  or  responsibilities  of 
any  description,  at  the  same  time  that  it  gives  preten- 
sions, the  assertions  of  which  are,  and  I  believe  you  know 
I  found  them  in  one  instance  to  be,  very  inconvenient. 
Bvery  officer  in  an  army  should  have  some  duty  to  per- 


*  General  Pierron,  Methodes  de  Guerre,  Vol.  i,  p.  138. 

t  General  Pierrou,  Methodes  de  Guerre,  Vol.  i,  pp.  136  and  137. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIE.S.         65 

form  for  which  he  is  responsible;  and  I  understand  a 
general  officer  commanding  a  division  or  a  large  body 
of  troops  to  be  in  this  situation.  The  second  in  com- 
mand has  none  that  anybody  can  define;  excepting  to 
give  opinions  for  which  he  is  in  no  manner  responsible, 
and  which  I  have  found  one  at  least  ready  to  relinquish 
when  he  discovered  that  they  were  not  liked  in  Eng- 
land." 

Wellington  to  Earl  Bathurst. 

"  Freneda,  January  26,  1813. 

"In  my  opinion,  the  office  of  second  in  command  of 
an  army  in  these  days,  in  which  the  use  of  councils  of 
war  has  been  discontinued,  and  the  chief  in  command 
is  held  responsible  for  everything  that  passes,  is  not  only 
useless,  but  injurious  to  the  service.  A  person  without 
defined  duties,  excepting  to  give  flying  opinions  from 
which  he  may  depart  at  pleasure,  must  be  a  nuisance  in 
moments  of  decision;  and  whether  I  have  a  second  in 
command  or  not,  I  am  determined  alwavs  to  act  accord- 
ing  to  the  dictates  of  my  own  judgment,  being  quite 
certain  that  I  shall  be  responsible  for  the  act,  be  the 
person  who  he  may  according  to  whose  opinion  it  has 
been  adopted.*" 

The  principle,  then,  of  unity  in  the  directing  thought 
does  not  admit  of  exception.  But  once  its  application 
is  assured,  the  strength  of  the  command  depends  upon 
the  personal  qualities  of  the  general-in-chief — upon  his 
character,  and  certain  faculties  whose  union,  often  diffi- 
cult to  find  in  the  same  man,  is  nevertheless  one  of  the 
surest  guaranties  of  success. 


&' 


II.— Qualities  Essential  for  the  Exercise  of  Command. 

In  connection  with  the  organization  of  the  command,- 
it  would  be  going  beyond  the  scope  of  this  work  to  enter 

*  General  Vie^rron,  Meihodes  de  Guerre. 


66  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

into  a  full  discussion  of  the  qualities  which  should  dis- 
tinguish a  general-in-chief. 

However,  it  may  be  advantageous  to  know  the  ideas 
which  are  current  upon  this  subject  in  Germany. 

They  may  serve  as  a  means  of  comparison  in  measur- 
ing our  own  views,  and  there  is  perhaps  no  officer  who 
will  not  be  able  to  draw  profit  from  them. 

Intelligence  and  capacity  are  often  regarded  as  the 
chief  qualities  of  a  military  leader.  This  is  generally 
an  error. 

In  the  first  place,  there  are  no  chief  qualities.  The 
qualities  necessary  for  a  commander  of  troops  vary  ac- 
cording to  the  circumstances  in  which  he  is  placed. 

This  much  is  certain:  with  a  commander,  qualities  of 
character  have  the  greatest  weight. 

Two  of  these  are  held  by  the  Germans  in  esteem 
be5^ond  all  others:  decision  and  good  sense. 

The  ability  to  form  a  clear  resolution  without  hesita- 
tion, and  to  put  it  into  execution,  is  indeed  an  eminent 
virtue,  especially  in  a  military  leader.  It  is  what  Verdy 
du  Vernois  calls  clearness  in  coiiception  and  energy  in 
execution.  These  qualities  sometimes  meet  in  ordinary 
men,  when  by  study  and  reflection  they  have  acquired 
the  faculty  of  clearly  comprehending  the  various  situa- 
tions that  are  constantly  being  presented. 

Decision. — One  of  the  most  remarkable  examples  of 
decision  in  a  commander-in-chief  was  that  given  by 
Prince  Frederick  Charles  on  the  evening  of  2d  July, 
1866,  when  he  resolved  to  attack  the  Austrian  army. 

On  this  date,  the  advanced-guards  of  the  Prussian  and 
Austrian  armies,  posted  upon  the  right  bank  of  the  Elbe, 
were  less  than  seven  kilometres  [from  4  to  4^  miles] 
apart,  and  yet  the  first  army  did  not  suspect  that  the  ad- 
versary was  so  near  and  so  concentrated. 

On  the  Prussian  side,  it  was  thought  that  the  bulk  of 


FIRST   CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.        67 

the  enemy's  forces  occupied  a  position  beyond  the  Elbe, 
witli  its  wings  resting  on  the  strong  places  Josephstadt 
and  Koniggratz.  At  the  general  headquarters,  there- 
fore, there  seemed  no  alternative  but  to  attack  this  po- 
sition or  to  so  manoeuvre  as  to  oblige  the  defenders  to 
leave  it. 

However,  the  staff  of  the  I.  Army,  which  was  the  most 
advanced,  realized,  during  the  2d  of  Jul}^,  that  it  was 
absolutely  essential  to  obtain  more  definite  information 
of  the  enemy.  For  this  purpose  it  sent  out  small  de- 
tachments, on  different  sides,  which  for  the  greater  part 
were  directed  upon  Koniggratz. 

Patrols  of  well-mounted  officers  were  charged  with 
gathering  details  of  the  strength  and  position  of  the  ad- 
versary's forces.  One  of  these  penetrated  beyond  the 
screen  formed  by  reconnoitring  cavalry,  and  found  the 
height  of  Dub  near  the  Bistritz  strongly  occcupied.  It 
ascertained  that  the  Prohaska  brigade  was  posted  there. 

From  prisoners  it  was  learned  that  four  Austrian  corps 
were  in  the  vicinity. 

An  officer  of  hussars  discovered  extended  bivouacs, 
and  was  able  to  locate  a  hostile  corps  at  Sadowa. 

All  this  important  information  reached  the  headquar- 
ters of  the  I.  Army  between  six  and  seven  o'clock  in 
the  evening.  There  was  a  temptation  to  transmit  it  to 
the  generalissimo  and  await  his  orders.  But,  thanks  to 
the  decision  of  the  general-in-chief,  it  resulted  other- 
wise. 

Although  the  day  was  far  advanced,  and  although  in- 
structions had  already  been  sent  from  the  King's  head- 
quarters for  a  general  flank  march  toward  Pardubitz, 
Prince  Frederick  Charles  at  once  determined  upon  a 
contrary  course. 

Large  masses  of  the  enemy  were  in  his  vicinity;  it 
was  therefore  essential  that  his  troops  should  concentrate 
immediately,  in  anticipitation  of  what  was  to  take  place 
on  the  morning  of  the  3d. 


68  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Consequently,  without  heeding  either  the  night  or  the 
bad  weather,  the  Prince,  at  nine  o'clock  in  the  evening, 
dispatched  orders  to  his  different  corps  to  be  in  position 
at  two  o'clock  in  the  morning  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Bis- 
tritz,  ready  to  attack  the  Austrian  positions. 

After  having  sent  these  orders,  his  chief-of-staflf  set 
out  for  Gitschin,  where  the  general  headquarters  of  the 
King  were  located,  arrived  there  at  eleven  o'clock  at 
liight,  gave  an  account  of  the  situation  and  the  disposi- 
tions made,  and  asked  the  judgment  of  the  generalis- 
simo. 

The  King  of  Prussia  showed  no  more  hesitation  than 
Prince  Frederick  Charles,  and  at  once  resolved  to  attack 
with  all  his  forces,  without  anxiety  as  to  whether  the 
entire  Austrian  army  was  before  him,  or  only  a  few  of 
its  corps. 

The  victory  of  Sadowa  was  due  in  great  measure  to  the 
energy  and  promptness  of  these  decisions.  They  resulted 
in  giving  the  initiative  to  the  I.  Army,  and  in  bringing 
the  II.  Army  upon  the  enemy's  right  flank  at  an  oppor- 
tune time. 

After  decision,  one  of  the  qualities  which  contributes 
the  most  to  success  is  stubbornness. 

At  the  end  of  a  day  of  battle,  after  a  prolonged  con- 
test which  has  exhausted  the  combatants  on  both  sides, 
the  general  who  has  the  energy  to  sound  the  charge,  and 
to  hurl  his  remaining  effective  troops,  with  bayonets 
fixed,  upon  the  enemy,  is  almost  certain  of  success. 
This  was  especially  the  opinion  of  General  Grant,* 
one  of  the  men  of  our  time  who  have  given  us  the  most 
remarkable  examples  of  stubbornness. 

"I  have  often  heard  General  Grant  declare  that  there 
arrives  a  moment  in  every  closely  contested  battle  when 
the  two  opposing  armies  are  nearly  exhausted  by  their 

*  General  Pierron,  Methodes  de  Guerre,  Vol.  I.,  p.  22,  ^  3. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.        69 

efforts,  and  when  it  seems  that  each  can  do  no  more. 
That,  in  his  opinion,  was  the  decisive  moment;  and  the 
general-in-chief  who  had  enongh  determination  to  then 
take  the  offensive,  was  sure  to  prevail." 

The  stubbornness  displayed  by  the  Prussian  officers  in 
1866  and  1870,  especially  on  the  offensive,  was  a  con- 
spicuous cause  of  their  success. 

In  this  regard,  moreover,  there  exist  in  this  army 
proud  traditions  which  each  endeavors  to  perpetuate. 

Marshal  Bliicher  boasted  of  his  obstinacy,  and  wrote 
in  1815:* 

"Paris  is  in  my  power;  the  French  army  retires  be- 
hind the  Loire,  and  the  capitol  is  delivered  to  me.  It 
is  to  the  incredible  bravery  and  unparalleled  energy  of 
our  troops,  as  much  as  to  my  own  ii^on  will^  that  this 
triumph  is  due.  Criticisms  and  complaints  upon  the 
exhausted  condition  of  the  troops  have  rained  upon  me; 
but  I  have  remained  deaf  to  them  all.  I  knew  by  exper- 
ience that  we  could  gather  all  the  fruits  of  a  victory  only 
by  pursuing  the  vanquished  without  relaxation  or  delay. ' ' 

In  more  recent  times,  the  Prussians  have  given  re- 
markable examples  of  tenacity. 

That  furnished  by  General  Fransecki,  commanding 
the  7th  division  of  infantry  at  Koniggratz,  deserves 
especial  notice. 

Placed  at  the  extreme  left  of  the  line  of  battle  of  the 
I.  Army,  in  the  Swiepwald  or  wood  of  Maslowed,  and  en- 
gaged since  eight  o'clock  in  the  morning,  this  division 
towards  eleven  o'clock  found  itself  in  presence  of  the 
enemy's  constantly  increasing  masses.  They  belonged 
to  two  Austrian  corps,  the  2d  and  4th,  which  had  al- 
lowed themselves  to  become  engaged  little  by  little,  and 
had  finally  brought  into  line  51  battalions  and  more  than 
100  guns. 

*  General  Pierron,  Methodes  de  Gtierre,  Vol.  I.,  p.  21,  \\. 


yo  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

To  resist  this  powerful  effort,  the  7th  Division  could 
count  only  upon  its  own  troops.  Its  centre  first  gave 
way,  and  it  was  then  feared  that  the  wings  would  be 
driven  asunder.  Soon  the  companies  became  inter- 
mingled and  divided  into  groups,  which  under  the  lead 
of  their  oflEicers  attempted  to  maintain  themselves  upon 
various  points  along  the  borders  of  the  woods.  Some  of 
them  found  themselves  menaced  at  the  same  time  in 
front,  on  the  flanks,  and  in  rear.  They  succeeded,  how- 
ever, in  holding  the  ground  in  the  northern  part  of  the 
woods. 

"In  the  midst  of  alternate  successes  and  reverses," 
says  the  Prussian  narrative,  "the  companies  which 
fought  in  the  depths  of  the  woods  had  finally  become 
thoroughly  commingled.  Moreover,  as  it  was  impossi- 
ble to  see  to  the  front,  and  therefore  to  give  a  svstematic 
direction  to  the  contest,  the  leaders  were  obliged  to  con- 
fine their  efforts  to  setting  personal  examples. 

"At  all  points  the  officers  assembled  around  them  the 
men  whom  they  had  in  hand,  no  matter  to  what  regi- 
ment belonging,  and  led  them  forward.  The  troops 
which  had  been  driven  from  the  woods  were  ordered 
back,  except  those  completely  disorganized,  which  were 
placed  in  reserve.  Large  numbers  of  Austrian  prisoners 
were  continually  being  sent  to  the  rear ;  but  increasing 
streams  of  the  wounded  and  of  men  who  had  lost  their 
leaders  were  also  finding  their  way  there." 

Already  more  than  2,000  men  were  hoj-s  de  combat^ 
and  General  Fransecki  had  vainly  called  for  support 
But,  comprehending  the  importance  of  the  point  occu- 
pied, he  inspired  all  those  surrounding  him  with  the 
firm  resolution  to  defend  to  the  last  extremity  the 
ground  upon  which  they  had  already  poured  out  so 
much  blood. 

The  leaders  gave  the  example,  and  the  resistance  con- 
tinued. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.        7  I 

Fortunately  the  approach  of  the  II.  Army  was  soon 
announced,  and  the  cry,  The  Crozvn  Prince  is  comings 
rintrinof  throujjh  the  thinned  ranks  of  the  defenders  of 
the  woods,  reanimated  the  exhausted  troops. 

But  this  succor  was  still  at  a  distance.  The  7th  Divis- 
ion was  in  a  most  critical  situation.  It  became  neces- 
sary to  dispatch  an  officer  toward  the  columns  of  the  II. 
Army  to  ask  that  the  much-needed  aid  be  immediately 
sent  forward.  This  officer,  in  carrying  out  his  orders, 
was  obliged  to  gallop  through  the  lines  of  the  enemy's 
sharpshooters. 

He  succeeded  in  his  perilous  mission,  and  a  few  min- 
utes after,  the  Prussian  Guard,  taking  the  Austrian 
masses  under  artillery  fire,  extricated  General  Fran- 
secki. 

It  was  by  its  stubbornness  that  the  I.  Army  escaped 
having  its  left  broken  and  its  communication  with  the 
11.  Army  interrupted. 

With  certain  peoples,  the  English  for  example,  tenac- 
ity has  become  a  national  virtue.  Wellington  is  among 
those  who,  by  the  firmness  of  their  character,  have  con- 
tributed the  most  to  this  result. 

He  wrote  upon  this  subject  to  I^ord  Clarendon,  in 
1811:* 

"  No  one  is  better  able  than  you  to  appreciate  the  dif- 
ficulties with  which  I  have  had  to  contend  (during  the 
period  of  Massena's  expedition  in  Portugal);  but,  I  be- 
lieve, you  are  not  acquainted  with  all  of  them.  I  have 
persevered  in  the  system  which  seemed  to  me  the  best, 
notwithstanding  the  opinion  of  every  officer  of  the  Eng- 
lish army  in  Portugal  was,  that  I  ought  to  evacuate  the 
country  and  re-embark  for  England;  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  Portuguese  civil  authorities  contended  that  I 
should  maintain   the  war  upon  the  frontier  in  place  of 

*  General  Pierron,  Methodes  de  Guerre,  Vol.  I,  p.  22,  \  2. 


72  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

coming'  within  the  lines  of  Torres  Vedras,  in  spite  of  the 
consideration  that  we  lacked,  for  this  purpose,  not  only 
material  forces,  but  also  the  means  of  providing  for  the 
wants  of  the  only  Portuguese  troops  which  could  be  put 
on  foot.  It  is  only  by  inflexible  firmness  that  I  have  for 
nine  months  resisted  the  discussions  of  opinions  contrary 
to  my  own.  Add  to  this,  that  public  opinion  in  England 
on  this  subject  was  almost  as  variable  as  the  wind,  and 
you  will  realize  that  I  could  rely  only  upon  myself" 

It  has  often  been  said  that  the  French  character,  nat- 
urally impressionable,  has  not  this  .  stubbornness  in 
action,  which  is  so  powerful  a  guaranty  of  success. 
We  have  all  manner  of  faults  ascribed  to  us,  especially 
since  our  defeats.  How  many  times  has  it  been  repre- 
sented that  we  allow  ourselves  to  be  easily  influenced  by 
appearances  during  battle,  and  are  often  led  to  consider 
as  lost,  positions  which  are  not  even  endangered  ? 

To  this,  there  is  only  one  reply  :  When  we  were  con- 
querors, it  was  quite  another  thing.  "The  tenacity  of 
the  French,"  says  General  Marbot,  "was  called  in 
question  before  the  wars  of  the  Revolution  ;  it  is,  how- 
ever, one  of  the  principal  virtues  which  they  displayed 
there,  and  one  of  the  first  causes  of  the  numerous  vic- 
tories which  they  won  during  a  period  of  twenty- 
seven  years.  The  persistency  of  our  generals  contrib- 
uted very  much  to  these  results,  for  this  quality  exercises 
a  great  influence  upon  the  fighting  capacity  of  the  sol- 
diers, who  soon  become  acquainted  with  the  character 
of  their  general.  And  when  they  realize  that  he  will 
order  a  retreat  only  in  the  last  extremity,  and  will  lead 
them  back  eight  or  ten  times  to  the  charge,  before  con- 
sidering himself  beaten,  they  make  their  first  attacks 
with  more  determination,  and  gain  victory  more  fre- 
quently, than  troops  which,  although  unshattered  them- 
selves, are  yet  accustomed  to  retreat,  because  not  able  to 
drive  back  the  enemv  in  one  or  two  attacks." 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.        73 

The  wars  of  the  first  part  of  this  century  offer  examples 
of  this  military  virtue,  unsurpassed  by  any  other  age. 

Was  it  not,  moreover,  to  this  that  Napoleon  owed  his 
victories  in  great  part  ? 

The  uniform  and  complete  successes  of  Napoleon, 
says  Rocquancourt,  ought  to  be  attributed  : 

ist.  To  his  incomparable  skill  in  creating,  assembling, 
organizing,  and  vivifying,  the  means  of  war,  propor- 
tionate to  the  grandeur  of  his  enterprises; 

2d.  To  an  activity  which  always  assured  him  the  in- 
itiative; 

3d.  To  a  rapidity  of  perception  and  of  action,  which 
left  to  the  enemy  neither  opportunity  for  reflection  nor 
time  to  check  his  designs; 

4th.   To  the  best  possible  use  of  masses. 

5th.  To  that  ascendency  which  he  exercised  from  the 
outset,  as  well  over  his  adversaries  as  over  his  own 
troops,  and  which  increased  with  his  growing  authority 
and  his  ulterior  successes; 

6th.  To  a  tenacity  which  he  knew  how  to  conijnuni- 
cate  to  all^  and  which,  with  him,  was  as  much  the  result 
of  reflection  as  a  natural  gift. 

It  was  a  principle  with  him,  when  an  action  was  com- 
menced and  while  nothing  was  yet  decided,  that  it  was 
better  to  continue  the  combat  and  to  consent  to  new 
sacrifices,  than  by  a  premature  retreat  to  render  of  no 
avail  to  the  country  the  blood  of  the  men  already  slain. 

This  principle,  far  from  being  inhuman,  results  in 
avoiding  fresh  sacrifice  of  life. 

^''Before  cojtceding  the  victory^  let  us  wait  until  it  is 
snatched ffom  us^''^  said  Napoleon;  ''''before  retiring,  let 
MS  wait  until  we  are  forced  to  do  so.'''' 

His  personal  opinion  upon  the  qualities  requisite  in 
the  commander  ought  not,  moreover,  to  be  passed  by  in 
silence.* 

*  General  Pierron,  Methodes  de  Guerre,  Vol.  I.,  p.  14,  \\2  and  4. 


74  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

"The  first  quality  of  a  commander-in-cliief  is  the 
possession  of  a  cool  head,  which  receives  correct  impres- 
sions of  things,  which  never  becomes  over-excited, 
which  does  not  permit  itself  to  be  intoxicated  by  good 
nor  bewildered  by  bad  news;  a  mind  in  which  the  suc- 
cessive or  simultaneous  impressions  received  during  the 
course  of  a  day  classify  themselves,  and  take  only  the 
place  they  should  properly  occupy;  for  good  sense  and 
reason  are  the  result  of  comparing  several  sensations, 
weighed  with  equal  consideration. 

"There  are  men  who,  from  their  ph^'^sical  and  moral 
constitution,  are  unable  to  form  practical  views  upon  a 
subject;  whatever  knowledge,  intelligence,  courage,  or 
good  qualities  of  any  kind  they  may  possess,  nature  has 
not  called  them  to  the  command  of  armies  nor  to  the 
direction  of  grand  operations  of  war. 

"It  is  necessary  that  a  warrior  have  as  much  charac- 
ter as  intellect;  men  who  have  a  great  deal  of  intelli- 
gence and  little  character  are  the  least  adapted  for  war; 
they  are  like  ships  with  masts  disproportionate  to  the 
ballast  ;  it  is  better  to  have  a  great  deal  of  character  and 
less  intelligence.  Men  of  mediocre  minds  and  corre- 
sponding character  will  often  succeed  in  this  profession: 
there  should  be  as  much  base  as  elevation.  Csesar, 
Hannibal,  Turenne,  Prince  Eugene,  and  Frederick,  were 
men  who  possessed  both  character  and  intelligence  in  a 
high  degree. 

"It  is  will,  character,  application,  and  audacity, 
which  have  made  me  what  I  am. ' '  * 

Difficulties  of  the  Command  in  our  Time. — Whatever  may 
be  the  qualities  required  in  those  to  whose  hands  the 
command  is  entrusted,  it  is  not  without  interest  to  ob- 
serve that  in  our  time,  these  qualities  ought  to  be  still 
more  highly  developed  than  formerly. 

*  General  Pierron,  Methodes  de  Guerre,  Vol.  I.,  p.  i6,  \  3. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.         75 

This  results  from  the  increase  in  the  size  of  armies, 
the  multiplicity  of  the  elements  composing  them,  and 
the  enlarged  dimensions  of  the  theatres  of  war. 

Frederick  the  Great  commanded  armies  of  from  30,- 
000  to  50,000  men.  Napoleon  directed  bodies  of  large 
size,  but  they  usually  acted  in  serried  masses  under  his 
own  eye. 

To-day,  a  general-in-chief  directs  two,  three  or  four 
armies  of  from  150,000  to  200,000  men  each,  or  a  total 
of  nearly  a  million.  In  battle,  he  has  difficulty  in  find- 
ing a  point  from  which  can  be  seen  the  movements  of 
his  entire  operating  forces.  At  all  events,  he  is  too  dis- 
tant to  exercise  personal  control  in  the  wings.  Often, 
when  he  sends  an  order,  the  situation  to  which  it  refers 
is  changed  before  the  arrival  of  the  bearer. 

From  this  state  of  things  will  arise  greater  difficulties, 
requiring  capacities  of  a  wider  grasp,  greater  skill  in  as- 
suming the  initiative,  and  above  all  a  stronger  and  bet- 
ter disciplined  will. 

III.— Assistants  to  the  Command.     ^ 

We  must  conclude  from  all  this,  that  henceforth  the 
commanders-in-chief  and  the  generals  ought  to  be  sec- 
onded by  more  carefully  selected  assistants  than  for- 
merly— men  whose  military  qualities  are  more  highly 
tempered. 

The  Staff. — The  first  of  these  auxiliaries,  and  one 
whose  co-operation  is  most  vital,  is  the  staff.  We  shall 
see  later,  on  the  subject  of  the  organization  of  general 
headquarters,  what  are  the  ideas  which  seem  to  prevail 
to-day  regarding  the  selection  of  a  good  staffi  This 
body  is  especially  a  transmission  agency.  But  the 
supreme  command  has  also  at  its  disposal,  an  executive 
instrument  more  useful  and  more  important  still.  It 
is  the  corps  of  officers. 


76  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Corps  of  Officers. — The  officers  of  an  army  are  the  soul 
of  a  body  of  which  the  general-in-chief  is  the  head. 

They  arouse  and  develop  the  moral  qualities,  and  sus- 
tain them  at  their  maximum  intensity.  They  exert 
this  influence  by  the  principles  they  propagate,  the  tra- 
ditions they  keep  alive,  the  example  they  set,  the  indi- 
vidual authority  they  exercise,  and  the  prestige  they 
acquire.  They  have  thus  a  strong  personality  ;  and 
notwithstanding  their  dispersion,  their  influence  upon 
the  results  of  a  war  is  signally  iniDortant. 

To-day,  with  our  large  effectives,  with  the  wide  de- 
velopment of  armies  upon  the  battle-field,  the  corps  of 
officers  will  exercise  a  still  more  important  control  over 
the  success  of  the  operations. 

They  are  the  creators  and  the  guardians  of  the  mili- 
tary spirit,  of  the  convictions  of  the  soldiers,  of  their 
enthusiasm,  of  their  energy. 

They  constitute  a  formidable  organ  that  can  of  itself 
alone  gain  battles;  that,  consequently,  should  be  guided 
with  solicitude,  and  cultivated  with  jealous  care;  whose 
efforts  should  be  encouraged  and  sustained,  whose  pres- 
tige raised,  whose  merits  extolled. 

For  all  these  reasons,  it  will  be  profitable  to  seek  out 
and  analyze,  briefly  at  least,  the  conditions  essential  to 
the  existence  of  a  good  corps  of  officers. 

Qualities  of  the  Corps  of  Officers. — "In  the  first  rank  of 
these  qualities  should  be  placed  obedience.  Some  wish 
it  passive  and  complete,  warm  and  devoted;  others  pre- 
fer a  cold,  reflecting,  arguing  obedience,  following  the 
sense  and  spirit  of  the  instructions."* 

Passive  and  Reasoning  Obedience.  —  General  Bedeau  re- 
jected the  principle  of  unqualified  and  irresponsible  obe- 

*  General  Blondel. 


FIRST   CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION   OF   ARMIES.       "]"] 

dience  as  an  obsolete  rule,  good  enough  for  the  past. 
By  a  strange  fatality,  destiny  has  taken  upon  herself  to 
answer  his  arguments.  He  perished  in  our  civil  dis- 
cords, a  victim  of  the  ideas  of  revolt  and  insubordina- 
tion. 

These  two  estimates  of  the  forms  of  obedience  are 
often  met  with.  In  a  good  army,  however,  obedience 
ought  never  to  be  argumentative,  even  in  intimacy. 

The  commander-in-chief  and  the  generals  permit  only 
passive  obedience. 

There  is,  then,  only  one  rule  which  properly  sums  up 
and  simplifies  the  duties  of  the  soldier: 

"  Under  arms,  the  law  is  the  command  of  the  respon- 
sible chief,  as  the  country  is  the  flag, 

"This  rule  governs  in  the  armies  of  republican  Amer- 
ica, no  less  than  in  the  armies  of  imperial  Germany  and 
of  autocratic  Russia.  It  has  governed  in  the  same  way 
in  all  armies,  ancient  and  modern.  History  constantly 
exhibits  to  us  as  enfeebled  and  conquered,  the  peoples 
that  have  turned  away  from  it;  for  outside  of  it,  there 
is  no  discipline,  and  without  discipline,  no  hope  of  suc- 
cess. 

"In  order  then  that  an  army  may  be  strong,  it  ijiust 
be  united;  to  be  united,  it  must  be  obedient,  energetic, 
devoted.  By  this  alone  is  that  harmony  of  efforts  as- 
sured which  creates  its  power,  and  which,  in  peace  as 
well  as  in  war,  maintains  it  at  a  height  in  keeping  with 
the  nobility  of  its  mission. 

"Let  it  not  be  said  that  such  obedience  abases  the 
character.  The  contrary  is  true.  Military  obedience  is 
noble,  for  it  is  enjoined  by  devotion;  and  devotion 
reaches,  in  case  of  need,  even  to  the  sacrifice  of  life. 

"Thus  a  good  soldier  owes,  above  all,  obedience  to 
his  superiors,  confidence  in  their  orders,  a  decided  wish 
to  have  them  executed;  obedience  in  fact  and  from  the 
heart,    without   reservation,    without   controversy,    free 


78  PART    FIPST. — STRATEGY. 

from  lukewarmness;  obedience  even  to  the  point  of  de- 
votion; for  it  is  necessary  to  make  renunciation  of  his 
own  thouoht  and  his  own  manner  of  seeing-  in  order  to 
place  his  will  and  his  intelligence  at  the  service  of  an- 
other intellioence  and  another  will." 

In  our  noble  and  proud  profession  there  can  then 
be  no  doubt  of  this:  absolute  obedience  is  a  dogma. 
"  However  active  may  be  the  intelligence  of  the  French- 
man, however  ardent  his  imagination,  however  sensitive 
his  vanity,  officer  or  soldier,  he  is  only  an  instrument. 
It  is  not  for  him  to  know  if  his  superior  is  fallible  or 
not';  he  has  only  to  obey.  It  is  necessary  to  obey,  for  in 
reasoning  one  may  perhaps  be  mistaken.  It  is  necessary 
to  obey,  for  in  war  hesitation  is  always  fatal.  In  case  of 
a  wrong  manoeuvre,  but  one  executed  with  decision  and 
sustained  with  vigor,  the  enemy  is  often  surprised  and 
disconcerted,  and  a  success  is  gained,  over  which  the 
victor  himself  is  sometimes  more  astonished  than  the 
adversary. 

"With  an  enthusiastic  nation  like  ours,  we  have  every- 
thing to  fear  from  hesitation  on  the  battle-field;  it  de- 
stroys the  chief  element  of  our  power  in  arms.  We 
should  obey,  because  an  army's  strength  lies  in  its  unity 
of  action,  and  out  of  discussion  comes  discord.  Finally, 
it  is  one's  own  interest  to  obey;  whatever  may  be  the 
results,  he  feels  himself  beyond  reproach  who  can  say, 
I  have  obeyed."* 

An  Order  to  Sacrifice  One's  Life. — In  Vendee,  on  June  17, 
1793,  the  Republican  army  under  Kleber,  had  since  sun- 
rise been  fighting  in  retreat  before  an  enemy  to  whom 
acquaintance  with  this  difficult  country  gave  great  ad- 
vantage. Arriving  toward  evening  at  the  bridge  near 
Clisson,  upon  the  Scvre,  which  he  wished  to  use  as  a 
protection  for  his  retreat,  the  Republican  general  called 

*  General  Blondel. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.        79 

a  chief  of  battalion,  and  ordered  him  to  defend  the 
bridge  to  the  last  extremity,  addressing  to  him  these 
harsh  words  :  "  You  are  to  die  there  with  your  battalion.'''' 

The  latter  replied  simply:  "  Yes^  general.,''''  and  he 
kept  his  word.  He  lost  200  men  and  was  himself  killed 
on  the  spot,  but  the  army  was  saved. 

Here  was  greater  patriotism  than  in  the  most  pom- 
pons speeches.  We  must  not  forget  his  name.  This 
hero  was  Schonardin,  the  commander  of  the  battalion 
from  Saone-et- Loire.  * 

Obedience  of  Grouchy  at  Waterloo. — One  of  the  most  cele- 
brated and,  at  the  same  time,  unfortunate  examples  of 
passive  obedience,  was  that  given  by  Marshal  Grouchy 
on  June  18,  1815,  the  day  of  the  disastrous  battle  of 
Waterloo.  His  conduct  has  caused  the  suspicion  of 
treason  to  rest  upon  his  memory;  yet  the  following 
letterf  which  he  wrote  to  the  Emperor  on  the  day  after 
the  battle  plainly  shows  that  he  had  not  considered  it 
his  duty  to  modify  one  of  Napoleon's  orders.  His 
greatest  fault  was  in  having  lacked  energy  in  the  pur- 
suit of  Bliicher,  and  in  not  having  overtaken  him. 

"Sire,  it  was  only  yesterday,  between  six  and  seven 
o'clock  in  the  evening,  that  I  received  the  Major-Gen- 
eral's letter  dated  June  18,  i  o'clock  p.  m.,  by  which 
you  ordered  me  to  move  upon  Saint-Lambert  to  attack 
General  Bulow. 

"While  I  was  in  the  act  of  writing  to  you,  a  cannon- 
ading was  heard  upon  the  left.  Having  been  apprised 
by  yourself,  the  evening  before,  when  I  took  leave  of 
your  Majesty  upon  the  battle-field  of  Fleurus,  that  you 
were  to  move  upon  the  English  and  give  them  battle 
should  they  make  a  stand  on  this  side  of  the  forest  of 

*  General  Blondel. 

t  General  Pierron,  Methodes  de  Guerre ^  Vol.  II.,  p.  758. 


8o  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Soignes, — which  your  Majesty  must  have  doubted,  since 
you  wrote  to  Prince  Joseph  at  Paris  that  the  English 
army  was  in  i-etreat  upon  Brussels, — I  was  but  little 
astonished  at  this  cannonading,  considering  it  a  rear- 
guard engagement! 

"I  had  just  dispatched  my  letter  to  you,  Sire,  by  one 
of  your  former  pages,  Major  La  Fresnaye,  a  good  horse- 
man and  well  mounted,  whom  I  ordered  to  keep  con- 
stantly within  reach  of  your  Majesty  for  the  purpose 
of  bringing  me  your  orders  in  case  you  had  any  to  give 
me,  when  I  was  informed  by  an  aide-de-camp  from  Gen- 
eral Excel  mans  that  he  had  a  Prussian  rear-guard  in  his 
front  which  had  taken  position  to  the  right  of  one  of  the 
roads  leading  from  Sart-a-Walhain  to  Wavre,  the  point 
toward  which  all  the  enemy's  troops  appeared  to  be 
directed.  I  mounted  my  horse  to  attack  them,  when 
General  Gerard,  stopping  me,  attei?ipted  to  pe7^suade  me 
to  move  in  the  direction  of  the  cannonadiiig.  I  made 
known  to  him  in  a  few  words  the  reasons  preventing 
me  from  following  his  advice;  but  he  did  not  the  less  ht- 
sist  upon  beijig  allowed  to  march  in  the  direction  of  the 
firing  with  the  ^th  Corps^  if  I  did  not  desire  to  do  so  with 
the  whole  of  my  troops.  I  did  not  believe  it  my  duty 
under  these  circumstances,  any  more  than  on  any  other 
occasion.  Sire,  to  assume  the  responsibility  of  modifying 
your  orders." 

There  are  certain  qualities  which,  more  than  all 
others,  develop  at  the  same  time  both  obedience  and 
discipline. 

Military  Spirit  and  Martial  Spirit. — In  the  first  rank  of 
these  qualities  should  be  placed  the  military  spirit. 
France  has  not  always  excelled  in  the  military  spirit, 
but  rather,  indeed,  in  the  martial  spirit.  There  is  a 
difference  between  these  two  qualities  which  it  is  im- 
portant to  grasp. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.        8 1 

"  The  latter,"  says  General  Blondel,  "makes  nations 
warlike;  the  former  makes  armies  powerful  by  order 
and  discipline.  One  is  a  native  virtue,  the  other  an* 
acquired  quality;  one  is  in  the  blood,  the  other  a  matter 
of  habit.  Alone,  the  one  can  gain  brilliant  successes, 
but  their  results  may  be  compromised  or  annihilated  by 
the  most  trifling  event.  By  itself,  the  other  can  give 
transient  eclat  to  peoples  without  natural  vigor;  but 
this  power  dies  with  the  great  men  who  created  it.  To 
attain  and  preserve  the  first  rank  among  nations,  both 
are  necessary — the  martial  spirit  and  the  military  spirit, 
a  warlike  people  and  a  great  leader." 

With  us,  will  alone  is  wanting  to  regain  these  two 
qualities.  One  of  them  is  the  birth-right  of  our  race; 
the  other  is  acquired  in  the  school  of  adversity.  If  kept 
alive  in  our  army,  and  developed,  they  will  again  shine 
with  renewed  splendor. 

When  we  consider  these  things,  must  we  not  wish 
that  the  recollection  of  our  reverses,  the  imprint  of 
which  is  borne  by  our  new  laws,  may,  in  time,  trans- 
form our  national  character,  arrest  the  contagion  of  self- 
ishness and  worldliness;  make  character  virile,  firm  in 
duty,  prepared  for  sacrifices;  restore  honor  to  her  true 
place,  not  upon  the  shrine  of  splendor  and  wealth,  but 
in  the  conscience  and  in  the  heart;  and,  while  our 
young  men  are  passing  through  the  army  for  instruction, 
teach  them  to  esteem  those  who  wear  the  uniform  as  the 
worthiest  and  the  most  deserving  of  honor. 

The  moral  qualities  which  distinguish  a  good  corps 
of  officers  are  not  the  only  sources  of  their  influence. 

Aside  from  these  qualities,  there  are  things  resulting 
from  them  which  more  particularly  strike  the  soldier, 
and  which  stimulate  him  to  becoming  deeds.  The  vairi- 
ousordinary  acts  of  the  military  life  are  summed  up  in 
a  single  one:  the  performance  of  duties. 

As  a  principle,  the  army  being  the  nation's  strength, 
6 


82  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

patriotism  enjoins  that  all  things  should  be  sought  for 
which  increase  its  power,  and  all  those  shunned  which 
tend  to  enfeeble  it.     This  is  a  primary  rule  of  conduct. 

Duties  towards  Superiors. — Now  in  order  that  an  army 
may  be  strong,  it  is  not  sufficient  that  all  the  officers  and 
soldiers  be  brave  and  well  equipped.  There  must  still 
be  cohesion,  unity,  and  constancy  in  their  efforts. 

These  advantages  can  spring  only  from  a  single  will, 
making  all  arms  and  hands  act  to  a  common  end,  and 
from  a  single  mind  directing  all  faculties  toward  the 
same  result. 

Discipline  and  Subordination. — "Discipline  and  subordi- 
nation are  the  thongs  of  the  fasces;  by  these  the  horde 
becomes  a  unit,  a  quickened  body,  a  colossus  capable  of 
the  most  gigantic  efforts. 

"  There  can  then  be  only  a  single  independent  will  in 
an  army:  that  of  the  general-in-chief.  The  others,  with- 
out exceptien,  obey,  from  the  general  officer  to  the  chief 
of  squad,  and  their  commands  are  but  a  consequence  of 
of  their  obedience."* 

Execution  ot  Orders. — But  this  obedience  should  be  in- 
telligent. It  is  not  the  obedience  of  a  machine  ;  it  is 
that  of  an  enlightened  will,  which,  while  it  does  not  dis- 
cuss the  order  given,  yet  seeks  to  execute  it  in  the  most 
intelligent  way. 

It  is  impossible,  in  making  out  orders,  to  foresee  and 
provide  for  all  situations  that  may  arise;  and  therefore 
in  high  commands  these  orders  should  be  liberal  enough, 
notwithstanding  their  precision,  to  allow  each  officer  the 
latitude  of  action  appropriate  to  his  position.  The  one 
who  executes  has  thus  to  exercise  a  choice  of  means. 

*  General  Blondei. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIP:S.         83 

"Even  a  corporal  of  the  outposts  or  a  distant  sentry 
may  give  proof  of  willingness  and  capacity.  .  .  .  This 
is  still  truer  of  an  officer.  .  .  .  He  ought,  then,  to  use 
the  faculty  of  thinking — to  find  and  to  place  in  operation 
the  best  means  of  attaining  the  end  prescribed  by  his 
chief.* 

The  Initiative. — We  see,  then,  that  the  dogma  of  passive 
obedience  ought  never  to  stifle  the  initiative,  especially 
in  high  grades.  Also  that  the  order  of  the  superior 
should  not  curtail  it  unduly,  to-day  especially,  when  the 
circumstances  under  which  the  order  is  given  may  have 
completely  changed  before  it  reaches  the  officer  charged 
with  its  execution .  To  properly  exercise  the  initiative  in 
carrying  out  orders  is  not  always  easy,  however.  Cir- 
cumstances are  liable  to  arise  in  the  field  when  the  re- 
quirements of  this  double  principle  place  the  officer  in 
the  most  critical  situations. 

Hesitation  in  the  Execution  of  an  Order. — At  Koniggratz, 
the  2d  and  4th  Austrian  Corps  had  received  orders  to 
place  themselves  between  the  Bistritz  and  the  Elbe,  thus 
to  form  the  right  wing. 

Drawn  into  a  violent  encounter  with  the  7th  Prussian 
Division,  which  defended  the  wood  of  Maslowed  (Swiep- 
wald)  with  great  stubbornness,  these  two  corps  insensi- 
bly changed  the  direction  of  their  front,  and  wasted 
most  of  their  forces  in  this  unprofitable  struggle. 

When  the  general-in-chief,  Benedek,  was  informed  of 
the  appearance  of  the  II.  Prussian  Army  upon  his  right 
flank  and  rear,  he  gave  these  two  corps  orders  to  return 
to  their  first  position  between  Clilum  and  the  Elbe,  at 
the  very  moment  when  their  success  against  the  7th 
Division  was  assured. 

*  General  Blondel. 


84  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

It  was  necessary  then  to  renounce  their  advantage. 
These  victorious  and  severely-tried  troops  were  obliged 
to  retire,  executing  a  flank  march  under  fire  of  the 
Prussian  columns  arriving  from  the  north, 
"  One  of  the  corps  commanders  hesitated,  and  hastened 
to  the  commander-in-chief  to  remonstrate.  But  the 
order  was  adhered  to. 

These  were  the  columns  in  retreat  whose  flank  and 
rear  the  Prussians  of  the  II.  Army  saw  upon  reaching  the 
field  of  battle  towards  noon.  The  latter  redoubled  their 
ardor  and  audacity,  and,  aided  by  a  withering  fire,  had 
no  difficulty  in  throwing  these  two  corps  back  in  disor- 
der beyond  the  centre  of  the  main  forces.  After  the 
defeat,  nothing  was  said  to  the  commanders  of  the  2d 
and  4th  Corps;  their  movement  had  been  fatal,  but  they 
had  obeyed. 

To  sum  up:  "  Obedience  in  all  its  length  and  breadth^ 
devotion  in  all  its  height^  characterize  the  ideal  niilitary 
spirit ; 

"And  all  soldierly  virtues  are  embraced  in  these  two: 
discipline  QXidi  courage.'''' 

Duties  towards  Equals  and  Inferiors. — After  all,  obedience 
to  the  orders  of  a  superior  is  perhaps,  for  officers,  the 
easiest  of  their  functions.  Their  duties  toward  equals 
and  inferiors  are  of  a  more  delicate  character.  "We 
fulfill  them  in  uniting  ourselves  to  the  former  by  affec- 
tion; to  the  latter  by  command  and  kindly  protection." 

It  is  by  following  this  principle  that  the  corps  of  offi- 
cers prepares  and  sustains  union  in  armies^ 

"For  the  officer,  the  affection  of  his  comrades  is  the 
compensation  for  sacrifices  ...  It  is  the  safeguard 
against  jealous  rivalries  and  intemperate  ambitions.  It 
has  its  source  in  the  generous  recollections  of  youth  or 
in  the  first  dangers  of  his  adventurous  life.  At  the  out- 
set of  a  career  so  peculiarly  honorable,  it  is  indeed  rare 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.         85 

that  he  does  not  feel  all  the  sentiments  inspired  by 
honor.  With  a  heart  still  warm  with  family  affection, 
he  sees  in  his  eqnals  only  friends,  in  his  leaders  models 
whom  he  delights  to  follow  and  whose  superior  qualities 
he  willingly  acknowledges. 

"In  this  first  freshness  of  zeal,  discipline  is  the  better 
understood. 

"Nowhere  is  fraternity  more  necessary  than  in  a 
career  where  one  is  always  liable  in  the  morning  to  have 
need  of  the  assistance  rendered  the  night  before  to 
another; — assistance  with  money,  advice,  or  sword.  He 
should  then  see  in  his  equals,  brothers  whose  attachment 
is  founded  on  esteem;  in  the  corps  to  which  he  belongs, 
a  family  replacing  his  own;  in  inferiors,  companions  in 
arms  whose  judgments  will  not  be  on  this  account  the 
less  favorable,  gratitude  the  less  lively,  nor  assistance  the 
less  effective. "  * 

The  bonds  thus  established  give  incalculable  strength 
to  armies. 

Mode  of  Exercising  Commaiid. — In  order  that  a  corps  of 
officers  may  have  great  influence  upon  an  army,  it  is 
necessary,  then,  that  the  command  be  skilfully  exercised. 
The  duties  imposed  by  this  office  require  special 
qualities. 

"The  commander  must  not  only  cover  the  acts  of  his 
inferiors  with  his  name  and  his  authority,  but  he  must 
require  these  subordinates  to  yield  submission  to  his 
orders, — an  obedience  not  only  unmurmuring,  but  even 
ardent.  He  must  know  how  to  make  them  submit 
without  wounding  them,  to  govern  without  degrading 
them,  to  keep  down  resistance  without  provoking 
revolt. ' ' 

Now   those  things   which    control    without   off"ering 

*  General  Blondel. 


86  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

offense  are  real  superiority,  moral  qualities,  knowledge, 
and  the  faculty  of  inspiring  respect  and  affection. 

Since  our  defeats  we  have  looked  in'  all  directions  for 
the  best  means  of  strengthening  discipline  in  the  army. 
Often  we  have  thought  to  find  it  in  excessive  rigor,  and 
at  other  times  in  undue  lenity. 

These  were  extreme  methods  :  "In  reality,  the  art  of 
easily  governing  men  is  to  act  upon  them  through  their 
impulses.  In  France  the  dominant  passions  are  love  of 
glory  and  honor.  Among  our  soldiers  there  is  not  one 
who  does  not  respond  to  this  powerful  and  sublime 
voice — the  voice  of  honor.  Honor  !  admirable  pivot  for 
great  actions;  soul  of  the  military  life;  exalted  pride, 
leading  men  to  lives  without  fear  and  without  reproach. 
It  gives  desire  for  reputation,  disdain  of  pomps  and  van- 
ities, abomination  of  shameful  means,  love  of  duty,  the 
passion  stimulating  the  soldier  to  merit  all  the  good  that 
is  thought  of  him.  It  is  more  powerful  still  and  more 
noble  than  the  love  of  glory,  for  it  is  deeper  seated  and 
less  interested."  * 

It  is  then  by  resting  himself  upon  these  high  senti- 
ments that  the  commander  can  succeed  in  obtaining 
from  his  troops  the  most  perfect  obedience  and  the  most 
substantial  discipline. 

He  will  be  sure  then  of  the  excellence  of  his  army. 

Condition  of  the  French  Army  in  Point  of  Morale. — Our 
army — let  us  make  no  mistake  in  the  matter — is  not  in 
this  respect  in  condition  to  admit  of  easy  comparison 
with  other  European  armies.  Many  shocks  have  dis- 
turbed it  during  the  last  century,  and  to  properly  esti- 
mate its  elements  of  strength  we  must  forget  neither  its 
past  character  nor  its  history. 

"A  hundred  years  ago  the  army  regenerated  France. 
It  was  in  its  ranks  that  the  passion  for  glory  and  liberty 


*  General  Blondel. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.         87 

electrified  so  many  hearts,  sustained  so  many  efforts, 
produced  so  many  prodigies.  It  was  there  that  after 
many  sacrifices,  mistakes,  and  reverses,  we  saw  our  in- 
experienced young  soldiers,  without  shoes,  without  bread, 
almost  without  arms,  but  animated  by  this  passion  and 
disciplined  at  the  cannon's  mouth,  conquer  and  drive 
from  the  sacred  soil  of  France  the  trained  generals  and 
veteran  troops  which  united  Europe  brought  against 
us. 

"This  fever  was  abating  when,  by  the  genius  of  a 
great  captain,  it  was  rekindled.  The  master  of  victory 
had  appeared."* 

He  gave  to  our  army  immortal  glories  which  no 
recollection,  even  the  most  cruel,  can  efface.  He  raised 
its  material  and  its  moral  power  to  a  height  which  no 
other  army  has  ever  known.  Under  his  ascendency, 
devotion,  enthusiasm,  and  the  other  military  virtues 
reached  their  highest  altitudes;  victory  became  a  habit; 
glory  had  never  before  such  brilliancy. 

So  much  renown  bewildered  us,  and,  in  our  blindness, 
we  did  not  see  the  enemy  growing  upon  our  frontier; 
did  not  understand  the  jealousies,  the  nameless  hatreds 
which  we  had  provoked,  nor  the  ambitions  which 
watched  us  in  silence. 

To-day,  however,  our  eyes  are  open.  But  yet  we 
know  that,  if  we  have  been  vanquished,  our  honor  is 
still  without  stain;  if  defeat  forced  us  once  to  lower  our 
colors,  it  has  not  made  us  forget  the  glory  of  our  former 
successes.  The  great  names,  Rivoli,  Marengo,  Jena, 
Austerlitz,  graven  in  characters  of  fire  upon  our  history, 
will  always  shine  with  the  same  splendor  on  the  stand- 
ards of  our  regiments.  The  military  qualities  which 
have  given  us  these  victories  are  the  same  as  formerly. 
Moreover,  we  know   to-day  the    faults  which    brought 

*  General  Blondel. 


88  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

about  our  misfortunes,  and  we  are  not  blind  to  the  ani- 
mosities which  threaten  us.  We  know  that  labor  and 
determination  have  already  given  back  to  us  our 
strength;  that  our  army  has  entered,  in  its  turn,  upon 
a  new  career,  and  that  it  has  constantly  for  its  guide 
two  sacred  words  whose  prestige  is  immortal,  the  words 
honor  and  country. 

The  principles  which  have  just  been  held  up  to 
view  have  shown  us  upon  what  foundations  the  organ- 
ization of  the  command  in  armies  should  rest.  But 
beyond  these  rules,  which  have  a  considerable  influence 
upon  the  moral  force  of  armies,  upon  their  cohesion  and 
their  strength,  there  are  others  of  a  material  character 
which  are  not  less  indispensable  to  assure  success. 

It  is  important,  first  of  all,  to  be  acquainted  with 
those  which  concern  the  distribution  of  the  masses  to 
be  set  in  motion. 

§  7.    FORMATION   OF   ARMIES. 

When  we  seek  the  rules  governing  the  formation  of 
armies,  the  first  question  which  presents  itself  to  the 
mind  is  that  relating  to  the  ^lumber  of  men  to  be  assem- 
bled under  the  same  leader;  the  second,  to  their  most 
advantageous  division;  and  the  third,  to  the  proportion 
of  accessories  to  be  joined  to  the  combatant  forces. 

We  shall  consider  each  of  these  subjects  in  detail. 

I.— The  Effective  Strength  of  Annies. 

History  teaches  us  that  very  large  armies  can  be  com- 
manded only  by  men  of  genius;  that  it  is  prudent,  in 
questions  of  organization,  to  count  in  general  only  upon 
moderate  capacities,  and  that  consequently  it  is  necessary, 
in  the  apportionment  of  the  forces  of  a  country,  not  to 
allow  the  strength  of  any  single  army  to  pass  beyond  from 
120,000  to  150,000  combatants. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARM1P:S.        89 

Human  powers  have  a  limit,  and  this  limit  will  not 
ordinarily  permit  the  grouping  of  larger  forces  in  a 
single  hand. 

Moreover,  an  army  of  ordinary  size  has  always  more 
cohesion  and  better  facilities  for  the  transmission  of 
orders,  permits  greater  promptness  in  the  execution  of 
these  orders  and  greater  rapidity  of  movement,  than  a 
larger  army, 

•Theoretically,  then,  a  mass  of  troops  formed  into  sev- 
eral armies  of  average  size,  has  more  powerful  means 
of  action  and  better  chances  of  success  than  if  arranged 
into  a  less  number  of  larger  units. 

We  must  then  conclude,  with  General  Lewal,  that 
there  exist  conditions  of  numbers  and  organization 
which  correspond  to  a  maximum  of  effectiveness.* 
These  conditions  may  be  determined  by  practical  data. 

Thus,  as  a  rule,  an  army  may  not  without  danger  ex- 
ceed a  certain  fixed  combat  front; 

It  must  preserve  a  march  front  which  will  allow  it  to 
concentrate  in  seasonable  time; 

It  should  occupy  a  space  of  territory  sufficient  to  sup- 
ply the  troops  with  food  for  at  least  twenty-four  hours. 

Each  of  these  considerations  leads  to  almost  identical 
results. 

Combat  Fronts. — Let  us  first  consider  the  combat  front. 

One  of  the  factors  determining  its  extent  is  the  dis- 
tance which  can  be  embraced  by  the  eye  aided  by  a  good 
field-glass,  or  from  8  to  9  kilometres  (from  5  to  5^/^ 
miles). 

The  commander-in-chief  being  supposed  in  the  centre 
of  the  field  in  an  open  country,  the  combat  front  would 
reach  from  i6  to  i8  kilometres.  Now  experience  proves 
that  this  space  is  too  extended,    that  we  must  regard 

*  General  Lewal,  Partie  Organique. 


90  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY, 

it  as  a  maximum,  and  that  it  may  not  be  exceeded  with- 
out exposure  to  disorders  and  miscalculations.* 

An  army's  combat  front  should,  moreover,  be  such 
that  an  interchange  of  communications  between  the 
general-in-chief  and  a  corps  commander  would  not  re- 
quire, going  and  coming,  more  than  an  hour  and  a  half 
at  the  most — an  interval  corresponding  to  12  kilometres. 

Combat  Front. 
i< 18  kilom. > 


3  kilom.                 6  kilom.             '<             6  kilom.                  3  kilom. 
< 1 >< 1 > 


Corps  Com.  Com. -in-Chief.  Corps  Com. 

Thus  the  most  distant  corps  commanders  should  not 
station  themselves  farther  than  6  kilometres  from  the 
general-in  chief. 

Supposing  the  former  to  be  in  the  centre  of  their 
troops,  we  see  that  the  combat  front  could  be  extended 
two  or  three  kilometres  beyond  their  stations.  In  this 
manner  we  again  reach  a  maximum  front  of  from  16  to 
18  kilometres. 

Now  if  we  suppose  a  corps  of  30,000  men  in  order  of 
battle  upon  three  lines,  and  a  maximum  of  5^  men  per 
running  metre,  the  proportion  dictated  by  experience 
with  arms  of  rapid  fire,  we  reach  a  front  of  from  5,400 
to  6,000  metres  for  this  body. 

From  this  it  is  seen  that  upon  a  front  of  from  16  to  18 
kilometres  we  cannot  employ  more  than  three  corps  of 
30,000  combatants,  or  90,000  men. 

To  these  should  be  added  the  general  reserves,  whose 
importance  is  well  understood.     It   is  with   these  that 

*  General  Lewal,  Par  tie  Organique. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.        9I 

battles  are  gained  and  defeats  tempered.  The  require- 
ments of  deep  orders  of  battle,  the  destructive  effects  of 
modern  arms,  the  obligation  to  advance  in  action  by  ' 
successive  efforts,  and  finally,  experience,  have  pre- 
scribed that  the  proportion  of  reserves  shall  be  two- 
fifths  of  the  engaged  troops;  or,  for  3  corps  in  line,  2 
corps  disposable  in  rear.  Consequently,  for  a  front  of 
from  16  to  18  kilometres,  the  army  would  contain  5 
corps  of  30,000  men  each,  or  150,000  combatants.* 

March  Fronts. — The  estimate  of  the  extent  of  the  march 
front  leads  to  the  same  conclusions. 

An  army  in  motion  should  always  be  able  to  concen- 
trate within  a  single  day. 

Now,  this  condition  will  be  fulfilled  if  the  length  of 
march  front  be  so  regulated  that,  in  order  to  take  its 
place  in  line,  an  army  corps  has  never  to  make  a  march 
exceeding  12  hours,  or  24  kilometres  (15  miles).  The 
baggage  and  other  impedimenta  are  in  this  case  left  in 
rear. 

Let  us  take  a  combat  front  of  16  kilometres,  and  sup- 
pose the  troops  assembled  there.  Each  corps,  in  mov- 
ing from  its  position  toward  the  point  marking  the  ex- 
treme limit  of  the  march  front,  will,  as  we  have  seen,  be 
able  to  travel  a  distance  of  24  kilometres,  and  we  shall 
thus  have  as  the  extreme  limit  of  the  march  front,  24 
kilometres  X  2  +  16  =  64  kilometres  (40  miles). 

Fig.  I. 
Maximum  March  Front  ^64  kilom. 

<  > 

24  kilom.                   16  kilom.                  24  kilom. 
<- < 1 > > 

On  the  other  hand,  in  order  that  a  corps  may  move 
*  General  Lewal,  Partie  Organique. 


92  PART   FIRST.  — STRATE;GY. 

upon  any  point  whatever  of  the  combat  front  without 
overstepping  this  distance  of  24  kilometres,  the  march 
front  should  be  reduced  to  a  minimum  of  32  kilometres 
(20  miles). 

Fig.  2. 
Minimum  March  Front  ^=  32  kilo. 

8  kilom.                             16  kilom.                             8  kilom. 
;  < >< >< > 

The  mean  Between  these  two  extremes  is  48  kilom., 
or,  in  round  numbers,  50  kilometres.* 
.    History  teaches  us  that  the  commanders  of  large  arm- 
ies acknowledge  the  correctness  of  these  figures. 

Moreover,  it  is  an  established  fact  that,  in  order  to 
assure  the  subsistence  of  an  army  for  24  hours,  in  the 
countries  of  Europe  in  a  fair  condition  of  cultivation, 
there  must  be  one  kilometre  of  front  to  every  3,000 
or  3,500  men.  For  a  front  of  50  kilometres,  this  pro- 
portion corresponds,  we  see,  to  an  army  of  150,000  men. 

The  average  of  disposable  communications  will,  of 
course,  have  a  controlling  influence  upon  the  maximum 
number  of  troops  that  can  be  set  in  motion. 

In  Europe,  a  front  of  50  kilometres  will  contain 
scarcely  more  than  three  roads  approximately  parallel. 
It  has  been  demonstrated,  moreover,  that  30,000  is  the 
maximum  number  of  troops  that  can  be  moved  upon  a 
single  road  and  preserve  the  power  of  concentrating 
upon  the  head  of  column  in  a  single  day,  or  that  two 
groups  of  30,000  men  each  constitute  the  largest  force 
that  can  be  moved  in  one  column  and  possess  the  power 
of  making  a  central  concentration  in  the  same  time. 

The  maximum  number  of  troops  therefore  that  under 
these  conditions  may  be  moved  over  3  roads  is  180,000. 
But  in  practice,  concentrations  usually  taking  place  to 

*  General  Lewal,  Partie  Organique. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.         93 

the  front,  each  corps  of  the  first  line  requires  at  least 
one  road,  the  reserve  corps  only  remaining  in  rear. 
This  leads  us  back  to  the  army  of  150,000  men  in  5 
corps,  2  of  which  march  in  rear. 

The  March  Front  of  Napoleon. — Napoleon  preferred  a  very 
strong  central  column  and  two  light  lateral  columns 
flanking  the  first. 

In  1805,  in  his  march  toward  the  Traun,  he  placed 
100,000  men  upon  the  same  road.  To-day,  we  have 
more  baggage,  more  munitions,  more  artillery,  and 
more  accessories,  and  it  would  be  dangerous  to  imitate 
this  example. 

On  the  whole,  then,  reason  accords  with  experience 
in  designating  150,000  men  as  the  mean  strength  of 
armies.  * 

But  there  is  no  doubt  that  force  of  circumstances  will 
often  lead  to  an  increase  in  this  number. 

Strength  of  Modem  Armies. — Contemporaneous  history 
offers  us  numerous  examples  of  the  strength  of  armies. 
Upon  this  subject  it  is  well  to  remark  that  in  France  the 
practice  has  been,  since  the  wars  of  the  First  Empire,  to 
give  as  the  strength  of  the  army  the  aggregate  of  those 
drawing  rations.  The  result  is  that  we  possess  errone- 
ous ideas  concerning  the  real  strength  of  the  fighting 
force. 

Indeed,  for  the  general,  there  is  but  one  useful  figure, 
that  of  the  combatants. 

Thus  the  Prussians,  leaving  to  their  commissaries  the 
duty  of  estimating  the  number  of  consumers,  count 
only  the  guns,  sabres,  and  cannon. 

Napoleon  in  his  bulletins  gave  only  the  strength  of 
the  combatants. 

*  General  Lewal,  Partie  Org  unique. 


94  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

The  Army  of  1809. — In  this  year,  the  Army  of  Germany 
with  its  ten  corps,  its  corps  of  observation  on  the  Elbe, 
its  cavalry  reserve,  and  its  parks,  contained  on  ist 
January,  present  under  arms  and  consequently  combat- 
ants, 234,750  men,* 

Grand  Army  of  1812. — On  June  15,  1812,  the  number  of 
those  present  under  arms  with  the  army  proper,  upon 
the  lines  of  communication,  on  the  coasts,  in  fortifica- 
tions and  depots,  in  Germany,  and  on  the  march  to  re- 
join their  commands,  reached  the  formidable  number  of 
574,506  men  and  152,463  horses. 

Counting  all  drawing  rations,  this  army  was  swelled 
to  625,646  men.  The  number  of  troops  actually  taking 
part  in  operations  during  these  two  campaigns  of  1809 
and  181 2  was  however  much  lessv 

Notwithstanding,  we  see  how  much  Napoleon  must 
have  relied  upon  his  genius  to  move  such  masses  with- 
out other  intermediaries  than  his  corps  commanders. 

Army  of  the  Crimea. — On  the  5th  September,  1855,  our 
Crimean  army  comprised  a  force,  officers  included,  of 
120,321  men,  27,249  of  whom  were  not  disposable  for 
action.  The  number  of  combatants  then  did  not  ex- 
ceed 93,000. 

Federal  Armies  in  the  War  of  Secession. — During  the  War 
of  Secession,  the  armies  of  the  North  were  inferior  in 
size  to  the  preceding. 

Sherman's  army  in  1864  was  about  100,000  strong; 
the  year  following,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  numbered 
107,777  men. 

Prussian  Armies  in  1866. — At  the  end  of  June,  1866,  the 
Prussian  forces  reached  326,600  combatants,  divided 
into  three  armies  and  four  detached  corps.  *     But  soon 

*  Prussian  General  Staff. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.         95 

the  three  armies  directed  against  Austria  were  formed 
into  two,  namely  : 

The  first  (Army  of  the  Elbe  and  I.  Army)  139,300 
combatants; 

The  second  (Army  of  Silesia)  115,000  combatants. 


German  Annies  in  1870. — At  the  end  of  July,  1870,  the 
II.  German  Army  had  198,000  combatants.  Some  days 
later  it  was  increased  by  a  new  corps,  and  reached  228,- 
000  men,  divided  into  7  army  corps  and  2  divisions  of 
cavalry. 

The  I.  Army,  which  served  as  right  wing  to  the  pre- 
ceding in  the  first  operations,  numbered,  counting  from 
the  6th  of  August,  96,000  combatants. 

At  the  same  time,  the  III.  Army  was  167,000  strong. 

The  aggregate  of  forces  assembled  to  invade  France 
reached,  by  August  6th,  in  combatants  alone,  461,000 
men. 

This  figure  is  a  minimum;  it  was  soon  augmented  by 
the  arrival  of  new  masses,  which  were  already  en  route 
at  the  beginning  of  August. 

At  this  time,  the  Germans  had  on  foot,  including  gar- 
rison and  depot  troops,  1,183,389  men. 

German  Annies  in  a  New  War  with  France. — In  a  new  war 
with  France,  it  is  probable  that  Germany  will  place  in 
the  field  4  armies,  each  comprising  5  corps  and  2  divis- 
ions of  cavalry;  that  is  to  say,  4  armies  of  from  150,000 
to  160,000  combatants  each. 

We  see  from  what  precedes  that,  as  a  rule,  modern 
nations  will  henceforth  be  obliged,  with  the  formidable 
effectives  which  they  mobilize,  to  divide  their  troops 
into  several  armies,  and  to  adopt  for  each  of  them  a 
mean  strength  of  about  150,000  men. 

But  we  must  admit  that  the  exigencies  of  war  will 


96  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

constantly  create  unexpected  situations,  which  may  re- 
quire a  modification  of  these  estimates. 

After  having  determined  the  number  of  effectives,  it 
remains  to  seek  the  most  advantageous  grouping  of  the 
masses  to  be  put  in  motion. 

II.— Army  Subdivisions. 

Troops  are  grouped  into  brigades,  divisions,  corps  and 
armies.  At  the  moment  war  breaks  out,  their  division 
depends,  in  most  cases,  upon  the  ground  on  which  they 
are  to  act,  upon  their  effective  strength,  and  the  part 
they  are  to  fill. 

In  countries  furrowed  with  canals  and  ditches,  troops 
can  march  only  upon  the  roads  and  in  separate  groups. 
The  management  of  large  units  presents  serious  difficul- 
ties, and  the  use  of  small  ones  becomes  therefore  a  neces- 
sity.    This  is  the  case  in  Upper  Italy,  for  example. 

Thus,  in  1866,  when  the  Austrians  took  the  field 
against  the  Italians,'  the  Archduke  Albert  kept  his 
troops  in  separate  brigades,  each  brigade  being  provided 
with  all  necessary  accessory  services. 

This  arrangement  was  also  adopted  for  operations 
against  Prussia  in  the  upper  basin  of  the  Elbe.  The 
army  corps  were  formed  with  four  brigades  each,  with- 
out divisional  designation.  But  here  the  ground  was 
quite  different;  the  experiment  was  not  favorable,  and, 
since  then,  this  army  has  resumed  the  divisional  forma- 
tion. 

Division  of  Small  Armies. — The  manner  of  dividing 
armies  depends  likewise  upon  their  effectives.  Gener- 
ally, the  utility  of  giving  them  a  principal  body,  two 
wings  and  a  reserve,  has  been  recognized.  Now  this 
rule  could  not  apply  to  small  armies  if  it  were  found 
desirable  to  divide  them  into  corps.  It  is  evident,  in- 
deed, that  an  army  of  from  50,000  to  70,000  men  formed 


FIRST   CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.        97 

into  two  or  three  corps  could  have  two  wings,  a  centre, 
and  a  reserve,  only  by  divesting  such  corps  of  their  real 
importance.  It  will  be  preferable  then  to  arrange  an 
army  of  this  size  into  4  or  5  divisions,  and  to  neglect  the 
corps  partition. 

This  combination  presents  another  advantage.  The 
authority  of  the  commander-in-chief  is  more  easily  ex- 
ercised over  commanders  of  comparatively  weak  units, 
than  upon  two  chiefs,  each  of  whom  directs  half  the 
forces. 

When  Marshal '  Marmont  took  command  of  the  Arm}^ 
of  Portugal  in  1812,  he  found  it  about  50,000  strong, 
divided  into  three  corps.  He  hastened  to  modify  this 
organization,  declaring  that  if  it  was  an  indispensable 
arrangement  for  moving  large  armies,  it  was  fatal  for 
those  of  smaller  size.  "It  places,"  said  he,  "too  much 
distance  between  the  general-in-chief  and  the  troops, 
retards  the  execution  of  general  orders  by  the  superfluity 
of  grades  and  stations  which  it  establishes,  and  it  more- 
over occasions  waste  in  the  matter  of  supplies. 


n 


Division  of  Large  Armies — The  rule  admitted  for  the 
division  of  small  armies  will  not,  however,  apply  to 
bodies  of  from  150,000  to  200,000  men.  In  such  masses 
if  the  largest  units  were  divisions  of  10,000  men,  for  ex- 
ample, the  number  of  orders  to  be  dispatched  by  the 
general  staff,  taking  into  account  the  divisions  of  inde- 
pendent cavalry,  the  commanders  of  special  arms,  parks, 
administrative  and  accessory  services,  troops  of  the 
second  line,  etc.,  would  probably  be  from  20  to  25. 

To  accomplish  this,  cumbersome  headquarters  and  a 
very  \2iX^Q personnel v^owXA  be  necessary;  the  general-in- 
chief  would  be  incessantly  overwhelmed  by  the  greatest 
variety  of  details;  and,  finally,  the  office  work  would  be 
so  overcharged  that  a  large  portion  of  the  orders  could 
not    be  dispatched    in   time.     The    machine  could    no 

7 


98  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

long-er  do  its  work.  It  is  important  in  such  a  case  to 
create  intermediaries  between  the  divisions  and  the  chief 
command;  hence  the  partition  into  army  corps. 

The  adoption  of  this  unit  has  the  advantage  of  sensi- 
bly diminishing  the  work,  the  mental  strain,  and  even 
the  responsibility  of  the  general-in-chief;  and  the 
stronger  the  large  units  are  made,  the  more  apparent 
will  be  this  relief 

On  the  other  hand,  if  it  is  desired  to  possess  the  power 
of  forming  a  centre,  two  wings,  and  a  reserve,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  divide  large  armies  into  four  or  five  corps. 

Napoleon  maintained  that  armies  should  not  contain 
more  than  five  large  units.  We  thus  find  that  the  pro- 
per division  of  an  army  of  150,000  men  is  into  5  corps 
of  30,000  each. 

The  opinion  of  the  leaders  of  the  Prussian  army  upon 
the  division  of  laro-e  armies  is  in  accord  with  the  above 
principles.  General  Bronsart  von  Schellendorf  expresses 
himself  thus  upon  this  question  : 

"In  consequence  of  the  adoption  of  compulsory  ser- 
vice, the  effective  forces  of  armies  have  sensibly  in- 
creased. This  will  scarcely  permit  us  to  conclude  that 
we  may  properly  diminish  the  effectives  of  the  first  sub- 
division of  an  army.  To  be  sure,  in  case  of  an  army  of 
from  60,000  to  80,000  men,  it  must  appear  more  logical 
to  form  4  divisions  of  infantry  and  i  of  cavalry,  than  to 
adopt  the  normal  partition  into  two  corps  with  a  divis- 
ion of  cavalry. 

"The  two  corps  would  together  form  4  divisions  of 
infantry,  and  in  this  particular  case,  the  corps  com- 
manders would  be  useless,  even  mischievous,  intermed- 
iaries. 

"But  in  an  army  composed,  in  time  of  peace,  of  18 
corps,  which  would,  in  time  of  war,  constitute  4  or  5 
armies,  each  of  these  armies  would  have  a  force  at  least 
double  that  supposed  in  the  last  case,  and  if  the  plan 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.         99 

we  are  considering  were  adopted,  it  would  require  these 
armies  to  be  separated  into  10  divisions  each,  which 
would  make  the  command  and  general  direction  of 
affairs  most  difficult. 

"Experience  has  demonstrated,  moreover,  that  the 
great  difficulties  presented  in  making  dispositions  for 
an  army's  daily  march,  arise  not  on  account  of  the 
troops  themselves,  but  entirely  from  those  things  desig- 
nated by  the  terms  columns,  trains,  baggage,  etc.  If 
the  commander-in-chief  of  an  army,  after  having  regu- 
lated the  plan  of  march  of  8  divisions,  must  still  take 
measures  varying  essentially,  according  to  the  case,  rel- 
ative to  the  places  to  be  occupied  by  the  various  trains 
in  the  columns  of  march,  he  will  impose  upon  himself  a 
task  beyond  the  limits  of  human  capacity. 

"It  is  at  this  time,  especially,  that  the  necessity  for 
application  of  the  principle  of  division  of  labor  makes 
itself  felt.  It  will  be  principally  with  reference  to 
marches,  to  those  features  of  military  operations  which 
are  presented  almost  daily  during  the  course  of  a  cam- 
paign, that  we  shall  recognize  the  advantages  arising 
from  adopting  the  corps  as  the  first  division  of  an  army. 
This  will  be  the  more  readily  seen  upon  considering  that 
the  corps,  accompanied  by  its  indispensable  trains  only, 
has  a  length  of  from  25  to  30  kilometres,  and  that  in  the 
ordinary  case  of  a  march  upon  a  single  road,  it  occupies 
by  itself  alone  a  space  equal  to  a  good  day's  march. 
The  disposition  for  the  march  upon  a  single  road  will, 
consequently,  be  more  judiciously  made  by  the  imme- 
diate commander  of  this  body  of  troops.  It  will  be  suf- 
ficient, then,  to  consider  the  importance  of  properly 
drawing  up  the  orders  of  march,  to  become  convinced  01 
the  necessity  for  the  creation  of  army  corps. 

"The  conclusion  is  moreover  the  same  upon  viewing 
the  matter  in  the  light  of  the  interior  wants  of  the 
bodies  of  which  an  army  is  composed.       If  in  order  to 


lOO  PART   FIRST.— STRATEGY. 

reduce  the  convoy  as  much  as  possible,  it  is  sought  to 
transport  the  smallest  practicable  quantity  of  munitions, 
clothing,  subsistence  and  hospital  stores,  etc.,  we  shall 
not  be  slow  in  discerning  that  this  result  will  be  the 
more  easily  reached  by  adopting  for  a  war  footing  an  or- 
ganization based  upon  grand  tactical  units  possessing 
large  effectives. 

"There  is  an  almost  perfect  equality  between  the 
aggregate  wants  of  similar  parts  of  an  army;  but  these 
vary  more  and  more  according  as  we  descend  the  scale 
of  subdivisions.  There  is  then,  even  in  this  regard,  an 
advantage  in  making  use  of  the  corps  system  in  prefer- 
ence to  the  separation  into  divisions  possessing  only  half 
the  number  of  troops.  It  is  beyond  doubt,  indeed,  that 
from  the  day  when  the  division  becomes  the  first  parti- 
tion unit  of  the  army,  it  will  be  indispensable  to  give  it 
munition  columns  and  a  complete  train.  Therefore,  in 
case  this  formation  should  supplant  the  corps  system, 
the  commander  would  no  longer  be  able  to  regulate  the 
matter  of  supplies  in  such  a  manner  as  to  provide  com- 
pletely at  all  times  for  the  needs  of  the  divisions,  unless 
it  should  be  a  question  of  an  army  only  three  or  four 
divisions  strong — that  is  to  say,  in  an  entirely  exceptional 
case,  and  one  which  it  is  unnecessary  to  take  into  ac- 
count when  the  subject  of  organization  is  under  consid- 
ation. 

Grrouplng  of  Armies. — We  have  still  to  examine  whether 
armies  should  act  separately  in  operating  toward  a  com- 
mon end,  or  whether  it  would  be  preferable,  in  order  the 
better  to  combine  their  efforts,  to  subject  them  to  a  com- 
mon will. 

The  principle  of  unity  in  command  has  already  an- 
swered this  question.  But  there  are  considerations  more 
potent  still.  With  the  prospect  of  future  conflicts  in 
view,  and  the  conditions  fully  understood  by  which  na- 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.      lOI 

tional  security  can  alone  be  maintained,  the  grouping 
of  armies  will  henceforth  become  a  kind  of  law  from 
which  it  will  be  dangerous  to  depart. 

The  same  reasons  which  have  led  to  the  union  ot 
smaller  units  under  the  same  command,  those  which 
have  brought  about  the  grouping  first  of  divisions  and 
afterwards  of  corps,  to  form  armies,  enjoin  that  on  ac- 
count of  increase  in  the  effectives,  a  combination  of  a 
higher  order  be  adopted, — a  group  of  ai^niies^  constitut- 
ing an  ensejnble  of  forces  acting  upon  the  same  theatre 
of  war  and  obedient  to  a  single  chief,  a  generalissimo, 
charged  with  directing  their  operations, 

Grrouping  of  Forces  under  Napoleon. — History  shows,  how- 
ever, that  great  warriors,  confident  in  their  genius,  or 
perhaps  doubting  the  capacities  of  their  lieutenants, 
have  always  preferred  to  command  a  single  large  army 
rather  than  several  smaller  ones. 

This  was  one  of  the  causes  of  the  difficulties  which 
arose  under  Napoleon  when  his  armies  reached  their 
highest  effective.  The  year  1812  marked  the  beginning 
of  this  period,  which  also  signalled  the  commencement 
of  his  decline  in  power. 

Combined  Armies  of  the  Coalition. — In  1813,  the  Allies,  for 
various  reasons,  gave  preference  to  the  system  of  com- 
bined armies.  They  had,  at  this  time,  three  armies: 
one  of  120,000  men  in  Bohemia,  one  of  100,000  in 
Silesia,  and  one  of  70,000  in  the  North,  near  Magde- 
burg. They  were  to  operate  in  concert,  and  it  was 
agreed  that  the  one  attacked  by  Napoleon  was  to  retard 
his  march,  while  the  other  two  operated  against  his 
flanks  and  rear. 

This  was  a  true  combination  of  armies.  Napoleon, 
constrained  to  act  in  the  same  way,  was  under  the 
necessity  of  weakening  himself  at  all  points  at  the  same 


I02  PART   FIRST, — STRATEGY. 

time.  It  was  thus  that  he  placed  65,000  men  under 
Ondinot  near  Wittenberg  and  Torgau;  100,000  men 
under  Ney,  upon  the  Bober;  96,000  divided  into  four 
army  corps  to  watch  the  defiles  of  Bohemia;  and  72,000 
in  reserve  near  Bautzen. 

He  had  thus  333,000  men  arranged  in  four  combined 
masses.  But  this  arrangement,  which  he,  however, 
claimed  was  only  provisional,  had  a  capital  defect. 
Under  his  powerful  hand,  the  leaders  of  his  different 
armies  did  not  feel  themselves  generals-in-chief ;  they 
had  neither  the  prestige,  the  authority,  nor  the  initia- 
tive characterizing  the  latter.  They  were  the  com- 
manders of  large  army  corps,  and  nothing  more.  This 
organization  did  not  prove  suitable  in  practice,  and  in 
consequence  the  operations  suffered.* 

Federal  Armies  During  the  War  of  Secession.— During  this 
war  the  Federals  avoided  the  use  of  large  armies,  pre- 
ferring the  system  of  combining  armies  of  moderate  size, 
which  offered  to  them  the  advantage  of  relieving  the 
commanders-in-chief  of  many  perplexing  details,  and 
also  of  diminishing  the  importance  of  the  powers  con- 
fided to  each. 

The  Germans,  in  1870,  acted  in  the  same  way, 
although  they  had  large  armies  and  eminent  generals. 
They  employed,  as  in  1866,  the  system  of  grouping 
armies  under  the  orders  of  a  generalissimo.  The  latter 
was,  moreover,  upon  the  very  theatre  of  operations,  and, 
in  most  cases,  upon  the  fields  where  decisive  actions  were 
fought. 

In  France,  Marshal  Niel  foresaw  the  wants  of  our 
army  in  this  regard  before  187c,  notwithstanding  a  cer- 
tain general  carelessness  for  the  future,  an  excessive  cen- 
tralization, and  a  blindness  which  led  us  to  consider  vic- 

*  General  Lewal,  Pariie  Oj'ganique,  p.  51. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.      103 

tory  as  a  foregone  conclusion,  and  which  prevented  us 
from  understanding  the  strength  of  the  organizations  of 
our  neighbors. 

Grouping  of  the  French  Armies  in  1868. — A  short  time  after 
the  agitation  growing  out  of  the  Luxemburg  question, 
and  in  anticipation  of  a  struggle  with  Germany,  Mar- 
shal Niel  caused  a  plan  of  army  organization  to  be  pre- 
pared at  the  war  office.  This  work,  remaining  secret 
for  some  time,  was  afterwards  printed.  It  grouped  our 
forces  into  three  armies  and  three  reserve  corps. 

The  first  army,  120,000  strong,  divided  into  three 
corps,  was  to  be  concentrated  at  Metz  ;  the  second, 
121,000  strong,  also  composed  of  three  corps,  was  to  be 
assembled  in  Alsace;  the  third,  only  87,000  strong,  in 
two  corps,  was  to  be  posted  at  Chalons. 

Finally,  three  reserve  corps:  one,  of  26,000  men,  at 
Belfort;  one,  of  40,000,  at  Paris;  and  one,  of  32,000, 
constituting  the  Guard,  completed  this  ensemble^  which 
the  sovereign  was  to  command  in  capacity  of  generalis- 
simo. 

There  was  thus  to  be  an  organized  mass  of  435,000 
men  operating  in  combined  armies.  Unfortunately, 
upon  the  breaking  out  of  war,  our  troops  were  not  thus 
distributed.  Adopted  in  time,  and  carried  out  with 
skill,  this  plan  would,  perhaps,  have  changed  the  result 
of  the  first  engagements. 

Grouping  in  1870. — Instead  of  adopting  it.  Napoleon  III. 
preferred  to  arrange  his  forces  in  a  single  grand  mass, 
divided  into  eight  unequal  bodies,  with  strong  general 
reserves,  incapable  of  being  moved  with  facility.  The 
first  operations  on  the  frontier,  at  the  end  of  July,  1870, 
made  the  inconveniences  of  this  system  very  apparent. 
It  became  necessary,  then,  to  return  to  the  idea  of  the 
three  groups,  and,  on  5th  August,  upon  the  eve  of  the 


104  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

first  defeats,  the  generalissimo  decided  that  two  groups, 
of  three  army  corps  each,  should  be  formed  in  the  first 
line,  one  upon  the  Sarre,  under  command  of  Marshal 
Bazaine,  the  other  in  Alsace,  under  Marshal  MacMahon, 
— the  order  adding,  for  operations  only.  In  every  other 
respect,  the  corps  comprising  these  groups  received 
orders  direct  from  general  headquarters,  under  the  im- 
mediate control  of  which,  moreover,  was  held  a  third 
group  composed  of  the  Guard,  the  6th  Corps  and  the 
general  reserves. 

This  defective  combination  had  hardly  an  opportunity 
of  beginning  its  trial.  The  repulses  of  the  6th  August 
quickly  changed  the  situation,  and  on  the  13th  of  the 
same  month,  again  on  the  eve  of  battle,  the  command 
received  a  new  organization. 

"After  the  fall  of  the  Second  Empire,  the  proper 
method  of  dividing  large  masses  was  no  better  under- 
stood. Many  efforts  were  made,  but  with  little  or 
no  concert  of  action,  and  hence  without  result;  and 
much  energy,  vigor,  and  even  heroism  were  displayed 
which  came  to  naught.  It  was  in  vain  that  General 
Chanzy  protested  against  the  lack  of  solidarity  among 
the  forces.      Several  of  his  dispatches  give  proof  of  this, 

"He  wrote  to  the  ministry,  December  30,  1870:  'Our 
greatest  chance  of  success  lies  in  combining  our  move- 
ments, in  the  co-operation  of  the  three  armies  (of  the 
Loire,  the  North,  and  the  East)  to  the  same  end,  in  the 
same  effort,  made  at  the  same  moment.' 

"This  last  and  supreme  appeal  of  good  sense  was  not 
listened  to.  The  imagination,  as  is  always  the  case  in 
our  country,  took  the  place  of  judgment.  An  army 
had  been  sacrificed  at  Sedan  to  a  simple  illusion;  an- 
other in  the  Jura  to  a  chimerical  hope  of  a  diversion; 
while  the  Second  Army  of  the  Loire  was  allowed  to  be 
crushed  at  a  time  when  it  had  become  the  very  founda- 
tion-stone of  our  resistance."* 

*  General  Lewal,  Partie  Or^anique,  p.  54. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.      105 

Necessity  for  Separating  Masses  of  Troops  into  Army  Groups. 
— These  facts  clearly  show  that  the  supreme  directing 
power  will  only  be  the  gainer  by  disposing  the  masses 
into  combined  armies.  But  other  considerations,  also 
drawn  from  actual  war,  favor  this  system. 

In  the  field,  the  management  of  troops  draws  in  its 
train  many  details.  In  consequence,  the  more  their 
number  increases,  the  greater  call  is  there  to  divide  the 
work  which  this  increase  develops. 

Now,  in  proportion  as  a  man  rises  in  the  military 
hierarchy,  the  more  serious  become  his  responsibilities. 
The  character  of  high  command  is  such  as  to  oblige  its 
depositaries  to  think,  to  reflect,  to  foresee,  and  to  com- 
bine, infinitely  more  than  in  the  lower  grades.  The  im- 
portance of  the  questions  with  which  they  have  to  deal 
increases  continually.  It  is  a  matter  of  great  moment, 
then,  that  the  number  of  these  questions  should  diminish, 
and  that  these  commanders  should  be  more  and  more 
relieved  from  the  consideration  of  details. 

Hence  arises  the  necessity  of  a  continual  decentraliza- 
tion of  the  military  power  and  the  formation  of  groups 
of  combined  armies,  thus  preserving  the  generalissimo 
from  the  annoyance  of  having  to  attend  to  secondary 
matters.  His  action  is  then  confined  to  the  general 
direction  of  affairs,  and  he  is  able  to  devote  himself  en- 
tirely to  combinations  of  the  whole  and  to  conceptions 
of  a  high  order. 

Application  of  the  Principle  of  Combining  Armies. — The 
combining  of  armies  is  then  one  of  the  obligations  of 
modern  war.  The  application  of  the  principle  will  de- 
pend upon  circumstances  and  needs  created  by  the  gen- 
eral situation. 

Thus  the  rule  prescribing  that  armies  shall  possess  a 
a  principal  body,  wings,  and  a  reserve,  is  likewise  true 
for  groups  of  armies.     Those  then  in  the  same  theatre 


Io6  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

of  operations  should  be  disposed  into  three  active  armies, 
one  of  them  a  reserve,  or  better  still,  into  four  armies, 
one  of  them  constituting  the  reserve. 

Their  lines  of  communication  should  then  be  covered 
by  territorial  troops,  or  troops  of  the  second  line,  leav- 
ing entire  independence  to  the  active  forces.  Moreover, 
the  investment  or  defense  of  the  large  intrenched  camps 
which  to-day  have  been  substituted  for  the  fortified 
places  of  former  times  in  the  protection  of  frontier  zones, 
requires  the  free  disposition  of  new  armies  upon  the 
flanks  or  rear  of  the  operating  forces. 

The  consequence  will  thus  be  to  set  in  motion  masses 
of  the  largest  proportions.  Supposing  a  principal  army 
of  150,000  combatants,  two  lateral  armies  of  120,000 
each,  and  a  reserve  of  110,000,  we  reach  half  a  million 
men  in  line,  or  nearly  the  number  which  Germany  threw 
upon  our  country  in  1870. 

Protection  of  the  Commuiiications. — To  guard  the  com- 
munications of  these  masses  will  require  scarcely  less 
than  one-third  of  their  number,  or  166,000  men,  estab- 
lished upon  the  railroads. 

Finally,  upon  the  offensive  it  is  probable  that  the 
front  of  operations  of  the  three  armies  will,  at  the  out- 
set, come  into  collision  with  at  least  two  intrenched 
camps  of  the  first  order,  which  will  menace  the  lines  of 
operations  from  the  flanks.  These  must  be  invested  or 
masked.  Each  of  them  will,  no  doubt,  arrest  an  army 
of  at  least  130,000  men. 

Army  Grroups  of  First  and  Second  Line. — We  shall  thus 
have  in  motion  a  mass  of  more  than  900,000  men,  di- 
vided into  two  groups  of  armies,  one  forming  the  first, 
the  other  the  second  line. 

Grouping  of  Armies  in  a  Future  War  between  France  and  Ger- 
many.— In  another  war   between    France  and  Germany 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.      107 

these  forces  will  perhaps  be  exceeded.  The  study  of  the 
organization  of  the  German  armies  reveals,  indeed,  that 
preparations  are  making  for  21  army  corps  of  the  first 
line,  with  a  probable  division  into  a  group  of  4  armies, 
each  composed  of  5  or  6  corps  and  2  divisions  of  cav- 
alry. 

Including  all  those  drawing  rations,  the  normal 
strength  of  the  corps  will  reach  37,000  men,  and  the 
Guard  40,000.  Here  is  then  a  first  mass  of  703,000  men, 
ready  again  to  inundate  our  eastern  provinces.  Behind 
these  will  come  924,000  trained  soldiers  charged  with  oc- 
cupying large  military  places,  investing  ourintrenched 
camps,  or  guarding  railroads  and  other  lines  of  supply. 

It  is  then  no  longer  a  question  of  two  or  three  armies, 
but  indeed  of  two  or  three  groups  of  armies,  which 
would  act  together  in  such  a  case  in  a  vast  ensemble  ot 
operations  upon  the  same  theatre  of  war. 

The  principle  of  grouping  combined  armies  appears, 
then,  in  the  operations  of  the  future,  quite  as  logical  as 
that  of  the  unity  of  command. 

Hence  there  is  no  doubt  that  these  groups  will  require 
a  generalissimo  exercising  command  upon  the  very 
theatre  of  war  itself.  Whichever  of  the  two  adversaries 
fulfills  this  condition,  will  have  an  incontestable  advan- 
tage over  the  one  directing  the  movements  from  a  dis- 
tance. 

Army  Groups  in  the  War  of  Secession. — In  the  United 
States,  during  the  War  of  Secession,  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment did  not  hesitate  to  conform  to  this  rule,  taught 
by  experience.  Thus  the  commanders  of  the  groups 
acting  in  the  West  were  subjected  to  the  authority  of  the 
commander-in-chief  of  the  federal  forces. 

We  must  admit,  therefore,  that  the  principle  of  group- 
ing combined  armies  is  suited  to  the  conditions  of  war- 
fare between  two  great  powers  at  the  present  day;  but  it 


I08  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

is   also  very  evident  that  this  principle  is  not  absolute 
under  all  conditions. 

In  practice,  exceptions  will  spring  up,  made  necessary 
by  circumstances — the  configuration  of  the  ground,  the 
number  of  effectives,  and  even  the  end  to  be  attained. 

Combination  of  Movements  in  1870. — In  this  year,  the  three 
German  armies  which  invaded  France  met,  at  the  out- 
set, many  obstacles  in  the  way  of  combining  their  move- 
ments, due  to  the  topographical  features  of  the  country, 
and  the  unforeseen  circumstances  attending  their  initial 
operations.  At  first,  upon  leaving  their  zone  of  concen- 
tration in  the  Palatinate,  these  armies  were  forced  to 
separate  into  two  groups,  which,  on  account  of  the 
Vosges,  were  obliged,  for  some  time,  to  pursue  diverg- 
ent directions. 

At  this  period,  their  junction  remained  somewhat  un- 
certain. After  the  6th  of  August,  the  events  of  the  war 
themselves  exercised  a  new  influence  upon  the  whole  of 
their  operations.  The  III.  Army,  forming  the  left  wing, 
had  the  good  fortune,  after  its  first  victory,  to  find  the 
ground  clear,  and  the  road  to  Paris  open.  The  I.  and  II. 
Armies,  on  the  contrary,  had  still  the  Army  of  Metz 
upon  their  lines  of  operations,  and  freedom  of  movement 
was  not  assured  them  even  as  far  as  the  Moselle.  The 
combination  for  marching  was  affected  by  this  also,  the 
progress  of  the  invasion  retarded,  and  the  pursuit  of  our 
ist  and  5th  Corps- rendered  less  active. 

These  facts  are  not  the  only  ones  exercising  an  influ- 
ence upon  the  combined  movements  of .  armies.  Cir- 
cumstances the  most  diverse  may  have  the  same  effect. 
They  have,  sometimes,  great  weight  in  fixing  the  essen- 
tial features  of  armies,  and  in  creating  unavoidable  ex- 
ceptions in  the  application  of  principles. 

Grouping  of  the  Prussian  Armies  in  1870. — Eighteen  days 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIE.S.      109 

after  the  declaration  of  war,  Germany  had  three  armies 
in  the  field  against  us.  The  First  Army,  composed  of  3 
army  corps  and  2  divisions  of  cavalry,  contained  115,000 
rationnaircs  (96,000  of  whom  were  combatants),  10,000 
horses,  and  270  guns.  Its  duty  was  to  form,  in  the  first 
strategic  marches,  the  right  wing  of  the  group  of  arm- 
ies which  was  to  advance  between  the  Rhine  and  the 
Moselle.  It  was  complete  and  in  position  upon  the  Sarre 
on  the  6th  of  August. 

The  Second  Army  was  to  form  the  centre,  and,  at  the 
same  time,  the  principal  body  of  the  group. 

But  instead  of  limiting  it  to  a  normal  effective  of  from 
150,000  to  160,000  combatants,  the  Chief  of  General 
Staff,  Field-Marshal  Von  Moltke,  believed  that  on  ac- 
count of  the  circumstances  of  the  case  it  should  be 
much  larger. 

He  estimated  the  French  forces  concentrated  upon  the 
Moselle  at  about  240,000  or  250,000  men. 

Moreover,  he  knew  that  the  Vosges  would  for  some 
days  separate  his  group  of  armies  into  two  masses;  that 
the  right  force  formed  of  the  I.  and  II.  Armies  was  ex- 
posed not  only  to  assault  from  the  forces  assembled 
around  Metz,  but  also  to  an  attack  upon  its  left  flank 
by  the  troops  that  we  had  left  in  Alsace.  These  views, 
conformable  to  the  tactical  principle  that  detached 
bodies  fall  back  upon  their  supports,  were  firmly  rooted 
in  the  minds  of  the  Prussian  generals  until  the  day  after 
Froeschwiller  [Woerth].  They  were  partly  the  cause  of 
the  failure  on  the  part  of  the  cavalry  of  the  III,  Army 
to  keep  up  the  contact  on  the  7th  of  August,  and  con- 
tributed to  the  safety  of  the  debris  of  our  ist  Corps. 
It  resulted  from  these  considerations,  that  in  order  to  be 
certain  of  always  having  the  numerical  superiority,  the 
central  army  of  the  group  required  great  strength. 

There  was  also  another  reason. 

The  intrenched  camp  at  Metz  lay  upon  the  line  of 


IIO  PART   FIRST. —STRATEGY. 

Operations  of  the  I.  and  II,  Armies,  It  was  important 
then  to  provide  for  the  case  of  driving  the  French  army 
within  the  walls  of  this  place,  and  consequently  for  the 
necessity  of  investing  it. 

The  II.  Army  came  thus  to  be  formed  into  six  corps,  two 
of  which,  the  Guard  and  the  Saxon  Corps,  had  a  very 
high  effective.  These  six  corps  were  soon  raised  to 
seven  by  the  addition  of  the  II.  Corps,  which  joined  it, 
however,  only  upon  the  battle-field  of  Saint-Privat. 
Finally,  two  divisions  of  independent  cavalry  were 
added  to  this  mass.  The  Germans,  desirous  of  conceal- 
ing the  number  of  their  forces,  have  attributed  to  this 
army  an  effective  of  only  180,000  combatants. 

This  is  indeed  the  number  which  they  obtained  by 
counting  only  the  bayonets  and  sabres.  But  the  artil- 
lery troops,  the  pioneers,  and  many  other  rationnaires 
who  were  also  combatants,  raised  the  effective,  from  the 
6th  to  the  i8th  of  August,  to  230,000  men,  22,200  horses, 
and  546  pieces  of  artillery. 

On  1 8th  August,  not  taking  into  consideration  the 
losses  sustained,  there  were  with  this  army,  including 
the  II.  Corps,  266,000  i^ationnaires. 

In  fact.  Von  Moltke  could  thus  oppose  nine  army 
corps  and  four  divisions  of  cavalry  to  the  five  French 
army  corps  which  he  knew  had  assembled  on  the  Sarre 
and  Moselle.  This  was  the  moving  cause  of  his  combi- 
nations. Consequently  he  did  not  hesitate  to  intrust  to 
a  single  general-in-chief  a  formidable  mass,  very  much 
larger  than  the  mean  effective  of  150,000  men. 

But  there  were  other  reasons,  aside  from  those  grow- 
ing out  of  these  strategical  considerations.  There  ex- 
ists in  the  Prussian  army  such  a  decentralization  of  the 
command  and  the  initiative,  that  the  generals,  even 
without  the  experience  acquired  in  the  campaigns  of 
1864  and  1866,  were  qualified  to  direct  the  most  unfore- 
seen movements  on  their  own  authority.     The  practice  of 


FIRST   CHAPTER.  —  ORGANIZATION   OF   ARMIES.     Ill 

receiving  only  general  instructions  in  their  orders,  and 
of  deciding  all  details  of  execution  themselves,  singu- 
larly facilitated  the  exercise  of  the  supreme  command. 

The  duties  of  this  office  were  thus  very  much  simpli- 
fied ;  and  in  an  army  whose  officers,  in  the  different 
grades  of  the  hierarchy,  unhesitatingly  come  to  a  deter- 
mination at  the  opportune  moment,  it  is  certain  that  the 
ordinary  limitations  to  the  exercise  of  the  command  may 
be  very  much  exceeded.  A  striking  proof  of  this  simpli- 
fication is  found  in  the  fact  that  this  army  of  266,000 
rationnaires^  almost  as  strong  in  itself  as  the  entire 
Army  of  the  Rhine,  employed  in  transmitting  the  orders 
of  the  general-in-chief  only  six  staff  officers  and  six 
assistant  staff  officers  acting  under  the  orders  of  a  major- 
general. 

As  to  the  Third  Army,  it  was  to  form  a  wing,  was  to 
act  separately  at  the  beginning,  and  was  perhaps  de- 
signed to  protect  South  Germany;  moreover,  in  advanc- 
ing into  the  interior  of  France  it  was  exposed  to  attack, 
particularly  upon  its  left  flank;  and,  finally,  it  was  to 
occupy  the  most  important  line  of  communications  of 
the  army  group,  that  from  Strasburg  to  Paris.  For  all 
these  reasons  it  required  considerable  strength.  In  con- 
sequence it  was  given  five  army  corps,  two  special  divis- 
ions of  infantry — one  of  Wiirtembergers,  the  other  of 
Badensers — and  two  divisions  of  cavalry,  or  a  total  of 
195,000  combatants,  20,000  horses,  and  576  guns.  Con- 
sidering all  its  rationnaires^  its  numbers  mounted  up  to 
220,000  men.  From  this  example  it  is  seen  that  in  mobil- 
izing the  large  effectives  of  to-da}^,  governments  should 
not  neglect  to  have  the  greatest  possible  number  of  com- 
batants upon  the  theatre  of  action.  And  when  this 
theatre  is  limited  by  accidents  of  the  soil  or  insuperable 
obstacles,  so  that  it  will  not  permit  the  combined  march 
of  more  than  three  armies,  it  is  frequently  found  advis- 
able to  exceed  in  their  composition  the  mean  figures 
fixed  by  experience. 


112  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY^ 

Formation  of  the  French  Anny  in  1870. — It  would  be  in- 
structive to  compare  tlie  defective  formation  of  our  army 
in  1870  with  the  grouping  of  the  German  armies;  but 
this  study  would  require  too  great  a  development.  It 
will  sufflce  to  recall  that  our  effective  national  forces  at 
that  time  were  estimated  at  1,100,000.  Unfortunately, 
this  was  an  illusion.  From  this  number  should,  first  of 
all,  be  subtracted  500,000  gardes  mobiles^  who  had  not 
served  a  single  day  with  the  colors.  Besides  these, 
allowance  should  be  made  for  a  large  number  of  non- 
effectives. Nevertheless,  France  actually  placed  on  a 
war  footing,  at  the  beginning  of  August,  553,223  drilled 
men. 

Of  this  mass,  it  was  unfortunately  necessary  to 
leave : 

5,466  men  for  the  occupation  of  Rome; 
43,194  men  to  guard  Algeria; 

240,000  men  in  the  interior  of  the  country. 

There  remained: 

252,760  campaign  troops. 

Such  was  the  official  effective  of  the  Army  of  the 
Rhine  on  the  ist  of  August.  But  it  included  all  the 
rationnaires.  The  number  of  combatants  has  never 
been  really  determined,  but  probably  did  not  exceed 
200,000  men. 

In  place  of  forming  two  armies,  this  mass,  as  we  have 
seen,  constituted  but  one,  divided  into  corps  of  unequal 
size,  which  were  scattered  upon  a  broken  line  200  kilo- 
metres (about  125  miles)  in  extent.  Notwithstanding 
the  courage  of  our  troops,  three  of  these  corps  were 
beaten  separately,  and  nearly  destroyed,  by  the  first 
shock  of  the  enemy's  compact  group.  Such  was  the 
consequence  of  this  defective  organization. 

To  sum  up,  we  must  allow  to  armies  a  mean  compo- 
sition corresponding  to  the  ordinary  limits  of  the  human 
faculties.      But  it  cannot  be  doubted  that,  as  a  general 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.      II 3 

rule,  their  strength  will  vary  according  to  their  mission, 
the  theatre  of  operations,  and  the  qualities  of  the  gen- 
erals commanding  them. 

After  having  studied  the  principles  adopted  for  the 
formation  of  armies,  it  remains  to  examine  those  which 
have  served  as  guides  in  the  organization  of  their  con- 
stituent parts. 

.     §  8.    COMPOSITION   OF   THE  ARMY   CORPS. 

We  have  already  seen  that  it  is  advantageous  for  an 
army  to  be  divided  into  three,  four,  or  five  large  ele- 
ments, so  that  it  may  have,  for  marches  and  combats, 
two  wings,  a  centre,  and  a  reserve. 

We  have  also  seen  that  this  division  assures  it  the 
greatest  degree  of  strength  and  mobility,  at  the  same 
time  that  it  facilitates  the  exercise  of  command.  The 
constituent  element  thus  formed  is  the  army  corps. 

Its  importance  arises  from  the  peculiar  role  assigned 
it.  Whether  forming  the  centre,  one  of  the  wings,  or 
the  reserve,  it  is  called  upon  for  individual  action  which 
is  sometimes  very  considerable.  It  is  evident  that  its 
mobility  and  strength,  in  a  certain  measure,  guaran- 
tee those  of  the  army  itself;  that,  in  consequence,  its 
composition,  its  effective  force,  the  means  of  action  at 
its  disposal,  and  its  method  of  utilizing  them,  have  a 
decisive  influence  upon  the  result  of  the  operations. 

In  reality,  the  army  corps  is  the  strategic  unit  of 
grand  armies.  In  order  to  permit  it  to  fulfill  the  part 
devolving  upon  it,  its  formation  should  be  such  as  to 
give  it  the  greatest  possible  mobility,  and  to  permit  the 
greatest  vigor  of  action. 

That  it  may  be  prepared  for  the  field  in  time  of  war 

with  the  greatest  rapidity,  and  may  possess  the  greatest 

cohesive  strength,  it  should  be  in  existence  in  time  of 

peace.     Thus  the  different  parts  will  be  already  created, 

8 


114  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

will  act  with  order  and  regularity,  and  be  located  upon 
the  very  same  territory  whence  their  war  complements 
of  men,  horses,  material  and  provisions  of  all  kinds  are 
to  be  drawn. 

From  this  it  follows  that  modern  armies  in  time  of 
peace  should  be  divided  into  corps,  and  the  country  into 
corps  regions,  or  into  grand  commands  corresponding 
to  this  grand  unit. 

The  numerical  strength  of  army  corps  has  for  a  long 
time  been  considered  a  variable  element. 

In  France,  Napoleon  was  the  first  to  adopt  the  parti- 
tion into  army  corps.  Substituting  numbered  corps  for 
the  former  groups, — wings  and  centre, — and  leaving  the 
Imperial  Guard  apart  as  a  special  corps,  he  reserved  to 
himself  the  employment  of  these  grand  units  according 
to  the  needs  of  the  moment,  instead  of  assigning  them 
a  permanent  part  in  marches  and  battles. 

Finally,  varying  the  effective  forces  to  correspond 
to  the  requirements  of  the  war  and  his  particular 
combinations,  he  gave  very  different  compositions  to  his 
corps. 

In  1806,  the  army  which  conquered  at  Jena  comprised 
seven  corps,  and  a  reserve  of  cavalry.  Their  effectives 
were  as  follow: 

1st  Corps Bernadotte 23,600  men. 

3d      "  Davout 33,000     " 

4th     "  Soult    , 41,000     " 

5th     "  ...  Lannes 22,700     " 

6th     "  Ney 33,5oo     " 

7th     "  Augereau 19,300     " 

8th     "  Bessieres Imperial  Guard. 

Murat Cavalry  Reserve. 

'  This  diversity  was  maintained  during  the  entire 
period  of  the  Empire;  but  even  at  this  time,  the  mean 
strength  of  the  corps  approximated  30,000  men. 

The  Allies,  although  more  disposed  to  adopt  a  normal 
corps  effective,  nevertheless  varied  it  also. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIRS.      II5 

In  this  regard,  the  Napoleonic  tradition  held  sway- 
even  to  the  Second  Empire. 

In  1870,  the  seven  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine 
presented,  abont  6th  August,  the  follov^ing  effectives, 
officers  included: 

Divisions  Divisions 

Corps.  of  of  Men.  Horses.      Guns. 

Infantry.  Cavalry. 

Imperial    -i 

Guard.     I           ^           .               ^  ^^'°75  7,304                72 

I  St  Corps.            4                         I  41,660  8,137              120 

2d      "                 3                         I  29,128  5,616                90 

3d       "                 4                         I  43,278  9.810              120 

4tli     "                 3                         I  28,910  5,536                90 

5tli     "                 3                         I  27,417  5,527                90 

6tli     "                  4                          I  38,756  6,286                66 

yth     "                  3                          I  24,185  5,396                78 

General      (Cavalry 3  6,001  5,536                 36 

Reserves.    ]  Artillery,  16  Batteries  .  .  2,903  2,749                96 

*-  Engineers 236  58 

Grand  Field  Park 682  42 

Grand  Engineer  Park  (not  formed)   . 

Imperial  Headquarters 1,767  1,610 

Grand  Total 266,998  63,607  858 

A  hasty  examination  of  this  distribution  will  be  suf- 
ficient to  show  that  this  ami}'  had  little  mobility,  that 
the  orders  of  its  chief  must  be  transmitted  with  slow- 
ness, often  with  difficulty,  and  that,  for  active  opera- 
tions, its  organization  was  inferior  to  that  of  the  Ger- 
man armies. 

To-day,  in  almost  all  countries,  the  strength  of  the 
corps  is  determined  by  the  following  considerations: 

The  uninterrupted  current  of  opinion  among  military 
men  has  been  that  30,000  troops  represent  the  largest 
force  that  can  be  marched  upon  a  single  road  in  a  day, 
and  preserve  its  proper  power  of  assemblement. 

With  the  Romans,  this  was  the  strength  of  a  con- 
sular army. 


Il6    -  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Napoleon  admitted  as  a  doctrinal  fact  that  more  than 
this  number  could  not  be  marched  upon  a  single  road  in 
one  day. 

The  Germans  have  expressed  the  same  thing  in  an- 
other way  by  saying  that  a  corps  of  30,000  men  is  the 
largest  force  which,  marching  upon  one  road,  can  be 
deployed  in  a  single  day  upon  the  head  of  the  column. 
To  accomplish  this,  it  will  be  sufficient  if  the  infantry 
march  by  fours,  the  cavalry  by  threes,  and  the  pieces 
and  caissons  in  single  file.  This  arrangement  is  not  ar- 
bitrary; it  results  from  the  dimensions  of  the  roads.  It 
prescribes  that  an  army  corps  in  column  without  trains 
shall  have  a  mean  length  of  24  kilometres  (about  15 
miles),  which  corresponds  to  a  day's  march. 

In  summer,  .the  length  of  the  daily  march  may  per- 
haps be  extended  to  30  kilometres  (about  18^  miles),  if 
the  heat  be  not  excessive.  In  winter,  on  the  contrary, 
with  but  eight  hours  of  clear  day,  it  should  be  short- 
ened. 

It  has  been  calculated  that  a  corps  of  40,000  men  in 
column  upon  a  single  road,  without  ammunition  or 
supply  trains,  ambulances,  or  bridge  equipage,  would 
occupy  a  length  of  32  kilometres  (about  20  miles);  a 
corps  of  50,000  men,  40  kilometres  (about  25  miles). 
The  trains  require  almost  as  much  space  as  the  corps 
itself;  so  that,  upon  a  single  road,  the  rear  of  the  trains 
of  an  army  corps  of  40,000  men  will  be  two  days'  march 
from  the  head. 

Hence,  when  a  corps  exceeds  30,000  men,  the  march 
should  be  made  upon  two  roads. 

In  France,  it  has  been  calculated  that  by  allowing  for 
an  extension  on  the  march  of  one-fourth  for  infantry, 
cavalry,  and  artillery,  and  of  one-half  for  the  convoys, 
the  length  of  the  combat  column  of  an  infantry  division 
of  12,000  muskets  will  be  14  kilometres  (between  8  and 
9  miles).     That  of  an  army  corps  of  25,000  muskets, 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.      II7 

under  the  same  conditions,  counting  from  the  head  of 
the  advanced-guard  to  the  rear  of  the  main  body,  without 
the  munition  trains,  has  been  fixed  at  26  kilometres  700 
metres  (between  16  and  17  miles). 

I. — Army  Corps  of  the  Principal  Powers. 

The  effective  strength  of  the  German  corps  has  been 
determined  according  to  these  principles,  which  have 
likewise  served  as  a  basis  in  establishing  that  of  our 
own. 

The  German  army  corps  is  always  estimated  at  a 
mean  of  30,000  men  ;  but  in  reality  upon  a  war  footing 
we  see  from  the  most  recent  documents  that  it  comprises 
the  following  elements  : 

German  Army  Corps. 


Headquarters 

1st  Divisiou  of  Infantry .  . 

2d  Division  of  Infantry  .  . 

Corps  Artillery,  with  Hos- 
pital Service,  Munition, 
Subsistence  and  Post 
columns,  etc 

Trains  and  Ambulances.  . 


TOXAI^ 


c/5 

0 

u 

M 

SJ 

^ 

% 

g 

M 

0 

0 

w 

S 

w 

16 

51 

214 

259 

335 

171 

14,290 

2,115 

362 

182 

15,528 

2,174 

85 

100 

3,418 

3,360 

30 

146 

2,251 

2,709 

828 

650 

35,701 

10,617 

05 


24 
24 

48 


96 


Vi 

o 

O 
< 


20 
214 
230 

383 
684 


1,551 


Grand  total,  officers  and  employes  included:  2)1i^79 
men. 

In  Austria  and  Russia  the  increase  in  effectives  has 
also  swelled  the  normal  figures. 


ii8 


PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 


Russian  Army  Corps. 

The  Russian  corps  upon  a  war  footing  comprises: 


OlfFICERS  AND 

others  of 

assimii.ated 

Rank. 

Troops. 

Horses. 

Guns. 

Wagons. 

1, 008 

41,735 

10,047 

108 

1,443 

Total,  officers  included:  42,743  rationjtaires. 

Austrian  Army  Corps. 

In  Austria,  the  mobilized  corps  comprises  a  still  larger 
effective;  but  this  may  be  changed  and  perhaps  reduced 
at  the  moment  of  taking  the  field. 

It  comprises  at  present: 


Oeeicers. 

Employes 

AND    Civil 

Agents. 

Men. 

Horses. 

Guns. 

Wagons. 

1,293 

526 

50,586 

9,368 

112 

1,526 

Of  actual  combatants  there  are,  however,  only  39,498 
infantrymen,  sappers,  and  pioneers:  1,815  cavalrymen, 
and  112  guns.* 


*The  figures  relating  to  the  Austrian  Army  Corps  are  taken  from 
the  Staff  Guide.  But  everything  leads  us  to  believe  that  Austria 
would  mobilize  her  army  corps  in  two  divisions  and  not  in  three.  The 
corps  effective  would  consequently  be  diminished. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.      II9 
Italian  Army  Corps. 

In  Italy  the  corps  approaches  the  normal  type,  and 
comprises: 


Or  in  all  :  28,570  men. 


II.— Corps  Subdivisions. 

The  composition  of  the  army  corps  is,  like  the  num- 
ber of  its  effectives,  controlled  by  settled  principles. 

From  the  moment  when  it  is  to  march  separately  upon 
a  single  road,  it  should  be  in  condition  to  preserve  its 
independence  under  all  circumstances;  and  to  this  end 
should  possess  troops  of  the  three  arms  of  the  service, 
technical  troops,  bridge  material,  an  administrative 
service,  and  accessory  services  of  all  kinds.  It  is  nec- 
essary even  that  the  general  who  commands  it  should 
avoid  having  his  hands  bound  by  the  auxiliary  services 
which  he  has  left  in  his  corps  region. 

While  seeking  means  to  enable  the  corps  to  march  in 
column  upon  a  single  road,  we  should  not  lose  sight  of 
the  advisability  of  moving  it  upon  two  roads  whenever 
practicable.  From  this  arises  the  obligation  of  organ- 
izing it  in  two  or  three  secondary  units,  strong  enough 
to  possess  a  proper  independence  in  their  turn.  Thus 
the  corps  is  formed  with  two  or  three  divisions.  But 
this  number  has  often  been  exceeded.      Corps  have  been 

*  Less  the  saddle  horses  of  the  officers. 


I20  PART    FIRST, — STRATEGY. 

known  with  three,  fonr,  and  even  five  divisions.  They 
had  then  little  mobility,  and  in  the  field  often  found 
themselves  out  of  condition  to  observe  the  tactical  rule 
which  prescribes  that  the  parts  of  an  army  designed  to 
act  in  common  be  held  together,  and  that  their  efforts 
be  combined  to  a  common  end. 

.  To-day,  we  still  hesitate  between  the  corps  of  two  and 
that  of  three  divisions.  But  the  weightiest  reasons 
make  in  favor  of  the  two-division  system. 

An  army  corps  of  30,000  men,  in  two  divisions,  upon 
a  single  road,  will  occupy,  in  fact,  with  its  regimental 
trains,  according  to  German  data,*  a  length  of  28  kilo- 
metres (17  miles)  —  extension  being  as  little  as  possible 
—  that  is  to  say,  the  rear  of  the  column  will  be  able  to 
start  onl}^  when  the  head  has  marched  28  kilometres. 
At  the  rate  of  4  kilometres  (about  2^  miles)  per  hour, 
this  column  will  require  7  hours  in  defiling.  In  the 
most  favorable  season  of  the  year,  in  summer,  with  thir- 
teen hours  of  clear  daylight,  from  the  moment  when  the 
rear  is  put  in  march,  there  will  be  but  six  hours  at  its 
disposal  in  which  to  reach  the  corps  bivouac.  This  will 
be  insufficient,  and  these  troops  will  arrive  only  after 
night-fall.  Properly,  the  corps  should  not  cover  more 
than  from  20  to  24  kilometres  in  a  day;  that  is  to  say,  it 
should  march  only  from  5  to  6  hours  in  the  mean. 

But  if  it  is  composed  of  three  divisions,  its  different 
parts,  moving  upon  a  single  road,  can  be  assembled  in 
the  same  day  only  upon  the  condition  of  reducing  the 
daily  march  of  the  corps  to  two  or  three  hours,  periods 
corresponding  to  eight  and  twelve  kilometres;  for  the 
more  numerous  the  units,  the  more  extended  becomes 
the  column. 

There  is  only  one  remedy  for  this  state  of  things, 
which  is  to  utilize  two  roads  in  the  march  of  suclica  corps, 

. ^ 

"^  Manual  for  the  Conduct  of  Troops,  by  Captain  von  Widdern. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.      121 

But  the  advantage  of  a  concentrated  formation  is  then 
lost. 

It  will  be  more  expedient,  therefore,  to  partition  the 
corps  into  two  divisions  instead  of  three.  It  follows, 
moreover,  as  a  result  of  our  discussion,  that  24  kilometres 
(about  15  miles)  is  the  longest  march  that  can  ordinarily 
be  made  by  a  corps  in  a  single  day. 

But  the  reasons  presented  are  not  the  only  ones  favor- 
able to  the  division  into  two  parts. 

It  has  been  found  a  difficult  matter,  especially  when 
the  armies  aie  numerous,  to  give  to  a  corps  a  larger 
force  than  from  30,000  to  35,000  men. 

Moreover,  experience  has  taught  that  it  is  advanta- 
geous to  form  the  division  into  two  brigades,  the  brigade 
into  two  regiments,  the  regiment  into  three  battalions. 

Under  these  circumstances,  it  is  the  separation  of  the 
corps  into  two  divisions,  which  allows  us  to  have  the 
highest  effective  force  for  each  of  these  units. 

In  1870,  we  had  corps  of  28,000  men  in  3  divisions; 
others  of  40,000  men  in  4  divisions.  The  latter  had 
then  an  effective  of  only  from  9,000  to  10,000  men  each; 
the  brigades  numbered  only  from  4,000  to  5,000;  the 
regiments  from  2,000  to  2,500;  and  the  battalions  from 
600  to  800.  All  these  units  were  thus  weaker  than  the 
corresponding  elements  of  the  German  army.  To  this 
numerical  inferiority  our  defeats  in  isolated  actions  were 
often  chiefly  due,  especially  in  the  first  days  of  the  war. 

Notwithstanding  the  advantages  of  the  distribution 
of  the  corps  into  2  divisions,  the  proposition  has  for  some 
time  been  under  consideration  in  Germany  of  giving  it 
3  divisions,  for  the  purpose,  it  is  said,  of  being  able  to 
make  a  greater  number  of  combinations. 

Upon  this  subject,  Major  Meckel,  Professor  of  Tactics 
at  the  Military  Academy  at  Berlin,  says:'  "Two  divis- 
ions can  only  be  employed  side  by  side,  or  one  behind 
the  other,  thus  necessitating  the  dismemberment  of  one 


122  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

and  sometimes  both,  when  it  is  desired  to  constitute  a 
reserve  or  to  occupy  points  of  secondary  importance," 
But  the  German  author  here  looks  at  but  one  side  of  the 
question,  and  a  debatable  side.  It  is  certain  that  the 
adoption  of  the  three-division  system  cannot  take  place 
without  deeply  changing  the  Prussian  military  organi- 
zation in  respect  to  recruitment,  territorial  distribution, 
and  mobilization. 

The  adoption  of  it  is  then  doubtful. 

But  it  is  not  the  less  interesting  to  see  arising  in  the 
minds  of  our  neighbors  the  idea  of  placing  a  new  infan- 
try division  at  the  disposal  of  the  corps  commander  in 
time  of  war.  Major  Meckel  has  attempted  to  justify  it 
by  the  following  reasons: 

"At  the  outbreak  of  war,  it  would  be  advantageous," 
says  he,  "to  confide  to  the  commander  of  the  corps,  in 
addition  to  its  organic  elements,  several  groups  of  bat- 
teries and  a  reserve  of  infantry."  The  reserve  divisions 
of  the  landwehr  would  allow  this  to  be  done  without 
difficulty,  and  would  assure  to  the  German  army  corps 
an  effective  of  from  45,000  to  50,000  men. 

A  buttress  is  furnished  the  partisans  of  the  three- 
division  system  by  the  words  of  Clausewitz:  ''''Nothing 
is  more  awkward  in  an  army  divided  into  three  coj-ps 
than  to  see  each  of  these  separated  into  two  divisions^  for^ 
by  such  an  organization^  the  authority  of  the  corps  com- 
marider  is  nearly  neutralized. " 

However,  it  is  certain  that,  to-day,  in  Germany, 
France,  Italy,  and  in  other  countries,  the  partition  of 
the  corps  into  two  divisions  is  intimately  connected  with 
the  peace  organization  of  the  army,  and  the  system 
could  not  be  disturbed  without  destroying  this  organiz- 
ation. Therefore,  while  this  continues,  it  will  be  neces- 
sary to  hold  to  the  present  composition. 

Composition  of  Foreign  Army  Corps. — In  Austria,  all  the 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.      1 23 

^corps  except  one  (the  14th)  are  in  3  divisions.  In  Rns- 
sia,  the  system  is  mixed.  Of  19  corps  cf  armee  mobiles^ 
II  have  2  divisions. 

In  Spain  and  Belgium,  the  two-division  system  is  also 
in  vogue.  In  England,  the  three-division  system  pre- 
vails, but  the  composition  is  no  longer  the  same  as  on 
the  Continent. 

III.— Composition  of  Infantry  Divisions. 

In  the  composition  of  infantry  divisions,  we  must  take 
into  account  the  case  when  circumstances  will  involve 
them  in  isolated  action.  This  situation  presents  itself 
not  only  when  a  division  is  separated  from  its  corps,  but 
may  also  arise  in  the  case  of  one  making  part  of  a  gen- 
eral line  of  battle.  The  corps  commander  can,  indeed, 
in  this  situation,  deploy  his  two  divisions  one  beside  the 
other,  and  assign  to  each  a  distinct  field  of  action. 

From  the  moment  when  the  divisions  are  liable  to  be 
called  upon  to  operate  separately,  it  is  necessary  to  or- 
ganize them  as  small  corps,  and  to  assure  them  a  pro- 
per independence.  Hence,  there  must  enter  into  their 
composition  the  three  arms,  infantry,  cavalry  and  artil- 
lery, with  an  engineer  detachment  and  divisional  ambu- 
lance and  administrative  services;  and,  in  special  cases, 
they  must  even  be  provided  with  bridge  equipage. 

This  organization,  moreover,  permits  each  division  to 
march  upon  a  separate  road,  when  occasion  requires. 

In  the  latter  part  of  the  war  of  1870,  when  the  Ger- 
man troops  were  obliged  to  extend  over  wide  distances, 
in  order  to  contend  with  the  enemy's  numerous  but  un- 
tempered  levies,  which  it  was  not  expected  would  give 
sustained  battles,  their  leaders  felt  the  necessity  of  form- 
ing the  divisions  into  brigades  with  all  arms  of  the  ser- 
vice. This  partition  was  demanded  by  the  peculiar  sit- 
uation of  the  adversary.     These  brigades  performed  the 


124  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

services  which  in  ordinary  times  fall  upon  divisions  or 
corps. 

In  1871,  when  the  Sonth  German  army,  under  orders 
of  General  Manteuflfel,  marched  across  the  Cote-d'Or,  to 
cut  our  Army  of  the  East  from  its  communications,  and 
throw  it  upon  Switzerland,  the  Kettler  Brigade  was  sent 
before  Dijon  to  cover  the  right  flank,  and  to  resist  the 
enterprises  of  Garibaldi. 

On  account  of  this  special  mission,  artillery  and  cav- 
alry were  joined  to  it.  Its  strength  was  6  battalions,  2 
squadrons,  and  12  guns. 

But  this  was  an  organization  made  necessary  by  cir- 
cumstances. It  should  be  adopted  only  in  exceptional 
cases,  and  for  particular  reasons. 

The  division,  as  a  rule,  is  composed  of  2  brigades, 
numbering  12  battalions  altogether;  a  group  of  artillery 
of  4  batteries;  a  regiment  of  cavalry  of  4  squadrons;  a 
company  of  engineers  with  bridge  equipage;  and  a  hos- 
pital detachment. 

Among  these  various  elements  there  is  one,  the  regi- 
ment of  cavalry,  whose  utility  is  still  debated.  It  has 
been  observed  on  this  subject  that  if  the  division  is  sep- 
arated from  the  army,  the  4  squadrons  are  insufficient, 
and  that  in  the  contrary  case  the  number  is  too  large. 

There  are  always  large  masses  of  cavalry  on  outpost 
duty  in  advance  of  these  squadrons  covering  the  front  of 
the  army.  If  the  two  divisions  march  one  behind  the 
other,  upon  the  same  road,  there  is  no  longer  a  place  in 
column  for  the  regiment  of  cavalry  of  the  2d  division. 
If  it  is  interpolated  into  the  grand  column  of  march,  it 
is  stripped  of  its  usefulness;  often  it  must  be  sent  in  ad- 
vance of  the  ist  division  or  upon  the  flanks,  and  in  this 
case  it  has  no  function  except  to  link  this  division  with 
the  neighboring  divisions,  which  is  unnecessary.  While 
awaiting  a  solution  of  the  question,  large  armies  have 
generally  maintained  the  regiment  of  divisional  cavalry. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIFS.      1 25 

111  France  it  has  been  otherwise.  We  have  united  the 
two,  regiments  of  cavalry  to  form  a  brigade,  which  is 
held  at  the  disposal  of  the  corps  commander. 

IV.— Corps  Artillery. 

In  Germany,  the  corps  contains  three  constituent 
parts:  2  infantry  divisions  and  the  corps  artillery  of 
from  6  to  8  batteries  (36  to  48  pieces). 

Our  neighbors  hold  that  this  artillery  should  gener- 
ally act  as  a  unit.  It  was  thus  that  they  often  employed 
it  in  1870,  imparting  to  its  action  a  deadly  power,  which 
was  o-reatlv  aug^mented  bv  the  concentric  direction  of 
the  fire.  Its  effect  was  always  severely  felt :  it  had 
a  destructive  action  upon  our  artillery,  which  it  quickly 
silenced,  and  a  demoralizing  influence  upon  our  infantry 
through  the  loss  of  its  artillery  support. 

"  A  line  of  guns  as  long  as  that  furnished  by  the  ar- 
tillery of  a  corps,"  says  Von  der  Goltz,  "has  an  imme- 
diate influence.  Wherever  it  appears  and  wherever  its 
blows  prepare  the  attack,  the  infantry  involuntarily 
rushes  forward." 

The  front  taken  by  it  ordinarily  indicates  the  line  of 
battle  of.  the  entire  corps.  Should  it  be  distributed  be- 
tween the  divisions,  as  has  been  several  times  proposed, 
there  would  be  taken  from  the  corps  commander  his 
most  effective  means  of  giving  a  direction  to  the  com- 
bat, and  of  obtaining  superiority  at  the  decisive  point. 
This  commander  should  then  have  the  sole  right  of  dis- 
posing of  his  corps  artillery. 

While  observing  this  principle,  in  Germany  a  consid- 
erable part  is  left  to  the  spirit  of  initiative  born  of  the 
occasion,  and  it  has  sometimes  resulted  from  this  that 
the  corps  artillery  has  been  placed  in  line  at  the  order  of 
the  artillery  officer  in  immediate  command  of  this  arm, 
or  even  by  some  other  inferior  authority. 


126  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Thus  at  Woerth,  August  6th,  1870,  the  artillery  of  the 
Fifth  Prussian  Corps  was  massed  at  eight  o'clock  in,  the 
morning,  at  the  commencement  of  the  battle,  upon  the 
order  of  the  general  commanding  one  of  the  divisions, 
with  the  concurrence  of  the  corps  chief-of-staflf.  The 
corps  commander  had  only  to  pass  upon  the  measure 
after  its  execution. 

According  to  the  ideas  held  by  our  neighbors,  the 
army  corps,  in  order  to  fullEill  its  function,  should  com- 
prise, as  we  have  said  before,  three  combatant  parts; 
namely,  two  divisions  and  the  corps  artillery;  the  re- 
maining parts  are  designed  to  provide  for  the  probable 
wants  of  the  corps.  Thus  munition  columns  should 
have  sufficient  ammunition  for  an  entire  day's  con- 
flict on  the  part  of  all  the  forces.  The  troops  carry- 
ing with  them  one  day's  supply,  it  follows  that  a  two 
days'  battle  will  not  entirely  exhaust  the  ammunition. 
Such  is  the  rule  on  this  subject. 

The  provision  columns  and  the  parks  should  be 
able  to  sustain  men  and  horses  for  five  full  days. 
The  five  provision  convoys  of  the  German  army  corps 
carry  four  days'  supply  for  all  the  troops,  and  the  five 
forage  convoys  a  seven  days'  allowance  for  the  ani- 
mals. These  convoys  form  a  single  service  in  the  field, 
and  by  means  of  them  a  minimum  supply  is  provided 
for  more  than  five  days,  or  more  exactly,  six  days. 

The  ambulance  service  should  be  able  to  care  for 
2,400  wounded,  the  mean  number  of  losses  in  a  single 
da)  's"'  battle  for  a  corps  of  30,000  combatants,  or  8 
per  cent. 

A  bake-house  equipment  should  be  provided  in  order 
to  be  able,  in  a  cultivated  region  and  with  the  aid  of 
private  industry,  to  furnish  each  day's  bread. 

The  divisional  bridge  equipage  should  permit  the 
crossing  of  streams  from  37  to  45  metres  wide. 

And,  finally,  the  horse  depot,  well  supplied  with  for- 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.      127 

age,  should  leave  its  territor}'  at  the  commencement  of 
a  campaign  with  200  horses. 

Normal  Type  of  the  German  Army  Corps. — Examined 
more  in  detail,  this  organization  creates  for  the  German 
army  corps  a  kind  of  type,  the  peculiarities  of  which 
are: 

Combat  troops:  2  divisions  and  corps  artillery. 

Each  division  has  12  battalions  of  infantry  formed  into 
2  brigades  of  2  regiments  (each  regiment  thus  having  3 
battalions);  i  regiment  of  cavalry  of  4  squadrons;  and 
a  group  of  artillery  of  4  batteries.  * 

The  corps  artillery  is  composed  of  8  batteries  (48 
pieces). 

The  battalions  have  1,000  men,  the  squadrons  150 
horses,  the  batteries  6  guns. 

The  troops  carry  with  them  supplies  as  follow: 

Food :  each  soldier  for  three  days,  the  horses  for  one 
day. 

Ammunition:  no  rounds  per  man  for  infantry,  50  for 
cavalry,  135  per  gun  for  artillery. 

These  supplies,  as  well  as  the  ambulance  material, 
are  carried  by  the  men  and  horses  or  in  the  battalion 
wagons. 

Each  battalion  of  infantry  has  one  six-horse,  one 
four-horse,  and  seven  two-horse  wagons. 

Each  squadron  has  a  two-horse  wagon. 

Each  battery,  in  addition  to  its  pieces,  has  twelve  six- 
horse  wagons. 

Each  infantry  division  has  an  engineer  company,  with 
the  bridge  material  necessary  for  a  35-metre  bridge,  and 
three  tool  wagons. 

A  third  company  of  engineers  is  joined  to  the  army 
corps,  with  equipage  sufficient  to  construct  a  bridge  125 
metres  long. 

*  A  battalion  of  chasseurs  is  in  addition  attached  to  the  2d  infantry- 
division. 


128  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

The  corps  possesses,  in  addition  to  the  munitions 
carried  by  the  troops,  about  200  six-horse  wagons,  with 
60  extra  rounds  per  man  for  the  infantry  and  about  140 
rounds  per  field-piece.  The  food  supply  of  the  corps  is 
assured  for  about  a  week  through  the  provisions  carried 
by  the  troops  and  those  transported  by  160  four-horse  and 
400  two-horse  wagons.  Respecting  the  care  of  sick  and 
wounded,  aside  from  the  surgeons  attached  to  the  troops, 
medical  attention  is  assured  by  three  infirmary  detach- 
ments of  100  men  each,  and  twelve  field  hospitals. 
These  detachments,  with  their  twelve  two-horse  wagons, 
are  charged  with  the  duty  of  assisting  the  corps  sur- 
geons in  giving  first  aid  to  the  wounded  upon  the  battle- 
field, and  in  removing  them  to  the  hospitals.  The 
twelve  field  hospitals  are  each  equipped  \vl  personjiel  and 
materiel  for  the  reception  of  200  sick  or  wounded,  or  in 
all,  2,400.  The  materiel  of  each  hospital  is  carried  in 
six  wagons. 

Finally,  the  army  corps  has  a  personitel  and  m^ateriel 
sufficient  for  the  establishment  of  a  telegraphic  line  of 
20  kilometres,  as  well  as  for  the  maintenance  of  com- 
munication between  the  field  stations  and  the  interior 
of  the  country.  The  whole  is  so  organized  as  to  enable 
the  divisions  to  operate  separately. 

The  normal  army  corps  prepared  for  the  field  is  thus 
composed  of: 

25  battalions  or  25,000  infantry; 

8  squadrons  or  1,200  cavalry; 

16  batteries  or  about  2,000  artillerymen  with  96 
guns.* 

But  as  we  have  seen,  the  total  force  is  raised  to  more 
than  37,000  men  and  10,000  horses. 


*Blume,  Strategy,  Berlin,  1882. 


FIRST   CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION   OF   ARMIES.     1 29 

§9. — CAVALRY   DIVISIONS. 

I.-  Bodies  of  Reserve  Cavalry. 

In  1870,  we  still  held,  in  France,  to  the  old  organiza- 
tion of  cavalry  reserves  dating  from  the  First  Empire. 
At  that  period  the  action  of  cavalry  through  its  momen- 
tum was  often  decisive;  great  masses  of  horsemen  were 
consequently  necessary;  and  yet  Napoleon  more  than 
once  regretted  these  formations. 

Ordinarily,  he  joined  to  his  armies  strong  cavalry  re- 
serves, which  were  usually  under  command  of  Murat. 
He  set  them  in  motion  as  compact  bodies,  giving  his 
orders  thus:  "To-morrow  the  cavalry  reserve  will  as- 
semble at  such  an  hour.  It  will  move  to  such  a  place." 
The  result  was  that  regiments  were  obliged  to  wait  whole 
hours  before  beginning  the  march,  thus  prematurely  ex- 
hausting their  horses.  Moreover,  there  was  great  diffi- 
culty in  feeding  these  masses  when  united.  It  was  to 
these  different  causes  that  must  be  attributed  in  part 
the  ruin  of  the  cavalry  of  the  Grand  Army,  the  com- 
mencement of  which  dates  from  1812. 

Without  taking  into  account  the  changes  which  im- 
provements in  fire-arms  made  necessary  in  cavalry  serv- 
ice, and  consequently  in  the  organization  of  this  branch, 
the  French  army,  until  1870,  remained  faithful  to  these 
traditions. 

The  Army  of  the  Rhine  contained,  indeed,  general 
reserves  of  cavalry,  artillery,  and  engineers. 

Cavaby  Reserves  in  1870. — The  cavalry  reserve  com- 
prised three  divisions,  one  of  which,  placed,  August  6, 
at  the  disposal  of  MacMahon,  was  nearly  disorganized  at 
the  battle  of  Froescliwiller,  The  others  were  joined  to 
the  Army  of  Metz,  but  continued  with  it  only  until  the 
battle  of  Borny, 

9 


130  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

On  August  14,  one  of  these,  still  imperfectly  formed, 
was  detached  to  protect  the  departure  of  the  Emperor. 

These  reserve  divisions  comprised  at  the  outset: 

The  first:  2  brigades  of  light  cavalry  of  2  regiments 
each,  and  2  batteries. 

The  second:  2  brigades  of  heavy  cavalry  of  2  regi- 
ments each,  and  2  batteries. 

The  third:  2  brigades  likewise  of  2  regiments  each, — 
one  of  them  cavalry  of  the  line,  the  other  heavy  cav- 
alry,—  and  2  batteries. 

We  see  that  in  the  composition  of  these  reserves,  the 
shock  idea  seemed  still  to  predominate. 

Independent  of  these  reserves,  there  was  one  divis- 
ion of  cavalry  for  each  army  corps.  The  composition 
of  these  divisions  lent  itself  best  to  reconnoitering  duty 
and  to  the  service  of  covering  the  movements  of  the 
other  forces.  But  with  us,  at  this  time,  but  little  use 
was  made  of  the  cavalry  in  this  sense.  Thus  the  army 
never  received  proper  information,  and  on  the  i6th 
August,  German  batteries  were  in  position  for  cannonad- 
ing the  headquarters  of  a  French  cavalry  division,  before 
a  suspicion  of  their  presence  was  aroused. 

The  cavalry  divisions  attached  to  army  corps  com- 
posed of  4  divisions,  comprised  3  brigades  with  from  2 
to  3  regiments  each,  without  artillery,  one  of  the  brig- 
ades of  light  cavalry,  one  of  cavalry  of  the  line,  and  the 
third  either  of  heavy  or  line  cavalry. 

Those  attached  to  army  corps  of  3  divisions,  consisted 
only  of  2  brigades  of  2  regiments  each,  one  of  them  of 
light  cavalry  and  one  of  line  cavalry. 

They  had  the  means  of  making  reconnaissances,  but 
lacked  artillery;  and  if  their  surveillance  duties  were  ill 
performed,  the  fault  lay  more  in  the  lack  of  tactical  in- 
struction than  with  the  organization  itself. 

Prussian  Cavahy  Divisions  in  1866. — In  this  year  the  cav- 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.      131 

airy  of  the  Prussian.s  was  apportioned  without  uiiiforin- 
ity.  This,  however,  did  not  prevent  their  being  gener- 
ally well  informed. 

Independent  of  its  divisional  cavalry  regiments,  the 
I.  Army  had  a  cavalry  corps  of  2  divisions,  the  first  of 
which  comprised  2  brigades, — one  of  heavy  cavalry  in  2 
regiments,  the  other  of  light  cavalry  in  3  regiments,  with 
2  horse  batteries;  the  second  division  contained  2  brig- 
ades of  light  cavalry, — each  composed  of  2  regiments, — 
and  2  batteries. 

Prassian  Cavalry  Divisioiis  in  1870. — In  this  year,  fixed 
rules  for  the  strength  and  composition  of  these  grand 
units  did  not  yet  exist  among  the  Germans. 

The  following  shows  the  composition  of  their  inde- 
pendent cavalry  divisions: 

3  of  3  brigades,  each  of  2  regiments,  with  2  batteries. 


2  of  3 

3 

2 

I  of  2 

3 

2 

I  of  2 

"            2               " 

2 

I  of  I 

3 

2 

I  of  I 

"            2               " 

2 

The  partition  into  3  brigades  of  2  regiments  was  al- 
ready the  most  in  favor. 

Since  1870,  this  question  has  been  much  discussed, 
but  it  is  still  unsettled.  Yet  the  principles  which  will 
eventually  lead  to  its  solution  are  very  nearly  estab- 
lished. 

II.— Independent  Cavalry  Divisions. 

If  progress  in  armament  has  deeply  modified  the 
function  of  cavalry,  it  has  nevertheless  far  from  dimin- 
ished its  importance.  It  is  true,  this  arm  can  no  longer 
decide  the  success  of  a  battle  as  formerly,  nor  even  in  a 
combat  destroy  the  cohesion  of  troops;  but  it  has  a  sur- 
veillance role  which   the  increase  in  the  range  of  arms 


132  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

has  extended  very  much  beyond  former  limits.  From 
another  point  of  view,  the  large  armies  now  put  in  motion, 
require  for  their  security  such  a  well  developed  recon- 
naissance service,  that  it  has  become  essential  both  to  in- 
crease the  cavalry  effective  and  to  require  greater  speed 
in  the  horses. 

It  has  then  been  necessary  to  give  it,  both  as  regards 
numbers  and  equipment,  the  means  of  acting  with  vigor, 
for  the  purpose  of  allowing  it  to  watch  at  a  distance  to 
the  front,  during  a  period  sufficiently  long- to  permit  the 
troops  covered  by  it  to  concentrate  for  battle. 

Its  reconnoitering  and  covering  duties  have  then  been 
constantly  increasing,  and  demand  to-day  an  enseinble 
of  acquirements  and  qualities  more  fully  developed  than 
formerly. 

In  principle,  every  unit  destined  to  act  individually 
ought  to  possess  the  means  of  obtaining  information. 
Thence  arises  the  necessity  for  both  divisional  and  corps 
cavalry. 

But  this  cavalry  will  not  suffice  to  cover  an  army. 
For  while  the  heads  of  the  advanced-guard  of  corps  and 
divisions  are  in  condition  to  assure  their  main  bodies 
against  surprises,  they  can  not  without  inconvenience 
be  sent  to  distant  points  to  form  a  zone  of  security  in 
advance  of  the  front,  and  upon  the  flanks  of  an  army 
in  march.  There  hence  arises  the  necessity  for  special 
cavalry  units,  qualified  to  discover  the  strength,  position, 
and  designs  of  the  enemy,  in  time  to  permit  the  main 
forces  to  assemble.  Hence  a  double  obligation  devolves 
upon  the  cavalry  of  an  army: 

I  St.  To  be  strong  enough  to  penetrate  to  the  vicinity 
of  the  enemy; 

2d.  To  keep  far  enough  in  advance  of  the  army 
proper  to  give  the  latter  sufficient  time  for  concentra- 
tion. 

We  have  seen   that  a  corps  of  ordinary  size  on  the 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.      1 33 

march  requires  a  day  to  deploy  and  take  position  for  ac- 
tion. If  each  corps  has  a  road  at  its  disposal,  the  army 
will  be  given  this  length  of  time  to  come  into  line  of 
battle. 

This  will  regnlate  the  minimnm  distance  to  which  the 
covering  cavalry  shonld  be  pushed.  It  will  necessarily 
exercise  then  a  certain  initiative.  This  has  led  to  a  re- 
turn to  independent  divisions  of  cavalry  acting  directly 
under  the  commander-in-chief 

It  is  evident  that  this  independence  can  be  assured 
only  by  special  conditions  of  strength,  and  these  condi- 
tions may  be  easily  determined  by  the  particular  service 
which  these  units  will  have  to  perform. 

But,  up  to  the  present  time,  this  service  has  not  been 
clearly  defined;  opinion  is  still  divided,  and  all  that  can. 
be  done  is  to  set  forth  the  theories  which  seem  to  lend 
themselves  best  to  actual  practice. 

Strength  and  Composition  of  Independent  Cavalry  Divisions. 
— When  in  action,  the  cavalry  division  ought  to  give  a 
shock,  sustain  it,  then  render  it  decisive,  and  finally 
assure  the  results.  There  must  therefore  be  three  units; 
one  for  the  attack,  one  to  support  it,  and  a  third  to  finish 
the  action. 

Now,  in  order  to  produce  a  powerful  shock,  a  regi- 
ment of  four  squadrons  is  too  weak.  Three  regiments, 
on  the  contrary,  constitute  too  large  a  force,  and  one  not 
easily  wielded.  The  force  then  designed  for  the  attack 
should  be  a  brigade  of  two  regiments. 

Moreover,  it  cannot  be  foreseen  which  of  the  three 
parts  of  a  cavalry  division  will  be  charged  with  the  shock, 
the  supporting  movements,  the  decisive  effort,  the  pur- 
suit, or  the  protection  of  the  retreat. 

The  three  parts  must  therefore  be  equal. 

Hence  the  cavalry  division  should  be  composed  of  3 
brigades,  each  with  2  regiments  of  4  squadrons. 


134  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Thence  results  also  a  combat  formation  in  three  lines, 
the  role  of  each  not  being  defined  in  advance,  so  that 
there  may  be  more  liberty  of  action,  and  the  means  of 
better  profiting  by  favorable  opportunities.  But,  in 
fact,  the  first  line,  the  one  nearest  the  enemy,  will  ordi- 
darily  be  entrusted  with  the  attack,  and  the  second  with 
manoeuvring,  while  the  third  should  generally  be  held 
in  reserve. 

In  certain  cases  it  would  be  more  advantageous  to 
manoeuvre  with  the  first  line  and  to  charge  with  the 
second,  in  order  to  deceive  the  enemy  regarding  the  di- 
rection of  the  blow: 

Let  us  pass  now  to  the  subject  of  reconnoitering  duty. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  considerations  drawn  there- 
from lead  to  results  similar  to  those  just  stated. 

In  order  to  become  sufficiently  extended  in  front  and 
upon  the  flanks  of  an  army,  a  division  of  cavalry  must 
occupy  at  least  two  principal  roads.  It  must  also  have 
at  all  times  a  reserve  ready  to  act,  according  to  circum- 
stances, in  either  direction.  And,  finally,  it  is  indis- 
pensable that  it  be  able  to  so  divide  itself  as  to  keep  up 
its  connection  with  the  reserve,  and  thence  with  the 
army  itself  Here  again  arises  the  necessity  for  a  divis- 
ion into  three  large  units,  capable  of  comparative  inde- 
pendence in  reconnoitering. 

Three  brigades  of  two  regiments  each  will  answer  this 
purpose. 

Verdy  du  Vernois  is  even  of  the  opinion  that  one  of 
these  brigades  could  be  advantageously  employed  as  re- 
enforcement  or  reserve;  and  that  in  consequence  a  di- 
vision should  have  one  brigade  of  heavy  and  two  brigades 
of  light  cavalry. 

But  this  is  not  all.  The  independence  of  these  large 
units  would  not  be  assured  for  reconnoitering  duty  with- 
out the  aid  of  an  artillery  force.  On  the  other  hand,  if  per- 
manently attached  to  these  divisions,  the  services  of  this 


FIRST   CHAPTER.— ORGANIZATION    OF    ARMIES.     1 35 

artillery  would  be  of  diminished  value  in  case  of  a  gen- 
eral engagement.  To  be  available  here,  it  should  not 
form  an  integral  part  of  the  cavalry  division,  but  be  de- 
tachable from  it.  Up  to  the  present  time,  it  has  been 
judged  sufficient  to  give  a  battery  to  each  of  the  two 
brigades  of  cavalry  acting  in  first  line.  But  ideas  on 
this  subject  have  been  modified  little  by  little,  and  to-day, 
on  account  of  the  difficulty  of  foreseeing  positively 
the  role  of  the  several  brigades,  the  tendency  is  to  give  a 
battery  to  each.  A  normal  division  of  cavalry  should 
then  have  three  batteries. 

In  France,  an  organization  has  been  adopted  in  con- 
formity with  these  principles,  that  is  to  say,  one  giving 
the  divisions  3  brigades  (each  having  2  regiments),  one 
of  light,  one  of  line,  and  the  third  of  heavy  cavalry. 
Moreover,  the  2d  regiment  of  each  artillery  brigade  in- 
cludes 3  horse  batteries  designed  to  accompany  the  cav- 
alry divisions  while  on  reconnoitering  service. 

Foreign  Cavalry  Divisions. — In  Austria,  the  divisions  of 
independent  cavalry  have  2  brigades,  each  with  2  regi- 
ments and  2  batteries. 

In  Russia,  the  same  composition  prevails.  In  Italy, 
the  cavalry  divisions  have  also  the  2  brigade  formation; 
but  one  brigade  is  allowed  2  regiments,  the  other  3,  with 
2  horse  batteries,  which  are  soon  to  be  created. 

The  number  of  independent  cavalry  divisions  to  an 
army  depends  upon  a  country's  resources  in  this  arm  of 
the  service,  the  object  which  the  army  has  in  view,  and 
the  character  of  the  theatre  of  operations  in  which  it  is 
to  act. 

§  10.    ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  HEADQUARTERS. 

Each  grand  unit,  army  corps  or  cavalry  division,  pos- 
sesses auxiliary  services  to  provide  for  all  its  needs.  The 
general-in-chief  finds  himself  thus  freed  from  the  consid-. 


136  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

eration  of  a  multitude  of  details,  which  were  formerly 
such  a  source  of  annoyance  as  to  paralyze  his  thought 
and  sometimes  his  movements. 

He  has  now  only  to  direct  the  operations^  command  the 
grand  units^  and  provide  for  the  general  wants. 

This  task,  however,  is  still  too  burdensome  for  a  single 
man.  He  requires  assistants.  Together  these  consti- 
tute the  staff. 

The  good  organization  of  a  staff  has  an  influence  upon 
the  success  of  an  army,  which  has  not  always  been  suffi- 
ciently appreciated.  Defeat  has  often  resulted  from  a 
want  of  foresight  or  proper  reasoning  upon  this  matter. 

The  Prussian  army,  in  1806,  and  the  Army  of  the 
Rhine,  in  1870,  have  furnished  us  examples  in  this  re- 
gard, the  recollection  of  which  ought  never  to  be  effaced. 
Von  der  Goltz  says  upon  this  subject: 

"In  1806,  the  organization  of  the  general  headquar- 
ters was  such  as  to  render  a  vigorous  exercise  of  the 
command  almost  impossible.  Clausewitz  speaks  iron- 
ically of  a  congress  called  to  direct  the  army.  The 
Duke  of  Brunswick  was  to  exercise  the  supreme  com- 
mand, but  at  the  same  time  he  had,  in  addition,  a  spe- 
cial command  intrusted  to  him.*  Prince  Hohenlohe, 
at  the  head  of  another  army,  occupied  at  the  same  time 
the  position  both  of  subordinate  and  equal.  His  reputa- 
tion as  a  general  was  not  far  below  the  Duke's;  in  the 
army,  in  particular,  some  accorded  to  him  the  greater 
talents.     For  himself,  he  believed  it  for  the  general  good 


*  "Something  similar,  it  is  tnae,  took  place  in  1757,  when  King 
Frederick  was  commander-in-chief  of  the  four  columns  of  the  army 
which  invaded  Bohemia,  while  having  under  his  direct  and  special 
orders  the  part  of  the  forces  which  set  out  from  Dresden.  A  Frederick 
might  venture  to  do  this,  for  he  was  certain  that  his  authority  would 
be  recognized  under  all  circumstances ;  but  for  Charles  William  of 
Brunswick  the  case  was  quite  otherwise,  especially  with  Hohenlohe 
under  his  orders,  and  he  himself  dependent  upon  the  King." 


FiRvST   CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION   OF   ARMIES.      137 

that  he  should  play  an  independent  role,  and  exercise 
the  greatest  possible  influence  upon  the  conduct  of  oper- 
ations. Massenbach,  his  adjutant-general,  confirmed 
him  in  this  opinion.  Riichel  was  in  the  same  situation 
as  Hohenlohe. 

"For  both,  special  armies  had  been  formed  to  satisfy 
the  pretensions  they  were  supposed  to  entertain. 

"Moreover,  the  King  was  with  the  Duke's  forces, 
which  formed  the  principal  army.  He  had  come,  it  is 
true,  only  to  awaken  ardor  by  his  presence,  and  thereby 
impart  vigor  to  the  operations.  But  his  influence  was 
to  extend  farther;  for  the  Duke  was  guided  by  the  de- 
cisions of  a  council  in  whose  deliberations  the  King 
took  part.  The  latter  was  accompanied  by  Phull,  the 
oldest  staff  officer  in  the  army,  who  here  acted  as  his 
chief-of-stafi:  He  had  with  him  also  Field  Marshal 
Mollendorf,  to  whom,  on  account  of  his  age  (eighty- 
two),  it  did  not  seem  advisable  to  give  an  active  com- 
mand, while,  at  the  same  time,  it  was  not  desirable  to 
lose  the  benefit  of  the  counsel  which  his  long  experience 
would  enable  him  to  give.  Zastrow,  in  whom  Freder- 
ick William  .  had  for  a  long  time  full  and  entire  confi- 
dence, was  likewise  called  to  headquarters.  Colonel 
Kleist,  aide-de-camp  of  the  general,  in  charge  of  official 
reports,  was,  by  virtue  of  his  important  position,  also 
given  a  voice  in  the  council.  Kalkreuth,  who  com- 
manded the  reserve  of  the  principal  army,  and  was 
constantly  near  the  King  and  the  Duke,  played  a  sec- 
ondary role.  Moreover,  the  diplomates  took  part  in  the 
deliberations  and  decisions.  In  these  discussions,  no 
one  sided  with  the  Duke  except  Scharnhorst,  his  chief 
of  staff;  but  in  rank  the  latter  was  inferior  to  Phull,  and 
even  to  Massenbach.  He  was  a  new-comer,  and  had  not 
the  gift  of  making  his  real  worth  apparent  at  the  out- 
set. The  party  of  the  general-in-chief  played  then, 
necessarily,  an  insignificant  role,  even  with  reference  to 


T38  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

the  number  of  voices.  The  King's  followers,  therefore, 
assumed  the  principal  part.  Instead  of  commanding 
and  leading,  the  Duke  himself  was  led;  and,  according 
to  Clause witz,  he  was  not  very  much  displeased  at  this. 

"Trained  and  capable  officers,  good  minds,  were 
not  lacking  at  the  council.  Certain  of  them,  notably 
Scharnhorst  and  Kleist,  and  even  Phull,  acquired  great 
reputation  later  on.  But  the  product  resulting  from  the 
collective  acts  of  this  body  amounted  to  less  than 
nothing;  trouble  and  irresolution  were  the  only  conse- 
quences. 

"The  evil  lay  in  the  fact  that  all  the  components  of 
this  directing  agency  being  selected  exclusively  with 
reference  to  persons,  all  questions  were  decided  upon 
purely  personal  considerations." 

Clausewitz,  who  at  the  age  of  twenty-six  served  in 
this  campaign  as  a  captain,  and  aide-de-camp  to  Prince 
Augustus,  saw  very  clearly  all  these  inconveniences, 
notwithstanding  his  subordinate  position.  "No  one 
has  any  idea  of  the  difficulties  which  beset  Scharnhorst 
in  the  discharge  of  his  office,"  he  writes  on  the  26th  of 
September  to  Countess  Marie  Briihl.  "This  may  per- 
haps be  in  a  measure  understood  by  considering  that 
there  are  present  with  this  army  three  generals-in-chief 
and  two  adjutants-general,  when  there  should  be  but 
one  general-in-chief  and  one  chief  of  general  staff. 
Never  in  my  life  have  I  met  a  man  better  fitted  to  over- 
come such  difficulties  than  the  one  I  have  just  named; 
but  how  much  is  the  force  of  his  talent  diminished  by 
these  thousand  obstacles  which  result  from  deference  to 
social  rank,  by  this  incessant  struggle  with  diverse  opin- 
ions. I  am  convinced  that  if  defeat  overtake  us,  it  will 
be  due  entirely  to  these  miserable  personal  considera- 
tions; for  in  all  other  respects  the  moment  is  most  for- 
tunate for  the  King  of  Prussia." 

In    1870,  at    the    commencement  of  operations,    the 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.       139 

composition  of  the  general  headquarters  of  the  Army  of 
the  Rhine  was  nearly  as  defective.  The  controlling 
power,  often  vacillating  or  entirely  without  aim,  was  al- 
ways in  a  state  of  perplexity  in  the  midst  of  diverse 
opinions,  which  at  times  completely  paralyzed  its  action. 

Later,  when  the  sovereign  left  the  army  and  confided 
the  command  to  Marshal  Bazaine,  the  misunderstanding 
between  the  latter  and  his  chief-of-staff  was  of  itself  suf- 
ficient to  compromise  the  safety  of  the  troops.  Here  is 
the  judgment  passed  by  the  Germans  upon  this  situation: 
"The  trial  at  Trianon  acquainted  us  with  the  lack  of  un- 
derstanding between  these  two  men.  Before  the  war  they 
were  on  excellent  terms.  But  Jarras  had  been  under- 
chief-of-stafFto  Leboeuf  during  the  time  that  the  Emperor 
was  commander-in-chief;  that  is  to  say,  from  the  com- 
mencement of  the  war  until  the  12th  August,  1870. 
Bazaine,  in  consequence,  considered  him,  when  the  Em- 
peror left  him  as  chief  of  general  staff,  a  sort  of  incon- 
venient overseer,  designed  rather  to  control  than  to  favor 
his  action.  Moreover,  Jarras  had  not  been  made  ac- 
quainted with  the  general  drift  of  military  affairs,  which, 
from  the  outset,  prevented  him  from  being  of  much  as- 
sistance to  the  marshal.  This  is  why  the  latter  kept  the 
business  of  .the  command  from  him,  assigned  him  a  purely 
passive  role,  and  considered  him,  upon  the  whole,  as  a  sec- 
retary of  very  high  rank.  The  consequences  may  easily 
be  imagined.  The  relations  between  the  two  men  were 
not  clearly  defined.  Neither  should  have  suffered  this 
strained  condition  of  affairs  to  continue,  for,  as  results 
plainly  showed,  it  contributed  to  the  ruin  of  the  army." 

To-day,  greater  attention  is  paid  to  the  organization 
of  headquarters,  because  the  changed  conditions  of  war 
have  increased  to  a  great  extent  the  duties  and  cares  of 
the  general-in-chief. 

First  of  all,  as  we  have  already  seen,  a  war  between 
two  great   European  powers  can  no  longer  take  place 


140  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

without  combined  armies,  and  in  consequence,  without 
a  generalissimo,  whose  authority  will  be  exercised  upon 
much  larger  masses,  and  over  more  extended  theatres  of 
operations.  The  needs  of  these  masses  have  augmented 
proportionately.  And,  finally,  new  technical  services 
have  been  created  calling  for  additional  personnel  and 
materiel^  and  special  instruction. 

More  than  ever,  then,  the  organization  of  headquar- 
ters, calls  for  a  choice  of  individual  qualities  and  a 
proper  grouping  of  directors  of  the  different  services, 
which  will  lighten  the  labors  of  the  general-in-chief 
without  diminishing  either  his  authority  or  his  initia- 
tive. From  the  harmony  of  this  organization,  from  the 
regular  working  of  these  different  efforts  set  in  motion 
by  a  single  will,  nothing  but  good  can  ever  result.  The 
slightest  disagreement  will,  on  the  contrary,  extend  to 
the  most  remote  members  of  the  hierarchy,  and  interfere 
with  the  success  of  the  operations. 

In  principle,  the  supreme  head  should  have  only  to 
decide.  The  responsibility  for  the  execution,  which 
rests  upon  him  alone,  is  burdensome  enough  to  engage 
all  his  attention.  Consideration  of  details  can  serve 
only  to  distract  his  thoughts  from  important  questions. 

It  is  necessary,  then,  to  entrust  these  details  to  others. 
Even  the  act  of  transmitting  his  will  does  not  lie  in  his 
province.  It  should  be  left  to  an  officer  of  high  rank, 
who,  on  account  of  the  character  of  his  position,  should 
possess  the  entire  confidence  of  the  commander.  This 
is  one  of  the  duties  of  the  chief  of  general  staff. 

The  selection  of  an  officer  for  this  position,  therefore, 
should  be  dictated  by  the  friendship  of  the  general-in- 
chief,  and  by  the  latter's  intimate  knowledge  of  his 
character  and  capacity. 

For  secret  business,  for  relations  of  a  confidential  nature, 
he  should  have,  in  addition,  a  group  of  special  officers, 
whose  tact,  personal  devotion,  and  zeal  are  unlimited. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.      141 

Hence  aides-de-camp  and  special  staff  officers. 
The  rule  accepted  everywhere  is  to  allow  the  military 
leaders  to  name  these  officers. 

Direction  of  Operations. — Jomini  thus  expresses  himself 
upon  this  subject: 

"A  good  staff  is  indispensable  to  a  properly  consti- 
tuted arm}^;  it  must  be  considered  as  the  nursery  whence 
the  commander-in-chief  can  draw  needed  material;  as  a 
body  of  officers  whose  intelligence  should  second  his 
own.  When  there  is  a  lack  of  harmony  between  the 
genius  which  commands  and  the  talents  which  are  to 
carry  out  its  conceptions,  success  becomes  doubtful,  for 
the  most  skillful  combinations  are  sure  to  be  defeated  by 
errors  in  execution.  A  good  staff  has,  moreover,  the 
advantage  of  being  more  lasting  than  the  genius  of  a 
single  man;  it  can  remedy  many  evils,  and  we  dare 
affirm  that  it  is  the  best  safeguard  of  an  army.  The 
small  interests  of  a  clique,  narrow  views,  misplaced  self- 
love,  will  range  themselves  against  this  assertion;  it  will, 
nevertheless,  remain  a  truth  without  exception,  acknowl- 
edged by  all  thoughtful  military  men  and  all  enlight- 
ened statesmen.  *  A  well  constituted  staff  will  be  to  an 
army  what  a  skillful  ministry  is  to  a  monarchy:  it  will 
second  the  chief,  even  when  he  may  be  in  condition  to 

, i . 

*  "I  do  not  consider  that  a  good  staff  may  be  properly  instituted  by 
this  alone,  that  unusual  studies  are  required  of  the  young  aspirant: 
he  may  be  a  profound  mathematician,  a  good  topographer,  a  correct 
draughtsman,  yet  a  poor  warrior.  A  staff  in  order  to  fulfill  all  re- 
quirements should,  in  my  opinion,  have  enough  influence  and  au- 
thority, to  hold  out  inducements  to  officers  of  other  arms  of  the  serv- 
ice; it  would  thus  secure  those  already  distinguished  by  aptitude  for 
the  profession  of  arms.  Engineer  and  artillery  officers  would  cease 
to  antagonize  such  an  institution,  in  reflecting  that  the  staff  would 
offer  them  a  wider  field  in  which  to  distinguish  themselves,  and  would 
thenceforth  be  only  an  assembly  of  those  officers  of  these  two  arms, 
who,  having  shown  themselves  the  most  capable  of  assisting  in  the 
directions  of  military  operations,  are  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the 
general-in-chief  to  aid  him  in  his  labors. ' ' 


142  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

direct  everything  by  himself;  it  will  tend  to  bridle  mis- 
takes by  furnishing  him  with  reliable  information;  when 
he  is  unskillful,  it  will  prevent  them.  How  many 
mediocre  men  in  ancient  and  modern  times  have  been 
made  illustrious  by  events  begotten  of  circumstances 
which  they  were  not  wholly  instrumental  in  fashioning! 

"Regnier  was  the  first  medium  of  Pichegru's  victor- 
ies, and  Dessoles,  like  him,  was  not  a  stranger  to  the 
glory  of  Moreau.  *  Is  not  General  Toll  associated  with 
the  successes  of  Kutusof;  Diebitsch  with  those  of  Bar- 
clay and  Witgenstein;  Gneisenau  and  Miifiiing  with 
those  of  Bliicher?  How  many  other  names  might  be 
cited  in  support  of  these  assertions!" 

The  present  opinion  of  the  leaders  of  the  Prussian 
army  upon  the  mission  of  the  staff  and  its  influence 
upon  armies  is  not  less  worthy  of  attention. 

Here  is  that  of  General  Bronsart  von  Schellendorf,  at 
the  present  time  Minister  of  War  at  Berlin: 

"The  staff  forms  one  of  the  essential  parts  in  the  or- 
ganization of  modern  armies.  The  general  placed  at 
the  head  of  a  body  of  troops,  no  matter  how  small, 
would  not  be  able,  especially  in  time  of  war,  to  lose 
himself  in  questions  of  detail,  the  examination,  the 
comparison,  and  reasonable  solution  of  which  are  often 
nevertheless  of  great  importance.  Aside  from  the  fact 
that  the  intellectual  and  physical  powers  of  a  single  man 
would  not  suffice  for  this  task,  such  an  obligation  would 
distract  serious  attention  from  the  comprehensive  glance 
which  this  officer  should  bestow  at  all  times  upon  the 
troops  placed  under  his  orders.  He  must,  then,  have  as- 
sistants, and  it  is  these  assistants  that  form  the  staff.  It 
is  difficult  enough  to  give  an  exact  general  definition  of 
the  portion  of  this  body  which  is  designated  under  the 
name  of  general  stafl. 

*  "I  do  not  intend  to  place  Moreau  in  the  rank  of  mediocre  gen- 
erals; I  only  affirm  that  he  was  so  well  seconded  by  his  chiefs-of-staflF 
as  to  owe  to  them  a  portion  of  his  glory. ' ' 


FIRST   CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION   OF   ARMIES.       143 


u 


111  some  armies,  the  general  staff  comprises  the  en- 
tire staff,  the  aides-de-camp  and  the  officers  placed  at  the 
head  of  the  artillery,  engineer,  intendance, *  auditorship, 
chaplaincy,  and  medical  services.  But  everywhere  it  has 
been  looked  upon  as  necessary  to  employ  in  the  elabor- 
ation of  the  operations,  properly  speaking,  a  part  of  the 
staff,  designated  generally  by  a  special  appellation.  In 
Germany  this  forms  an  adjunct  to  the  general  staff. 

"  The  importance  of  the  staff  augments  with  the  in- 
crease in  the  effectives,  with  the  constant  and  manifold 
developments  in  the  military  institutions  of  a  country. 

"When  armies  were  small,  when  their  movements, 
their  manner  of  camping  and  giving  battle,  were  de- 
termined, as  it  were,  by  rule,  the  need  of  having  in- 
structed and  experienced  staff  officers  was  little  felt. 
The  orders  emanating  from  the  general-in-chief  included 
the  details  of  execution;  and  therefore  with  an  invari- 
able order  of  battle  it  was  a  simple  matter  to  carry  them 
into  effect. 

"  This  is  not  so  to-day.  The  dimensions  of  the  forces 
emplo3-ed,  as  well  as  the  manner  of  dividing  and  sub- 
dividing them,  from  which  result  innumerable  modifica- 
tions, give  rise,  even  in  circumstances  appearing  at  first 
view  exactly  similar,  to  an  infinite  variety  of  minutiae 
in  the  execution.  In  consequence  of  circumstances  so 
varied,  the  army  leaders  should  be  constantly  assisted  by 
officers  chosen  and  trained  in  a  special  manner. 

"If  the  question  is  then  regarded  in  another  aspect, 
one  having  a  more  intimate  relation  still  with  the  com- 
bat tactics  of  troops,  namely,  that  respecting  the  disposi- 
tions and  movements  of  the  enemy;  or  is  surveyed  with 
reference  to  the  conduct  of  the  battle  upon  a  point  be- 
yond the  view  of  the  commander,  it  will  be  seen  that 

*The  Intendance  Department  is  the  general  supply  service.  It  cor- 
responds very  nearly  to  our  Quartermaster,  Commissary,  and  Pay  De- 
partments combined. — Tr. 


144  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

there  is  an   absolute  necessity  for  the  employment  of 
these  aids. 

"The  chief  of  staff  is  the  natural  coadjutor  of  the 
general-in-chief  in  the  exercise  of  his  command.  It  is 
he  who  transmits  the  thoughts  and  orders  of  the  latter. 
He  has  also  to  suggest  all  measures  that  appear  to  him 
for  the  good  of  the  army.  His  initiative  and  the  scope 
of  his  action  are  then  considerable.  He  is  in  fact,  after 
the  commander,  a  kind  of  second  director  of  operations. 
For  the  general-in-chief  he  is  an  alter  ego  so  intimate  as 
to  receive  his  entire  thousiht;  of  sufficient  authoritv  to 
express  his  own  upon  all  occasions;  high  enough  in 
rank  to  exercise,  in  case  of  need,  an  influence  upon  the 
command  of  the  largest  units,  and  to  centre  in  himself 
the  direction  of  the  general  services. 

"'The  harmony  existing  between  the  generalissimo 
and  his  chief-of-stafif, '  says  Von  der  Goltz,  'will  con- 
tribute in  large  measure  to  compensate  for  the  lack  of 
military  genius  in  the  former,  to  supply  the  place  of  the 
gifts  which  ought  to  distinguish  one  holding  a  positon 
of  so  much  importance.' 

"Their  fruitful  co-operation  will   depend,  above  all, 
upon  the  sympathy  which  one  feels  for  the  other. 

"The  services  of  the  general-in-chief  will  be  more  or 
less  valuable  according  as  he  is  well  or  ill-disposed.  It 
is  the  same  with  the  staff.  Its  chief  will  give  the  tone. 
If  this  be  good,  if  it  breathe  general  and  reciprocal  good 
will,  if  all  the  members  of  the  staff  work  in  a  spirit  of 
good  fellowship,  the  machinery  of  chief  command  will 
run  with  double  precision  and  rapidity.  Disunion  and 
ill-will  easily  enter  a  group  composed  of  such  diverse  ele- 
ments when  the  chief  is  ill  chosen;  and  everything  is 
badly  done,  at  a  season  when  the  utmost  is  expected  of 
all.  The  sharp  and  brusque  tone  of  command  is  then 
less  necessary  and  useful  here  than  elsewhere.  The  more 
engaging  the  manner,  the  more  cordial  the  relations,  the 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.      145 

better  is  the  order  obeyed.  And  a  ray  of  this  upper  light 
is  always  reflected  upon  the  army;  the  troops  are  infln- 
enced  by  the  good  or  bad  humor  prevailing  in  high 
places:  in  no  other  respect  is  the  influence  of  the  chief- 
of-staff"more  strongly  felt. 

"From  the  double  character  of  the  duties  devolving 
upon  the  incumbent  of  this  office,  it  is  evident  that  the 
person  selected  for  it  should  have  not  only  great  talent, 
but  also  pleasing  and  affable  manners,  which  exercise 
such  a  salutary  influence  upon  all.  There  are  men  who 
have  the  faculty  of  drawing  out  subordinates  in  the 
most  engaging  way,  to  the  full  extent  of  their  abilities. 
Such  men  possess  one  of  the  qualities  most  essential  for 
properly  discharging  the  duties  of  chief-of-stafif. 

"When  armies  do  not  exist  in  time  of  peace,  their  for- 
mation at  the  outbreak  of  war  will  of  course  be  very 
hastily  improvised.  The  staff  officers  and  the  aides-de- 
camp come  from  the  extremities  of  the  country.  They 
often  assemble  without  previous  acquaintance,  and  the 
chief-of-stafif  has  no  knowledge  of  their  individual  worth. 
If  the  regulations  assign  each  his  position  in  advance 
according  to  rank,  there  results  this  advantage  at  the 
first  moment,  that  the  organization  will  be  more  quickly 
completed.  But  this  benefit  is  unimportant;  it  presents 
this  inconvenience,  that  chance  alone  would  decide 
whether  men  were  put  in  positions  suited  to  their 
talents  or  training.  If  there  are  several  days  in  which 
to  disentangle  matters,  the  members  of  the  staff  will  be- 
come known,  and  it  will  be  possible  to  assign  to  each 
the  duty  for  which  he  is  best  qualified.  Seniority  and 
grade  matter  little;  the  essential  thing  is  harmony."* 

In  France,  in  grand  armies,  it  was  the  practice  to  give 
the  title  of  major-general  to  the  chief-of-stafif  Ordi- 
narily he  was  assisted  by  an  adjutant-general,  with  the 

*  The  Nation  in  Anns,  by  Von  der  Goltz. 
10 


146  PART   FIRST.  —  STRATEGY. 

rank  of  general  of  division.  This  was  the  quarterinas- 
ter-general  of  the  Germans.  He  was  to  relieve  the  chief- 
of-staff  of  a  portion  of  his  duties, — duties  which  in  many 
cases  were  too  burdensome  for  the  strength  of  a  single 
man.  He  usually  had  charge  of  the  various  bureaus, 
directed  the  members  of  the  staff,  and  had  authority  in 
other  important  matters. 

In  1870,  there  were  at  first  two  of  these  officers  with 
the  Army  of  the  Rhine,  bearing  the  titles  of  first  and 
second  adjutant-general.  They  were  charged  with  the 
duty  of  preparing  the  orders  relating  to  movements. 

It  is  equally  expedient  that  a  group  of  officers,  trained 
in  advance  for  their  special  work,  be  charged  with  the 
labors  relating  to  operations. 

In  this  connection,  the  Prussians  have  adopted  a  divis- 
ion of  work  which  is  the  logical  and  natural  result  of 
tradition  and  experience,  and  which  is  suited  to  the 
peace  organization,  as  well  as  to  service  in  the  field. 

To  the  staff  officers  alone  belongs  the  duty  of  prepar- 
ing for  the  various  movements  and  operations,  and,  in 
consequence,  of  making  out  the  orders  relating  to 
marches,  supplies  and  combats. 

Another  class  of  officers,  that  of  staff  assistants,  desig- 
nated under  the  name  adJ2tdantur^  is  exclusively  charged 
with  the  remaining  staff  duties. 

These  have  to  do  with  questions  relating  \.o  personnel^ 
promotions,  awards,  applications  of  all  kinds,  accounts, 
enrollments,  new  supplies  of  materiel^  etc. 

In  the  numerous  wars  undertaken  bv  the  Prussians,  it 
was  seen  that  most  advantageous  results  were  reached 
by  dividing  up  the  staff  for  special  work.  In  the  mean- 
while, admittance  to  it  was  open  to  all  officers.  This 
body  has  become  a  real  element  of  strength  for  their 
army,  and  has,  in  a  large  measure,  contributed  to  their 
success,  while  gaining  for  itself  a  justly  merited  reputa- 
tion. 


FIRST   CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION   OF   ARMIES.       1 47 

In  almost  all  armies,  the  rule  has  been  adopted  of  dis- 
tingnishing  the  various  headquarters  by  special  names. 
The  Germans  have: 

Headquarters  of  the  generalissimo,  Grosser  Haiipt- 
qiiarticr.  , 

Headquarters  of  the  commander-in-chief  of  an  army, 
Ober  Conunando. 

Headquarters  of  the  corps  commander.  General  Com- 
mando. 

Headquarters  of  the  division  commander,  Stabs-qiiar- 
tier. 

They  are  even  careful  to  designate  the  assistant  of  the 
chief-of-stafF by  a  particular  title: 

With  a  generalissimo  he  takes  the  title  of  General 
Qiiartiermeister. 

With  an  army  commander,  he  is  called  Ober  Qiiar- 
tiermeister. 

This  persojtnel  is  completed  by  a  chief  of  staff-bureau, 
who  is  especially  charged  with  superintending  the  issu- 
ance of  orders  relating  to  operations  and  movements. 

There  is  thus: 

A  general-in -chief  who  decides; 

A  chief-of-staff,  who  receives  the  decisions,  suggests 
them  in  case  of  need,  and  directs  their  execution; 

An  under-chief,  who  shares  the  responsibility  of  the 
latter  in  details  of  the  service; 

And,  finally,  a  chief-of-bureau,  who  sees  to  the  proper 
drawing  up  and  transmission  of  orders. 

In  France,  the  principles  relative  to  the  composition 
of  headquarters  have  been  summed  up  as  follows  by 
General  Pierron: 

"The  rule  to  be  observed' in  the  composition  of  head- 
quarters is  that  of  strict  economy  in  the  number  of  the 
personnel. 

"The  headquarters  of  the  commander-in-chief  will 
include  the  chiefs  of  all  the  different  services,  or  a  repre- 


148  .  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

seiitative  from  each  of  them,  charged  not  only  with  re- 
ceiving, but  especially  with  suggesting  orders  concern- 
ing their  special  branches;  and  in  this  regard  they  will, 
from  time  to  time,  refresh  the  memory  of  the  general- 
in-chief,  whose  responsibilities  and  cares  often  lead  to 
the  concentration  of  all  his  faculties  upon  a  single  ob- 
ject. 

"If  it  is  important  that  the  commander-in-chief  have 
the  chief  of  each  service,  or  his  deputy,  at  headquarters, 
it  is  necessary,  on  the  other  hand,  to  avoid  encumbering 
these  headquarters  by  what  are  called  central  adminis- 
trative services,  centi^al  reserves  of  artillery,  engineers, 
etc.  It  is  preferable  to  distribute  these  forces  among 
the  army  corps;  for  experience  shows  that  these  central 
administrative  services  remain  too  far  from  the  troops  to 
assist  them  in  time  of  need;  and  the  central  reserves  of 
special  arms  of  the  service  are  in  most  cases  tardy  in 
reaching  places  where  their  presence  may  be  urgently 
required,  for  on  account  of  the  length  of  their  columns 
or  their  position  behind  all  the  troops,  their  march  is 
delayed  or  they  are  forgotten. 

"Among  the  chiefs  of  services  which  the  headquarters 
should  include,  we  may  mention: 

"The  chief-of-stafif,  charged  with  making  out  the 
orders  concerning  operations. 

"The  under-chief-of-staff,  chief  of  the  bureaus. 

"The  chief-intendant,  charged  only  with  the  estab- 
lishment of  magazines,  and  the  distribution  of  their  re- 
sources among  the  subordinate  intendauts;  but  who  is  in 
no  case  to  supply  the  combatant  troops  directly. 

"The  chief-of-artillery,  charged,  not  with  careering 
upon  the  field  of  battle  with  one  or  several  batteries, 
thus  substituting  himself  for  his  subordinates,  but  with 
the  duty  of  assuring  the  continuous  supply  of  ammuni- 
tion and  its  distribution  to  the  army  corps,  and  with  di- 
recting the  whole  of  the  artillery  in  battles  and  sieges. 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.      149 

"The  chief-of-engineers,  whose  function  is,  not  to 
meddle  with  the  details  which  have  been  entrusted  to 
his  inferior  officers,  but  to  mark  out  the  grand  features 
of  investment  works,  draw  up  siege  plans,  etc. 

"The  inspector-general  of  stations  and  railroads,  sub- 
ordinate to  the  chief-of-stafif,  whose  office  is  to  determine 
the  priority  of  shipments  by  rail  of  all  kinds  of  supplies 
— food,  ammunition,  clothing,  reinforcements,  inaterial, 
etc. — which  are  sent  to  the  army;  with  protecting  the 
lines  of  communications,  regulating  their  service,  and 
attending  to  the  removal  to  the  rear,  of  disabled  men 
and  unserviceable  material. 

"  The  director  of  the  military  telegraph  service,  who 
will  dispose,  under  his  immediate  eye,  a  company  of 
telegraphists  in  the  first  line,  and  another  in  reserve  to 
connect  the  general  headquarters  with  the  subordinate 
headquarters. 

"The  military  director  of  railroads,  subordinate  to  the 
inspector-general  of  stations,  but  with  authority  to  sug- 
gest to  him  orders  concerning  this  branch  of  the  service. 

"  The  provost-marshal,  who  is  to  exercise  disciplinary 
police  over  the  sutlers  and  other  camp-followers,  and  to 
prevent  spying. 

"The  surgeon-general,  whose  office  is  to  propose  at 
headquarters,  the  adoption  of  general  hygienic  measures, 
to  make  suggestions  to  the  inspector-general  of  stations 
and  railroads  regarding  the  removal  of  the  sick  and 
wounded  to  the  rear,  and  to  look  after  the  general  medi- 
cal service  of  headquarters. 

"The  chief  veterinary  surgeon,  whose  business  is  to 
suggest  at  headquarters,  measures  for  the  proper  care  of 
saddle,  draught,  and  pack  animals;  and  to  the  before- 
mentioned  inspector-general,  the  establishment  of  in- 
firmaries for  horses  in  the  rear;  and,  further,  to  direct 
the  whole  of  the  veterinary  and  farriery  service,  partic- 
ularly at  headquarters;  to  find  out  in  time  the  necessary 


150  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY, 

measures  to  be  taken  for  winter  shoeing;  and  to  prepare 
reserve  supplies  for  the  manufacture  of  horse-shoes  and 
nails. 

"The  director-in-chief  of  postal  service,  charged  with 
suggesting  to  the  inspector-general  the  establishment  of 
relavs  in  the  rear,  and  with  directing  the  whole  of  the 
postal  service,  but  more  especially  that  at  headquarters. 

"  The  commandant  of  headquarters,  having  under  his 
orders  a  guard — composed  both  of  infantry  and  cavalry — 
permanently  connected  with  headquarters,  and  to  which 
will  be  attached,  for  the  purpose  of  subsistence,  order- 
lies, estafets,  headquarter  couriers,  guides,  etc. 

"The  representative  of  the  international  society  of 
voluntary  aid  to  the  wounded,  subordinate  to  the  in- 
spector-general. 

"The  agent  of  the  war  ministry,  having  charge  of  the 
rolls  relating  to  promotion  and  the  rolls  for  the  legion 
of  honor  or  the  military  medal. 

"  The  paymaster-general,  whose  duty  is  to  direct  the 
use  of  the  funds  in  a  way  to  provide  for  exigencies  of 
war  service,  and  further  to  suggest  at  headquarters 
measures  concerning  contributions  to  be  levied  in  the 
enemy's  country,  and  those  calculated  to  favor  French 
commercial  interests. 

"These  are  the  services  represented  in  the  highest 
military  sphere." 

To  complete  these  directions,  it  is  proper  to  add,  as 
the  dictate  of  experience,  that  useless  persons  should  at 
all  hazards  be  excluded  from  headquarters.  If  not,  its 
mobility,  its  independence,  its  liberty  of  action,  may 
perhaps  be  compromised. 

Moreover,  it  is  indispensable  that  the  chiefs  of  the 
different  services  be  not  independent  of  one  another,  but 
that  they  constitute  a  hierarchy  submissive  to  the  au- 
thority of  the  chief-of-stafif  and  his  immediate  assistant. 
If  they  all  have    the    right    of  expressing  their   views 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.      15-1 

to  tlie  general-in-cliief,  and  of  suggesting  orders,  the 
latter  will  soon  have  a  hundred  different  opinions.  It 
would  in  this  case  be  impossible  for  him  to  adopt  suit- 
able measures  of  the  whole,  and  at  the  same  time  to  work 
out  all  the  details  of  execution. 

On  the  contrary,  if  these  opinions  are  submitted  to 
the  examination  of  a  single  and  superior  mind,  the  work 
of  co-ordinating  them  will  be  performed  in  advance, 
and  the  general-in-chief  will  have  only  to  decide. 

In  our  time,  new  elements  have  been  introduced  into 
headquarters,  which  are  often  more  dangerous  than  use- 
ful ;  these  are  foreign  officers  and  reporters.  The  motive 
of  the  first  is  their  personal  instruction  and  the  interest 
of  their  country;  the  second  have  no  reason  for  being 
present,  except  their  own  private  interest.  The  general- 
in-chief,  who  ought  to  think  only  of  destroying  the  en- 
emy, has  nothing  in  common  with  them. 

They  will  therefore  be  for  him  a  source  of  embarrass- 
ment, often  leading  to  the  indiscreet  disclosure  of  infor- 
mation. If  he  can  get  rid  of  them,  he  will  find  himself 
the  better  for  it;  if  he  cannot,  the  best  thing  will  be  to 
utilize  them  by  communicating  to  them  only  those 
events  which  have  already  transpired,  and  which  he 
desires  to  make  public.  In  every  case,  it  is  the  rule 
that  all  their  correspondence  should  be  submitted  to  the 
staff. 

The  introduction  of  inexperienced  or  volunteer  offi- 
cers into  the  headquarters  has  the  same  inconveniences. 
These  have  been  frequently  pointed  out. 

One  of  the  most  curious  examples  offered  us,  in  this 
regard,  by  the  war  of  1870-71,  is  related  by  the  staff 
captain.  Von  der  Goltz,  then  attached  to  the  staff  of  the 
II.  Prussian  Army: 

"A  most  lucky  discovery  for  the  II.  German  Army  was 
that  of  papers  taken  from  an  Irish  adventurer,  Captain 
Ogilvy,  killed  in  the  French  ranks,  November  24,  1870. 


152  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

There  was  found  upon  him  a  note-book,  embodying  an 
account  of  daily  marches,  and  a  great  deal  of  other  infor- 
mation; also,  the  order  given  for  the  24th  of  November, 
to  General  Crouzat's  corps.  This  order  assigned  its  three 
divisions  to  Beaune-la-Rolande,  Juranville,  and  Saint- 
Loup.  As  the  X.  Prussian  Corps  had  also  been  ordered 
to  occupy  these  positions,  the  battle  which  then  took 
place  can  easily  be  accounted  for. 

"Not  only  did  the  papers  found  upon  Captain  Ogilvy 
indicate  the  composition  of  the  French  corps,  but  they 
even  enumerated  its  strength: 


&" 


ist  Division 13,000  men. 

2d  "  9,500     " 

3d  "  8,000     " 


u 


Finally,  there  was  found  in  his  pocket-book  a  letter 
furnishing  a  clear  account  of  the  views  of  the  directing 
authority  in  the  French  armies,  which  was  of  great 
importance  in  guiding  future  operations.  It  was  in  the 
hand  of  the  Dictator  Gambetta  himself,  and  was  written 
for  the  purpose  of  introducing  Captain  Ogilvy  to  Gen- 
eral Crouzat. 
"  It  ran  thus: 


a 


FRENCH   REPUBLIC. 


"government  of  national  defense. 

"The  Member  of  the  Government  of  National  De- 
fense, Minister  of  the  Interior  and  of  War; 

"By  virtue  of  the  powers  delegated  to  him  by  the 
Government,  by  decree  dated  ist  October,  1870; 

"Accredits  to  General  Crouzat,  commanding  the 
forces  assembled  at  Gien,  Captain  Ogilvy  of  the  En- 
gineers, an  attache  of  the  staff  of  the  i8th  Corps,  but 
at  present  temporarily  detached  from  it. 

"Captain  Ogilvy  has  my  entire  confidence.      I  con- 


FIRST  CHAPTER. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ARMIES.       153 

versed  witlrhim  at  length  upon  our  military  operations. 
Gien  is  evidently  the  key  to  our  position  upon  the  Loire. 
I  know  that  it  is  safe  in  the  hands  of  the  valiant  General 
Crouzat.  I  send  Captain  Ogilvy  to  assist  him  in  his 
mission,  and  I  beg  him  to  give  this  officer  a  seat  in  the 
council,  with  a  deliberative  voice. 
"Tours,  November  19,  1870. 

' '  IvEON  Gambetta.  ' ' 

"Certainly  Ogilvy  was  not  only  to  be  an  adviser,  but 
was  to  act  as  confidential  agent  of  the  war  commission, 
and  to  fill  the  office  of  inquisitor  among  the  generals. 
That  Dictator  Gambetta,  who  wrote  this  letter  with  his 
own  hand,  should  have  adopted  such  a  measure,  proved 
to  us  (Germans)  how  much  importance  he  attached  to 
the  success  of  the  operations  commenced  upon  the  Loire 
above  Orleans.  The  designation  of  Gien  as  the  most 
important  point  of  the  Loire,  when  Orleans  had  played 
this  role  up  to  that  time,  seemed  to  indicate  that  the 
army  making  an  offensive  movement  upon  Paris  was  to 
be  attacked  by  the  right  wing  of  the  army  of  the  Loire. 
It  was  clearly  revealed  that  the  advance  march,  so  many 
times  threatened,  for  the  purpose  of  breaking  the  invest- 
ment of  Paris,  would  not  take  place  by  the  Orleans 
route,  but  along  the  Loing,  toward  Fontaineblea'u. 
There  were  many  advantages  recommending  this  direc- 
tion, and  soon  its  selection  became  probable." 

In  concluding  this  expose  of  the  principles  relative  to 
the  organization  of  armies,  it  would  not  be  alien  to  the 
present  situation  to  set  forth  those  which  concern  the 
general  services  of  administration,  transport  and  corres- 
pondence. But  the  details  requiring  consideration  in 
such  an  expansion  of  the  subject  would  exceed  the  limits 
of  a  general  work,  and  should  rather  find  place  in  special 
treatises. 

It  is  well,  then,  to  end  here  this  brief  study  of  the  or- 
ganization of  the  military  forces  of  the  different  states. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. 


PREPARATION  FOR  WAR. 

The  strategic  function  of  an  army  comprises  two 
periods:  first,  a  period  of  preparation  for  war,  incident 
to  time  of  peace,  embracing  a  study  of  the  theatre 
of  operations  and  of  the  resources  of  the  enemy ^  and  the 
preparatioji  of  the  projet  of  operations ;  then  a  period  of 
execution,  which  follows  the  declaration  of  war,  and 
during  which  operations  are  effected,  according  to  the 
plan  established,  or  at  least  in  conformity  with  a  gen- 
eral idea  serving  as  a  basis  for  the  plans  of  the  general- 
issimo, and  which  the  more  or  less  unforeseen  events  of 
war  often  modify. 

It  is  then  with  this  ensemble  of  labors  designated 
under  the  name  of  preparatioii  for  war^  that  the  study 
of  strategy  should  begin. 

Preparation  for  war  includes  first  a  study  of  the  thea- 
tre of  operations  and  of  the  resources  of  the  enemy,  then 
the  drawing  up  of  2.  projet  of  operations  and  a  plan  of 
transportation. 

The  regions  through  which  the  armies  are  to  move 
offer  natural  or  artificial  obstacles  that  exercise  an  influ- 
ence upon  the  operations.  Therefore  the  strategic  im- 
portance of  these  theatres  often  depends  upon  their  topo- 
graphical characteristics. 

Thus  there  are  two  points  of  view  from  which  the  sub- 
ject should  be  successively  examined  :  one  topographic^ 
having  for  its  aim  the  study  of  the  inflections  of  the 
soil ;  the  other  strategic^  designed  to  set  forth  their  mili- 
tary importance.  The  task  of  making  reconnaissance 
of  a  theatre  of  operations  from  this  double  point  of  view 
is  one  of  the  most  important  duties  of  the  staff  officers. 


SECOND   CHAPTER. — PREPARATION   FOR   WAR.      1 55 


§  I.    TOPOGRAPHY   OF   THEATRES   OF   OPERATIONS. 

Formerly  the  reconnaissance  of  a  theatre  of  opera- 
tions was  made  at  the  outbreak  of  war. 

Napoleon  took  charge  of  it  himself,  and  entrusted  it 
only  to  his  most  eminent  officers.  Thus  in  1805,  through 
Murat,  Savary,  and  Bertrand,  he  made  reconnaissance 
of  the  roads  and  obstacles  of  the  ground  which  would 
be  met  with  in  the  basin  of  the  Danube.  The  direc- 
tions which  he  gave  General  Bertrand  on  this  occasion 
are  instructive. 

"Camp  of  Boulogne,  7th  Fructidor,  Year  XIII. 
(Aug.  25,  1805.) 

"General  Bertrand  will  proceed  direct  to  Munich;  he 
will  stop  at  the  house  of  M.  Otto;  he  will  present  to  the 
Elector  the  inclosed  letter;  after  which  he  will  proceed 
to  Passau.  He  will  examine  the  situation  of  this  place; 
he  will  ascend  the  Inn  to  Kufstein;  he  will  there  make 
a  regular  reconnaissance:  the  situation  of  the  various 
places,  their  distances  apart,  the  nature  of  the  roads,  the 
width  of  the  river,  the  amount  of  water,  the  dominant 
bank  from  point  to  point,  the  ferries,  bridges,  and  fords. 
He  will  be  accompanied  by  several  Bavarian  engineers; 
but  he  will  take  care  to  see  for  himself,  and  will  write 
down  whatever  the  engineers  may  be  able  to  tell  him  of 
the  character  of  the  river,  and  of  the  events  that  have 
occurred  there. 

"He  will  then  follow  the  Salza  to  Salzburg,  whence 
he  will  return  to  Munich,  passing  the  Inn  at  Wasser- 
burg,  and  will  also  make  note  of  this  third  reconnais- 
sance. At  Munich,  he  will  gather  from  well-informed 
persons  all  possible  information  concerning  the  outlets 
of  the  Isar  and  other  rivers  running  into  Tyrol,  as  far 
as  the  outlet  of  the  L/ech. 


156  PART  FIRST. — STRATEGY. 


(( 


From  Munich,  he  will  proceed  to  Fiissen,  without 
leaving  Bavarian  territory.  If  Fiissen  be  not  occupied 
by  the  Austrians,  he  will  examine  it  in  detail. 

"From  Fiissen  he  will  descend  the  Lech,  making  a 
perfect  reconnaissance  of  it  to  the  Danube;  will  recon- 
noitre Ingolstadt  and  Donauwoerth;  will  proceed  along 
the  Danube,  and,  going  from  one  to  the  other,  he  will 
have  seen  this  river  at  Passau,  and  he  will  note  the  fact 
whenever  he  sees  it  from  Danauwoerth. 

"He  will  reconnoitre  from  the  Regnitz  to  the  Main; 
from  Bamburg  he  will  return  to  Ulm  by  whatever  route 
he  may  think  proper;  from  Ulm  he  will  go  to  Stuttgart, 
always  traveling  slowly,  and  by  day  only;  from  Stutt- 
gart he  will  go  to  Rastadt,  and  will  make  a  thorough 
reconnaissance  of  the  road  from  Ulm  to  Rastadt,  from  a 
military  and  staff  point  of  view. 

"During  these  various  journeys,  he  will  be  careful  to 
sketch  well  the  road  from  Ulm  to  Donauwoerth  by  the 
left  bank  of  the  Danube;  thence  to  Ingolstadt  and 
Ratisbon,  and  from  Ratisbon  to  Passau,  from  the  best 
information  to  be  had  on  the  subject. 

''''Note. — When  he  is  at  Passau,  he  will  reconnoitre 
the  road  leading  from  this  place  into  Bohemia,  as  far  as 
possible  upon  Bavarian  territory;  information  upon  the 
rest.     Can  Prague  be  reached  by  this  route? 

"He  will  make  a  detailed  reconnaissance  of  the  small 
stream  of  the  Ilz,  and  will  note  the  nature  of  the  roads 
and  ground  from  the  source  of  the  Ilz  (which  comes 
down  from  the  mountains  of  Bohemia)  to  its  mouth. 
What  is  the  width  of  the  valley?  What  is  the  character 
of  the  roads?  the  principal  towns?  and  the  facilities  or 
inconveniences  which  would  attend  the  march  of  an 
army  upon  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube  to  turn  the  Inn 
by  this  means,  in  proceeding  to  Freystadt,  with  inten- 
tion of  moving  into  Moravia. 

"  Collect  all  information  possible  regarding  the  forti- 


SECOND   CHAPTER. — PREPARATION   OF  WAR.         157 

fications  wliicli  the  enemy  has  erected,  whether  at  Linlz, 
Steyer,  or  any  other  place  as  far  as  Vienna,  and  even 
at  Vienna  itself. 

"Determine  accnrately  to  what  point  the  Danube  is 
navigable,  both  in  going  down  and  up. 

"He  will  make  the  Ulm  reconnaissance  in  great  de- 
tail: population,  military  position,  etc.  He  will  note 
what  is  told  him  upon  the  Enns  regarding  the  char- 
acter of  the  various  difficulties  which  it  presents,  and 
also  with  reference  to  the  width  of  the  Danube  be- 
yond the  Traisen,  some  four  or  five  leagues  distant  from 
Vienna. 

"From  Rastadt,  he  will  return  to  Friburg,  from  Fri- 
burg  to  Donaueschingen,  and  from  there  to  Basle;  thence 
he  will  rejoin  me  by  way  of  Huningen,  without  passing 
through  Swiss  territory.  In  going  down  the  right  bank 
of  the  Rhine,  he  will  make  a  reconnaissance  of  the  po- 
sition of  Stockach. 

"M.  Bertrand  will  write  me  from  Strasburg  for  the 
purpose  of  acquainting  me  with  whatever  rumors  are 
current  concerning  war,  peace,  and  the  movements  of 
the  Austrians;  he  will  go  to  Stuttgart,  where  he  will  see 
M.  Didelot;  he  will  communicate  what  he  may  hear  re- 
garding the  Austrian  forces  in  Tyrol;  he  will  engage  M, 
Didelot  to  draw  up  a  statement  of  all  the  Austrian  pos- 
sessions in  Suabia,  ancient,  or  acquired  since  the  treaty 
of  Ivuneville,  making  his  work  almost  statistical;  on  his 
return,  he  will  give  me  these  memoranda,  which  will 
indicate  that  he  has  not  lost  his  time  there. 

"He  will  write  me  from  Munich  everything  that  is 
said  of  the  situation  of  the  Austrians  upon  the  Inn  and 
in  Tyrol;  his  presentation  to  the  Elector,  and  everything 
relative  to  the  other  part  of  his  mission;  from  Munich 
he  will  dispatch  a  courier  to  bring  me  his  news.  From 
Stuttgart,  M.  Didelot  will  send  his  dispatch  to  Strasburg 
by  one  of  his  servants;  it  will  be  addressed  to  the  Prefect, 


158  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

who  will  have  it  sent  to  me  wherever  I  happen  to  be. 
From  Passau  he  [Bertrand]  will  report  to  me  his  recon- 
naissances of  the  Inn  and  the  Danube  at  Passau,  of  the 
Ilz  and  all  that  relates  to  the  left  bank;  he  will  send  the 
report  by  an  estafet  to  M.  Otto,  who  will  forward  it 
by  one  of  the  numerous  couriers  going  to  Vienna  or 
Munich. 

From  Salzburg  he  will  furnish  me  with  the  recon- 
naissance of  the  Inn  or  of  the  Salza,  which  will  be  sent 
by  an  estafet  to  M.  Otto;  should  the  Austrians  be  at 
Salzburg,  or  should  it  be  inconvenient  to  proceed  to  this 
place,  he  will  not  go;  from  Munich,  he  will  send  me 
the  reconnaissance  of  the  road  from  Salzburg  to  Munich, 
and  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube,  made  out  from  such 
information  as  he  may  be  able  to  gather. 

"Everywhere  his  language  will  be  pacific;  he  will 
speak  of  the  expedition  to  England  as  imminent;  the 
troops  once  embarked,  he  will  show  no  anxiety,  even  to 
our  agents;  will  pay  no  attention  to  the  preparations  of 
the  Austrians — in  a  word,  will  assume  that  they  are  not 
able  to  commence  the  war,  that  such  a  course  would  be 
senseless.  ' '  N  apoleon.  ' ' 

The  instructions  given  General  Bertrand  may  be  epi- 
tomized thus: 

ist.  Reconnaissance  of  the  tiabiitaries  of  the  Danube 
flounng  in  from  the  right^  that  is  to  sa}^  the  rivers  which 
the  corps  of  the  grand  army  would  have  to  cross  in  their 
march  to  Vienna; 

2d.  Reconnaissance  of  the  course  of  the  Damtbe  be- 
tzveen  Donauwoerth  ajtd  Passau^  that  is  to  say,  of  the 
principah  valley  which  the  army  would  have  to  follow 
after  the  engagements  around  Ulm; 

3d.  Reconnaissance  of  the  road  connecting  the  Main 
zvith  the  Danube  by  the  valley  of  the  Regnitz.  The  direct- 
ing  thought   here   was    with   reference   to   the   line  of 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        1 59 

march  which  Napoleon  had  already  marked  out  to  be 
followed  by  the  left  corps  in  October. 

4th.  Reconnaissance  of  the  outlets  from  BoJicniia  in  the 
vicinity  of  Passan^  and  of  a  road  leading  from  the  Dan- 
ube into  Moravia  by  Freystadt.  The  general-in-chief 
thought  he  saw  here  a  possibility  of  a  retreat  of  the 
Austrians  down  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube  towards 
Moravia,  and  was  looking  for  the  means  of  pursuing 
them  there.  His  thoughts  were  fixed  upon  the  fortified 
town  of  Ulni,  and  upon  the  course  of  the  Danube. 

This  ensemble  of  labors  was,  we  see,  clearly  marked 
out,  and  corresponded  to  a  strategic  combination  already 
profoundly  considered  by  the  future  victor  of  Austerlitz. 
We  shall  be  able  to  draw  from  it  the  conclusion  that 
every  prepai-atoiy  reconnaissaiice  of  a  theatj^e  of  opei^a- 
tions^  in  order  to  be  fruitful^  should  be  executed  according 
to  the  program  rnade  out  by  the  general-in-chief  himself. 

In  1806,  Berthierwas  charged  with  having  similar  re- 
connaissances made  in  the  valleys  of  the  Main,  the  Saal, 
and  the  upper  Elbe. 

In  1868  and  1869,  reconnaissances  of  the  same  kind 
were  made  by  staff  officers  in  the  valley  and  upon  both 
banks  of  the  Rhine. 

To-day,  the  events  which  precede  active  operations 
have  too  rapid  a  march  to  allow  time  for  making  recon- 
naissance of  the  theatres  of  operations  at  the  last  mo- 
ment. 

It  must  be  done,  then,  in  time  of  peace.  This  study 
is  a  part  of  the  work  of  preparation  for  war.  It  should 
embrace  statistical  and  topographical  information  de- 
signed to  complete  the  maps,  and  to  furnish  to  the  com- 
mander-in-chief the  means  of  drawing  up  his  plan  of 
operations. 

The  points  to  which  the  study  of  the  topography  of  a 
theatre  of  operations  should  relate  are  extremely  numer- 
ous: in  general,  they  comprise,  first  of  all,,  communicat- 


l6o  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

ing  ways,  then  the  natural  and  artificial  features  of 
the  ground.  Whatever  may  be  their  character,  they 
have,  from  a  statistical  and  tactical  point  of  view,  an 
influence  upon  the  operations  which  it  would  be  impru- 
dent to  nesflect. 


-&' 


I.— Communications. 

The  topographical  features  of  greatest  interest  to  the 
general-in-chief  are  the  communications.  It  is  even  ad- 
vantageous in  a  reconnaissance  to  note  the  peculiarities 
of  the  country,  in  connection  with  the  communicating 
ways.  These  communications  are  classified  as  rail- 
roads^ ordinary  roads^  and  water  routes. 

The  Use  of  Railroads  in  War. —  Railroads  are  almost 
always  accompanied  by  telegraph  lines.  Their  crea- 
tion has  brought  about  great  changes  in  the  character  of 
theatres  of  operations  ;  and  these  changes  have  a  scope 
and  bearing  which  will  be  made  clear  by  indicating  the 
role  played  by  railroads  in  time  of  war. 

Railroads  can,  in  a  few  days,  transport  to  great  dis- 
tances large  masses  of  troops  and  enormous  quantities 
of  war  material.  As  a  result  of  this,  a  state  whose  army 
is  so  organized  as  to  admit  of  its  transportation  to  the 
frontier  more  rapidly  than  that  of  the  enemy,  will,  with 
equal  forces,  greatly  advance  its  chances  of  success. 

A  well-planned  system  of  railroads,  which  will  allow 
the  forces  of  a  country  to  be  concentrated  in  the  shortest 
possible  time,  is,  then,  an  offensive  arm  of  the  first  order. 
It  constitutes,  at  the  same  time,  an  instrument  of  defense 
more  efficacious  even  than  fortresses,  for  the  first  step  in 
the  preparation  for  defense  is  the  assembling  of  sufficient 
forces  upon  the  frontier  in  time  to  prevent  access  of  the 
enemy. 

It  follows  from  this  that  the  first  care  of  a  state  in  or- 
ganizing the  defense  of  its  frontiers  should  not  be  to 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  F.OR  WAR.        l6l 

envelope  itself  with  a  girdle  of  fortified  places,  but  to 
cover  its  territory  with  a  system  of  railroads,  thus  assur- 
ing the  most  rapid  concentration. 

Importance  of  their  Direction. — A  state,  therefore,  which 
seeks  to  place  itself  in  the  best  condition  for  defense, 
should  be  master  of  its  systems  of  railroads,  and  take 
into  account  the  requirements  of  commerce  and  indus- 
try only  as  subordinate  to  strategic  considerations. 
But  these  principles  have  not  been  everywhere  under- 
stood. In  certain  countries,  only  a  moderate  degree  of 
importance  has  been  attributed  to  these  new  means  of 
communication.  In  others,  even  after  the  conclusive 
examples  of  the  last  war,  their  military  role  has  been 
misunderstood,  and  their  construction  been  permitted  in 
directions  repugnant  to  the  most  obvious  mandates  of 
prudence. 

The  working  of  these  roads  in  a  manner  to  obtain 
from  them  their  maximum  yield  for  military  purposes, 
is  a  matter  of  great  difficulty.  Generally  the  junction 
points  of  these  systems  are  troublesome  places;  certain 
lines  cannot  transport  the  military  trains;  and,  again, 
the  service  varies  with  the  character  and  resources  of 
the  different  systems. 

Their  Influence  Upon  the  Movement  of  Armies. — There  is  no 
doubt  that  railroads  have  a  weighty  influence  not  only 
upon  the  beginning  of  operations,  but  even  upon  the 
general  character  of  the  war  itself.  Their  employment, 
it  is  true,  cannot  affect  the  movements  of  armies  in 
course  of  operations,  nor  modify  either  the  general  direc- 
tion of  these  movements  or  the  application  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  strategy;  but  they  extend  the  field  of  combina- 
tions by  enabling  an  army  to  rapidly  draw  to  itself  the 
disposable  troops  found  at  various  points  of  the  territory. 
Such  troops  can,  thanks  to  these  roads,  take  their  place 

on  the  battle-field  at  short  notice. 
II 


1 62  .PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Especially  to  the  belligerent  who  defends  his  own 
territory  is  this  advantage  assured. 

"During  the  campaign  on  the  Loire  in  October,  1870, 
28,000  infantry  of  the  15th  French  Corps,  were  trans- 
ported from  Salbris  in  Sologne,  by  way  of  Vierzon  and 
Tours,  to  Mer,  near  Blois,  between  7  o'clock  on  the 
morning  of  the  27th  and  9  on  the  evening  of  the  follow- 
ing day,  without  attracting  the  attention  of  the  Germans. 
By  8  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  29th,  besides  these, 
16  batteries,  2  regiments  of  cavalry,  munition  trains, 
etc.,  had  arrived.  In  November  of  the  same  year,' 
40,000  troops  of  the  three  arms  of  the  service,  under  Gen- 
eral Crouzat,  were  moved  in  three  days  on  88  railroad 
trains,  from  Besangon  upon  the  Doubs,  to  Gien  upon 
the  Loire.  The  German  staff  learned  of  this  movement 
only  when  these  troops  had  reached  their  destination. 
Repeatedly  during  this  campaign,  French  trains  were 
dispatched  one  after  another  at  intervals  of  ten  minutes 
or  less. 

"On  the  other  hand,  the  attempt  made  in  December, 
1870,  to  transport  the  army  of  General  Bourbaki  with 
great  celerity  from  the  Upper  Loire  to  the  valley  of  the 
Doubs,  failed  because  of  insufficient  preparation,  and 
lack  of  unity  in  execution.  Seven  days  were  required 
to  embark  two  army  corps,  and  the  division  forming  the 
reserve.  Altogether,  ten  days  were  consumed  in  making 
this  journey,  which  was  expected  to  require  but  half  this 
time.  An  army  corps  joining  it  later,  occupied  from  the 
4th  to  the  i6th  of  January  in  moving  from  Nevers  to  the 
upper  Doubs,  near  Belfort;  for,  in  consequence  of  the 
accumulation  of  troops  and  convoys,  material  and  food, 
transportation  was  rendered  singularly  difficult.  It 
would,  therefore,  have  been  wiser  to  march  these  troops, 
rather  than  persist  in  using  the  railroad,  especially  as 
this  was  the  only  one  running  along  the  upper  Doubs. 
Removal  of   troops  from  the  trains  was  rendered  very 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        1 63 

difficult  by  the  scarcity  of  stations;  it  was  not  possible 
to  construct  sidings  between  the  river  and  the  rocky 
walls  of  this  narrow  valley."* 

The  employment  of  railroads  for  the  movement  of 
troops  in  the  enemy's  country  will  be  less  common,  be- 
cause the  transportation  of  the  invaders'  supplies  will 
occupy  all  the  railroads  at  his  disposal. 

However,  the  war  of  1870-1871  furnishes  us  with  sev- 
eral interesting  examples  in  this  connection. 

"The  14th  Division  of  Infantry,  which  toward  the  end 
of  1870  was  besieging  the  fortified  places  on  the  north- 
ern frontier  of  France,  was  transported  thence  to  Cha- 
tillon-sur-Seine  by  rail,  between  7th  and  14th  January, 
1871.  On  the  latter  day,  the  combatants  of  the  division 
had  united  at  Chatillon;  the  train  and  the  columns  had 
not  yet  arrived. 

"  x\fter  the  taking  of  Strasburg,  the  landwehr  division 
was  transported  to  the  vicinity  of  Paris.  It  commenced 
the  journey  on  7th  October,  but,  being  compelled  to  use 
an  encumbered  line,  it  moved  by  successive  parts,  reach- 
ing Nanteuil  between  the  loth  and  19th. 

"In  like  manner,  the  11.  Army  Corps  was  transported 
from  Metz  to  Paris.  The  3d  Infantry  Division,  with  10 
battallions,  i  squadron,  4  batteries,  a  company  of  engin- 
eers, a  hospital  detachment,  a  supply  train, f  and  120 
wagons  of  the  military  equipage  train,  made  the  journey 
in  24  railroad  trains,  from  the  3d  to  the  8th  of  Novem- 
ber. The  4th  Division  had  begun  to  embark  at  Pont-a- 
Mousson  at  noon  on  the  26th  of  October.  On  the  6th  of 
November,  the  combatants  of  the  division,  with  the  hos- 
pital detachment,  field  ambulance,  and  the  indispensa- 
ble service  trains,  were  assembled  at  Lonjumeau.  A 
part  of  the  corps  marched  from  Metz  to  Paris.  "| 

*The  Nation  in  Arms,  by  Baron  Von  der  Goltz. 
t  Bake-house  equipments,  and  field  ambulances. 
%The  Nation  in  Arms,  Baron  Von  der  Goltz. 


164  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Sometimes,  on  the  eve  of  battle,  railroads  afford  trans- 
portation to  the  field  for  detachments  too  distant  to 
arrive  in  season  by  the  ordinary  roads,  thus  unexpect- 
edly changing  the  proportion  of  combatants. 

On  August  6,  1870,  3  battalions  of  the  13th  Prussian 
regiment,  and  i  battalion  of  the  20th,  were  transferred 
by  rail  from  Neimkirchen  to  the  battle-field  of  Spich- 
eren. 

The  4th  light  battery  of  the  I.  Corps,  arriving  the 
same  day  from  Koenigsberg  by  rail,  was  to  have  been 
halted  at  Neunkirchen.  It  was  resolved,  however,  to 
continue  the  journey,  and  the  battery  was  thus  able  to 
reach  the  field  of  battle  by  a  qiiarter  past  six. 

In  January,  1871,  Von  Moltke,  wishing  to  reinforce 
the  Army  of  the  North,  then  on  the  point  of  opening 
the  battle  of  Saint-Quentin,  ordered  the  Army  of  the 
Meuse  to  reinforce  it  by  rail  with  the  i6th  Infantry  Bri- 
gade and  a  light  battery.  These  troops  should  have 
proceeded  from  Gonesse  to  Tergnier  by  way  of  La  Fere, 
But  the  lack  of  material,  and  the  difficulties  connected 
with  unloading,  so  retarded  the  movement,  that  the  first 
battalion,  expected  on  the  17th  January,  could  not  leave 
the  train  before  8  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  i8th, 
and  the  last  battalion  did  not  accomplish  this  until  the 
afternoon  of  the  19th,  the  very  day  of  the  battle.  In 
consequence  of  these  delays,  only  the  four  battalions  of 
the  86th  regiment  reached  the  field  of  action  from  Terg- 
nier; the  remainder  of  this  brigade  was  stopped  en 
route^  in  consequence  of  the  favorable  issue  of  the  con- 
test, and  sent  back  to  Gonesse. 

When  the  I.  German  Army,  in  1870,  was  covering  the 
investment  of  Paris  against  the  improvised  troops  which 
we  were  assembling  at  Cherbourg  and  other  places  in  the 
North,  it  was  obliged,  with  a  reduced  effective,  to  pro- 
tect Rouen,  Amiens,  and  the  line  of  the  Somme.  It 
then  made  use  of  the  railroad  from  Rouen  to  Amiens, 


SECOND   CHAPTER. — PREPARATION    FOR   WAR,       165 

about    III    kilometres  [69  miles]  long,  to  direct  detach- 
ments here  and  there  upon  the  menaced  points. 

It  is  especially  with  reference  to  the  feeding  of  armies 
that  railroads  have  produced  unexpected  changes,  and 
have  become  of  paramount  importance.  One  of  the  first 
results  of  their  construction  has  been  to  change  the  na- 
ture  of  bases  of  operations;  and  they  have,  in  a  certain 
measure,  supplanted  the  latter.  Formerly,  indeed,  an 
army  in  the  field  was  obliged  to  establish  at  the  large 
frontier  places  in  its  rear,  vast  magazines  and  depots, 
designed  to  meet  the  enormous  drain  upon  its  resources. 
To-day,  railroads,  seconded  by  the  telegraph,  permit  the 
defensive  to  leave  its  supplies  in  the  principal  cities  of 
the  interior,  or  in  the  same  places  as  in  time  of  peace, 
and  to  receive  them  with  the  least  possible  delay.  On 
the  side  of  the  offensive,  they  give  to  each  army  corps  a 
rapid  and  sure  means  of  drawing  from  its  own  region  all 
needed  supplies.  But  even  if  each  corps  had  at  its  dis- 
posal a  railroad  and  telegraph  line  for  communication 
with  the  centre  of  the  country,  it  would,  nevertheless, 
be  always  advantageous  to  establish  an  intermediate 
depot  between  the  corps  region  and  the  theatre  of  oper- 
ations. For  this  purpose,  an  important  station  of  this 
same  line  of  railroad  is  usually  chosen.  This  place  is 
called  the  te77iporary  station.  If  the  line  is  double,  its 
carrying  power  will  be  at  its  maximum,  and  communi- 
cation will  be  correspondingly  facilitated.  It  is  very 
evident  that  if  each  corps  in  the  field  were  capable  of 
providing  for  its  own  wants,  the  commander-in-chief 
would  be  disembarrassed  of  a  multitude  of  anxieties. 

In  1866  and  1870,  in  the  Prussian  armies,  the  differ- 
ent corps  were  thus  in  direct  communication  with  their 
centres  of  supply. 

It  was  especially  in  these  two  wars  that  the  necessity 
of  organizing  the  service  of  railroads  in  the  rear  of  armies 
was  made  clear.     To-day  we  recognize  that  it  is  princi- 


1 66  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

pally  through  the  railroad  that  the  setting  in  motion  of 
the  large  masses  composing  modern  armies  is  made 
practicable. 

It  is  equally  certain  that  the  more  numerous  these 
roads  become  in  rear  of  the  zone  of  operations,  the  easier 
will  it  be  to  place  large  effectives  in  line,  to  provide  for 
them,  to  keep  up  their  numerical  strength,  and  to  at- 
tempt the  investment  and  siege  of  those  strong  intrenched 
camps  which  most  states  employ  to-da}^  for  the  protec- 
tion of  their  frontiers. 

As  the  result  of  experience,  then,  in  the  wars  of  the 
future,  armies  will  take  a  considerable  interest  in  having 
new  branch  railroads  constructed  in  their  rear,  according 
as  they  advance. 

In  this  connection,  it  may  be  said  that  the  number  of 
technical  railroad  troops  attached  to  armies  does  not  ap- 
pear commensurate  with  the  needs  arising  in  an  offen- 
sive campaign  in  which  large  masses  are  engaged.  This 
is  a  new  contingency  to  provide  for. 

To  sum  up,  rail  and  telegraph  lines  play  an  important 
part  in  the  front  of  armies  before  the  commencement  of 
operations,  and  in  their  rear  during  the  continuance  of 
these  operations.  The  railroads  found  in  the  space  be- 
tween the  belligerents,  are  destined  to  be  destroyed  by 
the  side  compelled  to  give  ground,  and  to  be  immediately 
reconstructed  by  the  opposing  forces.  In  all  these  cases, 
it  would  be  impossible,  to-day,  to  choose  a  line  of  oper- 
ations without  taking  into  account  the  railroad  which 
usually  follows  its  principal  direction,  and  without 
choosing  for  objectives  the  most  important  cities  lying 
upon  it. 

Ordinary  Roads. — Notwithstanding  the  existence  of  rail- 
roads, ordinary  roads  have  lost  nothing  of  their  import- 
ance within  the  zone  of  operations  itself  and  in  its  im- 
mediate  neighborhood,    especially  upon   the  front  and 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        167 

flanks  of  armies.  There,  as  formerly,  they  still  represent 
the  principal  means  at  the  disposition  of  the  geu- 
eral-in-chief  for  the  movement  of  his  troops.  Previous 
study  of  them  is  the  more  essential,  now  that  the  effec- 
tives have  been  so  largely  increased.  It  is,  therefore, 
even  more  necessary  than  formerly  to  properly  regulate 
in  advance  all  the  dispositions  for  the  march,  and  to  limit 
the  use  of  each  road  with  precision.  The  number  ot 
practicable  roads  has  been  increased,  it  is  true,  during 
the  last  few  years;  but  it  is  still  so  limited  as  to  make  it 
often  difficult,  in  strategic  marches,  to  give  more  than 
one  to  an  army  corps.  After  all,  then,  it  is  by  the  ordi- 
nary roads  that  armies  must  move  toward  the  decisive 
points  of  theatres  of  operations.  The  study  of  these 
roads  is  consequently  one  of  the  indispensable  tasks  in 
the  preparation  for  war.  We  have  to-day  TT-aveling 
Guides  describing  them,  which  did  not  formerly  exist, 
but  which  can  by  no  means  take  the  place  of  military 
reconnaissances. 

Reconnaissance  of  Roads. — There  should  henceforth  be, 
then,  as  a  part  of  the  general  staff,  a  permanent  travel- 
ing service  for  foreign  countries.  The  officers  charged 
with  this  duty  should  make  out  itineraries  of  previously 
designated  regions.  The  principal  lines  of  operation, 
corresponding  to  possible  future  campaigns,  should  first 
be  studied;  next  the  intermediate  and  transverse  lines; 
and,  finally,  accidents  of  ground  and  military  positions. 
These  first  works,  classified  according  to  projets  of  oper- 
ations, and  kept  up  to  date,  would  serve  as  a  basis  for  the 
combinations  held  in  readiness  for  a  state  of  war. 

Profiting  by  the  facilities  then  affiDrded,  there  should 
therefore  be  executed  in  time  of  peace,  those  reconnais- 
sances which  Napoleon  in  the  beginning  of  the  century 
directed  his  generals  to  make  before  operations,  and 
which  he  thus  defined: 


1 68  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 


a 


When  I  order  a  reconnaissance,  I  do  not  wish  to  be 
given  a  plan  of  campaign.  The  word  enemy^oxxiA  not 
be  mentioned  by  the  engineer.  He  should  study  the 
roads,  their  nature,  the  grades,  heights,  defiles,  and  ob- 
stacles; learn  if  carriages  can  pass;  but  abstain  entirely 
from  ^vsi'vcx^ pi^ojets  of  compaign." 

Here,  moreover,  is  the  way  he  intended   the  work  to 
be  executed: 


a 


Camp  of    Boulogne,    loth    Fructidor,    Year    XIII. 
(Aug.  28,  1805.) 

' '  761  General  Savary. 

"General  Savary  will  proceed  to  lyandau,  and  thence 
to  Germersheim.  He  will  cross  the  Rhine  in  the  vicin- 
ity of  Germersheim,  at  the  point  he  considers  most  fav- 
orable for  the  establishment  of  a  ponton  bridge.  He 
will  make  such  observations  at  Philippsburg  as  shall 
enable  him  to  give  an  accurate  account  of  the  condi- 
tion of  the  place.  He  will  then  proceed  to  Bruchsal; 
thence  to  Knittlingen,  thence  to  Vaihingen,  Cannstadt, 
Gmiind,  Aalen,  Giengen,  and  Gundelfingen,  on  the 
Brienz,  half  a  league  from  the  Danube.  He  will  travel 
only  by  day.  He  will  make  note  of  all  the  lateral  com- 
munications which  exist,  on  the  one  hand,  between  this 
road  and  that  from  Durlach  to  Ulm,  by  way  of  Pforz- 
heim, Stuttgart,  Bsslingen,  Goeppingen,  and  Geislingen, 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  between  the  road  which  he  is 
to  take  and  another  leading  from  Wiesloch  to  Sins- 
heim,  Heilbronn,  CEhringen,  Hall,  Bllwangen,  Neres- 
heim,  and  Dillingen,  upon  the  Danube.  He  will 
give  an  account  of  each  of  the  cities,  villages,  bridges, 
castles,  hills,  woods,  or  remarkable  places  met  with,  and 
the  distances  between  them,  specifying  the  cities,  vil- 
lages, or  castles  which  would  serve  to  lodge  troops. 
The  Enz  at  Vaihingen,  and  the  Neckar  at  Cannstadt, 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        169 

merit  special  attention,  and  he  will  mark  their  width, 
and  the  difficnlties  or  facilities  which  these  two  rivers 
present  for  the  passage  of  troops.  He  will  observe 
the  breadth  of  the  large  valleys,  and  note  the  dis- 
tances between  the  mountains  of  the  Black  Forest,  or 
those  separating  the  valleys  of  the  Rhine  and  the 
Neckar,  and  the  various  points  of  importance  along  his 
route.  He  will  take  cognizance  of  the  best  communica- 
tion existing  between  Gmiind  and  Giengen,  whether  by 
Heubach,  Heidenheim,  Weissenstein,  or  Langenau. 
He  will  examine  these  roads  personally,  for  the  purpose 
of  ascertaining  positively  which  is  the  most  favorable  for 
the  transportation  of  the  materiel  of  an  army. 

"  General  Savary  will  then  in  person  seek  the  best 
road  lying  between  the  one  traced  above  from  Philipps- 
burg  to  Gundelfingen,  and  another  road  leading  from 
Dillingen  by  Neresheim,  Hiilen,  Ellwangen,  Hall,  CEhr- 
ingen,  Heilbronn,  Sinsheim,  Wiesloch,  and  Spire,  assur- 
ing himself  that  the  road  in  question  is,  in  some 
degree,  parallel  to  the  other  two.  This  road,  which 
should  be  practicable  for  artillery,  and  military  trans- 
ports, should  lead  either  from  Aalen  toward  Murrhardt, 
lyoewenstein,  and  Heilbronn,  or  better  still,  from  Aalen 
to  Gmiind,  thence  to  Winnenden,  Marbach,  Bietigheim, 
Sachsenheim,  and  Knittlingen,  and  then  by  way  of 
Bruchsal  to  Philippsburg.  If  there  is  a  good  and  prac- 
ticable direct  communication  from  Giengen  to  Gmiind, 
it  should  be  preferred.  Having  returned  to  the  vicinity 
of  Philippsburg,  General  Savary  will  examine  the  right 
bank  of  the  Rhine  to  near  Spire,  and  will  again  turn  to- 
ward the  Danube,  and  proceed  to  Dillingen  by  way  of 
Wiesloch,  Sinsheim,  Heilbronn,  CEhringen,  Hall,  Ell- 
wangen, Hiilen,  and  Dischingen.  He  will  carefully  ex- 
amine this  road,  its  different  branches,  and  the  Neckar  at 
Heilbronn.  He  will  then  follow  the  Danube  from  Dil- 
lingen to  Ulm,  and  thence  proceed  to  Gceppingen,  giving 


lyo  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

close  attention  io  this  portion  of  the  road.  He  will  assure 
himself  of  the  means  of  communication  between  this  city 
and  Gmiind.  From  this  place  he  will  proceed  to  Ess- 
lingen  and  Stuttgart,  where  he  will  again  observe  the 
Neckar,  going  thence  to  Pforzheim,  Durlach,  and  Miihl- 
burg,  examining  the  Rhine  opposite  Pforz.  He  will 
then  join  the  Emperor  wherever  the  latter  may  be, 

' '  Napoleon.  ' ' 

The  reconnaissance  prescribed  to  General  Savary  con- 
cerns more  especially  the  roads  which  the  corps  of  the 
right  of  the  grand  army  were  to  follow  in  moving  from 
their  base  upon  the  Rhine  to  Ulm.  The  project  of  mak- 
ing the  various  corps  converge  upon  Ulm  had  its  origin 
in  the  same  thought  that  dictated  this  work. 

The  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  this  is  analogous  to 
that  before  suggested  by  the  instructions  given  General 
Bertrand — in  order  to  be  of  use,  preliminary  reconnais- 
sances of  the  ground  should  be  directed  by  the  general 
who  is  to  carry  on  the  war. 

The  reconnaissance  which  Murat  was  ordered  to  make 
at  this  same  period,  completes  the  preceding,  and  shows, 
in  a  still  more  precise  manner,  how  necessary  it  is  that 
these  labors  be  executed  with  a  view  to  a  special  hypoth- 
esis of  war,  and  a  preconceived  combination. 

"Zb  Marshal  Berthier. 

"  Camp  of  Bolougne,  7th  Fructidor,  Year  XIII.  (Aug. 
25,  1805.) 

"Marshal  Murat  will  start  to-morrow,  in  a  post-chaise, 
under  the  name  of  Colonel  Beaumont,  direct  for  May- 
ence,  where  he  will  stop  only  to  change  horses.  He  will 
proceed  to  Frankfort,  and  on  this  occasion  will  recon- 
noitre Offenbach;  will  then  go  to  Wiirzburg,  which  he 
will  reconnoitre,  stopping  there  a  day  and  a  half;  and 


SECOND   CHAPTKR.— PREPARATION    FOR    WAR.        171 

lie  will  observe  the  connections  of  this  place  with 
Mayence  and  the  Dannbe,  taking  particular  account  of 
the  roads  leading  towards  Ulm,  Ingolstadt,  and  Ratisbon. 
Thence  he  will  repair  to  Bamberg,  upon  the  Regnitz. 
From  Bamberg,  he  will  proceed  to  the  frontiers  of  Bo- 
hemia, near  Eger,  without  entering  Austrian  territory, 
and  he  will  keep  upon  neutral  ground  not  occupied  by 
Austrian  troops.  He  is  expressly  forbidden  to  enter 
places  where  there  are  such  troops.  He  will  note  the 
position  of  Bamberg  with  reference  to  Bohemia  and  the 
Danube;  will  take  particular  account  of  the  mountains 
of  Bohemia;  will  prepare  an  itinerary  of  the  road  from 
Bamberg  to  Prague,  and  especially  of  the  gorges  of  the 
Eger;  will,  first  of  all,  procure  the  campaign  of  Marshal 
Belle-Isle.  He  will  follow  the  Regnitz,  passing  through 
Nuremberg  and  across  the  Woernitz.  After  that,  he 
will  travel  along  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube,  passing 
rapidly  through  Ratisbon;  will  arrive  opposite  Passau; 
will  cross  the  Danube;  will  follow  the  Inn  as  far  as  Kuf- 
stein;  will  pass  through  Munich;  will  go  to  Ulm;  thence 
to  Stockach,  visiting  the  battle-field  of  Moesskirch;  will 
glance  at  the  different  outlets  of  the  Black  Forest,  and 
will  so  manage  as  to  be  in  Strasburg  on  the  24th  Fruc- 
tidor.  He  will  form  a  general  idea  of  the  country,  the 
size  of  the  rivers,  and  whatever  else  he  may  deem  nec- 
essary, locating  the  various  points  with  reference  to 
Tyrol  and  the  Danube;  will  not  enter  a  country  occu- 
pied by  the  Austrians,  and  if  they  have  crossed  the  Inn, 
he  must  not  fall  in  with  any  of  their  posts;  will  take  with 
him  an  officer  or  a  secretary  who  speaks  German;  de- 
mand will  be  made  upon  Jean-Bon-Saint-Andre*  for  one, 
but  the  latter  will  not  be  informed  of  it. 

"  The  horses  will  leave  Paris  quietly,  with  the  trains 

and  staffs. 

"Napoleon." 

*  Prefect  of  Mayence. 


172  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

River  Comraimicatioiis. — There  yet  remains  to  be  consid- 
ered the  importance  of  water  communications.  In  the 
matter  of  transportation  of  troops  and  supplies,  this  im- 
portance exists  only  in  case  of  water-courses  parallel  to 
the  line  of  march.  Here,  they  become  useful  auxilia- 
ries, and  complete  the  lines  of  operation  of  which  they 
themselves  constitute  a  part.  Army  commanders  in  this 
case  hasten  to  utilize  them  by  seizing,  as  soon  as  possi- 
ble, all  means  of  navigation  found  upon  their  banks. 

In  1805,  after  the  capitulation  of  Ulm,  Napoleon  re- 
solved to  march  immediately  upon  Vienna,  following 
the  valley  of  the  Danube.  The  river,  which  ran  paral- 
lel to  the  direction  of  his  march,  was  to  become  part  of 
the  line  of  operations. 

But  beyond  Linz,  the  road  was  shut  in  between  the 
river  bank  and  the  mountains.  It  was  thus  indispen- 
sable to  assure  the  possession  of  the  left  bank,  in  order  to 
attempt  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  Russians,  and  to 
cover  the  march  of  the  army  on  this  side. 

Dupont's  division,  numbering  hardly  3,480  men,  in 
6  battalions,  was  charged  with  this  duty,  and  with  mak- 
ing reconnaissances  of  the  roads  leading  into  Bohen'iia. 
But  these  forces  being  soon  found  too  weak,  Napoleon 
reinforced  them  with  Gazan's  division,  having  an  effect- 
ive of  4,460  men. 

There  was  thus  upon  the  left  bank  a  small  army  corps, 
which  was  placed  under  Marshal  Mortier.  He  was  to 
move  down  the  valley  on  the  side  then  occupied.  It  was 
not  prudent,  therefore,  to  leave  him  unprotected. 

It  became  necessary  to  connect  him  with  the  princi- 
pal body;  and,  for  this  purpose,  Napoleon,  having  as- 
sembled all  the  boats  that  could  be  found,  formed  them 
into  a  flotilla,  which  he  placed  under  the  orders  of  Com- 
mander L/Ostange.  The  crews  were  composed  of  the 
worn-out  and  foot-sore  men  of  each  division.  These 
boats,  loaded  with  supplies  and  ammunition,  descended 
the  Danube  abreast  of  the  army. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        1 73 

Napoleon  desired  400  of  these  boats,  so  as  to  be  able 
to  suddenly  embark  10,000  men,  and  throw  them  upon 
the  Russians  in  an  hour,  if  Mortier  found  himself  too 
strongly  engaged.  "There  must  be  no  Danube,"  wrote 
he  from  Linz,  "on  7th  November.  I  must  be  able  to 
cross  it  promptly.  The  Russians,  who  do  not  expect  this 
manoeuvre,  may  become  the  victims  of  it,  since  they  think 
themselves  engaged  only  with  Marshal  Mortier,  while 
I  shall  be  able  to  bring  a  superior  force  against  them." 

The  river  thus  became  a  means  both  of  communication 
and  of  transportation.  The  army  had  for  line  of  oper- 
ations the  road  from  Linz  to  Vienna,  with  the  water- 
course parallel  to  it  on  the  left. 

It  was  divided  into  two  principal  masses.  The  one, 
composed  of  the  corps  of  Soult,  Lannes,  Bernadotte,  and 
the  Guard,  preceded  by  Murat's  cavalry,  advanced  along 
the  right  bank,  which  was  the  more  exposed.  It  num- 
bered about  53,000  infantry  and  16,000  cavalry.  The 
other  was  weaker,  consisting,  as  we  have  said,  of  a  pro- 
visional corps  upon  the  left  bank. 

The  river,  instead  of  separating  them,  served,  thanks 
to  the  flotilla,  which  bore  the  impedimenta,  as  a  means 
of  connection. 

In  the  campaign  in  Egypt,  the  Nile  had  been  utilized 
in  the  same  way. 

We  shall  be  warranted  in  concluding,  from  this  ex- 
ample, that,  in  order  to  make  use  of  a  water-way  parallel 
to  an  army's  line  of  march,  it  will  be  necessary  gener- 
allv: 

ist.    To  seize  all  the  boats  that  can  be  found; 

2d.  To  occupy  the  points  of  passage  in  advance  of  the 
front ; 

3d.    To  hold  both  banks  ; 

4th.  To  tnarch  the  principal  mass  upon  the  more  ex- 
posed bajik. 

These  facts  of  themselves  indicate  what  points  should 
be  noted  in  making  reconnaissances  of  water-courses. 


171  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 


r 


The  tactical  importance  of  these  courses,  when  parallel 
to  the  line  of  march,  varies  according  to  circumstances. 

When,  instead  of  pursuing  the  course  of  a  single  river, 
an  army  follows  a  system  of  streams,  the  situation  is 
changed.  The  rivers  along  which  the  troops  are  pro- 
ceeding become  positive  obstacles.  They  isolate  the 
columns  marching  between  them,  and  the  points  of  pas- 
sage acquire  in  this  case  a  capital  importance.  It  is 
clear  that  in  order  to  assure  connection  between  the  var- 
ious forces,  these  points  must  be  occupied  in  advance. 

In  1813,  the  army  of  Schwarzenberg,  leaving  the 
mountains  of  Bohemia,  descended  to  the  plains  of  Sax- 
ony, pursuing  the  course  of  the  numerous  affluents  of 
the  Elster  and  the  Elbe.     It  thus  followed: 

Tke  Saale^  which  had  bridges  at  Dorneburg,  Kosen, 
Naumburg  and  Weissenfels; 

The  Elster  (bridges  at  Pegau,  Zwenckau  and  Zeitz); 

The  Pleisse  (bridges  at  Lobstadt  and  Altenburg); 

A  tributary  of  the  Pleisse  (bridge  at  Borna); 

The  Partha  (bridge  at  Eausigk); 

The  Mulde  (bridges  at  Kolditz  and  at  Grimma)  {See 
Plate  I.) 

Upon  arriving  in  this  region,  Schwarzenberg  issued 
the  following  order: 

"October  14,  1813. 

"  Count  Giulay  will  occupy  Weissenfels  with  the  main 
part  of  his  corps,  pushing  his  advanced-guard  upon 
Liitzen.  He  will  guard  the  bridge  of  Weissenfels,  upon 
the  Saale,  and  detach  two  battalions  with  a  squadron 
for  the  bridges  of  Naumburg  and  Kosen,  endeavoring 
thus  to  connect  with  the  army  of  the  Crown  Prince  of 
Sweden.  ^ 

"To  assure  the  communication  between  Borna  and 
Pegau,  General  Wittgenstein  will  send  two  battalions 
and  a  cavalry  detachment  to  occupy  the  bridge  of  Lob- 
stadt upon  the  Pleisse. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR,        1 75 

"To  keep  up  com miiiii cation  with  General  Knorring 
at  Kolditz,  General  Klenau  will  send  a  detachment  from 
Borna  to  occupy  Lausigk."* 

In  such  cases,  we  see,  water-courses,  far  from  being  of 
service,  are  a  positive  hindrance.  Reconnaissances 
should  pay  especial  attention  to  all  the  points  of  pass- 
age, as  well  as  to  the  means  of  assuring  their  possession. 

To-day  it  might  at  first  seem  that,  with  the  aid  of 
steam,  river  navigation  should  become  a  greater  aid  to 
armies  than  formerly.  This,  however,  is  somewhat 
doubtful. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  rare  that  the  directions  of  the 
rivers  of  Europe  are  identical  with  the  probable  lines  of 
operations.  This  is  shown,  for  example,  in  the  case  of 
France,  Germany,  and  Russia,  with  reference  to  opera- 
tions carried  on  from  east  to  west,  and  vice  versa. 

Finally,  rivers  can  float  steamboats  of  heavy  tonnage 
only  in  the  middle  or  lower  portions  of  their  course. 
Here  again  their  use  is  narrowed,  for  to  second  the 
movement  of  modern  masses,  powerful  means  of  trans- 
portation are  required. 

Recent  wars  demonstrate  the  truth  of  this  observa- 
tion. In  1866,  1870,  and  1878,  once  the  operations  had 
begun,  we  saw  that  armies  made  but  little  use  of  river 
communications.  And  yet,  only  a  century  ago,  the  Elbe 
was  regarded  by  Frederick  the  Great  as  a  principal  line 
of  communication  for  a  Prussian  army  operating  in  Bo- 
hemia. 

It  was  only  in  the  beginning  of  the  last  campaigns  that 
the  Rhine  and  the  Danube  were  used  by  the  Germans 
and  Russians,  for  transportation  of  supplies,  and  then 
only  in  those  parts  where  navigation  was  easy. 

In  1870,  during  the  concentration  of  troops,  the  staff 
of    the  11.    Prussian  army  organized    a   flotilla   of  ten 

*  General  Pierron. 


I'] 6  PART   FIRST, — STRATEGY. 

steamboats  and  numerous  tow-barges,  which  were  to 
serve  as  movable  magazines  upon  the  part  of  the  Rhine 
between  Worms  and  Bingen,  The  provisions  carried 
were  purchased  in  Holland,  on  the  lower  Rhine,  and  in 
the  countries  where  the  concentration  took  place. 

But  when  the  Prussian  armies  penetrated  our  territory, 
the  freight  of  these  boats  was  deposited  in  the  maga- 
zines of  Bingen  and  Worms.* 

Upon  the  whole,  sea  transports  are  the  best  fitted  to 
actively  second  the  movements  of  armies.  But  for  this, 
special  conditions  are  necessary,  which  no  longer  pertain 
to  the  study  of  a  theatre  of  operations;  and  notwith- 
standing the  examples  given  by  France  at  the  outbreak 
of  the  Crimean  War,  by  the  United  States  during  the 
War  of  Secession,  and  by  Turkey  in  1878,  this  method 
will  for  a  long  time  yet  be  only  exceptionally  available 
for  the  transportation  of  the  large  masses  composing 
modern  armies. 

II.— Natural  Obstacles. 

I.   WATER-COURSES. 

The  natural  obstacles  which  have  the  greatest  influ- 
ence upon  operations  are  water-courses  and  mountain 
ranges. 

The  direction  of  water-courses  determines  their  influ- 
ence. 

Parallel  to  the  march  of  armies,  they  are,  as  we  have 
just  seen,  a  means  of  communication  and  transportation. 

But  their  military  role  does  not  end  here,  and,  unfor- 
tunately, the  war  of  1870  has  shown  us  that  this  role 
has    not   always   been  understood.     It  will  then  be  of 
benefit  to  examine  this  subject. 

Certain  streams  become  natural  lines  for  the  invasion 

*Von  der  Goltz. 


SECOND   CHAPTER. — PREPARATION    FOR   WAR.        1 77 

of  the  countries  through  which  they  flow.  Such  are 
the  Danube,  for  Austria;  the  Po,  for  Italy;  the  Elbe,  for 
Prussia;  the  Oise,  the  Marne,  and  the  Seine,  for  France. 

In  this  case,  they  generally  serve  the  offensive  as  a 
point  of  support  for  a  wing.  The  Danube  was  thus  util- 
ized in  1805  and  1809. 

But  it  is  especially  as  a  base  of  manoeuvres  that  water- 
courses have  a  decisive  influence  upon  the  operations. 

In  1809,  the  Archduke  Charles,  beaten  at  Eckmiihl, 
crossed  the  Danube  at  Ratisbon,  made  a  demonstration 
of  recrossing  it  towards  Krems,  and,  covering  himself 
by  this  formidable  obstacle,  proceeded  to  take  position 
in  front  of  Vienna. 

In  1813,  Napoleon  transformed  Dresden  into  a  double 
bridge-head,  and,  profiting  by  the  advantage  which  this 
central  position  gave  him,  successively  assailed  each  of 
his  enemies. 

In  1870,  the  Moselle  at  Metz,  could  have  been  made 
to  play  a  part  similar  to  that  of  the  Elbe  at  Dresden. 

When  a  water-course  is  perpendicular  to  an  army's 
line  of  march,  it  becomes  an  obstacle  for  the  assailant 
and  an  aid  for  the  defender. 

It  is,  then,  its  defensive  role  which  gives  it  its  import- 
ance. A  wide,  deep  stream,  with  rapid  current,  de- 
fended by  fortified  places,  constitutes  a  formidable  obsta- 
cle to  offensive  operations,  and  often  enables  the  oppos- 
ino;  force  to  make  a  successful  resistance. 

It  was  thus  that  in  1796  the  Adige,  from  Eegnago  to 
Rivoli,  served  as  a  line  of  defense  to  cover  Italy  against 
attacks  coming  from  Friuli. 

In  1877,  the  Danube  might  well  have  served  the 
Turks  for  a  first  line  of  defense;  but  their  apathy  per- 
mitted the  Russians  to  pass  it  without  difficulty. 

In  1870,  the  Moselle  might  have  been  thus  used  by 
the  French  army  to  cover  the  country  against  the  inva- 
sion of  the  Germans. 
12 


178  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY, 

For  this,  it  would  have  been  necessary  to  blow  up  all 
the  bridges  above  and  below  the  defensive  position,  while 
preserving  upon  the  front  only  those  protected  by  forti- 
fications; to  concentrate  the  army  upon  the  left  bank; 
and  to  actively  guard  by  cavalry,  all  points  of  passage. 

Marshal  von  Moltke  took  this  hypothesis  into  consid- 
eration, and  for  a  time  supposed  it  was  our  intention  to 
defend  the  Moselle  from  Metz  to  Thionville.  But  we 
did  nothing  of  the  sort,  and  the  heads  of  columns  of  the 
X.  Prussian  Corps  were  able  to  occupy  the  bridges  of 
Pont-a-Mousson  without  firing  a  shot. 

The  importance  of  rivers  as  defensive  lines,   obliges 
armies,  in  their  offensive  marches,  to  seize  all  bridges  by 
cavalry,  as  soon  as  possible,  and  to  bring  their  heads  of 
columns  upon  the  banks  simultaneously.     Rivers  mark, 
thus,  a  succession  of  strategic  fronts  and  stations. 

From  a  .tactical  point  of  view,  the  defensive  value  of 
water-courses  perpendicular  to  the  line  of  march  is  still 
greater.  Their  crossings  are  defiles  difficult  to  pass  and 
easy  to  defend.  Moreover,  their  banks  frequently  offer 
shelter  and  commanding  positions,  which  the  defense 
has  often  turned  to  account  in  wresting  the  advantage 
from  the  assailant.  The  battle  of  Traktir,  in  the 
Crimea,  is  an  example  of  this. 

Such  water-courses  are,  in  certain  cases,  obstacles  of 
an  almost  insuperable  nature.  Thus,  the  passage  of 
a  river  under  the  fire  of  a  determined  adversary,  is  one 
of  the  most  difficult  operations  of  war.  Here  but  little 
can  be  done  successfully  except  by  surprise — through 
demonstrations  which  deceive  the  enemy  as  to  the  real 
point  of  passage;  or  by  an  open  attack  with  a  prepon- 
derating force,  an  operation  always  attended  by  bloody 
contests. 

The  successful  passage  of  such  courses  by  surprise  has 
always  been  accomplished  in  the  same  way:  the  assail- 
ant makes  a  demonstration  upon  one  point  and  crosses 
iu  force  at  another. 


SECOND   CHAPTER. — PREPARATION    FOR   WAR.     1 79 

In  1796  the  Army  of  Sambre-et-Mense,  under  orders 
of  Jourdan,  intending  to  effect  a  crossing  of  the  Rhine 
by  surprise,  first  made  a  feint  at  Neuwied.  It  then 
moved  25  leagues  to  Dusseldorf,  where  were  found  a 
favorable  re-entrant  and  an  island.  Here,  under  the 
powerful  protection  of  80  pieces  of  artillery,  it  made  a 
successful  passage  of  this  broad  river. 

In  1859  the  French  Army  concentrated  upon  the  right 
bank  of  the  Po,  in  the  vicinity  of  Alessandria,  while  the 
•Austrians  counted  upon  using  the  Ticino  as  a  first  line 
of  defense.     {See  Plate  II.) 

Our  troops  were  to  attempt  a  crossing  by  surprise. 

Our  right,  under  orders  of  Marshal  Baraguay  d'  Hil- 
liers,  made,  on  27th  May,  a  reconnaissance  toward 
Piacenza  by  way  of  Voghera.  The  Austrian  general- 
in-chief,  believing  that  the  passage  was  to  be  attempted 
in  this  vicinit}^,  concentrated  his  left  here  and  evacuated 
Vercelli. 

This  city  was  at  once  occupied  by  the  Piedmontese, 
Then  the  bulk  of  our  forces,  crossing  the  Po  at  Casale, 
moved  upon  Novara  and  Buflfalora, 

To  carry  out  our  plans  for  the  passage  of  the  Ticino, 
General  Espinasse,  on  the  2d  June,  moved  his  division 
along  the  road  leading  from  Novara  to  Milan,  by  way  of 
Trecate.  He  reached  the  bridge  of  San  Martino,  before 
Bufifalora,  and  made  a  show  of  crossing  there.  The 
Austrians  charged  with  the  guardianship  of  the  bridge, 
blew  it  up  and  retired. 

In  the  meantime  Camou's  division,  the  light  troops 
of  the  Guard,  marched  up  the  river  upon  Turbigo.  The 
scouts  thrown  upon  the  left  bank  at  once  scoured  the 
neighborhood.  Under  their  protection,  the  pontoniers 
threw  three  bridges,  enabling  one  brigade  to  cross  dur- 
ing the  night,  and  occupy  the  ground  beyond. 

The  next  day,  the  3d  June,  the  2d  Corps  (MacMahon) 
crossed  the  Ticino  without  difficulty,  and  moved  upon 
BufFalora. 


l8o  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Thanks  to  this  movement,  the  remainder  of  the  army 
crossed  the  Ticino  opposite  this  last  place  on  4th  June. 

The  passage  of  the  Moselle  by  the  11.  Prussian  Army 
in  1870,  may.  also  be  considered  as  executed  by  surprise. 
The  details  of  this  movement  have  not  perhaps  been 
sufficiently  noticed. 

On  the  i2th  August,  1870,  the  Prussians,  seeing  us  in 
position  upon  the  French  Nied,  believed  that  we  were 
intending  to  bring  on  a  decisive  action  here,  and  they 
had  not  yet  thought  of  securing  the  passages  of  the 
Moselle,  although  that  river  was  hardly  20  kilometres 
distant. 

But  on  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day,  their  advance 
squadrons  reported  the  country  clear  up  to  that  river. 
At  the  same  time,  the  I.  Army  reported  that  our  forces 
were  abandoning  the  Nied.  Von  Moltke  concluded 
from  this  that  we  were  retiring  beyond  the  Moselle. 

He  then  ordered  his  cavalry  to  cross  this  stream ;  the 
II.  Army  to  take  possession,  as  soon  as  possible,  of  the 
bridges  of  Pont-a-Mousson,  Dieulouard,  and  Marbach; 
and  the  I.  to  hold  us  north  of  Metz. 

This  movement  of  the  I.  Army  was  a  veritable  demon- 
stration to  the  north  of  this  place,  at  the  same  time  that 
the  main  forces  were  to  seize  the  passages  of  the  Moselle 
to  the  south  and  cross  unopposed. 

This  operation  indeed  was  actually  carried  out,  favored 
by  our  carelessness.  Such  a  contingency  as  the  neces- 
sity for  defending  the  Moselle  not  having  been  foreseen, 
no  one  thought  of  it  at  the  decisive  moment,  and  even 
the  bridges  were  not  destroyed. 

If  the  study  of  the  topography  of  the  frontier  had  been 
made  before  the  war  with  a  view  to  the  defensive,  we 
would,  no  doubt,  have  recognized  a  fact  plain  to  the 
Germans,  that  the  Moselle,  between  Metz  and  Thion- 
ville,  a  distance  of  26  kilometres,  with  these  two  places 
as  points  of  support,  furnished  a  strong  defensive  line. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.       l8l 

We  would  then  have  blown  up  the  bridges  from  Lun6- 
ville  to  Metz. 

This  line,  was,  however,  exposed  to  a  turning  move- 
ment from  the  south;  hence  that  part  of  the  river  be- 
tween Metz  and  Dieulouard,  with  the  Ache  to  cover  the 
right  flank,  would,  perhaps,  have  appeared  preferable. 

In  this  case,  it  would  have  been  essential  to  determine 
in  advance  the  defensive  works  necessary  to  be  organized, 
on  the  one  hand,  between  Metz  and  Thionville,  and  on 
the  other,  between  Metz  and  Dieulouard. 

The  most  instructive  modern  example  of  the  passage 
of  a  river  by  surprise,  is  the  crossing  of  the  Danube  by 
the  Russians  in  1877.     {See  Plate  III.) 

At  the  end  of  June,  the  concentration  of  their  army 
was  finisheci.  The  time  to  place  it  upon  the  right  bank 
had  arrived.  The  operation  was  difficult.  The  Turkish 
army  defended  the  line  of  the  river,  and  appeared  to 
keep  active  watch  at  all  points.  Moreover,  the  strength 
of  the  current,  and  the  width  and  depth  of  the  stream, 
added  to  the  dangers  of  the  enterprise. 

The  Russian  staff  caused  two  demonstrations  to  be 
made.  The  first  took  place  at  Braila,  facing  Dobrudja, 
on  the  22d  of  June.  This  was,  however,  more  than  a 
mere  offensive  manoeuvre.  One  of  the  great  political 
objects  which  Russia  had  in  view  at  this  time,  was  to 
assure  possession  of  the  mouths  of  the  Danube  by  seiz- 
ing Dobrudja,  a  province  which  she  claimed  as  Slavonic 
territory. 

A  bridge  had  already  been  thrown  across  the  Danube 
before  Braila,  and  the  fleet  was  collected  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Sereth.  The  Turks  opposed  no  obstacle  to  these 
movements ;  they  had,  moreover,  few  troops  in  this 
vicinity. 

During  the  night  of  the  21st,  ten  companies  of  Russian 
infantry  in  boats  were  thrown  upon  the  right  bank,  and 
drove  back  the  detachments  of  the  enemy.     Reinforce- 


1 82  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

nients  followed.  The  passage  was  effected,  and  soon  the 
whole  of  Dobrudja  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  assailants. 

The  second  demonstration  took  place  at  Flamunda, 
below  Nicopolis.  The  bnlk  of  the  Rnssian  forces  was 
apparently  assembled  here,  together  with  the  bridge 
eqnipages,  the  staffs,  and  the  principal  impedimenta.  At 
the  same  time  an  army  corps  with  a  few  boats  was  sent 
to  Zimnitza.  These  preparations  seemed  to  indicate  a 
demonstration  at  the  latter  place,  and  a  strong  attempt 
to  pass  at  Flamunda. 

While  these  movements  were  in  progress,  the  Russian 
artillery,  on  the  24th  and  25th  of  June,  opened  a  sharp 
fire  against  the  defenses  of  Nicopolis  and  Rustchuk,  to 
give  the  impression  that  an  attempt  to  cross  was  about 
to  be  made  near  these  two  places. 

At  the  same  time,  the  general-in-chief  himself  pushed 
forward  a  reconnaissance  upon  the  approaches  to  Zim- 
nitza, and  confided  his  plan  of  passage  to  the  corps  com- 
mander, who  was  to  be  entrusted  with  its  execution. 

At  this  point,  the  Danube  was  800  metres  wide;  its 
waters  were  rapid  and  deep;  and,  finally,  the  Turkish 
bank  commanded  that  of  the  opposite  side.  All  circum- 
stances seemed  unfavorable.  Nevertheless,  on  the  after- 
noon of  June  26,  the  commander  of  the  corps  in  position 
at  Zimnitza  concentrated  his  forces,  and  at  two  o'clock  on 
the  following  morning,  the  first  convoy  of  pontons  was 
launched.  It  bore  a  regiment  of  infantry,  60  Cossacks, 
and  the  officer  directing  the  operation.  ■  After  a  passage 
occupying  three-quarters  of  an  hour,  executed  without 
accident,  these  troops  landed,  receiving  only  a  few  shots 
from  the  enemy's  outposts  stationed  upon  the  bank. 

But  the  latter  retiring,  gave  the  alarm.  The  Turkish 
forces  at  Sistova  and  the  vicinity  assembled  in  haste 
and  immediately  opened  a  violent  infantry  and  artillery 
fire  upon  the  succeeding  pontons.  Nevertheless,  the 
passage    continued;    five    boats,   struck  by  shells,   were 


SECOND  CHAPTER, — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.       1 83 

sunk,  with  the  passengers  and  material  carried.  Two 
field-guns  were  thus  lost. 

General  Dragomiroff,  commanding  the  division, 
crossed  with  the  third  detachment,  and  assumed  direc- 
tion of  affairs. 

He  immediately  attacked  Sistova  and  the  heights  to 
the  south.  The  struggle  was  obstinate  from  3  o'clock 
in  the  morning  till  2  in  the  afternoon,  and  was  supported 
by  the  fire  of  artillery,  which  lined  both  banks.  Finally, 
on  the  afternoon  of  the  27th,  the  Turkish  fire  abated 
and  the  combat  ceased. 

The  passage  had  been  successful.  It  cost  the  Rus- 
sians 200  killed  and  568  wounded,  or  768  men  hors  de 
combat.  The  crossing  continued  uninterruptedly  during 
the  succeeding  days,  terminating  on  the  29th. 

Here  the  passage  by  surprise  was  quickly  transformed 
into  a  passage  by  force.  But,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
success  of  the  operation  was  assured  from  the  very  be- 
ginning of  the  struggle. 

The  passage  of  rivers  by  force,  of  which  past  wars 
offer  us  examples,  has  become  an  operation  of  very  ques- 
tionable utility  for  armies  of  the  present  day. 

The  power  and  precision  of  modern  arms  is  such  as 
not  to  admit  the  supposition  that  in  the  future  the  open 
passage  of  a  river,  under  the  eyes  of  a  resolute  and  war- 
like enemy,  can  be  attempted  before  his  resistance  has 
been  at  least  partially  overcome,  and  the  cohesion  of  his 
troops  has  been  shattered. 

As  a  result  of  these  considerations,  we  see  that  the  in- 
fluence of  water-courses  upon  the  conduct  of  an  army's 
operations  may  be  of  great  importance. 

In  certain  cases,  these  offer  excellent  points  of  sup- 
port to  cover  the  flank  of  an  army.  And,  finally,  the 
possession  of  a  river  and  its  crossings  permits  special 
manoeuvres  which  have  often  led  to  the  happiest  results. 
Ordinarily,  such  possession   favors  turning  movements, 


184  PART   FIRST.  — STRATEGY. 

which  aim  at  menacing-  the  enemy's  line  of  communica- 
tions. The  passage  of  a  river  upon  the  adversary's  flank 
or  rear  is  always  followed  by  serious  consequences. 

It  was  the  passage  of  the  Moselle  above  Metz  in  1870 
by  the  Prussian  armies,  which  led  to  the  battles  of  Au- 
gust i6th  and  i8th,  and  which  forced  our  troops  to  fight 
separated  from  their  base  of  operations.  The  driving  of 
these  forces  into  the  intrenched  camp  of  Metz,  the  in- 
vestment, and,  later,  the  fall  of  this  place,  were  the  con- 
sequences of  it. 

As  a  rule,  a  theatre  of  operations  cut  up  by  large 
water-courses  offers  serious  obstacles  to  an  army,  and  re- 
quires a  minute  reconnaissance  in  advance. 

The  theories  held  by  the  Germans  tend  to  confirm 
these  views. 

For  them,  "water-courses  are  essentially  obstacles  to 
the  movement  of  armies.  They  can  be  crossed  only  by 
artificial  means,  and  their  passage  is  always  attended  by 
loss  of  time. 

"The  defender  can  easily  destroy  the  bridges  after 
having  used  them.  If  for  one  reason  or  another  he  does 
not  wish  to  do  so,  the  fire  of  a  relatively  weak  force  is 
sufficient  to  prevent  the  assailant  from  making  use  of 
them.  The  latter  is  then  obliged  to  drive  away  this 
force,  either  by  fire  directed  from  the  opposite  bank, 
or  by  attacking  it  with  troops  that  have  crossed  at 
another  point. 

"There  are  two  means  of  accomplishing  this  cross- 
ing; viz.,  by  boats  and  service  bridges.  The  establish- 
ment of  such  bridges  cannot  be  effected  evervwhere. 
Their  preparation  alone  requires  a  certain  space  of 
time,  amounting,  in  the  case  of  large  rivers,  to  hours. 
In  such  a  situation,  the  fire  of  small  detachments  of  the 
enemy  posted  upon  the  opposite  bank  is  sufficient  to 
prevent  the  work. 

"With  boats,  even  under  favorable  conditions,  only 
comparatively  few  troops  can  be  crossed  in  several  hours. 


SECOND   CHAPTER. — PREPARATION    FOR   WAR.       185 

"  Bridges  form  defiles,  in  passing  which  an  army  con- 
sumes several  days.  During  this  time,  it  is  exposed  to 
attack,  and  remains  in  a  critical  situation.  If  it  seeks 
to  effect  a  crossing  at  several  points,  it  must  divide  its 
forces,  and  while  in  transit,  each  column  presents  to  a 
vigilant  enemy  a  favorable  opportunity  for  destroying 
it  while  separated  from  the  others. 

"Even  when  an  army  has  succeeded  in  crossing  a 
water-course,  it  finds  itself  upon  the  other  bank  in  a 
much  less  favorable  situation  than  its  adversary:  it  then 
has^  obstructions  upon  its  line  of  retreat,  and  in  the  com- 
bats which  follow,  is  generally  at  a  disadvantage. 

"Rivers  offer  then  great  advantages  as  lines  of  de- 
fense. 

"We  see  that  their  passage  within  the  radius  of  the 
enemy's  field  of  operations,  and  the  occupation  of  the 
opposite  bank,  will  fail  whenever  the  defender  succeeds 
in  destroying  the  first  detachments  before  the  arrival  of 
reinforcements. 

"In  reality,  however,  it  never  happens  that  the  de- 
fender can  long  prevent  the  successful  crossing  of  a  nu- 
merically superior  enemy.  *  *  *  It  may  then  be'  said 
that  the  defense  of  rivers  cutting  the  adversary's  line  of 
operations,  should  be  looked  upon  as  but  little  more 
than  an  expedient  for  gaining  time.      *     *     * 

"The  defender  ought  then  to  employ  only  the  number 
of  troops  necessary  to  observe  and  arrest  the  enemy. 

"With  this  in  view,  he  should  establish  the  bulk  of 
his  army  at  such  a  distance  from  the  river  as  to  permit 
the  utilization  of  his  entire  force  in  case  the  enemy  at- 
tempt the  passage.  Upon  the  stream  itself,  he  should 
place  only  observation  troops.  While  preventing  the 
enemy  from  seeing  what  takes  place  in  the  ranks  of  the 
defense,  these  will  at  the  same  time  serve  to  increase  the 
feeling  of  danger  which  the  passage  of  a  river  always 
inspires. 


1 86  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 


(( 


'An  army  which  undertakes  a  crossing  in  presence 
of  the  enemy,  should  know,  beyond  all  question,  that  it 
possesses  an  incontestable  superiority. 

"A  river  whose  course  is  parallel  to  the  general  direc- 
tion of  march,  makes  it  difficult  to  re-unite  the  troops 
operating  upon  its  two  banks.  The  commander  who, 
to  escape  the  danger  of  this  situation,  holds  to  a  single 
bank,  is  in  certain  cases,  contrary  to  his  desires,  obliged 
to  concentrate  his  forces,  and  to  abandon  the  other  bank 
to  his  adversary. 

"In  general,  the  possibility  of  passing  from  one  bank 
to  the  other,  without  seriously  modifying  the  direction 
of  the  line  of  communications,  augments  the  number  of 
possible  strategic  combinations,  to  the  detriment  of  that 
adversary  who  is  forced  to  regulate  his  movements  by 
those  of  the  other."  * 

The  opinion  of  Napoleon  upon  the  importance  of 
rivers,  viewed  with  reference  to  operations,  is  of  especial 
interest. 

"A  river,"  he  wrote  in  1808,  "be  it  as  wide  as  the 
Vistula,  and  as  rapid  as  the  Danube  at  its  mouth,  is 
nothing,  unless  there  are  means  of  crossing  to  the  other 
bank,  and  a  head  quick  to  seize  the  offensive."  f 

"A  line  such  as  the  Rhine,  or  even  the  Vistula,  can 
be  held  only  by  occupying  the  bridges,  which  will  give 
opportunities  for  taking  the  offensive.  "J 

"A  river  has  never  been  considered  as  an  obstacle 
which  could  cause  more  than  a  few  days'  delay  ;  and  its 
passage  can  be  defended  only  by  placing  troops  in  force 
at  the  bridge-heads  upon  the  farther  bank,  ready  to  take 
the  offensive  as  soon  as  the  enemy  commences  his  cross- 
ing. ' '  § 

*  Colonel  Blume,  Strategy. 

fNote  upon  the  situation  in  Spain,  August  20,  1808. 
J  Note  upon  Spauish  affairs,  September  30,  1808. 
?  Letter  to  Prince  Eugene,  March  15,  1813. 


SECOND   CHAPTER. — PREPARATION    FOR   WAR.        187 


II.    MOUNTAIN   RANGES. 


Mountain  ranges  alwa}'s  inconveniently  cut  up  the 
theatre  of  operations.  To  be  free  to  pass  from  one  side 
to  the  other,  an  army  must  hold  the  summits  command- 
ing the  heads  of  valleys,  and  the  defiles. 

Strategically,  mountain  chains,  like  rivers,  have  two 
principal  directions. 

Perpendicular  to  the  lines  of  invasion,  they  favor  the 
defense;  if  the  passes  are  few  and  stoutly  defended,  the 
offensive  is  subjected  to  considerable  delays.  Masters  of 
the  defiles,  the  defensive  can  menace  the  communica- 
tions of  the  assailant,  and  by  an  obstinate  struggle  some- 
times compromise  his  position. 

These  advantages  pass  to  the  offensive  when  it,  in 
turn,  controls  the  range  and  passes;  but  going  beyond, 
it  is  inconvenienced  by  the  presence  of  these  defiles  upon 
its  line  of  retreat. 

Parallel  to  the  lines  of  invasion,  mountains  permit 
the  defense  to  debouch  upon  the  enemy's  rear  by  the 
defiles  in  its  possession.  It  follows  from  this,  that  an 
a.ssailing  army  can  utilize  a  chain  parallel  to  its  line  of 
march  only  when  in  possession  of  both  slopes.  From 
every  point  of  view,  therefore,  a  mountain  chain  is  an 
obstacle  for  the  offensive  in  strategy  as  in  tactics,  and 
an  advantage  for  the  defensive. 

This  will  be  made  clear  by  facts  to  be  considered  fur- 
ther on. 

In  general  (according  to  Blume),  "mountains  diminish 
the  facilities  for  traffic.  Consequently  they  are  sparsely 
inhabited,  and  offer  few  resources  for  the  maintenance 
of  armies.  In  the  higher  regions,  they  are  not  even 
practicable  during  several  months  of  the  year. 

"In  mountainous  countries,  communications  are  few 
and  inconvenient.  Consequently,  the  movements  of 
troops  are  here  more  fatiguing,  slower,  and  less  regular 


1 88  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

than  on  the  plains.  The  length  of  the  columns  and  the 
duration  of  the  marches  are  always  increased,  and  more 
difficult  to  calculate. 

"Except  along  the  frequented  roads,  only  small  de- 
tachments of  troops  can  be  moved.  Hence  the  junction 
of  columns  moving  on  opposite  sides  of  a  range  is  un- 
certain and  difficult. 

"Among  mountains,  the  sphere  of  reconnaissances  is 
limited;  little  or  no  cavalry  can  be  used,  and  conse- 
quently it  is  difficult  to  observe  the  enemy. 

"-Mountains,  in  general,  offer  to  weak  detachments 
the  advantage  of  strong  defensive  positions,  which  gen- 
erally can  not  be  attacked  upon  the  flanks  nor  turned, 
without  great  loss  of  time. 

"Finally,  in  a  mountainous  section,  the  belligerents 
can  bring  only  a  limited  number  of  effectives  into  action. 
It  does  not,  then,  in  wars  of  great  magnitude,  offer  a 
favorable  field  for  decisive  operations. "  * 

Hilly  Regions. — All  this  is  not  entirely  true  of  regions 
that  are  simply  hilly.  We  may  even  go  so  far  as  to  ob- 
serve that  the  difficulties  which  these  formerly  presented 
to  the  movements  of  armies,  have,  in  our  time,  very 
much  diminished.  The  means  of  communication  have 
multiplied;  cultivation  has  become  more  extended;  and 
the  forests  have  been  thinned  out  or  entirely  destroyed. 
As  a  result,  these  regions  are  more  accessible,  and  their 
defiles  less  favorable  for  defense. 

This  is  apparent  in  France  in  the  hill  sections  of  Ar- 
dennes and  Argonne. 

The  other  important  natural  obstacles  which  theatres 
of  operations  possess,  are  woods,  forests,  lakes,  ponds, 
deserts,  and  sea-coasts.  It  would  be  too  long  a  task  to 
set  forth  the  importance  of  each  of  these  from  a  military 
standpoint.     Moreover,  it  will  always  be  easy  in  a  re- 

*  Blume.     Strategy. 


SECOND   CHAPTER. — PREPARATION    FOR   WAR.       189 

coiinaissaiice,  to  discern  the  natural  peculiarities  of  a 
theatre  of  war  which  connect  themselves  with  the  plans 
of  the  commander-in-chief,  and  to  find  ont  the  advan- 
tages or  inconveniences  which  they  offer  in  conducting 
operations. 

Woody  Regions. — It  ma}',  however,  be  useful  to  consider 
the  part  played  by  woody  regions  in  warfare.  In  gen- 
eral, they  strengthen  lines  of  defense  or  cover  the  con- 
centration of  troops. 

Thus  in  1792,  the  forest  of  Argonne  increased  the 
value  of  the  defensive  line  held  by  Dumouriez.  It  ex- 
tended parallel  to  the  Meuse,  from  Sedan  to  Passavant, 
and  consequently  cut  the  enemy's  line  of  operations. 
An  army  could  then  traverse  it  only  by  five  passages, 
all  of  them  constituting  dangerous  defiles — the  Chene- 
Populeux,  the  Croix-au-Bois,  the  Grand-Pre,  the  Cha- 
lade,  and  the  Islettes. 

It  was  the  same  in  1870.  These  defiles  had  still,  no 
doubt,  a  certain  defensive  strength  for  troops  energeti. 
cally  commanded.  But  at  this  period,  the  mass  of  the 
enemy's  armies  already  outflanked  the  forest  of  Argonne 
to  the  south,  when  the  Army  of  Chalons  arrived  there, 
marching  toward  the  north-east.  The  latter  was  partly 
disoroanized,  and  instead  of  beintj:  ordered  to  defend 
these  passes,  it  had  no  instructions  except  to  gain  the 
Meuse  as  rapidly  as  possible,  then  the  Moselle,  and 
finally  Metz. 

In  the  same  year,  the  forests  covering  the  right  bank 
of  the  Sarre  favored  the  concentration  of  the  I.  and  II. 
German  Airmies.  The  reconnaissances  made  by  our 
cavalry  were  then  very  limited,  and  lacked  the  boldness 
properly  belonging  to  this  arm;  so  that  the  woods  could 
be  used  by  the  enemy  as  a  screen,  permitting  him  to 
advance  undiscovered  by  us,  even  up  to  the  approaches 
to  our  territory. 


190  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Likewise,  in  November,  the  forest  of  Marchenoir 
served  to  veil  the  concentration  of  the  Army  of  the 
Loire.  It  cannot  then  be  doubted  that  strategy  should 
at  times  take  forests  into  account  in  its  combinations. 

From  a  tactical  point  of  view,  woods  have  the  advan- 
tage of  effectually  protecting  infantry  against  the  en- 
emy's projectiles.  Therefore,  in  a  period  when,  more 
than  ever,  the  combatants  are  interested  in  securing 
cover  and  in  concealing  their  movements,  woods  will 
undoubtedly  be  utilized  to  their  fullest  extent  whenever 
possible.  This  fact  was  made  clear  in  1866  and  1870. 
Nevertheless,  woods  are  an  obstacle  to  the  effective  em- 
ployment of  artillery  and  cavalry.  To  infantry,  how- 
ever, they  afford  shelter  favorable  either  for  holding  a 
position  or  for  marking  a  first  advance  and  giving  op- 
portunity to  prepare  a  second.  But  they  interfere  with 
unity  of  action,  and  do  not  readily  permit  a  decisive 
effort. 

It  is  not  less  true  that,  occupied  in  force,  they  often 
present  points  of  support  difiScult  to  carry.  From  every 
standpoint,  then,  the  consideration  of  the  offensive  and 
defensive  qualities  of  woods  ought  in  no  case  to  be 
omitted  in  the  preliminary  reconnaissances  of  theatres 
of  war. 

Among  the  natural  accidents  presented  in  a  field  of 
operations,  miliiary  posiiions  csXl  for  special  attention. 

Military  Positions. — All  regions  in  which  armies  may 
be  called  upon  to  operate,  offer  more  or  less  advantageous 
military  positions.  The  offensive  need  concern  itself 
but  little  with  these,  except  when  it  foresees  a  battle  in 
a  particular  region.  It  is  then  necessary  to  know  the 
means  of  reaching  and  seizing  such  positions.  But,  in 
general,  this  will  be  an  indispensable  preliminary  study 
for  the  defensive.  In  this  case,  it  will  be  essential  to 
estimate,  exactly,  the  forces  necessary  for  an  energetic 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.       191 

defense;  and  if  the  position  is  too  extended  to  be  prop- 
erly occupied  by  the  forces  in  hand,  it  will  often  be 
necessary  to  relinquish  it. 

In  1870,  the  position  of  Froeschwiller  [Woertli], 
though  studied  in  advance,  was  occupied  by  the  troops 
of  Marshal  MacMahon  under  disadvantageous  circum- 
stances. Its  defense  against  so  superior  an  enemy  re- 
quired a  much  larger  effective.  The  result  was  that 
only  two  companies  of  infantry  were  available  to  defend 
our  right  at  Morsbronn^  and  the  XI.  Prussian  Corps 
succeeded  at  this  point  in  outflanking  our  position. 

In  a  study  of  a  theatre  of  operations,  we  shall  hence- 
forth, more  than  in  the  past,  be  led  to  examine  and 
select  defensive  positions.  These  studies  are  especially 
important  for  armies  that  can  not  hope  to  take  the 
initiative  at  the  outset. 

It  was  this  thought  which,  in  1868,  led  General  Fros- 
sard  to  choose  the  two  positions  of  Froeschwiller  and 
Cadenbronn  in  Alsace  and  lyorraine. 

It  was  in  the  same  connection  that,  before  the  war  of 
1870,  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  3d  Corps  at  Nancy, 
selected  a  military  position  upon  the  left  bank  of  the 
Moselle.  The  forest  of  Haye,  west  of  this  city,  covered 
in  all  directions  by  the  Meurthe  and  the  Moselle,  situated 
upon  a  plateau  which  commanded  their  valleys  and  the 
approaches,  appeared  to  him  to  unite  all  conditions  de- 
sirable for  sustaining  an  obstinate  conflict  with  superior 
numbers.  But  events  did  not  permit  our  occupation  of 
this  position. 

In  a  new  war  with  Germany,  a  good  selection  of  de- 
fensive positions  would  be  of  decisive  importance  to  the 
French  army,  should  its  adversary's  concentration  be 
completed  first.  Should  the  contrary  be  the  case,  how- 
ever, such  study  would  be  of  little  use,  for  then  the  offen- 
sive alone  would  be  suited  to  the  situation. 

In  the  Turco-Russian  war  we  witnessed  the  great  ce- 


192  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

lebrity  gained  by  Plevna  through  the  obstinacy  of  its 
defense.  It  had  not,  however,  been  recognized  in  ad- 
vance, and  did  not  possess  peculiar  qualities  as  a  strong 
position.  Hence  the  combats  of  which  it  was  the  theatre 
show  especially  the  use  which  determined  troops,  ener- 
getically commanded,  can  make  of  chance  positions. 
Now  if  it  is  possible,  with  modern  arms,  to  give  to  a  few 
inflections  of  the  soil,  taken  at  random,  a  defensive  value 
considerable  enough  to  arrest, a  victorious  army,  what 
may  be  looked  for  when  a  position  is  fixed  upon  in  time 
of  peace  and  defensively  organized  ? 

This  topic  then  offers  ample  material  for  grand-tac- 
tical studies.  It  will  be  proper  to  refer  to  it  again  when 
the  regular  development  of  the  subject  conducts  us  to  it. 

Whatever  may  be  the  obstacles  encountered  upon  the 
theatre  of  war,  it  is  important  to  recognize  this  truth: 
they  more  especially  interest  tactics,  and  seldom  influ- 
ence the  combinations  of  the  general-in-chief. 

In  1805,  1806,  and  1809,  as  in  all  his  campaigns, 
Napoleon,  in  preparing  his  marches,  had  in  view  only 
the  enemy's  principal  mass,  the  point  of  attack,  and  the 
means  of  obtaining  decisive  results.  When  he  came  to 
the  execution  of  his  projects,  he  took  into  consideration 
the  facilities  and  impediments  which  the  character  of 
the  ground  presented;  he  gave  these  matters  attention 
in  his  concentrations,  in  the  direction  given  his  col- 
umns, in  the  choice  of  a  field  of  battle,  and  on  the  eve 
of  eno^aoements,  but  this  was  all.  The  end  to  be  at- 
tained,  the  total  destruction  of  the  enemy,  remained 
none  the  less  his  dominating  thous:ht. 

The  study  of  a  theatre  of  operations  should  then  be 
made  especially  from  a  tactical  point  of  view. 

Strategy  remains  independent  of  the  character  of  the 
ground,  which  has  for  it  only  a  relative  importance. 
This  view  is  also  that  of  the  German  staff.* 

*Blume,  Strategy. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION   FOR  WAR.       193 


III.— Artificial  Obstacles. 

The  principal  obstacles  created  by  the  hand  of  man 
upon  the  theatres  of  war,  are  cities  and  fortifications. 
Their  influence  upon  the  operations  requires  no  demon- 
stration. 

Cities. — Populous  and  industrial  cities  are'  always,  so 
far  as  the  support  of  large  armies  is  concerned,  centres 
of  resources.  Their  possession  furnishes  necessary  sup- 
ply stations,  and  depots  for  troops;  and  they  are  conveni- 
ent links  in  the  communications,  serving  to  assure  free- 
dom of  transportation.  They  therefore  give  evident 
and  positive  advantages  to  the  belligerent  controlling 
them. 

In  these  various  aspects,  large  cities  become  strat- 
egic points  with  which  it  is  essential  to  be  acquainted  in 
advance.  They  are  always  liable  to  become  objectives 
during  the  course  of  a  war :  it  '  is  essential  then  to 
consider  them  in  this  connection  before  the  opening  of 
hostilities. 

In  a  conflict  between  Germany  and  France,  Nancy, 
Rheims,  Paris,  and  Orleans  would  be  points  of  the  ut- 
most importance  for  our  adversaries,  who  would  then 
derive  incalculable  benefit  from  a  previous  study  of 
these  places  during  peace. 

The  large  cities  of  the  Rhine,  the  junction  points  of 
the  great  railroads  leading  from  this  river  toward  the 
Elbe,  would  have  a  like  interest  for  us. 


Fortifications. — These  considerations  apply  with  much 
greater  force  to  fortified  towns  and  positions. 

In  recent  years,  the  defensive  systems  of  the  different 
states  have  been  transformed  in  consequence  of  the  im- 
provements in  artillery.     Intrenched  camps  have  super- 

13 


194  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

seded  the  former  places  with  bastioiied  enceintes^  lunettes, 
and  citadels.  Upon  the  presumed  lines  of  invasion, 
forts  d^  ari'H  have  taken  the  places  of  batteries  and  small 
forts. 

To  a  special  degree,  countries  like  France,  which  are 
exposed  to  sudden  aggressions  or  menaced  by  perpetual 
enmities,  have  been  obliged  to  cover  themselves  by  for- 
tified works  and  intrenched  camps. 

Armies  can  no  longer  invade  a  country  without  tak- 
ing into  account  these  powerful  obstacles,  which  com- 
mand the  lines  of  communication,  and  whose  sphere  of 
action  extends  over  a  vast  area.  If  the  German  armies 
were  to  enter  our  territory  again,  they  would  be  com- 
pelled to  submit  to  this  law,  and  would  no  doubt  endeavor 
to  invest  the  intrenched  camps  of  Verdun,  Toul,  Belfort, 
Epinal,  and  Langres.  For  this,  masses  of  more  than 
100,000  men  would  be  required.  Our  enemy's  forces 
would  thus  be  divided,  and  determined  troops  who  had 
carefully  avoided  immuring  themselves  in  these  places, 
might  perhaps  seize  favorable  opportunities  for  taking 
the  offensive,  and  give  battle  under  advantageous  condi- 
tions. Yet  it  is  not  probable  that  these  places  could 
stay  the  invader.  He  would  still  have  forces  sufficient 
to  act  as  in  1870.  He  would  no  doubt  invest  our  fortresses 
by  troops  of  the  2d  line,  and  push  forward  those  of  the 
ist  line,  hoping  for  decisive  success  in  the  open  coun- 
try. Such  also  is  the  system  of  operations  which 
should  be  adopted  by  all  great  modern  armies.  Forti- 
fied places  should  be  masked,  while  the  main  operations 
are  pursued.  But  it  is  not  the  less  useful  to  carefully 
study  in  advance  these  artificial  defensive  positions, 
which  have  everywhere  undergone  a  signal  transforma- 
tion, rendered  necessary  by  recent  developments  in  the 
military  art.  The  character  of  the  new  fortifications 
erected  by  all  nations,  obliges  each  to  endeavor  in  time 
of  peace  to  become  acquainted  with  the  strength,  area 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        1 95 

controlled  by,  and  even  construction  of,    the  defensive 
works  of  its  neighbors. 

Defensive  Organization  of  Frontiers. — The  first  aim  of  the 
fortifications  of  a  country  is  to  prevent  access  of  the 
enemy  to  its  railroads  and  ordinary  roads;  the  second  to 
offer  to  armies  charged  with  the  defence,  points  of  sup- 
port that  may  be  utilized  for  offensive  as  well  as  defensive 
operations. 

First  of  all,  then,  it  is  essential  to  seek  control  of  the 
great  lines  of  invasion,  which  usually  correspond  to  the 
principal  railroads;  then  the.  railroads  entering  the 
national  territory  in  secondary,  and,  consequently,  less 
dangerous  directions;  the  ordinary  roads  in  hilly  sec- 
tions; the  defiles,  necks,  and  passes  situated  upon  the 
frontier,  which  might  enable  the  enemy  to  turn  cer- 
tain defensive  positions;  and,  finally,  in  the  interior  of 
the  country,  the  important  railroad  junctions,  the  defiles 
traversed  by  the  principal  railway  lines,  etc. 

Three  Kinds  of  Frontier  Places. — We  should  have,  then, 
three  kinds  of  frontier  works:  intrenched  ca^nps  or  fort- 
resses of  the  first  class,  upon  the  most  important  posi- 
tions; intermediate  defences,  sometimes  forming  small 
intrenched  camps,  in  secondary  positions;  forts  d'' arret ^ 
to  close  special  passages. 

Almost  all  nations  have  to-day  applied  this  system  to 
their  defensive  organization.  We  may  then  confidently 
expect  to  see  operations  at  the  outset  of  a  campaign  in- 
fluenced by  the  situation,  strength,  and  number  of  the 
fortified  places  covering  the  frontier  zones. 

In  this  regard,  we  have  a  peculiar  interest  in  knowing 
exactly  the  opinions  current  in  Germany  upon  the  sub- 
ject of  fortified  places  in  general,  and  especially  upon 
the  defensive  system  of  France  and  the  means  of  attack- 
ing or  masking  it. 


196  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

According  to  Prussian  theories,  fortified  places  should 
fulfil  certain  strategic  conditions.  They  should  pro- 
tect important  cities,  supply-depots,  or  depots  for  troops; 
should  defend  communicating  roads  or  important  passes; 
should  serve  as  points  of  support  for  either  defensive 
or  offensive  operations,  and  as  a  refuge  from  pursuit;  or 
finally,  should  assist  in  covering  an  army's  lines  of  re- 
treat. 

"Who  at  the  present  day  can  presume  to  disregard 
the  importance  of  a  system  of  fortifications  judiciously 
planned  for  the  country's  defence?  Well  employed,  it 
can  give  the  most  effective  and  varied  support  to  troops 
in  the  field. 

.  "If,  in  the  case  of  a  defensive  war,  we  could,  without 
a  notable  diminution  in  the  number  and  value  of  field 
forces,  or  in  the  energy  of  their  operations,  fortify  all 
the  cities  in  the  theatre  of  war,  exclude  the  enemy,  by 
our  works,  from  all  means  of  communication,  while  re- 
serving to  ourselves  the  possibility  of  using  them,  we 
should  attain  the  greatest  possible  security  against  at- 
tack. 

"  It  is  seen,  then,  that  fortresses  withdraw  immense 
numbers  from  service  in  the  field,  and  so  disperse 
them  throughout  the  territory  that  but  a  fraction  of  them 
can  take  part  in  active  operations.  This  portion,  it  is 
true,  will  often  render  more  effective  service  by  basing 
its  operations  upon  these  fortresses  than  by  joining  the 
ranks  of  the  active  field  force.  This  is  why  we  favor  a 
limited  number  of  judiciously  placed  fortresses.  But  it 
should  never  be  lost  from  view  that  great  and  decisive 
results  are  obtained  in  the  open  field  alone;  and  that 
while  each  of  the  established  fortifications  can  be  of  ser- 
vice only  in  the  cases  specified,  it  is  the  movable  troops 
that  secure  the  victory,  whatever  may  be  the  events,  or 
wherever  the  theatre  of  operations. ' '  * 

*  Blume.     Strategy. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        I97 

Von  der  Goltz  says  on  the  same  snbject: 

"  We  have  alhided  to  the  new  fortifications  constructed 
in  France.  During  the  last  ten  years,  the  eastern  fron- 
tier has  been  covered  with  a  net- work,  nay,  a  breast-plate 
of  forts  and  fortified  places,  presenting  but  few  gaps,  and 
the  presence  of  these  easily  explained  by  military  con- 
siderations. The  French  have  almost  solved  the  problem 
of  barring  all  the  roads  by  which  an  enemy  coming  from 
the  east  or  the  north-east  might  attempt  to  enter  the 
country. 

"A  war  between  France  and  Germany  would  begin 
then  by  a  series  of  struggles  around  fortified  places.  The 
girdle  of  frontier  fortifications  once  broken,  the  defender 
would  find  a  new  support  in  a  second  series  of  intrenched 
camps,  which  would  offer  a  new  impediment  to  the 
movements  of  the  assailant.  The  latter's  line  of  com- 
munication could  pass  through  only  at  the  single  point 
where  this  circle  of  forts  had  been  broken ;  and  the  im- 
portance of  this  consideration  increases  in  reflecting  that 
the  army,  advancing  slowly,  will  find  it  most  difficult 
to  live  upon  the  country.  In  the  report  made  by  Gen- 
eral Riviere  to  the  Chambers,  concerning  the  plan  of 
frontier  fortifications,  he  declared  that  their  aim  was 
to  compel  the  Germans  in  the  next  war  to  follow  a 
fixed,  well-defined  direction.  It  is  then  recognized  in 
France,  not  only  that  the  chief  superiority  of  the  Ger- 
mans lay  in  the  dispatch  with  which  they  carried  on 
war,  but  that  the  French  would  find  it  difficult  to 
quickly  enough  rival  them  in  this,  the  essential  condi- 
tion being  to  have  no  leaders  except  those  schooled  in 
this  system. 

"How  may  this  newly-created  obstacle  be  overcome? 

"In  the  absence  of  experience,  the  most  contrary  opin- 
ions will  continue  to  be  expressed.  One  urges  that  we 
hold  ourselves  upon  the  defensive  along  the  Rhine,  to 
avoid  this  bristling  collar  of  forts.     Another  would  make 


198  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

a  determined  assault;  that  is  to  say,  he  follows  the  ex- 
ample of  a  deliberative  assembly  when,  in  the  discussion 
of  a  bill,  it  holds  back  a  perplexing  clause.  A  third 
proposes  to  slip  between  the  forts,  and. to  turn  over  the 
matter  of  their  capture  to  the  reserves  when  they  come 
up,  putting  aside  the  question  in  this  simple  fashion. 
A  fourth  thinks  that  a  short  siege  would  be  sufficient; 
a  fifth,  that  it  would  be  absolutely  necessary  to  resort  to 
methodical  sieges. 

"As  a  consequence,  in  a  future  war,  even  if  our  armies 
should  be  led  with  as  much  circumspection,  and  should 
be  as  brave  as  has  been  the  rule  up  to  the  present,  we 
shall  be  obliged  to  admit  that  we  cannot  count  upon  such 
startling  rapidity  of  operations,  or  upon  resjults  as  bril- 
liant and  as  swift,  as  those  of  1866  and  1870.  After 
the  battle  of  Lowositz,  Frederick  wrote  to  Field-Mar- 
shal Schwerin:  'These  are  no  longer  the  Austrians  of 
last  year. '  And  we,  at  the  beginning  of  the  next  struggle, 
shall  be  obliged  to  make  this  confession:  These  are  no 
longer  our  enemies  of  former  years,  hi  order  not  to  enter 
the  next  war  with  false  ideas^  it  is  imperative  that  we 
keep  this  in  view.  We  shall  certainly  be  disabused  of 
them.  And  this  will  have  the  effect  of  shaking  the  confi- 
dence which  the  troops  have  in  their  leaders^  notwith- 
standi7ig  that  the  slower  march  of  events  is  the  outgroivth 
of  natural  causes.  The  difficulties^  in  the  future.^  will  be 
greater.^  in  any  case^  and  the  advantage.^  at  the  begin- 
ning.^ very  much  less.'''"^ 

The  extraordinary  development  of  our  frontier  fortifi- 
cations, has,  as  we  see,  impressed  the  other  powers.  All 
have  not  understood  it  however;  and  even  among  our- 
selves, more  than  one  discerning  mind  has  asked  him- 
self this  question:   Of  what  use? 

The    reply    is   very    simple.     The    independence    of 

*  Von  der  Goltz,  The  Nation  /«  Arms. 


SKCOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        199 

France,  nay,  her  very  existence,  was  for  a  time  threat- 
ened. Before  she  had  restored  her  army,  she  wished,  in 
the  first  place,  in  case  of  a  sndden  aggression,  to  have 
shelter  for  her  young  troops. 

Later,  when  her  forces  had  been  reorganized,  to  make 
it  ma,nifest  that  she  had  no  intention  of  attacking  her 
neighbors,  she  completed  her  defensive  system.  But 
when  the  inveterate  hatreds,  of  which  she  has  always 
been  the  object,  are  again  let  loose,  she  intends  to  make 
war  in  her  own  way,  in  the  manner  which  shall  appear 
the  most  advantageous,  which  the  best  corresponds  to 
actual  circumstances,  and  which  will  assure  her  the 
most  beneficial  results. 

Confident  of  shattering  the  efforts  of  the  enemy's 
masses,  she  will  choose  the  points  most  favorable  for 
striking  decisive  blows,  and  will  thus  be  certain  that  no 
assailant  can,  dictate  to  her  the  course  of  operations. 

However,  we  should  never  forget  the  practical  advice 
given  on  this  subject  by  a  Prussian  field-officer. 

"It  is  necessary  to  guard  against  too  great  a  confi- 
dence in  the  efficacy  of  fortifications  for  the  protection 
of  the  country — against  the  preference  given  the  shield 
to  the  detriment  of  the  sword. 

"An  excessive  tendency  to  employ  fortifications  has 
its  origin,  consciously  or  unconsciously,  in  a  feeling  of 
moral  weakness. 

"Fortresses  are  of  service  only  in  a  war  against  a 
superior  enemy.  But  the  weaker  may  be  morally 
strong,  and  in  this  case  only  will  it  make  a  judicious  use 
of  fortifications.  They  are,  on  the  contrary,  dangerous 
for  the  side  which  is  morally  weak.  For  such  a  nation, 
they  have  an  irresistible  attraction,  and  involve  it  in 
their  fall. 

"  Persuade  a  people  that  the  centre  of  gravity  of  the 
country's  defence  is  to  be  found  behind  the  ramparts  of  its 
fortresses,  and  long  before  the  necessity  arises,  you  will 


200  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

see  the  army  recruited  from  this  people  fleeing  to  these 
defences. 

"And  if  there  is  not  then  found  behind  these  walls 
the  anticipated  security, — if,  as  has  already  often  been 
seen,  the  improvements  in  the  technical  branch  of  the 
military  art  give  the  adversary  the  means  of  sweeping 
away,  in  a  manner  as  rapid  as  it  is  unexpected,  the 
protection  which  the  walls  and  ramparts  were  designed 
to  afford, — the  fate  of  that  country  will  soon  be  de- 
cided."* 

Following  the  same  ideas.  Napoleon  said: 

"The  most  abundant  means,  if  scattered,  can  pro- 
duce no  result.  With  artillery,  cavalry,  infantry,  forti- 
fied places,  and  throughout  the  entire  military  system, 
this  principle  is  invariable. 

"It  is  upon  the  open  field  of  battle  that  the  fate  of  for- 
tresses and  of  empires  is  decided,  "f 

IV.— Limits  of  Theatres  of  Operations. 

The  boundaries  of  theatres  of  operations  have  ac- 
quired, in  modern  times,  notably  in  case  of  France,  an 
importance  which  must  not  be  overlooked.  We  know, 
indeed,  that  success  in  the  field  is  most  frequently  at- 
tained by  a  turning  movement,  threatening  the  adver- 
sary's communications.  This  effect  is  produced  by  a 
strategic  manoeuvre,  which  to-day  requires  so  wide  a 
stretch  of  territory,  that  in  a  group  of  combined  armies, 
one  entire  army  is  ordinarily  charged  with  its  execution. 
If  this  space  is  contracted,  it  assures  the  defensive  ex- 
emption from  the  dangers  of  such  a  movement. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  army  on  the  offensive  has  the 
more  interest  in  throwing  back  the  enemy  toward  the 
limits  of  the  field  of  operations  in  proportion  as  these 

*Blume,  Strategy. 

■\  Military  Corresp07idence  of  Napoleon  1.     (2d  September,  1809.) 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        20I 

are  narrow  or  impracticable.  Nothing,  indeed,  is 
more  advantageous  for  the  prompt  termination  of  oper- 
ations than  to  drive  the  enemy  into  a  position  from 
which  escape  is  impossible. 

Impassable  Boundaries. — Impassable  boundaries  of  thea- 
tres of  war  are  formed  by  sea-coasts,  the  banks  of  large 
rivers,  high  mountain  chains,  or  "the  frontiers  of  neutral 
states. 

Frontiers  of  Neutral  States. — Our  territory  is  bounded  on 
the  north,  east,  and  south  by  neutral  states;  from  which 
fact  our  adversaries  were  able,  in  1870,  to  draw  consid- 
erable advantage,  by  driving  two  of  our  armies  to  our 
frontiers.  This  is  a  consideration  which  should  be  the 
less  lost  sight  of,  because  since  that  time  neighboring 
countries,  unconsciously  inflamed  by  outside  influences, 
seem  to  entertain  the  idea  that  France,  and  France  alone, 
is  disposed,  when  at  war,  to  violate  their  neutrality. 

The  consequence  is  a  marked  tendency  to  defensively 
organize  the  frontiers  of  these  countries  against  us. 
Now,  this  being  the  case,  the  dangers  of  being  driven 
upon  them  would  be  to-day  still  more  serious  for  our 
armies,  and  more  profitable  for  our  adversaries.  Our  posi- 
tion would  indeed  be  more  critical,  and  the  results  of  de- 
feat more  decisive  for  the  victors. 

In  every  sense,  says  Colonel  Blume,  the  throwing  back 
of  an  enemy  upon  a  neutral  territory  has  a  double  ad- 
vantage; first,  his  army  is  as  thoroughly  destroyed  as  if 
captured;  and  again,  the  burden  of  maintaining  it  falls 
upon  another  people. 

The  boundaries  of  a  theatre  of  operations  should  then 
be  studied  in  advance  with  minute  care,  in  view  of  prob- 
able operations  in  the  future,  and  in  order  to  be  prepared 
for  all  emergencies. 

We  must  conclude  from  the  preceding,  that  it  is  indis- 


202  ■     PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY, 

pensable  to  take  into  consideration,  in  time  of  peace,  the 
different  theatres  of  operations  upon  which  an  army  or 
groups  of  armies  may  be  called  to  act.  The  principal 
points  upon  which  these  studies  should  bear,  have  been 
placed  in  relief.  The  practical  result  should  be  to  bring 
together,  in  regular  order,  such  facts,  in  this  connection, 
as  shall  permit  the  general  staff  to  establish  its  plan  of 
campaign  in  seasonable  time. 

v.— Statistical  Resources. 

The  study  of  the  configuration  of  a  theatre  of  ope- 
rations would  not  be  complete  without  including  an  ex- 
amination of  the  statistics  of  its  resources. 

It  is  these,  indeed,  which  enable  the  chiefs-of-staff  to 
properly  provision  and  canton  their  armies. 

There  are  certain  statistics  a  knowledge  of  which  is 
indispensable  in  preparing  for  war;  namely,  those  relat- 
ing to  the  enemy's  forces. 

At  the  commencement  of  the  century,  the  only  means 
of  obtaining  this  information  was  to  have  it  gathered 
upon  the  spot  by  official  or  secret  agents. 

To-day,  on  account  of  the  facility  of  communication 
and  the  wide  extension  of  the  means  of  publicity,  it  is 
easy,  with  a  well-organized  service,  supplemented  by 
foreign  travel,  to  be  kept  constantly  acquainted,  not  only 
with  the  military  resources  of  a  people,  but  also  with  the 
spirit,  organization  and  distribution  of  its  army. 

Prussia  gave  the  first  example  in  this  regard,  pushing 
her  preparations  to  limits  as  nearly  complete  as  possible. 

The  general  staff  at  Berlin  contains  three  sections 
specially  charged  with  attentively  following  all  military 
movements  both  at  home  and  abroad,  for  the  purpose  of 
keeping  themselves  informed  concerning  everything 
touching  organization,  recruitment,  armament,  equip- 
ment,   the    geographical  configuration    of  neighboring 


SECOND    CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.       203 

countries,  the  construction  and  demolition  of  fortresses, 
the  development  of  ordinary  roads,  railroads,  canals,  etc. 

The  countries  of  Europe  are  distributed  among  these 
three  sections,  and  form  subjects  of  special  study.  Each 
section  has  a  chief,  assisted  by  staff  officers  severally 
charged  with  the  consideration  of  special  features  of  this 
work. 

This  organization  has  been  adopted  by  all  armies  since 
the  success  of  Pruisia  demonstrated  its  utility. 

France,  in  a  timid  way,  followed  this  example  in  1868 
and  1869,  and  in  a  more  thorough  manner  since  1871. 

§2.     STRATEGIC  VALUE   OF    THEATRES   OF   OPERATIONS. 

The  establishment  of  a  projet  of  operations  requires 
not  only  previous  knowledge  of  the  various  accidents  of 
ground  within  the  theatre  of  war,  but  also  exact  notions 
of  the  military  importance  of  each. 

Viewed  in  this  connection,  these  accidents  constitute 
strategic  points  and  lines. 

I.— Strategic  Points.— Objectives. 

Strategic  points  are  those  positions  in  the  theatre  of 
operations  the  possession  of  which  augments  an  army's 
power  for  action. 

The  number  of  such  points  is  always  considerable, 
and  their  importance,  although  varying  with  conditions 
of  time  and  place,  warrants  us  in  defining  and  classify- 
ing them. 

For  armies,  they  form  objectives. 

Objectives. — It  is  upon  the  choice  of  objectives  that  the 
lines  of  operations  depend. 

Before  the  wars  of  the  First  Empire,  and  even  after- 
wards, theorists  distinguished  objectives  as  principal, 
secondary,   contingent,    etc.,  and  made  their  possession 


204 


PART   FIRST.; — STRATEGY. 


the  army's  first  aim,   in  consequence  dictating  to  it  the 
line  of  march. 

Many  military  men  still  defend  this  principle;  yet, 
judged  by  the  light  of  former  wars  and  those  of  to-day, 
it  does  not  accord  with  facts. 

In  1866,  for  example,  the  Prussian  armies  entering 
Bohemia,  refrained  from  marching  upon  Prague  and 
thence  upon  Vienna.  They  took  the  army  of  Benedek 
for  their  objective.  After  having  beaten  it,  they  pursued 
its  remnants  towards  Olmiitz,  and  directed  themselves 
upon  the  new  army  which  was  assembling  at  Vienna. 

In  1870,  the  I.  and  II.  German  Armies  had  for  their 
first  objective  the  French  army  on  the  Sarre;  then  our 
main  forces  assembled  around  Metz.  Paris  became  the 
aim  of  their  march  only  after  the  battles  of  August  14, 
16,  and  18.  This  objective  was,  morever,  at  once  aban- 
doned when  Von  Moltke  was  apprised  of  the  presence  of 
a  new  army  upon  his  right  flank. 

But  it  is  especially  the  operations  of  the  III.  Army 
which  point  out  with  precision  the  rules  to  be  followed 
in  the  choice  of  objectives  at  the  commencement  of 
hostilities. 

On  the  30th  of  July,  1870,  the  German  armies  were 
nearly  ready  to  act.  Their  leaders  had  anticipated  an 
offensive  on  our  part,  but  upon  discovering  our  inaction, 
were  not  slow  in  comprehending  our  tardy  concentra- 
tion. 

It  was  consequently  resolved  at  the  German  general 
headquarters,  to  at  once  take  the  offensive  in  Alsace; 
and  the  objective  of  the  first  movements  was  indicated 
to  the  Crown  Prince  as  follows; 


?x* 


ia? 


"July  30,  9  o'clock,  p.  M. 
"His  Majesty  considers  it  expedient  that  as  soon  as 
the  III.    Army   is  reinforced   by   the   Baden  and  Wiir- 
temberg  divisions,  it  should  advance  toward  the  south 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        205 

by  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  to  seek  and  attack  the 
enemy. 

"  In  this  way  the  constrnction  of  bridges  to  the  South 
of  Lauterburg  will  be  prevented,  and  the  whole  of  South 
Germany  protected  in  the  most  effective  manner. 

"Von  M01.TKE." 

We  may  from  this  conclude:  The  principal  ai-my  of 
the  enemy  onght  always  to  be  the  first  strategic  objective. 

The  Russians,  in  1877,  thought  proper  to  violate  this 
principle.  Urged  by  political  considerations,  they  de- 
cided, after  the  passage  of  the  Danube,  to  neglect  a 
Turkish  army  of  100,000  men  on  their  left  at  Rasgrad, 
and  another  mass  of  about  40,000  men  holding  the  valley 
of  the  Vid  on  their  right,  and  to  take  Adrianople  for 
their  first  objective,  marching  straight  upon  it. 

This  was  a  mistake,  and  they  were  on  the  point  of 
paying  dear  for  it. 

The  resistance  organized  by  Osman  Pacha  upon  the 
flank  of  their  line  of  operations  arrested  their  progress, 
subjected  them  to  numerous  checks,  and  forced  them 
into  several  unanticipated  engagements.  Plevna,  which 
was  almost  devoid  of  strategic  significance  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  campaign,  soon,  through  the  energy  dis- 
played by  the  Turkish  general,  acquired  signal  impor- 
tance, and  thus  became  a  decisive  objective. 

In  studying  contemporaneous  wars  more  in  detail,  we 
shall  see  that  the  objectives  chosen  at  the  commence- 
ment of  operations  by  successful  invading  armies,  have 
always  been,  first,  the  enemy's  principal  masses,  then  the 
principal  railroad  centres  and  the  fortified  places  assur- 
ing free  use  of  communicating  ways,  and,  finally,  the 
capital  of  the  country. 

Marshal  Bugeaud  had  occasion,  in  1845,  ^^  express  his 
ideas  upon  this  subject. 

After  the  affairs  at  Sidi-Brahim  and  Ain-Temouchent, 


2o6  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

a  wide-Spread  insurrection  broke  out.  General  Ivamo- 
riciere,  commanding  in  the  absence  of  the  marshal,  hesi- 
tated concerning  the  aim  of  the  expedition  about  to  be 
undertaken. 

The  marshal  wrote  to  him: 

"Find  out  where  Abd-el-Kadir  is  with  the  bulk  of 
his  forces;  concentrate  your  own,  and  march  straight 
upon  him.  In  destroying  these  forces,  you  will  strike 
the  other  insurgents  with  the  same  blow,  and  will  at 
once  see  all  opposition  die  out."* 

This  rule,  so  precise,  so  clearly  affirmed  by  the  most 
celebrated  warriors,  is  not,  however,  without  excep- 
tions. 

In  1814,  the  allied  armies  of  Bohemia  and  Silesia 
had  taken  Paris  for  their  objective.  At  the  moment 
when  Napoleon,  abandoning  the  direct  defence  of  his 
capital,  turned  upon  their  communications,  they  con- 
tented themselves  with  placing  an  army  corps  in  his 
front,  and  continued  their  march. 

Their  generals  chose  to  neglect  the  enemy's  main 
forces,  takin'g  for  their  objective  the  principal  strategic 
point  in  the  theatre  of  operations. 

In  the  case  before  us,  their  determination  was  not  an 
error. 

They  knew  indeed  that  their  adversary's  forces  were 
very  weak ;  moreover,  an  intercepted  letter  had  apprised 
them  that  he  himself  doubted  the  success  of  his  opera- 
tion; and,  finally,  they  were  quite  certain  that  once  the 
capital  fell  into  their  hands,  they  could  bring  about  his 
dethronement. 

The  march  upon  Paris  assured  them,  then,  a  result 
more  in  conformity  with  the  aim  of  the  war,  more 
prompt  and  more  decisive,  than  could  be  obtained  by  a 
continuance  of  the  struggle  with  Napoleon  in  the  field; 

*  General  Pierron. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.       207 

for,  ill  taking  away  his  crown,  they  deprived  him  of  his 
last  resources.* 

This  exception  is  not  the  only  one  given  us  by  recent 
military  history. 

In  1849,  Hungary,  engaged  in  insurrection,  appointed 
Gorgei,  formerly  a  captain,  to  the  position  of  comman- 
der-in-chief. After  a  three  months'  campaign,  he  suc- 
ceeded in  driving  back  the  Austrian  army  commanded 
by  Prince  Windischgraetz  from  the  Theiss  to  the 
Danube.  The  imperial  forces,  wishing  to  oppose  the 
passage  of  this  river,  took  position,  on  the  5th  of  April, 
beyond  Pesth.  Gorgei  made  a  demonstration  towards 
Foldwar,  then  slipping  away  under  cover  of  the  2d 
Corps  (Aulich)  and  the  Knety  Division,  left  in  obser- 
vation before  Pesth,  marched  upon  Comorn  by  the  left 
bank,  for  the  purpose  of  debouching  upon  the  Austrian 
rear.     {See  Plate  IV.) 

On  the  loth  of  April,  he  took  Waitzen;  on  the  i8th, 
arrived  at  Leva,  forced  the  passage  of  the  Grau  at  Nagy- 
Sarlo,  and  succeeded  in  raising  the  siege  of  Comorn  on 
the  2 2d, 

The  Austrians,  seeing  their  line  of  retreat  threatened, 
fell  back  upon  Presburg.  At  the  same  time  their 
armies  in  Italy  were  driven  within  the  Quadrilateral. 
Their  continued  reverses  decided  them  to  accept  the 
assistance  of  the  Russians,  who  entered  Hungary,  June 
17,  by  way  of  Dukla. 

General  Hainan,  who  had  superseded  Windischgraetz, 
was  obliged  to  choose,  first  of  all,  an  objective  favoring 
co-operation  with  his  new  allies. 

Should  he,  according  to  recognized  principles,  form  a 
junction  with  the  Russian  army  at  once,  and  then  move 
with  it  against  Gorgei  ?  To  do  this  would  be  to  un- 
cover Vienna,  which  had  already  been  on  the  point  of 
falling  into  the.  hands  of  the  insurgents. 

*  General  Pierron. 


2o8  PART   FIRST.— STRATEGY. 

Under  the  pressure  of  circumstances,  not  being  able 
to  act  thus,  he  resolved  to  operate  by  the  right  bank  of 
the  Danube,  and  take  Buda-Pesth,  the  capital  of  Hun- 
gary, for  his  objective,  instead  of  the  enemy's  army. 

This  resolution  has  been  justified  as  follows  by  Ram- 
ming: 

"The  first  objective  of  the  operations  was  Buda- 
Pesth;  for  this  was  the  seat  of  the  provisional  govern- 
ment, the  centre  of  the  revolutionary  intrigues  of  the 
country,  and,  after  Comorn,  the  most  important  strate- 
gic point  in  the  western  part  of  the  theatre  of  oper- 
ations. All  the  communications  of  the  country  center 
here,  and  it  is,  with  exception  of  Comorn,  the  only  per- 
manent point  of  passage  of  the  Danube. 

"  In  marching  upon  this  place,  the  Austrians  assured 
the  possession  of  the  territory  comprised  between  the 
Danube,  the  frontier  of  Styria,  the  Drave,  and  the 
Muhr,  They  could  thus  at  any  time  form  a  junction 
with  the  Russians  by  way  of  Foldwar  and  the  line  of 
the  Franzens  Canal.  They  thus  shut  up  the  enemy  be- 
tween the  Danube  and  the  Theiss,  in  a  country  without 
defensive  positions. 

' '  From  Presburg,  Hainan  had  two  lines  of  operations 
leading  to  his  objective:  one  upon  the  left  bank,  through 
Freistadt,  Neutra,  and  Waitzen,  to  Pesth;  the  other 
upon  the  right  bank,  leading  to  Buda  by  way  of  Raab. 

"  Upon  the  first  line,  the  road  beyond  the  Waag  was 
assured  by  the  bridge-heads  of  Freistadt  and  Szered ;  but 
on  this  side,  the  enemy  could  take  up  good  positions, 
supporting  his  left  on  Comorn.  In  addition,  he  held 
the  interior  line,  and  could  reach  Buda-Pesth  before  the 
Austrians.  This  first  line,  moreover,  was  longer  than 
that  by  Raab;  and,  finally,  it  left  to  the  enemy,  who  pos- 
sessed the  passages  of  the  river  of  this  name,  the  means 
of  reaching  Vienna  in  six  marches,  either  by  this  town, 
Wieselburg,  and  Briick,  or  by  CBdenburg  and  Viener- 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        209 

Neiistadt,  while  preserving  his  line  of  retreat  upon 
Coniorn. 

"With  the  second  line,  the  sitnation  was  quite  other- 
wise. From  the  outset,  the  Austrian  army  occupied  the 
important  point  Raab;  it  thus  protected  its  left  wing 
by  the  river,  remained  in  direct  communication  with  the 
fortified  passage  at  Presburg,  kept  the  enemy  beyond 
Comorn  by  defensively  organizing  the  passages  at  Frei- 
stadt  and  Szered  upon  the  Waag,  obliged  him  to  besiege 
Presburg  if  he  wished  to  take  the  road  to  Vienna,  and 
finally  continued  master  of  the  shortest  road  to  Buda- 
Pesth.  This  latter  circumstance,  joined  to  the  menace 
of  an  attack  by  the  Russians,  sufficed  perhaps  to  de- 
termine the  retreat  of  thie  enemy."* 

The  two  cases  just  cited  prove,  indeed,  that  under  cer- 
tain circumstances,  the  first  objective  of  an  army  may 
very  properly  be  something  else  than  the  enemy's  prin- 
cipal force;  but  it  is  quite  as  evident  that  such  cases 
are  exceptional,  and  that  they  do  not  invalidate  the  rule. 

Railroad  Centres. — Without  seeking  to  classify  objectives 
in  advance,  according  to  their  degree  of  importance,  it  is 
proper  to  note  that,  for  modern  armies,  the  possession 
of  large  railroad  centres  is  an  object  which  first  and 
foremost  forces  itself  upon  the  attention.  Independent 
of  the  principal  centres,  the  branch  and  junction  points 
have  also  an  importance  of  the  first  order. 

These  considerations  have,  to-day,  led  all  the  powers 
to  construct  regular  fortresses  around  cities  commanding 
the  principal  railway  lines,  and  forts  d'' arret  upon 
branch  lines,  at  least  in  frontier  zones. 

In  1870,  the  German  armies  thus  made  their  move- 
ments toward  the  points  occupied  by  our  armies,  and 
then  moved  upon  the  cities,  the  control  of  which  assured 
their  communications. 

Finally,  the  capitals,  especially  in  nations  so  central- 


14 


'•^'General  Pierron. 


2IO  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

ized  as  ours,  always  constitute  decisive  objectives  for  a 
victorious  host. 

It  would  thus  be  easy  to  determine  in  advance  the 
points  in  a  theatre  of  operations  likely  to  become  objec- 
tives for  an  offensive  army. 

From  the  foregoing,  we  may  deduce  the  following 
rules  governing  the  choice  of  objectives: 

ist.  Generally,  the  first  objective  will  be  the  principal 
army  of  the  enemy; 

2d.  The  importance  of  the  strategic  points  of  a  theatre 
of  operations  is  indicated  by  the  positions  of  the  armies; 

3d.  The  occupation  of  these  strategic  points  is  effected 
in  the  order  indicated  by  the  aim  of  the  war; 

4th.  After  the  enemy's  principal  army,  the  most  im- 
portant objectives  are,  ordinarily,  large  railroad  centres, 
fortified  places,  points  of  junction  in  lines  of  communi- 
cation, and,  finally,  the  capital. 

There  are,  however,  circumstances  in  which  the  occu- 
pation of  the  capital  of  a  country  brings  little  advantage. 
Witness  that  of  Madrid  in  1808,  and  of  Moscow  in  1812. 
But  such  instances  are  exceptional. 

II. — Strategic  Lines. 

These  embrace  all  the  various  lines  which  are  of  ser- 
vice to  an  army  in  the  field,  such  as. lines  of  operations, 
bases,  etc.  It  will  be  sufficient  here  to  study  only  the 
lines  of  greatest  importance. 

Let  us  at  first  consider  those  from  which  armies  be- 
gin their  movements,  the  bases  of  operations. 

ist.  Bases  of  Operations. — In  the  opinion  of  a  great 
many  military  men,  bases  no  longer  exist;  railroads 
have  supplanted  them.  This  view  is  incorrect.  In  de- 
fault of  other  proof,  it  would  be  sufficient  to  quote 
portions  of  the  memoir  prepared,  in  1868,  by  Marshal 
Von  Moltke,  relative  to  a  choice  of  bases  in  a  war  against 
France.     The  true  state  of  the  case  is  that  the  changes 


SECOND   CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.       211 

which  have  taken  place  in  our  time  have  niodilicd,  but 
not  abolished,  bases  of  operations. 

To-day,  as  formerly,  before  commencing  active  oper- 
ations, an  army  is  obliged  to  collect  supplies  at  points  in 
its  immediate  rear,  and  from  these  the  troops  are  to  be 
fed  during  the  first  marches,  and  to  them  will  be  sent 
back  the  disabled  men  and  unserviceable  material. 

These  points  will  necessarily  be  chosen  upon  the  lines 
of  communications,  consequently,  at  stations  upon  the 
important  railway  lines.  They  should  always,  if  possi- 
ble, be  in  rear  of  a  defensive  line. 

They  will  form  a  line  of  centres  regulating  the  move- 
ment of  the  armies. 

In  1870,  aside  from  the  available  resources  of  the  vari- 
ous corps  regions,  the  German  army  had,  at  the  end  of 
July,  six  weeks'  provisions  collected  in  the  principal 
places  along  the  Rhine.  This  river  was  then,  at  least 
in  appearance,  its  base  of  operations. 

But,  in  reality,  these  centres  of  supply  had  no  influ- 
ence upon  its  operations,  except  as  intermediate  maga- 
zines between  the  corps  and  their  home  regions.  They 
did  not  constitute  a  base  of  operations. 

In  railroad  military  service,  by  base  of  operations  is 
understood  the  line  of  places  at  which  the  various  parts 
of  an  army  are  detrained. 

Again,  when  an  army  takes  the  offensive,  this  base 
changes  name,  and  becomes  the  line  of  temporary  sta- 
tions. This  line,  as  the  name  indicates,  shifts  as  the 
army  advances.      It  forms,  then,  a  new  contingent  base. 

On  the  defensive,  the  base  is  otherwise  constituted  as 
regards  transports.  Each  army  should  have  a  line  of 
central  railway  stations  where  will  be  gathered  the  prin- 
cipal supplies  sent  to  the  corps  from  their  regional  de- 
pots. This  line  is  looked  upon  as  the  base.  On  the 
defensive,  in  reality,  the  base  will  be  everywhere,  an-d 
the  lines  of  communication  may  be  changed  according 
to  the  exigencies  of  the  situation. 


212  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

For  railroad  service,  there  exist  then,  to-day,  principal 
bases^  which  are  the  centres  of  supply,  and  co7itingent 
bases^  which  vary  in  position  with  the  progressive  events 
of  the  war.  The  latter  are  the  intermediate  points  at 
which  supplies  are  brought  together. 

Indeed,  both  classes  mentioned  are  bases  of  transporta- 
tion, or  better  still,  lines  of  military  magazines,  and  noth- 
ing more.  To  demonstrate  this,  it  is  sufficient  to  recall 
the  role  which  these  magazine-stations  played  in  1870. 

Supply  Centres  of  the  German  Armies  in  1870. — At  the  end 
of  July,  1870,  the  Germans  had  collected  six  weeks' 
supplies  for  7  corps  at  Cologne,  Coblenz,  Bingen,  May- 
ence,  Hausen  near  Frankfort,  and  Mannheim.  Some 
days  later,  the  supplies  at  Cologne  and  Wesel  were 
transported  to  Bingen,  acd  so  brought  closer  to  the 
points  where  the  troops  were  assembled.  At  the  same 
time  magazine-depots  were  formed  at  Heidelberg  and 
Meckesheim,  for  the  grand-duchy  of  Baden;  at  Ger- 
mersheim,  Ludwigshafen,  and  Neustadt,  for  Bavaria; 
and  at  Bruchsal  for  Wiirtemberg.  All  these  places  were 
either  principal  or  branch-point  stations  on  railroads 
leading  to  the  Rhine. 

Foreseeing  the  difficulties  of  providing  for  the  troops 
during  their  transportation  to  the  frontier,  the  commis- 
sary service  had,  in  addition,  accumulated  six  weeks'  sup- 
plies in  each  corps  region.  A  portion  of  these  was  car- 
ried by  the  troops  to  the  zone  of  concentration.  And  up 
to  the  day  when  the  railroads  were  available  for  the  trans- 
portation of  provisions,  the  armies  were  fed  from  these 
supplies,  those  found  in  the  cantonments,  and  especially 
those  brought  together  in  the  cities  of  the  Rhine. 

Even  by  making  the  most  of  the  local  resources,  the 
German  commissary  department  recognized  the  fact  that 
t^ie  Rhenish  provinces,  notwithstanding  their  fruitful- 
ness,  would  be  able  to  furnish  but  two  days'  provisions 
to  the  troops  assembled  in  the  zone  of  concentration. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        213 

Dnrinof  the  first  davs  of  An<jn.st,  when  the  German 
armies  had  become  assured  of  our  defensive  attitude,  the 
dispositions  made  with  reference  to  their  supply-centres 
were  modified. 

The  I.  Army  established  temporary  depots  at  Frau- 
lautern  and  Treves,  in  rear  of  its  right  flank. 

The  11.  did  the  same,  locating  them  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Rhine  at  Kreuznach,  Alzey,  and  Worms. 

The  III.  made  no  changes  in  the  measures  previously 
adopted. 

After  the  battle  of  Sedan  and  the  surrender  of  Metz, 
the  Germans  established  their  principal  provision  sta- 
tions at  Pont-a-Mousson,  Nancy,  and  Ivuneville. 

Later,  when  the  operations  were  being  carried  on 
around  Paris,  in  the  North,  in  the  basins  of  the  Loire, 
and  the  Haute-Saone,  the  German  line  of  temporary  sta- 
tions was  developed  by  way  of  Chantilly  (line  from 
Paris  to  Amiens); 

Soissons  (line  from  Paris  to  Laon); 

Reims  (junction  of  lines  to  North,  Bast,  and  South- 
east) ; 

Chalons  (line  from  Paris  to  Strasburg); 

Blesme  (branch  of  preceding  line  connecting  with 
lines  of  the  Southeast); 

And,  finally,  Chaumont  in  Bassigny  (junction  point 
of  principal  lines  of  the  East). 

These  railroad  stations  taken  together  represented  an 
accidental  line  of  magazines  placed  upon  the  supply- 
routes  of  the  armies,  and  regulated  the  transport  move- 
ments according  to  the  needs  of  the  different  forces. 
They  were  then  true  supply-centres,  or,  according  to  the 
expression  officially  sanctioned  in  France  to-day,  stations 
de  transiton.  But  strategically  it  would  be  incorrect  to 
call  those  lines  bases  of  operations. 

From  another  standpoint,  if  we  leave  out  of  view 
these  supply  centres,  and  take  into  consideration  the  in- 


214  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

fluence  of  the  zones  of  concentration  upon  the  opera- 
tions, we  perceive  that  it  is  tho:  frontier  zones  by  which 
the  armies  communicate  with  their  country^  which  to-day 
co7istitute  trne  bases  of  operations. 

Bases  of  Operations  of  the  German  Armies  in  1870. — Let  us 
take  for  example  the  war  of  1870-1871.  Before  the 
commencement  of  hostilities,  there  were  several  combi- 
nations open  to  our  army.  It  could  in  the  first  place 
take  the  offensive  by  the  line  of  the  Meuse  and  debouch 
upon  Cologne.  In  this  case,  as  indicated  in  the  memoir 
written  in  1868  by  Marshal  von  Moltke,  the  German 
armies  would  have  concentrated  upon  the  Moselle,  to 
the  south  of  our  line  of  operations,  threatening  our 
right  flank  and  our  communications.  They  would  thus 
have  forced  us  to  stand  for  battle  faced  to  the  south,  in 
a  disadvantageous  position. 

According  to  the  same  project  of  the  Marshal,  the 
Rhenish  provinces  and  the  Moselle  were  to  serve  him  as 
a  base  of  operations. 

Again,  our  army  might  penetrate  Germany  by  violating 
the  neutrality  of  Switzerland.  But  this  operation  was  re- 
garded by  the  Germans  as  presenting  too  many  dangers. 

We  had  remaining  for  a  zone  of  concentration  only 
the  region  between  Metz  and  Strasburg.  There  our 
first  object  would  be  to  reach  Germany  by  the  valley  of 
the  Main,  for  the  purpose  of  separating  the  States  of  the 
South  from  those  of  the  North.  In  his  memoir,  the 
Marshal  concluded  that  we  would  then  effect  an  arrange- 
ment with  the  first  mentioned  states,  and  taking  them 
for  a  new  base,  advance  toward  the  Elbe. 

In  this  case,  the  Germans  might  have  concentrated 
upon  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine.  However,  as  it  was 
more  advantageous  to  menace  our  left  flank  and  our 
communications,  they  would  have  adopted  as  the  zone 
of  concentration^  the  Bavarian  Palatinate,  which  extends 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        215 

to  the  south-east  of  the  lower  Moselle.  This  latter  was 
the  plan  actually  adopted. 

It  was,  then,  the  region  comprised  between  Treves  and 
Landau  which  became  the  base  of  operations  of  the  Ger- 
man armies. 

Once  there,  by  reason  of  our  defensive  attitude,  their 
first  strategic  objectives  and  their  lines  of  operation 
defined  themselves. 

Our  principal  masses  in  Alsace  and  Lorraine  consti- 
tuted the  objectives,  and  the  numerous  roads  which,  on 
each  side  of  the  Vosges,  converged  upon  Metz  and  Stras- 
burg, — centres  of  union  of  these  masses, — formed  nec- 
essarily the  lines  of  operations. 

Definition  of  Bases. — We  may  then  conclude  that  the  base 
of  operations  of  an  army  is  the  frontier  zone  upon  which 
its  corps  concentrate  before  beginning  active  operations. 

From  the  example  offered  us  in  the  commencement  of 
the  campaign  of  1870,  it  is  seen  that  the  chief  modifica- 
tions in  bases  have  been  in  the  location  of  magazines, 
depots,    hospitals,    etc.      These  are  upon  the  principal 
railroads  in  rear  of  the  base. 

It  is  then  no  longer  necessary  to  leave  reserves  upon 
this  base  for  its  protection,  but  it  is  quite  as  important 
as  formerly  to  have  fortified  places  which  guarantee  pos- 
session of  the  railroads  connecting  the  base  with  the 
country  itself. 

France,  in  1870,  had  for  its  base  of  operations  the 
Metz-Strasburg  zone,  but  it  was  an  offensive  base,  estab- 
lished in  anticipation  of  events  whose  course  was  ar- 
rested by  the  first  engagements. 

The  mistake  was  made  of  establishing  the  first  sup- 
plies upon  this  base,  instead  of  placing  them  upon  the 
railroads  in  the  rear.  These  supplies  consequently  fell 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  when  one  of  the  points 
supporting  the  base  was  taken  from  us  and  we  were  re- 
duced to  the  defensive. 


2l6  PART   FIRST.  —  STRATEGY. 

From  this  time,  the  whole  of  France  became  our  base 
of  operations.  But  this  designation  applied  more  prop- 
erly to  the  region  connecting  our  forces  with  the  Centre 
and  the  South,  that  is  the  Orleans-Langres  zone,  which 
should  have  been  the  theatre  of  a  strong  defensive  or- 
ganization, and  where  a  stubborn  resistance  should  have 
been  made.  Unfortunately  the  importance  of  this  sec- 
tion was  understood  only  after  the  Germans  had  posses- 
sion of  it. 

Another  element  upon  which  the  influence  of  the 
base  depends,  is  its  direction  with  reference  to  the  adver- 
sary's^ lines  of  operations. 

Direction  of  Bases  of  Operations. — This  direction  may  be 
either  perpendicular  or  oblique  to  these  lines,  or,  indeed, 
at  once  perpendicular  and  oblique. 

Perpendicular  to  the  enemy's  lines  of  operations,  it 
gives  rise  to  combats  upon  the  front  without  immediate 
menace  to  the  communications. 

Oblique,  it  endangers  the  enemy's  flank,  and  places 
him  at  once  in  an  unfavorable  position.  Oblique  and 
perpendicular  at  the  same  time,  it  will  permit  combined 
and  converging  movements,  the  execution  of  which  ex- 
poses the  enemy  to  critical  situations. 

The  most  advantageous  bases  of  operations  will  be, 
then,  those  which,  while  covering  an  army's  communi- 
tions,  the  most  directly  threaten  those  of  the  adversary; 
that  is  to  say,  right-angular  bases. 

Napoleon's  Base  in  1805. — In  this  year,  the  Emperor  had 
a  base  of  operations  upon  the  Rhine,  menacing  the  front 
of  the  Austrians,  and  one  upon  the  Main,  almost  par- 
allel to  their  lines  of  operations,  and  threatening  their 
rear.     The  capitulation  at  Ulm  was  the  result. 

In  1806,  he  had  an  apparent  base  upon  the  Rhine,  ex- 
tending from  Mayence  to  Strasburg.     Therefore,  when 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR,        217 

the  Prussians  were  iiifoniied  of  the  great  concentrations 
which  he  was  effecting  in  the  valley  of  the  Main,  their 
first  plan  was  to  march  npon  Mayence  by  way  of  Frank- 
fort, to  separate  him  from  his  base. 

In  reality,  in  consequence  of  his  alliance  with  the 
States  of  the  South,  Napoleon  had  chosen  a  base  oblique 
to  the  preceding,  and  also  to  that  adopted  by  the  Prus- 
sians to  the  north  of  the  Thuringian  Forest.  It  ex- 
tended from  Wiirzburg  to  Kronach,  by  way  of  Bam- 
berg, He  then  massed  his  forces  upon  the  extremity  of 
his  base  at  Coburg,  Kronach  and  Bayreuth,  which  he 
temporarily  fortified;  whence  debouching  rapidly  upon 
Saalfeld,  Saalburg  and  Hof,  he  overlapped  the  left  of  the 
Prussian  army  and  threatened  its  communications. 
{See  Plate  V.) 

The  brilliant  result  of  this  combination  is  well  known. 
It  is  needless  to  dwell  upon  it  here.  But  in  considering 
the  selection  of  bases  and  the  importance  of  their  direc- 
tion, it  is  interesting  to  see  how  clearly  this  result  had 
been  foreseen  by  Napoleon  and  explained  by  him  before 
the  campaign  : 

"  Statement  of  the  rian  of  Operations  which  the  Emperor  ex- 
pects to  follOAV, 

"Instructions 

' '  To  the  King  of  Holland. 

"Mayence,  September  30,  1806, 
"I  dispatch  to  you  M,  de  Turenne,  who  is  an  orderly 
officer  near  my  person.  He  will  place  in  your  hand  this 
letter,  which  is  designed  to  acquaint  you  with  the  plan 
of  operations  that  I  propose  to  follow.  It  is  probable 
that  hostilities  will  commence  on  October  6." 

First  Observation. — -"It  is  my  intention  to  concen- 
trate all  my  forces  upon  my  extreme  right,  leaving 
the  whole  space  between  the  Rhine  and  Bamberg  en- 
tirely unguarded,  so  as  to  have  about  200,000  men  in 


2l8  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

hand  upon  the  same  field  of  battle.  If  the  enemy  pushes 
some  of  his  forces  between  Mayence  and  Bamberg,  I 
shall  be  but  little  concerned,  because  my  line  of  com- 
munication will  be  established  upon  Forchheim,  a  small 
fortified  place,  and  thence  upon  Wiirzburg.  The  course 
of  events  cannot  be  definitely  predicted,  because  the 
enemy,  who  supposes  my  left  to  be  upon  the  Rhine,  and 
my  right  in  Bohemia,  and  who  further  believes  my  line 
of  operations  parallel  to  my  front  of  battle,  may  at- 
tempt to  turn  my  left;  in  which  case,  however,  I  can 
throw  him  upon  the  Rhine." 

Second  Observation.  —  "My  first  marches  menace  the 
heart  of  the  Prussian  monarchy,  and  the  deployment 
of  my  forces  will  be  so  imposing  and  so  rapid,  that  it  is 
probable  that  the  whole  Prussian  army  of  Westphalia 
will  fall  back  upon  Magdeburg,  and  that  all  the  troops 
of  the  enemy  will  hasten  by  forced  marches  to  the  de- 
fense of  the  capital." 

Campaign  of  1800. — The  campaign  of  1800  furnishes  us 
a  still  more  remarkable  example  of  the  choice  of  bases, 
and  the  consequences  of  their  advantageous  direction. 

Bonaparte,  then  First  Consul,  was  to  oppose  the  Aus- 
trians  both  upon  the  Rhine  and  the  Alps,  from  Mayence 
to  Genoa.  Grasping  the  importance  of  the  Danube  as 
a  principal  line  of  operations,  he  wished  to  mass  a  force 
of  180,000  men  upon  the  Rhine  and  one  of  40,000  upon 
the  Alps.  His  plan  depended  upon  the  advantages  to 
be  derived:  ist.  From  the  occupation  of  Switzerland, 
whose  territory  extended  between  the  two  theatres  of 
operations  formed  by  the  basins  of  the  Danube  and  the 
Po;  2d.  From  the  choice  of  a  first  right-angular  base 
from  Strasburg  to  Basle  and  from  Basle  to  Constance; 
3d.  From  the  adoption  of  a  second  base  of  like  form,  ex- 
tending from  Marseilles  to  Lyons  and  from  L)ons  to 
the  Saint  Gothard. 

He  could  thus  turn  the  defiles  of  the  Black   Forest, 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.       219 

and  penetrate  the  valley  of  the  Danube,  cutting  the 
Austrian  communications  with  Italy;  could  then  de- 
bouch by  way  of  the  Saint  Gothard  into  the  valley  of 
the  Po  upon  Milan,  thus  cutting  the  communications  of 
the  Austrian  general,  Melas,  while  Massena  held  the 
latter  at  Genoa. 

For  the  purpose  of  assuring  the  execution  of  this  plan, 
Napoleon  issued  the  following  instructions  for  the  guid- 
ance of  Moreau,  general-in-chief  of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine: 

' '  To  General  BertJiier^  Minister  of  War. 

"Paris,  March  i,  1800. 

"You  will  impart  to  General-in-Chief  Moreau  my  de- 
sire that  he  garrison  Mayence,  Strasburg,  and  all  places 
of  the  first  line,  with  the  depot  troops  of  all  his  demi- 
brigades  and  of  his  cavalry  regiments. 

"That  before  the  ist  Germinal  [March  21],  his  army 
will  be  as  concentrated  as  circumstances  will  permit,  in 
the  space  between  Basle  and  Constance,  its  left  extend- 
ing as  far  as  Strasburg  for  facility  of  subsistence. 

"  That  he  cause  a  bridge  to  be  thrown  over  the  Aar  at 
the  earliest  possible  moment,  so  that  all  the  movements 
from  Basle  to  Constance  may  be  extremely  rapid. 

"That  he  gather  together  all  things  necessary  for 
throwing  three  bridges  between  SchafFhausen  and  Con- 
stance, calculating  the  amount  of  material  by  the  width 
of  the  Rhine." 

Some  days  later  he  wrote  to  Moreau: 

"  Citizen  General,  after  due  consideration  of  the  posi- 
tion of  our  troops  in  Switzerland,  in  Italy,  and  upon 
the  Rhine,  and  the  formation  of  the  army  of  reserve  at 
Dijon,  the  Consuls  of  the  Republic  have  decreed  the 
following  plan  of  operations: 

"Between  the  20th  and  30th  Germinal  [April  9  to 
April  19]  you  will  cross  the  Rhine  with  your  corps,  pro- 
fiting from  the  advantages  offered  by  the  occupation  of 


220  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Switzerland  for  turning  the  Black  Forest,  thus  nullify- 
ing the  preparations  which  the  enemy  may  have  made 
to  dispute  its  passes. 

"The  reserve  corps  will  be  specially  charged  with 
guarding  Switzerland. 

"The  aim  of  your  movement  in  Germany  should  be 
to  push  the  enemy  in  Bavaria  in  such  a  way  as  to  in- 
tercept his  direct  communication  with  Milan  by  way  of 
Lake  Constance  and  Grisons.  As  soon  as  this  is  effected, 
and  it  is  certain  that  in  no  event  will  the  grand  army  of 
the  enemy  be  able — even  supposing  that  it  obliges  you 
to  fall  back — to  reconquer  the  space  lost  by  it  in  a 
shorter  period  than  ten  or  twelve  days,  the  intention  of 
the  Consuls  is  to  have  Switzerland  guarded  bv  the  last 
formed  divisions  of  the  reserve  army,  made  up  of  less 
experienced  troops  than  those  which  will  compose  your 
reserve,  and  to  detach  the  latter  with  the  best  troops  of 
the  reserve  army  of  Dijon,  upon  a  movement  across 
Switzerland  and  through  the  Saint  Gothard  and  the 
Simplon,  to  effect  a  junction  with  the  Army  of  Italy  on 
the  plains  of  Lombardy. " 

Moreau  did  not  comprehend  this  plan,  the  magnitude 
of  which,  it  may  be,  was  beyond  his  grasp. 

He  replied  to  these  instructions  by  sending  General 
Dessole,  his  chief-of-staflf,  to  the  minister  of  war,  to  pro- 
pose passing  the  Rhine  at  Mayence,  Strasburg  and 
Basle,  and  moving  direct  upon  Ulm. 

However,  after  an  interchange  of  views,  he  consented 
to  make  a  demonstration  against  the  left  of  the  Austrian 
army  by  the  forest  cities  Engen  and'  Stokach. 

To  this  end,  he  was  to  march  his  left  under  Sainte- 
Suzanne  by  Kehl;  his  centre  under  Saint-Cyr  by  Neuf- 
Brisach,  and  his  reserve  by  Basle.  He  thought  thus  to 
attract  Marshal  Kray's  attention  to  the  ]'al  cP  Eiifcr 
and  the  passages  of  the  Kintzig,  and  then  to  steal  away 
by  a  flank  movement,  march  up  the  Rhine  on  the  right 


SECOND   CHAPTER. — PREPARATION    FOR   WAR.       221 

bank,  mass  his  forces  between  Saint-Blaise  and  Stuhl- 
ingen,  and  cross  his  right  wing  at  Stein. 

Here  is  Napoleon's  jndgnient  npon  the  selection  of 
this  base  and  the  combination  resnlting  from  it: 

"  Sainte-Suzanne  passed  the  Rhine  at  Kehl,  Saint- 
Cyr  at  Nenf-Brisach;  they  were  to  form  a  jnnction  in 
Brisgau.  Moreaii  felt  the  danger  of  this;  he  recalled 
Sainte-Snzanne  to  the  left  bank,  and  again  moved  across 
the  Rhine  by  the  Neuf-Brisach  bridge;  this  was  a  false 
movement,  and  not  a  ruse  de  guerre.  The  march  of 
thirty  leagnes  from  Vieux-Brisach  to  Basle  and  Schaff- 
hausen,  by  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine,  was  regrettable; 
the  army  presented  its  right  flank  to  the  Rhine  and  its 
left  to  the  enemy;  it  was  in  a  cul-de-sac  in  the  midst  of 
ravines,  forests,  and  defiles.  Field-Marshal  Kray  was 
by  that  time  forewarned  of  the  intentions  of  his  enemy; 
he  had  a  week  in  which  to  concentrate;  thus  he  was 
ready  for  battle  at  Bngen  and  Stockach,  and  in  condition 
to  cover  his  magazines  and  Ulm,  before  the  appearance 
of  the  French  general,  who  yet  had  the  initiative  of  the 
movement.  If  Moreau  had  debouched  by  Lake  Con- 
stance with  his  entire  army,  he  would  have  surprised 
and  defeated  the  Austrian  army  and  captured  half  of  its 
forces;  the  debris  would  not  have  been  able  to  rally  be- 
fore reaching  the  Neckar;  and  he  would  have  arrived  at 
Ulm  before  his  adversary.  What  grand  results!  The 
campaign  would  have  been  decided  within  a  fortnight." 

While  Moreau  was  committing  these  mistakes.  Na- 
poleon, confident  in  his  genius,  had  resolved  to  put  his 
projects  for  an  Italian  campaign  into  execution,  utilizing 
the  angular  base  of  operations  which  the  Alps  from  the 
Saint-Gothard  to  the  Col  di  Tenda  afforded  him. 

The  decisive  successes  resulting  from  this  skillful 
combination  are  matters  of  history. 

We  see  that  in  these  two  campaigns.  Napoleon  gave 
the  preference  to  angular  bases,  and  the  observations 
which  they  prompted  him  to  make  later,  leave  no  doubt 


222 


PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 


of  the  fact  that  he  reg^arded  them  as  enlistino^  more  ad- 
vantages  than  any  other. 

The  Germans  for  a  long  time  have  recognized  the 
vahic  of  angular  bases.  Hence,  with  their  characteristic 
tenacity  of  purpose,  it  is  rare  that  in  the  treaties  made 
at  the  end  of  their  wars,  they  do  not  contrive  to  secure 
bases  advantageous  for  the  future. 

French  Frontier  in  1815. — It  was  in  this  behalf,  that  in 
1815,  General  von  Miiffling,  Bliicher's  chief-of-stafif,  in- 
sisted that  our  frontier  should  pass  near  Sarreguemines 
and  Wissembourg.  This  was  to  secure  for  his  com- 
patriots an  angular  base  against  us  by  Cologne,  May- 
ence,  and  Germersheim,  permitting  the  Vosges  to  be 
turned  without  obstacle. 


In  1870,  the  Prussians  hastened  to  utilize  this  topo- 
graphical configuration  of  the  frontier. 


'  Cologne. 


•^m' 


cviiemce. 


Germer-sheinv. 


^M:-^ 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        223 

Followino;  the  same  idea,  it  is  officially  taught  in  Ger- 
many, that  in  case  of  a  war  with  Russia,  the  march  of  a 
Prussian  army  upon  Warsaw  should  be  made  by  way  of 
Thorn  and  the  right  bank  of  the  Vistula,  and  not  by 
Posen. 

German  Base  in  a  War  with  Russia. — The  truth  of  the 
statement  just  made  will  be  apparent  upon  considering 
that  in  case  of  a  German  advance  by  way  of  Posen,  the 
direction  of  the  Vistula  would  permit  the  Russians  to 
intercept  the  communications  from  the  North;  while, 
on  the  contrary,  in  the  first  case,  the  Germans  based 
upon  Thorn,  Dantzic  and  Kcenigsberg,  could  threaten 
the  Russian  communications  with  St.  Petersburg.  * 


iJSbeniqs  S  erq^^^ 


Poseru 


*General    Pierron. 


224  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

To-day,  the  frontier  which  the  victorious  Germans 
imposed  upon  us  by  the  treaty  of  Frankfort,  aims  like- 
wise at  giving  them  an  angular  base.  This  frontier 
extends  from  Metz  to  Donon  and  from  Donon  to  the 
Ballon  de  Servance.  It  thus  forms  an  open  angle  which 
will  permit  them  in  the  next  campaign  to  adopt  an 
enveloping  base  of  operations,  and  lines  of  operations 
converging  toward  the  upper  Moselle,  turning  the 
'Meurthe. 

It  is,  moreover,  quite  iiatural  that  a  treaty  should 
assure  the  conqueror  such  advantages.  The  essential 
thing  is  to  use  them  to  the  greatest  profit.  They  are  of 
such  importance  that  a  prudent  people  will  never  neglect 
them. 

Extent  of  Bases  of  Operations. — A  proper  direction  is  not 
the  only  quality  requisite  for  good  bases.  Their  extent 
has  also  a  value,  and  it  is  probable  that  the  campaigns 
of  the  future  will  give  added  importance  to  this  feature. 
In  reality,  at  the  moment  of  assembling,  armies  are  al- 
ready near  the  theatre  of  first  engagements.  They  should 
then  be  extended  enough  to  supply  themselves  without 
difficulty,  and  sufficiently  concentrated  to  fight.  Con- 
sequently, the  region  which  they  occupy  should  be  so 
limited  as  to  permit  them  to  unite  for  battle  in  a  single 
day.  From  this  it  may  be  concluded  that  to-day  armies 
will  have  an  interest  in  occupying,  upon  their  bases,  but 
a  narrow  front  compared  with  the  number  of  their  effec- 
tives, and  that  strategic  deployments  should  not  in 
general  become  too  much  developed.  But  it  is  not  less 
true  that  the  longer  the  base,  the  more  easily  can  the 
line  of  communications  be  changed,  and  in  consequence 
the  more  difficult  will  be  its  seizure.  From  this  point 
of  view,  the  advantages  of  extended  bases  of  operations 
have  not  diminished  ;  the  manner  of  their  employment 
only  has  been  modified. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        225 

The  Germans  applied  this  principle  in  1870  with  a 
clearness  which  was  not  withont  inflnence  npon  their 
first  successes. 

Towards  the  3d  of  August,  while  the  French  forces, 
to  the  number  of  260,000,  were  dispersed  over  a  front  of 
200  kilometres,  extending  from  Sierck  to  Belfort,  the 
German  armies,  aggregating  400,000  combatants,  occu- 
pied, on  the  contrary,  only  the  space  between  Bettingen 
and  Landau,  that  is  to  say,  72  kilometres. 

Formations  of  the  Troops  upon  the  Bases. — The  necessity 
for  keeping  the  troops  closed  up  while  upon  their  bases, 
on  account  of  the  probabilities  of  immediate  combats, 
combined  with  the  increase  of  the  effectives,  wnll  neces- 
sitate formations  in  echelon.  The  same  result,  more- 
over, is  brought  about  by  the  necessity  of  distributing 
the  military  debarking  stations  at  intervals  along  the 
railroad  lines. 

In  the  march  of  the  German  armies  to  the  Sarre,  from 
the  2d  to  the  6th  of  August,  1870,  the  I.  Army  formed 
in  advance  with  the  III.  and  IV.  Corps  of  the  II.  Army; 
then  came  the  Guard,  the  X.,  IX.,  and  XII.  Corps,  dis- 
tributed along  the  debarking  line  at  a  mean  distance 
of  a  day's  march.  It  even  happened  at  one  time  that 
the  extent  of  ground  occupied  by  these  masses  was  so 
narrow  that  the  different  corps  became  entangled. 

It  results  from  these  considerations,  that  independent 
of  its  direction,  a  base,  to  be  advantageous,  should  have 
a  length  proportionate  to  the  masses  to  be  concentrated, 
and  a  depth  sufficient  to  accommodate  the  different 
echelons. 

There  is  another  condition  that  will  henceforth  have 
a  dominating  influence.  A  good  base  should  be  the  out- 
let of  so  considerable  a  number  of  railroads  as  to  permit 
the  corps  to  disembark  and  execute  their  strategic  de- 
ployments in  the  least  possible  space  of  time. 
15 


226  PART   FIRST.— STRATEGY. 

This  condition  can  be  realized  only  through  the  fore- 
sight of  governments,  and  by  continued  efforts  and  con- 
stant expenditures,  which  always  present  difficulties. 

In  1870,  the  Germans  had  thus  prepared  nine  lines  of 
approach  to  their  base,  three  of  which  led  to  Neun- 
kirchen,  Homburg,  and  Landau,  upon  the  base  itself; 
the  others  were  in  proximity.  Since  this  time  they  have 
accomplished  a  similar  but  still  more  perfect  work  in 
their  new  province  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  Here  they  have 
apparently  formed  two  concentration  zones;  one  com- 
prising the  space  between  Thrinville,  Metz,  Sarreburg, 
and  Sarreguemines;  the  other  between  Saverne,  Stras- 
burg,  and  Miilhausen.  Everything  leads  us  to  think 
that  in  another  war  these  two  zones  would  be  used  by 
them  to  establish  their  troops  upon  an  angular  base. 

These  considerations  may  be  summed  up  as  follows: 

ist.  Bases  of  operations  have  been  U^ansformed  by  the 
establishment  of  7'ailroads; 

2d.  TJie  S2ipplies  formerly  assembled  itpon  the  bases^ 
zuill  henceforth  be  distiHbuted  along  the  railroads  charged 
ivith  amny  transport  service ; 

3d.  Bases  of  operations  are  frontier  so?ies  zvhich  con- 
nect the  armies  with  their  country^  and  npo7i  which  they 
concentrate  before  the  commencement  of  operations  ; 

4th.  TJie  direction  of  the  base^  with  regard  to  the 
ejiemy''s  lines  of  operations^  increases  in  importaiice  in 
proportion  as  the  masses  become  more  Jiumerous  and  the 
first  conflicts  more  imminent ; 

5th.  An  angular  base  is  always  the  most  advattta- 
geoiis  ; 

6th.  TJiere  should  be  a  suflicient  number  of  railroads 
running  from  the  interior  of  the  country  to  the  base  to 
ass2ire  the  prompt  concentration  of  the  army. 

The  dispositions  of  armies  upon  their  bases,  will  be 
considered  in  connection  with  the  study  of  concentra- 
tions. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        227 
II.    FRONTS   OF  OPERATIONS. 

The  strateg-ic  front  is  often  distino^nished  from  the 
front  of  operations.  Military  men  who  have  thought 
this  a  sound  distinction  have  desig^nated  as  strates^ic 
front  the  army's  front  of  march,  and  as  front  of  oper- 
ations^ the  geographical  space  comprised  between  the 
strategic  fronts  of  the  opposing  armies. 

In  reality,  it  is  upon  the  extent  and  direction  of  the 
first  only  that  the  combinations  of  the  commander-in- 
chief  depend.  The  second,  on  the  contrary,  is  the  re- 
sult of  circumstances,  and  of  the  combinations  of  the 
two  contending  armies.  It  varies  with  these  combina- 
tions, and  generally  imposes  itself  upon  both  of  the 
adversaries  during  the  entire  continuance  of  active  ope- 
rations, with  its  advantages  and  its  inconveniences.  It 
will  be  sufficient  here  to  point  out  the  practical  rules 
which  concern  the  strategic  fronts  or  fronts  of  march. 

This  is  the  space  occiLpied  by  an  amny^  s  heads  of  col- 
umns.    It  should  fulfil  certain  definite  conditions. 

It  has  already  been  seen,  in  connection  with  the  de- 
termination of  the  effectives,  that  the  first  of  these  con- 
ditions is  the  limitation  of  this  front  to  such  a  compass 
as  will  permit  the  concentration  of  the  army  for  action 
within  the  space  of  a  single  day.  Consequently,  each 
corps  should  not  be  required  to  march  more  than  24 
kilometres  [about  15  miles]  to  enter  the  line  of  battle. 

It  would  be  well,  if  such  a  thing  were  possible,  to 
apply  the  same  rule  to  the  strategic  front  of  the  group 
of  armies  into  which  the  large  masses  of  to-day  are 
formed.  It  is  certain,  however,  that  being  given  three 
grand  armies,  for  example,  it  would  hardly  be  thought 
possible  to  unite  them  for  action  upon  the  same  linear 
front.  We  shall  therefore  be  led,  in  the  future  oftener 
than  in  the  past,  to  combine  the  movements  of  armies 
in  such  away  as  to  secure  angular  attacks.     These  were 


228  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

the  means  most  frequently  used  by  Von  Moltke  to  insure 
the  concurrence  of  several  armies  in  the  same  battle. 
This,  in  fact,  happened  at  Koniggratz,  July  3,  1866, 
and  at  Sedan,  September  i,  1870. 

We  shall  see  further  on,  in  connection  with  marches, 
the  dispositions  necessary  for  these  combinations. 

Direction  of  the  Fronts  of  March. — If  the  extent  of  these 
fronts  is  a  matter  of  importance  in  connection  with  the 
concentration  of  the  forces  for  battle,  and  has  an  influ- 
ence upon  the  number  of  effectives  which  it  is  possible 
to  place  in  line,  their  direction  has  a  not  less  material 
effect. 

This  effect  is  analogous  to  that  attributed  to  the  direc- 
tion of  bases  of  operations.  Consequently,  fronts  at 
bnce  perpendicular  and  oblique  with  reference  to  the 
front  of  the  opposing  forces,  or,  as  has  just  been  said, 
angular  fronts,  will  be  the  most  advantageous,  provided 
they  cover  their  proper  communications  while  threaten- 
ing those  of  the  enemv. 

Thus,  a  strategic  front  parallel  to  the  adversary's  line 
of  operations,  constitutes  a  direct  menace  to  his  com- 
munications; and  if  it  is  supported  upon  a  second  per- 
pendicular base,  the  result  will  be  to  place  the  enemy  in 
a  critical  position. 

It  was  a  front  of  this  nature  that  the  Prussians  counted 
upon  taking  in  1870,  had  we  invaded  South  Germany. 
They  would  have  faced  the  south,  parallel  to  our  line  of 
operations, — Strasburg,  Wiirtzburg, — while  supporting 
their  right  upon  the  Rhine.  This  manoeuvre  would 
have  prevented  our  continuing  on  the  offensive. 

Napoleon  I.  knew  how  to  modify  his  strategic  front, 
at  times,  so  as  to  give  it  the  most  advantageous  direc- 
tions. 

Connection  between  Annies :  Protection  of  their  Flanks. — In  • 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        229 

dependent  of  the  conditions  of  extent  and  direction,  tlie 
fronts  of  march  shonld  be  such  as  to  offer  to  armies  the 
means  of  keeping  up  constant  connection  with  each 
other,  and  of  continually  protecting  their  flanks. 

Consequently,  whenever  a  front  of  march  is  broken  by 
obstacles  of  the  ground,  difficult  of  access,  the  situation 
will  be  unfavorable. 

In  1796,  Wiirmser,  descending  from  Tyrol  and  leaving 
Lake  Garda  between  his  columns,  paid  for  his  impru- 
dence by  the  loss  of  his  army. 

In  1870,  the  German  armies  remained  separated  by  the 
Vosges  into  two  distinct  groups  from  the  4tli  to  the  13th 
of  August,  with  two  divergent  fronts  of  march ;  on  one 
side,  the  I.  and  II.  Armies,  on  the  other,  the 'III.  Army. 
This  partition  was  a  necessary  consequence  of  the  dif- 
ficulties of  the  ground.  But  the  commander-in-chief  of 
the  German  armies  knew  that  the  French  corps  remain- 
ing still  intact  could  not  be  thrown  between  these 
groups,  because  these  corps  were  far  in  advance  upon 
the  Moselle.  The  momentary  separation,  then,  of  the 
two  masses,  was  accompanied  by  no  danger  whatsoever. 
This  example  shows  us  that  with  the  development  of 
modern  masses,  it  is  much  more  difficult  than  formerly 
to  fulfill  the  requirements  connected  with  the  main- 
tenance of  communications  between  armies. 

It  will,  however,  not  be  necessary  to  dwell  longer 
here  upon  the  subject  of  strategic  fronts.  Recurring  to 
it  further  on,  in  connection  with  the  study  of  marches, 
we  shall  consider  it  in  detail.  j 

III.    LINES   01^  OPERATIONS. 

Definitions  of  lines  of  operations  are  often  vague  or 
confused. 

It  is  generally  admitted  that  an  army's  line  of  opera- 
tions is  the  system  of  communications  conducting  it 
from  its  base  to  its  objective. 


230  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

But  it  may  be  urged  that  iu  our  time  the  base  of  oper- 
ations is  not  so  clearly  defined  as  formerly;  that  an 
array  does  not  always  march  from  its  base  toward  an 
objective;  and  that  objectives  are  sometimes  movable 
objects,  other  armies  in  motion,  for  example,  which 
change  place  from  day  to  day.  Thus  after  a  first  battle, 
when  the  victorious  army  is  directed  upon  the  enemy's 
principal  mass,  it  marches  from  one  objective  to  another. 
It  does  not  the  less,  however,  on  this  account,  follow  a 
line  of  operations. 

Finally,  it  is  difficult,  under  all  circumstances,  to  avoid 
confounding  the  line  of  operations  with  the  line  of  com- 
munications. To  insure  precision,  let  us  assume  that 
the  line  of  operations  of  an  army  is  simply  the  general 
direction  followed  by  its  columns.  It  naturally  embraces 
a  system  of  ordinary  roads,  and,  whenever  possible,  one 
or  more  railroads.  It  is  then  a  true  zone  of  territory, 
and  is  designated  in  accordance  with  its  general  direc- 
tion or  by  the  principal  road  of  the  system. 

The  line  of  operations  selected  at  the  outset  should 
lead  an  army  to  its  first  encounters,  and,  in  most  cases, 
to  decisive  eno-ao-ements.  It  has  then  an  extreme  im- 
portance;  its  selection  influences  the  highest  combina- 
tions of  strategy,  and  it  is  not  astonishing  that  its  gov- 
erning principles  should  have  been  profoundly  studied 
by  all  military  men. 

Considered  in  their  entirety,  these  principles  relate  to 
three  orders  of  facts,  namely: 

The  direction  of  the  line  of  operations; 

The  necessity  of  having  a  simple  line  of  operations; 

The  advantage  of  interior  lines. 

(a)   DIRECTION   OF   THE   LINES   OF  OPEIIaTIONS. 

According  to  Napoleon  and  the  Archduke  Charles, 
the  most  advantageous  direction  of  the  lines  of  oper- 
ations is  that  which  permits  aft  army  to  threatoi  the 


SECOND  CIIAI'TKR. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        23I 

communications  of  the  enemy  without  compromising  its 
oivn. 

Such  is  the  general  rule.  But  under  this  form,  it  re- 
mains a  little  vague.  Here  we  are  led  to  developments 
and  exceptions.  Jomini  defines  them  in  the  following 
terms : 

ist.  "  TJie  direction  to  be  given  to  the  line  of  opera- 
tions depends  npojt  the  geographical  configuration  of  the 
theatre  of  operations^  and  the  position  of  the  enemy's 
forces. 

2d.  "  Onl}^  a  general  direction  of  march  can  be 
adopted,  which  will  be  either  upon  the  enemy's  centre 
or  one  of  his  wings,  preferably  the  whig  ijuhich  is  7iearer 
his  lines  of  co^nmiinications. 

3d.  "The  movement  may  be  made  upon  the  front 
and  both  wings  of  the  enemy  with  a  greatly  superior 
force;  but  under  all  otJier  circumstances^  this  would  be  a 
capital  error. 

"  In  general,  if  the  enemy  distribute  his  forces  upon  a 
too  extended  front,  it  is  better  to  direct  the  line  of  oper- 
ations upon  his  centre.  Under  any  other  hypothesis, 
with  freedom  of  choice,  it  would  be  better  to  take  a 
direction  leading  upo7i  one  of  the  enemy'' s  zvings^  and 
thence  upon  his  line  of  communications.'''' 

4th.  "  The  configuration  of  the  frontiers  generally 
exercises  a  great  influence  upon  the  direction  of  the  lines 
of  operations,  and  upon  the  advantages  attending  these 
lines. 

"Central  positions  forming  a  salient  angle  toward  the 
enemy,  as  Bohemia  and  Switzerland,  are  the  most  ad- 
vantageous, because  they  naturally  lead  to  the  adoption 
of  interior  lines,  and  increase  the  means  of  taking  the 
enemy  in  rear." 

At  the  commencement  of  the  century,  these  princi- 
ples still  guided  generals  in  the  selection  of  lines  of 
operations. 


232  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

How  far  are  they  applicable  to  the  conditions  of  mod- 
ern war? 

Let  history  inform  ns. 

Campaign  of  1800  in  Italy. — We  have  already-  seen  with 
what  precision  Bonaparte,  then  First  Consul,  had  indi- 
cated to  Moreau  the  true  direction  for  the  columns  of 
the  Army  of  the  Rhine,  in  its  march  against  the  im- 
perial army. 

"The  aim  of  your  movement  in  Germany,"  wrote  he 
to  Moreau,  "should  be  to  so  push  the  enemy  in  Bavaria 
as  to  intercept  his  direct  communication  with  Milan  by 
way  of  Lake  Constance  and  Grisons. " 

The  reasons  which  prevented  Moreau' s  adoption  of 
this  plan  have  been  explained.  It  remains  to  be  seen 
how  Bonaparte  thought  he,  in  his  turn,  should  operate 
against  the  Austrian  army  which,  under  the  orders  of 
Melas,  had  recovered  Lombardy. 

Overwhelmed  by  superior  forces,  our  generals,  Mas- 
sena  and  Suchet,  liad  been  driven  back,  the  first  into 
Genoa,  the  second  upon  the  Var.  Italy  seemed  lost  to 
us.  Melas,  confident  in  his  recent  successes,  occupied 
Piedmont  and  the  Nice  district. 

Bonaparte  had  at  his  disposal  the  Reserve  Ami}', 
which  he  had  assembled  at  Dijon,  and  of  which  he  had 
retained  command. 

"An  ordinary  general,"  says  Jomini,  "alarmed  by 
the  victorious  attitude  of  the  Austrians  in  Piedmont, 
would  have  gone  in  all  haste  by  Dauphine  toward  Pro- 
vence, and  made  the  x'Vlps  the  theatre  of  war.  But  Bon- 
aparte appreciated  too  well  the  difficulties  of  a  frontal 
attack.  He  preferred  to  cross  the  mountains  upon  the 
rear  of  the  imperial  forces  and  gain  the  Ticino  unop- 
posed, where  his  pres-ence  could  not  fail  to  recall  his  ad- 
versaries, and  compel  them  to  accept  battle  with  all  the 
chances  of  success  against  them." 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        233 

To  accoinpHsli  this,  it  was  necessary  to  cross  the  Alps 
in  their  highest  regions  with  a  numerous  army,  without 
compromising;  his  line  of  retreat,  and  without  giving 
Melas  any  intimation  of  the  movement. 

To  put  his  plan  into  execution,  Bonaparte  first  ordered 
demonstrations  made  from  the  direction  of  Mt.  Cenis. 
Melas  was  not  alive  to  the  existence  of  a  real  army  of 
reserve,  believing  that  this  so-called  army  consisted  only 
of  scattered  and  unimportant  bodies.  These,  he  per- 
suaded himself,  intended  to  debouch  upon  the  Dora 
Ripaira  and  Turin.  He,  therefore,  continued  his  opera- 
tions against  the  Genoese  Riviera  and  the  territory  of 
Nice,  while  making  preparations  for  the  invasion  of 
Provence. 

In  the  meantime,  Bonaparte  directed  his  advanced- 
guard,  under  Lannes,  upon  the  valley  of  Aosta.  The 
passage  of  the  Great  St.  Bernard  was  effected  from  the 
15th  to  the  20th  of  May,  and  on  the  27th,  the  entire  Re- 
serve Arm)^  was  concentrated  at  Ivrea.  After  doubting 
the  arrival  of  our  columns  for  a  long  time,  Melas  finally 
yielded  to  proofs,  and  marched  upon  Turin.  Every  one 
then  believed  that  the  First  Consul,  profiting  by  the  suc- 
cess gained  at  Chiusella,  designed  marching  upon  the 
capital  of  Piedmont,  in  order  to  drive  out  the  Austrian 
general  and  to  effect  a  junction  with  General  Thurreau, 
who  had  proceeded  toward  Susa  by  Mt.  Cenis.  Nothing 
of  the  sort  was  intended.      {See  Plate  lY.) 

Still  aiming  at  the  enemy's  line  of  communications, 
and  wishing  first  to  collect  the  forces  he  had  directed 
into  Italy  by  the  Simplon  and  St.  Gothard,  he  left  an 
advanced-guard  before  the  enemy  to  hold  him  in  check, 
and  proceeded  toward  Milan,  which  he  entered  on  the 
2d  of  June.  It  was  scarcely  forty-eight  hours  previous 
to  this  that  the  inhabitants  first  heard  of  the  existence 
of  the  Reserve  Army,  and  of  the  passage  of  the  Alps. 

The  evening  before,  Lannes  had  occupied  Pavia,  and 


234  PART   FIRST, — STRATEGY. 

captured    the   Austrian    park    consisting  of  300   guns, 
200,000  pounds  of  powder,  etc. 

The  French  army  had  thus  seized  the  enemy's  line  of 
communication  before  a  single  decisive  battle  had  been 
fought.  The  Austrians  were  thus  confined  to  the  right 
bank  of  the  Po. 

The  results  of  this  combination  were  set  forth  by 
Bonaparte  himself  in  the  following  letter: 

' '  To  Citizen  Carnot^  Minister  of  War. 

-    "Milan,  15th  Prairial,  Year  VIII.  (June  4,  1800.) 

"We  are  at  Milan,  Citizen  Minister.  We  found  at 
Pavia  300  cannon  with  carriages,  half  of  them  field, 
half  siege  pieces;  200,000  pounds  of  powder,  10,000 
new  muskets,  and  a  great  quantity  of  war  material  of  all 
kinds. 

"  This  is  the  situation  in  Italy: 

"The  enemy  has  for  a  long  time  believed  that  we 
counted  at  the  most  only  7,000  or  8,000  men,  and  that 
we  were  attempting  a  raid  to  induce  him  to  raise  the 
sieges  of  Genoa  and  Nice;  he  persisted  in  this  idea  up  to 
the  8th  Prairial. 

"In  the  combat  on  the  Chiusella,  his  cavalry  took  7 
or  8  prisoners,  from  whom  he  obtained  information  to 
which  he  still  refuses  credence. 

"On  the  13th,  General  Hohenzollern,  who  commands 
the  troops  besieging  Genoa,  appeared,  as  you  will  see 
from  the  letter  which  I  sent  the  Consuls,  not  to  set  a 
very  high  value  upon  our  forces.  General  Melas  wrote 
to  Pavia  (to  a  woman  who  accompanies  him):  'I  know 
it  is  said  in  Lombardy  that  a  French  army  is  coming; 
have  no  fears;  I  forbid  your  leaving.'  Twelve  hours 
later  we  entered  Pavia. 

"We  are  at  Lodi  ;  Moncey's  advanced-guard  has 
reached  Como,  and  is  engaged  in  collecting  boats  for  the 
passage  of  the  Po. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        235 

"  x\ll  the  hospitals  in  Lombardy  are  in  our  hands;  we 
found  there  from  5,000  to  6,000  sick  or  wounded.  A 
part  of  the  garrison  of  Savona,  on  the  way  to  the  rear 
as  prisoners,  were  re-taken,  and  are  now  with  us. 

"You  perceive  that  events  of  the  greatest  importance 
will  shortly  take  place,  which  will  have  a  singular  influ- 
ence npon  the  future  of  the  House  of  Austria. ' ' 

The  brilliant  victory  of  Marengo  soon,  indeed,  crowned 
this  remarkable  series  of  operations. 

Looking,  then,  upon  the  movements  of  this  campaign 
in  their  bearing  upon  lines  of  operations,  we  see  that 
while  taking  the  enemy's  principal  army  for  his  objec- 
tive, Bonaparte  commenced  by  seizing  its  communica- 
tions. It  was  only  after  accomplishing  this  that  he 
marched  against  the  army  itself. 

Had  he  at  the  same  time  made  dispositions  to  secure 
full  and  free  possession  of  his  own  line  of  retreat?  In 
answer  to  this,  it  is  sufficient  to  cast  a  glance  over  the 
theatre  of  operations.  It  is  clear,  indeed,  that  if  after  the 
passage  of  the  St.  Bernard  he  had  marched  straight  i;pon 
Turin,  thence  upon  Asti  and  Alessandria,  and  then 
given  battle  at  Marengo  without  first  making  sure  of 
Lombardy  and  the  left  bank  of  the  Po,  his  communica- 
tions would  have  been  more  completely  cut  than  were 
the  enemy's.  The  direction  given  his  columns  was  then 
justified,  and  the  occupation  of  Casale  and  Pavia  cov- 
ered his  line  of  retreat  on  the  side  of  Switzerland.  The 
only  criticism  suggested  by  the  choice  of  this  direction 
is  that  he  had  defiles  in  his  rear,  but  defiles  whose  pass- 
age he  was  in  condition  to  protect. 

It  has  been  seen  before,  with  respect  to  bases  of  ope- 
rations, that  in  1805  and  1806,  Napoleon  manoeuvred 
in  the  same  way;  that  he  marched  first  upon  the  com- 
munications of  the  enemy's  forces,  to  compel  them  to 
accept  battle  while  in  a  disadvantageous  position,  this 
being  to  him  a  first  condition  of  success. 


236  PART  FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Later,  in  1807,  when  Benningsen,  beaten,  fell  back  by 
way  of  the  valley  of  the  Alle,  Napoleon  could  have  pur- 
sued his  columns  by  the  right  bank.  He,  however,  pre- 
ferred the  left,  for  this  led  him  directly  to  the  communi- 
cations established  by  his  adversary  upon  Koenigsberg. 
He  was  thus  able  to  fight  the  decisive  battle  of  Fried- 
land,  after  having  cut  the  opposing  forces  from  their 
magazines. 

In  more  recent  times,  the  same  principle  was  applied 
under  similar  conditions,  notwithstanding  the  greater 
difficulties  attending  the  management  of  the  enormous 
masses  of  to-day. 

In  1866,  when  Von  Moltke,  having  reached  Gitschin, 
had  to  determine  the  direction  of  the  march  of  the 
I.  Army  and  the  Army  of  the  Elbe,  he  immediately 
turned  his  attention  to  the  communications  of  the  Aus- 
trian army.  Supposing  the  latter  established  upon  the 
left  bank  of  the  Elbe,  between  Josephstadt  and  Konig- 
gratz,  he  indicated  Pardubitz  as  the  objective  point  of 
the  march.  This  is  an  important  place  at  a  bend  of  the 
Elbe,  upon  the  road  connecting  the  enemy's  forces  with 
Vienna. 

In  1870,  faithful  to  the  same  principles,  which  he 
seems  to  have  borrowed  from  the  campaigns  of  Napo- 
leon, the  chief  of  the  Prussian  general  staff  applied  them 
with  the  same  clear-sightedness,  and,  unfortunately  for 
us,  with  the  same  result. 

Operations  in  the  East  in  1871. — The,  Government  of  Na- 
tional Defense  had  formed  the  design  of  dispatching  for 
the  relief  of  Belfort,  an  army  formed  of  the  debris  of 
the  ist  Army  of  the  Loire,  under  command  of  General 
Bourbaki.  Assembled  rapidly  and  quietly,  it  was  to  be 
transported  to  the  East  by  rail;  and,  after  raising  the 
siege  of  Belfort,  was  to  intercept  the  enemy's  communi- 
cations. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        237 

Iiifoniiation  of  the  existence  of  this  army  and  of  the 
purpose  of  its  creation  did  not  reach  the  German  general 
headquarters  until  the  end  of  December,  1870.  But 
about  the  24th  or  25tli  of  this  month,  dispatches  from 
Berne,  sent  by  special  agents,  who  were  watching  our 
movements  in  the  East,  announced  that  a  corps  of  about 
25,000  men  had  been  directed  from  Lyons  upon  Belfort. 
The  commander  of  the  I.  Reserve  Division  of  the  sies^e 
corps  ascertained  that  French  troops  were  camped  at 
Clerval  and  Rougemont,  -and  that  a  mass  of  60,000  men 
was  expected  at  Besancon. 

Finally,  French  transportation  employes  of  the  ist 
Army  of  the  Loire,  who  had  been  captured  by  the  Prus- 
sians, informed  them  that  the  movement  toward  the 
East  had  been  in  operation  since  December  22. 

On  receipt  of  this  news.  Von  Moltke  ordered  the  VII. 
Corps  to  suspend  the  siege  of  Langres,  and  to  move  from 
Auxerre  to  Chatillon-sur-Seine;  the  XIV.  Corps  fell 
back  from  Dijon  to  Vesoul;  and  finally  the  Governor- 
General  at  Strasburg  was  directed  to  send  reinforcements 
to  General  Werder,  who  commanded  both  the  XIV. 
Corps  and  the  siege  corps  before  Belfort. 

Nevertheless,  Von  Moltke  paused  before  coming  to  a 
final  determination.  It  seemed  to  him  that  the  most 
logical  plan  on  our  part  was  to  make  a  combined  march 
of  the  ist  and  2d  Armies  of  the  Loire  upon  Paris. 

He,  therefore,  felt  some  uncertainty  and  hesitation  re- 
garding the  proper  movements  to  be  made.  However, 
as  a  first  precaution,  he  directed  the  II.  Corps  from  Paris 
upon  the  VII. ,  to  joi'n  with  the  latter  in  covering  the  in- 
vestment of  the  capital,  as  well  as  the  railroads  leading 
from  the  South. 

But  when,  on  the  5th  of  January,  1871,  Werder  re- 
ported the  engagements  which  had  taken  place  before 
Vesoul,  Von  Moltke  halted  no  longer.  He  was  decided, 
and  on  the  6th,  issued  his  orders,  which  may  be  briefly 
stated  thus: 


238  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

ist  Order  to  the  II.  and  VII.  Corps  to  assemble  at 
Nuits-sur-Armangon  and  at  Chatillon-sur-Seine; 

2d.  Formation  of  the  Army  of  the  South  under  Gen- 
eral Manteuffel,  comprising  the  two  corps  and  all  the 
remaining  troops  operating  in  the  Southeast; 

T,d.  Instruction  sent  to  General  Werder  by  a  confi- 
dential feldjdgei^^  defining  the  operations  to  be  under- 
taken, as  follows: 

General  Werder  was  relieved  from  the  role  of  covering 
the  siege  of  Belfort  on  the  side  of  the  west.  His  princi- 
pal mission  was  to  directly  protect  the  siege  operations 
with  all  the  troops  not  absolutely  indispensable  for 
maintaining  the  investment;  to  destroy  the  roads  to  the 
south  of  the  Vosges;  to  watch  all  the  movements  of  our 
columns  to  the  west  of  these  mountains;  and,  finally, 
to  keep  in  contact  with  the  adversary,  in  order  to  pre- 
vent the  latter  from  throwing  himself  with  all  his  forces 
upon  General  Manteuffel.  This  last  instruction  shows 
that  if  General  Bourbaki  could  not  raise  the  siege  of 
Belfort  before  the  arrival  of  Manteuffel,  it  was  upon  the 
latter  that  he  would  be  obliged  first  of  all  to  direct  his 
blows.  * 

Be  this  as  it  may.  Von  Moltke  and  the  new  com- 
mander-in-chief of  the  Arm}^  of  the  South  would  have 
to  determine  the  direction  of  the  line  of  operations.  How 
should  this  be  chosen?  Time  pressed,  and  the  manoeuvre 
to  be  executed  was  complex. 

To  understand  the  reasons  leading  to  the  final  decis- 
ion, let  us  hold  to  view  the  exact  situation  of  affairs  at 
this  point.  Manteuffel  could  not  reach  Versailles  before 
the  loth  of  January.  There  he  received  only  verbal  in- 
structions, which  were,  moreover,  very  brief. 


Werder  was  already  struggling  with  Bourbaki. 


*We  know,  however,  that  General  Bourbaki  had  not  the  choice  of 
his  combinations. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        239 

To  send  him  immediate  succor  was  not  to  be  thought 
of.  *  *  *  But,  if  possible,  Manteuflfel  was  to  throw  him- 
self upon  the  communications  of  our  army.  The  effect 
produced  would  be  considerable.  The  measures  to  be 
taken  to  reach  this  result  were  left  to  his  discretion." 

General  Manteuffel  departed  to  rejoin  his  troops,  and 
on  the  I2tli  of  January  arrived  at  Chatillon-sur-Seine. 
The  situation  was  as  follows:  his  two  corps  were  found 
dispersed  upon  a  front  of  35  kilometres,  the  11.  extended 
from  the  Armanqon  to  the  Serain,  the  VII.  from  the 
Aube  to  the  Seine.  The  latter  effected  its  concentration 
partly  by  marches,  partly  by  rail.  Werder  was  in  posi- 
tion upon  the  Lisaine,  where  the  struggle  had  already 
begun.     {See  Plate  VII.) 

The  French  army  was  then  completing  its  deploy- 
ment between  the  Doubs  and  the  Ognon. 

The  first  questions  presenting  themselves  to  the  mind 
of  Manteuffel  were: 

What  course  should  be  determined  upon,  and  what 
direction  chosen  for  the  march  of  the  columns  ? 

Various  considerations  guided  him  toward  the  most 
practical  solution. 

He  could  take  possession  of  Dijon.  The  seizure  of 
this  place,  the  capital  of  Burgundy,  was  seductive;  it 
would  produce  a  great  moral  effect,  and  extend  the 
sphere  of  action  of  the  invading  armies.  But  danger 
was  threatening  under  the  walls  of  Belfort,  and  the  first 
consideration  was  to  avoid  loss  of  time.  A  movement 
upon  Dijon  was  then  foreign  to  the  problem  in  hand, 
and  would  cause  delay. 

The  simplest  plan  consisted  in  772 arching  straight  upon 
the  enemy''  s  principal  army.^  and  in  directing  himself 
first  of  all  upon  its  communications. 

By  this  means,  if  Werder  should  be  pushed  back  upon 
upper  Alsace,  Manteuffel  would  fall  upon  the  rear-guard 
of  the  victor.     If,  on  the  contrary,   Werder  succeeded 


240  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

in  repulsing  our  attack,  and  obliged  us  to  retreat,  Man- 
teuffel  would  march  to  meet  us,  throwing  himself  upon 
our  communications  by  a  change  of  direction  to  the 
right. 

These  definite  resolutions  were  reached  by  Manteuffel 
on  the  day  of  his  arrival,  January  12,  and  from  this  time, 
he  had  only  to  choose  his  roads. 

The  country  to  be  traversed  was  difficult — a  hilly  and 
wooded  region,  with  roads  which  were  scarcely  practica- 
ble. The  secondary  chain  of  the  Morvan,  which  must 
be  crossed,  was  a  decided  obstacle,  especially  at  this 
season.  The  connection  between  the  columns  could 
not  always  be  relied  upon.  And  finally,  the  line  of 
direction  passed  between  Dijon  and  Langres,  two  points 
strongly  occupied  by  the  enemy.  Some  resistance  then 
was  to  be  expected  here.  Nevertheless,  the  case  was 
urgent;  hesitation  and  delay  were  more  than  ever  dan- 
gerous. Consequently,  Manteuffel  decided  to  take  the 
most  direct  roads,  while  keeping  up  his  communications 
with  Paris,  by  Chatillon-sur-Seine.  Having  arrived  at 
this  conclusion,  he  issued  his  orders  on  the  night  of  the 
I2th. 

His  first  care  was  to  secure  his  own  communications. 
To  this  end  he  formed  a  mixed  brigade  (Kettler).  It 
was  to  cover  the  line  Chatillon-Nuits-Tonnerre,  which 
was  of  the  greatest  importance  for  the  troops  operating 
in  the  basins  of  the  Loire  and  the  Sarthe.  This  line  had 
moreover  the  advantage  of  uniting  the  communications 
of  the  II.  and  VII.  Corps.  And,  in  case  of  necessity, 
these  corps  could  be  marched  upon  Blemes,  a  junction 
station  upon  the  principal  eastern  railroad. 

Then,  foreseeing  the  difficulties  that  would  probably 
be  experienced  in  giving  orders  regularly  to  his  two 
corps,  during  their  march  toward  the  east,  he  thought  it 
prudent  to  accompany  the  detailed  instructions  by  an  out- 
line of  the  first  end  to  be  attained  and  the  plans  which 
he  had  formed. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.         24 1 

The  main  ideas  at  the  outset  were: 

ist.  To  rapidly  gain  the  defiles  of  the  Morvaii  moun- 
tains; 

2d.   To  guard  them. 

In  leaving  the  defiles,  each  column  was  to  deploy  to 
the  right  and  left,  in  order  to  facilitate  the  exit  of  the 
various  bodies. 

All  the  dispositions  being  made,  the  march  began.  It 
was  the  14th  of  January,  the  very  day  of  the  first  com- 
bats between  Werder's  outposts  upon  the  Ivisaine  and 
our  advanced-guard.  Notwithstanding  the  intense  cold, 
the  poor  roads,  and  the  hardships  imposed  upon  the 
Prussian  troops,  the  columns  followed  regularly  the  in- 
dicated roads. 

The  VII.  Corps  was  covered  by  a  detachment  on  the 
left,  against  Laugres,  the  garrison  of  which,  however, 
remained  passive.  The  corps  on  its  march  destroyed 
the  telegraph  and  railway  line  branching  from  Chalin- 
dre)'. 

The  II.  Corps  was  protected  on  the  right  by  the  mixed 
brigade,  against  the  enterprises  of  the  defenders  of  Dijon. 

On  the  1 8th  of  January,  the  Seine  at  Gray  was 
reached  without  hindrance,  when  Manteuffel  received 
dispatches  from  Werder  which  completely  changed  the 
face  of  affairs.  Our  efforts  had  failed,  and  Bourbaki, 
not  having  been  able  to  carry  the  positions  on  the  Lis- 
aine,  had  been  obliged  to  retreat  to  Besangon. 

In  this  situation,  the  temptation  was  strong  for  Man- 
teuffel to  effect  a  junction  with  the  XIV.  Corps  towards 
Rioz  and  Montbozon,  and  to  endeavor  then  to  over- 
power our  already  enfeebled  forces.  This  project  was, 
in  appearance,  the  most  reasonable;  it  was  at  least  the 
simplest;  but  it  excluded  all  possibility  of  decisive  re- 
sults; the  cohesion  of  the  enemy  could  be  still  further 
diminished,  his  losses  increased,  but  he  could  not  be  de- 
stroyed. 
16 


242  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

If,  on  the  contrary,  the  II.  and  VII.  Corps,  inclining 
their  lines  of  operations  toward  the  sonth,  should  move 
upon  Bourbaki's  communications,  the  latter  would  be 
constrained  to  retreat  by  a  narrow  strip  of  territory  be- 
tween the  Saone  and  the  neutral  frontier  of  Switzerland. 
If  the  Besancon  road  should  be  occupied  before  our 
troops  arrived  under  the  walls  of  this  place,  their 
situation  would  be  extremely  critical.  The  march  of  the 
II.  and  VII.  Prussian  Corps  would  certainly  not  be  with- 
out danger,  for  they  would  thus  have  Besangon  upon 
their  flank.  The  bridges  of  the  Ognon,  theDoubs,  and 
the  Saone  were  so  many  defiles,  left  upon  their  rear, 
which  would  be  menaced  by  the  garrisons  of  Dijon  and 
Auxonne. 

However,  Manteufifel  persisted  in  his  plan  of  march- 
ing straight  upon  Bourbaki's  communications,  and  on 
the  13th  of  January  submitted  it  to  the  King  at  Ver- 
sailles, for  his  decision. 

Von  Moltke  was  the  first  to  support  it,  saying  to  his 
sovereign  : 

"This  movement  is  extremely  bold,  but  it  may  lead 
to  most  important  results.  If  Manteuifel  should  receive 
a  check,  he  must  not  be  blamed,  for  to  obtain  an  import- 
ant success,  something  must  always  be  risked." 

In  consequence,  on  the  19th,  Manteuffel  ordered  the 
march  toward  the  east  to  be  resumed,  and  prepared  for 
his  change  of  direction  toward  the  southeast.  The 
same  day,  he  received  information  that  Werder  was  to 
pursue  Bourbaki,  and  upon  the  20tli  would  be  upon 
the  line  Noray-le-Bourg-Villersexel-Onans,  extending 
thus  his  right  across  his  adversary's  line  of  retreat. 
Now  was  the  time  to  throw  the  II.  and  VII.  Corps  upon 
the  rear  of  the  beaten  arm}^,  that  is,  upon  Dole  and 
Dampiere-sur-Doubs.  The  order  for  this  was  immedi- 
ately given. 

On  the  2ist  of  January,   the  advanced-guard  of  the 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        243 

II.  Corps  arrived  at  Dole.  The  same  day  the  VII. 
reached  the  Ogiion,  encountered  the  first  outposts  of  the 
French,  and  established  its  connection  with  the  XIV. 
Corps. 

On  the  23d,  the  roads  to  the  sonth  of  Besangon  were 
closed;  on  the  24th,  the  order  was  given  to  attack 
Bonrbaki.  MantenfFel  had  accomplished  his  purpose. 
In  fact,  the  direction  chosen  for  his  line  of  operations 
had  led  him  at  once  upon  his  enemy's  communications; 
he  had  but  to  march  upon  the  adversary  and  defeat  him. 
We  know  that,  unfortunately  for  us,  the  retreat  into 
Switzerland,  and  the  consequent  loss  of  our  Army  of  the 
Bast,  were  the  results  of  this  skillful  combination.  This 
march  of  Manteufifel,  approved  by  Von  Moltke,  shows 
that  the  principles  which  guided  Napoleon,  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  century,  are  still  true,  and  that  their 
intelligent  application  should  insure  results  of  signal 
importance. 

In  the  present  instance,  however,  it  must  not  be  lost 
from  view  that  Bonrbaki' s  soldiers  were  not  as  exper- 
ienced as  their  adversaries,  and  that  in  strategy,  as  in 
tactics,  this  is  a  dominating  consideration. 

To  be  the  stronger  at  the  critical  point  fulfills  every 
requirement  for  success.  Had  Bonrbaki  possessed  this 
advantage  at  Hericourt,  he  would,  perhaps,  have  tri- 
umphed in  this  campaign,  and,  at  Besangon,  he  would 
have  remembered  that  he  occupied  a  strong  central 
position,  against  a  divided  enemy  advancing  upon  two 
separate  lines  of  operations.  He  would  certainly  have 
profited  from  this  situation.  But  his  soldiers  were  thor- 
oughly exhausted.  Though  well  ofiicered,  and  embody- 
ing many  good  cadres^  his  forces  were  no  longer  in  con- 
dition to  fight,  and  our  adversaries  dared  venture  anv- 
thing. 

Contemporaneous  wars  offer  us  examples  also  of  lines 
of  operations  directed  upon  the  centre  of  the  enemy's 


244  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

forces.  But  such  dispositions  are  associated  with  in- 
terior lines.  It  will  then  be  proper  to  study  them  with 
the  latter. 

If  we  wish  to  epitomize  the  preceding,  it  will  suffice 
to  recall  the  rule  of  experience  so  clearly  expressed  by 
Jomini : 

"One  of  the  principles  of  strategy  is  to  first  seize  the 
enei7iy  s  cojufiiunications^  and  tlien  turn  upon  his  army. 
The  direction  of  the  line  of  operations  should  be  that 
which  holds  out  the  surest  promise  of  decisive  success, 
and  which  forces  the  enemy  to  stake  the  fate  of  his  army 
upon  the  issue  of  a  single  battle.  It  is  imperative  then 
to  move  rapidly  upon  /^^;;^,  and  smite  hijn  until  he  is 
destroyed. ' ' 

[b)   UNITY  OF  IvINES   OF  OPERATIONS. 

Independent  of  the  proper  selection  of  roads  to  be 
traversed  by  the  columns,  military  men  of  all  times  have 
recognized  that  an  army  should  have  but  one  line  of 
operations. 

This  principle  is  one  of  those  most  clearly  exempli- 
fied in  the  campaigns  of  Napoleon.  And  yet,  when  he 
succeeded  for  the  first  time  to  the  chief  command,  it 
seemed  that  its  utility  had  up  to  that  period  been  unap- 
preciated and  neglected.  During  the  first  wars  of  the 
Republic,  indeed,  it  was  often  set  at  naught,  and  this 
error  always  led  to  disastrous  consequences.  It  will  not 
be  without  advantage  to  acquaint  ourselves  with  in- 
stances of  this. 

Campaign  of  ijc)^  in  Gei-many. — In  this  year  the 
Directory  resolved  to  carry  the  war  into  Germany. 
Jourdan,  at  the  head  of  the  Army  of  Sambre-et-Mcuse.^ 
was  to  cross  the  Rhine  at  Dusseldorf.  Pichegru,  with 
the  Army  of  Rhin-et-Moselle.^  was  to  pass  at  Mannheim 
and  to  effect  a  junction  with  Jourdan  upon  the  Main. 

The  Austrians,  commanded  by  Generals  Clairfayt  and 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        245 

Wuriiiser,  were  at  Mayeiice,  between  our  two  armies, 
whose  lines  of  operations  were  separated  by  50  leagues, 
without  possible  lateral  connection.  The  enemy,  on 
the  contrary,  was  operating  on  a  single  interior  line, 
which  offered  him  the  advantage  of  being  able  to  mass 
his  forces  successively  against  each  of  the  opposing 
armies.  Our  adversary  seized  this  advantage,  and  our 
separated  armies,  attacked  one  after  the  other  by  super- 
ior forces,  were  beaten. 

The  Directory  was  not  able  to  account  for  these  re- 
verses, and  contented  itself  with  replacing  Pichegru 
by  Moreau. 

Campaign  of  //p^,  in  Germany. — This  campaign  is 
one  of  the  most  fertile  in  instruction  which  history  offers. 
Later,  this  fact  forcibly  struck  Napoleon.  At  the  mo- 
ment the  events  of  this  war  were  transpiring,  he  was  on 
the  threshold  of  his  career,  engaged  in  struggles  with 
superior  forces  and  numberless  difficulties  in  Italy,  and 
had  consequently  neither  time  nor  opportunity  to  occupy 
himself  with  them. 

The  Aulic  Council  at  Vienna  had  replaced  Clairfayt 
by  the  Archduke,  and  toward  the  end  of  May,  1796,  de- 
cided to  send  Wiirmser  to  Italy,  The  Archduke  re- 
mained sole  commander-in-chief  of  the  forces  assembled 
on  the  Rhine. 

The  situation  was  as  follows:   . 

In  advance  of  Mayence,  at  Baumholder  and  upon  the 
Nahe,  was  stationed  an  Austrian  force  of  80,000  men, 
with  a  corps  under  orders  of  the  Duke  of  Wiirtemberg, 
between  the  Lahn  and  the  Sieg. 

Jourdan  guarded  the  Hundsriick,  observing  the  Arch- 
duke.    {See  Plate  VI  11.) 

A  second  force  of  70,000  Austrians  in  the  Palatinate, 
acted  in  conjunction  with  the  first  army,  and  covered 
Mannheim  against  the  enterprises  of  Moreau. 

On  our  side,  two  groups  of  forces  and  two  fields  of 


246  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY, 

operations;  with  the  Austrians,  on  the  contrary,  a  single 
mass. 

According  to  the  plan  of  campaign  of  the  Directory,  the 
Armv  of  Sambre-et-Meuse,  leaving  its  rig^ht  in  Hunds- 

^  ,'00 

riick,  was  to  advance  at  first  by  Dusseldorf  to  concen- 
trate the  enemy's  attention  upon  itself,  for  the  purpose 
of  facilitating  Moreau's  passage  of  the  Rhine.  It  was 
hoped  thus  to  force  the  Archduke  to  quit  the  left  bank 
of  the  Rhine,  on  account  of  the  menace  to  his  commu- 
nications. In  fact,  it  was  for  this  reason  that  the  Direc- 
tory gave  its  armies  two  lines  of  operations.  The  im- 
perial forces  on  their  side,  committed  a  similar  error, 
but  had  the  advantage  of  possessing  interior  lines  of 
operations. 

Our  generals,  feeling  the  inconvenience  of  this  plan, 
protested;  but  they  were  obliged  to  conform  to  it,  at 
least  in  part;  and  during  the  first  days  of  June,  Kleber 
entered  the  basin  of  the  Sieg,  and  defeating  the  Duke 
of  Wiirtemberg  at  Altenkirchen,  cast  him  back  upon 
the  Lahn. 

On  receipt  of  this  news,  the  Archduke  abandoned  the 
left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  and  marched  with  all  his  dispos- 
able forces  toward  the  Lahn,  to  the  succor  of  his  lieu- 
tenant. 

When  Jourdan  learned  of  the  departure  of  his  adver- 
sary's forces,  he  dispatched  a  body  of  light  troops  to 
follow  their  rear-guard,  and  moved  out  by  his  left  flank 
to  cross  the  Rhine  at  Neuwied,  for  the  purpose  of  sup- 
porting Kleber. 

General  Marceau,  with  20,000  men,  remained  before 
Mayence. 

These  first  movements  led  to  the  encounter  at  Wetz- 
lar  upon  the  Lahn,  between  the  Archduke's  forces 
and  one  of  Jourdan's  wings,  commanded  by  General 
Lefebvre,  the  divisions  of  which  were  very  much  spread 
out.  The  latter  forces  were  overwhelmed  by  superior 
numbers,  and  beaten. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        247 

Joiirdan  then  found  himself  in  a  dangerous  ]:)osition; 
his  army,  perpendicular  to  the  Rhine,  had  this  large 
water  course  on  its  right,  and  a  victorious  enemy  on  its 
left.  To  disengage  himself,  he  might  have  attempted  a 
change  of  front.  This  would  have  led  to  the  establish- 
ment of  his  line  of  battle  parallel  to  the  river,  in  which 
case  he  ran  the  risk  of  being  driven  upon  it.  If  he  re- 
mained on  this  side  of  the  Rhine,  there  was  but  one  course 
open  to  him,  to  take  the  offensive  with  all  his  forces. 
He  preferred  to  retire,  fearing  to  give  battle  in  this 
situation. 

Moreover,  the  object  of  his  march  to  the  Lahn  seemed 
to  him  already  accomplished,  since  he  had  induced  the 
bulk  of  the  Austrian  forces  to  let  go  their  hold  upon  the 
Rhine  and  follow  him  there.  Consequently  he  recrossed 
the  Rhine  at  Neuwied,  while  his  left  wing  under  Kleber 
retreated  toward  the  Sieg  and  Dusseldorf. 

Some  days  later,  the  Archduke  leaving,  in  his  turn, 
the  vicinity  of  Altenkirchen,  moved  with  a  part  of  his 
forces  against  Moreau,  who  had  crossed  the  Rhine  at 
Kehl,  threatening  the  important  line  of  the  Danube. 

In  fact,  the  adoption  of  two  separate  lines  of  oper- 
ations had,  in  less  than  a  month  after  the  commence- 
ment of  the  campaign,  the  regrettable  result  of  enabling 
the  Archduke  to  beat  one  of  our  corps  in  an  isolated 
combat,  and  to  force  the  retreat  of  one  of  our  main 
armies. 

What  was  passing  during  this  time  upon  the  upper 
Rhine? 

Moreau,  after  taking  command  of  Pichegru's  army, 
had  seen  the  Austrian  forces  diminish  little  by  little  on 
his  front,  and  finally  return  to  the  right  bank.  This 
resulted  from  the  fact  that  Wiirmser  had  received  orders 
from  Vienna  to  dispatch  reinforcements  to  the  Army  of 
Italy.  Finding  himself  then  too  weak  and  in  too  ex- 
posed a  position,  after  the  departure  of  the  Archduke 


248  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

for  the  Laliii,  he  had  in  turn  fallen  back  bevond  the 
Rhine.  A  short  time  after  this,  he  was  ordered  to  give 
up  his  command  and  proceed  to  Italy,  being  replaced 
by  General  L-atonr,  who  was  to  operate  under  the  Arch- 
duke. 

Moreau  had  profited  by  these  circumstances  to  forci- 
bly cross  the  Rhine  at  Kehl,  on  June  23,  and  direct 
himself  by  way  of  Renchen  toward  the  basin  of  the 
Neckar. 

The  Archduke  heard  of  this  on  the  26th.  He  took  in 
the  gravity  of  the  situation,  and  resolved  to  gather  to- 
gether all  his  forces  for  an  encounter  with  the  army 
about  to  threaten  his  principal  communications  and 
perhaps  forestall  him  upon  the  Danube.  He  immedi- 
ately assembled  his  disposable  troops,  and  quitting  the 
banks  of  the  Lahn,  set  out  with  about  25,000  men,  leav- 
ing a  strong  garrison  at  Mayence  and  a  corps  of  38,000 
men  upon  the  Main  under  Wartensleben.  His  army 
was  so  dispersed  that  its  concentration  seemed  difficult. 
In  this  the  Archduke  succeeded  as  well  as  possible  under 
the  circumstances,  and  as  soon  as  the  forces  in  hand 
seemed  sufficient,  attacked  his  adversary  on  the  plains  of 
the  Rhine.  But  General  Latour  did  not  know  how  to 
use  his  numerous  cavalry  to  advantage,  while  on  our 
side  the  tactical  dispositions  of  Desaix  threw  the  imper- 
ialists into  confusion.  The  latter  were  defeated  at 
Rastadt  and  Esslingen.  The  Archduke  concluded  from 
these  defeats  that  he  was  not  in  condition  to  stay  the 
march  of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine.  He  therefore  re- 
solved to  effect  a  concentration  of  the  scattered  Austrian 
forces  in  rear,  in  the  vicinity  of  Ratisbon,  to  throw  him- 
self first  of  all,  with  the  bulk  of  his  troops,  upon  the  Army 
of  Sanibi'e-et-Meiise^  and  then  to  return  with  greater 
chances  of  success  against  Moreau.  He  accordingly  re- 
treated to  Pforzheim,  and  thence  to  Nordlingcn,  covering 
thus  his  communications,  and  drawing  near  the  Danube, 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — rREPARATlON  FOR  WAR.        249 

which  he  reached  about  the  loth  of  April.  Finding 
himself  followed  by  Moreau,  lie  attacked  the  latter  at 
Neresheim,  where  an  indecisive  battle  was  fouglit. 
Then,  continuing  his  retreat,  he  crossed,  on  the  13th,  to 
the  other  side  of  the  Danube,  destroying  the  bridges  as 
far  as  Donauwerth.  This  movement  had  an  object. 
The  Archduke  had  just  learned  that  the  Army  of  Sam- 
bre-et-Meuse^  favored  by  the  crossing  of  the  Army  of  the 
Rhine  at  Kehl,  had  resumed  the  offensive,  thrown  back 
Wartensleben,  and  was  advancing  upon  Wurzburg. 

Profiting  by  his  central  position,  and  the  dangers  his 
adversaries  were  running  by  employing  two  independent 
lines  of  operations,  the  Archduke  conceived  the  plan  of 
leaving  a  retaining  force  in  front  of  Moreau,  and  hasten- 
ing to  assail  Jourdan  with  superior  numbers. 

The  latter,  after  recrossing  the  Rhine  and  calling 
Kleber  to  him,  took  the  field  against  Wartensleben,  who 
had  at  first  occupied  the  line  of  the  Lahn.  The  Aus- 
trian commander,  having  received  orders  not  to  come  to 
any  serious  engagement,  and  having  satisfied  himself 
of  the  numerical  superiority  of  the  French  army,  de- 
cided to  retreat  to  the  Main.  Jourdan  continued  his 
march,  seized  Wiirzburg  on  the  25th  of  July,  and  ad- 
vanced his  forces  according  to  the  instructions  of  the 
Directory,  upon  both  banks  of  the  Main,  without  at- 
tempting to  co-operate  with  the  Army  oi  Rhin-et- Moselle. 
{See  Plate  IX.) 

On  the  4th  of  August,  he  occupied  Bamberg.  On  the 
7th  he  drove  back  General  Kray  at  Forcheim,  then  as- 
cended the  Regnitz  by  both  banks,  seized  Am  berg,  and 
about  the  20th  of  August  arrived  upon  the  Naab,  where 
the  Austrians,  establishing  themselves  upon  the  strong 
positions  afforded  by  this  region,  finally  discontinued 
their  retreat.  The  two  armies  were  then  separated  by 
the  river. 

Bernadotte,  detached  to  Neumarkt,  observed  the  road 
to  Ratisbon,  and  covered  Jourdan' s  right  flank. 


250  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

After  the  battle  of  Neresheim,  iitli  and  i2tli  August, 
the  Archduke  resolved  to  march  to  the  Naab,  convinced 
that  a  victory  over  one  of  the  two  hostile  armies  would 
compel  the  retreat  of  the  other.  Yet  before  putting  his 
plan  into  execution,  he  endeavored  to  draw  Moreau  to 
the  right  bank  of  the  Danube.  The  latter,  however, 
desired  rather  to  manoeuvre  on  the  left  bank,  which' 
offered  facilities  for  joining  Jourdan.  He  at  first  fol- 
lowed the  Austrians  in  the  direction  of  the  Wornitz. 
But  the  Directory  ordered  him  to  advance  by  the  right 
bank,  for  the  purpose  of  facilitating  the  operations  of  the 
Army  of  Italy.  In  consequence,  he  crossed  the  Danube 
on  the  19th  of  August,  and  took  position  upon  the 
Zusani. 

As  soon  as  this  movement  was  completed,  the  Arch- 
duke left  lyatour  with  a  corps  of  38,000  men  upon  the 
Lech,  to  bridle  the  Army  of  the  Rhine,  recrossed  the 
Danube,  and  marched  by  way  of  Ingolstadt  upon  Neu- 
markt,  with  the  remainder  of  his  forces,  24  battalions 
and  50  squadrons,  about  28,000  men. 

Bernadotte,  who  had  been  posted  in  an  isolated  posi- 
tion at  Neumarkt,  was  struck  first.  Assailed  by  superior 
forces,  he  was  obliged  to  fall  back  upon  Lauf  and  For- 
cheim.  Jourdan,  learning  of  this  attack,  and  fearing 
for  his  right,  abandoned  the  Naab  and  retired  upon 
Amberg,  where  he  took  position  on  August  24.  War- 
tensleben  immediately  followed  him,  and  hastened  to 
form  a  junction  with  the  Archduke. 

Jourdan,  beaten  at  Amberg,  was  obliged  to  retreat. 
But  the  Nuremberg  road  had  already  been  seized  by  the 
enemy.  He  was  compelled,  therefore,  to  move  toward 
Velden,  and  thence  upon  Schweinfurth.  The  Archduke 
then  occupied  Wiirzburg.  Jourdan,  pressed  by  the  Di- 
rectory, vainly  endeavored  to  recapture  this  place.  His 
adversary  had  all  his  forces  assembled  upon  the  right 
bank  of  the   Main.     The  battle  of  Wiirzburg,    fought 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        25 T 

under  these  conditions,  was  another  repnlse  to  onr  arms. 
Jonrdan  was  obliged  to  retire  npon  Arnistein,  thence  upon 
the  Lahn,  through  Fulda  and  the  difficult  country  sur- 
rounding it.  To  extricate  him,  Marceau  received  orders 
to  raise  the  siege  of  Mayence  and  to  cover  the  retreat. 
This  was  conducted  en  echelons  and  in  good  order,  not- 
withstanding the  pursuit  and  attacks  of  the  Austrians, 
but  not  without  new  reverses.  It  was  in  one  of  the 
combats  of  this  period,  at  Altenkirchen,  after  a  glorious 
struggle  against  an  infuriated  and  outnumbering  enemy, 
that  Marceau  met  his  death. 

Finally,  on  the  20th  of  September,  the  Army  of 
Smnbre-et-Meuse  was  obliged  to  recross  the  Rhine  a 
second  time;  after  this,  it  took  no  further  part  in  the 
campaign.  Jonrdan  was  immediately  relieved  from  his 
command. 

Thenceforth,  the  Archduke  was  free  to  march,  with  all 
his  forces,  either  directly  against  the  Army  of  the  Rhine 
or  upon  its  communications.  To  appreciate  the  situa- 
tion, let  us  return  to  the  operations  on  the  Danube. 

Upon  learning  of  the  departure  of  the  Archduke,  far 
from  seeking  to  strengthen  Jourdan's  army,  the  success 
of  which  was  the  surest  guaranty  of  his  own,  Moreau  re- 
resolved  to  penetrate  Bavaria,  in  order  to  make  a  diver- 
sion in  favor  of  his  colleague.  He  crossed  the  Lech,  drove 
Latour  upon  Landshut,  and  advanced  to  the  Isar,  where 
several  insignificant  combats  took  place. 

But  soon,  news  from  the  Army  of  Sanibre-ei-Afense 
began  to  disturb  him.  He  advanced  toward  the  Danube, 
and,  in  the  first  days  of  September,  attempted  to  open 
communication  with  that  army.  But  it  was  too  late; 
Jourdan  was  already  upon  the  Lahn.  When  Moreau 
learned  of  the  battle  of  Wiirzburg,  and  of  the  retreat 
of  our  forces,  he  comprehended  the  dangers  of  his  iso- 
lated position.  He  decided  to  fall  back  upon  the  Lech, 
then  upon  the  Iller,  where  he  was  in  position  on  the 


252  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

24th  of  September,  followed  by  Latour,  whom  he  was 
disposed  to  resist.  But  the  absence  of  news  from  Jour- 
dan  made  him  apprehensive  of  a  descent  by  the  Arch- 
duke upon  his  rear.  Further,  an  Austrian  corps,  di- 
rected upon  Ulm,  threatened  to  outflank  his  left.  There 
was  nothing  remaining  but  to  yield  to  circumstances, 
and  seek  to  regain  the  Rhine  without  delay.  The  enemy 
then  began  to  press  him,  and  in  order  to  disengage  him- 
self, he  fought  the  battle  of  Biberach,  gaining  a  com- 
plete victory. 

But  this  success  did  not  extricate  him  from  his  em- 
barrassments. The  Archduke,  marching  straight  upon 
his  communications,  had  compelled  one  of  his  divisions 
to  cross  the  river  at  Mannheim.  Moreau  could  no  longer 
think  of  retiring  upon  Strasburg  by  the  valley  of  the 
Kintzig,  which  was  guarded,  and  too  near  the  Austrian 
corps  arriving  from  the  banks  of  the  Main.  lie  then 
took  the  Val-d'' Enfer  route,  leaving  only  a  strong  rear- 
guard in  front  of  Latour.  Yet,  before  repassing  the 
Rhine,  he  made  another  attempt  at  resistance.  But  his 
adversaries  had  united,  and,  after  several  unimportant 
combats,  he  was  forced  to  recross  the  river  at  Brisach 
and  Huningen. 

The  campaign  was  ended,  and  in  spite  of  brilliant 
feats  of  arms,  and  of  Moreau's  highly  applauded  retreat, 
the  results  had  declared  against  us.  Thus,  for  two  con- 
secutive years,  our  armies  in  Germany  had  been  forced 
to  evacuate  the  theatre  of  operations  and  retreat  upon  the 
Rhine,  leaving  all  the  advantages  to  the  enemy.  And 
yet  these  armies  were  large,  and  composed  of  warlike  and 
daring  troops,  commanded  by  worthy  generals.  Jour- 
dan  and  Moreau  were  leaders  of  talent,  and  had  under 
them  men  of  unusual  capacity,  such  as  Kleber  and  IMar- 
ceau,  in  the  Army  of  Sambre-et-Meiise ;  Desaix  and 
Gouvion  Saint-Cyr  in  that  of  Rhin-et-Moselle. 

How  was  it  that  at  the  same  period  a  smaller  body  of 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        253 

troops,  of  like  character,  g-ained  brilliant  victories  in 
Italy?  It  resulted  from  a  difference  in  the  directing 
thought. 

In  Germany,  we  constantly  adopted  double  lines  of  op- 
erations, far  distant  from  each  other,  and  without  possible 
connection  between  them,  leaving  to  our  enemies  all 
the  advantages  resulting  from  the  employment  of  inter- 
ior lines,  or  a  single  operating  line. 

The  Archduke  Charles  made  skillful  use  of  the  ad- 
vantage thus  thrown  into  his  hands,  marching  from  one 
of  our  armies  to  the  other,  overwhelming  the  first  with 
superior  forces,  and  returning  then  upon  the  second,  and 
threatening  its  communications. 

In  Italy,  it  was  our  adversaries  that  committed  these 
mistakes.  There  were  then  striking  analogies  in  these 
two  campaigns. 

Our  lack  of  success  in  Germany,  however,  could  not 
be  attributed  either  to  Jourdan.or  Moreau,  but  to  the 
author  of  the  plan  of  campaign — the  Director5\  It  had 
fallen  again,  in  1796,  into  the  error  which  had  already 
led  us  to  reverses  in  the  preceding  year. 

A  valuable  lesson  of  experience  may  then  be  drawn 
from  these  events;  it  is  that  zvith  good  troops  and  excel- 
lent geiierals^  there  is  yet  danger  of  disastrous  results 
when  the  directing  tJiotight  is  gnided  by  false  principles. 

The  necessity  for  a  single  line  of  operations  is  set  forth 
more  forcibly  still  in  the  campaign  which  opened  the 
following  year. 

Campaign  of  1797,  in  Italy. — {See  Plate  X.)  In  this  year 
the  two  conquerors  of  1796  found  themselves  facing 
each  other.  Our  army  of  Italy,  under  Bonaparte,  had 
successively  destroyed  four  hostile  armies,  and  won  the 
the  brilliant  victories  so  renowned  in  history.  Two 
divisions  drawn  from  the  armies  of  the  Rhine  and  Sam- 
bre-et-Meiise^  and  commanded  by  Generals  Bernadotte 


254  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY.     ■ 

and  Delmas,  had  been  sent  him.  This  raised  his  effec- 
tive to  only  60,000  men;  bnt  these  were  more  than  he 
required  to  gain  new  successes,  and  to  reply  by  new  tri- 
umphs to  the  jealousies  of  the  Directory. 

At  the  end  of  January,  1797,  he  occupied  the  Adige 
and  the  Italian  Tyrol. 

The  Aulic  Council  at  Vienna  had  intrusted  the  com- 
mand of  the  Austrian  forces  in  Italy  to  the  Archduke 
Charles.  The  latter  had  demanded  a  reinforcement  of 
40,000  men,  drafted  from  the  troops  in  Germany,  in  order 
to  recruit  the  army  of  Alvinzi  up  to  80,000  combatants. 
While  awaiting  their  arrival,  the  Archduke  had  estab- 
lished his  headquarters  at  Innspruck,  where  he  was  in 
person,  on  the  6th  of  February. 

Bonaparte  concluded  from  this,  that  his  adversary 
would  unite  the  principal  forces  in  Tyrol,  leaving  only 
a  detachment — a  division,  perhaps — behind  the  Taglia- 
mento,  to  cover  Friuli..  This  combination  offered  the 
Archduke  several  advantages.  First,  it  was  impossible 
to  prevent  the  union  of  his  forces.  Then,  he  would  be 
able  to  receive  his  Rhenish  divisions  twenty  days  earlier 
in  Tyrol  than  in  Friuli  or  Carinthia.  He  had  before 
him  Joubert,  whom  Bonaparte  had  placed  near  Trent 
with  17,000  men.  The  Archduke  could  bring  an  over- 
whelming force  against  these. 

In  anticipation  of  this  event,  Bonaparte  communi- 
cated his  apprehensions  to  Joubert,  ordering  him  to  take 
up  a  strong  defensive  position,  so  as  to  be  able  to  hold 
the  Archduke  in  check,  while  his  own  forces  took  the 
latter  in  rear  by  the  defiles  of  the  Brenta. 

But  these  were  simple  hypotheses.  The  Aulic  Council 
ordered  the  Archduke  to  concentrate  his  forces  in  Friuli. 
As  usual,  Carniola  and  Trieste  absorbed  the  attention  of 
the  Council,  and  it  endeavored  to  preserve  this  section 
from  invasion.  The  Archduke  moved  his  headquarters 
then  to  Villach  and  Goritz. 


SECOND  CIIAPTKP. — PRP:PARATI0N  FOR  WAR.         255 

When  Bonaparte  was  informed  of  this,  he  divined  the 
new  combination  decided  npon  b}^  the  Austrians,  and 
immediately  conceived  the  plan  of  attacking  them  be- 
fore the  arrival  of  their  reinforcements,  and  of  seizing 
their  line  of  communications. 

On  the  13th  of  March  he  gave  detailed  orders,  fully 
explaining  his  projects,  to  Joubert  and  to  Massena,  the 
the  latter  being  at  Belluno  with  his  division. 

At  the  same. time  he  left  the  divisions  of  Victor  and 
Kilmaine  in  the  Marches  and  in  Romagna,  to  observe 
the  Papal  army  and  Naples. 

"  To  General  Massena. 

"Headquarters,   Conegwano,    23  Ventose,  Year  V. 
(March  13,  1797),  7  o'clock  p.  m. 

"  General  Massena  is  informed  that  Serurier's  divis- 
ion is  at  Conegliano;  that  General  Guieu's  division,  and 
the  cavalry  reserve,  are  at  Sacile;  that  since  yesterday 
we  have  been  across  the  Piave. 

"The  enemy  is  retiring,  and  appears  to  have  decided 
to  take  position  behind  the  Tagliamento.  The  General- 
in-chief  hopes  to  deliver  a  blow  which  shall  decide  the 
fate  of  the  campaign,  and  cover  the  Army  of  Italy  with 
new  laurels.  He  is  certain  that  Prince  Charles  com- 
mands. 

"  The  General-in-chief  orders  General  Massena  to  set 
out  to-morrow  for  Belluno,  and  move  toward  the  Taglia- 
mento; he  desires  him  to  be  at  Aviano  to-morrow  even- 
ing, where  he  will  receive  new  orders.  If  from  inform- 
ation gathered,  it  should  appear  that  the  nature  of  the 
roads  will  not  permit  his  artillery  to  follow  him,  he 
should  send  it  under  escort  to  Sacile,  from  which  place 
it  could  rejoin  him  upon  the  Tagliamento. 

"  In  case  the  snows,  or  indeed  the  nature  of  the  roads, 
prevent  General  Massena' s  infantry  from  marching  to 


256  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Aviano,  he  could  take  the  road  from  Belluno  to  Sacile, 
endeavoring  to  gain  Pordenone,  beyond  Sacile,  on  the 
road  from  the  latter  place  to  San  Vito,  within  two  days. 
It  is  important  that  the  General-in-chief  be  informed  at 
the  earliest  moment  of  the  route  taken  by  General 
Massena,  and  of  the  place  in  which  he  shall  sleep  to- 
morrow and  afterwards.  Although  the  General-in-chief 
presumes  that  the  forces  which  he  has  at  this  moment 
are  sufficient  to  insure  victory,  he  may  think  it  well  to 
delay  his  attack  for  a  day,  in  order  that  the  brave  Mas- 
sena division  may  participate. 

'-'The  enemy  appears  very  uneasy,  and  will  find  him- 
self again  caught  at  the  very  moment  when  he  is  putting 
his  adopted  plan  into  execution.  Everything  presages 
the  grandest  successes  for  us — successes  which  must  de- 
cide the  campaign. 

"Should  General  Massena  have  given  orders  to  Gen- 
eral Baraguey-d'Hilliers,  he  will  apprize  the  latter  of  his 
movement,  in  order  that  he  may  no  longer  act  as  if  he 
alone  covered  General  Joubert's  right.  In  every  case. 
General  Massena  should  keep  these  two  generals  in- 
formed." 

Bonaparte's  attention  was  especially  directed  to  the 
position  of  Joubert,  to  whom  he  addressed  instructions 
setting  forth  both  the  provisions  to  be  made  and  the  pre- 
cautions to  be  taken. 

"77?  General  Joube7^t. 

"Headquarters,  Sacile,  25Vent6se,  YearV.  (March 

15,  1797)- 

"In  order  to  form  a  junction  of  the  divisions  which 
are  in  Tyrol  and  those  in  Friuli,  it  is  necessary  for 
the  latter  to  cross  the  Tagliamento,  seize  the  position  at 
Osoppo,  force  the  passes  of  Pontebbana,  and  reach  the 
valley  of  the  Drave. 


SECOND    CHAPTER. — PREPARATION    FOR    WAR.       257 

"The  Tyrol  divisions  should  arrive  at  Brixen  and 
drive  the  enemy  beyond  the  high  chain  of  mountains 
separating  Innspruck  from  Brixen.  But  events  may 
occur  which  the  contingencies  of  war  require  should  be 
provided  for  in  advance: 

"  ist.  The  Tyrol  divisions  may  be  beaten  and  obliged 
to  fall  back  upon  the  Mori  line,  or  even  that  of  Rivoli; 
be  forced  into  the  intrenched  camp  of  Castelnuovo,  and 
reduced  to  the  defense  of  the  Mincio;  or  even  be  com- 
pelled to  shelter  themselves  in  Mantua. 

"2d.  The  enemy  may  endeavor  to  penetrate  by  Feltre 
and  Primolano,  in  an  attempt  to  break  our  communica- 
tions; this,  in  the  present  condition  of  things,  appears 
to  me  very  difficult. 

"3d.  It  may  happen  that,  by  some  movement  or  an- 
other, the  divisions  which  are  in  Friuli  may  be  out- 
flanked on  the  right  or  the  left,  and  that  a  head  of  col- 
umn of  the  enemy  may  hence  gain  the  Piave  and  even 
the  Brenta,  before  the  Friuli  divisions, 

"Should  the  first  hypothesis  prove  correct,  but  only 
in  this  case,  you  will  make  use  of  the  order  which  I  send 
you,  giving  you  command  of  the  divisions  located  in  the 
district  of  Mantua,  as  well  as  in  Lombardy  and  the  whole  of 
the  country  comprised  between  the  Oglio  and  the  Adige. 

"In  every  case,  you  must  provision  and  hold  Pes- 
chiera,  Porto- Legnago,  Mantua,  and  Pizzighettone;  place 
yourself  between  Mantua  and  the  Po,  in  a  position  to 
supply  yourself  by  this  river,  and  to  fall  upon  the  rear 
of  the  enemy  if  he  dare  to  advance  into  the  Milanese; 
inform  General  Sahuguet  that  he  is  to  concentrate  all 
his  forces  in  the  castle  of  Ferrara.  I  shall  give  5^ou, 
moreover,  as  the  exigencies  of  events  demand,  all  neces- 
sary instructions,  not  doubting  that,  under  all  circum- 
stances, you  will  act  conformably  to  the  spirit  of  the 
war  which  we  are  now  waging. 

"You  understand  that  it  is  essential,  in  case  you  are 

17 


258  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

beaten,  to  dispute  every  position,  and  to  make  use  of  all 
resources  of  art  and  of  all  natural  features  of  the  ground 
in  order  to  give  the  Friuli  divisions  time  to  take  proper 
measures. 

"You  will  find  enclosed  herewith,  Citizen  General, 
detailed  instructions  upon  the  different  cases  which  may 
arise. 

''Prepare  to  attack  Botzen  by  the  most  convenient 
direction,  taking  the  snows  into  consideration. 

"To-morrow  we  shall  make  a  crossing  of  the  Taglia- 
mento,  which  it  is  said  the  enemy  intends  disputing.  I 
desire  you  to  begin  your  movement  on  the  27th  or  28th. 
If  the  weather  continues  as  fine  as  to-day,  and  fortune 
favors  us,  I  calculate  upon  being  in  the  defiles  of  the 
Pontebbana  on  the  30th;  that  is,  upon  the  road  leading 
from  Udine  to  Klagenfurt.  I  shall  write  from  Udine  in 
greater  detail. 

"  You  will  find  inclosed,  instructions  for  your  future 
government,  should  you  succeed  in  seizing  a  part  of 
Tyrol.  Bonaparte.  ' ' 


In  his  combination,  Bonaparte  seemed  to  adopt  two 
lines  of  operations:  one  through  Friuli,  the  other  through 
Tyrol  and  the  Pusterthal.  But  this  was  only  in  appear- 
ance. The  line  indicated  to  Joubert  was  to  be  followed 
only  in  case  of  the  success  of  the  main  forces.  It  ex- 
tended through  a  country  impracticable  for  the  enemy, 
and  was  to  be  connected  by  means  of  Massena's  division 
with  the  operating  line  of  the  principal  army. 

We  should  not,  moreover,  forget  that  in  moving 
toward  the  Noric  and  Julian  Alps,  Bonaparte  had  upon 
his  left  a  hostile  corps,  established  in  the  midst  of  Tyrol, 
and  ready  to  cut  his  communications  by  the  valley  of 
the  Adige,  aided  by  the  warlike  inhabitants  of  this 
country.  Joubert' s  corps  had  then,  a  special  mission. 
It  was  a  necessary  detachment,  but  it  was  only  a  detach. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        259 

inent.     The  line  of  operations  was  that  pnrsned  by  the 
bnlk  of  onr  forces. 

In  reality,  the  decisive  movement,  that  of  the  army 
proper,  was  to  take  place  upon  a  single  line  of  opera- 
tions, the  line  in  Frivili. 

It  commenced  on  March  10.  Bonaparte  wished  to 
have  the  advantage  of  the  initiative.  On  the  i6th  he 
encountered  the  bulk  of  the  enemy's  forces  in  position 
upon  the  left  bank  of  the  Tagliamento,  with  the  Arch- 
duke in  command.  The  latter's  line  of  communications, 
which  he  seemed  to  cover,  in  reality  extended  from  his 
right  toward  the  pass  of  Tarvis,  and  was  in  no  wise  pro- 
tected against  attacks  coming  from  this  side.  Bona- 
parte, in  pushing  Massena  forward,  counted  upon  seizing 
it,  while  he  himself  engaged  the  enemy's  main  forces. 
This  manoeuvre  was  an  entire  success. 

While  Bonaparte  was  defeating  the  Archduke  upon  the 
lower  Tagliamento,  Massena,  starting  on  the  i4tli  from 
Belluno,  reached  Aviano,  drove  back  the  L/Usignan  divi- 
sion of  the  Austrian  army,  captured  its  commander  and 
its  rear-guard,  passed  the  Tagliamento  at  San  Daniele 
on  the  i6th,  without  opposition,  and  then  marched  rap- 
idly upon  Osoppo,  Chiuesa-Veneta,  and  Pontebba,  the 
latter  of  which  he  captured  on  the  21st.  It  was  at  this 
point  also  that  he  threw  the  Austrian  Ocksay  brigade 
into  disorder,  pursuing  it  beyond  Tarvis,  and  taking  600 
prisoners.  By  the  same  blow,  all  the  magazines  estab- 
lished in  this  region  for  the  Austrian  cantonments,  fell 
into  his  hands, 

In  fact,  on  the  very  day  of  the  Archduke's  defeat,  his 
line  of  retreat  was  seized  by  the  enemy.  But  he  still  hoped 
to  regain  it.  He  had,  indeed,  conceived  the  project  of 
concentrating  all  his  forces  at  Villach,  in  front  of  the 
Drave,  where  the  first  columns  of  the  troops  from  the 
Arm}^  of  the  Rhine  had  just  arrived.  To  effect  this,  it 
was   necessary  for  him   to   insure  the  junction    of  his 


26o   .  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

right,  composed  of  Bayalisch's  three  divisions,  with 
four  battalions  of  grenadiers  already  at  Villach,  and  the 
divisions  in  march  for  Klagenfurt.  The  remainder  of 
the  Friuli  troops  was  to  join  these  forces  at  Laybach. 

But  the  rapid  passage  of  the  Isonzo  by  the  enemy,  and 
the  feeble  resistance  of  Gradisca,  overturned  these  cal- 
culations. Menaced  upon  his  right  by  Massena  and  by 
General  Guyeux,  who  was  marching  upon  Cividale,  the 
Archduke  had  nothing  left  but  to  order  Bayalisch  to  ac- 
celerate his  movement,  while  he  himself,  with  the  troops 
of  the  left,  directed  his  march  upon  Laybach  and  Krain- 
burg.  This  was  to  separate  his  columns  by  the  entire 
chain  of  the  Carnic  Alps,  and  to  expose  them  to  isolated 
defeats  by  the  indefatigable  activity  of  his  adversary. 

This  is  indeed  what  happened.  Massena,  pushing  on 
to  Tarvis,  seized  the  pass,  overthrew,  first,  the  reinforce- 
ments sent  from  Klagenfurt  by  the  Archduke,  then 
Bayalisch's  advanced-guard  when  it  came  up.  .  The  re- 
mainder of  Bayalisch's  force,  pressed  by  Guyeux,  and  no 
longer  having  the  support  of  the  fort  of  Chiusa-di-Pletz, 
which  had  fallen  into  our  hands,  soon  found  itself  be- 
tween two  fires,  and  was  forced  to  capitulate. 

The  road  to  Vienna  was  now  open. 

It  remained  first,  however,  to  connect  with  Joubert. 
The  latter,  putting  his  corps  in  movement  after  the  bat- 
tle of  the  Tagliamento,  had  occupied  Botzen,  thrown 
back  the  troops  of  Davidovitch,  one  part  into  the  valley 
of  Meran,  another  beyond  the  Brenner,  and  taken  Brixen, 
thus  assuring  himself  of  the  Pusterthal  road.  Notwith- 
standing the  uprising  in  Tyrol,  and  the  difficulties  of  his 
situation,  he  maintained  himself  at  Brixen,  awaiting 
news  of  the  arrival  of  the  main  army  upon  the  Drave. 
On  receipt  of  favorable  intelligence,  he  burned  the 
bridges  behind  him,  collected  all  his  disposable  troops, 
ascended  the  Rienz  to  the  pass  of  Toblach,  gained  the 
sources  of  the  Drave,  and,  by  way  of  Lienz,  reached 
Villach,  where  junction  was  made  with  the  main  forces. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        26 1 

The  Treaty  of  Leobeii,  negotiated  shortly  afterwards, 
was  the  fruit  of  these  remarkable  operations. 

Yet,  notwithstanding  the  results  attained,  this  was 
one  of  the  most  severely  criticised  of  Napoleon's  cam- 
paigns. The  victor  was  especially  censured  for  having 
adopted  two  distinct  lines  of  operations. 

It  is  interesting  to  know  how  he  himself  refuted  these 
strictures: 

"Was  not  the  march  into  Germany  by  two  lines  of 
operations,  those  of  Tyrol  and  Pontebba,  a  violation  of 
the  principle  that  an  army  should  have  but  one  line  of 
operations?  Was  not  the  union  of  these  two  corps  in 
Carinthia,  so  distant  from  the  point  of  departure,  con- 
trary to  the  principle  of  never  joining  columns  in  the 
face  of  the  enemy?  Would  it  not  have  been  preferable 
to  have  left  from  7,000  to  8,000  men  before  Trent  upon 
the  defensive,  and  to  have  collected  10,000  or  12,000 
more  upon  the  Piave?  This  plan  would  have  avoided 
the  necessity  of  carrying  on  the  war  in  Tyrol,  a  difficult 
theatre;  it  would  not  have  been  exposed  to  chances 
unfavorable  for  a  junction  of  the  columns;  and  at  the 
outset  of  the  campaign,  all  the  forces  would  have  been 
concentrated. 

"Neither  of  the  principles  above  cited  has  been  vio- 
lated. If  only  8,000  men  had  been  left  with  Joubert 
upon  the  Avicio,  he  would  have  been  attacked,  and  the 
corps  of  Davidovich  would  have  reached  Verona  before 
the  French  army  arrived  at  Villach.  For  the  purpose 
of  maintaining  himself  upon  the  Avicio,  Joubert  re- 
quired at  least  14,000  men.  It  seemed  preferable  to 
leave  his  forces  undiminished,  thus  giving  him  a  num- 
erical superiority  which  would  enable  him  to  defeat 
Davidovich,  shatter  and  demoralize  him,  and  drive  him 
beyond  the  Brenner.  Tyrol  is  a  difficult  region,  but  it 
is  fatal  to  the  conquered.  The  French  troops  had  ac- 
quired a  great  superiority  over  the  Germans, 


262  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

"Germany  was  not  entered  by  two  lines  of  operations, 
since  the  Pusterthal  is  on  this  side  of  the  crest  of  the 
Alps,  and  as  soon  as  Joubert  had  passed  Lienz,  the  line 
of  operation  was  that  of  Villach  and  Pontebba.  Junction 
of  the  two  corps  was  not  made  in  front  of  the  enemy, 
for  when  Joubert  left  Brixen  to  move  to  the  right,  upon 
Spittal  by  the  Pusterthal  or  the  valley  of  the  Drave,  the 
main  army  had  arrived  at  Klagenfurt,  and  had  patrols 
as  far  as  Lienz.  The  Archduke,  then,  could  devise  no 
manoeuvre  to  prevent  this  junction.  Joubert,  up  to  the 
time  of  the  battle  of  Tagliamento,  remained  upon  the 
'  defensive.  After  this  battle  he  attacked,  beat,  and  de- 
stroyed the  greater  part  of  Davidovich's  corps,  and 
threw  it  back  beyond  the  Brenner;  all  this  without 
risk,  since,  had  he  been  beaten,  he  would  simply  have 
.  fallen  back  from  position  to  position  into  Italy.  When 
he  learned  that  the  army  had  passed  the  Julian  Alps 
and  the  Drave,  he  made  his  junction  movement  by  way 
of  the  Pusterthal,  which  was  also  without  inconven- 
ience. This  operation,  rapidly  executed,  vv^as  indeed 
conformable  to  all  rules;  it  should  have  had,  and  indeed 
did  have,  every  kind  of  advantage." 

Contemporaneous  wars  offer  us  as  striking  examples 
of  the  application  of  the  principles  under  consideration. 

In  1870,  we  see  that  the  I.  and  II.  German  Armies, 
once  concentrated,  marched  upon  a  single  line  of  ope- 
rations, and  even  adopted  a  zone  so  confined  that  the 
lines  of  their  corps  cantonments  sometimes  overlapped 
one  another.  They  took  for  their  objective  point  the 
right  wing  of  the  masses  assembled  at  Metz,  then  the 
communications  of  the  latter  upon  Verdun,  and  marched 
upon  these  to  bring  the  adversary  to  action. 

After  the  great  battles  of  August,  the  III.  i\rmy  and 
the  Army  of  the  ]\Ieuse,  en  route  for  Paris,  followed  the 
general  direction  Nancy-Paris,  and,  notwithstanding  the 
absence  of  the  enemy,   refrained   from   taking  distinct 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        263 

lines  of  operations.  It  was  the  same  in  their  marcli 
from  Argonne  to  the  Meuse,  and  also  when,  after  Sedan, 
they  again  turned  toward  Paris, 

As  much  can  not  be  said  for  our  side.  At  Coulmiers, 
the  forces  of  General  Von  der  Tann  succeeded  in  effect- 
ing their  retreat  upon  Artenay,  because  our  army,  not- 
withstanding the  protests  of  its  commander-in-chief, 
was  obliged  to  take  the  offensive  upon  a  double  line  01 
operations.  As  a  result  of  this,  one  of  our  masses,  that 
under  General  d'Aurelle,  was  engaged  alone,  while  the 
corps  of  General  d'Pallieres  arrived  too  late  to  take  part 
in  the  general  action. 

Success  none  the  less  crowned  the  efforts  of  our  young 
troops,  and  the  patriotic  enthusiasm  which  followed  this, 
did  not  allow  any  account  to  be  made  of  the  error  com- 
mitted. 

At  this  period,  we  had  two  objectives:  first,  the  armies 
covering  the  siege  of  Paris,  then  the  army  of  investment 
itself. 

A  single  advantage  remained  on  the  side  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  National  Defense — the  numerical  superiority 
of  our  masses. 

This  would  have  been  of  great  value  had  it  been  ac- 
companied by  cohesion  and  unity  of  action.  The  im- 
portance of  this  proviso  becomes  the  more  striking,  when 
we  consider  that  our  contingents,  raised  and  organized 
in  haste,  poorly  equipped  and  supplied,  were,  notwith- 
standing their  will,  their  devotion  and  their  patriotism, 
powerless  to  obtain  any  definite  result,  unless  brought 
together  in  large  numbers  and  well  supported.  {See 
Plate  XL) 

This  was  well  understood,  and  yet,  after  the  battle  of 
Loigny  and  the  retreat  from  Orleans,  we  saw  the  Army 
of  the  Loire  divided  into  two  masses,  with  distinct  lines 
of  operations,  one  running  toward  the  east,  the  other 
toward  the  west. 


264  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

At  the  same  period,  the  Army  of  the  North  followed 
still  another  isolated  line. 

What  could  result  from  the  separation  of  these  forces 
and  the  enterprises  undertaken  by  them?  Let  General 
Chanzy  inform  us.  On  the  30th  of  December,  1870,  he 
wrote  to  the  Minister  of  War  : 

"I  thank  you  for  the  information  concerning  the  op- 
erations about  to  be  undertaken  by  General  Bourbaki. 
I  wait  with  impatience  to  learn  the  progress  of  his 
movement  and  what  forces  of  the  enemy  will  be  de- 
tached against  him.  I  should  like  also  to  be  informed 
concerning  General  Faidherbe's  actual  situation,  and  of 
his  plan  for  the  future. 

"Our  greatest  chance  of  success  resides  in  the  combi- 
nation of  our  movements,  in  the  simultaneous  co-opera- 
tion of  the  three  armies  to  the  same  end,  in  a  common 
effort  made  at  the  same  moment.  Without  this,  we 
may  expect  to  see  successively  beaten  the  forces  which, 
if  well  directed,  might  bring  us  victory.  I  earnestly 
request,  then,  that  you  give  me  at  once  all  information 
in  this  regard  that  may  be  in  your  possession." 

Three  days  later  he  sent  to  the  Minister  of  War  a 
general  plan  of  operations,  formulating  his  views. 

"The  situation,"  said  he,  "appears  to  me  to  be  as 
follows  : 

"Around  Paris,  a  powerful  army,  which  resists  all 
efforts  made  to  break  the  investment;  in  the  North, 
General  Manteuffel,  strong  enough  to  threaten  Havre 
while  holding  General  Faidherbe's  troops  in  check;  in 
the  East,  the  enemy's  forces  distributed  from  Paris  to 
the  Rhine,  to  cover  his  lines  of  operations,  with  groups 
sufficiently  large  to  successfully  oppose  our  troops  upon 
the  left  bank  of  the  Saone,  and  to  offer  resistance  to  the 
march  of  the  ist  Army;  in  the  South,  the  enemy 
strongly  occupying  Orleans,  and  yet  so  numerous  in  the 
valley   of  the    Loire,    from   Blois   to  Gien,    as   to   be  a 


SECOND    CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.       265 

menace  to  Bourges,  Tours,  and  Nevers,  and  to  trouble  us 
upon  the  Loir,  and  on  the  side  of  Le  Mans,  should  we 
quit  these  positions  without  leaving  a  force  capable  of 
defending  them;  in  the  West,  a  Prussian  army,  compre- 
hending that  an  effort  is  to  be  made  by  us  toward  Paris, 
and  establishing  itself  strongly  upon  the  line  of  the 
Eure,  in  order  to  parry  this  blow,  while  beating  the 
country  around  Chartres,  to  keep  up  its  communications 
with  the  army  on  the  Loire. 

"  Disposed  as  he  is,  the  enemy  evidently  seeks  to  pre- 
sent himself  successively,  and  in  force,  before  each  of  our 
armies.  He  manoeuvres  very  skillfully.  We  are  gener- 
ally very  poorly  informed  about  his  important  move- 
ments, which  he  dexterously  covers  with  a  screen  of 
troops;  and  the  only  means  of  frustrating  the  combina- 
tions which  up  to  the  present  have  so  often  been  suc- 
cessful, is  to  threaten  all  points  in  our  turn,  forcing  him 
thus  to  make  face  in  all  directions,  and  no  longer  allow- 
ing him  to  present  sufficiently  large  masses  upon  a  single 
point  to  crush  us  in  detail. 

"It  appears  to  me  indispensable  that  the  ist  and  2d 
Armies,  and  that  under  General  Faidherbe,  should  be- 
gin operations  at  the  very  same  time;  the  2d  Army  from 
Le  Mans,  to  establish  itself  upon  the  Eure  between 
,  Evreux  and  Chartres,  covering  its  base  and  its  lines  of 
operations,  which  are  Brittany  and  the  railroad  lines 
from  Alen^on  to  Dreux,  and  from  Le  Mans  to  Chartres; 
the  ist  Army  from  Chatillon-sur-Seine  to  take  position 
between  the  Marne  and  the  Seine,  from  Nogent  to 
Chateau-Thierry,  using  Burgundy,  the  Seine,  the  Aube, 
and  the  Marne  for  its  base  and  lines  of  operations;  the 
Army  of  the  North,  from  Arras,  to  establish  itself  from 
Compiegne  to  Beauvais,  with  its  base  of  operations  upon 
the  places  of  the  North,  and  its  principal  line,  the  rail- 
road from  Paris  to  Lille. 

"In  addition  to  these  three  main  operations,  and  to 


266  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

support  them,  the  forces  of  Cherbourg  should  advance 
along  the  railroad  from  Caen,  as  far  as  the  left  of  the 
2d  Army,  having  their  lines  of  retreat  always  assured 
upon  Carentan.     There  would  then  be: 

"The  forces  in  Brittany  and  upon  the  lower  Loire, 
strongly  occupying  the  Sarthe  from  Alen^on  to  Le  Mans, 
and  the  Perche  to  the  Loir,  to  assure  the  rear  of  the  2d 
Army;  the  two  volunteer  corps  under  Cathelineau  and 
Lipowski,  behind  the  Loir  and  Chateaudun  to  cover  the 
right  wing  of  this  same  army,  and  to  observe  the  enemy's 
troops  in  the  valley  of  the  Loire;  the  15th  Corps,  with- 
out uncovering  Bourges,  and  while  successively  threat- 
ening Blois,  Orleans,  and  Gien,  to  take  position  between 
the  Cher  and  the  Loire  to  hold  in  check  the  enemy's 
corps  upon  the  latter  river,  and  in  case  the  adversary 
should  fall  back,  to  march  resolutely  upon  Etampes. 

"Finally,  the  Army  of  Lyons,  replaced  in  the  positions 
which  it  now  occupies  by  troops  drawn  from  the  South, 
holding  Werder's  army  in  check  with  the  assistance  of 
Garibaldi's  forces  and  the  corps  in  the  East. 

"Our  three  principal  armies,  once  in  the  positions  in- 
dicated, would  place  themselves  in  communication  with 
Paris,  and  then  combine  in  dail}'  efforts  to  draw  nearer 
the  common  objective,  assisted  by  vigorous  sorties  on 
the  part  of  the  army  of  Paris,  to  oblige  the  enemy's  in- 
vesting army  to  remain  entirely  within  its  lines.  The 
result  will  then  depend  upon  the  success  of  one  of  the 
exterior  attacks;  and  if  this  success  is  assured,  if  the 
investment  can  be  broken  upon  one  point,  the  revictual- 
ing  of  Paris  becomes  possible,  the  enemy  is  thrown  back 
and  obliged  to  abandon  a  part  of  his  lines,  and  new 
efforts,  concerted  between  the  exterior  and  interior 
armies,  may,  in  the  supreme  conflict,  secure  our  deliver- 


ance," 


The  general  idea  of  the  project  no  doubt  responded  to 
the  necessities  of  the  moment;  but  the  details  of  appli- 
cation were  open  to  question. 


SKCOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        267 

The  conibiiiatioii  may  be  simniied  up  thus:  To  hold 
in  check,  by  detached  corps,  the  German  armies  of  obser- 
vation, and  to  act  simultaneously  with  the  three  princi- 
pal armies  from  the  north,  east,  and  west,  against  the 
army  of  investment.  But  this  was  yet  to  be  effected 
upon  three  distinct  exterior  lines  of  operations.  This 
was  to  play  a  part  very  acceptable  to  the  enemy,  and  to 
offer  him  an  opportunity  of  successively  crushing  each 
of  our  groups.  Concert  of  action  during  the  attacks  was 
surely  a  practical  idea;  but  the  directions  given  them 
violated  this  principle:  Forces  having  the  same  objective 
should  7nake  use  of  but  a  single  line  of  operations. 

In  1878,  it  was  the  same.  The  Turks,  unable  to  give 
a  common  aim  to  their  movements,  adopted  three  dis- 
tinct lines  of  operations;  one  from  Viddin  upon  the  Vid; 
the  second,  from  Adrianople  and  the  Maritza  upon  the 
Balkans;  the  third,  from  the  Quadrilateral  toward  the 
centre  of  Bulgaria.  The  Russians,  on  the  contrary,  with 
a  strong  disposition,  on  another  account,  to  allow  them- 
selves to  be  carried  away  in  the  direction  of  Constantino- 
ple, took  only  a  single  route,  which  was  to  conduct  them 
from  Sistova  to  Adrianople.  The  result  was,  that  the 
Turks,  without  cohesion  in  their  efforts,  came  into  con- 
tact with  superior  forces  at  all  points,  and  that  in  spite 
of  the  signal  bravery  displayed,  their  efforts  could  not 
prevent  the  scale  of  victory  from  inclining  to  the  side  of 
the  adversary. 

The  necessity  of  a  single  line  of  operations  is  then 
clearly  demonstrated.  And  after  the  numerous  illus- 
trations which  precede,  we  must  acknowledge  the  truth 
of  the  conclusions  so  often  expressed  in  this  regard  by 
the  highest  military  authorities. 

We  can  then  say  with  Jomini: 

' '  The  art  of  arranging  the  lines  of  operations  in  the 
most  advantageous  zvay^  is  one  of  the  essentials  of  the 
science  of  war. 


268  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 


(( 


With  equal  forces^  iipon  the  same  frontier^  a  shnple 
line  of  operations  should  have  the  adva7itage  over  a 
double  line, 

"The  formation  of  two  independent  armies  upon  the 
same  frontier  should  therefore  always  be  avoided."* 

Napoleon  was  not  less  explicit  in  saying:  "To  invade 
a  country  with  a  double  line  of  operations,  is  a  faulty 
combination." 

And  again  he  says:  "When  two  parts  of  an  army 
operate  by  lines  widely  separated  from  each  other,  and 
without  communications,  an  error  is  committed  which 
ordinarily  leads  to  a  second,  "f 

Strategic  Envelopment. — Notwithstanding  the  dangers 
attending  the  employment  of  double  lines  of  operations, 
they  are  frequently  adopted.  This  arises  from  the  facil- 
ity which  they  afford  of  realizing  the  idea,  always  seduc- 
tive, of  strategic  envelopment.  Moreover,  certain  cir- 
cumstances sometimes  permit  the  selection  of  two  lines 
without  the  usual  risks.  This  is  the  case  when  one  of 
the  belligerents  is  very  greatly  superior  to  the  other,  and 
when  his  two  armies  can  advance  without  breaking  their 
connection,  though  following  divergent  directions. 

In  manoeuvering  large  modern  armies,  or  more  par- 
ticularly groups  of  three  or  four  armies,  the  march  front 
will  often  be  too  extended  to  allow  the  use  of  but  a  single 
line  of  operations. 

The  important  consideration  in  this  case  will  be  the 
maintenance  of  constant  connection  between  the  armies. 

The  history  of  modern  wars  offers  us  frequent  exam- 
ples of  strategic  envelopment.  Our  army  unfortunately, 
in  1870,  had  to  submit,  in  this  regard,  to  the  most  woful 
experience. 

This  manoeuvre   is    especially    characteristic    of   the 


*  Treatise  on  Grand  Operations. 

-\  Cojnnientaries  0/  Napoleon,  Volume  I. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR,        269 

Operations  of  the  German  armies;  bnt  generally  they 
succeed  in  it  only  through  great  superiority  of  forces. 

The  combination  indicated  by  experience  as  the  most 
feasible  to  be  adopted  against  an  enemy  attempting  a 
strategic  envelopment,  is  to  take  the  most  vigorous  offen- 
sive^ both  strategical  and  tactical^  against  his  weaker 
force. 

In  case  of  an  enforced  defensive,  the  use  of  double 
operating  lines  on  the  part  of  the  adversary,  leads  to  the 
occupation  of  a  central  position.  But  it  will  always  be 
dangerous  to  await  the  enemy  there,  for  the  army  then 
remains  passively  upon  the  defensive,  and  is  almost  nec- 
essarily dedicated  to  disaster.  The  central  position 
should,  on  the  contrary,  be  turned  to  account  to  assail 
en  masse  the  most  exposed  fraction  of  the  enemy's 
force. 

Manoeuvres  from  central  positions,  moreover,  belong 
to  the  order  of  combinations  giving  rise  to  the  employ- 
ment of  interior  lines. 

[c)    INTERIOR   IvINES. 

The  campaign  of  1796  in  Germany  has  clearly  shown 
the  dangers  attending  the  use  of  a  double  line  of  opera- 
tions. In  presence  of  an  active  and  resolute  enemy,  the 
army  adopting  it,  is  exposed  to  the  risk  of  seeing  each  of 
its  parts  successively  overpowered  before  the  other  can 
come  to  its  aid. 

The  adversary's  line  is  then  called  the  interior  line^ 
while  the  lines  of  the  opposing  army  are  exterior  lilies. 

It  was  the  employment  of  interior  lines  which  gave 
to  Napoleon's  genius  its  most  brilliant  eclat^  notably  in 
1796  and  1814.  We  may  define  these  lines  as  the  coni- 
mnnicating  ways  which  most  directly  join  the  different 
parts  of  the  theatre  of  operations. 

They  permit  an  army  to  move  upon  any  point  what- 
ever of  this  theatre  by  the  shortest  route,  and  thus  to 


270  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

take  swift  advantage  of  the  division  of  the  enemy's 
forces,  or  even  to  provoke  this  division,  in  order  to  draw- 
thence  the  greatest  possible  advantages. 

The  possession  of  interior  lines  is,  then,  of  great  im- 
portance, but  it  has  led  to  success  only  on  certain  condi- 
tions, which  may  be  stated  thus: 

ist. '  Ahvays  mancEiivre  offetisively  and  in  force  ; 

2d.   Take  the  offensive  upon  only  one  point  at  a  time.* 

It  is  certain,  indeed,  that  if  an  army  passively  awaits 
its  adversary,  the  latter  will  assemble  his  troops,  choose 
his  point  of  attack,  secure  a  numerical  superiority,  and 
succeed  either  in  driving  it  into  a  dangerous  position  or 
surrounding  it. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  attacking  at  several  points,  an 
army  is  weak  everywhere. 

It  is  strong,  then,  only  when  engaging  with  all  its  dis- 
posable forces  upon  a  single  point,  choosing  well  its 
point  of  attack,  and  remaining  on  the  defensive  every- 
where else.  Such  were  the  combinations  of  the  Arch- 
duke Charles  and  Bonaparte  in  1796. 

Few  campaigns,  moreover,  have  so  forcibly  ill ustraled 
these  principles.  The  operations  of  Bonaparte  are  too 
well  known  to  render  an  extended  description  necessar}^ 
A  short  resume  will  be  sufficient  to  recall  their  general 
scope. 

Campaign  of.  1796  in  Italy. — In  March,  the  French  army, 
barely  42,000  strong,  spread  out  upon  a  line  of  can- 
tonments extending  from  the  Col  di  Tinda  to  Savona, 
had  before  it  the  Piedniontese  and  Austrian  armies. 
Bonaparte's  aim  was  to  divide  these  forces,  and  separately 
overwhelm  them.  He  thus  explained  the  situation  in 
the  plan  of  campaign  addressed  to  the  Directory  on  the 
19th  of  January.     {See  Plate  XII.) 

*  Maxims  of  Napoleon,  by  A.  G. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.       27 1 

"The  operation  to  be  undertaken,"  said  he,  "is 
simple.  Are  the  Piedmontese  alone  ?  March  upon  them 
by  Garressio,  Bagnasco,  la  Solta,  Castelnnovo,  and  Mon- 
tezemolo.  Having  beaten  them,  and  forced  the  in- 
trenched camp,  lay  siege  to  Ceva. 

"  Have  the  Austrians  the  good  sense  to  unite  at  Mon- 
tezemolo  with  the  Piedmontese?  Separate  them  by 
marching  upon  Alessandria;  and  as  soon  as  the  separa- 
tion is  effected,  give  twenty-four  hours  to  the  seizure  of 
the  intrenched  camp  at  Ceva. 

"  Once  this  camp  is  occupied  by  us,  double  forces  will 
be  required  to  compel  us  to  raise  the  siege  of  the 
fortress. ' ' 

The  armies  which  were  opposed  to  us  were  united, 
it  is  true,  but  upon  an  extended  front;  and  by  making 
a  demonstration  iipon  Genoa,  Bonaparte  succeeded  in 
drawing  Beaulieu  thither,  while  Colli  guarded  the  val- 
leys of  Piedmont.  The  centre  was  thus  weakened. 
Here  Bonaparte  struck  his  blow,  assailed  the  corps  of  his 
enemies  with  superior  forces,  gained  the  victories  of 
Montenotte,  Millesimo,  and  Dego,  and  from  this  mo- 
ment forced  his  adversaries  to  adopt  two  exterior  lines  of 
operations:  one  towards  Turin,  for  the  Piedmontese;  the 
other  in  the  direction  of  Milan,  for  the  Austrians. 

The  first  anticipated  result  was  attained  :  Bonaparte 
had  divided  his  enemies.  Then,  far  from  relaxing  his 
activity,  he  continued  his  offensive  upon  an  interior  line 
of  operations,  at  first  against  the  weaker  and  nearer  ad- 
versary, Colli,  whom  he  defeated  at  Mondovi,  and  whom 
he  soon  detached  from  Austria,  forcing  him  to  accept  the 
armistice  of  Cherasco. 

Turning  then  against  Beaulieu,  he  pushed  him  be- 
yond the  Po,  thence  upon  the  Mincio,  and  finally  into 
Tyrol. 

To  draw  from  this  campaign  the  noteworthy  instruc- 
tion which  it  embodies,  we  should  know  how  the  victor 
himself  regarded  it  some  years  later: 


272  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

"But  the  Piedmontese  army,  under  orders  of  Colli, 
instead  of  moving  upon  Millesimo,  should  have  sup- 
ported itself  upon  Dego  to  form  Beaulieu's  left.  It  was 
an  error  to  suppose  that,  in  order  to  cover  Turin,  Colli 
must  station  himself  directly  upon  the  road  to  that  city. 
The  united  armies  at  Dego  would  have  covered  Milan, 
because  they  would  have  been  astride  the  high-road  of 
Montferrat;  they  would  have  covered  Turin,  because 
they  would  then  have  been  near  the  road  to  that  place. 
If  Beaulieu  had  had  five  or  six  days  in  which  to  recall 
his  left,  it  would  have  been  expedient  to  march  upon 
Ceva,  in  order  to  form  a  junction  with  the  Piedmontese 
army,  because  it  was  more  advantageous  for  the  Allies  to 
keep  near  the  line  of  operations  of  the  French.  There 
was  no  fear  that  the  latter  would  enter  Montferrat  so 
long  as  the  enemy  held  an  army  at  Ceva.  United,  the 
two  forces  would  have  been  superior  to  the  French  army; 
separated,  they  were  lost. 

"General  Beaulieu  wished  to  defend  the  Mincio  by  a 
cordon.  This  system  is  the  worst  that  can  be  adopted 
for  defense.  It  was  only  the  month  of  May;  he  should 
have  occupied  the  Serraglio  with  his  entire  army;  he 
could  have  remained  there  seventy  days  without  any 
fear  of  sickness.  He  left  13,000  men  in  garrison  at 
Mantua,  and  he  had  26,000  men  upon  the  Mincio;  he 
would  then  have  been  able  to  bring  together  40,000 
men,  that  is  to  say,  an  army  superior  to  the  French,  in 
a  position  as  formidable  as  the  Serraglio;  and  he  would 
have  maintained  his  communications  with  Modena  and 
lower  Italy." 

Some  weeks  later,  in  July,  Bonaparte  was  besieging 
Mantua,  when  Austria  directed  a  new  army  against  him, 
commanded  by  Wiirmser.  {See  Plate  XIII.)  We  had 
then  15,000  ijien  before  the  place.  These  were  covered 
by  a  corps  of  observation  26,000  strong,  having  its  right 
at  Legnago,   its    centre    at  Verona  and    Rivoli,   its  left 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        273 

toward  Salo.  Holding  the  lines  of  the  Adige  and  Mincio, 
Napoleon  controlled  the  outlets  of  the  Trentin  and  the 
Friuli.  Wiirniser  having  arrived  at  Trent  in  the  middle 
of  July,  reorganized  there  an  army  of  60,000  men,  with 
reinforcements  drawn  from  the  interior  of  the  empire. 
Then,  relying  upon  his  numerical  superiority,  he  re- 
solved to  envelojD  his  adversary,  adopting  two  distinct 
lines  of  operations.  On  the  left,  Davidovich  was  to  de- 
scend the  left  bank  of  the  Adige;  in  the  centre,  Wiirm- 
ser  calculated  upon  advancing  between  the  Adige  and 
Lake  Garda  upon  the  positions  around  Montebaldo. 
These  two  masses  were  to  follow  the  same  direction. 
Finally,  on  the  right,  Quasdanovich,  with  28  battalions, 
17  squadrons,  and  24  pieces  of  reserve  artillery,  was  to 
move  down  the  west  side  of  lyake  Garda,  and  debouch 
upon  Brescia,  to  threaten  our  communications.  Between 
him  and  Wiirmser  was  a  space  of  10  or  12  leagues,  cut 
up  by  impassable  obstacles. 

The  movement  commenced  July  29,  and  our  support- 
ing troops,  assailed  upon  different  points  by  very  super- 
ior forces,  fell  back.  Brescia  was  occupied  by  the  enemy. 
Bonaparte  found  himself  in  a  critical  position.  Hesitat- 
ing for  a  moment,  he  called  a  council  of  war  to  collect 
the  advice  of  his  generals.  But  the  same  day^  by  an 
inspiration  of  genius,  he  divined  that  the  enemy,  in  de- 
scending from  Tyrol  to  Brescia  and  the  Adige,  was  fol- 
lowing two  exterior  lines,  leaving  him  master  of  the  in- 
terior line  of  the  Mincio.  Too  weak  to  make  head 
against  the  two  Austrian  masses,  he  yet  had  sufficient 
resources  to  beat  each  of  them  separately. 

But  for  this,  it  was  essential  to  bring  together  all  his 
forces;  that' is  to  say,  raise  the  siege  of  Mantua,  recross 
the  Mincio,  and  resolutely  take  the  offensive  against  the 
feebler  hostile  mass.  In  twenty-four  hours,  the  combi- 
nation was  arranged,  dispatched  to  his  lieutenants,  and 
put  into  execution. 
18 


274  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

« 

His  first  effort  was  directed  against  Quasdanovich,  who 
was  beaten  at  IvOnato  and  Salo  and  thrown  back  upon 
Riva.  By  the  4th  of  August,  Bonaparte  was  disembar- 
rassed of  this  adversary. 

These  successes  decided  Wiirmser  to  quit  Mantua, 
which  he  had  entered  as  a  liberator,  and  to  march  toward 
Goito  to  meet  us.  But  his  array,  deprived  of  the  corps 
of  Quasdanovich,  of  a  division  which  was  besieging 
Peschiera,  and  finally  of  the  detachments  left  at  Mantua 
and  upon  the  banks  of  the  Po,  numbered  only  25,000 
men.  Attacked  in  front  by  Bonaparte  at  Castiglione, 
and  turned  upon  its  left  by  the  Serrurier  division,  which 
the  retreat  of  Quasdanovich  had  freed,  it  was  completely 
defeated.  Its  commander,  fearing  the  loss  of  his  com- 
munications with  the  valley  of  the  Adige,  fell  back  upon 
Tyrol,  leaving  15,000  fresh  troops  at  Mantua. 

This  battle  was  completed  by  the  combats  of  Monte- 
baldo,  Corona,  Preabocco,  and  Rocca-d'Anfo,  in  conse- 
quence of  which  our  victorious  soldiers  were  able  to  re- 
take their  former  positions- 
Napoleon  has  passed  judgment  upon  this  second  part 
of  the  campaign  with  an  authoritativeness  which  leaves 
place  for  no  other  exposition. 

"  Wiirmser's  plan,  in  August,  was  defective;  his  three 
corps,  one  under  his  own  immediate  orders,  the  second 
under  Quasdanovich,  the  third  under  Davidovich,  were 
separated  by  two  large  rivers,  the  Adige  and  the  Mincio, 
several  mountain-chains,  and  Lake  Garda. 

"Wiirmser  ought: 

"  Either  to  have  debouched  with  all  his  forces  between 
Lake  Garda  and  the  Adige,  seized  the  Rivoli  plateau, 
and  drawn  to  him  his  artillery  at  Incanale;  70,000  to 
80,000  men  thus  posted,  with  their  right  upon  Lake 
Garda  and  their  left  upon  the  Adige,  on  a  front  of  three 
leagues,  would  have  overawed  the  French  army,  which, 
numbering  hardly  30,000  combatants,  could  not  have 
made  head  against  them. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.       275 

'•'Or  to  have  advanced,  with  his  united  army,  by  the 
Chiese,  npon  Brescia,  the  artillery  being-  able  to  move 
here. 

"In  the  execution  of  his  plan,  he  committed  an  error 
which  cost  him  dear:  he  wasted  two  days  in  marching 
to  Mantna.  He  should,  on  the  contrary,  have  thrown 
two  bridges  over  the  Mincio,  within  cannon  range  of 
Peschiera,  hastily  crossed  this  river,  joined  his  right  at 
Lonato,  Desenzano,  and  Salo,  and  thus  by  rapidly 
uniting  his  divided  forces,  have  repaired  the  defects  of 
his  plan. 

"To  operate  by  widely  separated  lines  and  without 
intercommunication,  is  a  fault  which  usually  leads  to 
the  commission  of  a  second.  The  detached  column 
has  orders  for  the  first  day  only;  its  operations  for  the 
second  day  depend  upon  the  progress  of  the  principal 
column;  either  it  loses  time  to  await  orders,  or  it  acts 
at  random.  In  the  case  under  consideration,  Wiirmser 
should  have  avoided  this  inconvenience  by  giving  Quas- 
danovich  orders  not  only  to  debouch  upon  Brescia, 
but  also  upon  Mantua;  and  he  himself  should  have 
moved  upon  this  fortified  place  with  the  principal  corps 
at  a  single  bound.  Quasdanovich  would  have  reached 
Mantua  if  he  had  not  delayed  at  Brescia;  he  would  have 
raised  the  siege,  found  protection  behind  the  ramparts 
of  this  place,  and  supplied  himself  from  its  magazines. 
Junction  could  then  have  been  made  with  his  army  at  a  * 
fixed  point,  sheltered  from  the  vicissitudes  of  the  cam- 
paign. If  Wiirmser  had  been  beaten  before  reaching 
Mantua,  Quasdanovich  would  none  the  less  have  in- 
sured the  revictualing  of  the  garrison;  he  could  have 
occupied  the  Serraglio  for  a  long  time,  and,  lastly,  have 
guided  himself  by  circumstances. 

"  It  is  then  a  principle  that  an  army  should  keep  all 
its  columns  united  in  such  a  way  that  the  enemy  can 
not  break  in  between  them.     When,  for  any  reason,  this 


2/6  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

principle  is  violated,  the  detached  corps  should  be  in- 
dependent in  their  operations;  and  in  order  to  form  a 
junction,  should  move  upon  a  previously-determined 
point,  advancing  without  hesitation,  and  without  new 
orders,  thus  avoiding  exposure  to  separate  attack." 

In  the  latter  part  of  August,  1796,  the  Imperial  army- 
began  to  reform  around  Trent.  It  still  had  40,000  men, 
a  force  superior  to  Bonaparte's.  Wiirmser  made  dispo- 
sitions to  continue  the  campaign,  and  drew  up  a  new 
plan  which  was  to  conform  to  the  aim  had  in  view  by 
the  Vienna  cabinet — the  deliverance  of  Mantua.  [See 
Plate  XIV.) 

According  to  this  plan,  Davidovich  was  to  remain  in 
Tyrol  with  7,000  or  8,000  Tyrolese  militia,  and  a  corps 
of  20,000  men  divided  into  four  separate  commands, 
very  strangely  posted. 

One  of  these,  3, 500  strong,  under  Groeffer,  was  charged 
with  covering  Upper  Tyrol  on  the  side  of  Vorarlberg; 
General  Landon,  with  3,000  men,  observed  the  outlets 
of  the  Valteline;  the  division  of  the  Prince  of  Reuss, 
5,500  strong,  was  established  to  the  north  of  Lake 
Garda;  and  finally,  the  Wukassovich  and  Spbrck  bri- 
gades, united  in  the  valley  of  Roveredo,  formed  the  prin- 
cipal force,  about  8,000  strong. 

Thus  divided,  this  mass  was  in  no  condition  to  concur 
in  Wiirmser's  operations.  Its  action  could  only  be  de- 
fensive, and  was  beyond  the  sphere  of  his  movements. 

He,  on  his  side,  calculated  upon  descending  on  Man- 
tua by  the  valley  of  the  Brenta,  Bassano,  and  Legnago, 
with  26,000  men  in  three  divisions,  while  Davidovich 
debouched  from  Tyrol  by  the  valley  of  the  Adige,  to 
threaten  our  communications  and  force  us  to  abandon 
the  line  of  the  Mincio.  The  movement  began  in  the 
first  days  of  September. 

Wiirmser  again  adopted  two  lines  of  operations,  sep- 
arated by  the  group  of  the  lycssini  mountains. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        277 

Bonaparte,  immediately  grasping  the  advantages 
which  his  position  on  the  Adige  gave  him,  advanced 
npon  an  interior  line,  directing  himself  first  against  the 
detachments  of  Davidovich.  The  latter  were  quickly 
dispersed  in  the  combats  of  San  Marco  and  Mori. 
Beaten  again,  on  the  4th  of  September,  at  Roveredo, 
they  were  thrown  back  as  far  as  Trent,  then  beyond 
Lavis,  and  were  finally  forced  to  retreat  to  Nenmarkt. 

From  this  moment  Davidovich  was  out  of  the  field. 
Without  hesitating,  Bonaparte  then  hastened  into  the 
valley  of  the  Brenta.  upon  the  rear  of  Wiirmser,  who 
was  at  Bassano,  and  who  had  just  detached  General 
Mezzaros'  division  upon  Verona.  Attacking  his  adver- 
sary in  force,  on  Septembers,  Bonaparte  drove  him  from 
Bassano,  separated  him  from  Quasdanovich,  who  was 
compelled  to  retire  into  Friuli,  and  threw  him  back 
upon  Vicenza  and  Legnago,  leaving  him  barely  10,000 
men. 

To  complete  his  success,  Bonaparte  attempted  further 
to  cut  him  from  Mantua;  but  a  fortunate  circumstance 
saved  Wiirmser,  and  permitted  him  to  reach  this  strong- 
hold, before  which,  at  St.  George,  he  thought  it  incum- 
bent upon  him  to  deliver  a  last  battle.  This  was  an 
added  misfortune  for  him.  Again  vanquished,  he  had 
no  alternative  but  to  shut  himself  up  in  the  place  he  had 
come  to  deliver. 

Napoleon  passed  the  following  judgment  upon  this 
campaign: 

"  In  the  beginning  of  September,  Wurmser  set  out  for 
the  Bassano  district,  with  30,000  men,  leaving  Davido- 
vich in  Tyrol  with  an  equal  number.  He  should  have 
foreseen  the  case  of  the  French  debouching  into  Tyrol, 
and  consequently  have  prescribed  to  Davidovich  not  to 
receive  battle  at  Roveredo,  but  to  fall  back  upon  Bas- 
sano, in  order  to  meet  the  French  with  united  forces; 
the  Tyrolese  militia  were  sufficient  to  observe  the  val- 


278  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

ley  of  the  Avicio.  Or  he  might  have  endeavored  to 
bring  on  the  battle  in  Tyrol,  withdrawing  Davidovich 
npon  Galliano  and  the  valley  of  the  Avicio.  Marco, 
Mori,  and  Roveredo  are  good  positions;  but  against  im- 
petuous troops,  their  advantages  cannot  compensate 
for  lack  of  numbers.  In  all  combats  in  mountain - 
passes,  the  columns,  once  broken,  are  thrown  into  con- 
fusion upon  each  other,  and  fall  into  the  power  of  the 
enemy. 

"  It  was  too  late  when  Wiirmser  conceived  the  project 
of  sending  the  Mezzaros  division  to  Verona.  This 
movement  had  been  foreseen;  Kilmaine  was  there  with 
a  small  corps  of  observation.  Wiirmser  would  have 
done  better  to  have  kept  this  division  at  Bassano,  to  sup- 
port the  other  two.  But,  finally,  since  he  wished  to 
operate  upon  Mantua  with  a  portion  of  his  troops,  he 
should  have  given  this  division  2,000  cavalry,  30  pieces 
of  artillery,  and  bridge  equipage;  have  directed  it  not 
upon  Verona  but  upon  Albaredo,  where  the  Adige  could 
have  been  bridged,  and  Mantua  thus  speedily  reached. 
The  blockade  of  the  place  would  have  been  raised,  the 
French  rear  disturbed,  and  even  Verona  itself  attacked 
from  behind.  The  garrison  of  Mantua  thus  reinforced 
could,  for  a  long  time,  have  controlled  the  events  of  the 
campaign.  The  Marshal  might  then  have  retired  frorn 
Bassano  with  his  other  two  divisions,  his  parks,  and  his 
staff,  upon  the  Piave.  The  French  army  in  this  case 
would  have  been  obliged  to  hold  the  valley  of  the 
Avicio  by  its  left,  in  advance  of  Trent;  its  centre 
would  have  rested  upon  the  Piave,  in  order  to  oppose  the 
enemy's  principal  corps,  and,  lastly,  it  would  have  had 
to  hasten  along  its  line  of  communications  to  re-estab- 
lish the  blockade  of  Mantua.  This  was  a  great  deal  for 
a  small  army,  and  might  have  given  rise  to  a  change  of 
fortune. 

Wiirmser's  march  to  the  Adige,  with  his  remaining 


•  SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        279 

force  of  16,000,  was  a  necessity,  He  should  here  have 
been  hemmed  in,  driven  iipon  the  river,  and  forced  to 
lay  down  his  arms,  on  account  of  the  lack  of  bridge 
material,  his  bridge  equipage  and  his  reserve  parks 
having  been  captured  at  Bassano.  It  was  only  through 
the  blunder  of  a  chief  of  battalion  who  evacuated  Leg- 
nago,  that  he  had  the  good  fortune  to  reach  Mantua. 

"The  Marshal,  inaptly,  left  1,800  men  and  several 
batteries  in  Legnago;  retreat  was  no  longer  possible  in 
the  direction  of  the  Adige,  on  account  of  the  presence 
of  the  entire  French  army;  he  had  to  gain  Mantua;  if 
this  was  not  possible,  it  was  easier  to  reach  Milan  than 
to  return  to  Legnago.  He  weakened  himself  and  sacri- 
ficed his  troops  to  no  purpose. 

"He  was  equally  in  error  when  he  risked  the  battle 
of  St.  George;  it  would  have  been  more  advisable  to 
have  maintained  himself  in  the  Serraglio,  which  is  the 
true  battle-field  for  the  garrisons  of  Mantua,  when  they 
are  strong. 

"The  Marshal  could  also  while  still  master  of  the 
Serraglio,  have  crossed  the  Po,  with  all  his  cavalry, 
several  battalions  of  grenadiers  and  a  few  well  equipped 
batteries,  descended  the  right  bank,  recrossed  this  river 
and  the  lower  Adige,  and  gained  Padua.  The  French 
general  would  have  learned  of  this  operation  too  late  to 
oppose  it.  Wiirmser  would  thus  have  preserved  all  his 
cavalry,  a  great  part  of  his  artillery,  and  his  entire  head- 
quarters,   and    maintained    the    honor  of  the  Austrian 


arms. ' ' 


The  other  attempts  made  the  same  year  by  the  Aus- 
trians  to  save  Mantua,  gave  rise  to  combinations  more 
remarkable  still.  They  are  presented  here  in  a  few 
words: 

Alvinzi  succeeded  Wiirmser  in  the  middle  of  October, 
and,  following  the  latter's  example,  debouched  by  the 
Brenta  with  40,000  men,  while   Davidovich  descended 


28o  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

by  the  valley  of  the  Adige  with  a  force  of  20,000  men. 
Favored  this  time  by  a  marked  numerical  superiority,  and 
by  the  fatigues  which  began  to  tell  upon  our  troops,  the 
two  Austrian  generals  nearly  succeeded  in  joining  forces 
at  Verona.  But  Bonaparte,  profiting  again  by  the  mis- 
takes of  his  adversaries,  and  manceuvring  upon  an 
interior  line,  defeated  Alvinzi  at  Areola,  and  obliged 
him  to  retreat;  then,  turning  upon  Davidovich,  routed 
him  and  threw  him  back  into  Tvrol. 

Napoleon  afterwards  wrote  upon  this  subject: 

"Nothing  could  have  been  more  fault}'  than  Alvinzi' s 
plan.  To  remedy  it,  as  soon  as  he  had  become  master 
of  Bassano,  and  Davidovich  of  Trent,  he  should  have 
called  the  latter  to  him  at  Bassano  by  the  valley  of  the 
Brenta,  leaving  the  Tyrolese  militia  around  Trent,  and 
have  presented  himself  upon  the  Adige  with  a  united 
army." 

In  expressing  himself  thus.  Napoleon  confirmed  a 
double  principle:  that  of  the  unity  of  the  line  of  oper- 
atiojis^  and  of  the  concentration  of  forces  before  battle. 

However,  the  defeat  of  Alvinzi  .was  not  to  put  a  term 
to  the  efforts  of  the  Viennese  cabinet.  Never,  up  to  this 
time,  had  it  thrown  so  much  energy  and  activity  into 
its  preparations,  and,  by  the  end  of  the  year  1796,  Alvinzi 
was  in  a  condition  to  resume  the  offensive  with  40,000 
men.  But,  as  in  the  first  instance,  he  formed  a  plan 
which  divided  his  forces  and  gave  rise  to  two  separate 
lines  of  operations. 

His  design  was  to  advance  with  his  centre  and  right 
between  the  Adige  and  Lake  Garda,  for  the  purpose  of 
assailing  us  in  the  neighborhood  of  Rivoli,  while  Gen- 
eral Provera,  with  a  corps  of  20,000  men,  was  to  move 
by  way  of  Padua  and  Legnago,  upon  Mantua,  and  direct 
a  division  from  Bassano  upon  Verona. 

The  movement  commenced  January  7,  1797. 

The  successive  attacks  of  the  Austrian  armies,  always 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.       281 

beaten  and  yet  alwa3^s  re-organized,  ended  by  placing 
Bonaparte  in  a  critical  situation,  the  more  so  as  the  Di- 
rectory, jealous  of  his  successes,  concerned  itself  but 
little  with  replacing  his  losses.  Nevertheless  he  did  not 
waste  an  instant  in  making  ready  to  face  this  new  storm. 
The  events  now  preparing,  were  to  be  the  most  glorious 
of  the  campaign,  assuring  immortal  renown  to  those 
who  distinguished  themselves  in  it. 

Bonaparte  was  at  Bologna  when  he  learned  of  the -at- 
tack of  the  Austrians.  Leaving  a  simple  detachment 
before  Provera,  he  proceeded  at  first  to  Verona,  to  secure 
information  and  judge  of  the  situation.  There  he  learned 
that  Joubert,  strongly  assailed  at  Corona,  had  been  forced 
to  fall  back.  He  immediately  divined  the  new  error 
committed  by  his  adversaries,  and  understood  that  their 
principal  mass  was  at  Rivoli,  since  Joubert  had  been  re- 
pulsed. He  hastened  to  this  point  with  all  the  forces 
that  could  be  assembled,  and  succeeded,  by  tactical  dis- 
positions as  remarkable  as  his  combinations,  in  inflict- 
ing a  complete  defeat  upon  Alvinzi. 

Returning  then  upon  Provera,  he  surrounded  him, 
and  obliged  him  to  capitulate  under  the  walls  of  Mantua. 

The  fall  of  this  place  was  soon  to  crown  the  successes 
of  our  army  of  Italy. 

Again,  the  defects  of  Alvinzi' s  plan  had  given  to 
Bonaparte  one  of  his  most  brilliant  triumphs.  Again 
the  latter  had  manoeuvred  upon  an  interior  line  of  oper- 
ations, while  his  enemies  followed  two  exterior  lines. 
Nor  was  this  their  only  mistake.  They  made  their 
principal  attack  in  a  mountainous  region  abounding  in 
strong  positions  favorable  for  defense,  while  upon  the 
lower  Adige  they  would  have  deprived  the  French  of 
this  advantage. 

Moreover,  the  march  of  Provera' s  corps  could  have 
led  to  no  profitable  result.  A  victory  for  Alvinzi  at 
Rivoli  would  'have  sufficed,  indeed,  to  save  Mantua;  his 


282  'PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

defeat,  on  the  contrary,  made  certain  the  loss  of  Pro- 
vera,  without  the  possibility  of  bringing  any  advantage 
in  return. 

The  direction  which  the  Austrians  should  have  fol- 
lowed was  quite  plain.  It  was  that  which  Prince  Eugene 
adopted  against  Catinat  in  1701,  and  which  Napoleon 
himself,  indeed,  afterwards  pointed  out  in  referring  to  the 
march  of  Wiirmser  upon  the  Brenta.  They  ought  then 
to  have  left  only  a  detachment  at  the  entrance  to  Tyrol, 
and  have  debouched  upon  the  lower  Adige  with  the  en- 
tire army. 

This  second  movement  of  Alvinzi  has,  like  the  pre- 
ceding operations,  been  reviewed  by  the  victor  himself 
in  these  terms: 

"Alvinzi  took  the  field  in  January,  1797.  Mantua 
was  severely  pressed.  He  operated  with  two  forces:  the 
first,  commanded  by  himself  in  person,  moved  upon 
Montebaldo;  the  other,  under  Provera,  marched  by  way 
of  the  lower  Adige.  Had  the  latter  succeeded,  his  vic- 
tory would  have  been  without  result,  in  caseof  Alvinzi's 
defeat.  The  defects  in  the  plan  of  campaign  were  ag- 
gravated by  connecting  the  two  attacks  with  a  central 
movement  upon  Verona,  which  was  purposeless,  and 
had  the  effect  of  weakening  the  principal  attacks  with- 
out uniting  them,  since  the  situation  of  the  forces  ren- 
dered this  impossible.  It  is  true  that  the  orders  from 
Vienna  were  that,  if  Alvinzi  should  be  beaten  and  Pro- 
vera succeed  in  raising  the  siege  of  Mantua,  Wiirmser 
was  to  cross  the  Po  with  the  garrison  from  this  place, 
and  retire  upon  Rome;  but  unless  the  cooperation  of  the 
King  of  Naples  could  be  assured,  which  was  by  no 
means  certain,  this  could  give  no  advantage. 

"Provera,  after  having  captured  by  surprise  the  pass- 
ages of  the  Adige  at  Angiari,  should  have  crossed  to  the 
right  bank  with  his  entire  corps,  including  Bajalisch's 
division,  removed  his  bridge,  and  proceeded  to  Mantua, 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        283 

liis  only  place  of  refuge.  He  would  have  arrived  there 
with  20,000  men.  lustead  of  this,  he  saved  only  8,000, 
because  he  had  left  the  Bayalisch  division  to  the  right, 
2,000  men  to  guard  his  bridge,  all  of  whom  were  made 
prisoners,  and  because,  having  lost  time,  his  advanced- 
guard  was  overwhelmed." 

Near  the  end  of  his  careei".  Napoleon  again  had  an 
opportunity  to  apply,  in  a  brilliant  manner,  the  princi- 
ples which  had  so  often  led  him  to  victory.  In  1814,  it 
was  the  employment  of  a  central  position  and  an  interior 
line  of  operations  which  gained  him  the  signal  successes 
of  Champaubert,  Montmirail,  Vauchamps,  Villeneuve- 
les-Bordes,  and  Montereau.  But  it  would  require  too 
much  space  to  describe  these  operations  here.  The  pre- 
ceding campaigns  have  sufficiently  set  forth  the  advan- 
tages which  the  possession  of  an  interior  line  assured  to 
armies  at  the  commencement  of  the  century.  It  re- 
mains to  examine  whether  tlie  principle  holds  good  to- 
day; whether  the  powerful  masses  which  modern  nations 
put  in  motion  are  in  an  identical  situation;  and  whether 
the  ideas  of  the  past  are  still  capable  of  being  applied  to 
the  same  advantage. 

In  this  connection  the  campaign  in  Bohemia  offers  us 
valuable  instruction. 

(d)    IvINES   OF    OPERATIONS  OF  THE  BELUGERENX    ARMIES  IN   1866. 

{^See  Plate  XV.) 

At  the  commencement  of  their  movements  against  the 
Austrians,  the  Prussians  adopted  two  distinct  lines  of 
operations. 

The  I.  and  II.  Armies  entered  Bohemia  by  two  con- 
verging lines  which  were  entirely  separate,  and  for  some 
days  without  lateral  communications.  The  I.  Army  ad- 
vanced by  Gorlitz,  Reichenberg,  Miinchengraetz,  and 
Gitschin;  the  II.  by  Neisse,  and  Koeniginhof  upon 
Gitschin. 


284  ^  PART   FIRST.  — STRATEGY. 

If  the  Aiistrians  had  been  concentrated  upon  the  Elbe, 
at  this  moment,  they  would  have  occupied  an  interior 
line,  and  been  in  a  situation  to  successively  attack  the 
enemy's  armies  with  superior  forces. 

Von  Moltke,  in  settling  upon  the  directions  of  his  first 
marches,  left  Benedek,  then,  a  most  favorable  opportun- 
ity. Although  the  latter  did  not  profit  by  it,  the  fact  has 
none  the  less  given  rise  to  lively  criticisms.  The  chief 
of  the  Prussian  general  staff  has  not  hesitated  to  recog- 
nize  their  justness.  He  has,  however,  defended  himself 
in  these  terms: 

"  How  came  it  that  we  did  not  meet  with  more  serious 
resistance  in  debouching  from  the  mountains  of  Lusatia? 
We  must  search  for  the  reason  in  the  dispositions  made 
by  the  Austrians. 

"Up  to  the  present,  it  has  been  impossible  to  learn 
anything  positive  of  Field  Marshal  Benedek' s  plan  of 
campaign.  If  we  accept  what  is  said  by  the  military 
journals,  we  must  conclude  that  he  intended  to  bring 
together  the  bulk  of  his  forces  upon  the  right  bank  of 
the  upper  Elbe, in  the  vicinity  of  Josephstadt  and  Koen- 
iginhof  Thus  placed,  the  Austrian  army  would  have 
been  on  a  central  line  of  operations  beiween  the  two 
Prussian  armies.  With  relatively  weak  forces,  it  could 
have  defended  the  deep  cuts  formed  by  the  Iser  or  the 
Elbe,  chosing  one  or  the  other  according  as  it  was  de- 
sirable to  bring  superior  forces  against  the  Crown  Prince 
or  Prince  Frederick  Charles. 

"It  seems  that  the  Field-Marshal  never  lost  sight  of  this 
project,  which  surely  was  excellent  in  itself,  and  which 
he  set  to  work  to  execute  with  the  inflexible  pertinacity 
characteristic  of  this  remarkable  warrior;  but  it  remains 
to  be  seen  if  this  project  still  held  good  at  the  moment 
when  its  adoption  was  under  consideration — at  the  time 
when  the  Prussian  armies  were  already  in  full  move- 
ment. 


SECOND   CHAPTER. — PREPARATION    FOR   WAR.       285 

"  111  order  to  profit  from  a  central  operating  position, 
it  is  essential  that  the  general  there  have  snfificicnt  free- 
dom of  action  to  permit  him  to  go  in  search  of  one  of 
his  adversaries  at  a  distance  of  several  days'  march, 
and  enough  time  to  allow  him  to  return  then  upon  the 
other.  If  the  space  be  too  restricted,  he  invites  the 
danger  of  having  to  meet  his  two  adversaries  at  once. 
When  an  army,  on  the  battle-field,  is  attacked  in  front 
and  upon  the  flank,  its  central  line  of  operations  will 
count  for  very  little;  what  was  an  advantage  in  a  strate- 
gical point  of  view,  has  become  a  disadvantage  from  a 
tactical  standpoint.  If  the  Prussians  were  permitted  to 
advance  to  the  Iser  and  the  Elbe,  if  the  few  defiles  which 
must  be  traversed  in  order  to  cross  these  obstacles  were 
allowed  to  fall  into  their  power,  it  is  evident  that  it 
would  be  very  perilous  to  advance  between  their  two 
armies:  in  attacking  one  of  them,  there  was  danger  of 
being  attacked  in  the  rear  by  the  other. 

"We  have  already  said  that  the  forces  placed  under 
command  of  Benedek  were  united  in  Moravia  on  the 
loth  of  June;  but  the  troops  were  so  poorly  equipped 
that  they  were  obliged  to  remain  there  until  the  17th." 

This  explanation  of  Field-Marshal  Von  Moltke  may 
be  epitomized  thus: 

I  St.  The  Prussians  were  obliged  to  divide  their  forces 
in  order  to  defend  the  two  threatened  parts  of  the  king- 
dom. 

2d.  Circumstances  required  a  concentration  in  three 
bodies  upon  three  different  points. 

3d.  The  distances  from  Gorlitz  and  Neisse  to  Gitschin, 
the  point  of  reunion  indicated  to  the  two  Prussian  col- 
umns, are  nearly  the  same  as  that  from  Gitschin  to  Ol- 
miitz,  Benedek' s  point  of  concentration. 

It  resulted  from  this,  then,  that  the  Austrians  had  not 
the  requisite  space  in  which  to  engage  one  Prussian 
force  without  being  attacked  by  the  other. 


286  ■      PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

The  explanation  given  by  the  Prussian  staff  supposes 
that  the  three  combatant  armies  are  at  their  points  of 
departure,  that  is  to  say,  at  Gorlitz,  Neisse,  and  Olmiitz. 
Presented  thus,  the  explanation  is  not  open  to  debate. 
It  shows,  however,  as  has  already  been  advanced,  that 
if  the  Austrian  forces  had  been  assembled  upon  the 
Elbe,  Benedek  would  have  found  himself  in  condition 
to  have  attacked  one  or  the  other  of  the  opposing  masses 
with  a  great  numerical  superiority. 

But  to  justly  estimate  these  facts,  as  well  at  least  as  it 
is  possible  to  do  at  a  somewhat  distant  time  and  place, 
it  will  be  well  to  examine  the  details  of  the  case  more 
closely. 

On  June  27,  1866,  the  I.  Army  and  the  Army  of  the 
Elbe  arrived  at  Miinchengrsetz.  The  II.  Army  marched 
into  Bohemia:  the  I.  Corps  reached  Trautenau;  the 
Guard,  Eypel  and  Costeletz;  the  V.  Corps,  Nachod;  and 
the  VI.,  Skalitz. 

The  Austrian  army  was  for  the  most  part  assembled 
around  Joseph stadt. 

Now  from  Josephstadt  to  Miinchengrsetz  is  a  distance 
of  about  70^  kilometres  [about  44  miles],  or  three 
marches  of  from  23  or  24  kilometres;  while  from  Joseph- 
stadt to  Trautenau  it  is  only  25  kilometres,  that  is  to 
say  one  good  march.  From  Trautenau  to  Eypel  is  a 
distance  of  10  kilometres;  from  Trautenau  to  Nachod, 
24  kilometres;  from  Trautenau  to  Miinchengrsetz,  66 
kilometres,  or  three  marches. 

Consequently,  on  the  27th  of  June,  the  Austrian  army 
was  in  position  to  assail  the  II.  Prussian  Army  in  force, 
especially  the  I.  Corps  and  the  Guard;  on  the  28th,  it 
would  have  been  able  to  attack  the  V.  and  VI.  Corps 
under  the  same  conditions,  and  it  is  certain  that  the  I. 
Army  and  the  Army  of  the  Elbe,  held  at  Munchengrcetz 
by  the  Clam-Gallas  Corps  and  the  Saxon  Corps,  were  too 
far  distant  to  arrive  in  time  upon  the  scene  of  action. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        287 

But  to  make  this  possible,  it  would  have  been  neces- 
sary for  Benedek  to  have  divined  the  presence  of  the  II. 
Army,  and  to  have  quickly  formed  the  decision  which 
the  circumstances  demanded. 

This  war  offers  us  another  example  of  the  employ- 
ment of  an  interior  line  of  operations. 

After  the  battle  of  Koniggratz,  the  Prussian  General- 
Staff  had  to  select  anew  the  line  of  march  for  its  prin- 
cipal mass. 

The  enemy  was  forming  an  army  at  Vienna,  while 
the  beaten  corps  fled  toward  Olmiitz,  There  were  thus 
two  important  Austrian  groups.  Von  Moltke  resolved 
to  advance  upon  the  line  Pardubitz,  Briinn,  Lunden- 
burg,  Presburg,  which  permitted  him  to  keep  these 
groups  divided  and  to  overcome  them  separately. 

The  adoption  of  this  interior  line  was  not  without 
influence  upon  the  request  for  an  armistice,  made  by 
Austria  within  less  than  a  month  after  the  decisive 
battle  of  Koniggratz. 

In  examining  the  strategic  combinations  which,  in 
1866,  guided  the  movements  of  the  Prussian  army,  one 
could  foresee,  in  a  certain  measure,  those  of  1870.  The 
latter  offer  peculiarities  worthy  of  remark. 

(e)   IvINKS   OK  OPERATIONS   IN   1870. 

At  the  cominencement  of  this  campaign,  the  Prussian 
armies  formed  two  grand  masses,  which  had  each  a  dis- 
tinct line  of  operation.  The  I.  and  II.  Armies  advanced 
upon  the  line  Mayence,  Neunkirchen,  Sarrebriick, 
while  the  III.  Army  had  for  its  general  direction,  the 
Landau,  Wissembourg,  Haguenau  line.  Before  the  pas- 
sage of  the  frontier,  the  connection  between  these  forces 
was  established  by  the  corps  near  Kaiserslautern  and 
Deux-Ponts,  and  by  a  cavalry  regiment  which  had  been 
directed  upon  Pirmasens. 

But  from  the  4th  to  the  12th  of  August,  during  the 


288  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

period  of  first  combats,  the  connection  ceased.  The  two 
grand  armies  were  separated  by  the  Vosges,  with  an 
interval  between  them  of  38  kilometres,  or  about  2 
marches.  At  one  time,  even,  when  they  were  both  en- 
gaged, the  one  at  Spicheren,  the  other  at  Froeschwiller, 
there  was  a  distance  of  three  marches  between  them; 
and  this  situation  was  aggravated  by  the  fact  that  all 
the  roads  to  the  south  of  Bitche,  which  communicate 
between  Lorraine  and  Alsace,  were  in  our  power.  These 
armies,  then,  manoeuvred  upon  two  exterior  lines,  and  it 
is  not  doubtful  that  a  favorable  occasion  for  making  use 
of  an  interior  line,  at  this  time  presented  itself  to  the 
French  army. 

It  would  be  an  error  to  suppose  that  this  circumstance 
escaped  the  attention  of  Von  Moltke.  He  had  well 
weighed  the  inconveniences  of  it,  before  hostilities.  But 
with  a  superior  insight  and  an  exact  acquaintance  with 
the  means  of  action  of  the  two  belligerents,  he  did  not 
hesitate  in  his  plan. 

Here  are  the  terms  in  which  he  expresses  himself 
upon  this  subject: 

' '  The  plan  of  invasion  on  the  part  of  the  French,  and 
the  character  of  their  railroad  system  having  led  them 
to  group  their  armies  into  two  principal  masses,  they 
were  to  effect  a  union  by  a  march  to  the  front. '^"  Such 
a  situation  could  not  with  safety  be  prolonged  in  pres- 
ence of  so  enterprising  an  adversary;  for  the  latter 
entering  France  by  either  the  lower  or  the  upper  Sarre, 
equally  threatened  the  retreat  of  the  still  intact  wing  of 
the  army  having  its  base  in  Lorraine,  and  could  even 
bring  about,  as  an  ulterior  consequence,  the  evacuation 
of  the  line  of  the  Moselle. 

"At  the  outset,  the  German  armies  were  in  direct 
contact  with  each  other  between  the  Nahe  and  the 
Lauter.  When  they  took  the  initative,  the  enemy's 
position    obliged  them    to  advance  in  divergent  direc- 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.         289 

tioiis.  Now  it  is  at  this  time  that  our  situation  in  rela- 
tion to  the  Vosges  becomes  apparent.  •  It  was  necessary 
to  cross  this  chain  in  order  that  one  wino-  nii^^ht  be  able 
to  profit  from  the  advantages  gained  by  the  other.  But 
here  was  presented  this  essential  difference  in  the  situa- 
tion of  the  two  belligerents,  that  in  case  one  of  the  Ger- 
man armies  experienced  a  check,  it  would,  at  the 
worst,  only  be  thrown  back  upon  the  others,  while  a  Ger- 
man success  would  result  in  separating  the  French 
armies." 

Scarcely  had  the  III.  Army  crossed  the  Vosges  range, 
when  it  inclined  toward  the  II.  Army  in  order  to  re-es- 
tablish connection,  and  join  it  in  taking  up  the  line  of 
the  Moselle. 

During  this  time,  the  group  of  the  first  two  armies, 
marching  from  Spicheren  upon  our  principal  body, 
might  have  attempted  to  turn  it  by  its  left,  and  to  pass 
the  Moselle  below  Metz,  cutting  thus  the  Metz-Thion- 
ville  line  of  defense,  and  threatening  our  communica- 
tions. But  in  this  case,  the  German  armies  would  have 
manoeuvred  upon  two  exterior  lines,  leaving  to  us  all 
the  advantages  of  an  interior  line  and  a  central  position. 
This  combination  would  have  been  faulty. 

The  German  staff  took  care,  then,  not  to  adopt  it,  and 
decided  upon  the  Pont-a-Mousson  direction  for  the  I. 
and  II.  Armies,  in  order  to  link  to  the  III.  Armv,  and 
form  with  it  a  single  group  of  forces  occupying  an  in- 
terior line  of  operations  between  our  troops  in  Alsace,  in 
retreat  upon  Chalons,  and  our  army  at  Metz. 

But  it  was  especially  at  the  end  of  August,  1870,  that 
the  lines  of  operations,  pursued  by  the  combatant  forces, 
became  of  a  nature  to  assure  the  success  of  one  and  the 
defeat  of  the  other. 

In  taking  a  north-easterly  direction,  our  Chalons  army 
abandoned  to  the  enemy  all  the  advantages  of  interior 
lines,  and,  moreover,  according  as  it  advanced,  uncov- 

19 


290  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

ered  its  communications.  We  were  then  manoeuvring; 
upon  two  exterior  lines,  the  one  from  Metz  toward  the 
places  of  the  North,  the  other  from  Chalons  toward 
Sedan,  while  the  group  formed  by  the  III.  German  Army, 
the  Army  of  the  Meuse,  and  the  army  of  investment  at 
Metz,  operated  upon  an  interior  line. 

It  is  certain  that  Metz  should,  at  this  stage,  have 
been  the  objective  of  an  army  of  succor;  but  the  line 
of  operations  that  appeared  the  most  plainly  pointed 
out,  was  that  which,  supporting  itself  upon  the  places  of 
the  East,  and  following  the  Vosges,  reached  to  the  Mo- 
selle,   while  threatening  the  enemy's  communications. 

(/)    CONCIvUSIONS. 

It  would  be  superfluous  to  cite  other  events  of  the  last 
war,  bearing  upon  lines  of  operations.  The  preceding 
observations  suffice  to  demonstrate  that  the  principles  of 
the  past  preserve  all  of  their  importance,  and  that  they 
may  not  with  safety  be  violated. 

They  permit  us  to  conclude  also  that  the  application 
of  these  principles  has  become  more  difficult,  and  that, 
through  the  increase  in  the  effectives,  lines  of  operations 
have  to-day  expanded  into  wide  zones,  embracing  sys- 
tems of  parallel  roads.  But  by  reason  of  this  very  fact, 
it  will  perhaps  occur  more  frequently  than  formerly,  that 
the  operating  forces  will  find  themselves  separated  for 
short  periods  by  obstacles  of  the  ground.  At  all  events, 
the  combinations  which  may  lead  to  a  division  of  the 
forces  of  the  enemy,  have  evidently  retained  all  their  in- 
fluence. Their  scope,  we  see,  is  even  extended,  embrac- 
ing larger  fields  of  action,  while  more  formidable  agents 
of  "destruction,  and  armies  at  once  more  numerous  and 
more  powerful  are  emploj'ed. 

The  rules  of  action  established  in  the  past  for  the 
situations  under  discussion  being  likewise  applicable  in 
the  present,  we  may  very  appropriately  give  them  here 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        29 1 

ill  the  laiif^nag-e  of  those  military  men  who  have  studied 
them  with  the  deepest  attention. 

Joniini  says  upon  this  subject: 

"  ist.  It  may  happen  that  a  double  line  becomes  a 
necessity,  either  on  account  of  the  topographical  con- 
figuration of  the  country,  or  because  the  enemy  himself 
has  taken  a  double  line,  and  it  becomes  essential  to  op- 
pose a  part  of  the  army  to  each  of  his  masses. 

"In  this  case,  interior  lines  should  be  taken^  in  order 
to  have  the  pozver  of  concentrating  more  rapidly  than  the 
enemy ^  and  of  successively  overcoming  each  of  his  sep- 
arated parts. 

"A  retarding  force  ought  then  to  be  left  before  one 
of  the  enemies'  groups,  with  orders  to  fall  back  upon  the 
main  army. 

"The  campaign  of  1814  presents  remarkable  applica- 
tions of  this  principle. 

"2d.  A  double  line  may  sometimes  be  advisable  when 
one  side  has  such  superiority  as  to  give  a  warrant  of  as- 
cendency on  each  line.  In  this  case,  it  is  necessary  to 
reinforce  the  part  of  the  army  designed  to  play  the  most 
important  role,  and,  if  possible,  proceed  so  that  the  two 
directions  may  be  connected."* 

During  the  wars  of  1866  and  1870,  the  combina- 
tions of  Von  Moltke  were  often  derived  from  the  preced- 
ing principle.  As,  for  example,  after  Sadowa,  when  he 
directed  the  Prussian  armies  upon  Olmiitz  and  Vienna. 
Such  was  also  the  case  with  the  march  of  the  two  prin- 
cipal German  masses  at  the  commencement  of  the  cam- 
paign of  1870. 

"3d.  Two  interior  forces,  mutually  supporting  each 
other,  should  not,  if  facing  two  superior  bodies,  allow 
themselves  to  be  drawn  into  too  restricted  a  space. ' ' 

Napoleon  committed  this  error  in  1813.     The  three 


*  Treatise  upon  Grand  Operations. 


292  PART  FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

masses  which  he  thought  to  oppose  to  the  grand  armies 
of  the  Coalition,  manoeuvred  upon  interior  lines;  but  in 
allowing  themselves  to  be  pressed  together  little  by 
little,  a  day  came  when,  at  Leipsic,  they  were  almost 
surrounded  and  overwhelmed  under  the  blows  of  their 
adversaries,  now  become  too  numerous. 

In  January,  1871,  it  was  the  same  imprudence,  aggra- 
vated, it  is  true,  by  a  peculiarly  critical  state  of  affairs, 
which  forced  our  last  army,  that  of  the  Hast,  to  retire 
into  Switzerland. 

' '  4th.  Two  concentric  are  better  than  two  divergent 
lines.  But  in  order  that  they  may  be  exempt  from 
danger,  they  should  be  so  combined  that  the  two  armies 
traversing  them  may  not  separately  encounter  the  united 
forces  of  the  enemy,  before  being  themselves  in  con- 
dition to  effect  their  junction."* 

The  march  of  the  Prussian  armies  at  the  end  of  June, 
1866,  offers  a  startling  example  of  the  violation  of  this 
principle.  It  is  to  be  noted,  moreover,  that,  in  the  future, 
its  application  will  be  more  frequent  and  more  necessary 
than  formerly,  by  reason  of  the  increased  forces  which 
will  henceforth  take  the  field.  Consequently,  the  con- 
ditions of  time  and  space  which  will  permit  the  differ- 
ent armies  to  support  one  another,  in  case  of  a  battle,  or 
w^hich  will  prevent  such  support,  will  have  an  extreme 
importance.  The  staffs  will  have  a  heavier  responsibil- 
ity in  this  regard;  and  more  than  ever  will  the  echelon 
disposition  for  the  march  impose  itself  as  an  obligation, 
in  order  to  provide  against  the  dangers  always  attending 
a  division  of  forces. 

In  terminating  this  statement  of  the  principles  relat- 
ing to  lines  of  operations,  it  will  not  be  uninteresting 
to  recall  those  which  Napoleon  has  authoritatively  laid 
down: 

*  Treatise  on  Grand  Operations. 


SECOND  CHAPTER.. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        293 

"All  army  marching"  to  the  conquest  of  aconntry  has 
its  two  wings  protected  by  neutral  territory  or  large 
natural  obstacles,  such  as  great  rivers  and  mountain- 
chains;  or  it  has  only  one  of  them  so  protected;  or 
neither  of  them.  In  the  first  case,  it  has  only  to  watch 
what  takes  place  in  its  front;  in  the  second,  it  should 
support  itself  upon  the  protected  wing;  and  in  the  third, 
it  should  hold  its  different  corps  supported  upon  the 
centre,  and  never  separate  them;  for  if  it  is  difficult 
to  succeed  with  two  unsupported  flanks,  this  difficulty 
doubles  when  there  are  four  flanks;  trebles  if  there  are 
six;  and  quadruples  if  there  are  eight:  that  is  to  say,  if 
the  army  is  divided  into  two,  three,  or  four  different 
parts.  All  army's  line  of  operations,  in  the  first  in- 
stance, may  support  itself  upon  the  left  or  the  right,  in- 
differently; in  the  second,  it  should  rest  upon  the  pro- 
tected wing;  in  the  third,  it  should  be  perpendicular  to 
the  marching  front  at  the>  middle  point.  In  every  case, 
it  is  necessary  to  have  strong  places  or  fortified  positions 
upon  the  line  of  operations,  at  intervals  of  five  or  six 
marches,  where  supplies  of  all  kinds  may  be  brought 
•together  and  convoys  organized.  These  places  become 
centres  of  movement,  new  starting  points  whereby  the 
line  of  operations  may  be  shortened." 

In  reality,  notwithstanding  the  extent  of  the  develop- 
ments to  which  they  have  given  rise,  the  rules  relating 
to  lines  of  operations  are  simple  and  few  in  number. 
Abridged  to  include  only  the  most  important,  they  may 
be  presented  thus: 

ist.  The  aim  in  selecting  lines  of  operations  should 
be  to  direct  upon  decisive  points  a  stronger  force  than 
the  enemy  is  able  to  bring  to  bear ; 

2d.  This  selection  depends  upon  the  form  of  the  bases ^ 
the  configuration  of  the  ground^  and  the  positions  of 
the  enemy  ; 

3d.  Simple  and  interior  lines  of  operations  are  always 
to  be  preferred ; 


294  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

4th.  The  most  advantageous  lines  of  operations  are 
those  which  lead  an  army  upon  the  enemy' s  communi- 
catio7is  without  endarigej'-ing  its  own. 

The  preceding  theories,  all  of  which  are  the  result  of 
experience,  should  not,  however,  lead  us  to  forget  that  the 
events  of  war,  the  nature  of  the  countries  traversed,  the 
national  spirit  of  the  peoples,  and  finally  the  capacity  and 
energy  of  the  leaders,  which  so  powerfully  influence  the 
results  of  a  campaign,  will  never  be  submitted  to  fixed 
maxims  nor  to  preconceived  rules. 

War  will  always  be  a  passionate  and  bloody  drama, 
not  a  mathematical  operation. 

IV.    WNES   OF  COMMUNICATIONS. 

Definitions. — Military  men  are  not  all  of  one  opinion 
upon  the  manner  of  defining  lines  of  communications. 

For  some,  they  are  transversal  directions  which  estab- 
lish connection  between  the  lines  of  march.  For  others, 
they  are  the  lines  of  operations  themselves.  To  the  end 
that  ideas  may  be  precise  upon  the  subject,  we  shall  as- 
sume that  the  lines  of  communications  are  the  lines 
which  connect  aj^mies  with  their  magazines. 

They  are,  then,  lines  of  retreat  also. 

Napoleon  often  deliberately  confounded  lines  of  opera- 
tions with  lines  of  communications.  And  yet  the  opin- 
ions and  examples  which  he  has  given  us  for  establish- 
ing the  communications  of  an  army  still  serve  as  models 
in  many  cases. 

On  January  12,  1806,  having  to  send  instructions  to 
King  Joseph  on  the  subject  of  the  command  of  the  army 
directed  upon  Naples,  he  thus  expressed  himself : 

"You  ought  to  establish  your  communications,  that 
is  to  say,  your  post  and  supply  routes,  in  short,  your  line 
of  communications,  through  Tuscany,  and  not  in  any 
sense  through  Ancona  and  the  Abruzzi,  because  it  is  my 
desire  that  you  act  by  way  of  Rome  upon  Naples." 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        295 

Importance  of  Lines  of  Communications. — An  army's  line  of 
communications  is  then  the  line  connectincy  it  with  its 
source  of  supply.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  it  is  still 
more  important  than  its  line  of  operations;  for  an  army's 
first  requisite  is  to  live,  and  consequently  to  remain  con- 
nected with  the  region  whence  are  drawn  its  food,  its 
munitions,  its  arms,  and  especially  its  soldiers.  One  of 
the  characteristics  of  an  army  in  the  field  is  that  it  forms 
an  organ  of  consumption  and  expense.  It  does  not  pro- 
duce, at  least  from  the  moment  it  begins  to  act;  it 
destroys  and  consumes.  Its  wants  are  constant,  and  in- 
crease at  every  step.  On  the  day  when  these  are  no 
longer  supplied,  it  ceases  to  act  and  loses  its  power. 

This  is  why  Napoleon  has  so  often,  in  energetic 
terms,  indicated  the  importance  which  he  attributed  to 
the  preservation  of  this  line. 

On  the  22d  of  September,  1808,  responding  to  a  plan 
of  campaign  proposed  by  King  Joseph  for  operations  in 
Spain,  he  wrote: 

"The  military  art  is  one  possessing  principles  which 
must  not  be  violated.  To  change  the  line  of  operations,* 
is  an  undertaking  which  should  be  confined  to  men  of 
genius;  its  loss  is  so  serious  an  event  as  to  render  the 
author  criminal.  The  preservation  of  the  line  of  oper- 
ations is  then  imperative,  in  order  to  avoid  losing  con- 
nection with  the  depot — the  point  of  rendezvous,  the 
magazine  of  supply,  and  the  place  where  the  wounded 
and  sick  may  be  sent. 

"If,  when  holding  Madrid,  all  the  forces  had  been 
collected  in  the  city,  with  the  Retiro  as  a  centre  for  hos- 
pitals and  prisoners,  and  as  a  means  of  keeping  down 
a  large  town  and  of  preserving  its  resources — this  might 
have  been  to  lose  the  line  of  communication  with  France, 


^Military  Correspondence. — Napoleon  intended  &ere  to  speak  of  the 
line  of  communications." 


296  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

but  it  would  have  assured  the  line  of  operations,  espe- 
cially if  profit  had  been  made  of  the  opportunities  to 
collect  large  quantities  of  provisions  and  munitions,  and 
if  there  had  been  organized,  at  a  distance  of  one  or  two 
marches  upon  the  principal  highwa3'S,  as  the  citadel  of 
Segovia,  etc.,  places  made  to  serve  as  points  of  support 
and  observation  for  the  divisions.  But  to  shut  one's  self 
up  in  the  interior  of  Spain  at  this  time,  without  an  or- 
ganized centre  or  well-supplied  magazines,  exposed  to 
the  risk  of  having  the  enemy's  armies  on  the  flanks  and 
rear,  is  to  be  guilty  of  a  folly  unexampled  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  world. 

"When  a  garrison  is  besieged,  it  has  lost  its  line  of 
communications,  but  not  its  line  of  operations,  because 
the  latter  extends  from  the  glacis  to  the  centre  of  the 
place,  where  the  hospitals,  magazines,  and  means  of  sub- 
sistence are  collected.  Is  it  beaten  in  a  sortie?  It  ral- 
lies upon  the  glacis,  and  has  three  or  four  days  in  which 
to  recruit  the  troops  and  restore  their  morale. 

"According  to  the  laws  of  war,  everv  general  who 
loses  his  line  of  communications  deserves  death.  By  the 
line  of  communications,  I  mean  that  line  upon  which 
are  situated  the  hospitals,  the  war  munitions,  and  the 
food,  and  upon  which  the  army  may  be  re-organized 
and  recruited,  and  after  a  day  or  two  of  rest,  recover 
its  morale^  shaken,  it  may  be,  by  an  unforeseen  acci- 
dent. It  is  not  understood  that  the  line  of  com- 
munications is  lost  when  it  is  disturbed  by  guerrillas, 
by  insurgent  peasants,  and  in  general,  by  what  in  war 
are  termed  partisans.  These  may  stop  couriers,  and 
some  of  them  may  even  cross  the  communications 
in  spite  of  all  precautions  ;  but  they  are  not  in  con- 
dition to  make  head  against  an  advanced  or  a  rear- 
guard ;  hence  they  are  not  worth  considering.  The 
line  of  communications  is  organized  upon  the  principle 
that  all  should  fall  back  upon  Madrid.      For  this  every- 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        297 

thing  should  have  been  amassed  at  the  Retire, — muni- 
tions of  war,  provisions,  etc. , — and  in  case  of  necessity,  a 
large  force  could  have  been  collected  there  in  a  few  days. 
There  is  a  great  difference  between  operating  with  a 
system  based  upon  an  organized  centre,  and  proceeding 
at  the  risk  of  losing  the  communications  without  hav- 
ing such  a  centre." 

It  results  from  the  preceding,  that  one  of  the  constant 
cares  of  the  leader  of  an  army  should  be  the  preserva- 
tion of  his  communications. 

But  this  does  not  signify  that  he  should  always  retain 
the  same  line  of  communications.  Circumstances  may 
arise  which  oblige  a  change. 

Changing  Lines  of  Conuniuiications. — The  letter  written  by 
Napoleon  to  his  brother  Joseph,  in  1808,  shows  us  that 
the  successful  accomplishment  of  this  operation  was  in 
his  eyes  a  stroke  of  genius.  His  campaigns  offer  us 
more  than  one  example  of  this. 

In  1805,  when,  after  having  passed  the  Danube  at 
Vienna,  he  moved  straight  to  the  north,  it  might  be 
thought  that  his  line  of  communications  passed  through 
Vienna  and  extended  thence  to  the  Rhine  by  way  of  the 
depot  places  which  he  had  organized  upon  the  right 
bank  of  the  Danube.  In  this  situation,  finding  himself 
forced  to  turn  to  the  right  to  attack  the  Russian  army, 
he  would  have  had  his  line  of  communications  upon  his 
right  flank.  This  was  a  danger  which  he  had  foreseen 
and  provided  for.  He  had  given  orders  that  his  line  of 
retreat  should  pass  through  the  bridge-head  of  Linz, 
which,  with  this  in  view,  he  had  strongly  organized, 
guarding  it  by  the  Bavarian  and  Wiirtemberg  contin- 
gents. From  I^inz,  this  line  extended  on  one  side 
through  Braunau  and  on  the  other  through  Passau  and 
Ratisbon.  It  was  by  this  last  route  that  he  counted 
upon  retiring  in  case  of  repulse. 


298  PART  FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

In  an  anonymous  communication,  published  in  1806 
in  the  Monitetir  Univei^sel^  Napoleon  shows  that  the 
Russians  were  under  the  impression  that  his  line  of 
communication  was  directed  upon  Vienna;  that  it  was 
.the  hope  of  cutting  it  that  induced  them  to  move  their 
.forces  between  Briinn  and  Vienna,  and  to  execute  a  false 
manoeuvre  and  a  flank  march  leading  to  their  defeat  at 
Austerlitz. 

In  1806,  the  Prussian  Staff  resolved,  in  its  turn,  to  cut 
the  line  of  communications  of  our  army.  It  supposed 
-that  this  line  ran  through  Mayence.  Consequently  it 
moved  its  advanced-guard  upon  Erfurt,  and  thence  toward 
Frankfort. 

Napoleon,  indeed,  had  taken  the  necessary  measures 
to  lead  his  adversaries  into  this  error,  and  to  this  end, 
had  caused  demonstrations  to  be  made  on  the  middle 
Rhine,  at  the  very  moment  that  he  was  massing  his 
corps  at  the  southern  extremity  of  the  Thuringian 
Forest.  His  communications  were  then  directed  from 
Kronach  and  Forcheim  upon  Strasburg,  covered  from 
the  enterprises  of  the  enemy. 

When  the  Prussians  discovered  their  error,  their  army 
was  itself  already  turned,  and  had  scarcely  time  to  make 
a  defense. 

But  it  is  to  be  noted  that  Napoleon,  on  the  day  fol- 
lowing Jena,  changed. his  line  of  communications  and 
adopted  the  shorter,  and,  thenceforth,  surer  route 
through  Erfurt,  Fulda,  and  Mayence. 

On  October  16,  1806,  he  wrote  to  Berthier  on  the 
subject: 

"Cousin,  give  orders  to  General  Songis  to  collect  at 
Erfurt  all  the  artillery  taken  from  the  enemy;  give 
orders  to  the  Intendant  General  to  assemble  all  supply 
magazines  at  Erfurt,  which  henceforth  will  be  the  pivot 
of  the  army's  operations. 

"General    Songis   will   send  to    Erfurt  the    artillery 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        299 

.company  which  is  now  at  Wiirzburf^;  he  will  call  back 
to  the  army  the  half  company  which  is  at  Kronach  and 
the  one  at  Forcheim. 

"You  will  give  orders  to  Marshal  Mortier  to  move 
with  the  first  division  of  his  corps  to  Fiilda,  and  estab- 
lish his  headquarters  there,  occupying  the  entire  princi- 
pality of  Fulda  as  soon  as  possible. 

"Order  a  commissaire  des  guerres'^'  to  organize  the 
route  of  the  army  upon  Frankfort  and  Erfurt.  The 
general  in  charge  at  Wiirzburg  will  proceed  to  Erfurt 
to  take  command  of  the  citadel,  the  city  itself,  and  the 
province.  The  general  who  is  at  Kronach  will  advance 
toward  Saxony. 

"The   entire   line  of  supply   now  running  through 
Bamberg,  will  be  removed  to  the  line  Erfurt,   Fulda, 
^  Mayence. 

"Give  orders  that  all  prisoners  hereafter  taken  will 
,be  sent  on  to  Erfurt.  It  is  advisable  to  have  a  general 
■staff  office  there  for  purposes  of  correspondence.  Have 
a  large  military  hospital  established  at  that  place." 

These  orders  of  Napoleon  seem  to  contain,  in  the 
germ,  the  organization  which  has  since  been  adopted  by 
the  Prussians.  It  was  thus  that  after  Jena,  the  city  of 
Erfurt  became  the  head  of  the  supply  line  in  place  of 
Kronach.  The  service  of  the  communications  was 
placed  under  the  orders  of  a  division  general,  who  left 
Wiirzburg  and  was  installed  at  Erfurt.  It  was,  more- 
.pver,  assured  by  a  special  staff  and  a  commissaire  des 
guerres. 

The  most  extraordinary  example  of  a  change  of  the 
lines  of  operations  and  communications,  which  the 
career  of  Napoleon  offers  us,  is  that  conceived  by  him 
in  1814,  but  which  events  did  i^ot  allow  him  time  to 
carry  into  execution. 

*  An  officer  combining  the  duties  of  provost-marstial,  inspector,  and 
paymaster  ; — afterwards  replaced  by  the  military  intendant. — Tr. 


u 


300  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Seeing  that  he  would  not  be  able  with  the  feeble 
forces  at  his  disposal,  to  struggle  forever,  single-handed, 
against  the  combined  armies  of  Bohemia  and  Silesia, 
and  counting,  moreover,  upon  the  resistance  of  Paris,  he 
resolved  to  leave  the  road  to  the  capital  open  to  the 
enemy,  assemble  whatever  troops  he  still  had  in  the 
places  of  the  East,  rally  his  marshals  with  the  remains 
of  their  corps,  and  march  thus  upon  the  rear  of  the 
allies.  He  would  then  have  abandoned  his  line  of  com- 
munications upon  Paris,  to  take  a  new  one  upon  the 
Vosges  and  the  places  of  the  East. 

'  He  wrote  to  the  Duke  of  Bassano  the  following  note 
upon  this  subject: 

There  are  four  courses  open: 

ist.   To  leave  here  at  two  o'clock  in  the  morning, 
reach  Vitry  by  eight,  and  attack  the  enemy. 

"2d.  To  set  out  early  to-morrow  morning  and  march, 
by  way  of  Bar-sur-Ornain,  upon  Saint-Mihiel,  so  as  to 
gain  the  bridge  of  Saint-Mihiel  to-morrow;  from  this 
moment  I  open  communications  with  Verdun,  and  assure 
the  passage  of  the  Meuse;  I  would  go  then  to  Pont-a- 
Mousson,  securing  communication  with  Metz;  I  would 
be  reinforced  by  12,000  men  which  I  could  draw  from 
the  fortified  places;  I  would  thus  have  chased  beyond 
the  Vosges,  the  corps  now  at  Nancy,  and  could  give  bat- 
tle based  on  Metz. 

"3d.  To  move  to-morrow  upon  Joineville  and  Chau- 
mont,  whence  I  would  take  my  line  upon  Bar-sur-Aube 
and  Troyes. 

"4th.  To  march  upon  Brienne  and  Bar-sur-Aube;  we 
would  go  by  way  of  Vassy,  and  would  almost  reach  Bar- 
sur-Aube  to-morrow. 

"  The  most  reasonable  of  these  projects  appears  to  be 
that  which  rests  my  line  upon  Metz  and  my  fortified 
places,  and  which  brings  the  war  near  the  frontiers." 

If  the  Emperor  had  been  able,  as  he  intended,  to  base 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        30I 

himself  upon  the  frontiers  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  to 
effect  a  junction  with  Mortier  and  Marniont,  and  espe- 
cially to  bring-  together  50,000  men,  his  project  would 
perhaps  have  still  led  to  extraordinary  results. 

It  is  surprising-  to  see  how,  at  once  taking  into  account 
the  surrender  of  Paris,  he  ordered  his  communications 
to  be  changed  anew,  directing  them  upon  Orleans. 

Unfortunately  he  was  too  late,  and  the  feeling  of  gen- 
eral exhaustion  which  prevailed,  triumphed  over  his  en- 
ergy- 

We  may  then  conclude  that: 

ist.  An  army  should  never  compromise  its  line  of 
communications  ; 

2d.  To  change  the  line  of  commimications  is  a  difficiLlt 
operation^  but  one  zvhich  it  is  essential  to  execute  when- 
ever the  security  of  the  army  demands  it. 

How  far  are  these  principles  applicable  in  our  day? 
x\  study  of  the  commuications  of  armies  during  recent 
wars  will  determine  the  matter  for  us. 

In  this  connection,  the  War  of  Secession  demonstrated 
to  what  extent  the  progress  of  industry,  especially  the 
creation  of  railroads  and  telegraph  lines,  had  modified 
the  svstem  of  communications  in  the  field.  Although 
this  war  was  carried  on  under  circumstances  of  time  and 
place  bearing  little  analogy  to  those  characterizing  a 
European  war,  it  will  not  be  without  profit  to  follow  one 
of  the  grand  movements  which  its  history  records,  and 
to  note  what  means  were  adopted  to  assure  the  commu- 
nications. The  importance  of  railroads  as  an  agency  of 
supply  will  first  of  all  be  shown,  and  this  will  prepare 
us  to  understand  the  role  which  they  were  called  upon 
to  play  later  in  European  wars. 


o- 


Sherman's  Campaign  in  Georgia  in  1864. — In  the  beginnin 
of  1864,  Grant,  then  Commander-in-Chief  of  the.  Union 
armies,  resolved  to  divide  his  forces  into  two  principal 


302  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

masses,  in  order  to  bring  the  war  to  a  close  as  speedily 
as  possible.  One,  under  his  own  orders,  was  to  operate 
against  Richmond,  the  centre  of  the  enemy's  defence: 
the  other  intrusted  to  Sherman,  was  to  set  out  from 
Tennesee,  then  in  the  hands  of  the  Federals,  seize  At- 
lanta, in  Georgia,  and  destroy  the  resources  which  this 
rich  state  and  the  Carolinas  furnished  the  Confederates, 

Sherman's  line  of  operation  followed  the  direction  of 
the  Tennessee-Georgia  railroad,  obliging  him  to  cross 
the  Oostanaula,  Etowa,  and  Chattahoochee  rivers,  and 
to  pass  several  mountain  spurs,  all  of  which  obstacles 
were  used  by  the  enemy  as  so  many  lines  of  defence. 

His  army,  a  hundred  thousand  strong,  comprising 
seven  corps,  was  divided  into  three  parts,  as  follows: 

The  Army  of  the  Ohio^  commanded  by  Schofield,  re- 
duced to  a  single  corps  of  15,000  men,  was  established 
on  the  upper  Tennessee  at  Knoxville,  and  formed  the 
left  wing. 

The  Army  of  the  Cumberland^  under  Thomas,  60,000 
strong,  divided  into  three  corps,  held  Chattanooga, 

'^\\.%  Army  of  the  Tennessee^  commanded  by  McPher- 
son,  numbering  25,000  men,  in  three  corps,  occupied 
Huntsville,  near  the  Tennessee,  to  the  north,  and  situ- 
ated upon  the  Chattanooga-Memphis  railroad. 

Sherman  possessed,  in  addition,  254  guns,  and  Stone- 
man's  cavalry,  comprising  three  divisions. 

The  Confederate  army  under  Johnston,  reduced  to 
60,000  men  in  three  corps,  was  established  in. intrenched 
positions  before  Dalton,  astride  the  Georgia-Tennessee 
railroad,  and  separated  from  the  Federals  by  the  moun- 
tains called  Rocky-Face-Ridge. 

Sherman  commenced  his  movement  during  the  first 
days  of  May,  1864.  The  Georgia-Tennessee  railroad 
served  both  armies  for  line  of  operations  and  communi- 
cations. It  was  of  so  much  importance  that  from  this 
time  it  became,  so  to  say,  the  pivot  and  the  objective  of 
their  operations.     {See  Plate  XVI.) 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        303 

Sherman  not  wishing  to  attack  Johnston's  strong  posi- 
tions in  front,  resolved  to  turn  them  by  their  left.  He 
directed  McPherson  upon  Resaca,  eighteen  miles  to  the 
south  of  Dalton,  with  orders  to  destroy  the  railroad 
there,  and  take  a  position  upon  the  Confederate  flank. 

In  the  meantime,  Schofield  marched  directly  upon 
Dalton,  and  the  rest  of  the  army  followed  McPherson. 

Johnston,  fearing  for  his  communications,  hastened 
to  defend  the  threatened  point;  but  he  was  repulsed, 
and  obliged  to  draw  back  to  the  line  of  the  Etowa  to  the 
south  of  Cassville.  Sherman,  who  up  to  this  point  had 
pursued  him  without  relaxation,  in  the  hope  of  taking 
him  in  the  rear,  was  now  alive  to  the  necessity  of  giving 
his  troops  a  few  days'  rest.  He  availed  himself  of  the 
pause  to  repair  the  railroad  and  collect  trains  sufficient 
to  carry  twenty  days'  food  and  forage  supply. 

These  dispositions  made,  he  resumed  the  offensive. 
Johnston's  position  was  strongly  intrenched,  and  de- 
fended the  dangerous  defiles  of  Allatoona.  Sherman 
again  made  a  flank  movement.  While  his  rear-guard 
made  demonstrations  upon  Cartersville,  the  remainder 
of  his  forces  moved  in  three  columns  upon  Dallas,  to  be 
able  to  wheel  around  froin  this  point  and  cut  the  rail- 
road in  the  enemy's  rear. 

Johnston  immediately  fell  back,  and  vainly  tried  to  re- 
take Dallas;  then  seeing  his  adversary  reseize  the  rail- 
road and  occupy  in  force,  at  Ackworth,  the  debouches 
south  of  the  defiles  of  Allatoona,  he  withdrew  to  Kene- 
saw  Mountain. 

Sherman  saw,  in  leaving  the  railroad,  how  much  his 
trains  hampered  his  movements,  and  hastened  to  re- 
sume his  natural  line  of  communications.  He  estab- 
lished his  magazines  at  places  situated  directly  in  his 
rear,  fortified  the  approaches  to  them,  and  left  detach-^ 
ments  there,  which  were  replaced  by  two  divisions  drawn 
from  the  17th  Corps. 


304  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

On  the  lotli  June,  lie  marched  upon  Marietta,  which 
Johnston  had  fortified,  forced  the  latter  to  retreat  upon 
Nose's  Creek,  and  on  the  26th  attacked  him  vigorously. 
Johnston  repulsed  his  assaults;  but  soon  Sherman  moved 
his  main  forces  toward  the  Chattahoochee,  obliging 
Johnston  to  retire  to  this  stream,  which  he  prepared  to 
defend,  Sherman  having  passed  the  river  above  the 
enemy,  while  his  right  made  demonstrations  in  front, 
compelled  the  Confederates  to  retreat  to  Atlanta. 

In  thus  continually  menacing  the  railroad  in  the  en- 
emy's rear,  Sherman  had  enlisted  Inmost  favorable  re- 
sults. This  manoeuvre  had  so  often  brought  him  success 
that  he  prepared  to  resort  to  it  again,  after  having  col- 
lected fresh  supplies  at  Allatoona,  Marietta,  and  Vining. 
On  the  i8th  Juh^,  he  directed  the  commands  of  McPher- 
son  and  Schofield  upon  the  Atlanta-Augusta  railroad, 
which  they  destroyed.  Then  these  two  parts  of  the 
army  marched  upon  Atlanta,  to  assail  it  from  the  east, 
while  Sherman  himself  threatened  it  from  the  north. 

At  this  juncture,  the  Confederate  government,  without 
taking  into  account  the  talent  displayed  by  Johnston, 
replaced  him  by  Hood,  one  of  his  corps  commanders. 
The  latter  gave  orders  for  an  offensive  movement,  to  take 
place  on  the  20th  July;  but  he  was  beaten,  and  his 
attempt  had  no  other  result  than  to  permit  the  Federal 
army  to  draw  its  lines  closer  around  Atlanta.  Two  days 
later  the  struggle  recommenced,  and,  although  very  de- 
structive to  the  Federals,  who  lostMcPherson,  it  brought 
about  no  sensible  change  in  the  situation. 

Sherman  realized  the  difficulty  of  carrying  the  in- 
trenchments  of  the  enemy,  without  a  siege,  and  returned 
to  his  customary  tactics.  Hood's  only  line  of  communi- 
cations was  the  railroad  to  the  south  upon  Macon,  an 
important  city  of  Georgia.  Starting  at  East  Point,  a 
branch  of  this  road  ran  to  West  Point  and  Montgomery, 
in  Alabama. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        305 

Sherman  directed  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  to  the 
right  npon  East  Point,  and  his  cavalry,  by  two  different 
directions,  upon  Lovejoy,  a  station  eighteen  miles  dis- 
tant from  Atlanta.  This  last  movement  did  not  succeed; 
each  of  the  detachments  was  assailed  by  superior  forces 
which  were  scouring  the  country.  As  to  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee,  attacked  by  Hood  in  its  march  of  July 
28,  it  inflicted  upon  him  a  defeat  which  thenceforth  re- 
duced him  to  the  defensive.  He,  however,  strove  still 
to  extricate  himself,  and  to  this  end  formed  an  import- 
ant artillery  and  cavalry  command,  which,  on  the  i8th 
August,  was  directed,  under  Wheeler,  against  the  railroad 
by  which  Sherman  was  supplied.  But  the  latter,  un- 
moved by  this,  profited  by  the  consequent  weakening  of 
Hood's  forces,  to  complete  the  destruction  of  the  rail- 
roads south  of  Atlanta.  A  short  time  after,  on  the  30th 
August,  he  moved  the  bulk  of  his  troops  in  this  direc- 
tion, in  such  a  manner  as  to  completely  cut  all  the  com- 
munications of  his  adversary  Hood  attempted  at  Jones- 
boro'  to  prevent  this  operation;  but  not  succeeding  there, 
he  abandoned  Atlanta  during  the  night  of  the  ist  Sep- 
tember, after  having  blown  up  the  arsenal  and  powder 
magazines,  and  destro3'ed  surplus  supplies. 

The  first  aim  of  this  four  months'  campaign  was  at- 
tained. The  victor  at  once,  on  the  2d  September,  estab- 
lished himself  firmly  in  Atlanta,  and  made  this  place  a 
base  for  new  operations,  which,  however,  were  not  yet 
fully  decided  upon.  The  month  of  September  was 
spent  in  the  work  of  reorganization  and  preparation.  It 
was  necessary  as  a  stepping-stone  to  future  action,  to 
secure  the  line  of  communications,  now  very  extended, 
reaching  from  Atlanta  to  the  Tennessee.  To  this  end  a 
division  of  occupation  was  installed  at  Chattanooga,  and 
another  at  Rome. 

Sherman  then  ordered  Atlanta  evacuated  by  all  not 
connected  with  the  Federal  forces. 
20 


3o6  PART  FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

At  the  end  of  September,  hostilities  recommenced 
with  increased  activity.  The  Confederates  united  in  an 
effort  to  seize  the  Federal  communications.  Their  cav- 
alry, under  Forrest,  first  made  extensive  raids  into 
Tennessee  and  Alabama,  and  soon  Hood's  entire  army 
moved  in  the  same  direction. 

Sherman,  who  had  divined  their  intentions,  and  rein- 
forced his  stations,  at  first  started  in  pursuit  of  them, 
leaving  a  corps  at  Atlanta.  He  proceeded  thus  to  with- 
in a  short  distance  of  the  Tennessee,  retracing  his  steps, 
and  moving  toward  the  army  which  he  had  established 
between  Nashville  and  Chattanooga,  under  the  orders, 
of  Thomas.  This  movement  led  the  bellieerents  back 
over  the  same  ground  upon  which  they  had  opened  the 
campaign,  with  reversed  positions.  But  having  freed 
his  communications,  and  assured  himself  that  Thomas 
covered  his  rear,  Sherman  resolved  to  execute  a  daring 
march  to  the  Atlantic,  the  results  of  which,  it  seemed  to 
him,  would  be  decisive.  For  this,  it  was  necessary  to 
change  his  line  of  communications,  abandon  his  connec- 
tion with  Tennessee,  and  direct  his  march  upon  an  At- 
lantic port,  relying  upon  the  assistance  of  the  fleet  there. 

Having  obtained  Grant's  consent,  and  given  orders  to 
Thomas,  who  had  45,000  men,  to  hold  Hood  in  check, 
and  follow  him  in  case  he  returned  South,  Sherman 
made  dispositions  to  march  from  Atlanta  to  Savannah 
with: 

65,000  men; 

72  guns,  with  200  rounds  per  gun; 

And  2,500  four-horse  wagons  with  20  days'  provisions. 

He  returned  to  Atlanta  to  prepare  for  this  grand 
movement,  and  on  the  nth  November  was  in  condition 
to  undertake,  with  his  veterans  of  the  West,  the  impos- 
ing march,  which  for  two  months  was  to  hold  in  sus- 
pense the  entire  population  of  the  United  States.  His 
instructions  are  worthy  of  citation  in  full;  but  it  will  be 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        307 

sufficient  here  to  present  those  relating  to  communica- 
tions and  supplies. 

His  army  was  to  march  in  four  columns,  and  to  make 
a  mean  distance  of  fifteen  miles  a  day.  It  had  no  gen- 
eral supply  trains.  Each  corps  had  its  special  munition 
and  provision  train.  The  army  was  to  live  upon  the 
country,  and  to  keep  its  wagons  constantly  filled  with 
provisions  for  at  least  twenty  days. 

The  march  was  begun  on  the  i4tli  November,  with- 
out apprehension  of  other  difficulties  than  those  arising 
from  the  character  of  the  country.  Not  wishing  to 
make  use  of  the  railroads,  Sherman  destroyed  them  all 
along  the  line  of  his  march,  which  led  through  Milledge- 
ville,  Saundersv.ille,  Louisville  and  Milieu.  After  ad- 
vancing three  hundred  miles,  he  arrived  before  Savannah 
on  the  loth  December,  seizing  Fort  McAllister  first, 
then  the  city  itself,  and  opening  communications  with 
the  Federal  fleet  cruising  in  the  vicinity. 

Thenceforth  the  Union  commander  was  free  to  move 
toward  the  north,  to  unite  his  operations  with  Grant's. 
His  army  was  set  in  motion  on  the  ist  February,  vafter 
having  received  reinforcements.  Charleston  fell  as  soon 
as  the  railroads  leading  to  it  were  destroyed.  Sherman 
continued  his  march  directly  upon  Fayetteville,  strip- 
ping the  whole  of  South  Carolina  of  her  resources. 
Wilmington  had  already  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the 
Federals.  Finally  he  met  the  Confederate  forces  at 
Averysboro',  on  the  17th  of  March,  and  at  Bentonville 
on  the  2ist,  when  he  again  checked  Johnston,  restored  a 
short  time  before  to  the  command  of  this  army.  On 
the  22d,  Sherman  was  joined  by  Schofield,  whom  Grant 
had  sent  from  the  north,  and  Johnston  was  pushed  upon 
Raleigh,  where  he  was  held  until  the  25th  of  April. 

At  this  point  hostilities  ceased.  On  the  9th,  Rich- 
mond had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  Federals,  and 
Johnston,  following  the  example  of  Lee,  surrendered. 


3o8  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Such  was  this  campaign,  the  boldness  of  which  can 
perhaps  be  compared  only  to  the  skill  with  which  the 
communications  were  maintained  and  protected. 

The  railroads  here  pla5^ed  such  a  part  that  the  armies 
had,  so  to  speak,  remained  tied  to  them  up  to  the  time 
when  Sherman  was  able  to  do  without  their  assistance, 
and  to  change  his  line  of  operations,  in  opening  new 
communications  with  the  sea,  upon  ports  whose  posses- 
sion was  assured  him  by  the  Federal  fleet. 

However  instructive  they  may  be,  the  events  of  the 
War  of  Secession  can  give,  so  far  as  modern  armies  are 
concerned,  but  an  incomplete  idea  of  the  establishment 
of  lines  of  communications,  and  the  manner  of  employ- 
ing and  protecting  them.  In  this  regard,  it  is  again  nec- 
essary to  have  recourse  to  the  measures  adopted  by  the 
Prussian  General  Staff  in  1870. 

LINES  OF  COMMUNICATIONS  OF  THE   GERMAN  ARMIES  IN   1870. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  nine  railroads  were 
made  use  of  b}^  the  Prussian  General  Staff  to  transport 
the  troops  of  the  North  and  the  South  to  the  zone  ot 
concentration. 

After  the  invasion,  these  roads  continued  to  keep  the 
different  German  army  corps  in  communication  with 
their  several  supply  districts  in  the  interior;  but  the  ad- 
vantages of  employing  them  were  enhanced  by  calling 
into  play  our  system  of  railroads  and  ordinary  roads. 

From  this  there  resulted  a  successive  development  of 
communications,  which  it  will  suffice  to  follow  in  out- 
line to  make  clear  the  system  adopted  by  the  enemy's 
armies. 

/.  Army. — Up  to  the  end  of  the  siege  of  Metz,  this 
army  couimunicated  with  its  different  corps  regions  al- 
most exclusively  by  a  line  of  stations  which  began  at 
Courcelles-sur-Nied.     The  latterwas  the  principal  depot 


SECOND   CHAPTER. — PREPARATION    FOR    WAR.       309 

ill  the  theatre  of  operations  during  this  period.  This 
line  was  directed  by  way  of  Boulay  upon  Sarreloiiis  and 
across  the  Hnndsruck  upon  Coblenz.  Beyond  the  last- 
named  place  two  railroads  extended  to  the  interior  ot 
the  country. 

Its  line  of  stations  was  guarded  by  9  battalions,  4 
squadrons,  and  1  battery,  drawn  from  the  landwehr. 

After  the  fall  of  Metz,  this  army  proceeded  toward  the 
north,  and  from  the  15th  of  November,  its  line  of  com- 
munications  was  established  by  the  Rheims-Bpernay- 
Frouard-Metz  railroad.  It  had,  moreover,  two  lines  of 
stations  directed  upon  Metz:  one  by  Rethel,  Vouziers, 
Dun-sur-Meuse,  Damvillers,  and  Briey;  the  other  by 
Rheims,  Verdun,  and  Btain. 

After  the  taking  of  Soissons,  two  station  routes  were 
directed  upon  this  point  by  Noyon  and  Compiegne;  be- 
yond this  place  use  was  made  of  the  railroad,  which  this 
army  shared  with  the  Army  of  the  Meuse. 

By  the  end  of  the  war,  the  I.  Army  had  repaired  and 
put  in  operation  the  circuitous  railroad  line,  Clermont 
to  Amiens,  and  Amiens  to  Rheims  by  way  of  La  Fere 
and  Laon.  Independent  of  this  supplemental  section, 
its  principal  line  of  communications  followed  the  rail- 
road indicated  above,  called  by  the  Germans  the  "  north 
line." 

Five  battalions  and  a  squadron  sufficed  to  guard  it. 
These  had,  however,  to  watch  only  the  space  between 
Paris  and  Peronne. 

These  communications  were  menaced  by  the  Army  of 
the  North  alone,  and  the  I.  Army  was  strong  enough  to 
hold  this  in  check. 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  sieges  of  Thionville, ' 
Longuyon,  Montmedy,  Mezieres,  La  Fere,  Peronne,  and 
Soissons,  were  undertaken  only  for  the  purpose  of  assur- 
ing the  safety  of  this  line. 


3IO  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

///.  Ariny. — In  the  middle  of  August,  1870,  the  III. 
Army  arrived  upon  the  Meurthe,  after  the  passage  of 
the  Vosges.  It  had  at  its  disposal  the  Nancy-Wissem- 
bourg  railroad  by  way  of  Vendenheim;  and  two  lines  of 
stations:  one  from  Sarrebourg  to  Haguenau  by  way  of 
Bouxwiller;  the  other  from  Marsal  to  Wissembourg  by 
way  of  Niederbronn. 

The  sieges  of  Bitche,  Phalsbourg,  and  Toul  were  un- 
dertaken to  assure  its  communications,  which  at  this 
period  were  guarded  by  fourteen  battalions  of  landwehr, 
a  regiment  of  reserve  cavalry,  and  a  company  of  Bava- 
rian engineers.  Our  defense  of  Toul  thwarted  the  III, 
Army's  attempt  to  establish  its  communications  by  the 
important  railroad  from  Nancy  to  Paris,  whose  direction 
it  followed.  But  this  did  not  prevent  its  advance.  As  it 
pushed  on,  a  line  of  stations  was  established  in  its  rear 
from  Nancy  to  Bar-le-Duc,  by  Colombey  and  Void  to 
the  south  of  the  railroad.  The  empty  wagons  returned 
by  the  road  from  Gondreville  and  Kcrouves.  At  the 
time  when  the  III.  Army  made  its  grand  wheel  toward 
the  north,  its  line  of  communications  was  prolonged  by 
Void  upon  Saint-Mihiel  and  from  Bar-le-Duc  upon  Cler- 
mont. Beyond  these  points,  up  to  Sedan,  the  communi- 
cations were  established  by  the  line  of  stations  of  the 
Army  of  the  Meuse,  upon  both  banks  of  this  river.  At 
the  same  time  the  general  inspectorship  of  depots  was 
established  at  Bar-le-Duc,  where  magazines  and  field 
hospitals  had  been  collected  as  at  Nancy  and  Luneville. 

The  defense  of  these  communications  was  in  the  main 
intrusted  to  the  Baden  and  Wiirtemberg  troops,  in  Al- 
sace; and  west  of  the  Vosges,  to  Prussian  and  Bavarian 
battalions.  For  some  time,  our  garrisons  at  Bitche  and 
Phalsbourg  rendered  these  communications  precarious, 
without,  however,  having  the  power  to  break  them. 
During  the  first  days  of  September,  the  investment  of 
our  places  in  the  East  and  the  shutting  up  of  the  active 


SECOND  CHAPTKR. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        31I 

forces  there,  resulted  in  giving  comparative  security  to 
the  Gennaii  comiiiiinications.  The  larger  part  of  the 
Prussian  depot  troops  had  stopped  before  the  walls  of 
Phalsbourg  and  Toul;  those  of  Baden,  before  Strasburg. 
In  fact,  the  III.  Army  had  very  few  troops  guarding  its 
depot  lines,  300  kilometres  long  [about  186  miles].  For 
this  reason,  the  francs-iireitrs^  now  beginning  to  orga- 
nize, were  not  slow  in  assuming  a  bold  front.  They 
cut  the  railroad  from  Strasburg  to  Paris,  as  well  as  the 
telegraph  line;  but  these  were  easily  repaired,  and  the 
damage  done  was  consequently  without  important  in- 
fluence. 

After  the  battle  of  Sedan,  and  during  the  siege  of 
Paris,  the  III.  Army  used  for  its  communications  the 
Nancy-Paris  railroad,  by  way  of  Kpernay,  as  far  as 
Nanteuil-snr-Marne.  Here  it  was  obliged  to  relinquish 
the  railroad  in  consequence  of  the  destruction  of  the 
bridges  and  the  tunnel. 

The  Army  of  the  Meuse,  whose  fate  since  Sedan  had 
been  linked  with  that  of  the  III.,  employed  the  route 
from  Clermont-en-Argonne  to  Pont-a-Mousson.  But  for 
a  long  time  it  had  no  railroad  except  that  from  Nan- 
teuil  to  Strasburg,  which,  from  Kpernay  served  also 
both  the  I.  and  III.  Armies.  But  need  was  felt  of  a 
second  line.  In  consequence,  it  was  decided  to  besiege 
Soissons,  which  closed  the  branch  road  from  Chalons 
to  Mitry,  by  Rheims.  The  order  for  this  was  given  on 
the  25th  of  September. 

On  the  20th  of- this  month,  the  general  inspectorship 
of  depots  of  these  two  armies  had  been  moved  forward. 
That  of  the  III.  Army  was  established  at  Corbeil;  and 
there  was  in  hand  to  protect  the  line  of  depots  against 
surprise,  a  small  body  of  4  battalions,  6  squadrons,  r 
battery,  and  2  companies  of  pioneers.  At  this  period, 
moreover,  an  additional  battalion  of  etappen  troops  was 
posted  at  each  important  point  of  the  line,  and  it  was 


312  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

found  necessary,  a  short  time  afterwards,  to  order  an 
entire  army  corps,  the  VII.,  to  protect  the  principal 
communications  toward  the  south  of  the  investing  army. 

In  the  meanwhile,  the  general  inspectorship  of  depots 
for  the  Army  of  the  Meuse,  was  fixed  at  Dammartin,  a 
point  which  marked  the  extremity  of  its  line  of  depots 
to  the  north-east  of  Paris.  Lagny  was  then  the  head 
station  of  the  line  of  depots  of  most  importance  to  the 
troops  engaged  in  the  siege  of  Paris.  Our  eastern  rail- 
way line  remained  then  the  great  artery  of  German 
communication,  called  by  the  Prussian  General  staff  at 
the  end  of  the  war  the  central  line. 

Its  protection  was  at  first  assured  by  the  troops  charged 
with  the  guardianship  of  the  depot  sites,  comprising: 
II  battalions, 
9  squadrons, 
2  batteries, 

4  companies  of  pioneers; 
then  by  the  VII.  Corps  which  watched  the  debouches  of 
the  upper  Seine,  the  Aube,  and  the  upper  Marne; 

And,  finally,  by  the  corps  under  General  Werder, 
which,  while  covering  the  siege  of  Belfort,  watched  the 
approaches  to  the  central  line.^  from  the  side  of  the 
upper  Meuse  and  the  Vosges. 

The  Army  of  the  Meuse,  in  addition,  dedicated  4  bat- 
talions and  2  squadrons  to  the  protection  of  its  depot 
stations. 

//.  Army. — It  is  interesting  to  glance  at  the  com- 
munications of  the  II.  Army  during  operations  upon  the 
Loire,  that  is  to  say,  during  the  latter  part  of  the  war. 
They  at  this  time  followed  the  railroad  from  Orleans  to 
Juvisy,  Montargis,  Montereau,  Joigny,  Tonnerre,  Nuits- 
sur-Arman^on,  Chatillon-sur-Seine,  Chaumont-en-Bas- 
signy,  and  Blesmes.  They  thus  formed  a  long,  sinuous 
line,  easy  to  intercept,  and  unfortunately  situated,  being 
in  rear  of  the  left  flank  of  the  army  which  it  supplied. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        313 

It  was  completed  by  three  depot  lines,  namely: 

One  from  Jnvisy  to  Lagny  by  Villeneuve-Saint- 
Georo-es ; 

One  from  Corbeil  to  Epernay,  by  way  of  Tournan, 
Conlmiersand  Montmirail; 

And  a  third,  from  Toury  to  Saint-Dizier,  by  Pithi- 
viers,  Nemonrs,  Sens,  Troyes,  Lesmont,  and  Vassy. 

These  communications  were  guarded  by  9  battalions, 
6  squadrons,  and  i  company  of  pioneers,  distributed  along 
the  lines.  It  was  especially  for  the  protection  of  these 
communications  that  the  VII.  Corps  was  directed  upon 
Chatillon-sur-Seine  and  Nuits-sur-Armangon,  when  the 
enterprises  of  our  francs-tireurs  became  so  bold  as  to 
interfere  with  the  security  of  the  transports  of  the  II. 
Army. 

Army  of  the  South  and  the  XIV.  Corps. — Until  its  ar- 
rival upon  the  Saone,  the  Army  of  the  South,  com- 
manded by  Field-Marshal  Manteuflfel,  used  the  same 
communications  as  the  II.  Army;  namely,  the  railroad 
from  Chatillon  to  Blesmes. 

We  have  seen  that  its  commander,  taking  into  account 
the  unskillfulness  of  our  improvised  troops,  did  not  hes- 
itate to  push  forward  through  a  difficult  country,  ne- 
glecting on  both  flanks  the  forces  collected  at  Dijon  and 
Langres.  Kettler's  mixed  brigade,  the  composition  of 
which  has  alreadv  been  given,  was  left  in  rear  for  the 
protection  of  convoys. 

But  once  upon  the  Saone,  at  Gray,  Manteuflfel,  with- 
out faltering,  changed  his  communications,  fixing  them 
upon  the  railroad  from  Vesoul  to  Blainville-la-Grande, 
by  way  of  Epinal,  the  line  which  already  supplied  Wer- 
der's  troops.  This  change  was  effected  without  diflS- 
culty,  and,  later,  this  line  was  supplemented  by  two  sta- 
tion routes  running  from  Dole  to  Xertigny,  to  the 
south  of  Epinal,  by  way  of  Gray,  Vesoul,  Faverney,  and 


314  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Vauvilliers;  the  other  by  Pesmes,  Gy,  Fretigney,  Vesoul, 
lyimeil,  and  Plombieres. 

All  the  German  communications  were  established  by 
special  services,  called  general  inspectorships  of  depots 
for  armies,  and  inspectorships  of  depots  for  army  corps. 
The  depot  sites,  called  cornmandantures^  were  generally 
in  charge  of  a  field  officer. 

Each  general  inspectorship  of  depots  made  a  part  of 
the  army's  headquarters,  and  comprised: 

A  lieutenant-general  as  inspector-general  (except  for 
the  Army  of  the  Meuse,  which  had  a  colonel); 
A  chief  of  staff  ; 

Aides-de-camp  to  the  inspector-general; 
An  artillery  officer; 
An  engineer  officer; 
An  intendant; 
A  provost-marshal; 
And  an  advisory  engineer  for  the  railroads. 

In  most  cases,  these  officers  and  functionaries  were  of 
high  grade,  and  on  the  retired  list. 

The  position  of  the  inspectors-general  was  purely 
military,  and  their  authority  did  not  extend  beyond 
the  communications  which  they  established.  They  had 
entire  control  of  the  matter  of  transports;  but  for  the 
distribution  of  the  guard  troops,  they  were  obliged  to 
take  orders  from  the  governors-general  of  the  provinces 
occupied. 

The  latter,  charged  with  maintaining  Prussian  au- 
thority in  the  invaded  provinces,  were,  as  has  just  been 
intimated,  in  a  certain  measure  responsible  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  communications.  The  troops  at  their  dis- 
posal co-operated,  as  occasion  required,  for  the  purpose 
of  guarantying  this  protection.  It  is  to  be  observed  that 
these  forces  were  quite  large. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  EOR  WAR.       315 

The  g-overnment  of  Alsace  had  at  its  disposal: 
22  battalions  and  3  companies, 
8  sqnadrons, 

2  batteries, 

10  heavy  artillery  companies, 

3  companies  of  pioneers. 

The  general  government  of  Lorraine  had  under  its 
orders: 

31  battalions  and  3  companies, 

7  sqnadrons, 
3  batteries, 

5  heavy  artillery  companies; 

Also  the  detachment  under  Colonel  Krenski,  located 
upon  the  line  of  communications  at  Commercy,  com- 
prising: 

6  battalions, 
2  squadrons, 

2  batteries, 

6  heavy  artillery  companies, 

3  companies  of  pioneers. 

The  general  government  of  Rheims  had  under  its  au- 
thority : 

20  battalions, 
5  squadrons, 
3  batteries, 

8  companies  of  heavy  artillery, 
2  companies  of  pioneers. 

Lastly,  the  Metz  government  had: 
15  batallions, 
2  squadrons, 

1  battery,  ' 
10  companies  of  heavy  artillery, 

2  companies  of  pioneers. 

All  these,  like  the  etappen  troops,  were  drawn  from 
the  landwehr.  A  recapitulation  of  their  effectives  gives 
an  actual  army  of  the  second  line  comprising: 


31 6  PART  FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Etappe7i  troops  of  the  I.  Army 4,130  men, 

III.  Army 10,910     " 

II.    Army 8,160     " 

"  "         "       Army  of  the  Meuse 3,460     " 

_  , 

Total  etappen  troops 26,660  men. 

Troops  of  the  General  Government  of  Alsace  .....  21,000  men. 

"  "  "  "     Lorraine  ....  33,070     " 

"     Rheims.        ...  18,220     " 

"     Metz 13,830     " 

Total  troops  of  occupation 86,220  men. 

Grand  ToTAiv 112,880  men. 

Stated  briefly,  the  service  of  the  communications  yf 
the  German  armies  in  1870  and  1871  was  fixed  as  fol- 
lows:* 

In  each  army  was  a  ge7ieral  inspectorship  of  depots. 
The  duties  of  this  office  related  to  the  establishment, 
protection,  and  operation  of  the  lines  of  communications. 
Each  army  corps  had  a  similar  service  called  inspector- 
ship of  depots.  The  communications  followed  the  rail- 
roads, as  far  as  practicable;  and  when  this  was  not  the 
case,  depot  lines  were  established.  It  was  sought  to  ar- 
range, for  each  army,  a  double  line  of  depots  and  an  in- 
dependent railroad.  The  protection  of  the  communica- 
tions was  assured  by  troops  of  the  second  line  distributed 
along  them  at  intervals,  and  supported  in  case  of  need 
by  special  detachments. 

Present  Organization  of  the  Lines  of  Communications. — 
Among  the  new  organizations  which  experience  in  re- 
cent wars  has  evolved,  must  be  included  that  relating 
to  the  communications.  The  present  system,  while  de- 
rived from  the  past,  takes  into  account  the  great  changes 

*The  battalions  are  counted  at  800  men  ;  the  squadrons  at  130;  the 
batteries  at  no;  the  pioneers  companies  at  180. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        317 

broiiQ-ht  about  in  the  means  of  communication  and  in 
the  composition  of  the  forces  set  in  motion. 

It  will  be  well,  then,  to  consider  the  body  of  circum- 
stances which  go  to  make  up  the  new  conditions. 

The  lines  of  communication  are  now  generally  com- 
posed of  the  railroads  connecting  armies  with  their  sup- 
ply centres.  These  become  at  once  their  lines  of  trans- 
portation and  of  march,  and  are  no  longer  limited,  as 
formerly,  by  the  base  of  operations,  but,  on  the  contrary, 
extend  to  the  interior  of  the  country,  to  the  regions 
which  feed  the  army  corps.  They  are  called  into  ope- 
ration at  the  moment  the  armies  reach  their  zone  of  con- 
centration. 

The  advantages  which  the  possession  of  several  rail- 
roads assures  to  armies,  have  no  need  of  being  demon- 
strated. The  same  is  true  regarding  the  importance  of 
the  services  charged  with  establishing  these  communi- 
cations. The  augmentation  of  the  effectives  and  the 
increased  complexity  of  the  military  machine,  have  still 
further  added  to  this  importance. 

As  a  result,  the  organization  of  the  lines  of  communi- 
cation, their  protection,  their  development,  the  estab- 
lishment of  intermediate  stations  and  depots,  in  a  word, 
the  services  pertaining  to  the  rear,  have  been  almost 
everywhere  fixed  by  regulations. 

The  movements  which  take  place  along  the  lines  of 
communications  are  directed: 

From  front  to  rear^  for  prisoners,  wounded,  sick,  and 
unserviceable  niathnel  ; 

From  rear  to  frojit^  for  reinforcements  and  supplies; 

And,  finally,  transversely^  for  the  maintenance  of 
communication  between  the  various  operating  bodies, 
and  also  between  the  different  parts  of  the  forces  of  occu- 
pation. 

This  division  indicates  the  distribution  of  these  ser- 
vices. The  care  of  assuring  order  and  regularity  in  these 


3l8  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

movements,  is  intrusted  to  a  general  officer,  who  has 
under  his  orders  the  troops  and  employes  serving  in  rear 
of  the  armies. 

The  system  of  communications  is  divided  into  sec- 
tions, each  under  a  field  officer.  These  sub-commanders 
are  given  great  latitude  of  action,  and  upon  them  rests 
the  responsibility  for  the  adoption  of  all  proper  measures, 
such  as  the  organization  of  depots,  the  repair  of  com- 
munications, the  establishment  and  maintenance  of 
magazines,  the  protection  of  transports  and  marches, 
the  creation  and  repair  of  fortifications  for  defence  of 
iniportant  points,  etc. 

Inspectors  of  lines  or  sections,  and  commandants  of 
depots,  etc. ,  are  to  second  them. 

These  various  authorities  must  always  be  dependent 
upon  the  general-in-chief,  and  act  only  in  accordance 
with  his  instructions.* 

As  far  as  possible,  the  rail  communications  should  be 
supplemented  by  accompanying  depot  lines. 

The  groundwork  of  the  foregoing  principles  was  laid 
down  in  the  beginning  of  the  century  by  Napoleon. 
His  views  may  be  found  in  his  correspondence  with 
Berthier. 

Whatever  may  be  the  perfection  of  existing  systems, 
however,  it  is  proper  to  remark  that  a  menace  to  an 
army's  lines  of  communication  is  now  no  less  dangerous 
than  formerly.  By  reason  of  the  high  effective  of  the 
masses  to  be  provided  for,  the  security  of  these  lines  is 
even  more  than  ever  a  necessity  upon  which  depends  at 
once  the  existence  of  the  troops  and  their  capacity  for 
effective  service. 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  with  the  present  extension  of 
railway  systems,  we  should  understand  that  the  seizure 

*Our  [French]  regulations  upon  army  depot  service  were  published 
August  21,  1884.  They  fix  the  methods  to  be  henceforth  followed  in 
establishing  communications. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        319 

of  a  single  line  will  cause  only  temporary  embarrassment 
to  an  army  possessing  several  lines. 

Tims,  in  1871,  the  destrnction  of  a  section  of  the 
Paris-Nancy  road  wonld  have  produced  no  change  in 
the  movements  of  the  Germans,  unless  its  loss  had  con- 
tinued for  several  weeks;  for  at  this  period,  their  armies 
controlled  other  railway  lines.  Their  communications 
embraced  a  zone  of  country  included  between  the  rail- 
road from  Mezieres  to  Metz,  by  way  of  Thionville,  and 
the  line  from  Nuits-sur-Armangon  to  Luneville  by  Cha- 
mont-en-Bassigny;  thus  covering  a  space  with  a  mean 
width  of  160  kilometres  [between  99  and  100  miles], 
and  a  length  of  more  than  400  kilometres  [about  248 
miles]. 

It  was  not  possible,  then,  for  a  party  oi  francs- tireurs 
to  cut  them.  The  latter  might  injure  one  road,  cause  a 
stoppage  here  for  a  short  time,  and  diminish  thus  the 
enemy's  means  of  circulation;  but  it  would  require  an 
entire  army  to  intercept  all  the  routes  held  by  him, 
drive  away  the  troops  defending  them,  and  oblige  one 
of  his  armies  to  turn  back  to  secure  their  restoration. 

However,  it  is  to  be  remarked  that,  during  nearly  the 
entire  war,  the  various  German  forces  used  one  section 
of  railroad  in  common,  that  from  Blesmes  to  Frouard. 
It  is  not  doubtful  that  a  French  army  posted  in  Argonne, 
from  Blesmes  to  Grand-Pre,  would  have  placed  these 
forces  in  a  critical  situation. 

Was  this  the  object  that  our  Government  of  National 
Defence  sought  to  attain?  Was  the  project  feasible? 
These  are  questions  which  it  •would  be  difficult  now  to 
answer.  But  it  is  sufficient  to  put  them  in  order  to  show 
what  was,  perhaps,  the  most  vulnerable  part  of  the 
German  system  of  communications  during  the  last  in- 
vasion. 


320  PART  FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

V.   DElI^ENSIVE  LINES. 

Lines  of  defense  are  formed  by  natural  obstacles,  be- 
hind which  an  army  organizes  its  resistance.  They 
cover  a  country  against  invasion.  They  serve  to  guard 
the  front  of  a  position,  and  to  protect  a  retreat — in  a 
word,  to  increase  the  chances  of  success. 

In  these  various  aspects,  the  study  of  lines  of  defence 
is  coincident  with  that  of  defensive  operations.  It  will 
still  be  useful  here,  however,  to  gain  a  correct  concep- 
tion of  their  strength  and  the  assistance  they  render  to 
armies.  In  this  regard,  no  better  idea  can  be  given  of 
the  qualities  required  in  a  good  defensive  line  and  the 
comparative  importance  of  accidents  of  the  ground, 
than  that  presented  in  the  views  of  Napoleon. 

We  know  that  he  was  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the 
various  theatres  of  operations  in  Europe.  But  there 
were  two  of  them  which  events  gave  him  special  oppor- 
tunities of  studying.  These  were  the  valleys  of  the  Po 
and  the  Danube.  The  observations  left  by  him  upon 
the  military  importance  of  these  regions,  and  especially 
upon  the  defence  of  Italy,  will  always  remain  worthy 
of  profound  consideration. 

' '  The  frontiers  of  states, ' '  he  wrote,  ' '  are  either 
mountain-chains,  great  rivers,  or  large  and  arid  deserts. 
France  is  thus  defended  by  the  Rhine;  Italy  by  the 
chain  of  the  Alps.  Of  all  these  obstacles,  deserts  are 
without  doubt  the  most  difficult  to  cross;  mountains 
hold  the  second  rank;  large  rivers  have  only  the  third." 

"  To  oppose  an  invasion  by  the  French,  the  best  line 
to  take  is  that  of  the  Roja!  the  right  of  this  line  extends 
from  the  pass  of  Tenda  to  Saorgio,  the  centre  froni 
Saorgio  to  Breglio,  and  the  left  from  Breglio  to  the 
sea.  The  town  of  Saorgio  and  a  small  fort  upon  the 
heights  of  Breglio  would  serve  as  a  support  for  this  line, 
and  to  guard  the  high  road  leading  to  Tenda.  This  line 
forced,  the  Genoese  Riviera  offers  several  otliers,  such  as 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        32 1 

those    furnished  by  the    Moiite-Grande,    covering    San 
Remo. " 

"The  Tici'no  forms  a  last  line  against  the  aggressions 
of  France,  and  also  against  an  army  debonching  by  the 
Simplon;  the  right  rests  on  Lago  Maggiore  and  the 
mountains;  the  left  on  the  Po  and  the  defile  of  Stra- 
della,  which  has  uninterrupted  communication  with  the 
Ligurian  x\.pennines.  The  Ticino  is  wide  and  rapid. 
The  bridge  at  Pavia  intrenched  and  well  guarded,  and 
a  good  fort  at  the  defile  of  Stradella,  would  cover  Italy 
from  the  French  side.  The  lines  which  an  Italian  army 
ought  to  take  in  order  to  oppose  an  invasion  from  the 
side  of  Germany,  are  those  which  follow  the  right  bank 
of  the  rivers  flowing  into  the  Adriatic,  to  the  north  of 
the  Po;  these  lines  protect  the  entire  valley  of  the  Po, 
and  hence  close  up  the  peninsula,  and  cover  nppe}'-^ 
middle^  and  lower  Italy.  Those  which  follow  the  rivers 
emptying  into  the  Po  divide  the  valley  of  this  river,  and 
expose  middle  and  lower  Italy;  it  is  necessary  here  to 
have  two  armies  inanceuvring  upon  opposite  banks  of 
the  Po. 

"  The  lines  of  defense^  which  cover  the  valley  of  the 
Po,  are  those  of  the  Isonzo,  Tagliamento,  Ivivenza, 
Piave,  Brenta,  and  Adige. 

' '  The  line  of  the  Isonzo  covers  the  whole  of  Italy ^ 
since  it  forms  one  of  its  boundaries;  but  this  line  is 
turned  by  the  high  road  of  Pontebba,  which  descends 
upon  Osoppo  and  the  Tagliamento;  a  strong  position 
near  Tarvis  should  then  be  occupied,  which  would  shut 
off  the  two  highways  of  Pontebba  and  the  Isonzo. 

"The  line  of  the  Livenza  can  be  turned  by  its  left, 
from  Sacile  to  the  mountains.  The  lyivenza  is  not  ford- 
able;  it  is  marshy,  but  not  ver)^  wide. 

"The  line  of  the   Piave  is  defended  by  the  forest  of 
Montello,  and  from  there  to  the  sea  it  is  covered  with 
impracticable   swamps;    but   the   Piave   is  fordable  in 
21 


322  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

places.  To  give  importance  to  this  line,  the  bed  of  the 
river  should  be  partially  dammed,  and  the  country  in 
the  vicinity  flooded.  This  line  has  the  advantage  qf 
covering  Venice. 

"The  line  of  the  Brenta,  to  the  left  of  Bassano,  is 
closed  by  passes  easy  of  defence;  from  Bassano  to  Bron- 
dolo,  the  Brenta  is  fordable. 

"The  high  road  from  Munich  to  Verona,  which  ex- 
tends through  Brenner  Pass  and  across  the  Adige,  turns 
these  five  lines,  so  that  if  the  enemy  had  an  army  corps 
in  Bavaria  and  Tyrol,  he  could  reach  the  right  bank  of 
the  Adige  by  this  route,  and  cut  from  Italy  the  army 
occupying  any  one  of  these  lines. 

"The  Adige  is  the  sixth  and- last  line  which  covers 
the  valley  of  the  Po:  it  is  beyond  comparison  the  best. 
This  line  is  divided  into  three  parts:  the  first,  between 
Lake  Garda  and  the  plateau  of  Rivoli;  the  second,  from 
Rivoli  to  Legnago;  the  third,  from  Legnago  to  the  sea. 
The  first  is  defended  by  the  heights  of  Montebaldo  and 
the  position  of  Corona;  the  enemy  cannot  move  there 
with  artillery.  The  works  at  Verona  and  the  portion  of 
the  city  upon  the  left  bank  must  necessarily  be  occupied 
as  bridge-heads.  The  small  town  of  Legnago  serves  as 
bridge-head  to  the  centre  of  the  line.  From  Legnago  to 
the  sea,  there  are  many  marshes;  it  is  possible,  profiting 
by  the  waters  of  the  Adige,  the  Brenta,  and  the  Po,  to 
establish  a  means  of  communication  with  Venice.  By 
cutting  the  dam  of  the  Adige  below  Porto-Legnago,  all 
the  ground  between  this  river  and  the  Po  is  inundated; 
their  waters  are  joined  to  those  of  the  Molinella;  then 
all  the  country  from  Legnago  to  the  sea  becomes  im- 
practicable. Upon  opening  the  sluice-gates  at  Castag- 
naro,  the  Blanco  Canal  is  filled  by  the  waters  of  the 
Adige.  This  canal  empties  into  the  Po;  it  forms  thus 
a  second  lijie^  in  case  the  enemy  passes  the  Adige  be- 
tween Castagnaro  and  the  sea.     The  best  way  of  defend- 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        323 

ing  the  Adige  is  to  take  post  011  the  left  bank,  upon  the 
heights  of  Caldiero,  behind  the  Alpone,  the  right  sup- 
ported by  the  marsh  of  Arcole,  with  two  bridges  at 
Ronco,  the  left  supported  by  commanding  heights  which 
could  be  easily  intrenched  in  a  few  weeks;  then  all  the 
portion  of  the  line  from  Rivoli  to  Ronco  is  covered,  and 
if  the  enemy  wishes  to  pass  the  Adige  between  Arcole 
and  the  sea,  the  forces  are  in  position  to  fall  upon  his  rear. 

"  The  Mincio  is  the  first  line  which  cuts  the  vallev  of 
the  Po.  This  line  requires  the  control  of  Lake  Garda 
and  the  fortress  of  Rocca  d' Anfo.  The  towns  of  Peschiera 
and  Mantua  are  the  principal  sources  of  strength  for  this 
line." 

These  citations  are  sufficient  to  gain  our  recognition 
of  the  following  general  principles: 

A  good  line  of  defense  should  have  its  flajtks  so  well 
covered  as  to  offer  security  against  a  turning  movement. 

Its  front  should  be  protected  by  an  obstacle  difficult  of 
access.^  and  there  should  be  in  its  rear.^  lines  of  retreat.^ 
protected  by  positions  of  the  second  line. 

It  would  be  proper  to  add  to  these  conditions,  those 
imposed  by  tactics;  but  the  latter  will  be  indicated 
farther  on,  in  considering  defensive  positions. 

Upon  the  whole,  the  strategic  study  of  a  theatre  of 
operations  should  set  in  relief  the  importance  of  the  dif- 
ferent zones  of  country,  and  the  part  which  they  may 
be  called  to  play,  whether  as  bases  near  the  frontiers, 
as  regions  of  march,  or  as  positions. 

Having  examined  the  principles  fixed  by  experience 
relative  to  this  subject,  it  will  be  interesting  to  follow 
their  application  during  the  Franco-German  war. 

III. — Objectives  and  Lines  of  Operations  of  the  G-erman  Armies 

in  1870. 

Progressive  Occupation  of  the  Theatre  of  Operations. — We 
have  already  seen  how  the  first  base  of  operations  of  the 


324  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

three  German  armies  was,  as  early  as  1868,  selected  by 
Von  Moltke  in  the  Bavarian  Palatinate. 

Once  upon  the  frontier,  and  after  being  assured  of  our 
defensive  attitude,  the  first  care  of  the  Germans  was  to 
decide  upon  the  directions  of  their  march ;  and  for  this 
it  was  necessary  to  know  the  positions  of  our  forces.  On 
August  3,  intelligence  was  received,  through  the  cavalry, 
that  our  principal  masses  were  in  Alsace  and  upon  the 
Sarre. 

These  regions  became  at  once  the  first  general  objec- 
tive in  the  march  of  the  invading  armies. 

Lilies  of  Operations  and  Objectives  of  the  I.  and  n.  Armies 
from  the  5th  to  the  14th  of  August. — Seeing  that  we  were 
letting  the  opportunities  to  take  the  offensive  slip  from 
us.  Von  Moltke,  in  order  to  settle  upon  his  lines  of  op- 
erations, had  already  endeavored,  before  Spicheren  and 
Froeschwiller,  to  penetrate  our  designs. 

First  of  all,  our  resolution  to  remain  upon  the  defen- 
sive seemed  evident  to  him.  Then  as  the  Moselle,  near 
the  frontier,  offered  a  good  line  of  defense,  having  many 
advantageous  positions  and  possessing  in  its  lower  val- 
ley two  fortified  points  of  support,  Metz  and  Thionville, 
26  kilometres  [about  16  miles]  apart,  he  supposed  that 
on  the  4th  of  August  our  army  was  in  position,  either  in 
advance  of  this  river  or  along  its  course,  its  wings  sup- 
ported upon  these  two  strongholds. 

In  consequence,  he  decided  that  the  I.  Army  should 
engage  us  in  front,  while  the  II.  made  its  attack  by  a 
flanking  movement  directly  from  the  south. 

This  decision  defined  the  first  objective  and  the  line 
of  operations  of  the  group  of  armies  forming  the  Ger- 
man right.  The  objective  was  to  be  the  enemy's  prin- 
cipal army,  whatever  its  position.  The  line  of  opera- 
tions was  the  svstem  of  roads  leadin<r  from  the  Sarre 
upon  the  middle  Moselle,  and  included  the  railroad  from 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR,        325 

Sarrebriick  to  Metz,  an  important  double-track  road 
traversing  the  Bavarian  Palatinate  and  connecting  the 
valleys  of  the  Rhine  and  Moselle. 

Such  was  the  first  general  idea,  conceived  while  yet  at 
the  base  itself.  It  resulted  from  first  information  gath- 
ered regarding  the  enemy's  force  and  position,  and  was 
conformable  to  the  projet  of  operations. 

This  idea  was  not  at  once  communicated  to  the  army 
commanders.  The  frontier  must  first  be  crossed;  this 
was  the  immediate  aim.  This  operation  would  probably 
lead  to  an  encounter,  and  perhaps  modify  the  first  projet. 
It  was  necessary  to  wait,  then,  before  making  known 
the  combinations  of  the  generalissimo. 

Objectives  and  Line  of  Operation  of  the  HI.  Army  up  to 
August  7. — On  30th  July  the  III.  Army  received  orders  to 
move  toward  the  south  b}^  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  to 
seek  and  attack  our  forces  in  Alsace. 

This  action  was  demanded  by  the  presence  of  our 
troops,  and  by  the  necessity  of  first  of  all  protecting 
South  Germany. 

Here  again,  the  objective  and  line  of  operations  were 
indicated,  but  only  in  a  general  way,  on  account  of  the 
scarcity  of  information.  The  III.  Army  was  to  supply 
this  deficiency. 

It  received  orders  to  move  first,  because  it  formed  the 
exterior  wing  in  the  vast  wheeling  movement,  which 
was  to  transfer  the  group  of  German  armies  from  the 
Palatinate  to  the  Moselle. 

The  objective  was  reached  August  6,  almost  unex- 
pectedly, and  on  the  very  next  day,  this  army  had  to 
select  a  new  direction. 

Its  choice  depended  upon  the  situation  of  the  enemy; 
consequently  it  was  necessary  to  follow  the  forces  de- 
feated the  evening  before  at  Froeschwiller  [Woerth]. 

Affairs  now  took  a  peculiar  turn. 


326  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

The  Germans,  with  their  customary  logic,  supposed 
the  beaten  forces  of  MacMahon  would,  according  to  the 
rule  in  such  cases,  fall  back  upon  their  supports,  that  is 
to  say,  upon  the  principal  army,  which  was  at  Metz. 
The  fact  that  the  bulk  of  their  masses  appeared  to  be 
moving  upon  Niederbronn  and  Bitche,  lent  probability 
to  this  supposition. 

It  was  necessary  then  to  take  a  general  direction 
toward  the  west,  that  is  to  say,  to  change  the  recent  line 
of  operations,  complete  the  grand  wheel  commenced 
on  the  day  of  battle,  and  to  march  upon  Metz. 

This  direction  led  across  the  Vosges,  to  the  north  of 
the  Nancy-Strasburg  line.  The  Germans  followed  it 
without  hesitation,  spreading  out  on  both  flanks,  since 
they  were  now  unopposed. 

The  Sarre  was  indicated  to  the  various  corps  of  this 
army  as  the  first  line  to  be  reached  upon  the  west  side 
of  the  Vosges.  They  crossed  this  range  without  hind- 
rance, the  French  having  fallen  back. 

The  small  places  designed  to  defend  its  passes  not  be- 
ing upon  the  communications,  caused  no  concern. 

The  line  of  the  Sarre  was  occupied  August  12. 

A  strong  place  of  the  first  order,  Strasburg,  was  upon 
the  left  and  rear  of  the  army's  new  line  of  operations. 
A  division,  composed  of  all  arms  of  the  service,  and 
which  was  to  be  further  strengthened,  moved  to  the 
siege  of  this  city.  Its  first  step  was  to  occupy  Venden- 
heim,  at  the  junction  of  the  Paris-Strasburg  and  Stras- 
burg-Mayence  railroads. 

This  division  became  thenceforth  independent. 

March  to  the  Moselle. — Having  arrived  upon  the  Sarre, 
the  III.  Army  continued  its  march  toward  a  new  line  of 
defence,  the  J\Ioselle.     At  the  same  time,  Von  Moltke 
ordered  it  to  take  a  somewhat  more  southerly  direction, 
toward  Nancy  and  Luneville. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        327 

This  was  to  give  to  this  army  for  its  immediate  objec- 
tives these  two  important  cities,  the  possession  of  which 
assnred  to  the  Germans  the  control  of  the  Nancy-Ven- 
denheim-Wissembours:  railroad,  and  the  branch  lines 
from  these  places. 

Beginning  with  August  10,  the  III.  Army,  having  as- 
certained the  exact  direction  taken  toward  the  south  by 
MacMahon's  corps,  extended  its  front  of  march  and 
consequently  the  width  of  its  zone  of  operations,  with- 
out other  concern  than  to  limit  itself  toward  the  north 
by  the  left  of  the  II.   Army. 

It  reached  its  new  objective  on  the  14th  of  August, 
without  interruption.  Its  first  care^was  to  occupy  Frou- 
ard,  junction-point  of  the  Paris-Nancy  and  Nancy-Metz 
railroads.  It  then  pushed  on  to  Toul,  a  fortified  place 
on  the  first  of  these  lines,  which  it  found  defended. 

In  the  meantime  the  group  of  armies  of  the  right,  for 
a  moment  embarrassed  by  the  false  hypothesis  of  the 
retreat  of  our  forces  from  Alsace  upon  Metz,  also  directed 
itself  upon  the  Moselle.  The  objective  of  the  I.  Army 
was  our  army's  front,  that  is  to  say,  Metz;  and  its  line 
of  operations,  the  system  of  communications  comprised 
between  the  road  from  Sarrebriick  to  Pont-a-Mousson 
and  that  from  Sarrelouis  to  Metz. 

The  II.  Army  took  our  right  wing  for  its  objective, 
and  for  its  line  of  operations  the  roads  having  the  gen- 
eral direction  Sarrebriick-Pont-a-Mousson,  supplemented 
by  those  leading  to  the  south  from  the  Sarre  to  the  Mo- 
selle. 

For  a  short  time,  our  corps  concentrated  upon  the  left 
bank  of  the  Nied-Francaise,  between  Pange  and  Cour- 
celle-sur-Nied.  This  position  then  became  the  objective 
for  the  enemy's  group  of  armies.  But  this  situation  was 
of  short  continuance;  it  lasted  but  a  single  day,  the  12th 
of  August,  and  the  next  day  the  general  direction  was 
resumed. 


328  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

In  executing  these  movements,  the  German  armies 
took  the  precaution  to  seize  the  railway  stations  of  For- 
bach,  Saint-Avoid,  and  Courcelle-sur-Nied. 

After  the  12th  of  August,  the  important  line  of  the 
Moselle  was  in  their  power,  together  with  the  passages 
of  this  river. 

The  action  of  the  14th,  i6th,  and  i8tli  of  August 
assured  them  decisive  results,  among  others  the  throw- 
ing back  of  our  army  within  the  entrenched  camp  of 
Metz. 

Objectives  of  the  German  Armies  after  tlie  Battle  of  Saint- 
Privat  [Grravelotte]. — A  new  situation  was  then  presented 
to  the  victor. 

The  position  of  his  adversary  was  again  the  control- 
ling consideration. 

After  the  18th  of  August,  the  new  objectives  of  the 
Germans  were,  on  the  one  hand,  the  army  thrown  back 
upon  Metz,  and  on  the  other,  the  forces  reforming  at 
Chalons. 

In  consequence,  one  army  was  to  observe  the  first  and 
to  render  it  powerless  for  further  action.  The  mission 
of  this  blockading  army  took  now  an  essentially  defen- 
sive character;  it  was  to  check  every  attempt  of  its  ad- 
versary to  assume  the  offensive. 

Then,  a  group  of  two  armies  was  immediately  formed, 
and,  on  the  20th,  put  en  route  toward  Chalons. 

In  the  order  of  the  German  generalissimo  dated  the 
19th  of  August,  Paris  was  indicated  as  the  principal  ob- 
jective; but  the  forces  assembled  at  Chalons  were  desig- 
nated as  the  immediate  objective. 

Lines  of  Operations  from  the  Moselle  upon  Chalons. — As  a 
consequence  of  the  above,  the  III.  Army  continued  its 
operation  toward  the  west,  having  for  general  direction, 
Nancy,  Commercy,  Bar-le-Duc,  Vitry  and  Chalons. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        329 

The  IV.  Army  took  for  its  line  of  operation,  the  route 
from  IMetz  to  Verdun,  then  the  Verdun-Chalons  railroad 
by  Sainte-Menehould,  taking  care  to  close  upon  the  III. 
Army  toward  the  defiles  of  Argonne,  a  few  days  before 
reaching  Chalons. 

But  news  of  the  march  of  the  Chalons  army  toward 
the  north,  and  then  towards  the  north-east,  again  led  to 
a  change  in  their  directions. 

It  would  be  easy  thus  to  follow  the  successive  de- 
velopments of  the  German  objectives  and  lines  of  ope- 
rations to  the  end  of  hostilities;  but  this  would  lead  us 
too  far.  The  brief  statement  here  given  of  this  first 
series  of  events,  will  suffice  to  confirm  the  principles 
already  set  forth,  and  to  show  their  application  in  the 
operations  of  modern  armies. 

§3. — Projets  OF   OPERATIONS. 

The  aim  of  the  study  of  theatres  of  operations,  of  the 
resources  of  the  adversary,  and  of  the  conditions  under 
which  the  war  is  likely  to  be  carried  on,  should  be  the 
establishment  of  a  plan  of  campaign. 

This  is  the  necessar}^  complement  to  active  prepara- 
tion for  war. 

Definition. — Before  the  adoption  of  the  present  military 
systems,  governments  usually  waited  until  their  polit- 
ical relations  became  so  strained  as  to  point  to  hostilities, 
before  establishing  a  plan  of  campaign. 

At  such  a  juncture,  questions  relating  to  the  probable 
theatre  of  operations,  and  the  strength  and  plans  of  the 
enemy,  presented  themselves  for  immediate  considera- 
tion. The  second  step  was  to  determine  upon  move- 
ments that  seemed  best  fitted  to  these  circumstances. 

The  projects  thus  formed,  constituted  the  J>lan  of  cam- 
paign or  of  operations. 


330  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

To-day,  this  is  no  longer  the  case.  The  opening  of 
the  campaign  so  closely  follows  the  declaration  of  war, 
and  the  affairs  which  press  at  the  outset  are  so  multi- 
plex, that  the  generalissimo  would  not  have  time  to 
prepare  a  projet  of  operations. 

It  then  becomes  imperative  to  establish  these  projets 
during  peace,  not  upon  a  positive  basis,  but  upon 
probable  hypotheses.  To  avoid  surprises,  these  hypo- 
theses should  sweep  in  all  possible  contingencies.  Pro- 
perly speaking,  these  are  no  longer  plans,  but  simple 
projects.  They  may  be  defined  as  the  exposition  of  the 
first  combinations  which  a7^e  to  serve  as  a  guide  to 
armies  in  their  operations. 

They  will  be  of  two  kinds :  the  plan  of  war^  and  the 
projet  of  operations. 

The  Plan  of  War. — The  plan  of  war  is  dependent  upon 
the  political  situation.  It  determines  the  general  condi- 
tions which  are  to  govern  the  war.  It  embraces  the  dif- 
ferent theatres  of  operations  from  an  offensive  or  defen- 
sive point  of  view,  the  general  end  to  be  attained,  and 
the  manner  of  combining  the  movements  of  the  various 
forces.  In  a  certain  measure,  it  lies  within  the  province 
of  the  government;  but  all  military  questions  should  be 
intrusted  to  the  general-in-chief  and  the  chief-of-sta£f. 

Circumstances  may  sometimes  require  the  preparation 
of  several  plans  of  war.  At  the  present  time,  for  exam- 
ple, France  is  forced  to  consider  in  advance  the  means  of 
sustaining  a  war  with  Germany  and  Italy.  She  should 
even  provide  for  the  unfortunate  situation  in  which  she 
would  be  placed,  if  after  a  first  reverse,  she  should  see  all 
the  neighboring  powers  declare  against  her. 

Projets  of  Operations. — Their  Provisional  Character. — Pro- 
jets  of  operations  indicate  the  general  method  of  car- 
rying out  the  plan  of  war  upon  a  determined  theatre. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.       33 1 

As  has  been  said,  it  is  especially  to  them  that  the  desig- 
nation plans  of  campaig-n  should  be  applied,  were  it  not 
for  their  provisional  character. 

They  are  of  special  service  to  the  general-in-chief  at 
the  outbreak  of  the  war,  when  the  exact  situation  of 
affairs  is  known;  they  then,  during  the  few  days  which 
the  period  of  mobilization  usually  affords,  aid  him  in 
the  adoption  of  a  definite  plan. 

Certain  authors,  especially  in  Prussia,  maintain  that 
these  provisional  plans  are  useless,  and  attribute  to  Na- 
poleon the  saying :  "  /  never  had  a  plan  of  operations. ' '  * 
This  may  be  so,  but  every  one  to-day  knows  with  what 
care  the  Prussian  staff  elaborates  its  proje  is  of  operations, 
and  with  what  certainty  it  holds  its  combinations  ready 
for  attack  upon  its  enemies. 

We  also  know  what  profound  attention  Napoleon  al- 
ways bestowed  upon  the  preparation  of  his  first  move- 
ments. On  this  subject  he  wrote  to  his  brother  Joseph 
on  the  6th  of  June,  1806:  "Nothing  is  attained  in  war 
except  by  calculation.  During  a  campaign,  whatever  is 
not  profoundly  considered  in  all  its  details  is  without  re- 
sult. Every  enterprise  should  be  conducted  according 
to  a  system:  chance  alone  can  never  bring  success." 

To-day,  the  rapid  march  of  events  after  the  declara- 
tion of  war,  no  longer  leaves  time  to  retrieve  an  error. 
It  is  then  a  matter  of  necessity  to  bestow,  in  time  of 
peace,   the  greatest   attention  upon  the  preparation  of 
these  provisional  plans. 

In  every  case,  it  is  clear  that  they  can  embrace  but  a 
short  period  of  operations,  and  that  only  at  the  outset. 

They  consequently  will  be  governed  by  the  already 
determined  character  of  the  war,  the  probable  projets  of 
the  enemy,  the  forces  which  he  can  place  in  motion,  and 
the  lines  of  operations  which  he  is  likely  to  adopt. 

*  The  Nation  in  Arms,  by  Major  Von  der  Goltz,  p.  199. 


332  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

The  choice  of  the  zone  of  concentration,  the  first  ob- 
jectives, and  the  lines  of  operation,  shonld  result  from 
these  data.  Everything  else  is  contingent  upon  future 
events.  The  provisional  plan  may  still  mark  out  a  gen- 
eral aim  for  the  army,  but  this  will  be  all. 

It  is  not  possible  for  the  projet  of  operations  to  go  be- 
yond the  first  battle,  because  a  decisive  action  often 
completely  changes  the  situation.  New  combinations 
and  new  pi'-ojets  will  consequently  be  required.  ' '  It 
would  then,"  as  Von  Moltke  has  said,  "be  an  error  to 
expect  to  see  in  the  development  of  a  campaign,  the  com- 
plete execution  of  a  plan  settled  in  advance  in  all  its 
details.  The  leader  of  an  army,  no  doubt,  has  always 
before  his  eyes  the  essential  object  to  be  pursued,  but  he 
can  never  indicate  precisely  the  ways  in  which  it  may 
be  reached.  'During  the  course  of  operations,'  says 
General  Berthaut,  'there  arise,  even  leaving  battles  out 
of  consideration,  many  unforeseen  events,  such  as  the 
arrival  of  reinforcements,  or  a  change  in  the  manner  of 
grouping  the  forces,  which  modify  the  situation,  and  give 
rise  to  new  problems,  the  solution  of  which  cannot  be 
determined  in  advance.'  " 

The  opinions  of  great  leaders  have  always  confirmed 
these  principles. 

Should  armies  become  more  numerous  and  the  frontier 
fortifications  closer  together,  the  limits  of  these  pi'ojets 
would  be  still  more  restricted,  for  the  forces-  would  be 
immediately  in  presence  of  each  other,  and  the  space 
left  for  their  movements  still  further  reduced. 

The  Officer  Charged  with  the  Preparation  of  Projet s  of  Ope- 
rations.— It  is  the  head  of  the  army,  and  in  France,  con- 
sequently, the  Minister  of  War,  upon  whom  rests  the 
responsibility  connected  with  the  drawing  up  of  the 
projets  of  operations.  Usually  this  work  is  intrusted  to 
the  chief  of  general-staff",  who  should,    in  this  behalf. 


SECOND    CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.       333 

collect  necessary  information  tlirougli  the  efforts  of  his 
officers,  withont  acquainting  the  latter  with  the  use  to 
be  macle  of  it. 

The  plan  of  war  has  already  provided  for  the  event  of 
a  conflict  with  each  neighboring  power,  sometimes  with 
two  of  them;  it  has  weighed  the  consequences,  and 
worked  out  the  resulting  situations.  These  assumed 
situations  become  the  starting-point  for  the  chief  of  gen- 
eral-staff in  the  preparation  of  th&  projets  of  operations. 

Data  Necessary  for  I^rawing  up  a  Projet  of  Operations. — 
These  data,  as  we  have  seen,  will  necessarily  be: 

ist.  Infoi'mation  regarding  the  probable  theatres  of 
operations. 

Secret  reconnaissances,  made  in  time  of  peace  accord- 
ing to  a  particular  programme  and  corresponding  to  the 
general  aim  of  the  projet.^  will  easily  complete  the  liberal 
information  possessed  to-day  upon  the  geographical  sit- 
uation of  each  country. 

2d.  Exact  ideas  regarding  the  forces  at  the  disposal 
of  the  enemy. 

The  general-staffs  of  all  armies  should  gather  the 
latest  information  in  this  particular,  in  time  of  peace. 

3d.  Statistical  information  upon  the  resources  of  all 
kinds  which  the  various    theatres  of  operations  afford. 

As  soon  as  these  data  are  gathered,  the  question  will 
arise  of  deciding  upon  the  offensive  or  defensive. 

Offensive  Projet. — Let  us  examine  first  the  case  of  the 
offensive. 

The  principal  army  of  the  enemy  will,  always  be  the 
first  objective.  The  numbers  of  his  forces  and  the  rail- 
road terminal  points  upon  the  frontier  are  known.  Con- 
sequently his  zone  of  concentration  may  easily  be  fixed, 
as  well  as  the  time  required  for  making  the  movement. 

There  is  hope,  then,  of  being  prepared  before  the  ad- 


334  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

versary,  or  certainly  at  tlie  same  time,  and  of  having  a 
superiority,  or  at  least  a  numerical  equality.  Conse- 
quently, the  offensive  is  decided  upon. 

The  hypothesis  of  being  behind  the  adversary  in  pre- 
paration may  still,  however,  be  compatible  with  the 
offensive,  if,  after  the  concentration,  there  remain  two  or 
three  days  in  which  to  march  upon  the  enemy  with  an 
approximate  equality  of  forces. 

In  these  different  hypotheses,  the  hope  is  entertained 
of  reaching  the  opposing  army  in  a  definite  region,  and 
at  a  date  which  may  easily  be  calculated  with  compara- 
tive accuracy. 

Nothing  remains  but  to  adopt  the  strategic  combi- 
nation promising  the  greatest  advantages.  Almost  al- 
ways this  will  be  a  turning  movement,  designed  to 
threaten  the  adversary's  communications  and  to  obtain 
the  most  decisive  results. 

Thus,  after  having  studied  the  means  at  the  disposal 
of  the  enemy,  and  the  zones  of  invasion  open  to  the 
offensive,  the  position  necessary  to  occupy  is  approxi- 
mately determined.  Among  these  zones  that  one  is 
chosen  which  permits  the  most  rapid  march  upon  the 
enemy,  and  an  attack  under  the  most  favorable  condi- 
tions. 

To  determine  this  zone,  it  will  be  necessary  to  examine 
the  relative  value  of  all,  to  scrutinize  their  topograph- 
ical configuration;  the  facilities  or  the  difficulties  which 
they  present  to  the  movements  of  troops;  the  roads;  the 
railways  belonging  to  the  national  system  which  can 
serve  to  supply  the  army;  the  resources  found  in  each 
for  maintenance  of  the  troops,  etc. 

After  this  first  work,  a  decision  must  be  taken: 

ist.  Upon  the  pomts  at  which  to  effect  the  concentra- 
tion; 

2d.  Upon  the  direction  to  be  given  the  movements  of 
the  forces^  a?id  upon  the  zones  of  march  to  be  assigned ; 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        335 

3cl.  Upon  the  general  end  to  be  attained^  and  upon  the 
7mm  be?^  of  armies  into  zvhich  the  forces  should  be  formed. 

A  solution  of  the  first  strategic  problems  connected 
with  the  beginning  of  a  war,  will  thus  have  been  reached. 

Defensive  Projet. — Let  us  pass  to  the  defensive. 

In  taking  the  role  of  the  defensive,  the  assumption  is 
that  the  enemy  is  ready  first,  and  that  he  has  a  numer- 
ical superiority  upon  the  zone  of  concentration, 

A  beginning  of  this  sort  holds  out  to  the  enemy  such 
a  strong  invitation  to  success,  that  an  army  should  never 
voluntarily  thus  expose  itself.  It  would  be  better  not 
to  wage  war.  But  there  are  circumstances  in  which  a 
country  may  be  forced  to  soberly  examine,  before  hos- 
tilities, the  probabilities  of  a  defensive  war.  It  is  neces- 
sary then  to  provide  in  advance  for  such  a  contingency. 
The  opportunity  of  thus  making  a  deliberate  examina- 
tion of  the  matter  should  be  regarded  as  a  comparative 
advantage. 

Here  it  is  still  more  requisite  than  on  the  offensive,  to 
hold  exact  account  ot  the  zones  on  the  enemy's  frontier 
marking  the  extreme  limit  of  his  rail  transportation.  It 
is  essential  to  ascertain,  with  as  much  precision  as  pos- 
sible, the  number  of  corps  that  he  will  concentrate  there, 
and  the  day  on  which  the  movement  will  be  completed. 

These  two  cases  are  presented:  either  it  will  be  pos- 
sible to  make  several  marches  in  the  direction  of  the 
enemy,  or  the  attack  will  come  before  departure  from 
the  zone  of  concentration  is  practicable. 

In  the  first  instance,  it  is  very  necessary  to  profit  from 
the  respite  vouchsafed  by  circumstances,  to  determine 
the  position  where  the  first  encounters  are  likely  to  take 
place,  and  to  decide  upon  the  most  advantageous  direc- 
tion for  delivering  the  blow;  and  finally,  it  is  essential 
to  march  boldly  upon  the  enemy,  and  attack  him  with- 
out hesitation.     This  is  to  return  to  the  plan  of  taking 


336  PART   FIRST, — STRATEGY. 

the  offensive  after  having  been  several  days  behind  the 
adversary  in  making  ready  for  war,  and  will  always  be 
the  soundest  measure  to  pursue  whenever  the  circum- 
stances are  favorable. 

When  this  course  is  not  open,  it  is  imperative  that 
the  concentration  be  effected  under  shelter  of  a  screen  of 
troops  charged  with  guarding  the  frontier,  and  behind  a 
line  of  defence  strong  enough  to  delay  the  enemy's 
movements.  As  far  as  possible,  it  should  be  made  upon 
strong  positions  suitable  to  receive  an  attack.  After 
that,  nothing  remains  but  to  trust  to  circumstances. 

-  We  shall  have,  then,  as  on  the  offensive,  to  define,  first 
of  all,  the  probable  points  of  the  enemy'' s  concentration^ 
the  number  of  his  effective  forces,  his  lines  of  invasion, 
and  the  direction  of  his  attack.  It  is  in  the  light  of  these 
data  that  we  should  select  the  ground  upon  which  to 
make  ready  to  receive  him.  This,  as  far  as  practicable, 
should  be  under  cover  of  a  line  of  defence,  and  in  the 
strongest  possible  position,  as  has  already  been  said. 

We  generally  consider  defeat  as  the  lot  of  the  defen- 
sive. If  it  is  often  so,  it  is  because  the  troops  compelled 
to  take  this  part  have  usually  less  confidence  and  energy 
than  the  assailant  forces.  But  if  the  contrary  is  the 
case,  if  the  defence  can  direct  its  efforts  aright,  and  pro- 
long the  struggle,  it  also  has  favorable  chances  of  suc- 
cess. From  this  point  of  view,  an  army  making  an 
energetic  defence  should  have  but  one  aim — to  become 
the  assailant  at  the  first  opportunity. 

With  the  defensive,  as  with  the  offensive,  the  first  ob- 
jective is  the  enemy — the  battle.  It  is  upon  this  event 
that  all  its  attention  should  be  bestowed.  With  modern 
arms,  with  like  forces,  equal  in  courage  to  the  troops  of 
the  enemy,  with  clear  ground  to  the  front,  with  a  posi- 
tion not  easily  turned,  theoretically,  the  defense  should 
prevail.  If  it  is  otherwise,  it  is  because  the  fact  of  re- 
maining upon   the    defensive  weakens  the  energy  and 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.       337 

morale  of  the  troops,  especially  when  this  course  is  adopted 
in  consequence  of  a  marked  numerical  inferiority. 

In  every  case,  it  should  never  be  lost  sight  of  that  the 
defensive  is  peculiarly  exposed  to  flank  attacks,  that  its 
wings  are  vulnerable  points,  and  that  to  preserve  its  lines 
of  retreat,  it  must  strengthen  them  by  suitable  points  of 
support. 

The  defensive  ought,  finally,  to  prepare  for  a  frequent 
renewal  of  its  efforts.  Often  an  action  renewed  on  the 
second  day,  with  the  aid  of  fresh  troops,  leads  to  a  tri- 
umph over  an  enemy  who  the  evening  before  believed 
himself  victorious.  It  is  in  these  first  resistances  that 
the  defensive  should  display  its  obstinacy  and  its  vigor. 

The  Relation  of  the  Frontiers  to  the  Defensive. — Whatever 
may  be  the  condition  of  the  struggle,  the  event  of  de- 
feat should  be  provided  for,  and  consequently  the  differ- 
ent positions,  the  successive  occupation  of  which  would 
permit  the  country  to  be  defended  foot  by  foot,  must  be 
known  in  advance. 

The  fortifications  of  the  frontier  and  of  the  zone  in 
rear  will  necessarily  play  an  important  role  in  the  midst 
of  these  events.  Their  investment  should  be  considered 
as  a  probability.  It  will  be  essential,  then,  to  estimate 
the  number  of  troops  of  the  second  line  necessary  for 
their  defense,  the  time  when  these  forces  will  be  in  posi- 
tion, and  when  the  armament  of  the  forts  will  be  com- 
pleted. 

On  account  of  the  rapidity  with  which  armies  assem- 
ble, and  the  muliplicity  of  duties  devolving  upon  the 
troops  from  the  moment  war  is  declared,  such  measures 
should  be  kept  in  force  even  during  time  of  peace  as 
will  assure  to  places,  forts,  and  intrenched  camps,  of  the 
first  line,  an  armament  sufficient  for  their  defense,  proper 
munition  supplies  in  their  magazines,  and  a  portion  of 
their  defenders  ready  at  their  posts. 
22 


338  PART   FIBST. — STRATEGY. 

In  a  defensive  projet  it  is  necessary  to  admit  that  the 
assailant  will  be  bnt  little  delayed  to-day  by  fortifications 
on  his  lines  of  invasion  and  on  his  flanks.  The  high 
effective  of  the  masses  put  in  movement  permits  him  to 
mask  them  until  the  troops  of  the  reserve  arrive  for  their 
investment. 

It  will  be  possible  to  approximately  estimate  the  de- 
tachments made  from  the  enemy's  forces  in  passing  this 
line,  and  the  decrement  in  his  strength  resulting  there- 
from. 

The  defender  will  have  had  a  few  days'  breathing  space 
in  which  to  concentrate  upon  the  positions  of  the  second 
line  the  fresh  troops  that  had  not  been  able  to  reach  him 
in  seasonable  time.  It  is  to  these  that  the  defense  will 
be  intrusted.  The  beaten  troops  will  rally  behind  them, 
to  engage  again,  if  not  too  much  demoralized. 

But  history  proves  that  at  any  price,  even  in  case  of 
disorganization,  beaten  troops  should  not  be  held  in  be- 
sieged or  invested  places.  Nothing  is  more  pernicious 
than  the  shutting  up  of  field  forces  in  fortified  towns; 
investment  is  the  prelude  to  capitulation. 

Moreover,  a  people  that  counts  upon  its  fortresses  to 
save  its  independence,  is  a  people  destined  to  perish.  It 
can  have  no  future  save  servitude.  Fortresses  are  built 
with  a  view  of  offering  to  defeated  armies  the  means  of 
reforming,  and  of  resuming  the  offensive.  Yet  history 
presents  no  instance  in  which  they  have  served  this 
end.  An  army  beaten,  and  driven  into  a  fortified 
"place,  is  an  army  definitively  conquered.  To  restore 
its  elasticity,  it  would  be  necessary  to  have  the  power  of 
transporting  it  to  the  interior  of  the  country,  there  to 
wait  until  discipline,  confidence  in  its  leaders,  and  pop- 
ular encouragement,  had  reanimated  its  heart.  Above 
all,  then,  strongholds  should  be  avoided.  They  exercise 
an  unhealthy  influence  upon  the  troops,  which  shakes 
their  morale  and  develops  human  weaknesses,  without 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        339 

raising  in  the  minds  of  the  leaders  a  suspicion  of  their 
existence.  It  would  be  better  to  fight  without  leaning 
upon  fortresses,  and  experience  a  new  defeat. 

The  Army  of  Metz  could  still  have  effectively  served 
its  country  after  the  battles  of  Borny,  Rezonville,  and 
Saint-Privat,  had  it  been  able  to  fight  beyond  the  range 
of  the  guns  of  this  place,  and  disposed  to  consider  the 
fortress  merely  as  a  point  of  support  for  its  manoeuvres. 

The  projet  of  defense  ought  then  to  take  these  things 
into  consideration,  and,  further,  to  choose  a  line  of  re- 
treat covering  that  portion  of  the  territory  whence  come 
the  reinforcements,  to  prepare  for  the  destruction  of  rail- 
roads, to  organize  means  of  retarding  the  enemy's  ad- 
vance, and,  in  general,  to  profit  by  all  means  of  resist- 
ance. 

The  essential  elements  in  the  establishment  of  o, pro- 
jet  of  defensive  operations  are  then : 

ist.  Selection  of  a  zone  of  concentration^  as  far  as  pos- 
sible^ in  rear  of  a  good  line  of  defense; 

2d.  Selection  of  favorable  positions  for  battles^  and 
organization  of  their  defense ; 

3d.  Selection  of  lines  of  retreat  and  successive  posi- 
tions in  rear. 

As  applications  of  these  principles,  the  projets  of  op- 
erations formed  by  the  Austrian,  Prussian,  and  French 
staffs  before  the  campaigns  of  1866  and  1870,  offer  us 
instructive  examples: 

Of  iowr projets  prepared  at  these  periods,  three  were 
of  an  offensive  character;  one  alone  was  defensive — that 
of  the  Austrians  in  1866. 

Let  us  first  study  the  campaign  which  interests  us  the 
more,  that  of  1870. 

§4.    Pr(?7>^' OF  OPERATIONS  OF  THE   PRUSSIANS   IN    1870. 

On  account  of  the  triumphs  of  the  Germans,  the  plan 
of  campaign,  or  projet  of  operations,  of  Von  Moltke  has 


340  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY, 

been  brought  into  prominence.     It  deserves  then  to  at- 
tract our  attention  at  the  outset. 

As  has  already  been  seen,  the  idea  of  invading  France 
had  been  firmly  rooted  in  the  German  mind  since  1815. 
It  was  the  secret  hope  of  all  patriots;  it  is  still  to-day 
the  desire,  more  or  less  expressed,  of  a  great  many 
officers.  The  number  of  works  published  on  this  sub- 
ject, from  1815  to  1870,  was  considerable,  and  the  com- 
binations which  they  proposed  were  probably  of  service 
to  Von  Moltke  in  the  latter  year. 

Several  citations  will  give  us  opportunity  to  judge 
of  this. 

Putting  to  profit  the  lessons  of  1814  and  1815,  General 
Clausewitz  laid  down  as  a  principle  that  the  invasion  of 
France  should  be  undertaken  with  a  mass  of  from  700,000 
to  800,000  men,  furnished  by  Germany,  Austria,  Italy, 
and  England  combined.  These  forces  were  to  march 
upon  Paris  by  the  east  and  the  north-east,  in  two  grand 
armies  of  300,000  men  each;  and  he  indicated  the  val- 
ley of  the  Loire  as  the  most  suitable  locality  in  which 
to  decide,  in  one  supreme  battle,  the  fate  of  our  country. 

The  idea  of  making  the  march  upon  Paris  coincident 
with  the  occupation  of  the  Loire  at  Orleans  came  up  for 
the  first  time  in  1813,  in  a  council  of  war  held  at  Frank- 
fort by  the  principal  generals  of  the  Coalition.  It  ap- 
peared then  combined  with  a  plan  of  concentration  in 
Haute-Marne,  in  the  vicinity  of  Langres. 

Later,  in  i860,  we  again  find,  in  the  projets  of  the 
Bavarian  General  Hartmann,  the  recommendation  of  a 
line  of  invasion  directed  from  the  Rhine  upon  Nancy  by 
way  of  the  Sarre.  The  plan  embraced  the  masking  of 
Strasburg,  Bitche,  Metz,  and  Thionville,  while  taking 
Paris  constantly  for  the  objective.*     This  plan  of  in- 

*  General  Harlmann  was  familiar  with  a  report  made   by  the  In- 
spector General  of  Engineers,  Prevost  de  Vernois,  and  qnoted  it  entire. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        34 1 

vasion  laid  stress  upon  the  formation  of  two  grand 
columns,  designed  to  effect  a  junction  near  Nancy.  They 
were  to  cross  the  valley  of  the  Rhine:  one  with  Ger- 
mersheim  and  lyandau  for  bases,  the  other  based  upon 
Sarrelouis. 

During  the  same  year,  in  an  essay  upon  the  lines  to 
be  adopted  in  the  invasion  of  France,  L-ieutenant-Colonel 
Meyer,  of  the  Prussian  staff,  recommended  the  directions 
from  Sarrebriick  to  Verdun  by  Saint-Avoid,  thus  turn- 
ing Metz,  and  from  Sarreguemines  to  Frouard  and  Pont- 
a-Mousson. 

In  this  new  project,  the  investment  of  Strasburg  was 
regarded  as  a  necessity  at  the  outset  of  the  campaign, 
and  the  cities  of  Neufchateau,  Vaucouleurs,  Pagny,  and 
Saint-Mihiel  were  designated  as  the  natural  points  of 
assembly  upon  the  Meuse  for  the  German  columns. 

The  Luxemburg  question  and  the  imminence  of  a 
war  with  Prussia  gave  rise  to  new  plans  of  invasion. 

One  of  these  proposed  the  irruption  eri  masse  into  the 
centre  of  Lorraine,  by  the  routes  comprised  between  the 
Vosges  and  the  Moselle,  then  the  invasion  of  the  country 
between  the  Meuse  and  the  Moselle,  and,  depending 
upon  circumstances,  either  a  march  iipon  Paris,  or  with 
the  assistance  of  South  Germany,  a  conquest  of  Alsace 
and  Lorraine.  Considered  apart  from  the  means  of  exe- 
cution, the  majority  of  these  combinations  are  reduced 
to  this:  to  overwhelm  France  by  a  violent  effort^  through 
a  great  numerical  superiority.  Regarding  the  end  to  be 
reached,  they  had  likewise  but  a  single  objective:  the 
conquest  of  7iew  territory. 

These  projects  had  threatened  our  country  since  the 
beginning  of  the  century.  Unfortunately  they  were  not 
often  enough  the  object  of  serious  reflection  on  our  part. 

In  Germany,  on  the  contrary,  when  the  Prussian  staff 
had  to  prepare  a  plan  of  campaign,  the  matter  was  al- 
ready ripe.     It  remained  only  to  bring  the  measures  pro- 


342  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

posed  in  the  past  into  accord  with  the  circumstances  of 
the  situation  at  this  time.  The  study  of  this  situation 
was  prosecuted  with  vigor.  Already  in  1868,  meetings 
had  taken  place  in  Berlin  between  the  chiefs  of  the 
Prussian  staff  and  the  representatives  of  the  contingents 
of  the  South.  The  combinations  to  which  the  next  war 
with  France  would  give  rise  were  discussed,  and  the 
most  suitable  operations  to  guaranty  the  protection  of 
South  Germany  recapitulated. 

A  leading  idea  of  concentration  upon  the  middle 
Rhine  was  concurred  in  by  all. 

During  the  following  winter,  1868-9,  ^^^  whole  plan 
was  completed,  and  the  work  necessary  to  give  it  effect 
was  immediately  begun  by  the  Prussian  general  staff 
under  the  direction  of  Von  Moltke.  It  was  industriously 
pursued  and  promptly  completed.  Soon  nothing  re- 
mained but  to  obtain  the  approbation  of  the  King,  to 
inscribe  the  first  day  of  mobilization  upon  the  schedules 
of  march,  and  to  direct  the  movements  to  the  front. 

This  projet^  formed  in  1868,  in  consequence  of  the 
prospect  of  war,  to  which  the  act  of  Germany  the  year 
before  in  the  Luxemburg  affair  had  given  rise,  was  elab- 
orated in  the  following  manner: 

ist.  It  first  of  all  closely  considered  the  respective  forces 
of  France  and  Germany. 

It  is  a  notable  fact  that,  under  all  circumstances,  the 
great  concern  of  the  German  staff  has  been  to  possess  a 
numerical  superiority. 

In  a  manner  more  or  less  candid  it  admitted  that 
this  superiority  had  been  attained.  This  point  was  es- 
tablished with  a  precision  which  showed  a  profound  ac- 
quaintance with  our  resources. 

2d.  It  then  examined  the  combinations  by  ivhich  this 
superiority  could  be  increased.  Among  these  were  to  be 
counted  those  likely  to  divide  the  French  forces ;  for  exa?n- 
ple^  a)i  isolated  attempt  by  us  upon  the  South  Ger?nan 
States. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.       343 

This  explains  the  determination  which  constantly  ani- 
mated all  the  German  officers  after  the  6th  of  August, 
1870,  to  maintain  at  all  hazards  the  separation  of  our  two 
groups  at  Metz  and  Chalons. 

3d.  After  the  stjidy  of  oiw  forces^  came  that  of  our 
probable  operations. 

The  first,  the  one  in  which  the  Germans  generally 
had  the  greatest  interest,  and  which  the  Prussians  espe- 
cially feared  the  most,  because  it  would  immediately 
weaken  them  by  about  three  army  corps,  was  a  march 
against  the  States  of  the  South.  To  prevent  this,  a 
combination  was  proposed,  and  in  1870  adopted,  by 
which  all  the  forces  of  the  North  and  the  South  were  to 
unite  upon  the  middle  Rhine.  The  left  flank  of  a  French 
army  penetrating  Germany  would  thus  be  menaced, 
and  brought  to  a  standstill. 

This  proposition,  as  has  been  said,  was  accepted  in 
1868,  by  the  representatives  of  the  States  of  the  South. 

The  second  contingency  was  the  violation  by  us  of  the 
neutral  territory  of  Belgium.  This  was  to  be  met  by  a 
concentration  upon  the  lower  Moselle,  and  a  direct 
menace  to  our  right  flank. 

The  march  of  our  army  against  Germany  by  way  of 
Switzerland,  was  regarded  as  too  disadvantageous  to 
merit  an  examination. 

The  conclusion  from  this  study  was:  First.^  the  proba- 
bility of  a  co7icentration  of  our  forces  upoji  the  Metz- 
Strasburg  line;  then.,  of  their  march  to  the  liite  of  the 
Main^  for  the  purpose  of  tiLrniitg  the  strong  places  of  the 
Rhine  and  of  separating  the  States  of  the  South  from 
those  of  the  North.     {See  Plate  XVII. ) 

After  having  thus  estimated  our  forces  and  considered 
our  probable  designs,  the  Prussians  sought  a  means  of 
successfully  opposing  them.  They  examined,  from  this 
point  of  view,  the  consequences  of  a  German  concentra- 
tion to  the  south  of  the  Moselle  and  to  the  east  of  the 
Sarre. 


344  PART  FIRST. — STRATEGY, 

This  would  permit  an  attack  upon  our  left  flank  be- 
tween the  Rhine  and  the  Black  Forest,  with  the  pros- 
pect of  a  disastrous  retreat  for  us. 

In  case  the  direction  of  our  railroads  should  oblige  us 
to  form  two  principal  masses  at  Metz  and  Strasburg,  the 
occupation  of  the  Palatinate  assured  to  the  German 
army  the  possession  of  an  interior  line  of  operations. 

The  choice  then  lay  with  the  high  roads  leading  from 
Kaiserslautern  to  the  upper  Moselle  in  the  direction  of 
Nancy,  by  Bitche  and  Dieuze,  or  by  Sarreguemines  and 
Chateau-Salins. 

The  Germans  thought  thus  to  apply  the  favorite 
manoeuvre  of  Napoleon  when  directing  a  numerically 
inferior  force,  but  with  this  difference,  that  here  the  ad- 
vantage in  numbers  lay  on  their  side.  They,  however, 
admitted  the  possibility  of  being  compelled  to  assail  both 
our  groups  simultaneously. 

Their  concentration  in  the  Palatinate  had,  besides, 

the  advantage  of  covering  the  Rhine  and  the  countries 

beyond  this  river,  extending  from  Basle  almost  half  way 

to   its  mouth.     They  thought  by  taking  the  offensive 

•from  these  positions  to  prevent  the  invasion  of  Germany. 

The  Bavarian  Palatinate  was  therefore  indicated  as 
the  most  favorable  zone  of  concentration,  or  base  of  oper- 
ations. 

5th.  It  remained  to  examine  zvJiether  the  relative  mo- 
bilization periods  of  the  antagonists  would  pennit  this 
co7}ibination. 

The  German  system  of  mobilization,  supplemented 
by  a  minutely  prepared  plan  of  transportation,  assured 
the  assembly  of  two  corps,  or  60,000  combatants,  on  the 
thirteenth  day,  and  384,000  on  the  eighteenth  day.* 


*  According  to  the  German  custom,  this  took  into  account  only  the 
combatants.  In  reality,  the  Prussians  had  upon  the  frontier  on  the 
1 8th  day,  12  corps  besides  the  Baden  and  Wurtemberg  troops,  or  to- 
gether 480,000  men. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.       345 

The  Germans  knew  that  our  army  was  not  able  to 
move  with  equal  rapidity.  They  also  learned  through 
the  indiscretion  of  some  one  unknown,  that  the  Emperor 
Napoleon  III.  and  Marshal  Niel  had  secretly  studied  the 
means  of  assembling  150,000  men  at  Metz  on  the  eighth 
day.  It  was  calculated  by  the  Germans  that  a  six  days' 
march  would  be  required  by  these  forces  to  move  from 
this  place  to  the  Rhine;  and  that  upon  reaching  it  on 
the  fourteenth  or  fifteenth  day,  they  would  find  superior 
forces  in  their  front. 

The  difference  in  mobilization  and  means  of  transport 
of  the  two  armies  thus  permitted  the  Germans  to  select 
the  Palatinate  as  the  zone  of  concentration. 

6th.  These  different  conclusions  once  established, 
nothing  remained  but  to  determine  the  manner  oi group- 
ing the  forces. 

Here  the  work  was  simplified. 

First,  on  account  of  the  large  masses  assembled,  the 
necessity  arose  of  forming  them  into  several  armies.  It 
remained  only  to  decide  upon  the  part  to  be  assigned  to 
each  army  in  order  to  fix  its  effective,  and  consequently 
the  number  of  corps  which  should  enter  into  its  compo- 
sition. 

Finally,  the  assignment  of  the  various  corps  was  to 
depend  upon  their  comparative  readiness. 

We  have  previously  seen  how  the  Germans  effected  a 
formation  into  three  armies,  which  were  supplemented 
by  a  fourth  reserve  army,  and  that  the  effectives  of  each 
were  limited  so  as  not  to  exceed  130,000  combatants. 

Such  in  outline  was  Marshal  Von  Moltke's  projet  of 
operations.  While  it  does  not  form  a  fixed  rule  to  be 
rigidly  followed  under  all  circumstances,  yet  in  the  logic 
with  which  it  was  worked  out,  it  none  the  less  offers  us 
a  model  type  and  a  precious  lesson  of  experience.  It  pre- 
sents this  peculiarity,  that,  formed  in  1868,  it  unfolded 
itself  two  years  afterwards  with  almost  mathematical 
regularity,  and  in  conformity  with  settled  anticipations. 


346  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

However,  it  should  not  be  forgotten  that  these  results 
ought  to  be  attributed  less  to  the  perfection  of  the  projet 
of  operations  than  to  the  superiority  of  the  forces,  artil- 
lery armament,  tactical  instruction,  discipline,  and 
finally  the  weakness  of  the  adversary. 

In  order  the  better  to  understand  the  scope  of  the  pro- 
jet  and  the  accuracy  of  its  estimates,  it  is  well  to  recall 
the  combinations  adopted  in  France  at  the  same  epoch. 

§  5. — Projet   OF  OPERATIONS   OF   THE    FRENCH    IN    187O. 

In  consequence  of  the  events  of  1866,  France  felt  great 
concern  over  the  probabilities  of  a  conflict  with  Germany. 
After  the  Luxemburg  incident,  the  apprehension  being 
emphasized,  the  Emperor  instructed  Marshal  Niel,  Min- 
ister of  War,  to  prepare  a  plan  of  army  organization. 
This  took  place  in  1868,  at  the  same  time  that  the  mem- 
orandum of  Marshal  Von  Moltke  was  preparing  at  Berlin. 

This  work,  divided  into  two  parts,  centemplated  the 
formation  of  three  armies  and  three  reserve  corps,  the 
effective,  the  composition,  and  the  assembly  places  of 
which  have  already  been  indicated. 

It  was  estimated  that  we  would  thus  have,  with  the 
troops  in  Algeria,  489,978  men,  121,218  horses,  and 
12,033  wagons. 

The  preparation  for  war  did  not  go  beyond  this  simple 
division  of  the  troops,  the  numerical  estimate  of  which 
contained  several  errors.  However,  at  this  period,  after 
due  reconnaissances  had  been  made,  a  plan  of  campaign 
was  elaborated  by  General  Frossard,  governor  of  the 
Prince  Imperial  and  aide-de-camp  to  the  Emperor. 

According  to  this  plan,  "the  first  question  presented 
to  the  mind  under  the  hypothesis  of  a  war  with  Germany 
was  this  : 

'"''What  will  the  enemy  do  at  the  Jirst  moment?  Will  he 
keep  himself  upon  his  general  base — the  Rhine — where 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        347 

he  has  a  solid  footings  and  zvait  until  France  i^eveals  her 
pi'ojets  ?  Or^  resolved  to  take  an  advanced  positioji  from 
the  outset^  will  he  come  zvith  his  corps  completely  or- 
ganised^ establish  himself  upon  the  fortified  bases  which 
he  possesses  before  our  frontiers^  that  is  to  say^  before 
Lower  Alsace,  and  upon  the  fro7it  and  fiank  of  Lorraine^ 
and  attempt  the  immediate  invasion  of  our  country? 

"The  present  state  of  mind  in  the  Prussian  armies, 
the  confidence  which  their  success  in  1866  has  given 
them,  and  which  is  still  further  increased  by  the  super- 
iority attributed  to  their  armament,  the  hope  that  they 
will  surprise  France  in  the  midst  of  preparations  and 
incomplete  movements,  all  lead  us  to  think,"  said  the 
General,  "that  the  enemy  will  take  the  second  alterna- 
tive, and  not  leave  us  the  initative  of  the  attack." 

As  a  consequence  of  these  views,  the  General's  report 
treats  particularly  of  the  defence  of  the  country,  in  the 
following  terms: 

Character  of  tlie  Eastern  Frontier. — "  The  portion  of  our 
frontiers  comprised,  on  the  one  hand,  between  the  Rhine 
and  the  Moselle,  and  on  the  other,  between  the  Moselle 
and  the  Meuse,  and  the  Meuse  and  the  Sambre,  will  be 
particularly  threatened  by  the  German  armies.  These 
forces  acting  in  concert,  by  virtue  of  treaties  of  alliance 
recently  concluded,  will  be  so  considerable  that  they 
may  be  expected  to  act  concentrically  from  different 
sides. 

"The  part  of  the  frontier  between  the  Rhine  and  the 
Moselle  is  still,  so  far  as  we  are  concerned,  in  the  condi- 
tion where  the  events  of  1815  and  the  treaties  of  Vienna 
left  it.  But  the  Germans  have  here  assumed  an  attitude 
toward  us  much  more  aggressive  and  dangerous  than 
formerly, 

"Let  us  recall  what  lyieutenant-General  Dode  wrote 
upon  this  subject  in  1837,  in  a  report  to  the  high  com- 
mission of  defense  instituted  the  preceding  year: 


348  PART   FIRST.  — STRATEGY. 

"  'This  side  of  France,'  said  he,  '  is  undoubtedly  the 
most  vuhierable  and  the  most  threatened.  Our  neiofh- 
bors  have  always  indicated  it  as  the  place  of  entrance 
most  favorable  to  their  designs,  if  they  were  to  make  a 
third  invasion  of  our  country.  The  works  which  they 
have  erected  upon  the  territory  opposite  us  corroborate 
this  estimate  of  their  plan  of  attack,  and  serve  to  still 
further  develop  their  views.  .  .  .  Germany  tends,  more- 
over, toward  centralization,  and  the  formation  of  a  more 
compact  and  homogeneous  body.  The  fusion  of  com- 
mercial interests  which  is  going  on  under  our  eyes 
(1837)  throughout  this  vast  territory  will  produce,  in  the 
not-distant  future,  a  unity  of  political  interests  which 
will  make  of  this  section  of  Europe,  feeble  heretofore 
by  reason  of  its  divisions,  a  very  formidable  whole.'  " 

"After  thirty  years,  these  forecasts  are  completely 
realized. 

"The  situation  is  even  very  much  aggravated,  for  the 
Federal  strongholds  erected  before  our  frontier  of  Lor- 
raine and  the  Rhine  will  henceforth  be  in  the  hands  of 
a  single  power,  the  one  that  will  have  the  direction  of 
future  operations, — Prussia, — and  this  iron  girdle  which 
clasps  us  will  press  upon  us  with  redoubled  force. 

"  Tlie  German  Lines  of  Invasion. — Furthermore,  the  exist- 
ence of  numerous  railroads  which,  starting  from  the  dif- 
ferent passages  of  the  Rhine,  converge  upon  the  fortified 
places,  has  created  new  dangers,  through  the  facility 
afforded  for  the  rapid  concentration  of  invading  troops. 
There  is  then  an  imperative  necessity  for  concerning 
ourselves  about  the  means  of  defending  this  frontier. 

"All  the  forces  of  North  Germany  can  be  very 
promptly  thrown  upon  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  by  the 
railroads  running  to  different  points  of  this  river. 

"These  principal  passages  are  those  of  Maxau,  8  kilo- 
metres below  lyauterburg,  of  Germersheim,  Mannheim, 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.       349 

Worms,  Mayence,  Cobleiitz,  Bonn,  Cologne,  and  Diissel- 
dorf. 

"  The  railroad  lines  in  communication  with  these  dif- 
ferent passages,  and  which  are  a  menace  to  France,  are: 

"  ist.  For  the  invasion  of  Lower  Alsace^  the  lines  Ra- 
stadt-Carlsruhe-Landau  and  Mayence-Neustadt-I^andau- 
Wissembourg. 

' '  2d.  For  the  invasion  of  Lorraine^  the  three  lines  May- 
ence-Kaiserslautern-Sarrebriick,  Mayence-Neunkirchen- 
Sarrebriick,  and  Treves-Sarrelouis-Sarrebriick,  all  cen- 
tering in  the  large  railway  station  at  Sarrebriick. 
These  lines  are  prolonged  upon  our  territory  by  the 
Forbach-St.  Avold-Metz  line. 

"3d.  Finally  the  Tj^eves- Luxemburg  line^  and  be- 
tween the  Moselle  and  the  Meuse,  the  Cologne-Aix-la- 
Chapelle-Spa-Ivuxemburg  line.  These  two  lines  are 
prolonged  by  rail  upon  Longwy  via  Arlon. 

"On  account  of  the  facilities  for  rapid  movements  and 
for  concentration  which  their  railroads  give  them,  the 
Germans  would  be  able,  from  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
to  have  distinct  bases  of  operations  established  immed- 
iately before  our  frontiers,  even  touching  them,  so  to 
speak.     These  are: 

"  ist.  Before  Lower  Alsace^  Landau  and  Germers- 
heim ; 

"2d.  Before  Lorraine^  Sarrebriick  and  Sarrelouis, 
upon  the  Sarre; 

' '  3d.    To  the  north  of  Lorraine^  Luxemburg. 

"This  is  a  grave  situation;  it  calls  for  most  serious 
attention,  and  dictates  to  us  the  proper  course  to  pursue. ' ' 

This  writer  supposed  that  the  enemy  would  concen- 
trate his  forces  in  the  Palatinate  and  in  front  of  central 
Lorraine,  which  was  his  principal  theatre  of  operations; 
then  below  Luxemburg;  and  that  in  the  first  phases  of 
the  struggle  he  would  possess  an  effective  of  about 
470,000  men. 


350  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

He  further  computed  that  France  would  be  able  to 
oppose  to  these  forces: 

ist.  An  arj7iy  of  the  Rhine^  of  120,000  men,  the  right 
wing  in  Upper  Alsace  or  at  Strasburg,  with  the  left  wing 
in  Lower  Alsace; 

2d,  An  army  of  the  Moselle^  of  140,000  men,  before 
the  debouche  at  Sarrebriick; 

3d.  An  army  of  the  North  or  of  the  Meuse^  of  60,000 
men,  established  upon  the  Rheims-Chalons  base,  the 
first  of  these  cities  being  transformed  into  a  place  of 
manoeuvre,  whence  the  troops  could  take  the  railroad 
either  to  the  north,  into  Lorraine,  or  upon  Langres. 

"In  Lower  Alsace, "  said  the  General,  "the  enemy 
will  have  Landau  and  Germersheim  for  a  base;  his  right 
will  extend  to  Pirmasens  by  means  of  a  corps  connect- 
ing with  his  army  of  the  Sarre.  His  lines  of  attack  will 
lead  him  through  the  mountains  between  Bitche  and 
Wissembourg,  and  the  plain  between  Wissembourg  and 
the  Rhine.  It  is  probable  that  he  will  also  make  efforts 
by  his  right,  to  the  west  of  Wissembourg,  in  the  upper 
valleys  of  the  Lauter  and  the  Saner,  after  the  manner 
of  the  Allies  in  1793." 

Defence  of  Lower  Alsace. — The  French  army  of  Lower 
Alsace  ought  then,  at  the  outbreak  of  war,  to  occupy 
the  line  of  the  Lauter,  its  right  at  Lauterburg,  its  left 
at  Wissembourg  and  the  position  Col  die-  Pigeonnier 
upon  the  Bitche  road. 

This  line  of  the  Lauter  should  be  only  provisional;  it 
must  be  abandoned  if  the  enemy  advances  with  superior 
forces. 

Woerth  as  a  Position. — The  army  in  falling  back  should 
execute  a  change  of  front  and  cover  itself  by  the  Sauer- 
bach,  which  runs  to  Lembach  and  Woerth. 

"  Once  established  upon  the  right  bank  of  this  stream, 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.       35 1 

it  slioiild  occupy  the  fine  position  near  Woerth,  which, 
extending  along  a  crest  to  a  distance  of  9  or  10  kilo- 
metres, has  this  town  and  Froeschwiller  as  points  of 
support.  The  position  should  be  strengthened  by  field- 
works,  especially  upon  the  left  bank,  near  the  village  of 
Gunstett." 

This  was  the  position  occupied,  in  a  contrary  way,  by 
the  Austrians,  in  December,  1793,  when  Hoche  threw 
himself  between  them  and  the  Prussians,  forcing  them 
to  beat  a  retreat,  after  having  captured  the  redoubts  es- 
tablished by  them  near  Froeschwiller  and  Woerth, 

Upon  this  position  at  Woerth,  our  army  should  be  able 
to  sustain  a  struggle  against  superior  forces  with  the 
chances  of  success  in  its  favor. 

The  General  thought  it  would  even  be  possible  to  de- 
tach a  division  to  move  across  the  Vosges  to  the  support 
of  the  right  wing  of  the  army  of  the  Moselle. 

Defense  of  Lorraine. — The  army  obliged  to  contend  with 
the  main  forces  of  the  enemy,  coming  from  Mayence 
and  Coblenz,  should  be  the  most  important.  It  should 
place  its  right  wing  upon  the  plateau  between  Sarregue- 
mines  and  Saint-Avoid,  and  its  left  in  advance  of 
Thionville. 

Right  wing: 

It  was  proper  to  assume  that  the  enemy  would  assemble 
considerable  forces  upon  the  Sarre,  and  make  Sarrebriick 
the  starting-point  for  his  greatest  efforts. 

There  was  reason  to  suppose  that  he  would  invade 
Lorraine  upon  an  extended  front,  his  right  taking  Metz 
for  objective,  his  left  Luneville,  and  his  centre  Nancy. 

The  French  army  could  abandon  neither  Lorraine  npr 
the  western  slope  of  the  Vosges;  it  must  then  take  a  de- 
fensive position. 

Cadenbronn  as   a  Position. — The  General,  to  this  end, 


352  PART  FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

chose  "the  plateau  between  Sarreguemines  and  Saint- 
Avoid,  where  there  was  a  favorable  line  for  battle,  from 
12  to  13  kilometres  [about  7^  miles]  in  extent."  With 
its  right  at  Sarreguemines,  its  centre  at  Cadenbronn,  its 
left  near  CEtingen,  trending  around  toward  Theding, 
and  occupying  the  crests  at  the  foot  of  which  runs  the 
railroad  from  Metz  to  Forbach,  the  French  army  would 
be  in  condition  to  oppose  an  energetic  resistance  to  the 
enemy. 

This  advantageous  situation  was  indicated  for  the  first 
time  by  General  Haxo  in  his  memoir  of  1819,  upon  the 
defense  of  Lorraine,  and  recommended  by  various  mili- 
tary men,  especially  General  Schneider. 

The  right  would  be  solidly  supported  by  several  earth- 
works upon  the  heights  above  Sarreguemines. 

"The  centre  would  extend  through  Rouhling  and 
Cadenbronn,  the  latter  the  highest  point  of  the  plateau. 
The  left,  which  would  command  the  railroad  and  the 
ordinary  road,  would  have  an  advance  post  at  Forbach, 
and  detach  a  division  to  Saint-Avoid,  for  the  purpose  of 
preventing  a  turning  movement  by  the  enemy's  troops 
coming  from  Sarrelouis. " 

Retreat  upon  Metz  and  upon  the  Line  of  the  Seille. — After  a 
battle  upon  the  Sarreguemines-Cadenbronn  position,  the 
right  wing  of  the  army  of  the  Moselle  might  be  obliged 
to  retreat.  It  should  then  fall  back  upon  Puttelange, 
Sarralbe,  and  Dieuze,  in  rear  of  the  Seille,  and  occupy 
the  left  bank  of  this  river  abreast  of  Vic. 

If  the  left  wing  should  find  it  an  impossibility  to  fol- 
low the  movement  of  the  right,  it  was  to  retire  upon 
Metz,  where  it  would  find  the  support  of  field  works 
constructed  in  advance  to  transform  this  site  into  a 
grand  place  de  manoeuvres. 

Successive  Retreats  upon  Luneville  and  Langres. — If  fortune 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        353 

for  a  second  time  should  set  its  face  against  the  French 
armv,  and  it  should  be  forced  to  abandon  the  line  of  the 
Seille,  the  retreat  was  indicated  upon  Luneville,  in  such 
a  way  as  to  hold  the  two  railroads  of  the  Vosges-Saint- 
Die  and  Epinal. 

We  should  thus  reach  the  positions  situated  in  rear, 
and,  in  case  of  need,  the  fortified  town  of  Langres. 

The  retreat  of  the  army  of  the  Moselle,  and  its  con- 
centration at  L-angres  with  the  defensive  forces  of  Alsace, 
were  not  considered  by  him  as  manoeuvres  too  far  from 
the  centre,  by  reason  of  the  advantageous  changes  which 
the  fortifications  of  Paris  had  brought  about  in  the  con- 
ditions of  the  struggle. 

Reserve  Army. — According  to  this  plan,  it  was  essen- 
tial to  have  between  the  enemy  and  Paris  a  reserve 
army,  which  could  retire  upon  the  capital  or  go  to  the 
assistance  of  the  other  armies.  It  was  proposed  to  es- 
tablish it,  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  at  Rheims  and 
Chalons. 

The  General  foresaw  that  the  right  wing  of  the  army 
of  the  Rhine  would  be  opposed  to  a  German  army  which 
would  attempt  first  to  invade  Alsace,  and  then  to 
move  either  by  the  passes  of  the  Vosges  upon  lyorraine, 
which  it  would  thus  take  in  rear,  or  by  the  opening  be- 
tween the  Vosges  and  the  Jura  upon  Vesoul  and  Gray, 
and  thence  upon  Langres  or  Dijon. 

This  attack  was  to  be  prevented  "  by  a  vigorous  offen- 
sive. The  Rhine  was  to  be  crossed  at  Neuf-Brisach  and 
at  Huningen,  and  an  attempt  made  to  separate  the 
South  German  States  from  those  of  the  North." 

Retreat  of  the  Troops  of  Upper  Alsace  upon  Belfort,  Lure,  and 
Langres. — If  the  enemy,  passing  the  Rhine,  moved  upon 
Mlilhausen,  our  army  was  to  occupy  the  position  from 
this  place  to  Altenkirchen,  facing  the  Rhine  and  the 

23 


354  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

debouches  from  Himingen  and  Basle,  upon  the  heights 
covering  the  railroad  and  the  Belfort  road. 

In  case  of  a  reverse,  retreat  was  to  be  made  upon  Bel- 
fort,  and  its  intrenched  camp  occupied. 

The  army  would  then  receive  reinforcements  by  the 
railroads  from  Lyons  and  Dijon. 

If,  after  another  failure,  Belfort  was  abandoned,  re- 
treat would  be  effected  by  Lure  upon  Vesoul,  an  import- 
ant position  and  a  railroad  junction,  where  it  would  be 
necessary  to  direct  the  reinforcements  in  advance,  and 
to  throw  up  field-works. 

Concentration  of  the  Resistance  at  Langres. — Finally,  if  the 
enemy  again  obliged  our  army  to  abandon  its  position, 
it  would  have  to  retire  upon  Langres,  without  relin- 
quishing the  railroad.  This  place  would  then  become 
the  centre  of  resistance  for  the  entire  country. 

The  work  of  General  Frossard  was,  in  1870,  commu- 
nicated to  Marshal  Bazaine,  who  thought  proper  to  dis- 
pute the  opinions  there  expressed. 

When  one  recurs,  however,  to  the  opening  events  of 
the  campaign,  he  is  struck  by  the  similarity  existing 
between  the  actual  and  the  suggested  combinations. 

Independent  of  the  necessity  for  standing  upon  the 
ground  of  the  defensive,  the  positions  upon  which  the 
first  combats  took  place,  the  retreat  of  the  troops  from 
Lower  Alsace  upon  the  Vosges,  and  that  of  the  army  of 
the  Sarre  to  Metz,  had  all  been  foreseen.  We  may  then 
believe  that  this  study  was  not  without  influence  upon 
the  dispositions  made  later  by  the  French  army.  At 
all  events,  the  memoir  of  General  Frossard  denoted  a 
real  understanding  of  the  situation,  and  proposed  defen- 
sive combinations  which,  vigorously  followed,  would 
have  modified  the  situation  in  1870  to  our  advantage. 
That  it  did  not  happen  thus,  was  due  to  circumstances 
which  form  a  part  of  our  military  history. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        355 

At  the  end  of  May,  1870,  the  views  of  the  military  au- 
thorities having  assumed  a  different  phase,  a  new  projet 
was  drawn  up  and  submitted  to  certain  foreign  dignitaries, 
whose  concurrence  and  support  were  desired.  ''^\\\'s,  pro- 
jet  was  at  once  changed,  and  in  its  place  the  following 
combination  was  proposed: 

The  French  army,  the  mobilization  of  which  it  was 
supposed  could  be  completed  in  fifteen  days,  was  to  take 
the  field  on  the  sixteenth  day.  It  was  to  form  in  two 
masses:  a  principal  army,  which  was  to  operate  upon  the 
right  bank  of  the  Rhine;  a  second  army  upon  the  left 
bank  which  was  to  act  beyond  the  Sarre,  in  the  Palati- 
nate. The  latter  was  to  vigorously  take  the  offensive, 
in  order  to  deceive  the  Prussians  as  to  the  real  point  of 
attack.  In  the  meantime,  the  principal  army  was  to 
pass  the  Rhine  near  Strasburg,  separate  the  States  of 
the  Sputb  from  those  of  the  North,  and  by  the  prompt- 
ness of  its  mobilization,  assure  itself  against  all  serious 
attack  upon  its  left  flank. 

It  would  then  be  able  to  form  a  junction  with  the 
Austrian  army  near  Nuremberg,  whence  these  two 
masses  would  be  moved  into  Saxony,  to  repeat  Na- 
poleon's plan  of  operations  of  1806.  France,  in  the 
meantime,  was  to  make  a  strong  diversion  by  landing 
a  corps  on  the  shores  of  the  Baltic. 

This  project,  the  result  of  a  simple  interchange  of  views 
between  two  high  military  officials,  did  not  rest  upon 
practical  bases,  but  on  the  contrary  upon  erroneous 
data;  namely,  the  mobilization  of  our  army  in  a  fort- 
night, the  preparation  of  our  fleets  and  transport -ships 
in  a  month,  and  the  mobilization  of  the  Austrian  army 
in  three  weeks. 

After  July  6,  1870,  events  followed  one  another  in 
such  a  rapid  march  that  no  chance  was  left  for  new 
combinations,  and  Napoleon  III.  returned  to  t\\&  projet 
of  operations  drawn  up  in  May. 


356  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

It  consisted  in  assembling  three  armies  at  Metz,  Stras- 
bnrg,  and  Chalons  respectively,  crossing  the  Rhine  be- 
tween Strasburg  and  Germersheim,  and  pressing  in  be- 
tween Sonth  and  North  Germany.  * 

The  forces  assembled  in  Lorraine  were  to  march  into 
Alsace  and  pass  the  Rhine  immediately  after  those  con- 
centrated at  the  outset  near  the  river.  Those  from  the 
camp  of  Chalons  were  to  march  into  Lorraine  and  take, 
either  at  Metz  or  Nancy,  a  position  adapted  to  cover 
the  communications. 

-  At  the  same  time  our  fleet  was  to  land  a  corps  upon 
the  Baltic  coast,  and  seize  Kiel  and  Hamburg. 

It  is  known  how  these  combinations  miscarried,  how 
the  project  of  forming  three  armies  was  abandoned,  and 
that  of  employing  a  single  army  adopted  in  its  stead; 
and  finally,  how  false  calculations  concerning  the  peri- 
ods of  mobilization,  transportation,  and  assemblement 
rendered  the  execution  of  any  plan  impossible. 

Soon  the  Germans  were  able  to  take  the  initiative.  It 
became  necessary,  on  this  account,  to  subordinate  our 
operations  to  theirs,  and  to  accept  defensive  battles  which 
had  not  been  foreseen.  Then  came  defeat,  and  finally  in- 
vasion. 

The  practical  conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  these  facts 
are  as  follow: 

ist.  Henceforth  an  ainjiy  must  always  know  in  advance 
the  duration  of  its  pei^'iod  of  mobilizatioii  and  transporta- 
tion to  within  about  a  day ; 

2d.   It  must  know  the   same   concerning   the   armies 
which  it  may  be  called  upon  to  meet ; 
■    3d.   As  a  riile^   the  army  which  is  beJiindhand  in  pre- 
paration^   should  not  think  of  directing  the   war^    but 
rather  submit  to  follozu  its  course.     From  this  ti?ne^   it 


*  Testimony  of  Marshal  Le  Boeuf  before  the  Commission  of  Inquirj', 
volume  I,  p.  51. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        357 

should prepm-e  the  defense  with  such  energy  as  to  triiunpJi 
over  the  offensive  iti  the  long  run^  and  in  its  turn  assume 
the  role  of  the  assailant. 

This  conclusion  naturally  leads  to  the  study  of  defen- 
sive/;'<7;>/^  of  operations. 

§6. — ProjetS   of    operations    of   the    AUSTRIAN 

ARMY  IN    1866. 

The  Austrian  projet  of  operations  in  1866,  unlike 
Prussia's  of  this  year,  had  not  been  prepared  in  advance. 
The  first  council  of  war  called  to  consider  its  elabora- 
tion, dates  from  the  time  when  the  relations  between  the 
two  nations  became  so  tense  as  to  render  war  inevitable, 
i.  e.^  after  the  7th  of  March,  1866.  Hostilities  com- 
menced about  three  months  later — on  the  15th  of  June. 

Three  questions  were  then  put: 

ist.  How  should  the  ari7iy  be  distributed  in  view  of 
the  double  canipaigii  in  the  north  and  in  the  south  ? 

2d.    When  ought  it  to  be  mobilized? 

3d.  Where  should  the  army  be  assembled  which  is  de- 
signed to  act  against  the  Prussians  ? 

These  three  questions  were  for  the  purpose  of  deter- 
mining-: 

The  distribution  of  the  troops; 

The  date  of  mobilization; 

The  zone  of  concentration. 

They  were  treated  one  after  another  as  follows: 

ist.  Distribution  of  the  Forces. — The  division  into  two 
armies,  one  in  the  north  against  the  Prussians,  the 
other  to  face  the  Italians  in  the  south,  was  a  necessity. 
It  was  adopted  without  hesitation.  But,  after  deduct- 
ing the  garrison  troops  and  troops  of  occupation,  it  was 
seen  that  there  remained  for  the  army  of  the  North  only 
196  battalions,  175  squadrons,  and  93  batteries.  For 
that  of  the  South,  only  63  battalions,  25  squadrons,  and 
22  batteries. 


358  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Upon  both  theatres  of  operations  Austria  would  then 
have  a  numerical  inferiority,  and  she  could  count  only 
upon  a  peculiarly  favorable  combination  of  events  to 
gain  the  ascendency. 

Preparations  were  then  made  to  concentrate  all  efforts 
upon  the  point  where  the  fate  of  the  campaign  was  to 
be  decided — upon  the  northern  frontier. 

To  this  end,  the  chief  of  general-staff  asked  for  an  im- 
mediate increase  in  the  effectives  by  the  fourth  battalions 
which  were  in  the  fortresses  and  the  fifth  battalions  yet 
to  be  formed.  Already  long  delayed,  this  measure  was 
adopted  but  two  months  before  the  opening  of  the  cam- 
paign. To  carry  it  out,  it  was  necessary  to  make  a  call 
for  85,000  men. 

2d.  Date  of  Mobilization.. — Upon  this  subject  the  de- 
cisions were  as  fatal  as  they  were  contrary  to  the  rules  of 
war.  The  States  of  the  Confederation  had  declared  that 
they  would  take  part  against  that  one  of  the  two  nations 
which  became  the  aggressor.  The  Diet  decided  then 
to  await  the  action  of  the  two  hostile  powers,  before 
commencing  preparations  for  war. 

Once  before,  a  similar  measure  had  been  followed  by 
disastrous  results,  and  had  led  Austria  to  reverses,  the 
recollection  of  which  was  not  yet  effaced.  The  Austrian 
chief  of  general-staff  called  attention  to  this,  pointing 
out  the  danger  of  such  action.  But  no  notice  was  taken 
of  his  protest,  and  the  decision  was  adhered  to.  The 
Minister  of  War  was  simply  advised  to  make  such  dis- 
positions that  the  army  might  be  assembled  upon  the 
points  of  concentration  within  seven  weeks  after  issu- 
ance of  the  order  for  mobilization. 

However,  the  armaments  of  Prussia  and  Italy  were 
soon  to  hasten  the  dispatch  of  this  order.  It  became 
necessary,  indeed,  to  forward  it  to  the  Army  of  the  South 
by  the  21st  of  April. 

3d,   Zone  of  Concentration. — Upon  this  question,   the 


SECOND   CHAPTER. — PREPARATION   FOR   WAR.       359 

chief  of  general-staff  reasoned  thus:  The  Prussian  forces, 
being  the  first  ready,  will  take  the  offensive.  The  Aus- 
trian aTmy  will  be  reduced  to  the  defensive.  Hence  it 
will  not  be  able  to  concentrate  in  Bohemia,  which  the 
Prussians  will  enter  at  once.  It  ought,  however,  to 
leave  a  corps  there  to  stretch  a  hand  to  the  Saxon  army, 
and  take  up  position  upon  the  flank  of  the  enemy's  gen- 
eral line  of  march.  The  town  of  Olmiitz  offering  in  this 
regard  the  best  point  of  support,  was  to  be  the  centre  of 
concentration.  This,  then,  was  to  be  effected  in  Mora- 
via.    {See  Plate  XVIII.) 

Such  were,  in  a  general  way,  the  resolutions  adopted 
in  March.  They  did  not  constitute  a  plan  of  operations, 
biit  bases  for  war  preparation. 

General  Krismanic,  called  to  Vienna  for  this  purpose, 
was  charged  with  forming  a  projet  of  defensive  opera- 
tions upon  these  bases. 

Following  is  a  summary  of  his  projet: 

PLAN   OF  OPERATIONS  OFTHE;  ARMY  OF  THE  NORTH. 

ist.   Probable  forces  of  the  armies  facing  each  other. 

Th.&  projet  estimated  the  Austrian  forces,  those  of  the 
the  contingents  of  the  Allies,  and  those  of  the  Prussians. 
The  opposing  masses  seemed  about  equal.    " 

2d.   Decision  to  remain  on  the  defensive. 

The  author  believed  that  this  decision,  in  every  case  to 
be  lamented,  would  lead  to  the  deployment  of  the  Prus- 
sian army  at  the  moment  when  the  Austrians  were  yet 
on  the  march  toward  the  points  of  concentration.  If  the 
latter' s  concentration  could  be  effected  at  the  same  time 
as  their  adversary's,  he  believed  that  the  offensive  should 
be  taken  at  all  hazards,  and  vigorously  taken. 

But  by  reason  of  the  measures  adopted  by  the  council 
of  war,  he  counted  only  upon  the  defensive,  and  made 
this  the  basis  of  his  calculations. 

3d.  Zo7ie  of  co7icentration. 


360  PART  FIRST. — STRATKGY. 

This  zone  should  offer  a  point  of  support  to  the  army, 
and  cover  the  line  of  retreat  upon  Vienna  and  that  capi- 
tal itself 

The  Olmiitz-Mahrisch-Triibau  line,  45^  kilometres 
[27  miles]  long,  fulfilled  these  conditions.  The  various 
corps  could  be  moved  up  to  any  point  of  this  line  in 
three  days,  with  exception  of  the  I.  Corps,  which  would 
require  five  days.  Kach  corps  in  this  first  movement 
was  to  be  restricted  in  its  cantonments  to  a  space  S}4 
miles  square  ;  but  rapidity  of  concentration  was  to  com- 
pensate for  this  disadvantage. 

4th.   Hypothesis  of  an  offensive  movement. 

In  case  the  army  centering  at  Olmiitz  should  have 
time  to  take  the  offensive  in  Bohemia,  it  was  to  do  so, 
gain  the  upper  Elbe  in  ten  or  eleven  days,  and  establish 
itself  between  Josephstadt,  Gitschin,  Pardubitz,  and 
Podiebrad,  with  Koniggratz  as  a  point  of  support. 

This  projet  was  in  the  main  the  one  put  into  execu- 
tion by  Field-Marshal  Benedek  a  few  weeks  later ;  but 
he  did  not  recognize  the  favorable  opportunities  offered 
him  by  the  defiles  upon  his  right  flank,  which  one  of 
the  Prussian  armies  was  forced  to  follow. 

5th.    Case  of  a  concentration  2ipon  the  Iser. 

The  movements  of  the  army  were  also  regulated  to 
apply  to  the  case  of  a  concentration  upon  the  Iser. 

6th.    The  ene7fiy^  s  lines  of  invasion. 

The  Hirschberg-Neisse  zone  of  concentration  in  Sile- 
sia, was  pointed  out  as  the  one  most  convenient  for  the 
Prussians,  and  one  which  would  permit  them  to  adopt  as 
lines  of  invasion  the  roads  debouching  from  Neisse  and 
Glatz  upon  the  Upper  Elbe. 

In  every  case,  the  projet  prescribed  a  passive  defense, 
while  recommending  that  advantage  be  taken  of  the 
least  mistake  of  the  enemy  to  seize  the  offensive  with 
vigor. 

The  various  hypotheses  of  Prussian  combinations  were 
treated  at  great  length. 


SECOND   CHAPTER. — PREPARATION    FOR  WAR.       361 

This  projet  was  adopted  in  its  principal  features,  and 
served  as  a  basis  in  deciding  upon  the  orders  for  opera- 
tions, dispatched  a  short  time  afterwards. 

It  had,  as  we  see,  a  clearly  defensive  character,  and 
embraced,  altogether,  the  following  points  : 

Tst.   Estimation  of  the  forces  of  the  belligerents ; 

2d.  Motives  for  taking  the  defensive^  the  dangers^  the 
chances  of  seizing  the  offensive ; 

3d.  Choice  of  a  first  zone  of  conceiitratioji  upon  the 
flank  of  the  lines  of  invasion ; 

4th.  Hypothesis  of  taking  the  offensive ; 

5th.  Choice  of  a  second  zone  of  concejitration  171  ad- 
va7ice  of  the  first ; 

6th.  Eneniy^ s  probable  lines  of  invasion. 
.  Like  the  preceding  projets^  this  one  should  not  serve 
as  a  model,  for  the  reason  that  every  situation  of  this 
kind  presents  special  circumstances  and  requires  combi- 
nations peculiarly  suited  to  it.  However,  we  see  from 
this  study  that  the  resolve  to  hold  the  defensive,  taken 
on  account  of  political  reasons,  was  as  much  feared  by 
the  leaders  of  the  Austrian  army  as  it  was  regrettable, 
since,  from  the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  it  placed 
this  army  in  a  condition  of  conscious  inferiority. 

We  then  reach  the  following  conclusions  : 

ist.  When  war  is  decided  upoji^  the  consideration  of 
any  matter  foreign  to  its  purpose  is  hurtftcl; 

2d.  If  the  concentration  of  one  army  is  effected  at  the 
same  time  as  that  of  the  enemy ^  it  should  take  the  offen- 
sive with  the  greatest  energy  ; 

3d.  Even  when  its  concentration  is  slower.^  it  should 
so  act  as  to  be  able  to  move  forward  to  meet  the  enemy  ; 

4th.  In  defensive  strategy^  positions  upon  the  flank  of 
lines  of  invasion  seein  indicated  as  the  most  advantageous. 

The  operations  of  the  Austrians  showed  that  the  01- 
miitz  position  was  too  far  removed  from  the  enemy's  line 
of  operations. 


362  PART  FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

A  review  of  the  Austrian  plans  of  campaign  in  1866 
would  not  be  complete  without  a  consideration  of  the 
one  adopted  by  the  Archduke  Albert. 

§  7. — Projet  OF   OPERATIONS   OF   THE   ARCHDUKE 
ALBERT  IN    1866. 

The  campaign  which  the  Archduke  Albert  of  Aus- 
tria made  in  Italy,  in  1866,  is  one  of  the  most  remark- 
able in  contemporaneous  history.  It  would  then  be 
well  to  go  no  further  without  giving  the  substance  of 
\}l\!^  proj et  of  operations  which  served  him  as  a  basis.  At 
the  outset,  the  conditions  of  the  two  opposing  armies 
did  not  entirely  correspond  to  the  ordinary  circumstances 
of  modern  war.  Mobilization  and  concentration  were 
effected  more  in  accordance  with  past  usages  than  in 
conformity  with  the  rules  in  vogue  to-day. 

The  Austrian  army  was  upon  the  very  theatre  of  ope- 
rations before  the  declaration  of  war.  The  Italian 
army  was  already  assembled.  It  had  almost  reached  its 
war  complement  before  the  two  countries  broke  off  in- 
tercourse. Finally,  the  opposing  masses  had  not  the 
formidable  proportions  of  the  Prussian  armies  of  1866 
and  1870.  Nevertheless,  the  dispositions  made  by  the 
Austrians  once  more  demonstrate  that  skill  in  combina- 
tions gives  the  power,  in  certain  cases,  not  only  to  make 
head  against  a  numerically  superior  enemy,  but  also  to 
defeat  and  destroy  him. 

Called  to  the  leadership  of  the  Army  of  the  South  on 
2ist  of  April,  the  Archduke  took  command  on  the  9th 
of  May. 

A  month  later,  on  June  10,  his  corps  were  entirely 
mobilized  and  ready  to  take  the  field.  He  had  under 
his  orders : 

71,824  men,  3,536  horses,  and  168  guns. 

To  these  were  added  the  troops  stationed  in  Tyrol,  in 
Istria,  and  in  the  various  garrisoned  towns,  the  total 
effective  being : 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        363 

190,945  men,  20,755  horses,  248  guns. 

But  the  nuinber  of  combatants  did  not  exceed: 

138,158  men,  5,273  horses,  248  guns. 

The  Italian  army  contained: 

314,331  men,  33,103  horses,  and  450  guns.  Its  com- 
batant strength  was: 

270,680  men,  10,080  horses,  and  450  guns.  To  which 
force  should  be  added  about  36,000  volunteers. 

The  Italians,  after  having  taken  measures  to  effect 
their  concentration,  apparently  wished  to  turn  the  Quad- 
rilateral, by  operating  in  the  lower  basin  of  the  Po. 
But,  toward  the  middle  of  May,  they  modified  their  first 
dispositions,  and  formed  their  forces  into  two  groups. 
The  more  important  was  stationed  behind  the  Oglio,  and 
the  other  upon  the  right  bank  of  the  lower  Po.  The 
bulk  of  the  volunteers,  under  Garibaldi,  was  to  operate 
in  Tyrol.     {See  Plate  XIX.) 

The  Archduke  watched  the  movements  of  his  adver- 
saries with  the  liveliest  attention.  As  soon  as  he  per- 
ceived the  faulty  disposition  adopted  by  them  in  forming 
two  separate  masses,  he  resolved  to  seize  the  interior 
line  and  throw  himself  upon  one  of  these  before  the 
other  could  go  to  its  aid.  Owing  to  his  numerical  in- 
feriority, this  was  the  only  plan  that  appeared  to  hold 
out  a  prospect  of  success. 

As  early  as  May  26,  he  called  the  attention  of  the 
Bmperor  to  the  mistake  committed  by  the  enemy,  sup- 
plementing this  information  by  a  dispatch  of  June  3,  in 
which  he  set  forth  the  opportunities  presented  by  the 
situation,  and  indicated  the  advantage  which  he  in- 
tended drawing  therefrom.  This  report  was  a  compre- 
hensive exposition  of  his  plan  of  operations.  Here  are 
its  leading  principles: 

Examination  of  the  Projets  of  tlie  Enemy. — Considering 
first  of  all  the  probable  ^r^y'^^'j- of  the  Italians,  the  Arch- 
duke expressed  himself  in  these  terms: 


364  PART  FIRST, — STRATEGY. 

"The  concentration  of  the  forces  of  our  adversary  in 
the  Duchies  and  upon  the  lower  Po,  might  lead  us  to  sup- 
pose that  he  intended  to  penetrate  Venetia,  while  turn- 
ing the  Quadrilateral.  But  the  position  which  he  now 
occupies,  assures  us  that  he  has  abandoned  this  design, 
and  that  his  present  plan  of  operations  consists  in  hold- 
ing our  forces  in  check  upon  the  Mincio,  with  the  prin- 
cipal portion  of  his  army,  in  order  to  allow  the  remain- 
der to  cross  the  lower  Po  without  danger,  in  the  vicinity 
of  Ferrara,  march  upon  Padua,  and  join  the  army  of  the 
King  under  the  walls  of  Verona.  At  the  same  time  a 
force  of  five  regiments  of  volunteers  and  a  detachment 
of  regular  troops  will  be  landed  upon  a  point  of  the 
Venetian  coast,  while  the  remainder  of  the  volunteer 
corps  assembled  upon  the  frontiers  of  Tyrol  will  attack 
the  defiles  of  this  country,  and  attempt  to  penetrate  to 
the  interior." 

The  plan  of  the  Italians  consisted,  then,  in  executing 
a  turning  movement  to  the  south  and  east  of  the  Quad- 
rilateral with  the  Army  of  the  Lower  Po,  while  the  King 
engaged  with  the  Army  of  the  Mincio,  and  the  remain- 
ing forces  endeavored  to  cut  the  lines  of  communication 
in  Friuli. 

This  division  of  the  Italian  army  explains  itself,  with- 
out, however,  offering  a  complete  justification  of  the 
measure.  It  was  difficult,  indeed,  to  operate  with  220,- 
000  men  by  the  lower  Po,  in  a  country  cut  up  by  num- 
erous streams  and  constantly  presenting  defiles  where 
heads  of  columns  only  could  engage. 

On  the  other  hand,  to  form  the  forces  into  a  single 
army,  and  advance  as  a  unit  by  the  Mincio,  would  give 
success  by  reason  of  numerical  superiority;  but  as  such 
a  movement  would  menace  none  of  the  enemy's  lines  of 
retreat,  no  decisive  results  could  be  expected. 

Finally,  another  consideration  comes  into  view  to 
diminish  the  defects  in  the  combination  of  the  Italians. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        365 

Each  of  their  groups  was  superior  to  the  entire  Austrian 
army.  The  forces  of  the  King  reached,  indeed,  about 
130,000  men,  and  those  of  General  Ciaklini  more  than 
80,000,  while  the  Archduke  had  less  than  72,000. 

The  Italians  could  foresee,  then,  no  danger  of  a  re- 
pulse, for  the  reason  that  while  reserving  the  Army  of 
the  Lower  Po,  they  would  begin  operations  with  the 
Army  of  the  Mincio,  whose  forces  outnumbered  the 
Austrians  nearly  two  to  one. 

Subsequent  facts  proved  the  incorrectness  of  their  es- 
timation. 

Dispositions  made  by  the  Enemy  for  tlie  Execution  of  his 
Projets. — The  Archduke  in  his  report,  afterwards  notices 
the  dispositions  made  by  his  adversaries  to  put  these /r^)- 
jets  into  execution.  At  this  time  two  of  their  corps  were 
moving  toward  the  Mincio.  A  third  was  at  Piacenza, 
near  the  King's  headquarters.  The  IV.  Corps,  6  divis- 
ions strong,  comprising  an  effective  of  48,000  men,  was 
cantoned  from  Parma  to  Bologna.  The  volunteers  were 
organizing  themselves  at  the  foot  of  the  Alps.  Finally, 
the  Italian  cavalry  had  outposts  along  the  frontier,  upon 
the  Po  and  the  Mincio. 

Positions  Taken  by  the  Austrian  Army. — To  oppose  these 
movements,  the  Austrians  had  made  the  following  dis- 
positions: 

The  V.  Corps  was  at  Verona,  the  VII.  at  Padua,  the 
IX.  at  Vicenza.  The  various  detachments  charged  with 
guarding  Tyrol,  Friuli,  Istria,  and  the  coasts  of  the 
Adriatic,  occupied  the  places  assigned  them.  It  was 
possible  to  concentrate  the  field  forces  in  two  marches, 
while  three  would  be  required  by  the  enemy  in  reaching 
Verona,  the  nearest  Austrian  position. 

Selection  of  the  Point  of  Concentration. — In  the  light  of 


366  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

these  considerations,  the  Archduke  was  to  decide  upon 
the  point  of  concentration.  Verona  was  the  key  to  the 
entire  defensive  system,  and  the  grand  depot  site  of  the 
army. 

It  was  essential,  then,  to  remain  in  proximity  to  this 
fortress,  in  order  to  avoid  running-  the  risk  of  beinsf  cut 
from  it,  and  caught  between  the  two  armies  of  the  enemy. 

From  another  point  of  view,  the  entrance  of  the  Army 
of  the  Lower  Po  into  Venetia,  would  probably  arouse 
the  inhabitants,  endanger  his  communications  with 
Friuli,  and  deprive  him  of  the  resources  of  this  country. 
It  was  necessary,  under  the  circumstances,  to  -occupy  a 
central  position,  so  selected  that  the  army  would  be 
able  to  march  in  a  single  day  against  either  force  of 
the  enemy,  whether  toward  Verona  or  Badia,  and  be 
thus  enabled  to  profit  by  any  mistakes  that  might  be 
made..  The  line  of  defense,  extending  from  Montag- 
nana  to  Ivonigo  upon  the  Frassine,  fulfilled  these  con- 
ditions. 

While  prepared  to  throw  himself  upott  the  first  of  the 
Italian  armies  coming  within  reach,  the  Archduke  fore- 
saw that  he  would  have  at  the  outset  to  contend  with 
the  Army  of  the  Mincio,  commanded  by  the  King,  and 
congratulated  himself  accordingly;  for  if,  in  spite  of  his 
numerical  inferiority,  he  should  be  victorious,  the  con- 
sequences of  this  success  would  be  decisive,  and  sufiice, 
perhaps,  to  paralyze  the  action  of  the  Army  of  the  Lower 
Po.  Besides,  it  was  easy  enough  for  him,  if  not  to  stop 
the  latter,  at  least  to  retard  its  march  with  a  small  force, 
on  account  of  obstacles  of  the  country. 

But  he  could  assure  the  execution  of  these  plans,  only 
by  very  precisely  informing  himself  of  the  designs  and 
movements  of  the  enemy,  and  by  deceiving  the  latter  as 
to  his  own.  To  reach  this  result,  he  established  an 
extremely  vigorous  outpost  service,  in  which  his  cavalry 
displayed  remarkable  activity. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. — PREPARATION  FOR  WAR.        367 

To  sum  up,  the  pi'ojct  of  operatious  of  the  Archduke 
dwelt  upon  three  principal  points: 

An  examination  of  the  adversary''  s  projets  ; 

An  account  of  the  dispositions  already  made ; 

And  the  selection  of  the  point  of  concentration. 

Finally,  this  projet  adopted  a  system  of  defensive 
strategy  combined  with  offensive  tactics,  and  manoeuvred 
the  Austrian  army  upon  an  interior  line,  starting  from 
a  central  position. 

It  was  certainly  contrived  with  skill;  and  in  its  exe- 
cution, judgment  and  energy  were  equally  conspicuous. 

The  examples  just  cited  permit  us  now  to  make  a  gen- 
eral recapitulation  of  the  various  considerations  entering 
into  the  establishment  oi  a. pi^ojet  of  operations,  namely: 

ist.   Account  of  the  forces  of  the  belligerents ; 

2d.   Study  of  the  enemy''  s  probable  pi'-ojet  of  operations  ; 

3d.  The  most  advantageous  combinations  to  adopt  for 
meeting  him;  selection  of  a  base  of  operations ; 

4th.   Plan  of  mobilization  and  concentratio7i ; 

5th.  Formatio7t  of  the  armies  ;  the  par  tic2ilar  part  each 
is  to  play. 


THIRD  CHAPTER. 


OPERATIONS. 


-OFFENSIVE. 


After  the  pi^ojet  of  operations  is  completed  and  war  is 
declared,  nothing  remains  but  to  enter  upon  the  active 
part  of  strategy :  the  operations. 

As  has  previously  been  said,  it  is  the  art  of  directing 
these  operations  which  constitutes  strategy. 

All  principles  laid  down  in  definition  of  this  art,  all 
explanations  given  to  establish  its  rules,  may  be  summed 
up  in  a  single  law: 

Be  the  stronger  at  the  decisive  point. 

The  combinations  proposed  for  the  attainment  of  this 
end  are  of  two  kinds  only :  offeiisive  and  defejisive. 

In  practice,  to  be  the  stronger  does  not  always  mean 
to  have  the  larger  forces; — witness  the  second  period  of 
the  war  of  1870,  in  which  we  mustered  superior  num- 
bers, but  without,  the  military  training  that  creates  dis- 
cipline, and  in  which  we  were  defeated. 

To  be  the  stronger  does  not  mean  to  have  the  better 
arms; — witness  the  first  period  of  the  same  war,  in  which 
our  infantry  armament  was  superior  to  the  enemy's,  and 
in  which  we  were  likewise  beaten. 

However,  it  is  certain  that  with  drilled  troops,  and  ar- 
maments of  equal  quality,  numerical  superiority  will  be 
the  most  powerful  element  of  victory. 

Improvements  in  fire-arras  and  progress  in  the  art  of 
war,  have  in  no  way  modified  this  rule  of  experience. 

Having  admitted  that  strategy  has  but  one  aim,  vic- 
tory, and  but  one  fundamental  principle,  the  necessity 
of  attaining  moral   and  material  superiority,  we  shall 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  369 

proceed  to  examine  in  turn  the  two  series  of  combina- 
tions, offensive  and  defensive,  which  make  up  the  life  of 
armies  in  the  field. 

Here  is  the  opinion  expressed  upon  this  subject  by  one 
of  the  most  distinguished  Prussian  military  writers  of 
our  day.  * 

"What  is  the  comparative  value  of  these  two  orders 
of  operations,  the  offensive  and  the  defensive?  Both 
have  engaged  the  earnest  attention  of  strategists,  and 
the  grounds  for  discussion  regarding  them  are  far  from 
being  exhausted. 

"  Clausewitz  preferred  the  defensive;  Willisen,  the 
offensive. 

"With  modern  theorists,  the  power  of  fire-arms 
should,  theoretically,  lead  to  the  selection  of  the  defen- 
sive. 

"However,  the  choice  of  one  or  the  other  depends 
primarily  iipon  circumstances,  and  these  are  as  varied 
as  the  caprices  of  fate.  In  fact,  this  choice  hardly  ever 
depends  upon  the  will  of  the  general-in-chief ;  and  con- 
sidering the  diversity  of  incidents  arising  in  war,  the 
matter  of  paramount  importance  is  to  clearly  under- 
stand the  scope  of  both  these  modes  of  operating. 

"Each  varies  according  as  it  relates  to  strategy  or  to 
tactics. 

"The  strategical  offensive  comprehends  the  general 
plan  of  attack,  the  movements  necessary  to  carry  it  into 
effect,  and,  in  a  certain  measure,  the  battle,  which 
should  be  delivered  from  such  a  direction  as  to  confound 
the  enemy  and  bring  about  decisive  results. 

"The  tactical  offensive,  on  the  contrary,  considers 
only  the  method  of  attack  upon  a  particular  point  of  the 
field  of  battle.  The  ability  to  take  this  role  is  one  of 
the  aims  of  strategy. 

*  The  Nation  in  Arms,  by  Von  der  Goltz,  Berlin,  1883. 
24 


370  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

"The  strategical  defensive  is  the  general  plan  of  de- 
fense ;  the  tactical  defensive  is  the  resistance  to  attack 
upon  a  chosen  position. 

"These  premises  established,  it  must  be  conceded  that 
to-day  two  states  equally  strong  and  equally  well  pre- 
pared, would  both  wish  to  take  the  offensive.  A  few 
days'  delay  in  preparation  will  be  sufficient  to  reduce  to 
the  defensive  the  side  that  is  the  less  advanced. 

"The  sudden  and  successful  attacks  of  Napoleon  have 
led  to  the  belief  that  the  offensive  has  always  the  advan- 
tage. Since  the  recent  improvements  in  fire-arms,  we 
are  forced  to  the  conclusion  that,  from  a  tactical  point  of 
view,  the  contrary  is  true. 

"And  yet,  the  offensive  always  possesses  the  most 
powerful  means  of  bringing  the  intellectual  and  moral 
forces  of  its  army  into  play.  This  is  proved  by  the 
number  of  victories  put  down  to  its  account.  The  as- 
sailant presses  forward,  confident  in  his  plans  and  in  his 
ability  to  carry  them  out.  He  selects  his  mark,  and  all 
his  efforts  take  thus  a  settled  direction.  At  the  same 
time  his  designs,  in  the  progress  of  events,  become  pro- 
ductive. The  very  fact  that  the  offensive  has  more  ac- 
tivity than  the  defensive  is  much  in  its  favor,  for  between 
two  adversaries  equal  at  the  outset,  the  more  active  will 
finally  prevail. 

"The  defender  awaits  the  blow,  and  endeavors  to 
parry  it.  He  must  watch  the  enerny,  and  make  the 
latter's  action  the  regulator  of  his  own.  It  is  impos- 
sible for  him  to  give  his  operations  the  same  impetus. 
In  putting  his  principal  forces  in  motion,  the  aggressor 
has  an  exact  idea  of  the  part  each  group  is  to  play  in  his 
combinations,  and  the  precise  time  it  will  come  into  ac- 
tion, and  he  often  brings  about  astonishing  results.  The 
attitude  of  an  army  moving  forward  is  entirely  different 
from  that  of  one  making  a  retreat,  or  even  awaiting  the 
enemy.     It  has  more  latitude  of  operation,  and  sets  more 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  37 1 

elements  in  motion.  The  commander-in-chief  gives 
only  general  directions.  The  snbordinate  leaders,  in- 
vited to  follo>v  the  impnlsion  received,  bring  the  utmost 
ardor  into  play.  Each  individual  in  the  army  of  the 
offensive,  even  the  meanest,  when  events  lead  to  the  de- 
cisive moment,  becomes  an  actor  in  the  drama.  The 
hope  of  carrying  the  day  arouses  a  powerful  enthusiasm 
in  the  the  ranks  of  the  assailant.  His  chances  of  suc- 
cess constantly  increase  as  he  brings  more  and  more  of 
his  troops  into  action  ;  and  a  head  of  column  which 
penetrates  the  enemy's  line,  exercises  an  attraction  upon 
all  other  portions  of  the  army.  The  psychologic  ele- 
ments, we  thus  see,  have  as  much  importance  in  war  as 
the  material  forces. 

"The  defensive  lacks  impulsion.  It  brings  its  forces 
together  instead  of  pushing  them  forward.  It  leaves 
the  soldiers  under  the  impression  that  their  leaders  are 
controlled  by  circumstances,  instead  of  having  the  power 
to  direct  them.  The  defensive  is  apprehensive  regard- 
ing the  issue  of  encounters,  and  has  fears  of  its  ability  to 
preserve  its  line  of  battle  intact. 

"A  fatal  difference  between  the  defensive  and  the 
offensive  is  that  the  former,  in  order  to  win  success, 
must  triumph  at  all  points;  while  for  the  assailant,  it  is 
sufficient  if  he  be  successful  at  a  single  point. 

"Upon  the  whole,  the  offensive  possesses  the  greater 
active  moral  force. 

' '  But  in  our  age,  the  r61e  of  the  attack  has  become  more 
difficult.  The  most  extraordinary  efforts  are  necessary 
to  decisively  defeat  the  armed  masses  brought  into  action 
to-day.  The  general-in-chief  must  not  only  reflect  more 
profoundly,  but  must  venture  more.  In  future,  the  in- 
crease in  the  forces,  and  the  equality  of  their  armaments, 
will  render  the  fighting  of  battles  more  difficult.  The 
next  wars  will  probably  unfold  to  our  view  hostile  arrays 
unknown  in  past  campaigns. ' ' 


372  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Superiority  of  the  Offensive. —  '^Everything  considered^ 
the  offeiisive  outranks  the  defensive. 

"This  does  not  arise  from  external  cauges,  but  from 
the  sentiments  which  control  the  springs  of  human 
action.  Every  new  difficulty  in  the  path  of  the  as- 
sailant, every  new  incident,  gives  rise  to  new  resources, 
sharpens  his  thought,  and  develops  his  spirit  of  enter- 
prise, his  capacity  for  successful  action  keeping  pace 
with  his  aspirations.  Happy  the  combatant  upon  whom 
fate  or  superior  preparation  for  war  bestows  the  part  of 
assailant. 

"  It  is  only  by  the  offensive  that  the  object  of  all  war- 
fare can  be  realized — the  destruction  of  the  enemy's 
army.  It  is  indeed  recognized  that  the  defensive  should 
endeavor  finally  to  take  the  offensive.  But  this  proves 
simply  that  the  defender  would  prefer  the  part  of  as- 
sailant, and  that  he  awaits  the  moment  when  he  shall 
thus  be  able  to  catch  a  glimpse  of  victory. 

' '  The  defender  does  not  make  war,  he  submits  to  it. 

' '  To  make  war  is  to  attack.  * 

"  According  to  Jomini  :  'The  offensive  at  the  begin- 
ning of  operations,  offers  most  favorable  means  for 
making  a  combined  movement  upon  a  decisive  point  with 
overwhelming  forces.''  'This  means,'  says  he,  'is  to 
take  the  initiative  in  the  movements,'' '\  The  general 
who  succeeds  in  winning  this  advantage  to  his  side,  is 
free  to  move  his  forces  wherever  expediency  dictates. 
He  who  on  the  contrary  awaits  the  enemy,  puts 
it  out  of  his  power  to  control  a  single  combination, 
since  he  subordinates  his  movements  to  those  of  the  ad- 
versary, and  once  these  are  in  full  execution,  no  longer 
has  time  for  making  new  dispositions  to  arrest  them. 
The  general  who  takes  the  initiative  has  an  exact  idea  of 

*  The  Nation  in  Arms,  by  Von  der  Goltz. 
■\  Jomini,  Treatise  on  Grand  Operations. 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  373 

what  is  to  be  accoinplislied:  lie  conceals  his  inarch,  sur- 
prises and  overcomes  an  exposed  wing  or  other  weak 
part.  He  who  waits  may  be  beaten  upon  one  point  even 
before  he  is  informed  of  the  attack." 

There  is  but  one  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  the 
above  quotations:  the  offensive  is  the  only  role  for  the 
general  who  wishes  to  conquer.  This  principle  holds 
good  at  the  present  time,  and  is  especially  applicable  at 
the  beginning  of  a  campaign,  if  the  enemy's  masses  are 
not  in  a  condition  of  readiness,  and  if  his  frontier  is 
without  defense. 

But,  ordinarily,  there  will  be  an  interval  between  the 
periods  of  concentration  of  the  two  armies  of  but  one  or 
two  days,  perhaps  only  a  few  hours. 

Ill  consequence,  the  offensive  will  mean  simply  the  in- 
itiative in  the  first  movements.  Nevertheless,  from  what 
has  just  been  said,  the  offensive  should  never  be  ne- 
glected when  it  is  possible  to  assume  it.  The  resulting 
advantages  are  especially  of  a  moral  nature;  if  they  are 
not  at  once  perceived,  they  are  nevertheless  real. 

The  Proper  Period  at  which  to  Decide  upon  the  Assumption  of 
the  Offensive. — It  will  frequently  be  possible  to  decide 
upon  the  strategical  offensive  during  the  period  of  trans- 
portation to  the  frontier;  but  oftener  it  will  be  imprac- 
ticable to  arrive  at  a  determination  of  the  matter  in  ad- 
vance. This  will  be  settled  by  each  belligerent  in 
accordance  with  the  information  which  he  receives 
concerning  the  movements  of  the  other.  The  one  that 
finally  becomes  assured  of  his  priority  in  complete  prep- 
aration, should  immediately  decide  to  take  the  offensive, 
and  issue  orders  accordingly. 

Let  us  suppose  that  the  offensive  has  been  resolved 
upon,  and  study  the  operations  as  they  unfold  themselves. 


374  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

§  2.   MOBIUZATION. 

The  organization  of  the  various  European  armies  is 
now  known.  We  have  an  insight  into  the  general  prin- 
ciples which  serve  as  a  guide  in  the  grouping  of  forces 
among  the  different  nations,  in  the  apportionment  of 
their  effectives  among  the  several  arms  of  the  service, 
the  organization  of  their  reserves,  and  the  distribution  of 
the  personnel  and  materiel  between  their  various  units. 

Before  considering  the  manner  in  which  they  are  put 
in  movement  against  the  enemy,  it  is  well  to  examine 
the  methods  by  which  they  to-day  pass  from  a  peace  to 
a  war  footing.  Briefly  stated,  the  troops  are  assembled 
at  points  in  the  interior,  and  are  then  rapidly  concen- 
trated upon  the  frontier,  ready  to  act. 

Hence  result  two  distinct  operations:  mobilization  and 
concentratioji. 

In  France,  before  the  war  of  1870,  the  first  was  called 
passage  to  the  war  footing  ;  the  second,  formation  of  the 
army.  They  took  place  simultaneously  near  the  theatre 
of  operations,  and,  so  to  say,  at  the  commencement  of 
the  roads  which  were  to  serve  as  lines  of  operations,  but 
under  conditions  entirely  different  from  those  coming 
into  play  at  the  present  time. 

Mobilization  is  the  passage  of  all  the  units  to  the  war 
footing.  •  It  is  absolutely  distinct  from  concentration. 
This  principle  appears  trite  to-day,  and  yet  at  the  time  of 
our  last  war,  the  two  operations  were  confounded,   and 
reciprocally  embarrassed  one  another. 

Formerly,  at  the  commencement  of  the  century  for 
example,  a  political  rupture  was  visible  a  long  time  in 
advance,  especially  by  the  power  that,  counting  upon  a 
superiority  of  military  resources,  had  resolved  to  take 
the  offensive.  It  then  prepared  its  forces  in  secret,  as- 
sembled them  with  equal  concealment,  declared  war 
when  it  was  ready,  and  endeavored  to  bring  on  hos- 
tilities at  once. 


THIRD   CHAPTP^R. — 0PE;RATI0NS.  375 

To-day,  with  the  development  of  intercourse,  increase 
in  the  number  of  railroads  and  telegraph  lines,  and  expan- 
sion of  the  influence  of  the  press,  such  methods  are  no 
longer  practicable.  All  preparations  for  war  in  view  of  an 
early  offensive  will  immediately  become  known.  Indeed, 
the  character  of  the  masses  to  be  moved,  no  longer  permits 
action  under  the  same  conditions.  But  if  the  assemble- 
ment  of  men  and  horses,  in  view  of  hostilities,  can  no 
longer  be  concealed,  it  can,  on  the  other  hand,  be  exe- 
cuted at  the  decisive  moment  with  a  promptness  formerly 
unknown,  and  in  a  shorter  space  by  one  belligerent  than 
by  the  other.  This  is  dependent  upon  the  kind  and  de- 
gree of  preparation  in  time  of  peace. 

Scope  of  Present  Mobilizations. — With  the  introduction  of 
compulsory  service,  the  opening  of  war  has  become  a 
more  critical  moment  than  formerly,  for  the  nations  con- 
cerned. It  is  no  longer  a  question  of  sending  against 
the  enemy  a  portion  of  the  young  men  organized  as  an 
active  force,  but  the  entire  able-bodied  population  of  a 
country  is  called  out.  From  one  to  two  millions  of  men 
must  be  rudely  torn  from  the  peaceful  pursuits  of  ordi- 
nary life,  from  their  firesides,  from  the  dearest  objects  of 
affection.  To  these  must  be  added  from  one  to  two  hun- 
dred thousand  horses.  It  is  necessary  to  feed,  group, 
equip,  and  transport  these  masses  with  all  the  material 
required  by  them.  This  is  a  supreme  ordeal  which  pro- 
foundly stirs  the  nation,  reaches  all  households,  all  oc- 
cupations, suspends  public  life,  and  with  feverish  activ- 
ity strains  to  the  utmost  all  the  springs  of  the  govern- 
mental machine.  For  a  virile  people,  it  is  the  touch- 
stone of  the  spirit  that  controls  its  social  and  military 
organization. 

Mobilization  is  then  essentially  a  gigantic  work,  which 
absorbs  the  life  of  the  entire  nation,  and  which  presents 
the  greatest  imaginable  complications. 


376  PART   FIRST. — STRATKGY. 

Now  it  is  nothing  to  raise  a  regiment  to  the  war  effec- 
tive. Difficult,  however,  is  the  execution  of  that  great 
body  of  measures  requiring  simultaneous  execution:  the 
installation  of  new  authorities;  the  formation  of  new 
agencies;  the  organization  of  depots,  interior  garrisons, 
commands,  special  governments,  and  station  services; 
the  creation  of  new  staffs  from  heterogeneous  elements; 
the  organization  of  trains,  parks,  convoys,  and  accessory 
field  services;  the  assembling  of  horses,  provisions,  mu- 
nitions, means  of  transport,  etc. 

A  simple  enumeration  of  the  details  of  such  an  opera- 
tion makes  it  apparent  how  greatly  confusion  is  to  be 
feared,  and  how  indispensable  it  is  that  minute  prepara- 
tions be  made  in  time  of  peace. 

Still  further  reasons  demand  this.  The  mobilization 
must  be  effected  as  rapidly  as  possible,  for  the  sooner  it 
is  finished,  the  sooner  will  the  concentration  be  accom- 
plished, provided  the  railroads  lend  themselves  to  a 
prompt  transportation  of  troops.  An  army  which  con- 
centrates upon  a  frontier  more  speedily  than  the  enemy, 
possesses  advantages  which  exercise  a  favorable  influence 
upon  the  entire  course  of  the  campaign. 

Advantages  of  a  Prompt  Mobilization. — These  may  be 
stated  thus: 

The  belligerent  that  is  ready  first  has  the  initiative  of 
the  movements.  Consequently  he  iinposes  his  will  upon 
the  enemy. 

With  eqnal  forces^  he  has  more  chances  of  enlisting  the 
first  successes  on  his  side^  and  of  increasing  thus  the 
moral  value  of  his  army^  the  assurance  of  his  troops^  at  the 
same  time  that  he  correspondingly  diminishes  the  confi- 
dence of  the  enemy. 

He  will  dictate  the  law  i7istead  of  receiving  it. 

He  will  draw  great  advantage  from  the  fact  that  the 
direction  of  the  ivar  rests  principally  with  him^  and  he 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  377 

will  be  able  to  retain  control  of  events  for  a  considerable 
pej'-iod. 

These  considerations  show  to  what  degree  mobiliza- 
tion and  concentration  are  to-day  essential  to  the  success 
and  even  the  existence  of  armies.  Such  a  point  has  been 
reached  that  the  duration  of  these  operations  is  not 
counted  by  days,  but  by  hours. 

They  must,  then,  at  any  price,  be  completed  with  the 
least  possible  delay,  and  to  this  end  all  means  must  be 
employed,  all  efforts  put  forth,  all  sacrifices  made. 

The  mobilization  of  an  army  comprehends  two  essen- 
tial acts:  the  preparation  in  time  of  peace  ^  and  the  exe- 
cution. The  chief  requisite  in  the  former  is  order  and 
system,  and  in  the  latter,  rapidity. 

For  the  purpose  of  insuring  dispatch  in  the  execution, 
it  is  necessary  that  all  the  details  be  foreseen  and  worked 
out  in  time  of  peace;  and  that  they  be  so  regulated  that 
their  realization  will  be  attended  by  the  least  possible 
delays. 

The  fundamental  principle  accepted  on  this  subject  is 
to  place  as  near  as  possible  to  the  various  permanent 
organizations,  the  men,  horses,  and  material  needed  by 
them  to  change  from  a  peace  to  a  war  footing,  so  that 
for  each  force,  all  the  movements  may  be  made  upon  a 
small  area,  and  consequently  require  the  shortest  possi- 
ble space  of  time. 

Moreover,  the  principle  of  division  of  labor  and  of 
decentralization  of  the  service,  should  be  applied  in  this 
hour  of  supreme  crisis,  in  amplest  measure. 

In  France,  since  1872,  all  has  been  done  that  the  laws 
in  force,  the  circumstances,  and  the  situation  of  the 
army  permitted.  But  all  work  is  capable  of  improve- 
ment; ours  certainly  is.  In  the  first  place,  we  should 
endeavor  not  to  lose  sight  for  an  instant  of  the  possibil- 
ity of  a  sudden  mobilization.  In  this  thought,  we 
should  ceaselessly  study  the  best  methods  of  execution 


378  PART   FIRST, — STRATEGY. 

already  known,  endeavor  to  find  those  that  seem  the 
most  advantageous,  and  propose  all  practicable  improve- 
ments. 

The  best  instruction  which  the  past  can  furnish  us  on 
this  subject,  is  that  offered  by  the  German  and  French 
mobilizations  of  1870.  It  will  not  be  out  of  place,  then, 
to  recall  these  two  events  of  contemporaneous  military 
history,  and  to  set  forth  such  incidents  as  are  calculated 
to  awaken  interest  and  afford  instruction. 

I. — Mobilization  of  the  G-erman  Armies  in  1870, 

1ST.    SYSTEM   OF   MOBILIZATION. 

Experience  gained  in  the  campaigns  of  1864  and  1866 
demonstrated  that  with  the  masses  composing  modern 
armies,  speed  in  mobilization  was  one  of  the  first  condi- 
tions of  success.  Therefore,  since  the  war  in  Bohemia, 
this  operation  had  become  a  subject  of  constant  study 
for  the  Prussian  general  staff. 

The  work  undertaken  seemed  to  have  a  double  aim: 
the  separation  of  the  field  forces  from  the  landwehr;  the 
reduction  of  the  time  necessary  to  assemble  the  reserves. 
Moreover,  since  the  earliest  days  of  her  present  military 
system,  Prussia  had  adapted  the  organization  of  her 
army  to  the  requirements  of  mobilization.  And  this 
practical  idea,  which  reason  in  default  of  experience 
should  have  moved  her  neighbors  to  adopt,  had  led  her, 
little  by  little,  to  the  creation  of  a  powerful  mechanism 
whose  parts,  set  in  motion  during  peace,  worked  together 
regularly  and  without  friction  in  time  of  war,  imparting 
a  new  impulse  to  her  forces,  and  concentrating  all  the 
powers  of  the  machinery  to  one  supreme  end — the  suc- 
cess of  her  arms. 

The  first  consequence  of  this  system  was  the  elabora- 
tion, in  time  of  peace,  of  all  the  details  of  mobilization, 
and  especially  of  the  role  of  each  unit,  each  group,  each 


THIRD  CHAPTKR. — OPERATIONS.  379 

service,  each  individual;  the  various  duties  had  been 
rigorously  marked  out,  and  for  a  long  time,  every 
measure  of  military  legislation  brought  about  improve- 
ments. It  is  thus  that  the  mobilization  of  1866  was 
effected  after  the  plans  established  in  consequence  of  the 
reorganization  in  i860.  That  of  1870  was  carried  out 
conformably  to  projets  drawn  up  after  the  Bohemian 
campaign,  and  in  accordance  with  the  improvements  to 
which  it  gave  rise. 

Independent  of  the  plan  of  mobilization,  the  Prus- 
sian general-staff  renewed  from  3'ear  to  year,  for  the 
military  authorities  interested,  an  order  of  mobilization 
which  remained  in  force  from  the  ist  of  April  of  one 
year  to  the  31st  of  March  of  the  following  year,  and 
which  indicated  to  each  his  duty  from  day  to  day  for  this 
important  operation.* 

Tables  relating  to  time  and  manner  of  moving  the 
bodies  of  troops,  and  further  tables  pertaining  to  trans- 
port trains,  formed  corallaries  to  these  orders. 

The  mobilization  rested  upon  the  fruitful  principles 
of  the  division  of  labor  and  of  decentralization.  Each 
army  corps,  each  organized  troop,  each  unit,  each  ser- 
vice, was  mobilized  as  a  whole,  dependent  only  upon 
itself  The  responsibility  was  thus  divided  among  the 
different  elements  of  the  hierarchy,  and  these  concurred 
in  obtaining  the  greatest  precision,  even  in  the  smallest 
details.  At  the  first  note  of  war,  the  German  soldier 
saw  in  advance  the  course  of  his  duties.  In  France,  on 
the  contrary,  from  the  top  to  the  bottom  of  the  military 
establishment,  every  one  was  ignorant  of  his  role,  and 
awaited  the  orders  of  the  supreme  authority. 

Usually,  the  German  plan  of  mobilization  commenced 

*In  the  words  of  the  "Secret  Instructions,"  "Every  person  in  au- 
thority should  know  in  peace  what  will  be  required  of  him  on  the 
order  to  mobilize,  and  must  expect  no  further  orders.  All  orders 
which  have  to  be  issued  are  to  be  kept  ready  in  peace." — Tr. 


380  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

by  indicating  the  way  in  which  the  effectives  were  to  be 
organized  upon  a  war  footing,  and  the  measures  to  be 
taken  to  reach  the  regulation  figures. 

On  these  data  were  based  the  tables  prescribing  the 
distribution  of  the  field  forces,  and  the  depot  and  gar- 
rison troops.  These  tables  went  into  effect  only  upon 
the  approval  of  the  Minister  of  War. 

The  designation  of  the  points  of  mobilization  came 
next.  As  a  rule,  each  group  or  service  was  mobilized 
in  its  own  region. 

Naturally,  the  headquarters  of  the  landwehr  battalion 
districts  played  a  preponderating  part  in  these  combina- 
tions. 

Directions  concerning  horses  and  materiel^  and  regula- 
tions governing  the  replacement  of  the  military  authori- 
ties,* completed  these  plans,  which  were  accompanied 
by  detailed  tables  and  instructions. 

The  operations  of  mobilization  comprehended  five 
successive  periods: 

1.  The  call  for  men  and  the  requisition  for  the  proper 
complement  of  remounts; 

2.  The  movement  of  men  and  remounts  toward  the 
centres  of  mobilization; 

3.  The  formation  of  field  troops; 

4.  The  formation  of  depot  troops; 

5.  The  formation  of  garrison  troops. 

The  call  for  men  and  horses  resulted  from  the  order 
for  mobilization. 

Notice  of  mobilization  was  at  once  telegraphed  by  the 
War  Ministry  to  the  commanders  of  the  landwehr  bat- 
talion districts,  who  were  directed  to  summon  the  re- 
serves.    These  commanders,  by  aid  of  the  civil  author- 


*The  commanders  of  corps,  divisions,  etc.,  upon  taking  the  field 
with  their  troops,  are  replaced  in  their  local  commands  by  temporary 
officials. — Tr. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  381 

ities,  sent  out  the  written  summonses,  which  are  always 
kept  ready,  notifying  each  reservist  and  landwehr-man 
when  and  where  to  join.  A  delay  of  twenty-four  hours 
was  granted  them,  and  by  the  fifth  day  the  greater  part 
of  the  reservists  had  reached  the  designated  points. 
They  were  there  formed  into  detachments  and  forwarded 
to  their  regiments  under  non-commissioned  officers. 

On  the  fourth  day,  the  commissions  for  the  purchase 
of  remounts  assembled  at  the  points  indicated.  On  the 
following  day,  the  owners  of  horses  presented  themselves 
with  their  animals,  which  were  inspected,  paid  for,  and 
delivered  to  the  officers  sent  to  receive  them. 

The  men  and  horses  were  in  general  directed  upon  the 
main  bodies  on  the  day  after  their  arrival  at  local  head- 
quarters, that  is,  on  the  sixth  or  seventh  day.  In  the 
meantime,  the  regiments  emptied  their  magazines,  pre- 
pared arms,  clothing,  munitions,  provisions,  etc.,  and 
organized  the  depot  cadres.  These  operations  were  con- 
ducted with  methodical  activity,  and  when  the  reserv- 
ists arrived,  they  were  immediately  clothed,  equipped, 
armed,  and  incorporated.  Twenty-four  hours  later  they 
were  prepared  to  take  the  field,  or,  as  a  rule,  on  the 
seventh  day  of  mobilization. 

This  was  also  the  time  when  the  remounts  of  the  new 
complement  were  received  at  the  points  of  assembly. 
And  on  the  eighth  day,  as  a  rule,  the  artillery  and  train 
teams  were  nearly  completed. 

A  fundamental  principle  served  to  regulate  the  organ- 
ization of  the  war  effectives:  the  reservists  must  enter 
not  only  the  regiment  in  which  they  received  instruc- 
tion, but  even  the  same  battalion  and  the  same  company. 
The  affection  developed  for  the  flag  under  which  he  had 
been  instructed  in  the  calling  of  the  soldier,  and  for  the 
group  of  comrades  of  his  early  service,  was  thus  kept 
alive,  and  gave  added  cohesion  to  a  regiment  at  the  out- 
set of  a  campaign. 


382  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

The  Guard  alone  did  not  conform  to  the  system  of 
regional  mobilization,  but  drew  its  effectives  from  all 
parts  of  the  kingdom. 

The  special  arms  and  various  services  received  their 
complement  of  men  from  the  whole  of  the  corps-region 
in  which  they  were  located. 

In  this  system,  the  calling  together  of  the  reservists 
to  the  headquarters  of  the  battalion  districts,  and  their 
dispatch  to  their  respective  regiments,  required  but  a  short 
space  of  time;  and  as  the  jnateriel  wa.s  always  ready  at 
the  mobilization-centres,  there  was  a  certainty  that  they 
would  meet  neither  obstacles  nor  embarrassments  of  any 
kind  while  en  route. 

The  assemblement  thus  took  place  without  friction, 
without  loss  of  time,  without  difficulty  of  any  kind. 

While  the  reservists  were  rejoining  their  regiments, 
it  was  necessary  to  proceed  to  the  formation  of  the  sup- 
plementary units. 

In  this  respect,  the  infantry  and  cavalry  had  only  to 
organize  their  depot  troops,  but  the  task  of  the  special 
arms  was  more  burdensome. 

The  artillery  was  obliged  to  prepare  its  munition 
columns,  its  parks,  and  its  depots  of  reserve  munitions. 

The  engineers,  their  bridge  equipage,  their  implement 
columns,  their  companies  of  pontoniers  and  sappers, 
their  railroad  and  telegraph  sections. 

The  train,  its  supply  columns,  its  sanitary  detach- 
ments, its  horse  depots,  ambulances,  etc. 

The  cadres  of  these  new  units  were  in  existence  in 
time  of  peace,  and  came  into  active  operation  at  the  very 
commencement  of  the  mobilization,  aiding  in  the  prep- 
aration of  their  respective  groups. 

When  the  various  commands  had  reached  their  full 
effective,  formed  their  depots,  and  organized  their  supple- 
mentary services,  their  mobilization  was  complete.  The 
time  required,  varied  according  to  the  arm  of  service.   In 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  383 

1866,  the  infantry  regiments  of  the  line  took  from  nine 
to  fonrteen  days  to  reach  a  war  footing  ;  those  of  the 
Guard,  from  fourteen  to  fifteen  days  ;  those  of  the  cav- 
alry, from  fifteen  to  seventeen  days  ;  and  the  artillery 
regiment  of  the  Guard,  twenty  days. 

Notwithstanding  the  rapidity  of  these  operations,  the 
improvements  brought  about  since  1866  still  further 
diminished  these  periods,  and  thenceforth  infantry  regi- 
ments required  but  from  seven  to  nine  days ;  cavalry, 
nine  to  eleven  days  ;  the  other  services,  fifteen  days. 

After  the  formation  of  the  field  forces,  came  that  of 
garrison  troops.  A  part  of  the  latter,  called  the  first 
augmentation^  were  designed  to  act  as  a  territorial  guard; 
of  the  remainder,  called  the  second  augmentation^  some 
were  to  take  the  field  with  the  active  army,  others  to 
maintain  the  communications,  while  others  still  were 
charged  with  the  defense  of  fortified  places.  They  were 
composed  of  landwehr  men.  These  were  summoned  to 
report  at  their  district  headquarters  while  the  last  de- 
tachments of  the  reservists  were  being  dispatched  to 
their  regiments.  They  were  immediately  formed  into 
battalions,  and  on  the  day  following  their  arrival,  put  in 
motion  toward  the  places  to  be  garrisoned  or  the  desig- 
nated points  of  concentration.  They  thus  passed  under 
the  authority  of  the  commanders  of  army  corps,  or  the 
governors- general  remaining  in  the  territory,  as  the  case 
might  be. 

Such  were  the  general  rules  of  mobilization  for  the 
North  German  troops  in  1870.  The  States  of  the  South 
had  adopted  the  same  system,  had  begun  to  apply  it, 
and  were  in  condition  to  pass  to  the  war  footing  with 
the  same  promptness. 

The  regulation  methods  were,  moreover,  to  receive 
an  unexpected  stimulus  by  the  meddlesome  instigation 
of  the  press  in  the  circulation  of  an  erroneous  account 
of  an  insult  to  the  King  of  Prussia,  by  our  ambassador, 


3S4  PART   FIRST.— STRATECA'. 

and  finally  from  the  popularity  of  a  war  against  a  people 
always  denominated  hereditary  enemies^  notwithstand- 
ing a  period  of  nearly  sixty  years  of  unbroken  peace. 

2XD. — MOBrLizATioisr  OF  1S70. 

Confederation  of  the  North. — In  1870,  the  precipitancy 
displayed  by  France  in  the  conduct  of  negotiations  pre- 
ceding hostilities,  resulted  in  the  almost  entire  suppres- 
sion of  the  period  called  preparation  for  icar.  It  was 
on  both  sides  supplanted  by  a  period  of  surprises,  due  in 
a  great  measure  to  the  declaration  of  July  6,  by  the  Corps 
Legislatif,  M'hich'had  for  immediate  consequences:  in 
France,  the  dispatch  of  warnings  to  various  military 
authorities  ;  in  Germany,  precautionary  measures*  and 
various  preparations,  entered  upon  Juh'  8. 

Members  of  the  landwehr  residing  in  foreign  countries 
were  recalled,  f 

The  purchase  of  horses  was  effected  in  Belgium.  Dat- 
ing from  the  loth,  military-  movements  were  taking  place 
in  Germany  on  all  sides.  Finally,  on  the  13th,  the  40th 
Regiment  of  Infantry,  garrisoned  at  Treves,  received 
orders  to  be  ready  to  move  in  twenty-four  hours.  | 

*  Declaration  of  the  King  of  Prussia  to  M.  Benedetti,  July  ii. 

t  Dispatch  of  the  Prefect  of  the  Boiiches-dii-Rhdne  to  the  Minister 
of  the  Interior,  July  lo.  An  order  for  mobilization  was  found  at  ]\Ietz 
upon  the  person  of  a  member  of  the  landwehr  of  the  VI.  Corps  who 
had  been  called  to  rendezvous  at  Breslau  on  July  9. 

X  Notwithstanding  these  preparations,  the  Prussian  general  staff  ob- 
ser%-es,  in  the  first  number  of  its  histor\-  of  the  war  (page  47),  that,  "on 
the  side  of  the  Germans,  no  measure  whatsoever  had  been  adopted 
looking  toward  war,"  "while  for  a  considerable  time  the  French  INIin- 
istry  of  War  displa^-ed  great  activity ;  that  all  dispositions  were  made 
for  railroad  transportation ;  that  considerable  supplies  of  forage  had 
been  accumulated ;  that  the  horses  placed  temporarily  in  the  hands 
of  farmers  had  been  recalled  to  the  artillery  regiments,"  etc. 

Here  is  the  truth  regarding  these  assertions  : 

The  order  relating  to  railroad  transportation  did  not  leave  the  Min- 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  385 

It  was,  "however,  on  the  night  of  15th  of  July,  that 
the  order  of  mobilization  was  sent  from  Berlin  and 
Carlsruhe  respectively,  to  the  different  authorities  of 
North  Germany  and  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Baden.* 

The  last  landwehr  districts  received  it  the  next  morn- 
ing. It  was  distributed  in  Bavaria  on  the  i6th,  and  in 
Wiirtemberg  on  the  19th. 

The  landwehr  districts  of  the  North  had  received  it 
early  enough  on  the  morning  of  the  i6th  to  immediately 
begin  the  operations  ordered  for  the  second  day,  that  is 

istry  of  War  until  July  15,  at  5  o'clock  in  the  evening,  the  day  after 
the  reserves  were  called  in.  It  was  in  the  form  of  a  letter  addressed 
in  these  terms  to  the  Minister  of  Public  Works  : 

"To  the  end  that  the  movement  of  troops  and  war  material  toward 
the  frontier  may  be  effected  as  rapidly  as  possible,  I  have  the  honor  to 
beg  Your  Excellency  to  be  kind  enough  to  request  the  railroad  com- 
panies to  promptly  respond  to  all  requisitions  which  may  be  addressed 
to  them  by  the  military  authorities  for  the  transportation  of  troops, 
horses,  material,  etc." 

With  reference  to  the  assertion  concerning  the  accumulation  of  for- 
age supplies,  it  had  no  foundation  save  the  fact  that  Intendant-Gen- 
eral  Blondeau  had,  on  July  7,  taken  upon  himself,  without  orders,  to 
have  siege  supplies  collected,  principally  of  wheat  and  floirr. 

As  to  the  return  to  the  army,  of  the  horses  let  out  to  farmers,  the 
order  for  this  was  not  given  until  9  p.  m.  of  the  i6th,  when  a  tele- 
graphic notice  was  sent  offering  a  premium  of  ten  francs  for  all  horses 
arriving  before  the  22d. 

The  only  measures  taken  in  France  before  the  declaration  of  war 
were  : 

1.  A  dispatch  addressed  to  the  Governor  of  Algeria,  on  July  8,  in- 
structing him  to  hold  his  troops  in  readiness  to  move  ; 

2.  Instruction  to  the  engineer  inspectors,  July  9,  regarding  the  in- 
spection of  the  fortified  places  of  the  Xorth-East ; 

3.  An  order  of  the  nth,  directing  the  generals  to  be  at  their  posts 
and  to  ascertain  if  the  recruiting  bureaus  had  the  orders  calling  out 
the  troops,  ready  for  forwarding  ; 

4.  An  order  of  the  12th,  calling  the  crews  of  the  fleet  into  active 
service. 

*The  27th  Infantry  at  Magdeburg,  and  the  65th  Infantry  at  Cologne 
received  it  on  the  night  of  the  15th.  The  35th  Infantry  (Brandenburg) 
received  it  on  the  following  day  at  6:30  a.  m.;  the  loSth  Infantry 
(Dresden),  at  6:15  a.  m.;  the  8th  Hussars  (Panderbom),  at  7:30  a.  m. 

25 


386  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

to  say,  the  acknowledgement  of  the  receipt  of  the  tele- 
graphic order,  the  communication  of  it  to  the  civil  and 
military  authorities  of  the  district  and  to  the  news- 
papers, and  the  summoning  of  the  reversists  and  land- 
wehr  men. 

While  the  various  permanent  bodies  prepared  for  the 
incorporation  of  the  reservists,  the  officers  of  garrison 
troops  received  the  order  to  present  themselves  on  the 
2ist  of  July,  and  the  men  of  the  different  classes  on  the 
19th,  20th  and  2ist. 

On  the  19th  of  July,  the  gathering  of  reservists  at 
their  respective  district  headquarters  began.  On  the 
same  date,  the  horses  were  taken  by  their  owners  to  the 
commissions  that  were  now  coming  into  activity. 

It  was  also  on  the  19th  that  the  first  detachments  of 
reservists  reached  their  regiments,  some  of  which  were 
ready  to  march  on  the  21st*  a  large  number  by  the 
23d,  and  the  majority  by  the  24th.  f  A  small  number 
of  others,  delayed  by  particular  circumstances,  finished 
their  mobilization  on  July  28  and  29.  One  regiment 
only,  the  40th  Infantry,  on  account  of  its  special  mission 
upon  the  frontier,  did  not  receive  its  last  complement  of 
men  until  August  2. 

The  rules  of  German  mobilization  were  obliged  to 
make  an  exception,  however,  in  the  case  of  the  contin- 
gents of  the  Rhenish  provinces.  The  proximity  to 
France  had  raised  the  fear  of  a  sudden  incursion,  which 
had  interfered  with  the  assemblements  of  the  reservists 
in  the  region  between  the  Rhine  and  the  Moselle.  In 
consequence,  the  pe7'-soiuiel  and  materiel  of  the  district 
headquarters  of  the  i6th  Infantry  Division,  and  its  re- 


*By  the  19th  of  July  there  were   in   France  only  13  departments 
which  had  summoned  their  reservists. 

t  On  the  24th  of  July  the  reservists  in  France  had  not  all  left  their 
homes. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  387 

servists  and  depots,  were  moved  back  upon  the  Rhine,  to 
effect  mobilization. 

Another  exception  was  made  in  case  of  the  reservists 
who  were  to  assemble  at  Sarrelonis.  It  was  decided  to 
incorporate  them  in  the  69tli  and  70th  Infantry  regi- 
ments which  were  stationed  there,  in  order  to  have  upon 
the  frontier  as  soon  as  possible,  two  completely  equipped 
bodies  of  troops. 

These  peculiar  circumstances  did  not,  however,  pre- 
vent the  VIII.  Corps  (Treves)  from  finishing  its  mobiliza- 
tion on  the  26th  of  July. 

Upon  the  other  frontiers,  there  were  no  changes.  In 
a  word,  the  military  organization  of  North  Germany  per- 
mitted her  to  place  her  infantry  upon  a  war  footing  in 
about  seven  days,  her  cavalry  in  ten,  and  her  artillery  in 
eleven. 

She  owed  these  remarkable  results  to  the  simplicity 
of  her  mobilization,  and  this  simplicity  to  the  system  of 
regional  recruitment. 

An  enumeration  of  the  field  effectives  of  her  various 
masses  on  31st  July,  will  give  an  idea  of  the  power  for 
action  at  her  command. 

Considered  separately,  the  tactical  units  reached  the 
following  figures: 

Infantry. 

NON- 
OFFICERS.      MEN.      COMBATANTS.      HORSES. 

Effective  of  a  company    .    .      5  249  3 

Effective  of  a  battalion    .    .    22  998  26                      34 

Effective  of  a  regiment    .    .    69  3,005  95                     121* 
Effective   of   a    battalion  of 

rifles 22  998  28                      40 


*  These  figures  represented  the  normal  formations,  exceptions  to 
which  were  very  rare. 


388 


PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 


Cavalry. 


NON- 
OFFICERS.      MEN.      COMBATANTS.      HORSES. 


Effective  of  a  squadron 
Effective  of  a  regiment 


Effective  of  a  brisfade  of  in- 


•      5 

150                  8 

170 

•    23 

602                   52 

706 

OFFICERS. 

TROOPS. 

HORSES. 

fautr)' 


140 


6,210* 


256 


OFFICERS. 
Effective  of  a  di\'ision  of  in- 

fantT)' ...    357 

Effective  of  an  ann}-  corps  .    816 


TROOPS.       HORSES.    PIECES. 


I5,234t 
33,429$ 


1,980 
9,647 


24 
84 


Taken  together,  tlie  mobilized  troops  of  the  Federal 
army  gave  on  August  i,  1S70,  the  effectives  shown  in 


the  following  tables : 


Army  of  the  Confederation  of  tlie  North  on  August  1,  1870. 

I.  Field  Troops. 


Staffs 

Infantry 

Cavalry- 

Artillery 

Engineers 

Trains      and      Administrative 
Services 

TOTAI^ 


OFFICERS. 

TROOPS.  !| 

HORSES. 

PIECES. 

805 
9,104 
1,840 
1,397 

371 

405 

6,512 

398,422 

52,320 

55,468 

15,950 

36,349 

7,075 
15,417 
56,480 
51,218 

6,901 

32,090 

1,284 

13,922 

57S, 

565,021 

943 

169,181 

1,284 

*  Tlie  non-combatants  are  included  in  this  figure,  as  in  the  French 
army. 

t  The  composition  of  the  infantry  di%'isious  not  being  uniform,  their 

effectives  varied,  but  between  narrow  limits. 
J  The  effectives  of  the  army  corps  were  not  always  tlie  same. 

II  This  column  comprehends  both  combatants  and  non-combatants. 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  389 

2.  Depot  Troops. 


Infantry    . 
Cavalry  .  . 
Artillery    . 
Engineers  . 
Trains.  .    . 

Totals 


OFFICERS. 

TROOPS. 

HORSES. 

PIECES. 

2,314 

380 

164 

52 

162 

148,776 

19,912 

10,362 

3,458 

8,249 

354 
16,912 

2,999 
2,821 

246 

3,072 

190,757 

23,086 

246 

193,829 

3.  Garrison  Troops. 


Temporary  Officials,  Inspec-  "I 

tors,  vStafFs,  etc / 

Infantry 

Cavalry 

Artillery,   /batteries 
•'       (,  Compani 
Engineers  .  . 


ipanies 


Totals 


OFFICERS. 

TROOPS.* 

HORSES. 

PIECES. 

1,190 

3,174 
276 

99 
722 

145 

10,619 

135-422 

7,848 

5,022 

38,598 

6,177 

580 

5,566 
8,472 
2,025 

493 

162 

5,606 

203,686 

17,136 

162 

209,292 

Recapitulation. 


Field  Troops  .  . 
Depot  Troops  .  . 
Garrison  Troops 


OFFICERS. 

TROOPS. 

HORSES. 

PIECES. 

13,922 

3,072 
5,606 

565,021 

190.757 
203,686 

169,181 
23,086 
17,136 

1,284 
246 
162 

22,600 

959,464 

209,403 

1,692 

982,064 

Totals  

Effective  of  the  rationnaires 
on  August  I 


States  of  the  South. — Mobilization  in  the  South  Ger- 


*  This  column  includes  both  combatants  and  non-combatants. 


390  PART  FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

man  States  was  completed  as  rapidly  as  in  the  Northern 
States.  Although  in  July  the  new  organization  of  their 
armies  was  not  quite  perfected,  plans  of  mobilization 
had  been  prepared,  and  the  passage  to  the  war  footing 
was  effected  without  difficulty.  Notwithstanding  the 
proximity  of  the  frontier,  the  district  commanders  re- 
mained at  their  posts,  ready,  however,  to  fall  back  at 
the  first  signal. 

Grand  Duchy  of  Baden. — This  State  furnish'ed  a  division 
of  field  troops  complete  in  all  arms  of  the  service,  com- 
prising: 

13  battalions  of  900  combatants  each; 

12  squadrons  of  about  150  combatants  each; 

9  batteries  of  6  pieces  each; 

1  company  of  pioneers. 

The  war  effective  of  this  division  reached: 
465  officers,  17,818  men,*  6,221  horses,  and  54  pieces. 
Its  depot  troops  formed: 

6  infantry  depot  commands,  corresponding  to  6  regi- 
ments; 

3  depot  squadrons,  corresponding  to  3  regiments; 

2  depot  batteries  of  6  pieces  each; 

I  detachment  of  pioneers. 

Their  effective  reached  147  officers,  5,936  men,  930 
horses,  12  pieces. 

Finally,  the  garrison  troops  comprised: 

II  battalions  of  infantry  of  1,000  combatants  each; 
I  squadron; 

9  companies  of  garrison  artillery,  and  6  guns. 
I  company  of  fortress  pioneers. 

*  The  Prussian  General  Staff  estimated  the  effective  of  this  division 
at  11,700  infantry,  and  1,800  cavalry,  figures  which  correspond  to  13 
battalions  of  900  combatants  each,  and  12  squadrons  of  150  each. 

But  in  order  to  present  the  effectives  of  the  two  armies  uniformly,  it 
is  necessary  to  include  here  the  artillery  and  engineer  troops,  the 
troops  of  accessory  services,  and,  in  brief,  all  the  rationnaires. 

This  rule  will  be  followed  throughout  the  remainder  of  this  work. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS. 


391 


A  total  for  the  garrison  troops  of  337  officers,  10,478 
men,  887  horses,  and  6  pieces. 

The  entire  mobilized  forces  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of 
Baden  were,  therefore,  as  follow: 

Army  of  Baden  on  August  1,  1870. 

Field  Troops. 


Staffs  .  .  . 
Infantry  . 
Cavalry  .  • 
Artillery  . 
Engineers  . 
Trains    .    . 

ToTAivS 


OFFICERS. 

ICROOPS. 

HORSES. 

PIECES. 

15 
298 

69 

57 

7 

19 

150 

12,108 

1,962 

2,177 

272 

1,149 

250 

507 
2,121 
2,046 

134 
1,163 

54 

465 

17,818 

6,221 

54 

18,283 

Depot   Troops. 


Infantry    . 
Cavalry  .  . 
Artillery    . 
Engineers  . 
Trains    .    . 

TOXAI^S 


OFFICERS. 

TROOPS. 

HORSES. 

PIECES. 

114 

17 
8 
2 

6 

4,500 
600 
302 

133 
401 

8 

639 
137 

146 

12 

147 

5,936 

930 

12 

6,083 

Garrison  Troops. 


Staffs  .*.   . 

Infantry  . 
Cavalry  .  . 
Artillery  . 
Engineers  . 

ToTAi^ 


OFFICERS. 

TROOPS. 

HORSES. 

PIECES. 

30 

251 

4 
48 

4 

187 
8,786 

104 
1,200 

201 

50 
402 

113 
264 

6 

337 

10,478 

887 

6 

10,815 

392 


PART  FIRST. — STRATEGY. 


Recapitulation. 


Field  Troops 

Depot  Troops 

Garrison  Troops 

ToTAi^S   . 

'Effective  of  rationnaires  on  ist 
August 


OEFICERS. 

TROOPS. 

HORSES. 

PIECES. 

54 
12 

6 

465 

147 
337 

17,818 

5,936 

10,478 

6,221 
930 

887 

949 

34,232 

8,038 

72 

35,181 

Kingdom  of  Wiirtemberg. — This  State  likewise  furnished 
a  division,  counting  all  arms  of  the  service  in  the  fol- 
lowing proportions: 

15  battalions  of  infantry  and  rifles,  each  numbering 
about  1,000  combatants; 

10  squadrons  of  about  150  combatants  each; 

9  batteries  of  6  pieces  each; 

2  companies  of  pioneers. 

The  effective  of  this  field  division  reached  524  officers, 
21,950  men,  6,868  horses,  and  54  pieces. 
The  depot  and  garrison  troops  comprised: 
8  battalions,  4  of  them  of  the  active  army; 
6  depot  squadrons; 

3  depot  batteries,  with  12  field  pieces; 

4  garrison  batteries; 

I  company  of  engineers; 
I  division  of  depot  pioneers; 
Depot  personnel  for  each  regiment. 
A  total  of  339  officers,  14,367  men,  2,008  horses,  and 
12  pieces. 
The  war  forces  of  Wiirtemberg  were  then  as  follow: 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS. 


393 


Army  of  Wurtemberg  on  August  1,  1870. 

Field  Troops. 


Staffs 

Infantry 

Cavalry 

Artillery 

Engineers 

Trains  and  Administrative  Ser- 
vices  

ToTAi^s  .  c 


OFFICERS. 

TROOPS. 

HORSES. 

PIECES. 

26 
342 
59 
48 
19 

30 

198 

15,564 

1,635 

1,878 

822 

1,853 

225 
720 

1,765 
1,678 

413 
2,057 

54 

524 

21,950 

6,868 

54 

22,474 

Depot  and  Garrison  Troops. 


Staffs 

Infantry \ 

Cavalry 

Artillery \ 

Engineers \ 

ToTAi^S 


OFFICERS. 

TROOPS. 

HORSES. 

PIECES. 

48 

404 

70 

182 

8,602 

360 

44 

2,052 

36 

981 

1,059 

19 

611 
900 

519 

12 

2 

84 

4 

201 

8 

532 

339 

14,367 

2,008 

12 

14,706 

Recapitulation. 


Field  Troops 

Depot  and  Garrison  Troops    . 

TOTAI^S 

Total  rationnaires  on  August 
ist 


OFFICERS. 

TROOPS. 

HORSES. 

PIECES. 

524 
339 

21,950 
14,367 

6,868 
2,008 

54 
12 

863 

36,317 

8,876 

66 

37,180 

394  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Kingdom  of  Bavaria. — Bavaria  upon  the  war  footing  was 
able  to  form  two  army  corps  complete  in  all  arms,  with 
the  following  elements: 

50  battalions  of  infantry  and  rifles,  of  about  1,000 
combatants  each; 

40  squadrons  of  about  135  combatants  each; 

32  batteries  of  6  pieces  each; 

6  companies  of  pioneers. 

Their  effective  reached  1,778  officers,  71,345  men, 
19,381  horses,  and  192  pieces. 

The  depot  troops  formed  in  addition: 

16  battalions; 

10  companies  of  rifles.  * 

10  squadrons; 

8  batteries  with  3  field  pieces  each; 

2  companies  of  engineers. 

Total  effective:  486  officers,  30,193  men,  2,992  horses, 
24  pieces. 

There  remained  besides,  for  the  garrison  troops: 

24  battalions,  8  of  which  were  infantry  of  the  line, 
with  650  combatants  each,  and  later  819; 

I  detachment  of  cavalry  (about  ^  of  a  squadron); 

16  batteries; 

4  companies  of  engineers; 

In  all  ']^']  officers,  24,385  men,  and  1,683  horses. 

The  mobilization  required  some  changes.  In  the 
Palatinate,  the  Zweibriicken  district  called  its  reservists 
to  Spire.  The  others  formed  in  their  own  districts,  ready 
to  retire  in  case  of  attack.  Those  depots  formed  in  ex- 
posed places  were  moved  to  the  rear. 

The  total  Bavarian  effective  upon  a  war  footing  was 
composed  as  follows: 

*The  regulation  effective  of  the  infantry  units  was  higher  than  in 
Prussia,  and  was  soon  to  be  still  further  increased. 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS. 


395 


Bavarian  Army  on  August  1, 1870. 

Field  Troops. 


Staffs 

Infantry 

Cavalry 

Artillery 

Engineers 

Trains  and  Administrative  Ser- 
vices   

ToTAi^ 


OFFICERS. 

TROOPS. 

HORSES . 

PIECES. 

89 

1,160 

200 

228 

45 
•56 

702 

52,537 

5,614 

6,970 

1,021 

4,501 

795 
2,045 
5,940 
7,032 

901 

2,668 
19,381 

192 

1,778 

71,345 

192 

73-123 

Depot  Troops. 


Infantry    . 
Cavalry  .  . 

Artillery    . 
Engineers  . 
Trains    .    . 

TOTAI^ 


OFFICERS. 

TROOPS. 

HORSES. 

PIECES. 

328 
50 
60 

32 
16 

23,676 

2,400 

2,224 

1,301 

592 

48 
1,760 

635 
428 
121 

24 

4S6 

30,193 

2,992 

24 

30,679 

Garrison   Troops 


Staffs  .  .  . 
Infantry  . 
Cavalry  .  . 
Artillery  . 
Engineers  . 

TOTAI^ 


OFFICERS. 

TROOPS. 

HORSES. 

PIECES. 

171 

515 

3 

68 

20 

1,000 

18,400 

90 

3,915 
980 

310 
960 
100 
309 

4 

777 

24,385 

1,683 

25,562 

396 


PART  FIRST. — STRATEGY. 
Recapitulation. 


Field  Troops 

Depot  Troops 

Garrison  Troops 

Tol^Ai^S 

Total  rationnaires  on  August 
1st  ....    .    


office;rs. 

TROOPS. 

HORSKS. 

PIECEIS. 

1,778 
486 

777 

71,345 
30,193 
24,385 

19,381 
2,992 
1,683 

192 

24 

3,041 

125,923 

24,056 

216 

128,964 

The  total  forces  of  the  South  German  States  upon  the 


war  footing  were  thus: 


Baden  .  .  . 
Wiirtenaberg 
Bavaria  .  .    . 

T0TAI3 


OPMCERS. 

MEN. 

HORSES. 

PIECES. 

949 
863 

3,041 

34,232 

36,317 

125,923 

196,472 

8,038 

8,876 

24,056 

72 

66 

216 

4,853 

40,970 

354 

Finally,  a  general  recapitulation  of  the  forces  of  the 
North  and  South  German  States  mobilized  by  August 
I,  1870,  gives  the  following  figures  : 


General  EflPective  of  the  German  Armies  August  1, 1870. 

Field  Troops. 


North  .  .  .  . 
Bavaria  .  .  . 
Wiirtemberg 
Baden    .    .    . 

TOTAI^ 


OFFICERS. 

TROOPS. 

HORSES. 

PIECES. 

13,922 

1,778 

524 

465 

565,021 

71,345 
21,950 
17,818 

169,181 

19,381 
6,868 
6,221 

1,284 
192 

54 
54 

16,689 

676,134 

201,651 

1,584 

692,823 

THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS. 

Depot  Troops. 


397 


North  .... 
Bavaria  .  .    .    . 
Wiirtemberg  * 
Baden    ... 

Totals  . 


OFFICERS. 

TROOPS. 

HORSFS. 

PIFCFS, 

3,072 
486 

339 
147 

190,757 

30,193 

14,367 

5,936 

241,253 

23,086 

2,992 

2,008 

930 

246 
24 
12 

12 

4,044 

29,016 

294 

245,297 

Garrison  Troops. 


North    , 
Bavaria 
Baden . 


TOTAI^ 


OFFICFRS. 

TROOPS. 

HORSES. 

PIECES. 

5,606 

777 
337 

203,686 

24,385 
10,478 

17,136 
1,683 

887 

162 
6 

6,720 

238,549 

19,706 

168 

245,269 

General  Recapihdation. 


Field  Troops  .  . 
Depot  Troops  . 
Garrison  Troops 


MEN. 

HORSES. 

PIECES. 

692,823 

245,297 
245,269 

201,651 
29,016 
19,706 

1,584 
294 
168 

1,183,389 

250,373 

2,046 

Grand  Totai,  on  August  i  .   . 

The  general  effective  of  the  German  army  comprised, 
then: 

1,183,389  men  and  250,373  horses. 

It  is  worthy  of  note  that  the  number  of  really  mobile 
troops,  that  is  to  say,  those  put  on  a  complete  war  foot- 
ing, and  furnished  with  all  accessories,  very  much  ex- 
ceeded that  of  the  field  army.  The  garrison  troops, 
even,  included  a  certain  number  of  mobile  troops.  The 
following  table  shows  the  composition  of  the  effective 
from  this  point  of  view: 

*The  garrison  troops  are  here  included. 


398 


PART  FIRST. — STRATEGY. 


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THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  399 

II.— Mobilization  of  the  French  Army  in  1870. 

1ST.   MODE  OF  CALLING  OUT  THE  RESERVES. 

In  France,  before  1870,  it  was  customary  to  effect  the 
calling  out  of  the  reserves  and  the  formation  of  the 
armies  simultaneously. 

At  the  same  time  that  one  order  returned  the  men  of 
the  reserve  and  of  the  second  portion  to  the  colors, 
another  directed  the  various  permanent  bodies  toward 
the  frontier,  and  grouped  them  according  to  a  table  pre- 
pared in  advance.  This  system,  which  had  its  advan- 
tages when  it  was  a  question  of  assembling  an  army  of 
only  100,000  men,  exposed  the  country  to  serious  com- 
plications when  it  was  necessary  to  put  the  whole  of  the 
national  forces  upon  a  war  footing  within  three  or  four 
weeks.  These  defects,  taken  in  connection  with  the 
feebleness  of  our  effectives,  placed  us  in  presence  of  the 
Germans  in  a  dangerous  condition  of  inferiority. 

There,  however,  existed  precise  rules  for  calling  out 
the  reserves,  and  through  the  influence  of  the  feeling 
which,  since  1866,  had  been  aroused  over  the  condition 
of  foreign  affairs,  instructions  in  the  matter  had  been 
changed  and  improved. 

Modification  of  1868. — On  September  9,  1868,  about  six 
months  after  the  promulgation  of  the  law  which  had 
just  created  the  garde  mobile^  Marshal  Niel,  then  Min- 
ister of  War,  addressed  to  the  military  authorities  new 
instructions  for  their  guidance  in  case  of  war. 

They  radically  changed  existing  regulations,  suppress- 
ing the  intervention  of  the  sub-intendants  and  the  pre- 
fects in  the  work  of  sending  notifications  to  the  reserv- 
ists of  the  time  and  place  of  assembly. 

Before  this,  the  commandant  of  the  recruiting  bureau 
sent  the  list  of  reservists  to  the  sub-intendant,  who  pre- 
pared the  orders  and  sent  them  to  the  prefect.   The  latter 


400  PART  FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

classified  these  orders  by  parishes,  and  dispatched  them 
by  post  to  the  mayors  of  each  canton.  The  mayors  for- 
warded them  to  those  interested.  This  was  a  very  long 
procedure,  especially  in  populous  centres.  At  Lille,  for 
example,  the  sub-intendant  was  obliged  to  make  out 
5,000  such  orders. 

Again,  the  mayors  and  prefects  were  far  from  offering 
the  same  guaranties  as  the  military  authorities  for  the 
accomplishment  of  the  work. 

Beginning  with  1868,  the  recruiting  bureau  replaced 
the  sub-intendancy,  and  the  gendarinerie  supplied  the 
places  of  the  civil  authorities.  The  suppression  of 
three  intermediaries,  while  simplifying  the  operation, 
abridged  by  six  or  eight  days  the  time  elaj)sing  between 
the  dispatch  of  the  summonses  and  the  arrival  of  the 
reservists.  Thenceforth  the  passage  to  the  war  footing 
was  to  occasion  the  following  operations: 

Enrollme7it  in  the  Reserve.  — Upon  the  completion  of 
the  soldier's  service  with  the  colors,  his  corps  com- 
mander forwarded  his  certificate  of  enrollment  to  the 
commandant  of  the  recruiting  bureau,  who  placed  his 
name  upon  the  muster-rolls,  and  prepared  his  order  of 
individual  summons,  in  anticipation  of  the  calling  out 
of  the  reserves.  These  summonses  were  kept  ready,  and 
required  only  to  be  dated  and  sent  out. 

Calling  out  the  Reserves. — Immediately  upon  the  dec- 
laration of  war  by  the  Chambers,  two  general  move- 
ments took  place,  extending  over  the  entire  country;  one 
for  the  calling  out  of  the  reserves,  the  other  for  the  for- 
mation of  the  army.  The  first  movement  embraced 
three  stages:  ist,  from  the  man's  home  to  the  recruiting 
station;  2d,  from  the  recruiting  station  to  the  corps  de- 
pot; 3d,  from  the  depot  to  the  frontier.  The  second 
movement,  or  that  relating  to  the  formation  of  the  army, 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  401 

included  only  the  transportation  of  the  troops  from  the 
garrison  places  to  the  frontier. 

Operations  Attending  the  Calling  in  of  Reserves. — The  order 
calling-  to  active  service  was  sent  by  telegraph  direct 
from  the  War  Ministry  to  the  military  authorities,  to 
the  prefects,  and  to  the  commandants  of  recruiting 
bureaus. 

Then  followed: 

The  Dispatch  of  SiLirwionses  to  the  Members  of  the 
Reserve. — The  individual  muster  orders  prepared  in 
advance,  and  arranged  by  classes  and  categories,  were 
dated  and  signed  by  the  commandant  of  the  bureau; 
then  transmitted  to  the  commander  of  the  gendannei'ie., 
who,  arranging  them  by  cantons  and  parishes,  placed 
them  in  the  hands  of  the  gendarmes  charged  with  their 
speedy  distribution  to  the  individual  reserve  men. 

Formation  and  Forwarding  of  Detachments. — This 
order  indicated  to  the  soldier  of  the  reserve,  the  day  on 
which  he  was  to  report  at  the  department  rendezvous. 
The  dates  were  so  calculated  as  to  avoid  all  delay. 

The  reserve  men  once  assembled  at  the  rendezvous, 
were  formed  into  detachments  under  direction  of  the 
officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  sent  from  the 
regiments  to  receive  them,  reviewed,  and  forwarded  by 
rail  to  their  depots. 

Incorporation  of  the  Reservists  and  Dispatch  to  their 
Regiments. — Upon  reaching  the  depots,  these  men  were 
incorporated,  clothed,  equipped,  armed,  and  sent  as  rap- 
idly as  possible  to  their  regiments,  under  conduct  of  the 
non-commissioned  officers  of  their  respective  groups. 

These  operations,  very  simple  so  far  as  the  military 
authorities  were  concerned,  in  execution  produced  many 
26 


402  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

complications,  caused  by  the  dispersion  of  the  active 
forces,  the  reserves,  and  the  magazines  over  the  entire 
territory. 

Inconveniences  of  the  System. — The  conspicuous  feature  of 
this  system  was  the  wide  dispersion  of  the  different  ele- 
ments to  be  grouped  together  on  the  day  of  danger.  This 
peculiarity,  however,  had  its  reason. 

There  was  a  benefit  in  composing  regiments  of  men 
of  equal  physical  aptitude,  in  that  by  such  an  arrange- 
ment was  obtained  a  homogeneity  which  imparted  co- 
hesion to  the  troops. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  change  of  station  almost  always 
separated  the  troops  from  their  depots. 

In  consequence  of  these  changes,  a  regiment  stationed 
in  the  North  might  have  its  depot  in  the  South,  and  re- 
ceive its  contingents  from  the  East,  the  West,  or  the 
South-West.  *  In  this  case,  the  calling  out  of  the  reserves 
would  occasion  numerous  unnecessary  journeys:  the  de- 
tachments, converging  first  toward  the  south,  would 
surge  back  again  toward  the  north  or  toward  the  frontier. 
These  cross-movements  applied  to  all  the  various  bodies 
of  troops  without  exception.  Those  regiments  which 
were  at  their  proper  depots  upon  the  breaking  out  of  the 
war,  had  to  submit  to  these  influences  also,  for  when  the 
reservists  had  begun  to  arrive  at  the  depots,  the  active 
portions  were  already  in  the  zone  of  concentration. 

Some  of  the  infantry  regiments  were  at  considerable 
distances  from  their  depots.  The  32d,  sent  to  Chalons, 
in  1870,  had  its  depot  at  Ajaccio;  that  of  the  86th,  then 
at  Lyons,  was  at  Saint-Malo;  that  of  the  13th,  at 
Bethune,  was  at  Romans;  of  the  i6th,  at  Setif,  was  at 
Puy;  of  the  98th,  at  Dunkirk,  was  at  Lyons;  and  that 

*This  rule  for  the  distribution  of  the  contingent  is  still  followed. 
A  regiment  in  the  vicinity  of  Paris,  for  example,  receives  its  recruits 
from  Brittany,  from  the  North,  and  from  the  Eastern  frontier. 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  403 

of  the  17th,  at  Lyons,  was  at  Foix,  etc.  But  it  was 
especially  the  wide  distribution  of  the  members  of  the 
reserve  to  all  points  of  the  country,  which  caused  the 
greatest  delay  and  embarrassment.  It  first  of  all  imposed 
a  considerable  increase  of  work  upon  the  recruiting 
bureaus,  and  obliged  them  to  form  an  excessively  large 
number  of  detachments,  a  systematic  account  of  which 
could  be  kept  only  with  the  greatest  difficulty.  That 
of  the  Guard,  for  example,  had  47  of  these:  28  of  the 
first  portion  and  19  of  the  second. 

These  movements  took  place  at  the  same  time  in  86 
recruiting  bureaus,  and  extended  to  all  the  various  units. 
Three  or  four  thousand  detachments  were  spread  over 
the  surface  of  the  country,  obstructing  the  communica- 
tions, crossing  each  other's  paths  at  every  turn,  and 
coming  into  collision  at  the  railway  stations,  at  first  with 
the  masses  of  troops  directed  toward  the  frontier,  then 
with  the  materiel — wagons,  horses,  munitions,  and  sup- 
plies— converging  from  the  regional  or  other  depots 
toward  the  point  of  army  formation. 

From  all  this  there  resulted  inevitable  disorders,  still 
further  increased  by  the  wanton  conduct  of  many  of  the 
men  in  abandoning  their  detachments,  and  wandering 
in  bands  around  the  large  railway  stations,  living  on 
charity,  escaping  from  all  proper  authority,  and  setting 
their  comrades  a  pernicious  example. 

Under  these  circumstances,  nothing  was  more  uncer- 
tain than  the  execution  of  the  orders  calling  forth  the 
reserves;  and  it  was  quite  as  difficult  to  calculate  in  ad- 
vance the  time  necessary  for  this  operation  as  to  foretell 
the  resulting  deficiencies  in  the  effectives. 

And  yet  the  circumstances  of  these  war  movements 
had  been  thoroughly  considered  by  the  government. 

It  was  calculated  that  from  the  time  of  sending  the 
order  for  mobilization,  an  average  of  five  days  would 
be  necessary  for  the  reception  of  the  individual  sum- 


404  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

monses,  seven  days  for  fhe  men  to  put  themselves  en 
route  and  reacli  their  depots;  three  days  to  arm  and 
equip  themselves  and  to  join  their  regiments.  Two  ad- 
ditional days  were  allowed  in  case  of  the  recruits  of  the 
second  portion. 

This  period  of  fifteen  days  in  passing  to  a  war  footing 
seemed  a  large  enough  estimate,  but  it  proved  every- 
where insufficient.  This  arose  from  the  fact  that  no  one 
could  appreciate  in  advance  the  scope  of  the  exceptional 
situations  which  an  unexpected  declaration  of  war,  and 
the  sudden  displacement  of  all  the  forces  in  the  country, 
were  to  create.  One  example  will  suffice  to  make  this 
clear. 

The  reserve  men  of  the  2d  regiment  of  Zouaves,  living 
in  the  North,  were  obliged  to  proceed  to  Marseilles,  and 
from  there  to  Oran,  then  to  return  to  Marseilles,  and 
finally  to  rejoin  their  regiment  in  the  East,  thus  travel- 
ing 2,000  kilometres  [1,200  miles]  by  rail,  and  making 
two  sea  voyages,  of  three  days,  before  reaching  their 
post.  The  length  of  time  consumed  in  their  numerous 
journeys,  and  the  variations  in  their  effectives,  must 
necessarily  have  escaped  all  forecasts. 

In  consequence  of  this  system,  regiments  en  route  to 
their  place  of  formation  often  encountered  their  reserve 
detachments  going  in  opposite  directions. 

In  case  of  defeat,  it  was  probable  that  the  active  por- 
tions would  be  obliged  to  change  their  positions  before 
having  received  their  reserves,  and  that  the  latter  would 
never  succeed  in  finding  them. 

Indeed,  this  actually  happened.  On  July  18,  1870, 
a  detachment  of  the  53d  regiment  of  the  line,  leaving 
Lille  to  rejoin  its  regiment  at  Belfort,  arrived  at  the  de- 
pot at  Gap  on  the  28th,  having  still  five  days'  journey 
to  make  on  foot;  remained  there  until  August  30th;  was 
stopped  at  Lyons  because  the  location  of  its  proper  regi- 
ment was  no  longer  known;  was  directed  upon  Orleans  in 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  405 

the  first  days  of  October  to  assist  in  the  formation  of  the 
27th  marching  regiment  {regwient  de  marche);  arrived 
there  on  the  nth,  and  was  forced  into  battle  before  even 
having  fonnd  its  new  colors.  Setting  out  on  the  i8th 
of  Jnly,  it  did  not  enter  the  line  until  three  months 
afterwards,  and  during  this  time,  the  53d,  for  which  it 
was  at  first  destined,  had  disappeared  in  the  storm. 

Forming  the  Armies  Upon  the  Frontier. — To  the  inherent 
difficulties  attending  the  calling  forth  of  the  reserves, 
were  to  be  added  those  arising  from  the  assemblement 
of  the  troops  upon  the  frontier.  This  operation  gave 
rise  to  measures  of  preparation  and  of  execution. 

ist.  Preparatory  Measures — A  table  showing  the  com- 
position of  the  army  was  drawn  up  by  the  Ministry  a 
few  days  before  the  declaration  of  war,  simultaneously 
with  the  preparation  of  the  orders  for  the  movements  of 
the  various  bodies  of  troops,  and  the  service  letters  for 
the  generals,  intendants,  etc. 

2d,  Aleasiires  of  Execution. — The  dispatch  of  the 
orders  for  the  various  movements  followed  the  issuance 
of  those  calling  out  the  reserves.  The  generals,  the  staff 
officers,  and  other  officers  absent  from  their  commands, 
repaired  individually  to  the  frontier,  to  the  points  indi- 
cated for  the  concentration,  while  the  regiments  returned 
to  the  depots  those  men  not  fit  for  service,  completed 
their  war  cadres.^  their  supplies  of  provisions  and  muni- 
tions, and  proceeded  by  rail  or  on  foot  to  the  points 
designated,  where  they  found  their  generals,  received 
orders,  and  were  grouped  into  brigades,  divisions,  etc. 

Difficulties  of  these  Formations. — There  came  a  time,  then, 
when  the  grand  units  seemed  formed,  while  in  reality 
they  had  hardly  begun  to  arrange  their  administrative 


4o6  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

services,  to  receive  their  reserves,  their  complements  of 
horses,  their  means  of  transportation,  and  their  field 
mnnitions  and  supplies. 

From  that  moment,  control  of  the  time  necessary  for 
their  final  organization,  in  part  at  least,  slipped  from 
the  hands  of  the  leaders,  and  lodged  principally  with 
the  central  administration,  which  alone  possessed  the 
power  of  giving  orders  in  the  interior.  But  this  office 
was  frequently  intrusted  at  the  last  hour  to  a  new 
minister  little  acquainted  with  the  requirements  of  the 
occasion,  the  resources  at  disposal,  and  generally  the 
means  to  be  used  to  finish  the  work  commenced;  and 
thus  additional  complications  arose. 

In  presence  of  forces  mobilized  after  the  manner  of 
the  Germans,  and  sure  to  be  ready  for  battle  within 
eighteen  days,  our  army  was  exposed  to  surprise  and 
attack  in  the  midst  of  the  period  of  formation,  without 
sufficient  preparation,  without  cohesion,  and  perhaps 
even  without  its  war  effectives. 

Such  was  the  mechanism  of  the  passage  to  the  war 
footing.  A  recital  of  its  details  no  doubt  suggests  pain- 
ful reflections,  but  it  is  still  more  distressing  to  think 
that  the  dangers  to  which  it  exposed  the  country  had  in 
vain  been  pointed  out  by  several  generals  who  foresaw 
the  terrible  catastrophies  in  the  midst  of  which  the 
efforts  of  their  soldiers  would  prove  powerless. 

2D.    PASSAGE  TO   A   WAR   FOOTING. 

The  Order  Calling  to  Active  Service  ;  and  New  Formations. — 
On  July  14,  1870,  war  having  been  decided  upon  in  min- 
isterial council,  a  telegraphic  order  was  issued  at  4:40 
p.  M. ,  calling  into  active  service  the  recruits  of  the  2d 
portion  and  the  soldiers  of  the  reserve,  * 


*On  Jul}'  I,  these  contingents,  numbering  173,507,  were  composed 
as  follow  : 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  407 

If  this  order  had  stood  by  itself,  its  execution  would 
have  been  relatively  easy;  but  it  was  trammeled  by  other 
measures,  for  the  most  part  improvised  to  create  new 
formations. 

The  next  day,  July  15,  in  receiving-  notification  of  the' 
calling  out  of  the  reserves  and  of  the  volume  of  work 
falling  upon  their  depots,  the  infantry  colonels  were 
ordered  to  forma  fourth  battalion  of  four  companies,  and 
to  prepare  the  cadres  of  two  companies  designed  to  be 
kept  at  the  depots.  According  to  this  plan,  the  infantry 
regiments  were  to  be  thus  composed  :  ist,  of  an  active 
portion  ready  to  proceed  to  the  east,  with  three  battalions 
of  six  companies  each;  2d,  of  a  fourth  battalion  of  four 
companies;  3d,  of  a  depot  battalion  of  two  companies. 
The  active  portion  counted  in  its  ranks  the  men  with 
the  colors  and  the  reserves  called  in,  that  is  to  say,  a 
contingent  of  conscripts  of  eight  months'  service,  re- 
serve contingents  unpracticed  in  the  use  of  the  new  rifle, 
and  five  small  contingents  of  drilled  men. 

The  fourth  battalions  were  to  receive  only  reserve  men 
of  the  2d  poj^tion.     These  had  served  but  five  months. 

On  the  15th  of  July  a  new  order  directed  infantry 
regiments  to  place  all  disposable  men  in  their  active 
battalions. 

On  the  i6th,  \\\^  garde  nationale -mobile  of  the  ist,  2d, 

Soldiers  of  Recruits  of 

Classes.                       the  Reserve.  the  2d  portion.  Total. 

1863 26,071  33>567  59,638 

1864 30,000  no  30,110 

1865 3,962  54  4,016 

1866 917        ,  23,372  24,289 

1867 299  25,989  26,288 

1868 133  29,033  29,166 

Totals 61,382  112,125  i73,507 

The  men  of  the  2d  portion  of  the  1S64  and  1865  classes  had  been 
called  to  active  duty  on  May  20  and  June  15,  1867. 


408  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

and  3d  coprs  d^ aj'-mee'^  was  called  to  active  duty,  and 
the  men  were  assembled  at  the  department  rendezvous. 
Another  decree  organized  a  depot  cadre  in  each  artillery 
regiment  and  train. 

On  the  17th,  the  call  to  active  service  was  extended  to 
the  other  army  corps,  and  instructions  given  to  make 
enlistments  for  the  entire  period  of  the  war. 

On  the  i8th,  it  was  decided  to  form  regiments  of 
garde  mobile  with  two,  three,  and  four  battalions,  com- 
manded by  lieutenant-colonels.  The  decree  urged  the 
ultimate  creation  of  brigades  of  two  or  three  regiments 
of  garde  mobile^  and  of  divisions  of  two  brigades  en- 
trusted to  generals  on  the  reserve  list.  At  the  same 
time  the  provisional  composition  of  the  artillery  of  the 
garde  mobile  was  fixed  at  six  batteries. 

On  the  19th  a  new  decree  prescribed  the  organization 
of  the  regiments  de  77iafche  from  the  fourth  battalions, 
three  to  each. 

On  the  20th  appeared  the  order  calling  to  the  colors 
the  contingent  of  1870,  which  was  estimated  at  140,000 
men.  On  the  24th  was  ordered  the  formation  of  six  pro- 
visional regiments  of  garde  mobile^  from  the  eighteen 
existing  battalions. 

On  the  26th  an  imperial  ordinance  authorized  the  for- 
mation of  foreign  battalions;  another  placed  the  customs 
corps  at  the  disposal  of  the  Minister  of  War. 

Finally,  on  July  28,  the  organization  of  the  companies 
oi  ^o\w\\\.&^x  francs-tireiirs  was  decreed.  These,  during 
the  continuance  of  the  war,  were  upon  the  same  footing 
as  the  regular  troops. 

The  majority  of  these  decrees,  which  were  designed 
to  be  executed  at  the  depots,  had  the  effect  of  increasing 
the    difficulties.      However,    on    the  night   of  July  14, 


*  France  and  Algeria  were  then  divided  into  seven  grand  commands, 
called  corps  d'armec. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  409 

these  complications  had  not  yet  appeared.  It  was  not 
until  the  morning  of  the  15th  that  the  recruiting  bureaus 
began  the  task  of  dispatching  the  individual  summonses. 
Commencing  on  the  i8th,  the  movement  was  continued 
without  interruption  until  the  28th,  in  the  midst  of 
divers  embarrassments. 

On  the  first  day,  three  departments  only,  the  North, 
the  Cantal,  and  the  Cher,  forwarded  their  reserves,  to  the 
number  of  7,889  men. 

On  the  succeeding  days,  the  departures  took  place  at 
the  following  rate: 

July  19 10  departments  forwarded  14,331  men. 

July  20 .16  "  "  25,077 

July  21 15  "  "  22,597 

July  22 23  "  "  45,542 

July  23 14  "  "  22,629 

July  24 3  "  "  5,471 

From  July  25  to  July  28  .    .    5  "  "  21,484 

All  these  movements  give  a  total  of  163,020  men,  a 
force  less  by  io,-487  men  than  the  number  set  down  on 
the  list  of  effectives  on  July  i.  It  had  taken  ten  days 
to  put  the  troops  en  route.  The  recruiting  bureaus  which 
had  been  the  longest  delayed  were  those  of  Ille-et- 
Vilaine,  which  terminated  operations  on  July  25;  of  the 
Loire  and  of  Corsica,  which  finished  on  July  26;  and  of 
the  C6tes-du-Nord,  which  required  until  the  28th.  The 
journe5's  of  the  men  called  out  were  made  by  rail,  or 
on  foot'  when  their  points  of  destination  did  not  lie  on 
the  railroads.  Certain  groups  had  thus  a  march  of  sev- 
eral days  to  make.  The  greater  portion,  placed  under  a 
garrison  officer  or  a  non-commissioned  officer  of  the  re- 
serve, reached  their  destination  without  loss  of  time. 
But  this  was  not  the  case  with  all;  for,  from  the  19th, 
the  obstruction  at  the  railway  stations  of  the  Eastern 
svstem  began,  and  the  confusion  increased  more  and 
more  to  the  end  of  the  month. 


4IO  PART   FIRST, — STRATEGY. 

At  certain  points,  individual  men  who  had  left  their 
detachments  on  various  pretexts,  added  still  further  to 
the  embarrassment  of  the  railroads.  At  other  points, 
the  soldiers  who  presented  themselves  at  the  ticket  offices 
without  regular  requisitions  were  refused  tickets,  and 
in  consequence  forced  to  wander  about  the  stations  with- 
out order  or  direction. 

Condition  of  AflFairs  at  the  Depots. — In  the  depots  the  re- 
servists found,  as  a  rule,  clothing,  shoes,  and  arms,  in 
sufficient  quantities.  But  the  equipage  was  not  always 
adequate  to  supply  all  wants.  The  camp  equipage  espe- 
cially left  much  to  be  desired.  The  demands  made  upon 
the  central  administration  toward  the  end  of  July, 
showed  that  a  great  number  of  corps  magazines  had  not 
been  sufficiently  supplied  in  this  regard. 

When  the  reserves  joined  their  depots,  the  authorities 
there  were  already  overburdened  by  the  multiplex 
minutiae  of  mobilization.  Independent  of  putting  the 
active  battalions  upon  a  war  footing,  the  details  of  which 
fell  in  great  part  upon  them,  they  had  to  arrange  for  the 
formation  of  the  fourth  battalions,  create  the  two  com- 
panies composing  them,  prepare  the  enlistment  papers 
of  volunteers,  etc.  To  add  still  further  to  the  incon- 
veniences of  the  situation,  the  reserve  detachments 
arrived  irregularly,  and  sometimes  with  a  force  of  from 
200  to  300  men  each. 

The  depot  of  the  54th  regiment  of  the  line,  at  Napol- 
eon-Vendee, had  to  provide  for  twelve  detachments, 
varying  in  strength  from  60  to  200  men,  which  had  been 
sent  there  by  the  recruiting  bureaus  of  C6tes-du-Nord, 
Aude,  La  Manche,  Gard,  Finistere,  Dordogne,  Loir-et- 
Cher,  Mayenne,  Charente-Inferieure,  and  La  Vendee.  In 
the  meantime,  on  July  21,  the  active  portion  left  Conde 
for  Thionville,  remained  there  until  the  24th,  and  pro- 
ceeded then  to  tlie  occupation  of  Colmen,  in  the  neigh- 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  411 

borliood,  A  statement  of  the  variety  and  uncertainty  of 
these  operations  gives,  however,  but  an  incomplete  idea 
of  the  difficulties  of  this  short  period.  They  resulted  in 
impeding  the  passage  to  the  war  footing  almost  every- 
where, and  in  delaying  the  reception  of  their  reserves 
by  the  various  regiments.  Beginning  with  27th  of  July, 
the  forces  on  the  frontier  finding  their  formations  incom- 
plete on  account  of  the  feebleness  of  their  effectives,  be- 
gan to  complain.  Orders  were  then  sent  by  the  Ministry 
to  hasten  the  departure  of  the  reservists  from  the  depots. 
By  July  30,  142  detachments,  varying  in  strength  from 
200  to  400  men,  had  come  to  increase  the  army  by  38,- 
678  soldiers.  This  was  the  entire  yield  during  two  whole 
weeks  of  the  system  of  mobilization  in  vogue. 

But  at  this  moment,  the  railroads  were  found,  in  their 
turn,  obstructed  by  the  transports;  and  the  embarrass- 
ment was  such  that  the  troops  sent  by  the  depots  to  the 
active  portions  were  necessarily  delayed.  Some  detach- 
ments even  found  it  impossible  to  reach  the  army.  As 
a  result,  certain  regiments  were  not  able  to  bring  the 
war  effective  of  their  battalions  to  800  men.  In  the 
composition  of  the  army  of  the  preceding  years,  it  was 
thought  that  active  battalions  of  900  men  each  could  be 
counted  upon.  However,  on  August  i,  the  most  favored 
regiment  had  but  2,417  men  in  ranks;  while  the  feeblest 
did  not  contain  more  than  1,207  rationnawes^  with  bat- 
talions of  400.  The  average  strength  of  a  regiment  was 
1,554  men. 

At  this  date  the  Army  of  the  Rhine  had  reached  a 
total  of  262,295  rationiiaires. 

This  figure  was  to  be  increased  by  the  accession  of 
reserves,  which  was  to  continue  even  after  the  opening 
of  hostilities,  and  which  raised  the  effective,  notwith- 
standing the  losses  in  the  first  conflicts. 

Before  the  6th  of  August,  the  increase  in  the  effect- 
ives through  the  incorporation  of  reservists  and  the 
formation  of  the  different  services,  was  as  follows: 


412  PART  FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Men.  Horses.  Increase. 

July  27,  1870 187,485* 

July  28,  1870 200,795  13.310 

July  29,  1870 201,256    ,  461 

July  30,  1870 231,008  29,752 

July  31,  1870 240,386  51,184  9,378 

August  I,  1870 251,127  53,991  10,741 

August  2,  1870 255,249  54,945  4,i22 

August  3,  1870 260,868  57,567  5,619 

August  4,  1870 267,280  60,497  6,412 

August  5,  1870 269,676  61,015  2,396 

August  6,  1870 272,673  63,435  2,997 


Total  increase  from  the  27tli  July  to  6tli  August^  ....    85,188 

By  subtracting  from  this  sum  the  number  of  men 
already  belonging  to  the  active  force  who  arrived  be- 
tween the  extreme  dates,  we  have  the  number  of  reserve 
soldiers  who  joined  up  to  August  6.  It  is  thus  seen  that 
twenty-two  days  after  issuance  of  the  order  for  mobiliza- 
tion, scarcely  one-half  the  men  borne  upon  the  rolls  had 
been  assembled. 

From  this  time  it  is  impossible  to  follow  the  detach- 
ments sent  by  the  depots,  or  to  count  the  reservists  who 
actually  took  their  places  in  ranks.  Those  detachments 
leaving  their  depots  after  the  battles  of  August,  saw  their 
effectives  perceptibly  diminish  in  consequence  of  some  of 
the  soldiers  stopping  en  route  or  entering  the  hospitals. 
The  latter  were  often  sent  back  to  the  depots;  and  there 
were  others,  who  having  left  their  department  on  the  i8th 
of  July,  were  not  able  to  enter  the  line  until  the  beginning 
of  December — sad  example  of  the  weaknesses  springing 
from  defeat,  the  recollection  of  which  alone  should  suf- 
fice to  prevent  its  recurrence. 

*  These  figures  are  taken  from  the  reports  signed  by  the  corps  chiefs- 
of-sta£f.  ^But  from  various  circumstances,  loss  of  documents,  absence 
of  means  of  verification,  etc.,  it  is  not  possible  to  affirm  their  exactness 
to  within  less  than  a  thousand  men. 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  413 

3RD.    FORMATION  OF  THE  VARIOUS  ARMY  CORPS. 

On  July  14,  1870,  the  date  of  the  order  calling  the 
various  classes  to  active  service,  the  table  of  army  com- 
position was  prepared.  It  was  based  upon  the  estimates 
of  1868,  renewed  in  1869,  and  which  had  been  made  on 
the  hypothesis  of  the  eventual  formation  of  three  armies. 

But,  at  the  last  moment,  \X\t.  projet  drawn  up  by  Mar- 
shal Niel  was  abandoned.  His  desire  was  to  place  two 
armies  upon  the  offensive,  on  the  Sarre  and  the  Lauter, 
and  to  hold  the  third  in  reserve  at  Chalons.  The  Em- 
peror ordered,  as  we  have  seen,  the  formation  of  a  single 
army,  designated  the  Army  of  the  Rhine,  placed  under 
his  own  command,  and  composed  of  seven  corps,  to 
which  were  added  the  Guard  and  the  general  reserves  of 
cavalry,  artillery,  and  engineers. 

It  was  to  assemble  upon  various  points  near  the  fron- 
tier, group  there  its  tactical  uilits,  and  there  receive  its 
reserves. 

But  the  majority  of  the  regiments  not  having  been 
assigned  beforehand,  it  was  necessary  to  follow  the 
methods  ^of  the  past,  and  to  improvise  new  commands 
throughout. 

Beginning  with  the  15th,  the  Ministry  issued  orders 
to  the  chiefs  of  the  different  services,  the  staff  officers, 
and  the  generals,  to  hasten  to  the  centres  of  assemble- 
ment  near  the  frontier.  These  officers  were,  as  a  rule, 
unacquainted  with  each  other,  and  arrived  from  all  sides 
at  the  same  time,  each  ignorant  of  the  whereabouts  of 
his  subordinates. 

This  converging  movement  oi  personnel  2.x\.di.  materiel 
toward  the  East,  obstructing  in  its  course  the  detach- 
ments of  reservists  en  route  to  their  depots,  led  to  stop- 
pages and  confusions  often  difficult  to  control. 

In  fixing  the  composition  of  the  army,  the  Ministry 
endeavored  to  continue  the  various  regiments  under  the 


414  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

leaders  who  already  commanded  them.  It  was  thus 
that  the  troops  from  Africa  were  given  to  Marshal  Mc- 
Mahon,  then  governor-general  of  Algeria;  the  Paris  and 
Metz  troops  to  Marshal  Bazaine,  then  commander  of  the 
3d  Corps  at  Metz;  those  of  the  North,  to  General  de 
Ladmirault,  commander  of  the  2d  Corps  at  Lille.  But, 
in  most  cases,  leaders  and  soldiers  were  left  to  them- 
selves to  establish  those  mutual  bonds  of  confidence  so 
necessary  to  the  success  of  operations. 

Strasburg,  Saint-Avoid,  Metz,  Thionville,  Bitche, 
Chalons,  Belfort,  and  Nancy,  were  chosen  as  the  first 
points  of  formation  of  the  ist,  2d,  3d,  4th,  5th,  6th,  and 
7th  Corps,  and  the  Guard.  But  on  July  24,  the  necessity 
for  nearing  the  frontier,  and  of  establishing  a  more  inti- 
mate relation  between  the  corps  guarding  it,  led  to  a 
modification  of  this  disposition.  The  3d  Corps  had 
Boulay  assigned  to  it  for  point  of  concentration,  instead 
of  Metz;  the  5th,  Sarreguemines,  in  place  of  Bitche;  and 
the  Guard  was  to  assemble  at  Metz,  instead  of  Nancy. 

The  service  letters  and  the  orders  of  movement,  dis- 
patched for  the  most  part  after  July  15,  as  a  rule  indi- 
cated only  the  first  localities,  and  assigned  the  generals 
to  command  without  indicating  precisely  where  their 
troops  were  to  be  found.  From  this  resulted  several 
surprises  and  much  dissatisfaction.  It  was  also  thought 
advisable  to  abandon  the  principle  of  equal  army  corps, 
for  the  purpose  of  giving  the  marshals  larger  commands 
than  the  generals  of  division. 

The  zone  of  concentration  extended  from  Thionville 
to  Belfort,  upon  a  broken  line  of  about  265  kilometres 
[about  165  miles],  leaving  gaps  of  considerable  extent 
between  certain  corps.  The  reasons  for  this  choice  have 
already  been  explained. 

Composition  of  Corps  and  Divisions. — Finally  the  compo- 
sition of  the  grand  tactical  units  was  fixed  according  to 
the  following  rules: 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  415 

The  Guard  preserved  its  peace  formation.  The  army 
corps  were  to  comprehend  three  or  four  divisions  of  in- 
fantry of  two  brigades,  each  brigade  of  two  regiments. 
Generally  a  battalion  of  light  infantry  was  attached  to 
each  division. 

The  diyisions  contained  thirteen  battalions  of  infantry, 
two  battalions  of  light  artillery,  |i  mitrailleuse  battery,  a 
company  of  engineers,  and  a  train  detachment. 

The  army  corps  had,  in  addition,  a  division  of  mixed 
cavalry  of  two  or  three  brigades,  each  composed  of  two 
or  three  regiments;  two  horse-batteries  {canon  de  4*) 
accompanied  each  cavalry  division. 

The  reserve  artillery  of  the  army  corps  comprised 
four  batteries  (two  of  canon  de  4  and  two  of  canon  de 
12),  and,  according  to  the  strength  of  the  corps,  two  or 
three  horse- batteries  {canon  de  4). 

The  engineer  reserve  of  the  corps  was  composed  of 
from  one  to  two  and  a  half  companies  of  engineers,  ac- 
cording to  the  number  of  divisions. 

The  three  reserve  cavalry  divisions  had  the  same  com- 
position as  those  of  the  army  corps. 

The  general  artillery  reserve  was  to  be  formed  into 
sixteen  batteries  (8  batteries  of  canon  de  4  and  8  of 
canon  de  12). 

The  general  engineer  reserve  was  to  include  one  com- 
pany of  sappers,  one  of  miners,  one  of  telegraphists, 
and  one  of  railroad  troops. 

Finally,  trains,  administration  troops,  litter-bearers, 
and  workmen,  were  attached  to  the  divisions  and  corps 
according  to  the  needs  of  the  service. 

The  2d  Corps,  assembled  in  the  camp  at  Chalons  under 
orders  of  General  Frossard,  led  the  movement  to  the 
front.      Its  brigade  of  heavy  cavalry,  composed  of  the 


*The  canon  de  4  and  cajion  de  12  correspond  very  nearly  to  8  and 
24-pounders. — Tr. 


41 6  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

ist  and  4th  cuirassiers,  left  it  to  become  part  of  a  division 
of  Reserve  Cavalry  forming  at  Luneville. 

2d  Corps. — General  Frossard  having-  at  11:30  p.  m., 
July  15,  received  the  order  to  move  his  corps  to  Saint- 
Avoid,  the  1st  Division  started  at  5  o'clock  p.  M.,  of  the 
1 6th,  and  reached  its  destination  qn  the  morning  of  the 
17th. 

The  2d  Division,  starting  on  the  17th,  was  at  Saint- 
Avoid  on  the  i8th.  The  Cavalry  Division  arrived  on 
the  same  day,  and  the  3d  Division  during  the  night  of 
the  i8th  or  the  morning  of  the  19th.  The  artillery  and 
different  services  followed. 

The  movement  terminated  on  the  morning  of  the 
19th,  except  for  the  administrative  services,  the  organ- 
ization of  which  was  to  be  completed  later. 

This  corps  numbered  24,965  men  at  Chalons  on  the 
15th;  but  it  sustained  a  reduction  in  consequence  of  the 
departure  of  its  heavy  cavalry  brigade,  and  on  the  28th 
of  July  presented  an  effective  of  only  23,430  men.  It 
then  occupied  Saint- Avoid,  Forbach,  and  Bening,  It 
comprised  39  battalions,  three  of  which  were  chasseurs, 
18  squadrons,  72  pieces  of  artillery  {canon  de  4  and  de  12), 
18  mitrailleuses,  4  companies  of  engineers,  and  i  detach- 
ment of  pioneer  sappers.  On  the  ist  of  Aiigust  it  was 
nearly  complete,  and  comprised  1,172  officers,  27,956 
men,  and  5,016  horses. * 

The  other  army  corps  effected  their  concentration 
simultaneously,  but  less  easily  than  the  2d. 

« 

Imperial  Guard. — The  Guard,  however,  being  completely 
organized,  had  only  to  await  marching  orders.  It  was 
stationed  at  Paris  and  in  the  vicinity,  under  command  of 
General  Bourbaki.     It  comprised  two  divisions    of  in- 

*The  effectives  represent  rationnaircs. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  417 

fantryaiid  one  division  of  cavalry  of  three  brigades — one 
each  of  heavy,  light,  and  line  cavalry.  Its  other  arms 
and  services  were  already  constitnted.  The  order  of 
march  reached  it  on  the  17th,  and  the  movement  jcom- 
menced  on  the  21st,  ending  on  the  25th  at  Nancy,  where 
it  received  instructions  to  proceed  on  foot  to  Metz.  This 
march,  effected  in  two  days,  ended  on  the  28th,  the  en- 
tire corps  on  this  date  going  into  camp  at  Metz,  Ban- 
Saint-Martin,  and  on  the  island  of  Chambiere. 

Composed  of  select  troops,  the  officers,  the  cadres^  and 
all  the  elements  of  which  had  long  been  acquainted  with 
each  other,  the  Imperial  Guard  executed  its  assigned 
movement  in  order  and  without  difficulty.  However, 
on  the  28th  of  July,  the  day  when  the  Bmperor  placed 
himself  at  its  head  and  took  command  of  the  army,  it 
had  yet  neither  its  reserves,  which  were  small,  nor  its 
administrative  services,  which  did  not  join  it  until  after 
the  30th.  It  required  then  ten  days  in  which  to  take 
post  upon  the  frontier  in  a  fully  equipped  condition.  It 
had  then  24  battalions  of  infantry  (one  of  them  chas- 
seurs), 30  squadrons,  60  pieces  {cano7i  de  4  and  de  12),  12 
mitralleuses,  3  companies  of  engineers,  and  i  train 
squadron. 

On  August  I,  its  effective  was  1,047  officers,  21,028 
men,  and  7,304  horses. 

1st  Corps. — The  formation  of  the  ist  Corps,  designed  to 
cover  Alsace,  was  a  matter  of  the  greatest  urgency. 
This  could  not,  however,  be  entirely  completed. 

There  were  attached  to  it,  troops  of  the  East  and  of 
Algeria,  with  some  elements  drawn  from  the  North  and 
South.     This  corps,  commanded  by  Marshal  McMahon, 
was  to  have  four  divisions  of  infantry  and  one  of  cavalry, 
the  latter  in  three  brigades. 

Its  movement  began  on  the  i6th  July,  led  by  the  ist 
Division,  which  was  formed  at  Strasburg  from  the  gar- 

27 


41 8  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

rison  there,  the  45th  regiment  of  the  line,  which  arrived 
from  Belfort,  and  the  ist  regiment  of  Zonaves,  which, 
embarking  at  Algiers  from  the  i6th  to  the  19th,  reached 
Marseilles  on  the  23d,  and  arrived  at  Strasbnrg  on  the 

25th. 

On  the  26th,  without  awaiting  either  its  reserves, 
which  were  to  be  directed  upon  Strasbnrg,  or  its  admin- 
istrative services,  which  were  not  yet  formed,  the  ist 
Division,  9,190  men  strong,  commanded  by  General 
Ducrot,  was  sent  by  Marshal  McMahon  to  Froesch- 
willer,  for  the  purpose  of  there  watching  the  frontier  of 
the  Lauter.  It  was  to  complete  its  organization  at  this 
place. 

The  2d"  Division,  which  was  to  receive  troops  from 
Besangon,  Langres,  Neuf-Brisach,  and  Blidah,  com- 
menced its  formation  at  Strasburg,  and  finished  it  at 
Haguenau,  where  it  had  its  infantry  assembled  on  July 
28.  Its  artillery,  its  reserves,  and  its  administrative  ser- 
vices were  not  able  to  join  it  until  later.  On  July  28,  it 
occupied  Haguenau  with  7,250  men. 

The  3d  Division,  which  received  its  forces  from  Tou- 
louse, Marseilles,  and  Oran,  beginning  its  formation  on 
July  21,  did  not  complete  it  until  the  30th,  at  Strasburg. 
On  this  date,  it  had  also  received  a  large  portion  of  its 
reserves,  and  counted  an  effective  of  8,044  men- 

The  4th  Division  was  to  receive  its  troops  from 
Saint-Omer,  Toulon,  Montpellier,  and  Constantine.  Its 
infantry  included  the  Zouaves  and  the  Algerian  sharp- 
shooters, whom  the  order  for  formation  found  assembled 
at  Philippeville  and  Bone.  The  movement  of  its  va- 
rious bodies  commenced  on  July  17,  and  was  not  ended 
until  August  3;  but  by  the  28th  of  July,  the  infantry 
regiments  had  nearly  all  assembled.  The  reserves  and 
accessory  services  did  not  arrive  until  later,  and  not 
without  experiencing  certain  difficulties. 

This    division — which    upon   quitting   Strasburg,  on 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  419 

August  3,  was  to  leave  behind  one  regiment,  the  87th, 
as  a  garrison — contained,  on  the  28th  of  July,  8,370 
men. 

It  was  intended  that  the  division  of  cavalry  charged 
with  covering  the  concentration  of  this  corps,  should 
assemble  early  and  occupy  various  points  near  the  fron- 
tier. But  its  ist  brigade  did  not  arrive  until  24th  July. 
Its  2d  was  still  further  delayed,  arriving  (except  the  loth 
Dragoons)  on  July  28  and  August  5.  Its  3d  reached  the 
place  of  formation  on  the  26th  and  29th  July.  The  di- 
vision was  not  assembled  until  the  30th  of  July,  when, 
with  an  effective  of  3,671  men,  it  occupied  Soultz,  Hag- 
uenau,  Strasburg,  Schelestadt,  and  Brumath. 

In  brief,  then,  the  ist  Corps  had  only  34,660  men  on 
the  28th  of  July.  It  had  nearly  reached  completion  by 
August  I,  aggregating  1,651  officers,  40,165  men,  and 
8,143  horses. 

On  this  date,  it  was  composed  of  52  battalions,  4  of 
them  chasseurs,  26  squadrons,  96  pieces  {canon  de  4  and 
de  12),  24  mitrailleuses,  5^  companies  of  engineers,  etc. 

This  corps  had  required  thirteen  days  to  reach  a  state 
of  comparative  readiness,  and  eighteen  to  finish  its  organ- 
ization. 

3d  Corps. — The  3d  Corps,  placed  under  command  of 
Marshal  Bazaine,  was  to  receive  its  troops  from  Paris, 
Metz,  and  Nancy.  It  comprehended  four  divisions  of 
infantry,  and  one  of  cavalry  in  three  brigades. 

Its  Paris  troops  were  already  formed  in  time  of  peace 
into  active  divisions,  but  without  artillery,  engineers,  or 
accessory  services.  This  organization  was  to  favor  con- 
centration, which  was  commenced  on  July  17th  by  the 
3d  Division,  and  terminated  on  the  21st.  The  4th  Di- 
vision was  formed  on  the  19th,  from  the  troops  stationed 
at  Nancy  and  Metz. 

The  Cavalry  Division,  composed  of  regiments  coming 


420  PART   FIRST.  — STRATEGY. 

from  Versailles,  Aiich,  Cambrai,  Lille,  Abbeville,  and 
Maubeuge,  was  formed  on  July  23. 

On  this  date,  the  various  elements  having  assembled, 
the  corps  was  moved  to  Boulay,  near  the  frontier,  where 
it  was  completed  by  the  arrival  of  its  reserves  and  its 
different  services. 

It  now  contained  52  battalions,  4  of  them  chasseurs, 
31  squadrons,  96  guns  {cajton  de  4  and  de  12),  24  mitrail- 
leuses, 5^  companies  of  engineers,  and  i  detachment  of 
pioneer  sappers. 

-  Its  effective,  which  was  33,910  men  on  July  27,  had 
increased  by  August  i  to  1,704  officers,  41,574  men,  and 
9,810  horses. 

On  August  6,  it  numbered  43,721  men  and  9,573 
horses.  But  it  did  not  approach  completion  until  about 
the  13th  of  August. 

4tli  Corps. — The  4th  Corps,  commanded  by  General  de 
Ladmirault,  was  to  be  formed  at  Thionville  with  the 
garrisons  of  the  North  and  North-east.  It  was  to  receive, 
in  addition,  a  battalion  oi  chasseurs  a  pied  from  Rennes. 

Its  Cavalry  Division  was  the  first  to  complete  its  regi- 
ments, which  were  ready  by  the  20th  of  July;  then 
came  its  3d  Infantry  Division,  which  had  received  all  its 
regiments  by  July  22.  Those  of  the  two  other  divisions 
arrived  on  the  next  day,  the  23d. 

Then,  pursuant  to  orders  of  the  24th  from  the  chief 
of  general-staff  to  move  out  from  Thionville,  approach 
the  other  army  corps,  and  watch  the  frontier,  the  4th 
Corps,  without  awaiting  the  arrival  of  its  reserves,  pushed 
its  ist  Infantry  Division,  with  its  brigade  of  light  cav- 
alry, to  Sierck,  and  its  3d  Division  to  Kedange. 

By  July  28,  this  corps  had  organized  an  effective  of 
25,040  men,  divided  into  39  battalions,  3  of  which  were 
chasseufs  a  pied^  18  squadrons,  72  guns  {canon  de  4  and 
de  12),  18  mitrailleuses,  4  companies  of  engineers,  and 
a  company  of  pioneer  sappers. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  42  I 

But  it  had  not  yet  received  its  reserves,  nor  the  differ- 
ent services  required  to  complete  it. 

By  August  I,  its  elements  had  nearly  all  been  assem- 
bled, raising  its  effective  to  1,208  officers,  27,702  men, 
and  5,536  horses.  But  it  was  only  towards  the  13th  of 
August  that  its  formation  was  completed. 

Six  days  were  thus  required  to  assemble  its  permanent 
forces,  and  nearly  twenty-seven  days  to  call  in  the  re- 
serves and  complete  the  change  to  a  war  footing. 

5tli  Corps. — The  active  divisions  of  the  army  of  Lyons, 
already  formed  in  time  of  peace,  but  lacking  the  special 
arms  and  accessory  services,  were  designed  to  form  the 
5th  Corps  at  Bitche, 

The  5th  Division  only,  was  to  assemble  at  Strasburg. 

The  corps  command  was  intrusted  to  General  de 
Failly  (aide-de-camp  to  the  Emperor),  who,  in  1867  had 
under  his  orders  at  Mentana,  a  small  corps  complete  in 
all  arms  of  the  service. 

The  assemblement  of  these  various  tactical  units  was 
made  easy,  as  in  the  case  of  the  3d  Corps,  on  account  ot 
their  peace  formation;  and  although  there  were  joined 
to  them  a  regiment  from  Toulouse  and  two  from  Paris,  * 
the  movement,  begun  on  July  16,  was  terminated  on  the 
20th. 

The  ist  Division  had  all  its  parts  at  Bitche  on  the  i8th 
of  July;  the  2d  Division,  on  the  19th;  and  the  Cavalry 
Division  on  the  20th. 

The  3d  Infantry  Division  had  also  assembled  its  parts 
at  Strasburg  on  the  20th. 

The  5th  Corps  had  not  yet  completed  its  formation, 
when,  in  consequence  of  information  sent  to  Paris  re- 
specting the  first  movements  of  the  enemy,  the  chief  of 
general-staff,  on  the  23d  of  July,  ordered  a  deployment  of 

*The  sth  Hussars  and  the  12th  Chasseurs. 


422  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

our  forces  from  Sierck  to  the  Vosges.  General  de  Failly 
was  to  direct  upon  Sarreguemines  the  two  divisions 
which  he  had  at  Bitche,  and  upon  the  latter  place  his  3d 
Division  coming  from  Haguenau.  The  execution  of 
this  order  began  on  the  24th. 

By  the  28th,  the  5th  Corps  occupied  these  points, 
connecting  by  its  left  with  the  2d  Corps;  but  it  had  not 
yet  received  its  reserves  nor  its  accessory  services,  and 
could  not  be  considered  in  any  degree  complete  until 
August  5. 

On  July  28,  indeed,  it  still  contained  but  a  weak  effec- 
tive, which,  however,  increased  rapidly,  and  on  August 
I  reached  1,174  officers,  26,243  men,  and  5,527  horses. 
It  comprised  39  battalions  of  infantry  (3  of  them  chas- 
seurs), 18  squadrons,  72  guns  {canoji  de  4  and  de  12),  18 
mitrailleuses,  4  companies  of  engineers,  and  a  detach- 
ment of  artificers. 

6th  Corps. — The  6th  Corps,  under  Marshal  Canrobert, 
designated  to  serve  as  reserve,  received  orders  to  form 
its  divisions  at  Chalons,  Soissons,  and  Paris,  and  then 
to  concentrate  at  Chalons.  It  was  to  receive  its  troops 
from  Setif,  St.  Etienne,  Bourges,  Limoges,  Perigueux, 
Blois,  Angers,  Tours,  Bordeaux,  Lille,  Caen,  Rouen, 
Cherbourg,  Lorient,  Nantes,  and  Brest. 

Notwithstanding  this  diversity  of  points  of  departure, 
its  elements  were  assembled  in  the  usual  way. 

The  4th  Division  composed  of  troops  from  Brittany, 
was  the  first  to  form.  It  brous^ht  tog^ether  its  infantrv 
by  July  21,  and  replaced  at  Paris  those  divisions  that 
had  gone  to  the  front. 

On  the  24th,  the  3d  Division  at  Soissons,  having  re- 
ceived its  regiments,  set  out  for  Chalons,  where  it  did 
not  assemble,  however,  until  the  5th  of  August. 

On  the  25th  of  July,  the  troops  of  the  2d  Division 
arrived  at  Chalons  simultaneously  with  those  of  the  ist. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  423 

The  Cavalry  Division  was  formed  with  regiments  from 
the  West,  except  one  which  arrived  from  Tarascon.  Its 
ist  and  2d  brigades  were  united  at  Chalons  on  Jnly  22, 
while  the  3d  remained  at  Paris.  These  brigades  not 
having  commenced  their  march  npon  Nancy  nntil  Au- 
gnst  6,  were  ordered  back  to  Chalons  on  the  following 
day,  in  conseqnence  of  our  reverses  on  the  frontier.  The 
division  was  thenceforth  to  remain  separated  from  its 
corps. 

On  the  28th  of  July,  this  corps  (6th),  which  had  be- 
gun to  receive  its  reserves,  presented  an  effective  of  29,- 
820  men.  On  August  6,  before  entire  completion,  it  was 
ordered  to  move  to  Nancy  and  draw  near  the  main  body 
of  the  army. 

Its  movement  had  commenced,  when  a  second  order, 
necessitated  by  the  unfavorable  news  received  from  the 
frontier,  obliged  a  retrograde  march.  Upon  the  receipt 
of  further  orders,  these  troops  were  again  moved  for- 
ward on  the  9th,  and  the  concentrations  of  the  3d,  4th, 
and  ist  Divisions  upon  Metz,  were  effected  August  10,  11, 
and  12  respectively.  At  the  same  time  a  regiment  of 
the  2d  Division  arrived,  accompanied  by  its  division 
commander.  General  Bisson,  who  had  pressed  forward 
with  his  first  troops.  The  other  regiments,  \.h.Q  personnel 
of  the  engineers,  and  the  reserve  artillery,  were  not  able 
to  pass  Nancy.  The  railroad  between  this  place  and 
Metz  had  already  been  cut  by  the  enemy's  scouts. 

The  6th  Corps  was  obliged  to  content  itself  with  an 
incomplete  formation.  It  was  to  comprise  only  39  bat- 
talions of  infantry,  one  of  them  chasseurs  a  pied^  48 
guns  [canon  de  4  and  de  12),  and  24  mitrailleuses.  The 
services  which  it  lacked  were  made  up  to  it  in  part,  after 
the  battles  of  Rezonville  and  Gravelotte,  by  loans  from 
the  other  army  corps  and  the  General  Reserve.  There 
was  thus  added  to  it,  August  17,  the  ist  Division  of 
Reserve  Cavalry,  completed  a  few  days  afterwards,  and 


424  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

reaching,  August  23,  an  effective  of  3,624  men  and  3,211 
horses. 

The  General  Artillery  Reserve  gave  it,  from  the  i6th 
to  the  19th,  4  batteries,  which  increased  its  effective  556 
men,  24  guns,  and  470  horses. 

The  persomtel  oi  the  administrative  and  medical  ser- 
vices, and  of  the  trains  and  artillery  parks,  was  organized 
and  completed  in  the  same  manner. 

Notwithstanding  the  obstacles  in  the  path  of  its  con- 
centration, the  6th  Corps  presented  on  August  i  an  ef- 
fective of  1,474  officers,   33,946  men,   and  5,534  horses. 

7tli  Corps. — This  corps,  under  order  of  General  Felix 
Douay,  was  to  be  formed  at  Belfort  and  Colmarfrom  the 
garrisons  of  the  South-East.  In  addition,  it  was  to  re- 
ceive troops  from  St.  Denis,  Civita  Vecchia,  Perpignan, 
La  Rochelle,  and  Clermont-Ferrand.  It  was  to  encoun- 
ter greater  difficulties  in  its  organization  than  the  other 
corps.  The  character  of  its  composition  exposed  it  to 
the  risk  of  being  still  unprepared  when  the  German 
armies  would  be  in  condition  to  take  the  offensive;  and 
in  case  of  a  reverse  upon  the  Lauter,  its  isolated  situa- 
tion in  Upper  Alsace  would  oblige  it  either  to  follow 
the  neighboring  forces  in  retreat  or  to  separate  itself 
from  them. 

Three  of  the  regiments  of  the  ist  Division  were  at 
Colmar  on  July  24;  the  fourth  did  not  arrive  until  Au- 
gust 4. 

The  2d  Division  found  itself  in  a  similar  situation  at 
Belfort.  It  lacked  on  August  i,  a  battalion  of  chas- 
seurs which  had  set  out  from  Civita  Vecchia,  but  which 
did  not  arrive  at  Altkirch  until  August  4. 

The  3d  Division  was  still  further  delayed.  Having 
yet  received  but  three  of  its  regiments,  it  was  ordered  to 
temporarily  replace  at  Lyons  the  divisions  sent  to  the 
frontier,  and  did  not  arrive  at  Belfort  until  August  12 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  425 

and  13.  One  of  its  regiments,  then  in  Corsica,  was  not 
able  to  join  it.  One  brigade  of  the  Cavalry  Division 
formed  at  Belfort  on  25th  Jnly.  The  second  brigade  was 
retained  at  Lyons  for  fear  of  popnlar  ontbreaks  there, 
and  afterwards  directed  upon  the  13th  Corps  at  Ver- 
sailles. 

The  7th  Corps  was  fettered  even  to  a  still  greater  de- 
gree in  organizing-  its  accessory  services  and  its  reserves. 
It  was  obliged,  under  the  pressure  of  events,  to  abandon 
Upper  Alsace,  then  the  line  of  the  Vosges,  and  to  follow 
the  fortunes  of  the  ist  Corps  before  having  finished  its 
formation.  On  August  6,  the  day  of  Woerth,  it  had,  as 
yet,  in  Alsace,  but  22  battalions  of  infantry,  two  of  them 
chasseurs  a  pied ^  13  squadrons,  66  guns,  {canoji  de/\.an6. 
de  12),  12  mitrailleuses,  3  companies  of  engineers,  and 
a  detachment  of  artificers. 

Its  effective,  which,  on  July  28,  did  not  exceed  8,400 
men,  reached  by  August  i,  1,043  ofiicers,  23,142  men, 
and  5,396  horses. 

General  Reserves. — The  General  Cavalry  Reserve  v^SiS  to 
comprise  three  divisions,  each  of  16  squadrons  and  12 
pieces  {canon  de  4).  The  first  and  second  divisions  re- 
ceived orders  to  form  at  Luneville,  and  the  third  at 
Pont-a-Mousson, 

The  last  two  only  were  organized.  The  first,  at  Metz, 
composed  of  chasseur  regiments  from  Africa  was  weak-, 
ened  by  the  absence  of  its  4th  regiment,-  and  still  further 
disorganized  by  the  loss  of  two  additional  regiments 
sent  to  Chalons.  The  second  of  these  divisions,  formed 
by  August  2,  left  Luneville  on  this  date  for  Brumath, 
and  on  August  5  bivouacked  at  Reichshoffen.  The  third, 
organized  about  the  29th  of  July,  proceeded  to  Faulque- 
mont  on  August  5.  The  first  left  Luneville  on  August 
7,  with  three  regiments,  but  did  not  reach  Metz  until  the 
loth. 


426  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

By  August  I,  these  three  divisions  presented  an  effec- 
tive of  464  officers,  6,360  men,  and  6,321  horses. 

The  General  Artillery  Reserve  was  to  be  composed  of 
16  batteries  (eight  oi  canon  de  4  and  eight  oi  canon  de  12.) 

Its  formation  was  completed  at  Nancy  during  the  first 
days  of  August,  and  it  reached  Metz  on  the  8th  and  9th. 

On  August  I,  it  counted  an  effective  of  87  officers, 
2,675  men,  and  2,725  horses. 

The  General  Engineer  Reserve  was  organized  in  4 
companies  about  August  2,  and  on  the  8th  presented  an 
effective  of  13  officers,  459  men,  and  196  horses. 

Finally,  the  General  Headquarters  of  the  army,  in- 
cluding the  Emperor's  military  household,  comprised, 
August  I,  207  officers,  1,560  men,  and  1,610  horses. 

It  was  in  reality  about  28th  July,  that  the  army  began 
to  increase  its  effectives.  At  this  time,  the  Germans 
were  prepared  to  repel  an  aggression  with  all  the  ad- 
vantages of  numerical  superiority.  In  France,  all  the 
principal  movements  of  concentration  had  terminated, 
but  the  mobilization  continued.  This  was  the  conse- 
quence of  a  system  which,  in  attempting  these  two 
operations  simultaneously,  succeeded  only  in  entangling 
them. 

The  arrival  of  the  reserves,  the  most  distant  troops, 
and  the  accessory  services,  continued  to  increase  the 
effectives  up  to  August  6,  the  date  on  which  the  forma- 
tion of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine  was  nearly  completed. 

It  had,  then,  .taken  twenty-three  days  to  concentrate 
the  greater  portion  of  our  forces  on  the  frontier.  The 
delays  had  been  caused  by  the  blocking  up  of  the  rail- 
roads, and  by  the  tardy  organization  of  the  accessory 
services.  But  on  account  of  the  character  of  events,  and 
the  rules  in  vogue  governing  official  reports,  it  was  not 
possible  until  August  i,  to  estimate  with  sufficient  ac- 
curacy the  results  of  the  work,  which  had  been  dragging 
on  with  so  much  confusion  and  disorder  since  July  16. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  427 

We  obtain  the  following  general  figures  for  August  i: 

OFFICERS.  MEN  HORSES. 

With  the  Army  of  the  Rhine   .    .  11,249  252,761  63,607 

In  the  interior 8,924  231,629  45,258 

In  Algeria 2,249  40i945  12,529 

At  Rome 206  5,260             813 

22,628        530,595      122,207 
ToTAi, 553,223  rationnaires. 

The  only  completely  organized  troops  remaining  dis- 
posable in  the  interior  were  the  22d,  34th,  58th,  and 
72d  regiments  of  the  line,  and  the  8th  regiment  of  chas- 
seurs a  cheval.  * 

The  War  Ministry,  on  August  i,  estimated  the  Army 
of  the  Rhine  as  24,844  stronger  than  here  indicated. 
This  difference  arose  from  the  following  causes: 

ist.  In  the  calculations  made  at  Paris  were  included 
certain  elements  that  had  not  yet  been  joined  to  this 
army.     Their  effective  was  6,841  men. 

2d.  Detachments  aggregating  38,678  men,  had  been 
directed  upon  the  army  from  the  depots  in  consequence 
of  orders  from  the  War  Ministry,  under  dates  of  July  27, 
28,  29,  and  30.  At  the  depots,  all  of  these  men  were 
considered  as  having  reached  the  army  on  August  i, 
while,  in  reality,  20,000  only  had  joined  at  this  date. 
This  was  the  number  given  in  the  corps  reports.  There 
thus  resulted  a  difference  of  about  18,500  men,  which 
number,  added  to  the  6,841  mentioned  in  the  preceding 
paragraph,  gives  a  total  of  25,347 — but  slightly  different 
from  24,844,  the  figures  already  given. 

On  August  I,  the  forces  of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine 
were  thus  made  up: 

*  The  troops  of  occupation  in  Rome  comprised  the  6th  battalion  of 
chasseurs  a  pied,  the  35th  and  42d  of  the  line,  2  squadrons  of  the  7th 
chasseurs  d  cheval,  and  3  batteries  of  artillery. 


428 


PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 


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1,172 

27,956 

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1,704 

41,574 

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4th  Corps    .... 

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1,208 

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1,174 

26,243 

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5,534 

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2d  Division  of  Re- 

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2,520 

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3d  Division  of  Re- 

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2,104 

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General     Artillery 

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squadroi 

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X  9  battalions,   9  squadr 

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Lyons  on  August  i. 

II  The  4th    Chasseurs   d 

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the    3d 

Chasseurs  d'A/rique,  had 

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eceived  its  artillery  by 

August  ] 

[. 

f  Was  not  organized  on 

Angust  I. 

THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  429 

These  figures  compreliend  all  the  elements  entering 
into  the  composition  of  the  Army  of  tJie Rhi7ie^  and  which 
were  assembled,  fully  equipped,  on  August  i,  either 
upon  the  frontier  or  at  other  points  (Paris,  Chalons, 
Lyons,  etc.).  After  deducting  the  latter,  that  is  to  say,  all 
the  6th  Corps  and  a  part  of  the  7th  (9  battalions,  9  squad- 
rons, 2  batteries),  we  have  for  the  total  force  assembled 
upon  the  frontier  on  August  i,  the  following  figures: 

267  battalions  \  .    22  242  men 

195  squadrons    \   representing  an  effective  of  \     ^2  SL.  v,      'p^ 
152  batteries      J  ,  ^    5t>,094  norses. 

On  August  6,  the  preceding  tabular  totals  became: 
329  battalions,  230  squadrons,  and  152  batteries,  repre- 
senting 275,101  men  and  65,439  horses.  From  the  ist 
to  the  6th  of  August,  the  effective  was  raised  10,702 
men  and  2,421  horses,  notwithstanding  the  losses  ex- 
perienced in  the  first  combats.  At  this  time  the  inva- 
sion began.  Its  first  effect  was  to  disorganize  three  army 
corps  (ist,  5th,  and  7th),  and  to  retard,  if  not  to  prevent, 
further  mobilization. 

France  expiated  thus  cruelly  the  defects  of  her  organ- 
ization, and  learned  too  late,  under  the  lash  of  terrible 
misfortunes,  that  her  entire  military  system  needed  re- 
vision. But  thenceforth  regrets  were  futile,  and  nothing 
remained  but  to  defend  the  national  hearth  by  employ- 
ing to  the  best  advantage  the  resources  brought  together 
with  so  much  difficulty. 

§3.    CONCENTRATION. 
I.— Concentrations  of  Armies. 

1st.   SEI.KCTION  OF  THE)  ZONE   OF   CONCENTRATION. 

After  an  army  has  been  mobilized,  it  is  necessary  to 
concentrate  its  various  forces. 


430  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

The  zone  and  points  of  concentration  are  determined 
by  the  geographical  character  of  the  frontiers.  But 
considerations  of  a  different  nature  press  into  view  to 
supplement  this  principle,  and  to  modify  its  application. 

It  is  imperative.^  at  the  very  outset.^  to  consider  the  pro- 
jets  of  the  ene7ny.^  taking  into  account  the  effectives  at 
his  disposal,  the  duration  of  his  mobilization  and  con- 
centration, and  finally  the  strategic  importance  of  his 
first  movements. 

This  work  completed,  it  is  necessary  to  think  of  cov- 
ering the  threatened  provinces.  This  is  one  of  the 
essential  conditions  of  a  good  concentration,  and  it  is 
independent  of  the  protection  of  the  frontier  by  the 
screen  of  troops  found  there  at  the  moment  war  is  de- 
clared. 

There  are,  then,  two  operations:  to  protect  the  fron- 
tiers against  the  attempts  of  the  adversary,  and  to  cover 
the  concentration. 

For  the  first,  the  selection  of  a  good  zone  of  concen- 
tration will  often  suffice. 

It  is  certain,  indeed,  that  if  the  assemblements  of  a 
grand  army  take  place  upon  the  flank  of  the  probable 
direction  of  the  enemy's  columns,  the  latter  will  be 
forced  to  abandon  his  projects. 

In  this  connection  the  campaign  of  1809  presents  an 
array  of  favorable  dispositions  worthy  of  citation. 

CONCENTRATION   OF  THE;   FRENCH   ARMY  IN   1809. 

Learning,  in  March,  of  the  preparations  for  war.  made 
by  the  Austrians,  Napoleon  calculated  that  they  would 
be  able  to  take  the  initiative  of  the  movements  before 
the  loth  of  April.  His  army  was  at  various  points  in 
Germany.  It  was  necessary  to  make  a  concentration 
looking  toward  the  enemy's  probable  offensive. 

He  chose  for  this  a  position  covered  by  lines  of  de- 
fense,   from    which   he  could  threaten  his  adversaries' 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  43 1 

communications.     To   this  end  he  wrote  to   Berthier. 
[Sec  Plate  XX.) 

Paris,  March  28,  1809. 

"If  the  x\nstrians  attack  before  April  10,  the  army 
should  concentrate  behind  the  Lech,  the  right  occupy- 
ing Augsburg,  the  left,  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube 
from  Ingolstadt  to  Donauwerth. 

"  Donauwerth  ought  to  be  the  most  central  point  of 
the  line.  *         *         *         *" 

Napoleon  adopted  thus  an  angular  base  of  concentra- 
tion, the  choice  of  which  sufficed  to  render  the  Austrians 
circumspect  in  their  advance. 

The  dispositions  designed  to  complete  this  measure 
were  developed  in  the  instructions  which  he  two  days 
later,  when  about  to  set  out  for  the  army,  addressed  to 
Berthier: 

"The  Austrians  have  not  declared  war.  Everything, 
however,  indicates  that  toward  the  15th  of  April,  their 
army  will  be  ready  to  take  the  field.  It  is  then  ex- 
pedient that  we  also  be  ready  by  that  date,  and  with 
exception  of  the  direction  to  be  taken,  we  shall  be  so. 
*  *  Thus,  then,  from  the  ist  to  the  15th  of  April,  I 
shall  have  three  army  corps,  which  should  be  assembled 
upon  the  Danube  either  at  Ratisbon,  Ingolstadt,  or 
Donauwerth.     *     *     * 

"  It  is  necessary  then: 

"  ist.  That  Augsburg  be  protected  against  surprise, 
.  and  that,  instead  of  relaxing  the  work  on  the  fortifica- 
tions, their  restoration  be  pressed  with  redoubled  ac- 
tivity. 

"2d.  That  all  bridge-heads  upon  the  Lech  should 
be  palisaded  and  armed.with  stronger  artillery  than  that 
used  in  field  service. 

"Work  should  be  so  carried  on  at  Ingolstadt  as  to 
provide  good  bridge-heads  upon  the  Danube,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  allowing  a  debouch,  at  will,  upon  the  left  bank. 


432  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

"The  headquarter  station  at  Donaiiwerth,  and  the 
line  of  the  Lech,  are  to  constitute  our  position  in  case 
the  enemy  anticipates  my  dispositions;  but  if  he  does 
not  stir,  I  desire  that  General  Oudinot  and  General  St. 
Hilaire  unite  at  Ratisbon.  This  city  is  five  ordinary 
or  four  forced  marches  from  Augsburg.  By  starting 
General  Oudinot  from  the  latter  place  on  April  5,  he 
would  be  at  Ratisbon  on  the  loth ;  and  supposing  Gen- 
eral St.  Hilaire  at  Nuremberg  on  the  5th  of  April,  he 
would  arrive  at  Ratisbon  on  the  8th  or  9th,  where,  about 
loth  April,  I  would  have  30,000  infantry  and  7  regiments 
of  cavalry. 

"The  Duke  of  Istria  would  reach  the  place  oil  the 
same  day,  and  assemble  his  entire  cavalry  reserve. 

"The  Duke  of  Auerstadt  would  move  his  headquarters 
to  Nuremberg.  He  would  occupy  Baireuth  and  the 
debo2iches  upon  Egra  with  his  extreme  left  only.  His 
headquarters  would  thus  be  but  twenty-four  leagues 
from  Ratisbon,  that  is  to  say,  three  marches. 

"The  three  divisions  of  the  Bavarian  army  would 
also  be  assembled  around  Ratisbon,  at  distances  of  one 
or  two  days'  march,  or  three  at  the  farthest. 

"The  Duke  of  Rivoli  would  move  his  headquarters 
to  Augsburg,  thus  holding  himself  within  four  or  five 
marches  of  Ratisbon. 

"Thus  the  general  headquarters  would  be  located  at 
Ratisbon,  in  the  midst  of  200,000  men  astride  the  Dan- 
ube, guarding  its  right  bank  from  Ratisbon  to  Passau; 
and  we  would  then  be  released  from  all  apprehensions 
on  account  of  the  enemy's  movements,  while  the  Danube 
would  give  us  easy  means  of  supply. 

"With  our  army  cantoned  around  Ratisbon,  what 
will  the  enemy  do?  Will  he  move  upon  Cham?  We 
shall  be  ready  to  unite  all  our  forces  against  him  to  stop 
him  upon  the  Regen  in  previously  selected  positions. 

"  Does  he  move  upon  Nuremberg?  He  will  find  him- 
self cut  off  from  Bohemia. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  433 

"Will  he  advance  upon  Bamberg?  He  will  likewise 
be  cut  off. 

"Again,  will  he  march  upon  Dresden?  Then  we 
enter  Bohemia,  and  pursue  him  even  into  Germany. 

"Will  he  act  in  Tyrol  simultaneously  with  his  ad- 
vance from  Bohemia?  He  could  undoubtedly  reach 
Innspruck,  but  the  ten  or  twelve  regiments  placed  there 
could  not  take  part  in  the  struggles  upon  the  debouches 
of  Bohemia;  and  these  troops  at  Innspruck  would  learn 
of  the  defeat  of  the  army  in  Bohemia  by  our  arrival  at 
Salzburg. 

' '  Finally,  if  the  enemy  should  appear  inclined  to  attack 
us  upon  both  the  extreme  right  and  left,  we  must  accept 
the  centre,  having  the  Lech  upon  which  to  retreat,  and 
holding  a  garrison  at  Augsburg,  in  order  to  be  sure  of 
always  commanding  this  place. 

"Thus  then  the  engineer  service  will  confine  itself  to 
fortifying  the  bridge-heads  upon  the  Lech,  and  also 
the  cities  of  Passau,  Augsburg,  and  Ingolstadt. " 

These  instructions  were  not  well  understood.  Berthier, 
thinking  to  conform  to  them,  directed  the  corps  of  Oudi- 
not  and  of  Davout  upon  Ratisbon,  to  the  north-east  of 
Ingolstadt.  He  thus  prolonged  the  army's  positions 
upon  the  Danube,  and  exposed  them  to  separation  by 
an  active  and  resolute  enemy.  * 

Napoleon  immediately  wrote  him: 

"My  cousin,  I  am  in  receipt  of  your  letter,  in  which 
you  inform  me  that  you  have  directed  Oudinot's  corps 
upon  Ratisbon.  You  do  not  let  me  know  what  neces- 
sitates such  an  extraordinary  measure,  which  scatters 
and  weakens  my  forces. 

"  I  do  not,  indeed,  understand  the  spirit  of  your  letter 
of  the  evening  of  the  13th,  and  I  would  have  preferred 
to  know  that  my  army  was  concentrated  between  Ingol- 

*  General  Pierron. 
29 


434  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

stadt  and  Augsburg,  the  Bavarians  in  the  first  line,  as 
the  Duke  of  Dantzic]had  placed  them,  until  it  is  made 
clear  what  the  enemy  intends  to  do.  I  am  anxious  for 
news  from  the  Duke  of  Auerstadt.  My  instruction  must 
be  complied  with,  which  is  to  rally  my  army  and  to 
have  it  in  hand.  If  the  enemy  were  to  debouch  by 
Tyrol,  and  we  should  be  obliged  to  give  battle  at  Augs- 
burg without  General  Oudinot,  this  would  be  a  great 
misfortune.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  were  forced  to 
abandon  Augsburg,  which  is  not  in  a  state  of  defense, 
and  to  surrender  our  magazines  at  Ulm,  this  would 
also  be  a  great  misfortune.  The  situation  would  be 
perfect  if  the  Duke  of  Auerstadt  had  been  stationed  near 
Ingolstadt;  the  Duke  of  Rivoli  with  the  Wiirtembergers, 
and  the  corps  of  Oudinot  near  Augsburg.  Since  the 
enemy  has  taken  the  offensive,  we  must  find  out  his 
plan.  The  principal  thing  is  that  Oudinot  be  at  Augs- 
burg before  the  enemy,  and  that  he  keep  his  eyes  well 
open.  As  regards  the  Duke  of  Auerstadt,  and  the  St. 
Hilaire,  Nansouty,  and  Montbrun  divisions,  the  instruc- 
tions for  them  are  the  same  as  for  all — to  concentrate 
between  Ratisbon,  Ingolstadt,  and  Augsburg;  so  that  it 
will  be  necessary  to  do  just  the  contrary  of  what  you 
have  already  done.  It  is  possible  that  I  shall  leave  here 
to-day,  so  as  to  reach  Dillingen  this  evening.  Write 
me  by  this  route." 

Napoleon  hastened  to  Donauwerth  at  once,  in  order 
to  repair  the  mistake  committed,  before  the  arrival  of 
the  Austrians.  Here  he  learned  that  the  Archduke 
Charles,  who  had  crossed  the  Inn  on  the  loth  of  April, 
was  marching  upon  Ratisbon  to  effect  a  junction  there 
with  Bellegarde,  coming  from  Bohemia.  He  imme- 
diately ordered  Massena  to  march  from  Augsburg  upon 
Landshut,  to  cut  the  enemy's  communications  there; 
Davout  to  move  from  Ratisbon  upon  Ingolstadt,  inform- 
ing him  that  he  would  undoubtedly  have  an  opportunity 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPKRATIONS.  435 

of  attacking  the  flanks  of  the  Austrian  cohimns  arriving 
from  lyandshut,  while  the  Bavarians,  posted  at  Abens- 
berg,  would  assail  them  in  front. 

This  combination  succeeded,  and  the  Archduke  lost 
his  communications  with  Vienna  by  the  right  bank.  It 
is  to  be  observed  that  if  he  had  taken  another  direction, 
and  had  moved  upon  the  Lech,  his  communications 
would  not  have  been  the  less  compromised,  on  account 
of  the  angular  form  adopted  by  Napoleon  for  his  zone 
of  concentration.  * 

In  reality.  Napoleon  had  not  alone  to  prepare  an  of- 
fensive campaign  against  Austria.  He  was  obliged  also 
to  protect  Bavaria,  his  ally,  against  an  Austrian  invasion. 
This  was  assured  by  the  positions  taken  in  the  move- 
ments of  concentration,  and  by  the  presence  of  our  corps 
upon  the  frontier. 

In  1870,  the  selecti'on  of  the  Palatinate  by  Marshal 
Von  Moltke,  for  the  concentration  of  the  German  forces, 
produced  similar  results.  The  States  of  the  South  were 
protected  against  a  French  invasion  by  the  fact  alone 
that  the  position  of  the  German  forces  threatened  from 
the  left  the  communications  of  troops  directed  toward 
this  side. 

2ND.   PROTECTION  OF  CONCENTRATIONS. 

The  assemblement  of  the  different  parts  of  an  army 
cannot,  without  danger,  be  effected  under  the  eyes  of  the 
enemy  and  exposed  to  his  blows.  The  army  is  then 
obliged  to  conceal  its  movements  behind  a  protecting 
screen  formed  by  troops,  obstacles  of  the  ground,  or  a 
combination  of  both. 

For  the  discovery  of  the  principles  controlling  these 
combinations,  let  us  again  resort  to  the  lessons  of  his- 
tory. 

*  General  Pierron. 


436  -       PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

CONCENTRATION   OF  THE  RUSSIAN  ARMY  IN   1807. 

In  this  year  Napoleon  had  cantoned  his  army  between 
the  Narew  and  the  Vistula,  calculating  that  the  Rus- 
sians, in  retreat  upon  the  Niemen,  would  not  resume 
hostilities  before  the  commencement  of  good  weather. 
He  was  soon  undeceived. 

Benningsen,  appreciating  the  advantages  to  be  drawn 
from  the  network  of  woods,  lakes,  and  marshes,  that 
covered  the  country  between  the  Alle  and  the  Narew, 
had  concentrated  his  forces  to  the  east  of  the  extensive 
forest  of  Johannisberg. 

While  he  was  effecting  his  assemblements  behind  this 
screen,  three  divisions  were  assigned  to  the  duty  of  pro- 
tecting them.  One  of  these,  in  position  at  Goniatz, 
watched  the  debouches  of  the  lake  region.  The  other 
two,  established  at  Ostrolenko  and  at  Bransk,  held  those 
of  the  forest.  The  Russians  thus  succeeded  in  conceal- 
ing their  operation  from  our  outposts,  and  on  January 
23,  profiting  by  the  woods,  which  served  as  a  mask,  they 
attacked  our  cantonments  upon  the  Passarge. 

Fortunately  the  resistance  of  Ney's  corps,  which  re- 
ceived the  enemy's  first  shock,  gave  Napoleon  time  to 
make  his  dispositions.  These  were  so  skillful  that  their 
discovery,  through  the  capture  of  a  bearer  of  dispatches, 
decided  Benningsen  to  renounce  his  projects  and  retire 
upon  Kylau.* 

Benningsen's  concentration  was  effected  then  under 
cover  of  a  large  forest,  in  a  region  difiicult  of  access,  and 
with  the  protection  of  three  grand  tactical  units,  com- 
posed of  troops  of  all  arms,  guarding  the  points  of  issue. 

Under  similar  circumstances,  Napoleon  frequently  em- 
ployed the  same  means. 

*  General  Pierron. 


THIRD    CHAPTKR. — OPERATIONS.  437 

CONCENTRATION   OF  THE   FRENCH  ARMY  IN    1815. 

111  March,  1815,  the  Emperor  wished  to  conceal  the 
concentration  of  his  army  from  the  Allies.  The  canton- 
ments of  the  English  extended  from  the  Scheldt  in  the 
vicinity  of  Oudenarde  to  the  high-road  from  Brussels  to 
Charleroi.  Those  of  the  Prussians  covered  Namur  and 
Sombref,  near  the  confluence  of  the  Sambre  and  the 
Meuse.     {See  Plate  XXI.) 

In  the  space  comprised  between  these  two  rivers,  to 
the  south  of  Marchiennes,  the  forest  of  Beaumont  formed 
a  vast  curtain,  which  hid  from  the  Allies  the  country  be- 
tween Sobre,  Beaumont,  and  Philippeville.  It  was  there 
that  Napoleon  resolved  to  assemble  his  forces. 

But  the  enemy  was  near;  he  must  be  deceived  as  to 
the  real  points  of  concentration.  The  garrisons  of 
Lille,  Dunkirk,  and  the  neighboring  places,  received 
orders  to  advance  upon  the  English  outposts  and  push 
them  vigorously,  to  give  the  impression  that  we  were  to 
take  the  offensive  by  this  side. 

At  the  same  time  the  most  rigorous  measures  were 
ordered,  to  prevent  all  communication  upon  the  frontier. 
Even  camp  fires  were  forbidden. 

These  measures  succeeded,  and  on  the  evening  of 
June  14,  the  French  army,  entirely  assembled,  occupied 
the  following  positions:  The  ist  and  2d  Corps,  forming 
the  left  wing,  were  at  Sobre,  upon  the  Sambre,  and  at 
Ham-sur-Heure;  the  3d  and  6th  Corps  and  the  Guard, 
composing  the  centre,  were  around  Beaumont;  and  the 
right  wing,  which  consisted  of  the  4th  Corps,  was  at 
Philippeville. 

On  the  morning  of  the  15th,  Napoleon  debouched  in 
three  columns,  crossed  the  Sambre,  and  on  the  next  day, 
at  Ligny,  gave  battle  to  the  Prussians,  who,  on  account 
of  the  measures  adopted,  had  not  been  able  to  discover 
his  preparations  for  attack. 

Some  of  these  measures  are  indicated  in  the  order  of 


438  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Junej3,  1815,  which  pointed  out  to  the  army  the  posi- 
tions to  be  occupied  on  the  14th  : 

"The  cavalry  of  the  Imperial  Guard  will  be  stationed 
behind  Beaumont;  and  its  most  distant  parts  should  be 
within  a  league  of  that  place. 

"The  2d  Corps  will  take  position  at  Leers,  that  is  to 
say,  as  near  as  possible  to  the  frontier  without  crossing 
it.  The  four  divisions  of  this  corps  will  be  united,  and 
will  be  bivouacked  in  two  or  four  lines:  the  headquarters 
in  the  centre,  the  cavalry  in  advance,  exploring  all 
the  debouches^  but  not  passing  the  frontier,  yet  making 
it  respected  by  any  of  the  enemy's  partisans  who  may 
attempt  to  violate  it. 

"The  bivouacs  will  be  so  placed  that  the  fires  may  not 
be  seen  by  the  enemy.  The  generals  will  see  that  no 
one  leaves  camp. 

"The  ist  Corps  will  take  position  at  Sobre-sur-Sambre 
and  will  bivouac  in  several  lines;  making  certain  that 
like  the  2d  Corps  its  camp-fires  are  not  seen  by  the  en- 
emy, and  that  no  person  leaves  camp.  The  generals 
will  assure  themselves  that  their  munitions,  supplies, 
etc.,  are  in  proper  condition. 

"The  3d  Corps  will  to-morrow  take  position  a  league 
in  advance  of  Beaumont,  as  near  as  possible  to  the  fron- 
tier, but  not  crossing  it,  nor  permitting  it  to  be  crossed 
by  any  portion  of  the  enemy.  General  Vandamme  will 
keep  every  one  at  his  post,  and  order  the  fires  to  be  con- 
cealed, so  that  they  may  not  be  seen  by  the  enemy. 

"The  6th  Corps  will  move  beyond  Beaumont,  and 
bivouac  in  two  lines,  at  a  quarter  of  a  league  from  the 
3d  Corps. 

"Marshal  Grouchy  will  send  the  ist,  2d,  3d,  and  4th 
Cavalry  Corps  in  advance  of  Beaumont,  and  bivouac 
them  between  that  place  and  Walcourt,  also  making 
the  frontier  respected,  and  seeing  that  no  one  belonging 
to  his  own  forces  crosses  it  or  allows  himself  to  be  seen, 
and  that  fires  are  concealed  from  the  enemy." 


THIRD   CHAPTER.  — OPERATIONS.  439 

The  results  of  this  operation  were  afterwards  esti- 
mated by  Napoleon  himself  in  the  following  terms : 

"Marshal  Bliicher  and  the  Duke  of  Wellington  were 
surprised  ;  they  saw  nothing,  knew  nothing  of  all  the 
movements  which  were  taking  place  near  their  outposts. 

"VI.  Sixth  Comment. — The  French  army  manoeuvred 
upon  the  right  bank  of  the  Sambre  on  the  13th  and 
14th.  It  camped,  on  the  night  of  the  14th,  within  half 
a  league  of  the  Prussian  outposts,  and  yet  Marshal 
Bliicher  had  no  knowledge  of  its  presence.  And  when, 
on  the  morning  of  the  15th,  he  learned  at  his  headquar- 
ters at  Namur  that  the  Emperor  was  entering  Charleroi, 
the  Prusso-Saxon  army  was  still  in  cantonment  over  a 
stretch  of  country  thirty  leagues  in  extent.  Two  days 
were  necessary  to  bring  its  parts  together. 

"VII.  Seventh  Comment. — The  Duke  of  Wellington 
was  surprised  in  his  cantonments.  Beginning  with  15th 
May,  he  should  have  concentrated  around  Brussels,  and 
within  eight  leagues  of  this  city,  holding  his  outposts 
upon  the  debouches  of  Flanders.  The  French  army  had 
been  manoeuvring  within  reach  of  his  outposts  for  three 
days  ;  it  had  been  engaged  in  hostilities  for  twenty-four 
hours  ;  its  headquarters  had  been  established  at  Charleroi 
for  twelve  hours — and  yet  the  English  general  at  Brus- 
sels was  ignorant  of  all  these  events,  and  his  canton- 
ments were  still  spread  over  twenty  leagues  of  ground, 
in  fancied  security." 

In  this  campaign,  the  concentration  was  protected  by 
a  natural  screen,  the  forest  of  Beaumont ;  by  a  line  of 
defense,  the  Sambre  ;  by  an  extremely  rigorous  covering 
service  ;  and  finally  by  a  manoeuvre  which  rarely  fails  of 
success — a  demonstration  of  attack  in  a  direction  widely 
different  from  the  line  along  which  the  real  movement 
is  to  be  made. 


440  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

CONCENTRATIONS  Olf  THE   1ST  ARMY  OF  THE  I.OIRE  AND  THE  ARMY 

OE   THE   NORTH   IN    1870. 

The  Government  of  National  Defense,  having  resolved 
to  continue  the  war,  was  desirous  of  taking  the  offensive 
with  the  ist  Army  of  the  Loire,  just  formed.  The  first 
step  was  to  bring  its  forces  together. 

The  enemy  was  at  Orleans. 

A  zone  of  concentration  was  then  chosen  which  threat- 
ened his  line  of  retreat,  and  furnished  a  natural  obstacle 
extensive  enough  to  conceal  the  intended  movements. 
The  forest  of  Marchenoir,  covering  on  the  east  the 
ground  between  Vendome  and  Blois,  fulfilled  these  con- 
ditions. 

The  army  concentrated  there  at  the  end  of  October, 
sheltered  by  this  forest.  It  guarded  the  debouches  from 
More  to  Lorges  by  battalions  of  gardes  mobiles  not  yet 
assigned  to  regiments. 

General  Von  der  Tann,  in  order  to  acquaint  himself 
with  the  scope  of  these  movements,  of  which  he  had 
been  apprised,  made  an  armed  reconnaissance  at  Val- 
lieres,  in  which  his  troops  were  repulsed.  On  the  8th 
of  November,  this  new  army  appeared  upon  the  eastern 
borders  of  the  forest  curtain,  and  on  the  following  day 
at  Coulmiers  successfully  attacked  the  I.  Bavarian  Corps, 
which  had  little  idea  of  its  strength  or  organization. 

During  the  same  period  the  Army  of  the  North  was 
able  to  form,  under  protection  of  the  strongholds  in  the 
departments  of  the  North  and  of  Pas-de-Calais,  organ- 
ize at  once  into  three  divisions,  concentrate  unknown  to 
the  enemy,  debouch  into  the  valley  of  the  Somme,  and, 
although  incomplete,  match  itself  against  the  I.  Prus- 
sian Army  at  Pont-Noyelles. 

3D.— SCOPE  OF  CONCENTRATIONS   AT  THE   PRESENT  TIME. 

In  our  day,  at  the  commencement  of  a  war,  the  con- 
centrations of  armies  have  no  longer  the  same  character 
as  formerly. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  44 1 

Their  scope  is  enlarging-,  and  between  two  powers  of 
the  first  order,  these  operations  will  henceforth  offer,  ac- 
cording to  a  German  expression,  the  spectacle  of  a  veri- 
table displacement  of  peoples.  Each  nation,  with  feverish 
activity,  throws  upon  its  frontiers  more  than  a  million  of 
men,  two  or  three  hundred  thousand  horses,  and  im- 
mense war  material.  One  might  almost  say  the  entire 
populations  of  the  two  states  are  poured  forth  upon  a 
narrow  space  there  to  fall  upon  each  other. 

Without  the  commercial  and  industrial  relations  ex- 
isting in  our  day,  without  the  means  of  communica- 
tion and  of  correspondence  operating  in  time  of  peace, 
the  transportation  and  supply  of  such  masses  would  be 
impossible.  In  this  regard  Franc^  and  Germany  are 
most  amply  furnished.  They  stand  alone,  perhaps,  in 
possessing  railroad  material  in  sufficient  abundance  to 
transport  the  entire  field  army.  * 

The  importance  of  concentrations  has  then  consider- 
ably increased  since  the  rapid  growth  of  the  combatant 
masses.  And,  consequently,  it  has  become  necessary  to 
bring  to  their  preparation  and  execution  the  most  skill- 
ful methods  that  can  be  devised. 

This  operation  will  henceforth  be  of  such  grave  im- 
portance that,  according  to  the  views  of  the  German 
staff,  ''''mistakes  made  at  the  outset^  in  the  assemble^nent 
of  the  armies^  cannot  be  repaired  during  the  e^itire  course 
of  the  ca7npaign. ' ' 

It  is  not  impossible,  surely,  for  a  victory  to  turn  to 
the  right  path  a  campaign  badly  begun  ;  but  in  the  light 
of  experience,  such  a  result  is  at  least  improbable. 

The  first  consequence  of  a  defective  concentration  is 
felt  upon  the  discovery  that  the  forces  are  not  at  the 
points  where  they  may  be  employed  to  the  best  advan- 
tage. In  such  a  case,  the  army  is  powerless  to  deliver 
the  battles  which  alone  could  repair  its  past  mistakes. 

*  Von  der  Goltz. 


442  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

The  campaign  of  1805  offers  us  proof  of  this  fact. 
The  principal  Austrian  army,  100,000  strong,  with  the 
best  regiments  and  the  most  skillful  general,  the  Arch- 
duke Charles,  was  ordered  into  Italy,  where,  from  ap- 
pearances, were  to  take  place  the  decisive  events  of  the 
war,  as  in  1796,  1797,  1799,  and  1800.  In  Germany,  on 
the  contrary,  there  were  brought  together  only  70,000 
men,  under  orders  of  the  Archduke  Ferdinand  and  Gen- 
eral Mack.  Soon  Napoleon  appeared  upon  the  Danube 
with  superior  forces,  hastening  from  Boulogne  by  forced 
marches.  The  catastrophe  at  Ulm  was  the  result,  and 
the  victory  gained  by  the  Austrians  in  Italy  at  Caldiero 
in  no  way  compensated  for  it. 

The  mistake  being  at  once  seen,  the  Archduke  was 
recalled  to  Germany.  But  it  was  too  late.  This  could 
not  alter  the  issue  of  the  campaign,  and  the  battle  of 
Austerlitz  put  a  term  to  it  before  the  Archduke  could 
reach  the  scene  of  active  operations. 

A  defective  distribution  of  the  forces  is  not  the  only 
unwelcome  consequence  of  a  badly  devised  concentra- 
tion. 

Ordinarily,  a  great  power  concentrates  its  armies  with 
a  view  to  take  the  offensive.  Now,  mistakes  in  the 
calculation  of  this  operation  will  usually  have  the  effect 
of  reducing  it  to  the  defensive.  In  this  case,  its  concen- 
tration, suitable  for  the  offensive,  may  become  disastrous 
when  it  finds  itself  suddenly  cast  upon  the  defensive. 

The  assemblement  of  our  army  in  1870,  is  proof  of 
this.  The  first  project  of  concentration  provided  for  the 
formation  of  two  separate  groups,  one  at  Metz,  the  other 
in  Alsace.  This  project  rested  upon  the  hope  of  a  prompt 
offensive,  and  further,  upon  political  considerations;  and 
it  commended  itself  by  the  fact  that  it  offered  increased 
facilities  for  supplying  the  masses  thus  assembled. 

Unfortunately  we  had  not  the  means  of  being  before- 
hand with  the  offensive.     The  suppositions  maSe  upon 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  443 

this  subject  proved  erroneous.  The  alliances  upon  which 
we  counted  were  illusive.  These  circumstances  snatched 
from  the  commander-in-chief  the  opportunity  of  adopt- 
ing timely  and  energetic  measures.  Finally  the  facilities 
for  provisioning  the  army,  represented  in  the  eyes  of  the 
administration  by  the  railroads  centering  at  Metz  and 
Strasburg,  were  found  from  the  beginning  to  be  entirely 
annulled  by  the  transport  of  troops  and  material  of  war. 
And  as  the  rule  then  was  to  draw  everything  from  the 
central  magazines,  it  soon  became  impossible  to  receive 
even  the  most  necessary  provisions. 

The  loss  of  the  first  combats  was  the  bitter  fruit  of  this 
unhappy  concentration. 

Moreover,  distance  and  obstacles  of  the  ground  would 
not  permit  our  two  principal  masses  to  effect  a  concen- 
tric retreat  after  these  reverses.  Their  junction,  which 
had  become  indispensable,  was  to  be  effected  upon  ex- 
terior lines,  long  and  dangerous,  and  the  movements  to 
this  end  began  by  a  retreat  upon  Chalons.  The  pro- 
traction of  this  retreat,  and  the  isolation  of  the  groups, 
gave  the  Germans  the  means  of  closing  upon  the  more 
important  one  at  Metz,  and  shutting  it  up  there.  The 
desire  to  rejoin  the  latter  at  this  place,  and  to  repair  the 
faults  incident  to  the  commencement  of  the  campaign, 
led  to  the  march  upon  Sedan  and  the  catastrophe  of  the  ist 
of  September.  This  chain  of  reverses,  or  fatalities,  as 
some  are  pleased  to  term  them,  was,  as  has  already  been 
said,  only  the  logical  consequence  of  the  faulty  dispo- 
sitions adopted  for  the  concentration  of  our  forces. 

II.— Transports. 

1ST.   PLAN   OF  CONCKNTRA.TION  AND  TRANSPORTATION. 

The  concentration  of  armies  is  intimately  connected 
with  their  mobilization.  The  end  of  the  one  marks  the 
beginning  of  the  other.     It  has,  likewise,  a  close  asso- 


444  PART   FIRST. — STRATKGY. 

ciation  with  'Oa^  projet  of  operations.  The  latter  deter- 
mines its  zone  as  well  as  the  number  of  effectives  to  be 
assembled. 

Concentration  comprises  two  periods: 

The  transport  of  troops^ 

And  their  strategic  deploy77ieiit. 

It  is  effected  according  to  a  methodical  plan  prepared 
in  advance  by  the  commander-in-chief  and  the  chief-of- 
staff. 

The  plan  of  transportation  is  regulated  by  this  first 
general  plan;  and  in  all  countries  it  is  a  secret  under- 
taking, of  which  the  general- staffs  and  the  railroad 
companies  have  entire  control.  Rapidity  of  concen- 
tration depends  in  great  part  upon  the  care  with  which 
this  plan  is  drawn  up.  It  is,  then ,  strongly  influenced 
by  the  execution  of  the  transports. 

2ND.   DURATION   OF  CONCENTRATIONS. 

The  concentration  is  of  such  importance  that  the  loss 
of  a  single  hour  should  not  be  looked  upon  as  a  matter 
of  trifling  consideration.  The  greatest  possible  number 
of  railroads  should,  therefore,  be  called  into  requisition. 

The  influence  of  these  roads  upon  the  movements  of 
armies  now  becomes  all-controlling.  It  is  understood 
that  if  each  army  corps  had  an  independent  double 
track  at  its  disposal  for  the  transportation  of  its  various 
elements  to  the  frontier,  if  it  were  stationed  upon  this 
line,  and  so  mobilized  as  to  insure  uninterrupted  use  of 
its  means  of  transport,  the  concentration  would  be 
effected  under  the  most  favorable  circumstances.  This 
would,  indeed,  be  perfection.  Finally,  if  at  the  terminal 
stations  the  sidings  were  sufficiently  numerous  to  allow 
the  trains  to  succeed  one  another  every  fifteen  minutes, 
ninety-six  trains  could  be  unloaded  in  twenty-four  hours. 
It  would  thus  be  possible  to  secure  the  arrival  of  the  one 
hundred  and  five  trains  of  an  army  corps  in  twenty-six 
and  a  quarter  hours. 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  445 

It  is  evident,  however,  that  in  practice  such  a  result 
can  never  be  reached. 

We  must  then  be  content  with  knowing  and  applying, 
within  possible  limits,  the  principles  which  insure  order 
and  rapidity  in  this  operation.  These  principles  are  as 
follow: 

First  of  all,  provision  should  be  made  for  the  wants  of 
the  troops  during  the  period  of  transportation.  On  ac- 
count of  the  positive  rule  which  prescribes  that  the  troops 
shall  be  transported  first, — the  different  arms  of  the  ser- 
vice being  apportioned  according  to  the  exigencies  of 
the  situation, — and  that  the  provision  trains  shall  be 
held  back  until  the  last,  it  must  be  calculated  that  the 
units  disembarking  during  the  first  days  will  not  receive 
their  supplies  of  provisions  in  less  than  a  week.  As  to 
the  local  resources,  it  is  estimated  that  the  richest  sections 
can  furnish  these  troops  subsistence  for  no  longer  a 
period  than  two  days.  Abundant  supplies  must,  there- 
fore, be  collected  near  the  zones  of  concentration,  either 
before  the  actual  declaration  of  war  or  during  the  period 
of  mobilization. 

To  return  to  the  transports,  it  is  essential  that  all  rail- 
roads be  utilized  without  loss  of  time,  and  without  leav- 
ing a  single  means  of  transport  unemployed. 

This  last  condition  depends  upon  the  mobilization.  In 
this  view  all  the  various  units  should  be  promptly  made 
ready,  and  sent  in  season  to  the  embarking  stations. 
The  maximum  yield  of  the  railroads  does  not,  indeed, 
depend  upon  the  speed  of  the  trains,  but  upon  their  fre- 
quency. And  to  obtain  such  returns  in  the  general 
movement,  it  is  clear  that  the  ordinary  roads  of  the 
country  must  be  combined  with  the  railroads,  and  all 
the  work  be  prepared  in  advance  with  mathematical  pre- 
cision. 

This  work  is,  in  a  general  way,  controlled  by  the  fol- 
lowing rules: 


446  .      PART  FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

For  the  transports,  single-track  railroads  are,  of  course, 
inferior  to  double-track  lines.  The  capacity  of  the 
former  was  estimated  in  Germany,  in  1866,  at  twelve 
trains  per  day,  and  of  the  latter,  at  eighteen  trains. 

To  allow  for  mischances,  however,  a  reduction  in 
these  figures  was  advised. 

It  was  calculated  that  the  transportation  of  an  army 
corps  with  all  its  accessories  would  require  eleven  days 
by  a  single,  or  seven  by  a  double-track  line.  Now  this 
body  would  be  able  to  make  on  foot  about  50  leagues  in 
II  days  and  33  in  7  days,  at  a  daily  rate  of  22  kilometres 
[13  miles],  with  two  days  of  rest  in  the  first  case  and 
one  in  the  second. 

It  is  then  certain  that  railroads  should  be  employed  as 
a  means  of  transportation  for  troops  only  for  long  dis- 
tances. 

Under  these  conditions,  in  computing  the  returns, 
counting  eight  and  twelve  trains  for  single  and  double- 
track  roads  respectively,  the  Germans  estimated  that 
they  could  dispatch — 

Upon  a  single-track  railroad: 

A  division  of  infantry  complete  in  66  hours; 

A  division  of  cavalry  in  63  hours; 

An  army  corps  without  trains  in  seven  days; 

An  army  corps  complete  in  eleven  days. 

Upon  a  double-track  line  : 

A  division  of  infantry  in  44  hours; 

A  division  of  cavalry  in  42  hours; 

An  army  corps  without  trains  in  four  and  two-thirds 
days; 

An  army  corps  complete  in  seven  and  a  half  days. 

With  a  mean  speed  of  26  kilometres  [16  miles]  an 
hour,  our  neighbors  calculate  that  a  body  of  troops  can 
be  transported  157  kilometres  [97^  miles]  in  six  hours, 
315  [196  miles]  in  twelve  hours,  and  630  [391  miles]  in 
twenty-four  hours. 


THIRD   CHAPTKR. — OPERATIONS.  447 

Consequently,  in  order  to  move  an  army  corps  900 
kilometres  [560  miles],  two  months  would  be  required  by 
ordinary  roads,  thirteen  days  upon  a  single-track,  and 
nine  days  upon  a  double-track  line  of  railroad. 
.  But  for  a  distance  of  112  kilometres  [70  miles]  it 
would  require: 
.    Upon  a  single-track  line,  eleven  days; 

Upon  a  double-track  line,  eight  days; 

By  ordinary  roads,  five  days.* 

There  is  thus  a  minimum  distance  below  which  the 
employment  of  railroads  would  be  disadvantageous.  It 
is  a  limit  that  may  always  be  easily  determined  by  the 
circumstances  of  a  given  case. 

We  may  then  sum  up  thus  the  various  works  to  be 
executed  and  the  rules  to  be  followed  in  preparing  and 
operating  the  transports: 

ist.  The  establishment  during  peace  of  tables  of  march 
corresponding  to  the  different  hypotheses  of  concentration  ; 

2d.  Dispatch  of  the  units  as  soon  as  their  mobiliza- 
tion is  finished ; 

3d.    Transport  of  the  combatants  before  the  materiel; 

4th.  Complete  utilization  of  all  means  of  commtcnica- 
tion  ; 

5th.  DistiHbutio7i  of  the  disembarking  stations  at  in- 
tervals upon  the  lines  of  concentration^  the  most  dis- 
tant points  not  being  farther  than  a  day''  s  march  apart. 

III.— Strategic  Deployment. 

The  troops  having  reached  the  railroad  termini  and 
disembarked,  it  is  essential  to  consider  their  further  dis- 
position. To  leave  them  at  the  landing-places  is  impos- 
sible. They  must  be  established  to  the  front  in  such  a 
way  as  to  be  able  to  support  each  other  in  case  of  need. 

*Blume,  Strategy.     (These  figures  are  below  the  time  actually  re- 
quired. ) 


448  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Hence  the  necessity  of  making  several  marches,  gener- 
ally short,  after  disembarking,  the  effect  of  which  will 
be  to  place  each  division  upon  the  points  it  is  to  pro- 
visionally occupy.  These  movements,  however  limited, 
constitute  what  is  called  to-day  the  strategic depioynnent. 

With  the  transport,  this  completes  the  concentration 
of  the  forces  upon  a  frontier  zone,  and  is  equally  subject 
to  rules  which  we  may  very  properly  consider. 

The  strategic  deployment  is  designed  to  put  the  army 
in  condition  for  immediate  service. 

If  the  offensive  has  been  decided  upon,  the  canton- 
ments should  be  so  chosen  that  the  army  ma}'  be  able 
to  undertake  the  first  marches  as  soon  as  possible,  some- 
times even  before  the  transport  is  completed.  Their 
localities  will  be  dictated  by  the  roads  upon  which  the 
corps  must  advance  toward  the  enemy's  frontier. 

The  certaintv  of  being  able  to  take  the  initiative  of 
the  movements  will,  moreover,  give  the  power  of  ex- 
tending the  deployment.  The  contrary  would  be  the 
case  if  an  offensive  movement  on  the  part  of  the  enemy 
was  feared. 

Once  the  strategic  deployment  is  ended,  each  army 
will  occupy  a  certain  number  of  frontier  points  consti- 
tuting its  front.  The  direction  of  this  front  with 
reference  to  the  enemy's  lines  of  operations,  is  not  a 
matter  of  indifference;  it  should  vary  according  to  cir- 
cumstances. In  principle,  as  we  have  already  seen,  it 
is  so  ordered  as  to  be  prepared  for  all  contingencies, 
while,  if  possible,  threatening  the  adversary's  line  of 
communications. 

In  ever}^  case,  the  first  condition  of  success  for  a 
strategic  deployment,  as  well  as  tfor  a  concentration,  is 
security. 

Hence  arises  the  necessity  for  double  precaution: 

In  the  first  instance,  to  protect  the  frontier  against  the 
enemy's  incursions  during  the  period  of  mobilization; 

Then,  to  cover  the  concentration. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  449 

Now,  at  the  moment  war  is  declared,  the  protection 
of  the  territory  devolves  entirely  upon  the  garrisons 
nearest  the  enemy.  But  immediately  afterwards,  or  at 
the  same  time,  if  possible,  a  defensive  screen  should  be 
organized,  capable,  by  its  strength  and  the  extent  of  its 
front,  of  allowing  the  various  bodies  to  assemble  and  to 
support  each  other  in  case  of  attack. 

Hence  arises  the  obligation  of  sending  to  the  front 
strong  masses  of  cavalry  reinforced  by  artillery,  and  sup- 
ported in  rear,  if  circumstances  require  it,  by  a  large 
infantry  unit. 

The  duty  at  this  time  resting  upon  the  cavalry  is  at 
the  present  day  usually  performed  by  the  independent 
divisions  of  this  arm.  It  is  one  of  the  features  of  their 
reconnaissance  service. 

To  cover  the  concentration  of  the  army  is,  however, 
only  a  part  of  the  service  they  are  called  upon  to  render 
at  this  critical  time.  They  must,  in  addition,  seek  to 
retard  the  union  of  the  enemy's  forces. 

Such  a  result  ought  to  assure  great  advantages  to 
whichever  belligerent  succeeds  in  obtaining  it. 

It  may,  indeed,  be  asked  what  would  be  the  conse- 
quences of  a  raid  boldly  carried  out,  on  the  day  follow- 
ing the  declaration  of  war,  by  eight  or  ten  brigades  of 
cavalry,  each  accompanied  by  a  battery.  Throwing 
themselves  unexpectedly  upon  the  enemy's  territory, 
they  would  hasten  to  burn  his  magazines  and  destroy 
his  railroads,  detraining  stations,  and  other  important 
works,  spreading  terror  among  the  inhabitants  for  sixty 
leagues  from  the  frontier,  and  at  one  blow  arresting 
mobilization  and  concentration. 

A  glance  is  sufficient  to  reveal  the  consternation  which 
such  an  event  would  kindle  on  the  one  side,  the  confidence, 
ardor,  hope  of  victory  it  would  awaken  on  the  other. 

France  must  expect  enterprises  of  this  kind  in  a  future 
war  with  her  neighbors. 
29 


450  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

The  means  for  undertaking  them  are  all  prepared, 
and  there  is  but  one  way  of  replying — to  be  in  our  turn 
prepared  to  act  in  the  same  way. 

"In  every  instance,"  says  Von  der  Goltz,  "the 
parts  of  an  army  charged  with  protecting  the  frontiers 
during  the  concentration,  should  be  diverted  from  the 
main  operations  only  while  engaged  in  the  performance 
of  this  duty.  It  is  essential  that  the  troops  be  so  dis- 
posed that  all  of  them  may  be  available  and  easily  united 
when  the  necessity  arises  for  striking  heavy  blows." 

.  In  1866,  Field-Marshal  Benedek  departed  from  this 
rule,  and  thus  at  the  outset,  the  fractions  of  his  army 
were  beaten  separately  before  the  hour  for  decisive  en- 
gagements. 

As  a  result  of  our  study,  we  may  conclude  that  the 
rapidity  with  which  armies  will  be  able  henceforth  to 
assemble,  will  depend  upon  their  more  or  less  perfect 
system  of  mobilization,  and  the  number  of  independent 
railroads  that  their  government  may  have  at  its  disposal. 

These  conditions  can  not  be  created  by  the  genius  of 
a  general-in-chief,  but  rather  by  the  prudence  of  govern- 
ments, and  by  the  sacrifices  that  a  people  is  willing  to 
make. 

Those  peoples  who  recognize  the  importance  of  these 
advantages,  will  be  ever  ready  to  submit  to  all  the  ex- 
penses which  these  military  operatio^is  entail.  Those 
who,  not  understanding  it,  or  distracted  by  pre-occupa- 
tions  of  another  kind,  neglect  them  during  peace,  may 
be  certain,  beforehand,  of  condemning  their  armies  to 
the  defensive,  and  their  country  to  invasion. 

Whatever  may  be  the  difficulties  presented  b}^  a  con- 
centration, this  truth  must  be  understood,  that  the 
strategic  deployment  of  an  army  is  the  only  act  of  war 
that  depends  completely  upon  the  will  of  the  supreme 
directing  power. 

The  combinations  connected  with   it,   however  com- 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  45 1 

plicated  they  may  be,  are  under  the  control  of  no  outside 
circumstances.  Here  it  is  only  necessary  to  will,  in  order 
to  succeed.  The  responsibility  which  in  this  connec- 
tion falls  to  the  commanders-in-chief  and  to  their  staffs, 
is  consequently  exercised  to  its  fullest  extent. 

It  is  later  only  that  the  sovereign  forces  of  chance 
come  into  play  to  put  a  hand  upon  the  course  of  events. 

Without  further  extending  these  considerations,  we 
see  that  there  exist  certain  general  principles  for  strategic 
deployments  as  well  as  for  transports,  which,  though 
not  absolute  in  their  character,  greatly  facilitate  the 
concentration  of  armies. 

They  may  thus  be  stated: 

ist.  Before  the  concentration,  assemblenient  near  the 
disembarking  stations^  of  provisions  sufficient  to  supply 
the  army^  at  least  during  the  entire  period  of  transpor- 
tation; 

2d.  Protection  of  the  frontier^  from  the  day  war  is  de- 
clared, by  the  first  disposable  troops; 

3d.  Dispatch  to  the  frontier  of  the  first  mobilized  units^ 
for  the  purpose  of  cover  irig  the  strategic  deployment ; 

4th.  Distribution  of  the  corps  arid  divisions  ripon  the 
zone  of  concentration^  in  order  more  or  less  close  (gener- 
ally en  echelon)^  according  to  the  probable  character  of 
the  first  combats; 

5th.  Concentration  of  the  armies  upon  angular  fronts^ 
when  the  circumstances  are  favorable  for  such  a  direc- 
tion. 

Contemporaneous  military  history  offers  us  various 
examples  of  concentrations. 

That  of  Prussia,  in  1866,  is  one  of  the  most  fertile  in 
instruction.  Upon  its  completion,  it  appeared  entirely 
natural;  but  if  one  recurs  to  the  circumstances  which 
characterized  its  beginning,  he  is  struck  with  the  diffi- 
culties lying  in  its  way. 


452  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

IV.— Concentration  of  Modern  Armies. 

1ST. — CONCENTRATION   OF  THE   PRUSSIAN   ARMIES  IN   1866. 

In  this  year  Prussia  had  nine  army  corps,  including 
the  Guard,  distributed  thus: 

I.       Corps Kcenigsberg. 


11. 

III. 

IV. 

V. 

VI. 

VII. 

VIII. 


Stettin. 

and  the  (^uard   .    .  Berlin. 


Magdeburg. 

Posen. 

Breslau. 

Miinster. 

Coblentz. 


The  first  preparations  for  war  commenced  secretly 
during  the  latter  part  of  March. 

The  Prussian  mobilization,  ordered  on  May  3,  was 
ended  by  the  23d.  It  had  thus  required  a  mean  of  from 
twenty  to  twenty-one  days  to  completely  mobilize  an 
army  corps. 

As  to  transports  and  strategic  deployments,  they  were 
not  executed  rigorously,  in  accordance  with  the  prevail- 
ing rules  on  the  subject. 

Difficulties  of  tlie  Situation. — Prussia  was  in  a  delicate 
situation.  She  was  obliged  to  make  head  against  three 
groups  of  enemies.  To  the  South,  Austria  and  Saxony 
could  unite  264,000  combatants.  They  controlled  a  ter- 
ritory which  projected  a  salient  against  the  centre  of  the 
Prussian  monarchy.  From  the  summit  of  this  salient, 
the  expanded  valley  of  the  Elbe  stretched  away  to  with- 
in a  few  marches  of  Berlin. 

On  each  side  of  this  summit,  a  mountain  chain,  diffi- 
cult of  access,  inclined  toward  the  south,  making  any 
line  of  communications  precarious. 


THIRD   CHAPTKR. — OPERATIONS.  453 

To  the  South-west,  the  South  German  States  had  a 
force  of  100,000  combatants  at  command,  which  would 
perhaps  be  joined  to  the  first  group.  The  frontier  separ- 
ating these  States  from  Prussia,  was  co-incident  with  the 
course  of  the  Main.  To  the  West,  Hanover  and  Hesse 
contained  about  40,000  troops.  This  fact  was  not  of 
much  importance;  but  their  territory  extended  to  the 
Elbe,  and  if  these  forces  were  neglected,  Prussian  com- 
munications with  the  Rhine,  as  well  as  with  the  Duchies 
of  the  Elbe,  might  perhaps  be  cut. 

Prussia  had  then  before  her  three  groups  of  enemies, 
three  groups  of  forces,  and  three  frontiers.  Moreover, 
grave  political  considerations  obliged  her  to  treat  with 
circumspection  the  populations  she  thought  of  annex- 
ing, and  this  necessity  weighed  heavily  upon  her  delib- 
erations. 

The  positions  of  her  enemies  made  it  difficult  to  keep 
up  the  close  intercourse  with  her  ally,  Italy,  that  the 
necessities  of  the  case  demanded. 

Prussia's  concentration  was  to  be  effected  in  the 
midst  of  these  divers  embarrassments. 

It  was  fair  to  suppose  that  Austria  would  be  able  to 
mobilize  240,000  combatants,  and  that  the  majority  of 
these  would  be  sent  against  her  northern  enemies,  the 
Prussians.  It  was  probable,  moreover,  that  the  decisive 
events  of  the  struggle  would  occur  on  this  side. 

On  May  12,  it  was  learned  at  Berlin  that  Austria  was 
concentrating  three  of  her  ten  army  corps  in  Italy;  that 
her  transports  had  begun  on  the  nth;  that  her  cavalry 
was  eii  route  toward  the  Moravian  frontier;  and  that 
with  due  activity  she  counted  upon  having  considerable 
forces  assembled  on  the  borders  of  Saxony  and  Silesia 
by  the  end  of  the  month. 

From  nine  to  twelve  days  were  then  required  by  Prus- 
sia to  transport  a  corps  with  its  accessories.  The  period 
varied  according  to  the  character  of  the  road.     What- 


454  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

ever  the  distance,  it  was  understood  that  the  railroads 
used  would  not  be  entirely  closed  to  commerce,  and  that 
only  a  small  number  of  trains  would  be  available  for  the 
service  of  the  commissary  and  quartermaster  depart- 
ments. 

It  was  already  known  that  the  movements  of  all  the 
corps  would  not  be  completed  before  the  first  week  of 
June,  and  that  to  reach  even  this  result  not  an  hour 
was  to  be  lost.  All  railroad  lines  were  to  be  used  in  the 
transport,  and  none  was  to  move  more  than  one  corps. 
To  transport  more  than  this  number  upon  a  single  line 
would  be  to  increase  the  concentration  period  by  from 
nine  to  twelve  days. 

On  the  8th  of  April,  1866,  a  treaty  of  offensive  alli- 
ance— for  a  while  kept  secret — had  been  concluded  with 
Italy  against  Austria.  Nevertheless,  negotiations  with 
a  view  to  an  arrangement  continued  with  the  latter 
power,  with  the  lesser  German  States,  with  the  Ger- 
manic Confederation,  and  other  European  powers. 
These  negotiations  were  of  a  character  difficult  to  un- 
derstand until  later.  An  incident  will  suffice  to  illus- 
trate. 

On  April  20,  the  Austrian  Government  learned  that 
50,000  troops  of  the  Neapolitan  provinces  had  already 
concentrated  between  Modena,  Bologna,  and  Ferrara; 
that  there  was  an  Italian  force  of  more  than  200  battal- 
ions in  IvOmbardy  and  Tuscany;  that  the  transportation 
of  merchandise  by  rail  had  been  entirely  suspended  in 
Italy  since  April  15,  and  replaced  by  military  convoys. 
On  22d  April  it  addressed  a  communication  upon  this 
subject  to  the  cabinet  at  Berlin. 

Count  Bismarck  deferred  replying  until  the  30th, 
when  he  said:  "There  are  no  armaments  in  Italy  of  a 
menacing  character,  and  those  which  have  taken  place 
justify  our  conviction  that  an  unprovoked  aggression 
against  the  Austrian  Empire  is  far  from  the  intentions 
of  the  cabinet  of  Florence.    =*=  *  * 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  455 


u, 


Count  Bismarck  hopes  that,  upon  receivinq^  more  pre- 
cise information,  the  Imperial  government  will  arrive  at 
the  conviction  that  the  reports  which  have  reached  it 
concerning  the  aggressive  intentions  of  Italy  are  en- 
tirely withont  foundation,  and  that,  consequently,  it 
will  return  to  a  permanent  peace  footing." 

Now  at  this  very  moment  war  had  been  resolved  upon, 
Prussia  believed  the  situation  so  tense  as  to  warrant  mo- 
bilization, but  too  uncertain  to  permit  fixing  the  date 
and  place  of  her  concentrations. 

In  the  first  part  of  May,  the  group  of  enemies  of  the 
West  had  indeed  made  its  attitude  plain;  but  Prussia 
was  doubtful  if  it  dare  take  part  in  actual  hostilities. 
As  to  the  South  German  States,  "they  were  enemies 
yet  to  be  born. "  The  Austro-Saxon  group  alone  pre- 
sented an  organized  army,  strong,  and  soon  to  be  in  con- 
dition to  fight. 

In  anticipation  of  events,  the  Prussian  government 
then.  May  3,  ordered  a  first  assemblement  of  five  army 
corps. 

The  V.  and  VI.  Corps  were  to  concentrate  at  Neisse 
and  Schweidliitz,  in  Silesia;  the  III.  and  IV.  in  Lower 
Lusatia,  between  Torgau  and  Kottbus;  the  VIII,  at 
Coblentz.     {See  Plate  XXII. ) 

This  movement  of  troops  was,  in  a  certain  sense,  a 
precautionary  measure.  It  did  not  yet  correspond  to 
future  operations.  It  was  completed  by  the  assemble- 
ment of  the  Guard  at  Berlin,  and  the  two  divisions  of 
the  VIL  Corps  at  Minden  and  Miinster. 

In  reality,  Prussia  began  by  a  sort  of  half-concentra- 
tion, contrary  to  her  principles  and  to  the  customary 
rules  prescribing  that  large  tactical  units  shall  not  be 
concentrated  before  the  time  of  their  transportation  to 
the  frontier.  But  she  took  existing  circumstances  for 
her  pilot;  and  not  knowing  at  the  time  whether  the 
peoples  whose  annexation  she  contemplated  would  be 


456  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

friends  or  enemies,  she  resolved  to  treat  tlieni  as  enemies. 
This  was  logical  and  practical. 

At  the  end  of  May,  it  was  clearly  seen  at  Berlin  that 
a  decisive  solution  of  the  questions  raised  could  be  found 
only  in  the  Austrian  front.  In  consequence,  it  was  de- 
cided first  of  all  to  assemble  on  this  side  the  seven  corps 
in  the  East,  and  then  the  two  corps  cantoned  in  the 
Western  provinces.  A  body  of  troops  composed  of  the 
garrison  regiments  and  the  forces  from  the  Duchies  was 
formed,  and  with  these  it  was  resolved  to  crush  Hanover 
and  Hesse  with  unsparing  hand.  This  arose  from  the 
necessity  of  first  of  all  getting  rid  of  the  groups  of  ene- 
mies nearest  the  heart  of  the  monarchy. 

Selection  of  the  Zone  of  Concentration. — It  was  only  when 
this  decision  was  reached  that  the  Prussian  staff  sought 
to  fix  the  zone  of  concentration  of  the  forces  destined  to 
act  against  Austria. 

The  outline  of  the  Bohemian  frontier,  and  the  position 
taken  by  the  Saxon  troops  within  seven  marches  of 
Berlin  and  five  of  Breslau,  as  well  as  the  situation  of  the 
Austrian  corps  at  Reichenberg  and  Trautenau,  upon  the 
highways  conducting  to  the  two  capitals,  led  to  the  be- 
lief that  these  two  large  cities  might  be  threatened.  The 
Prussian  provinces  which  therefore  seemed  exposed  to 
the  first  blows  of  the  enemy,  were  Lusatia  and  Silesia. 
It  was  impossible  to  cover  them  both  with  a  single  army. 
The  space  to  be  protected  was  too  extended,  and,  more- 
over, the  Bohemian  frontier  permitted  the  turning  of  an 
isolated  army  by  the  north  or  east. 

Two  separate  masses  were  therefore  required.  This 
division  was  rendered  still  further  necessary  by  the  im- 
possibility of  feeding  an  excessively  large  number  of 
men  upon  a  limited  area. 

The  separation  of  the  first  two  Prussian  armies  at  the 
outset,  was  afterwards  very  much  criticised.     The  Prus- 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  457 

sian  staff  very  well  understood  that  it  was  a  defective 
formation,  but  considered  it  a  necessity,  replying  as  fol- 
lows to  the  objections  raised  on  this  head: 

"In  acting  thus,  it  is  perfectly  evident  that  an  Aus- 
trian army  concentrated  beforehand,  would  be  able  to 
fall  upon  one  of  the  parts  of  the  Prussian  army.  But 
whatever  disposition  might  be  made,  nothing  could 
change  the  configuration  of  the  theatre  of  war,  nor  alter 
the  fact  that  there  was  an  enemy  stationed  in  Bohemia 
between  Lusatia  and  Silesia." 

Thus  the  configuration  of  the  frontier,  the  presence  of 
the  enemy's  forces,  uncertainty  as  to  the  projects  that  he 
was  supposed  at  this  period  to  entertain,  the  obligation 
to  protect  neighboring  provinces,  and  the  necessity  of 
occupying  a  region  of  considerable  size  for  the  supply  of 
the  troops,  were  so  many  reasons  for  leading  the  Prus- 
sians to  assemble: 

.  ist.  A  Jirst  army^  composed  at  the  outset,  of  the 
II.  III.  and  IV.  Corps  under  Prince  Frederick  Charles 
in  Lusatia,  around  Kottbus,  a  railroad  centre  leading 
into  Saxony  and  Silesia,  and  upon  Berlin. 

2d.  A  second  ariny^  composed  at  first  of  the  V.  and 
VI.  Corps,  and  the  detachments  already  established  in 
Silesia,  under  command  of  the  Crown  Prince,  cantoned 
upon  the  Neisse.  The  Guard,  whose  role  was  still  unde- 
cided, was  to  take  position  between  Baruth  and  Luckau. 
Finally  the  I.  Corps  was  to  be  moved  to  Gorlitz,  to  con- 
nect the  two  groups,  and  to  be  ready  to  reinforce  either 
in  case  of  need. 

In  order  to  hold  Saxony  in  check,  it  was  resolved  to 
concentrate  upon  the  frontier  at  Zeitz  a  third  arniy^ 
called  the  Artny  of  the  Elbe^  composed  of  the  VII.  and 
VIII.  Corps. 

It  was  learned,  toward  the  middle  of  May,  that  the 
States  of  the  South  would  surely  support  Austria.  It 
was  further  known  that  political  reasons  and  the  char- 


458  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

acter  of  their  organization  would  prevent  dispatch  in 
their  movements.  Prussia  thus  persisted  in  the  project 
of  taking  vigorous  action  against  the  Duchies  of  the  Elbe, 
Hanover,  and  Hesse,  and  of  uniting  then  the  different 
forces  which  had  engaged  on  this  side,  and  joining  to 
them  a  division  which  had  been  left  in  observation  at 
Wetzlar,  in  order  to  form  an  army  of  the  Main^  to  be 
charged  with  contending  against  the  South  German 
States. 

Finally,  in  order  to  prepare  for  all  contingencies,  a 
reserve  corps  was  assembled  at  Berlin. 

All  this  was,  no  doubt,  complicated;  but  the  disposi- 
tions made  corresponded  to  the  situation.  They  may 
be  epitomized  thus: 

To  co7iceiitrate  one  group  of  forces  before  each  group 
of  the  enerny  except  in  case  of  Austria  ;  two  against  her. 

The  difficulties  of  this  concentration  were  so  evident, 
that  in  takino-  command  the  Kingr  announced  that  the 
composition  of  the  armies  was  not  final,  and  that  he 
would  modify  it  in  accordance  with  the  course  of  events. 

Transports  of  the  Prussian  Army. — The  orders  were  issued 
May  15  and  16.  At  this  time  the  first  regiments  had 
finished  their  mobilization;  the  concentration  transports 
began  immediately,  on  the  i6th,  before  the  general  mo- 
bilization was  finished.  In  realit)^  these  transports 
were  made  in  two  movements.  The  first,  accomplished 
during  the  period  of  indecision,  from  the  i6th  to  the  23d 
of  May,  was  designed  to  secure  Prussia  against  sur- 
prise and  sudden  invasion.  It  was  executed  by  only 
four  corps:  the  V.  (Posen),  VI.  (Breslau),  III.  (Berlin), 
and  IV.  (Magdeburg.) 

The  VI. ,  stationed  in  one  of  the  threatened  provinces, 
proceeded  to  Neisse  and  Frankenstein,  almost  entirely 
by  ordinary  roads.  Its  concentration,  finished  on  the 
2ist,  had  occupied  five  days. 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  459 

The  V.  was  transported  entirely  by  the  Posen-Breslan- 
Koenigszelt  line,  occupying  twelve  days,  from  the  17th 
May  to  the  28th. 

The  greater  part  of  the  III.  was  fiioved  upon  Giiben 
in  six  days,  from  the  17th  to  22d,  by  the  line  Berlin- 
Frankfort-upon-Oder. 

The  IV.  was  transported  by  the  line  running  from 
Thuringia  into  Saxon3%  and  finished  its  movement  to 
Torgau  and  Herzberg  by  the  24th.  Eight  days  were 
required. 

At  this  time — toward  the  end  of  the  month — the 
period  of  indecision  closes.  Prussia  realizes  that  the 
enemies  she  has  provoked  are  resolved  to  fight.  She 
hears  of  their  first  movements,  and  decides  to  cover 
Lusatia  and  Silesia  by  two  armies.  The  mobilization 
is  finished.  The  forces  on  the  first  zone  of  assemble- 
ment  must  be  moved  to  that  upon  which  hostilities  are 
expected,  and  the  five  corps  left  in  rear  added  to  them. 
The  offensive  is  resolved  upon;  but  it  is  not  known  to 
a  certainty  that  this  is  possible,  nor  that  Austria  will 
allow  time  for  it.  The  necessity  arises,  therefore,  for 
Prussia  to  first  insure  the  protection  of  her  own  territory. 

The  transportation  of  the  I.  Corps  was  then  ordered 
from  Koenigsberg  to  Gorlitz,  via  Kreuz  and  Frankfort- 
upon-Oder.  This  movement,  commenced  on  May  24, 
by  means  of  eight  trains  a  day,  was  accomplished  in  ten 
days,  ending  June  2. 

The  II.  Corps,  intended  for  the  II.  Army,  was  trans- 
ported from  Pomerania  to  Herzberg  by  way  of  Berlin. 
Begun  on  the  23d  of  May,  the  movement  was  completed 
on  the  2d  of  June,  with  eight  trains  a  day,  cccupying 
thus  eleven  days. 

The  VII.  Corps,  except  one  division  left  in  Westphalia, 
was  concentrated  at  Zeitz  (by  the  Miinster  and  Diissel- 
dorf  lines),  Cassel,  and  Eisenach.  With  eight  trains  a 
day,  the  movement  was  made  in  ten  days,  from  May  27 
to  June  5. 


460  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY.  ' 

The  bulk  of  the  VIII.  Corps  was  transported  from 
Coblentz  to  Halle  by  way  of  Cologne,  Miinden,  and 
Magdeburg-  in  ten  days,  from  May  27  to  June  5,  by 
means  of  twelve  trains  a  day. 

The  Guard  did  not  arrive  until  the  middle  of  June. 

Strategic  deployment. — The  concentration  transport  of 
the  eight  Prussian  army  corps  occupied  then  twenty- 
one  days,  from  May  i6th  to  June  5.  They  formed,  ac- 
cording to  the  Prussian  staff,  a  mass  of  197,000  men, 
55,000  horses,  and  3,500  vehicles,  which  thus,  during 
the  first  week  in  June,  occupied  a  curved  line  444  kilo- 
metres [275  miles]  in  extent,  reaching  from  the  Saale  to 
the  Neisse,  and  passing  by  Zeitz,  Halle,  Torgau,  Herz- 
berg,  Gorlitz,  Schweidnitz.  Frankenstein,  and  Neisse. 

This  concentration  gave  then  : 

In  the  left  wing,  the  Army  of  Silesia^  having  two 
corps,  upon  the  front  Waldenburg-Landshut,  18  kilo- 
metres and  a  half  [about  11)^  miles]  in  extent. 

In  the  centre,  the  /.  Arniy^  upon  the  front  Kottbus- 
Torgau,  covering  89  kilometres  [about  55  miles]. 

The  distance  separating  these  two  armies  was  about 
133  kilometres  [83  miles],  or  six  marches. 

In  this  interval,  at  Gorlitz,  was  placed  the  I.  Corps, 
74  kilometres  [46  miles]  from   the  right  of  the  Army  of 
Silesia. 

In  the  right  wing,  upon  the  front  Halle-Zeitz,  was  the 
Army  of  the  Elbe,  but  a  corps  and  a  half  strong,  sepa- 
rated from  the  I.  Army  by  a  distance  of  74  kilometres 
also. 

It  would  have  required  twelve  marches  to  assemble 
these  three  groups  upon  the  centre. 

This  extension,  and  the  consequent  dispersion,  pre- 
sented dangers.  But  the  dispositions  made  must  be 
considered  as  only  a  provisional  concentration,  the  points 
occupied   forming   but  an   accidental    line — the  line  of 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  461 

railway  disembarking  points.  The  necessity  arose  then 
of  drawing  the  lines  nearer  together.  Here  other  con- 
siderations came  into  view. 

By  closing  up  her  corps,  Prussia  could  begin  opera- 
tions on  the  6th  of  June,  She  was  ready  for  this  clos- 
ing movement,  and  had  just  learned  that  the  concentra- 
tion of  the  Austrians  was  far  from  being  finished. 

All  the  chances,  therefore,  were  upon  her  side.  Nev- 
ertheless, according  to  the  official  account,  she  had  no 
disposition  to  take  advantage  of  the  favorable  situatioii. 

The  King  of  Prussia,  knowing  that  Austria  intended 
to  present  a  pacific  motion  to  the  Diet,  was  disposed  to 
await  the  result  of  this  action  before  taking  the  offen- 
sive. 

Thus  at  this  difficult  pass,  politics  might  still  have 
been  able  to  exercise  an  influence  upon  the  concentra- 
tion, at  the  very  moment  when  one  of  the  belligerents 
was  ready  to  commence  hostilities. 

Consequently,  the  Prussians  contented  themselves 
'with  bringing  their  corps  nearer  together  by  flank  move- 
ments parallel  to  the  frontier,  so  as  to  be  in  readiness  for 
executing  a  swift  concentration.  These  movements 
ended  on  the  8th  of  June. 

The  forces  then  occupied  the  following  positions: 

/.  Army :  The  II.,  III.,  and  IV.  Corps  were  in  the 
vicinity  of  Gorlitz,  with  the  I.  Corps. 

They  held  Niesky,  Binzlau,  Wiegandsthal,  and 
Warmbriinn,  forming  a  mass  of  93,300  combatants. 

//.  Army :  This  army,  115,000  strong,  was  upon  the 
Neisse,  between  Brieg  and  Patschkau. 

The  Army  of  the  Elbe  was  upon  the  Elbe,  around 
Torgau.     It  contained  46,000  combatants. 

The  other  groups  were  at  Berlin  (Reserve  Corps),  Min- 
den  (13th  Division),  Hamburg  (Manteuflfel  Corps),  and 
Wetzlar  (Beyer  Division). 

The  first  two   armies  had  a  front  of  only  148  kilo- 


462  PART   FIRST.  ^STRATEGY. 

metres  [92  miles],  from  Seuftenberg  to  Waldenbiirg. 
They  could  be  assembled  upon  the  centre  in  three  days. 
Including  the  Aimy  of  the  Elbe,  a  general  concentra- 
tion could  be  effected  within  four  or  five  days. 

News  was  received  about  this  time,  which  had  the 
effect  of  still  further  modifying  the  situation. 

On  the  nth  of  June  the  first  positive  information 
reached  the  Prussians  concerning  the  dispositions  of  the 
Austrians.  This  was  to  the  effect  that  their  principal 
forces  were  not  in  Bohemia,  as  at  first  supposed,  but  in 
Moravia,  around  Olmiitz,  and  in  a  defensive  attitude. 
From  this  the  conclusion  was  drawn  that  Lusatia  and 
Brandenburg  were  not  threatened,  and  that  Silesia  alone 
could  be  the  object  of  aggression.  It  was  also  discovered 
at  the  same  time  that  the  concentration  of  the  Austrians 
was  not  yet  finished,  and  that  they  had  decided  not  to 
advance  to  the  assistance  of  the  Saxons. 

The  latter,  on  account  of  their  weakness,  were  thus 
reduced  to  the  sad  prospect  of  abandoning  their  own 
territory,  and  moving  into  Bohemia  to  join  forces  with 
their  allies. 

The  II.  Army  was  ordered  to  make  an  immediate 
movement  to  the  front,  to  draw  its  lines  closer  together 
behind  the  Neisse,  to  cover  Silesia,  and  to  hold  itself 
ready  for  battle.  It  was  reinforced  by  the  I.  Corps. 
The  I.  Army  was  directed  to  move  by  the  left  flank,  for 
the  purpose,  of  bringing  its  parts  together  around  Gor- 
litz,  where  it  would  be  in  position  to  act  either  in  Silesia 
or  in  upper  Lusatia. 

In  reality,  these  dispositions  made  very  little  change 
in  the  situations  of  the  three  groups  designed  to  contend, 
the  one  with  Saxony,  the  other  two  with  Austria. 

The  //.  Army  occupied  the  front  Neisse-Patschkau, 
29^  kilometres  [18  miles]  in  extent,  with  a  considerable 
depth,  extending  as  far  as  Brieg. 

The  /.  Army  held  the  front  Wiegandsthal-Niesky,  50 
kilometres  [31  miles]  long. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  463 

The  centres  of  the  two  armies  were  separated  by  only 
about  148  kilometres  [92  miles],  and  their  junction  could 
be  effected  in  three  or  four  days. 

While  these  movements  were  going  for'Ovard,  the  in- 
fluence of  politics  upon  the  preliminary  operations  was 
growing  feebler.  On  the  14th  of  June,  it  ceased  alto- 
gether, in  consequence  of  a  decision  of  the  German  Diet 
to  commence  hostilities. 

The  King  of  Prussia  then  resolved  to  take  the  offen- 
sive, and  as  his  armies  were  well  in  advance,  he  deter- 
mined to  unite  thein  upon  the  enemy's  territory,  which 
for  him  was  the  quickest  possible  means  of  bringing 
them  together* 

It  was  thus  that  the  invasion  of  Saxony  was  decided 
upon  (which  permitted  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  to  support 
itself  upon  the  I.  Army  by  way  of  Bautzen),  and  that 
the  I.  and  II.  Armies  were  given  orders  to  invade  Bo- 
hemia. 

To  sum  up,  the  transports  of  the  three  Prussian  armies 
(I.,  II.,  and  Army  of  the  Elbe),  begun  on  May  16,  were 
finished  on  June  5. 

The  strategic  deployment  was  completed  on  i8th  of 
June,  by  the  last  movements  of  the  Guard  and  the  re- 
serve troops. 

Prussia  had  thus  been  able,  in  twenty-one  days,  to 
move  masses  to  her  southern  frontier,  which  the  Aus- 
trian staff" estimated  in  rationnaires  as  follows: 

MEN.  GUNS. 

I.  Army 97,020  300 

II.  Army 120,000  342 

Army  of  the  Elbe 48,840  144 

Totals 266,850  786 

The  concentration  of  the  Prussian  armies  in  1866 
was,  as  we  see,  extremely  difficult.  This  arose  from  a 
complicated    and    doubtful    political   situation,    which 


464  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

lasted  'until  the  end  of  the  movement,  and  from  en- 
forced ignorance  of  the  plans  of  the  various  adver- 
saries— their  points  of  assembly  and  the  forces  which 
they  counted  upon  putting  in  line.  It  is  also  to  be 
observed  that  upon  learning  of  the  choice  of  Moravia  as 
the  Austrian  zone  of  concentration,  the  Prussian  staff 
was  greatly  surprised,  and  could  explain  this  selection 
only  on  the  ground  of  "the  traditional  selfishness  of  the 
house  of  Austria,  which  induced  it  to  abandon  its  allies 
in  order  to  seek  before  everything  the  recovery  of  one 
of  its  former  provinces,  Silesia."  In  reality,  however, 
the  choice  of  this  zone  was  dictated  by  other  considera- 
tions. Seeing  Prussia  ready  before  her,  Austria  had 
resolved  to  stand  upon  the  defensive,  and  in  this  per- 
suasion had  adopted  for  zone  of  concentration  a  region 
protected  by  fortified  places  situated  upon  the  flank  of 
the  adversary's  lines  of  invasion.  If  the  Austrian  staff 
denied  the  fact  later,  and  attributed  it  to  political  con- 
siderations, this  was  to  cast  all  the  odium  of  the  war 
upon  Prussia. 

We  know  that  defeat  was  the  consequence  of  the 
system  adopted  by  the  Austrians. 

2ND.— CONCE;nTRATION  of  the  GERMAN  ARMIES  IN  1870. 

In  this  year,  the  concentration  of  the  Prussian  armies 
was  simpler  and  easier,  although  the  number  of  effect- 
ives was  very  much  higher. 

This  arose  from  various  causes:  first  of  all,  from  the 
improvements  realized  since  1866;  then  from  the  well- 
defined  character  of  the  political  situation. 

Railroad  transport  service  had  undergone  melioration, 
and  at  the  time  the  war  broke  out,  reached  a  high  state 
of  efficiency. 

All  the  movements  were  prepared  in  advance.  The 
i6th  of  July,  1870,  was  fixed  upon  as  the  first  day  of 
mobilization,  and  on  the  17th,  the  tables  of  march  were 
sent  to  the  army  corps. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  465 

A  few  days  afterwards,  food  for  six  weeks  was  col- 
lected near  the  zone  of  concentration,  and  nothing 
remained  but  to  assure  the  protection  of  the  early  assem- 
blements  on  the  frontier;  but  it  was  not  supposed  that 
strong  enough  masses  could  be  sent  forward  to  prevent 
access  of  the  enemy. 

Surveillance  of  the  Frontier  by  a  Defensive  Screen. — The 
question  then  was  simply  to  guard  the  frontier  with 
care,  and  to  display  enough  troops  to  make  it  respected. 
This  was  so  much  the  more  essential,  as  it  was  expected 
that  the  French  army  would  take  the  offensive.  With, 
this  before  them,  the  garrisons  of  the  Rhenish  Provinces 
and  of  the  Palatinate  were  raised  to  the  war  effective 
at  the  earliest  practicable  moment,  and  charged  with 
observing  our  movements  by  reconnaissances  made  in 
all  directions. 

It  was  thus  that  the  Rhenish  Provinces  were  guarded 
from  Treves  to  Bliescastle,  during  the  interval  between 
July  16  and  July  25,  upon  an  extent  of  68  kilometres 
[42  miles],  by  three  regiments  of  infantry  and  two  of 
cavalry,  numbering  in  all  about  10,600  men.  After 
July  25  another  regiment  of  cavalry  was  added. 

In  the  Palatinate,  the  frontier  was  protected  between 
the  i6th  and  19th  of  July,  from  Homburg  to  Lauter- 
bourg,  a  distance  of  72  kilometres  [45  miles],  by  three 
battalions  and  five  squadrons  (six  after  July  22),  sup- 
ported in  rear  by  a  brigade  of  infantry  and  by  detach- 
ments of  special  arms  stationed  at  Landau  and  Germers- 
heim;  or  a  total  of  about  10,000  men. 

Thus,  up  to  July  23,  a  defensive  screen  of  about  six- 
teen battalions  and  fourteen  squadrons  sufficed  to  cover 
a  reach  of  140  kilometres  [87  miles]  of  frontier. 

We  know,  however,  that  this  zone  did  not  become  the 
object  of  aggression. 

After  the  23d  of  July,  the  eighth  day  of  mobilization, 

31 


466  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

the  situation  changed.  There  was  alreadjMn  the  Palat- 
inate a  complete  division  of  infantry,  the  4th  Bavarian, 
and  upon  the  right  bank  was  the  Baden  Division  with 
eight  squadrons,  ready  to  support  it. 

Moreover,  at  this  date,  the  first  mobilizations  had  ter- 
minated. 

Transport  of  the  Prussian  Armies. — Prussia  learned  the 
composition  of  the  French  army  and  the  positions  of  its 
different  corps  upon  the  frontier.  In  seeing  them  thus 
assembled  without  awaiting  the  arrival  of  the  reserves, 
the  Prussians  were  strengthened  in  the  belief  of  an  of- 
fensive designed  to  prevent  their  concentration. 

Hence  it  became  essential  first  of  all  to  protect  the 
troops  while  leaving  their  transports  at  the  railroad 
stations,  and  to  cover  the  strategic  deployment. 

Regarding  the  I.  Army,  nothing  was  to  be  feared.  Its 
line  of  march  followed  the  neutral  frontier  of  Luxem- 
burg, which  formed  a  shelter.  If  the  French  offensive 
assumed  shape,  this  army  was  always  in  condition  to 
arrest  the  movement  in  season.  It  was  the  same  with 
the  III.  Army.  It  had  no  cause  for  alarm  in  the  rela- 
tively weak  group  occupying  lower  Alsace.  However, 
its  proximity  to  the  frontier  imposed  upon  it  a  very  close 
concentration. 

The  II.  Army,  on  the  contrary,  could  be  assailed  by 
the  masses  assembled  in  Lorraine,  and  reduced  to  the 
defensive.  The  Prussian  staff  admitted  this  hypothesis 
during  the  few  days  of  uncertainty  as  to  our  move- 
ments. 

Consequently  it  resolved: 

Tst.  Not  to  unload  the  forces  of  this  army  too  near  the 
frontier; 

2d.  To  have  the  disembarking  stations  in  rear  of  a 
line  of  defense; 

3d.  To  move  this  army  forward  only  when  in  con- 
centrated formation,  with  its  parts  ready  for  action. 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  467 

The  line  of  the  Rhine,  at  six  marches  from  the  fron- 
tier, was  chosen  as  the  disembarking  region. 

Orders  were  given  in  conseqnence,  and  on  Jnly  24  the 
transports  began. 

The  details  of  this  rapid  displacement  of  a  half  mil- 
lion of  men,  150,000  horses,  1,200  pieces  of  artillery, 
and  theenormons  materiel  requisite  for  this  vast  host, 
are  well  known.  It  is  needless  to  review  them;  it  will 
suffice  to  recall  that  this  movement  was  terminated  on 
the  date  prescribed,  August  5,  or  in  thirteen  days.  The 
transport  of  an  army  corps  at  the  rate  of  twelve  trains 
a  day  upon  single-track  roads  and  eighteen  upon  double- 
track  lines,  required,  as  we  have  seen,  only  a  space  of 
from  three  and  a  half  to  five  and  a  half  days. 

Strategic  Deployment. — Orders  for  the  strategic  deploy- 
ment were  issued  on  July  23,  and  communicated  to  all 
the  corps  commanders. 

According  to  these  orders  the  I.  Army  was  to  be  con- 
centrated by  August  2,  between  Treves  and  Hermeskeil. 

The  II.  Army,  by  August  5,  between  Bingen  and 
Mannheim. 

The  III.  Army,  by  August  3,  between  lyandau  and 
Carlsruhe. 

These  movements  were  executed  in  accordance  with 
the  plan  prescribed,  and  gave  the  following  results: 

/.  Army  (2  corps).  The  VII.  Corps,  disembarking  at 
Aix-la-Chapelle  and  Call,  July  26  and  27,  reached  the 
zone  of  concentration  in  an  averatre  of  six  marches. 
The  VIII.  Corps,  mobilized  in  the  vicinity  of  this  zone, 
was  assembled  by  ordinary  roads. 

This  army,  60,000  strong,  was  concentrated  August 
I,  upon  the  Treves-Birkenfeld  line,  along  a  front  of  48 
kilometres  [about  30  miles].  Detachments  occupied  the 
line  of  the  Sarre  from  its  mouth  to  Sarrebruck,  and  its 
principal  crossings. 


468  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

//.  Army.  This  army  disembarked  upon  a  defensive 
position,  while  awaiting  fuller  information  regarding 
our  projects. 

Its  four  corps  were  transported  upon  two  railroads 
only,  and  were  cantoned  in  the  neighborhood  of  the 
cities  where  they  had  disembarked.  None  of  these 
troops  had  been  obliged  to  make  a  single  march.  For 
this  army  the  general  situation  was  modified  before  the 
end  of  the  transport.  After  July  28,  the  German  lead- 
ers knew  that  they  had  not  to  fear  an  offensive  on  our 
part.  Hence  the  corps  already  disembarked,  and  the 
two  cavalry  divisions  of  the  11.  Army,  were  pushed  for- 
ward to  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  From  this  it  re- 
sulted that  the  first  strategic  deployments  were  com- 
pleted under  peculiar  conditions. 

The  corps  disembarking  first,  marched  toward  the  en- 
emy's frontier,  and  cleared  the  way  while  the  transport 
was  still  going  on.  By  an  order  of  the  commander-in- 
chief  the  disembarking  points  were  located  nearer  the 
frontier,  and  the  trains,  which  at  the  outset  had 
stopped  on  the  Rhine,  now  continued  their  movement 
into  the  Palatinate. 

On  the  ist  of  August  this  army  was  established  upon 
the  line  Fiirfeld-Hochspeyer,  over  a  front  of  45  kilo- 
metres [28  miles],  with  two  corps  in  the  first  line, 
covered  by  two  divisions  of  cavalry.  These  two  corps 
each  held  one  of  the  high-roads  leading  to  our  territory, 
which,  with  the  adjacent  communications,  were  to  form 
the  lines  of  operations.  Each  high-road  had  also  a  cor- 
responding railroad. 

The  other  corps,  for  the  most  part  still  incomplete, 
were  echeloned  in  rear,  at  distances  varying  from  29  to 
45  kilometres. 

As  to  the  ///.  Army^  it  had  on  this  date  116  bat- 
talions, 86  squadrons,  and  300  guns  concentrated  from 
Bergzabern  to  Carlsruhe,  upon  a  front  of  39  kilometres 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  469 

[24  miles].  Its  future  line  of  operations,  whicli  was  to 
run  through  the  Rhine  plain  between  the  Vosges  and 
the  river,  included  two  principal  roads:  that  from  Lan- 
dau to  Strasburg  by  way  of  Wissembourg,  Soultz,  and 
Haguenau;  and  that  from  Germersheim  to  Strasburg, 
by  way  of  Lauterbourg  and  Seltz. 

The  first,  the  most  important,  was  supplemented  by  a 
railroad.  Its  deboiiche  beyond  our  frontier  was  occupied 
at  Bergzabern,  7  kilometres  from  Wissembourg,  by  a  di- 
vision of  infantry,  which  was  supported  by  a  corps 
cantoned  at  Landau,  13  kilometres  [8  miles]  in  rear. 

The  second  road  was  occupied  by  a  brigade  at  Rhein- 
zabern,  and  by  a  corps  in  rear  at  Germersheim. 

These  two  highways  were  covered  by  outposts  as  far 
as  the  frontier;  all  the  important  crossings  upon  the 
flanks  were  guarded,  and  connection  was  established 
upon  the  right  with  the  neighboring  army. 

To  provide  against  an  offensive  movement  by  our 
Alsace  troops,  orders  were  given  for  an  immediate  as- 
semblement  upon  a  chosen  position.  The  forces  cantoned 
upon  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  could  be  united  in  half 
a  day. 

On  the  ist  August  the  transports  of  the  Germans  were 
still  unfinished,  and  yet  the  strategic  deployment  of 
their  principal  masses  could  be  considered  as  ended. 

Although  these  armies  were,  therefore,  not  in  a  con- 
dition of  entire  completion,  they  yet  at  this  time  com- 
menced their  first  offensive  movements,  with  a  view  of 
attacking  the  frontier. 

To  summarize,  at  the  date  indicated,  the  group  com- 
posed of  the  three  German  armies  presented  on  its  base 
of  operations  the  following  formation: 

Upon  each  wing,  an  army  pushed  to  the  enem^^'s 
frontier,  constituted  an  advanced  echelon.  In  the  centre, 
the  principal  army,  at  a  mean  distance  of  two  marches 
from   the   wings,    formed    a    second    echelon.       These 


470  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

masses  occupied  in  force  the  railroads  and  ordinary 
roads  leading  to  our  territory.  Each  of  the  armies  of 
the  wings  had  its  outward  flank  resting  on  a  line  of  de- 
fense: the  Moselle  to  the  north,  and  the  Rhine  to  the 
east.  The  one  on  the  left  possessed,  moreover,  two 
strong  places  upon  its  base.  The  corps  were  placed  in 
echelon,  and  sufficiently  concentrated  to  be  united  in  a 
day,  although  there  no  longer  was  reason  to  suppose  an 
offensive  movement  on  our  part. 

Finally,  the  corps  were  echeloned  upon  points  con- 
trolling the  principal  communications. 

§4. — ATTACK   OF   FRONTIERS. 

I.— Character  of  this  Operation. 

Before  the  invention  of  railroads,  upon  the  breaking 
out  of  war,  the  first  encounters  were  liable  to  take  place 
in  any  locality.  The  belligerent  whose  forces  were 
ready  entered  upon  the  action  at  once,  penetrated  the 
enemy's  territory,  gained  the  most  favorable  positions, 
and  sometimes  reached  the  heart  of  the  country  before 
delivering  battle.  In  every  instance,  the  difference  in 
degrees  of  preparation  between  the  two  opposing  armies 
was  considerable,  and  the  masses  could  be  directed 
against  each  other  only  by  the  ordinary  roads  of  the 
country.  Consequently  between  the  beginning  of  the 
offensive  and  the  first  engagements,  there  were  long 
marches,  covering  many  days.  At  the  present  time  this 
is  no  longer  the  case.  The  railroad  systems  of  each 
country  in  a  brief  period  pour  forth  the  armed  masses 
upon  the  frontier.  The  duration  of  the  concentrations 
is  nearly  the  same  on  each  side,  and  the  zones  upon 
which  they  are  effected,  are  brought  nearer  together. 

As  a  result,  the  first  shocks  will  generally  be  felt  upon 
the  frontiers.  The  first  act,  therefore,  of  an  army  taking 
the  offensive  will  henceforth  be  clearly  defined — the 
attack  of  the  frojitier. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  471 

Sometimes  this  will  be  accomplished  after  the  first  or 
second  march,  as  in  Alsace,  in  1870,  Under  other  cir- 
snmstances,  the  assailant  will  have,  perhaps,  three  or 
four  marches  to  make  before  engaging.  But  from  the 
time  of  the  first  movements,  he  will  be  in  contact  with 
the  adversary,  and  the  meeting  will  always  take  place 
near  the  boundaries  of  the  belligerents'  territories. 

The  first  successes  will  necessarily  be  the  result  of  the 
strategical  and  tactical  dispositions  made  at  this  mo- 
ment. Their  consequences  will  influence  the  remainder 
of  the  war  so  powerfully  that  it  is  advisable  to  seek  to 
discover  if  there  are  not  rules  to  be  followed  and  prin- 
ciples to  be  observed  in  such  a  case,  as  in  all  other  opera- 
tions of  war. 

II.— Exploration  of  Frontier  Zones. 

We  have  seen  that,  in  order  to  succeed,  the  strategic 
deployment  should  be  effected  at  a  little  distance  from 
the  frontier,  and  be  covered  by  independent  cavalry 
divisions.  . 

The  latter  should  then  prevent  all  patrols  and  all  re- 
connoitring parties  from  piercing  their  line.  For  this, 
they  must  first  of  all  know  where  the  enemy  is ;  that  is 
to  say,  resolve  each  day,  each  hour,  and  under  all  cir- 
cumstances, this  perplexing  problem,  "without  the 
solution  of  which  a  general-in-chief  can  act  only  in  the 
dark.  He  is  then  like  a  soul  in  travail,  like  a  blind 
person  that  does  not  know  where  to  direct  his  steps,  that 
advances  on  one  side  only  to  fall  back  on  the  other,  that 
consumes  himself  in  impotent  experiments,  in  restless 
hesitation,  up  to  the  very  moment  when  the  first  shell 
from  the  enemy  comes  to  acquaint  him  that  the  latter 
has  been  able  to  see  clearly  and  to  take  the  offensive. ' '  * 

*Von  der  Goltz. 


472  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

From  this  it  must  be  concluded  that  the  first  act  of 
every  army  beginning  operations  is  to  sejid  its  cavalry 
upon  exploration  service. 

The  latter  should  both  reconnoitre  and  cover.  But 
information  is  not  gained  by  the  cavalry  alone.  The 
inhabitants,  the  newspapers,  and  secret  agents,  are  so 
many  sources  of  intelligence.  One  might  easily  be  led 
to  believe  that  these  are  the  best  sources,  but  this  is  a 
mistake.  An  army  in  the  field,  especially  an  army 
which  has  taken  the  offensive,  should  make  calculations 
upon  informing  itself  only  through  its  cavalry.  Hence 
the  importance,  for  this  arm,  of  thorough  instruction  in 
time  of  peace,  and  a  sound  organization. 

As  to  the  limits  of  the  zone  of  exploration,  they  will 
in  the  beginning  be  somewhat  restricted,  in  most  cases 
not  extending  beyond  the  frontier,  for  the  enemy  is  also 
forced  to  defend  his  territory.  The  latter  will,  likewise, 
.seek  thus  to  gain  information,  and  in  consequence  to 
push  to  a  distance  numerous  squadrons  to  reconnoitre 
his  adversary's  points  of  concentration.  In  such  a  case, 
it  will  often  happen  that  the  zone  of  exploration  will 
-not  be  extended  beyond  a  day's  march.  But,  as  a  rule, 
it  should  be  stretched  to  the  front  as  far  as  possible.  The 
greater  the  distance,  the  greater  will  be  the  security  of 
the  army  ;  for  it  will  then  have  more  time  in  which  to 
concentrate  in  case  of  attack,  greater  space  in  which  to 
move,  more  towns  for  cantonments,  and  more  abun- 
dant sources. of  supply. 

It  follows  from  these  considerations  that  the  first  en- 
counters will  very  probably  take  place  either  between 
the  opposing  cavalry  or  between  small  infantry  units. 

In  these  collisions,  success  will  sometimes  be  due 
to  the  superiority  of  the  mass  and  to  the  celerity  of 
its  niovements ;  but  oftener  to  the  audacity  of  the 
leader,  to  his  tactical  skill,  and  to  the  special  qualities 
which  he  may  have  developed. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  473 

This  exploration  service  will  naturally  be  directed  upon 
the  roads  debouching  upon  the  front  and  flanks  of  the 
army.  But  it  is  possible  that  this  will  not  suffice  to  in- 
form the  general-in-chief.  He  will  then  be  obliged  to 
throw  patrols  of  officers  to  the  front,  whose  duty  it  will 
be  to  penetrate  beyond  the  veil  formed  by  the  enemy's 
cavalry,  in  order  to  endeavor  to  discover  the  movements 
of  his  masses,  their  strength,  and  their  positions. 

The  wars  of  1866  and  1870  offer  us  examples  of  enter- 
prises of  this  character. 

The  development  of  the  cavalry  screen  will  depend 
upon  the  extent  of  the  strategic  deployment  of  the  main 
forces;  and  the  distance  to  which  it  may  be  pushed  will 
vary  according  to  the  positions  of  the  enemy. 

This  will  naturally  be  the  moment  to  call  to  mind  that 
the  first  encounters,  even  the  most  insignificant,  have  a 
considerable  moral  influence  upon  the  troops. 

It  is  important  then  to  have  the  numerical  superiority 
in  the  beginning,  even  in  these  first  cavalry  engagements. 

Consequently,  the  first  reconnaissances  upon  the  fron- 
tier zones  should  be  made  by  sufficiently  large  units. 

The  number  of  cavalry  divisions  at  an  army's  dis- 
posal, will  necessarily  have  a  direct  influence  upon  these 
dispositions  and  their  results. 

In  foreign  armies,  and  especially  in  Germany,  the 
military  authorities  appreciate  this  fact.  The  Prussians 
owe  their  convictions  in  this  respect  to  Frederick  II.  In 
their  estimation,  the  general  who  has  not  in  his  hand  a 
strong  and  well-drilled  cavalry,  can  neither  move  in  a 
rational  manner  nor  aspire  to  success. 

' '  Proper  information, ' '  says  Frederick,  ' '  assures  great 
superiority.  If  one  knew  the  situation  of  the  enemy  at 
each  instant,  he  would  be  sure,  even  with  an  inferior 
army,  of  being  everywhere  the  stronger. ' '  * 

■^Frederick  the  Great,  General  Principles  of  War  (1753). 


474  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

It  will  then  be  only  after  having  received  these  first 
accounts  of  the  enemy's  intentions,  that  a  leader  will 
be  able  to  properly  direct  his  masses  toward  the  hostile 
frontier.  His  movements  will  feel  the  influences  then 
of  the  state  of  uncertainty  in  which  he  is  kept  for  a 
period,  and  to  which  he  will  generally  be  obliged  to 
submit. 

As  a  result,  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  when 
the  concentration  is  terminated  and  the  moment  arrives 
for  an  advance,  the  first  marches  will  almost  always  re- 
quire to  be  conducted  with  great  prudence.  They  merit 
the  more  attention  from  the  fact  that  the  first  successes 
or  the  first  reverses  will  ordinarily  be  the  result  of  the 
dispositions  made  at  this  time  of  hesitation;  and  the  im- 
portance of  these  initial  engagements  is  emphasized  upon 
recalling  how  great  an  influence  they  exercise  upon  the 
remainder  of  the  campaign. 

The  best  instruction  in  this  connection  is  that  fur- 
nished us  by  recent  wars. 

III.— Attack  of  the  Bohemian  Frontier  in  1866. 

We  have  already  seen  that  in  this  year  the  concentra- 
tions of  the  Prussian  armies  were  strongly  influenced  by 
the  political  difficulties  in  the  midst  of  which  they  were 
effected. 

But  on  the  14th  of  June,  the  situation  cleared.  The 
attitude  of  the  various  adversaries  was  at  length  ascer- 
tained. Prussia  determined  to  take  the  offensive,  and 
ordered  her  armies  to  make  their  final  concentrations. 

After  these  movements,  which  ended  on  June  18,  and 
which  immediately  preceded  hostilities,  the  I.  Army, 
the  Army  of  the  Elbe,  and  the  II.  Army  were  respectively 
assembled  around  Gorlitz,  Torgau,  and  Neisse,  where 
their  headquarters  were  established.  These  points  were 
distant  but  two  marches  from  the  enemy's  frontier. 

The  cavalry  scouts  had  been  pushed  to  the  boundaries 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  475 

of  the  territory,  and  the  various  roads  leading  into  Mo- 
ravia and  Bohemia  were  occnpied  in  force.  Nothing 
remained  bnt  to  attack  the  frontier. 

The  order  was  issned  on  June  22.  There  was  uncer- 
tainty as  to  whether  the  frontier  would  be  defended,  but 
the  supposition  was  that  it  would  be,  at  least  in  front  of 
the  II.  Army,  which  was  the  weakest,  and  which,  more- 
over, had  dangerous  defiles  in  its  front. 

In  consequence,  the  operation  commenced  by  the  I. 
x\rmy  and  the  Army  of  the  Elbe.  It  gave  rise,  as  is 
well  known,  to  murderous  combats,  the  results  of  which 
had  a  decisive  influence  upon  the  issue  of  the  campaign. 

To  relate  these  in  detail  would  require  too  much  space; 
a  simple  reference  to  them  will,  no  doubt,  be  sufficient 
to  call  to  mind  their  importance. 

The  events  of  1870  contain  lessons  of  experience  in 
the  matter  we  are  considering,  which  have  for  us  a  still 
more  direct  interest.  It  will  be  proper,  then,  to  study 
them  with  all  their  various  developments. 

IV.— Attack  of  the  Alsacian  Frontier  in  1870. 

1ST. — DISPOSITIONS   MADE    BY  THE   GERMANS. 

In  July,  1870,  the  III.  German  Army  had  effected  its 
concentration  upon  the  line  Landau-Carlsruhe,  divided 
into  two  parts  by  the  Rhine.  It  was  known  by  the 
Germans,  moreover,  that  we  had  no  intention  of  taking 
the  offensive  in  Lower  Alsace.  They  did  not  hesitate 
then  to  effect  their  assemblements  within  half  a  day's 
march  of  the  Lauter.  On  the  28th,  certain  thenceforth 
of  numerical  superiority,  and  seeing  that  we  had  let  slip 
the  hour  for  action,  they  resolved  to  move  forward  and 
attack  our  frontier. 

On  the  30th,  a  telegram  from  Von  Moltke  conveyed 
the  order  to  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  III.  Army 
in  these  terms: 


476  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 


u 


His  Majesty  considers  it  expedient  that  as  soon  as 
the  III.  Army  has  been  reinforced  by  the  Baden  and 
Wiirtemberg  divisions,  it  should  advance  toward  the 
south  by  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  to  seek  the  enemy 
and  attack  him.  In  this  way  the  establishment  of 
bridges  to  the  south  of  Lautersbourg  will  be  prevented, 
and  the  whole  of  South  Germany  protected  in  the  most 
effective  way.  * 

"  Sig^ned:  Von  Moltke." 


'&' 


This  order  was  not  immediately  executed;  the  Crown 
Prince  had  not  yet  completed  his  trains.  But  three  days 
later,  August  2,  his  army  was  ready,  and  to  provide 
against  an  offensive  on  our  part,  of  which  we  were  far 
from  thinking,  he  at  once  drew  his  lines  closer  together. 

In  consequence  of  these  movements,  this  army,  on 
the  3d,  occupied  the  following  positions: 

The  4th  Bavarian  Division  at  Bergzabern,  7  kilometres 
[between  3  and  4  miles]  from  our  frontier;  the  remain- 
der of  the  II.  Bavarian  Corps  in  rear  at  Germersheim. 

The  V.  Corps  at  Billigheim,  S}4  kilometres  in  rear  of 
Bergzabern. 

The  XI.  at  Rohrbach,  at  the  same  distance. 

The  I.  Bavarian  at  Lingenfeld. 

The  Baden  Division  at  Hogenbach,  7  kilometres  from 
the  frontier. 

The  Wiirtemberg  Division  at  Knielingen,  upon  the 
right  bank  of  the  Rhine,  near  Maxau. 

The  4th  Cavalry  Division  somewhat  in  rear  at  Offen- 
bach, near  Landau. 

The  outposts  of  this  army  extended  from  Schweigen 
to  Scheldt  and  Minfeld,  and  from  Buchelberg  to  Neu- 
burg. 

They  were  thus,  those  of  Schweigen  at  1,400  metres 
[t^  of  a  mile]  from  the  outskirts  of  Wissembourg,  and 
those  of  Neuburg  at  1,500  metres  from  the  frontier. 

*  Franco-German  War,  Part  i. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  477 

The  front  of  the  III.  Army  did  not  exceed  21  kilo- 
metres [13  miles].  It  was  concentrated  npon  a  space  from 
9  to  10  kilometres  deep,  less  than  half  a  day's  march, 
holding  each  of  the  important  roads  leading  from  the 
Palatinate  into  Alsace,  by  a  division. 

Resolved  to  cross  our  frontier  the  next  day,  the  4th, 
and  to  take  the  offensive  vigorously,  the  chief  of  the  III. 
Army  sent  to  his  corps  commanders  the  following  re- 
markable instructions: 


li 


"Headquarters,  Landau,  August  3. 
My  intention  is   to  move  to-morrow  as  far  as  the 
Lauter,    and    to    cross  this  stream   with    the  advanced 
troops. 

To  this  end  the  forces  will  traverse  the  Bienwald  by 
four  roads.  The  enemy  should  be  thrown  back  wher- 
ever found.  The  different  columns  will  march  in  the 
following  order: 

"  I.  The  Bavarian  Bothmer  Division,  forming  the 
advanced-guard,  will  move  upon  Wissembourg  and  en- 
deavor to  seize  it.  A  sufficient  detachment  will  flank 
its  right  by  Bollenborn  and  Bobenthal.  The  division 
will  leave  its  bivouac  at  7  o'clock  a.  m. 

"2.  The  remainder  of  the  Hartmann  Corps,  the 
Walther  Division  included,  will  set  out  at  4  A.  m.,  and 
move  upon  Ober-Otterbach,  passing  around  Landau  by 
Impflingen  and  Bergzabern. 

"The  trains  of  this  corps  will  proceed,  during  the 
course  of  the  morning,  as  far  as  Appenhofen. 

"3.  The  4th  Cavalry  Division  will  be  assembled  to 
the  south  of  Morlheim  by  6  a.  m.,  and  will  march  by 
way  of  Insheim,  Rohrbach,  Billigheim,  Barbelroth,  and 
Capellen,  as  far  as  Otterbach,  4,000  paces  to  the  east  of 
Ober-Otterbach. 

"4.  The  V.  Corps  will  leave  its  bivouac  at  Billigheim 
at  4  A.  M. ,  and  move  by  Barbelroth  and  Nieder-Otter- 
bach,  upon  Gross-Steinfeld  and  Kapsweyer. 


4/8  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

"It  will  have  its  own  advanced-guard,  which  will 
push  beyond  the  Lauter,  and  station  its  outposts  upon 
the  heights  on  the  further  bank.  The  trains  will  re- 
main at  Billigheim. 

"5.  The  XL  Corps  will  quit  Rohrbach  at  4  a.  m., 
and  direct  itself,  through  the  Bienwald,  by  Steinweiler, 
Windeu,  and  Scheidt,  upon  the  '  Bienwalds-Hiitte. '  It 
will  have  its  own  advanced-guard,  which  will  push  for- 
ward beyond  the  Lauter,  and  place  its  outposts  upon  the 
heights  on  the  further  side.  The  trains  will  be  left  at 
Rohrbach. 

''6.  The  Werder  Corps  will  march  upon  Lauterbourg, 
by  the  high  road.  It  will  endeavor  to  take  possession 
of  this  locality,  and  will  establish  outposts  upon  the 
riofht  bank.     The  trains  wnll  continue  at  Hao^enbach. 

''  7.  The  Von  der  Tann  Corps  will  leave  its  bivouacs  at 
4  A.  M. ,  and  following  the  high  road,  proceed  by  Riilz- 
heim  to  Langenkandel,  where  it  will  bivouac  to  the 
west  of  the  town.  The  trains  will  remain  at  Rliein- 
zabern.  The  corps  headquarters  will  be  moved  to  Lan- 
o^enkandel. 

"8.   I  shall  be  upon  the  heights  between  Kapsweyer 
and  Schweigen,  during  the  morning,  and  shall  probably 
establish  my  headquarters  at  Xieder-Otterbach. 
' '  Signed :     Frederick  William, 

Crown  Prince." 

2XD. — DISPOSITION   MADE    BY   THE    FRENCH   ARMV. 

While  this  offensive  was  preparing,  we  were  yet  in 
the  period  of  organization. 

On  the  ist  of  August,  in  a  letter  to  General  Dejean, 
then  Minister  of  War,  ^Marshal  Lebceuf,  chief-of-staff, 
stated  that  it  was  the  intention  of  the  Emperor  to  move 
our  7th  Corps  (Douay),  as  soon  as  possible,  toward  Lower 
Alsace,  to  unite  with  the  ist  (!Mac-!Mahon),  which  was 
to  be  directed  from  Strasburg  upon  Haguenau. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  479 

^larshal  Mac-Mahon,  apprised  of  these  projects,  and 
disturbed  by  the  reiterated  demands  of  the  municipal 
authorities  of  Wissembourcf,  arising  from  the  incursions 
of  Bavarian  patrols,  decided  to  change  the  position  of 
his  troops. 

He  consequently  issued  the  following  order  on  Au- 
gust 2d: 


Headquarters,  Straseurg,  August  2,  1870. 

The  I  St  Division  will  leave  its  positions  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  4th,  to  take  post  at  Lembach,  where  the 
division  staff  is  located;  it  will  hold  a  regiment  at  Xoth- 
weiler,  a  battalion  at  Obersteinbach,  and  a  regiment  at 
Climbach.  At  Lembach  it  will  post  a  brigade,  the  bat- 
talion of  chasseurs,  the  artillen-,  and  the  engineers. 
General  Ducrot  will  give  detailed  orders  concerning  the 
ground  to  be  occupied  by  troops  of  the  various  arms. 
He  will  have  under  his  orders  the  2d  Division  of  Infan- 
tr}-,  which  will  rest  its  right  upon  Altenstadt  and  oc- 
cupy "Wissembourg  (where  its  headquarters  will  be 
located),  Weiler,  and  the  neighboring  positions,  as  well 
as  the  pass  of  the  Pigeonnier,  by  which  it  will  be  con- 
nected with  the  ist  Division.  The  ist  Brigade  of  Cavalry-, 
composed  of  the  3d  hussars  and  nth  chasseurs,  will  be 
established  the  same  day  at  Geissberg,  so  as  to  connect 
with  the  2d  Division  of  Infantn,*,  and  be  in  condition  to 
obtain  information  upon  the  right  as  far  as  Schleithal. 
General  de  Septeuil  will  receive  instructions  from  Gen- 
eral Ducrot  upon  the  positions  to  be  occupied  by  the 
various  bodies  of  troops,  and  the  part  each  is  to  take. 
General  Ducrot,  being  acquainted  with  the  character  of 
the  ground  at  Wissembourg,  and  in  the  vicinit}',  will  as- 
sume the  task  of  indicating  the  positions  to  be  assigned 
the  different  portions  of  the  Douay  Division. 

By  order  the  Marshal  commanding  the  ist  Corps, 

"Signed:  CoLSox, 
"General  and  Chief-of-Staflf. " 


u 


480  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

This  order  was  supplemented  by  the  following  instruc- 
tions, which  General  Ducrot  addressed  to  General  Abel 
Douay,  on  August  3d: 


1ST  ARMY  CORPS.— 1ST  DIVISION  (OFFICE  OF  THE  GEN- 
ERAI.  COMMANDING). 

"  Reichshoffen,  August  3,  1870. 

Instructions  of  General  Ducrot,  August  3. — "  As  indicated 
in  the  Order  of  His  Excellency,  the  Marshal,  which  you 
have  received,  you  will  move  upon  Wissembourg  with 
your  division,  the  3d  hussars,  and  2  squadrons  of  the 
nth  chasseurs.  You  will  establish  vour  ist  brigade 
upon  the  Geissberg  plateau;  the  2d  to  the  left,  upon  the 
Vogelsberg  Plateau,  occupying  thus  the  line  of  crests 
which,  by  the  road  from  Wissembourg  to  Bitche,  is  con- 
nected with  the  pass  of  the  Pigeonnier;  the  cavalry  and 
artillery  upon  the  southwest  slope  of  the  rising  ground. 
I  think,  moreover,  that  it  will  be  easy  to  march  your 
troops  by  adopting  a  narrow  front.  You  will  this  evening 
place  a  battalion  in  Wissembourg.  Early  to-morrow 
morning  you  will  send  a  regiment  of  the  2d  brigade  to 
support  the  96th  in  the  position  occupied  by  it  between 
Climbach,  the  Pigeonnier,  and  Pfaffenschlick ;  the  96th 
will  move  in  advance,  in  the  direction  of  Nothweiler; 
one  of  its  outposts  will  be  established  at  Durremberg, 
connecting  thus  with  the  left  of  your  division  toward 
Climbach.  My  left  will  be  at  Obersteinbach,  where  it 
will  be  near  the  right  of  the  V.  Corps  at  Hulzelhof. 
My  headquarters  and  the  bulk  of  my  division  will  be 
at  Eembach;  you  may  establish  your  headquarters 
either  at  Geissberg,  Oberhoffen,  or  Roth.  The  cav- 
alry brigade  is  placed  under  your  immediate  orders,  and 
you  will  utilize  it  to  obtain  information,  either  in  front 
of  Wissembourg,  or  to  the  right  in  the  direction  of  Lau- 
terbourg. ' ' 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  481 

At  the  same  time  the  3d  Division  (General  Raoult) 
was  to  move,  on  the  3d,  from  Strasburg  to  Haguenau, 
and  on  the  4th  to  Reichshoffen.  It  was  to  be  replaced 
at  Hagnenau  by  the  4th  Division  (de  Lartigue),  then  at 
Strasbnrg.  The  7th  Corps  was  to  direct  its  ist  Division 
(General  Conseil-Dumesnil)  by  rail,  from  Colmar  upon 
Strasbnrg,  while  its  artillery  was  to  follow  on  ordinary 
roads. 

Upon  receipt  of  a  still  further  communication  from  the 
sub-prefect  of  Wissembourg,  MacMahon  ordered  Douay 
to  execute  on  the  3d  the  movement  which  had  been  pre- 
scribed for  the  4th. 

This  march  of  27  kilometres,  made  on  a  warm  day, 
required  a  rest  of  three  hours  at  Soultz,  and  very  much 
fatigued  the  troops. 

The  presence  of  the  enemy  could  not  have  been  sus- 
pected, for  the  cavalry  brigade  which  accompanied  the 
2d  Division  remained  on  the  left  of  the  column. 

The  troops  arrived  at  nightfall,  and  immediately  took 
the  positions  previously  indicated. 

The  2d  battalion  of  the  74th  (Commandant  Liaud), 
was  sent  to  Wissembourg. 

The  78th  was  designated  to  move  at  daylight,  to  re- 
lieve the  96th  at  the  pass  of  the  Pigeonnier. 

Commandant  Liaud  established  two  companies  as  a 
grand-guard  upon  the  northern  ramparts  of  Wissembourg. 

On  the  evening  of  the  3d,  our  forces  were,  then,  dis- 
tributed as  follows: 

1ST   CORPS    (mAC-MAHON). 

ist  Division  (Ducrot)  at  Reichshoffen; 
2d  Division  (Douay)  at  Wissembourg; 
3d  Division  (Raoult)  at  Haguenau; 
Brigade  of  cavalry  (Nansouty)  at  Seltz,  10  kilometres 
from  Lauterbourg; 

Brigade  of  cavalry  (Michel)  at  Brumath.; 


482  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

ist  Division  (Conseil-Dumesnil)  of  the  7th  Corps,  en 
route  from  Colmar  to  Strasburg. 

The  respective  positions  of  the  belligerents  may  be 
briefly  given  as  follows: 

In  front  of  our  border  an  army  of  170,000  men  (the 
VI.  Corps  and  the  2d  Cavalry  Division  not  having  joined 
yet),  concentrated,  ready  to  fight,  its  outposts  at  1,500 
metres  from  our  territory,  well  informed  by  its  cavalry, 
aware  of  our  numerical  inferiority  and  of  the  impossi- 
bility of  our  acting  efficiently,  and  in  condition  to  at 
once  resolutely  take  the  initiative  of  the  movements. 
-  On  our  side,  a  division  of  but  6,600  men,  all  told, 
ignorant  of  the  presence  of  the  enemy,  uncertain  as  to 
his  plans,  and  acting  under  the  impression  that  its  part 
was  simply  one  of  surveillance.  It  was,  moreover,  pro- 
tected only  by  two  or  three  infantry  grand-guards,  while 
the  cavalry  at  its  disposal  bivouacked  in  its  rear. 

As  to  assistance  from  other  portions  of  the  corps,  there 
was  nothing  to  hope  in  this  direction.  The  nearest,  the 
Ducrot  Division,  was  25  kilometres,  a  day's  march,  dis- 
tant. It  could  not  arrive  in  time  to  prevent  the  advanced 
forces  from  being  overwhelmed  by  superior  numbers. 

3D. — COMBAT  Olf  WISSEMliOURG,    AUGUST  4,    1870. 

Preliminaries. — On  the  morning  of  the  4th,  the  Ger- 
mans began  the  execution  of  the  order  issued  the  evening 
before.  The  different  forces  had  set  out  at  the  hours 
prescribed,  each  grand  unit  making  its  dispositions  in 
expectation  of  an  encounter  with  the  enemy,  the  4th 
Bavarian  Division  covering  its  right  flank  by  a  detach- 
ment.     {See  Plate  XXI I  I.) 

On  his  arrival  at  Wissembourg,  General  Douay  was 
apprised  of  the  strong  assemblements  to  the  north  of 
the  Lauter. 

He  concluded  from  this,  that  the  Prussians  were  pre- 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  483 

paring  an  offensive  reconnaissance,  and  thought  to  decide 
the  matter  definitely  the  next  day  by  gathering  informa- 
tion in  the  front. 

At  daybreak  on  the  4th,  he  moved  two  squadrons  of 
the  nth  chasseurs  forward,  supported  by  a  battalion  of 
infantry  and  a  section  of  artillery.  These  were  ordered 
to  reconnoitre  the  ground  beyond  Wissembonrg. 

The  squadrons  left  the  infantry  and  artillery  in  po- 
sition, advanced  toward  the  town,  moved  around  it 
without  entering,  gained  the  frontier  by  the  Landau 
road,  following  it  for  some  time  ;  proceeded  thence  along 
the  Spire  road,  and  returned  to  camp  at  7:30  p.  m.  with- 
out having  met  the  enemy. 

The  report  of  the  leader  of  this  force  says,  "The  re- 
connaissance extended  several  kilometres  beyond  the 
frontier,  and  only  a  few  hostile  sharpshooters  were 
seen." 

Everything  conducts  to  the  belief  that  this  reconnais- 
sance was  made  principally  in  the  direction  of  Spire, 
which  was  the  reason  why  the  Bavarian  outposts  were 
not  encountered  at  Schweigen,  1,500  metres  from  Wis- 
sembonrg. 

Ver}^  early  on  the  4th,  the  Marshal  was  warned  by  the 
Emperor  that  he  would  be  attacked  on  that  day.  He 
immediately  sent  General  Douay  the  following  dispatch, 
which  reached  the  latter  at  the  moment  when  the  recon- 
noitering  party  of  the  nth  chasseurs  was  returning  to 
its  place  of  bivouac  : 


Strasburg,  August  4,  5:27  A.  M.  (Dispatched  at  6  a.  m.) 

Have  you  gained  any  information  this  morning  lead- 
ing to  the  belief  that  the  enemy  is  assembling  in  forc& 
in  your  front? 

"Answer  immediately.  Be  watchful,  ready  to  fall 
back  upon  General  Ducrot  by  the  Pigeonnier,  should 
you  be  attacked  by  very  superior  numbers. 


484  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 


u- 


Warn  General  Ducrot,  en  route  for  Lembach,  to  be 
also  upon  liis  guard. 

"Signed:  Mac-Mahon." 


'&' 


At  this  time  the  report  of  the  squadrons  of  the  nth 
chasseurs  had  convinced  General  Douay  that  he  had 
nothing  to  fear.  It  was  for  this  reason  that  he  sent  his 
brigade  generals  the  following  order  : 

"In  the  not  very  probable  case  of  a  concentration  upon 
the  Ducrot  Division,  the  movement  will  be  commenced 
by  the  2d  brigade.  It  will  follow  the  direction  of  the 
crests  to  the  Wissembourg-Bitche  road,  passing  thus  by 
the  base  of  the  Pigeonnier  mountain  and  the  village  of 
Climbach. 

"General  Ducrot' s  headquarters  are  at  Lembach. 

"The  96th  covers  the  left  of  the  2d  Division  in  the 
direction  of  Nothweiler,  on  the  extreme  frontier." 

A  few  minutes  after  8  o'clock,  the  discharge  of  cannon 
from  the  direction  of  Schweigen,  announced  the  ap- 
proach of  the  enemy.  A  Bavarian  battery  had  just 
opened  fire  upon  the  town  of  Wissembourg. 

Development  of  the  Combat. — A  sharp  fusillade  imme- 
diately burst  forth  from  the  ramparts  when  the  Liaud 
battalion  caught  sight  of  General  Bothmer's  advanced- 
guard. 

In  the  camp  there  was  great  surprise  at  this  attack. 
No  one  expected  it  The  various  bodies  had  sent  men 
to  Wissembourg  on  fatigue  duty,  who  were  obliged  to 
hasten  back  to  their  companies. 

General  Pelle,  commanding  the  1st  brigade,  was  re- 
duced from  7  battalions  to  3.  He  had  a  regiment  at  the 
pass  of  the  Pigeonnier,  4  kilometres  distant  from  the 
theatre  of  the  engagement,  and  a  battalion  of  cliasseurs 
at  Seltz,  at  a  distance  of  20  kilometres.  The  latter  was 
acting  with  the   Nansouty  Brigade,  as  was  also  a  bat- 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  485 

talion  of  the  50th  regiment  of  the  line.  Nevertheless 
General  Pelle  at  once  moved  to  the  outskirts  of  the  town 
with  the  first  Algerian  sharpshooters,  energetically  re- 
sisting the  advance  of  the  Bothmer  Division.  One  bat- 
tery at  first,  then  two,  responded  to  the  Bavarian  guns. 
We  were  then  2,700  against  12,000.  In  spite  of  this 
disproportion,  the  vigor  displayed  by  the  sharpshooters 
arrested  the  progress  of  the  enemy. 

Towards  10  o'clock  the  right  detachment  of  the  Both- 
mer Division  reached  the  Lauter,  and  turned  toward 
Wissembourg,  taking  our  troops  upon  the  left  flank. 

At  the  same  time  the  XL  Prussian  Corps  arrived  at 
Schleithal,  6  kilometres  from  our  right,  to  the  south  of 
the  Lauter. 

General  Douay  then  comprehended  the  gravity  of  the 
situation,  and  moved  the  2d  brigade  (Montmarie)  to  po- 
sitions around  Geissberg,  favorable  for  action. 

The  Septeuil  Cavalry  was  charged  with  connecting 
the  two  brigades. 

The  troops  of  the  Montmarie  Brigade  were  hardly  in 
place  before  two  battalions  of  the  XL  Corps  arrived  at 
the  point  of  junction  of  the  Schleithal  and  Strasburg 
roads,  and  opened  a  heavy  fire  upon  them.  Our  two 
divisional  batteries  replied  as  best  they  could,  dividing 
their  fire  between  these  and  the  batteries  now  estab- 
lished upon  the  Windhof. 

The  struggle  was  maintained  with  singular  energy, 
and  near  the  town  the  resistance  of  the  sharpshooters 
obliged  the  Bavarian  Division  to  await  the  arrival  of  the 
heads  of  column  of  the  V.  Corps. 

The  latter  soon  appeared  in  sight,  moving  upon 
Altenstadt. 

From  the  summit  of  the  Geissberg,  General  Douay 
watched  the  course  of  the  contest.  When  he  saw  that 
the  enemy's  masses  were  pouring  in  from  all  sides, — by 
the  roads  north  of  the  Lauter  and  by  the  Lauterbourg, 


486  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Niederwald,  and  Schleithal  roads, — he  comprehended 
the  danger  of  prolonging  the  engagement. 

He  immediately  sent  General  Pelle  orders  to  make  a 
slow  retreat,  for  the  purpose  of  giving  Liand,  of  the 
74th,  time  to  rally  his  forces,  and  directed  the  latter  to 
evacuate  Wisserabourg. 

He  was  on  the  point  of  giving  the  same  orders  to 
General  Montmarie,  when  he  was  mortally  wounded  by 
a  fragment  of  a  shell,  dying  a  few  minutes  afterwards. 

This  event  increased  the  gravity  of  the  situation. 

General  Pelle  was  not  informed  of  it  until  toward 
noon.  At  this  time  he  was  hotly  pressed  by  the  enemy. 
The  V.  Corps,  passing  Altenstadt,  which  it  found  unoc- 
cupied, fell  upon  the  right  flank  of  the  sharpshooters. 
The  II.  Bavarian  had  resumed  the  offensive,  and  five 
batteries  posted  on  Windhof  supported  these  movements. 
Upon  other  parts  of  the  field  six  additional  batteries 
overwhelmed  us  with  projectiles. 

We  were  then  making  resistance  with  twelve  pieces 
and  six  mitrailleuses  against  sixty-six  guns  of  the  enemy. 

The  ist  tirailleurs,  under  Commandants  Sermensan, 
de  Lammerz,  and  de  Coulanges,  coped  single-handed  with 
the  troops  of  the  two  corps  by  which  they  were  beset. 

Soon  they  were  completely  outflanked,  and  their  line 
of  retreat  was  threatened. 

This  regiment  had  lost  600  men  out  of  2,200.  It  was 
nearly  enveloped  when  General  Pelle  learned  of  the 
death  of  General  Douay,  and  received  the  latter's  order. 

He  then  gave  the  signal  for  retreat,  and  this  gallant 
force  was  thus  obliged  to  abandon  to  the  enemy  the 
ground  which  it  had  so  heroically  defended. 

It  was  nearly  one  o'clock.  The  sharpshooters,  leaving 
the  valley,  withdrew  slowly  toward  Geissberg,  while  in- 
formation on  the  situation  was  sent  to  the  commander 
of  the  74th,  at  Wissembourg.  But  at  this  instant  the 
attack  was  developing  around  this  place,  and  when  Liaud 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  487 

decided  to  retire,  lie  perceived  that  evacuation  of  the 
town  was  impossible.  He  then  directed  two  companies 
npon  each  gate  to  dispute  possession  with  the  assail- 
ants. Rut  the  Haguenau  gate  had  been  opened  to  the 
Bavarians  b}^  one  of  their  countrymen  who  lived  in  the 
town,  Liaud  retook  it,  making  a  vigorous  oifensive 
movement  in  return. 

In  the  meantime  the  Landau  gate  was  carried  by  the 
enemy.  At  this  moment  Liaud  was  wounded  and  forced 
to  turn  over  the  command  to  a  captain. 

Each  group  of  two  companies  found  itself,  a  few  min- 
utes later,  surrounded  and  out  of  condition  to  continue 
the  contest.  That  at  the  Bitche  gate,  which  resisted 
longest,  learning  of  the  retreat  of  the  division,  was 
obliged  to  surrender  towards  three  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon. 

500  men  thus  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

The  latter  was  then  master  of  the  place,  and  thence- 
forth resistance  was  to  be  concentrated  at  the  farm  of 
Geissberg. 

There  General  Pelle  ordered  dispositions  to  be  made 
for  retreat,  and  rallying  the  sharpshooters,  who  again 
took  up  their  knapsacks,  led  them,  as  he  had  been 
ordered,  toward  the  heights  of  the  Pigeonnier. 

But  the  troops  of  the  2d  brigade  were  now  too  far  en- 
gaged to  be  able  to  break  off  the  action. 

The  four  battalions  composing  it,  commanded  by  en- 
ergetic leaders,  were  to  contend,  unsupported,  against 
the  masses  of  the  V.  and  XI.  Corps.  The  cavalry  had 
been  moved  to  the  rear,  toward  Riedseltz. 

The  resistance  was  renewed  in  front  of  Geissberg. 

There  a  battalion  of  the  50th,  led  by  Lieut.  Colonel 
de  la  Tour  d'  Auvergne,  repulsed  the  first  attack,  which 
was  very  violent;  but  obliged  to  yield  to  the  compact 
masses  surrounding  them,  our  troops  became  divided  at 
the  very  moment  when  Marshal  MacMahon  arrived  at 


488  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

the  pass  of  the  Pigeonnier,  inquiring  for  General  Mont- 
marie.  The  remains  of  the  two  battalions  of  the  50th 
and  74th,  under  Commandant  Cecile  of  the  74th,  shut 
themselves  up  in  Geissberg.  The  third  battalions  of 
the  same  regiments  took  post  at  the  farm  of  Schafbusch, 
500  metres  to  the  west. 

The  fight  then  waxed  desperate.  The  defenders  of 
Geissberg,  by  their  continuous  fire  and  by  two  bayonet 
charges,  repulsed  the  repeated  assaults  of  the  PrussianSo 
The  latter  endeavored  to  overwhelm  them  by  their  bat- 
teries; but  the  resistance  continued  with  unabated 
energy  up  to  the  moment  when  the  ammunition  was 
exhausted,  and  the  leader  Cecile,  who  had  so  well  sus- 
tained and  encouraged  his  troops,  had  fallen  severely 
wounded. 

At  this  time,  out  of  1,200  men  with  which  these  two 
battalions  began  the  action,  there  remained  only  200, 
with  a  few  of][icers. 

Shut  in  upon  all  sides,  without  means  of  continuing 
the  struggle,  they  were  forced  to  lay  down  their  arms. 

The  combat  was  drawing  to  an  end.  Our  battalions, 
in  obedience  to  the  orders  received,  had  retired  upon 
Kleeburg,  losing  one  piece  which  had  been  dismounted. 

The  defenders  of  Schafbusch  alone  held  out,  under 
the  orders  of  Lieut.  Colonels  Baudoin  and  la  Tour  d' 
Auvergne. 

But  after  the  taking  of  Geissberg,  seeing  the  enemy 
debouch  upon  the  plateau  in  solid  masses,  they  fired  sev- 
eral volleys  which  arrested  him;  and  then,  profiting  by 
the  hesitation  produced  in  his  ranks  by  these  discharges, 
retired  in  good  order  toward  the  wood  of  Bubeneich, 
where  they  disappeared. 

The  Germans  contented  themselves  with  throwing 
their  last  shells  at  this  column. 

It  was  about  half  past  two:  the  action  was  ended,  and 
the  enemy  not  in  condition  to  attempt  pursuit. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  489 

Comments. — From  7:30  a.  m.  until  2:30  p.  m. ,  a  divi- 
sion of  6,663  ^iicn  and  302  officers  had  foiif^ht  against 
three  German  army  corps. 

It  had  yielded  only  after  losing  its  general,  2,221  men 
(700  of  them  prisoners),  and  89  officers. 

The  loss  in  killed  and  wonnded  alone  was  23  per 
cent.  * 

It  had  disabled  1,460  men,  and  91  officers  of  the  enemy, 
and  for  seven  honrs  had  resisted  the  attack  of  70,000 
troops,  supported  by  144  guns. 

It  had  then  fought  in  the  proportion  of  one  man 
against  ten. 

Notwithstanding  the  surrenders  at  Wissembourg  and 
Geissberg,  this  action  was  most  honorable. 

But  the  defeat  was  not  the  less  a  great  misfortune. 
The  confidence  of  our  troops  was  shaken,  that  of  the 
enemy  excessively  heightened;  the  prestige  of  our  arms 
was  lowered;  the  soil  of  our  country  was  trodden  by  the 
foreigner. 

Causes  of  the  Defeat. — x\t  the  outset,  an  unduly  excited 
public  opinion  sought  to  find  the  cause  of  this  reverse 
in  a  lack  of  vigilance  or  a  fault  in  our  strategy. 

In  reality,  if  the  morning  reconnaissance  had  been 
made  in  a  different  manner,  like  those  of  the  Prussians, 
for  example,  there  is  no  doubt  that  General  Douay  would 
have  received  timely  notice  of  the  enemy's  presence. 
For  this  it  would  have  sufficed  if  the  brigade  of  cavalry 
had  directed  two  squadrons  upon  each  of  the  roads  lead- 
ing from  Wissembourg  to  the  north,  and  the  reconnais- 
sance been  pushed  to  a  distance  of  not  more  than  seven 
or  eight  kilometres. 

General  Douay  would  thus  have  been  enabled  to  fall 
back  and  avoid  a  disaster. 

*The  proportion  of  losses  at  Marengo  was  18.6  per  cent.;  at  Jena, 
4  per  cent.;  at  Eylau,  15.8  per  cent.;  at  the  Moskwa,  16. i  per  cent. 


490  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

His  advanced  position  exposed  him  to  dangers  only 
in  case  of  failure  to  keep  himself  informed  of  what  was 
going  on  in  his  front. 

If  on  the  evening  before,  in  his  march  upon  Wissem- 
bourg,  his  division  had  been  preceded  by  his  cavalry  at  a 
distance  of  half  a  day's  march,  he  would  have  been  ac- 
quainted with  the  gravity  of  the  situation  on  the  even- 
ing of  the  3d. 

If  the  troops  camped  at  Seltz  had  in  the  same  way 
reconnoitered  to  a  distance  of  twenty  kilometres,  and, 
finally,  if  their  reconnaissance  had  been  executed  with 
the  boldness  and  vigor  traditional  with  our  cavalry,  it  is 
bevond  doubt  that  Marshal  Mac-Mahou  and  General 
Ducrot  would  have  made  the  dispositions  required  by 
the  circumstances  of  the  situation. 

The  first  cause  of  this  repulse  was  then  the  insuffi- 
ciency of  reconnaissance  service  upon  the  frontier. 

It  is  to  this  want  of  information  that  we  must  attribute 
the  other  tactical  errors,  such  as  the  dispersion  of  the 
forces. 

This  combat,  moreover,  has  disclosed  other  imperfec- 
tions: 

ist.  During  the  action,  two  regiments,  the  78th  and 
96th  (over  4,000  men),  had  remained  assembled  at  Clim- 
bach,  eight  kilometres  from  Wissembourg,  awaiting 
under  arms  the  order  to  move  forward;  but  this  order 
was  not  given. 

With  the  Prussians,  notwithstanding  the  disproportion 
between  the  troops  engaged,  it  is  probable  that  this 
force  would  have  hastened  to  the  scene  of  conflict  with- 
out orders. 

2d.  The  2d  Division,  in  taking  its  positions,  on  the 
evening  of  the  3d,  was  not  placed  so  as  to  guard  the  pas- 
sages of  the  Lauter,  the  probable  aim  of  its  movement. 

These  unfortunate  positions  had  been  previously  pre- 
scribed to  it,  and  its  chief  had  no  authority  to  post  it 
elsewhere. 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  491 

And  yet,  as  the  Prussians  have  observed,  it  was  not 
possible  to  defend  the  approaches  to  Wissembonrg  with- 
out occupying  the  passage  at  Altenstadt,  which  per- 
mitted the  place  to  be  turned  from  the  east. 

3d.  The  disproportion  of  our  artillery  and  the  general 
inferiority  of  this  arm  in  presence  of  the  Prussian  artil- 
lery, indicated  with  what  difficulty  it  would  thence- 
forth prepare  for  the  attacks  of  our  infantry. 

4th.  It  may  be  said  that  there  was  generally  on  our 
part  a  false  impression  regarding  the  German  forces, 
their  number,  their  military  education,  their  intrinsic 
value  as  troops,  and  the  resources  at  their  disposal. 

5th.  Lastly,  when  possessed  of  proper  information, 
we  did  not  seem  able  to  discern  the  scope  of  the  enemy's 
assemblements  and  the  aim  of  his  movements.  Even 
the  attack  upon  the  frontier  had  escaped  our  notice,  up 
to  the  moment  when  it  burst  upon  us  with  full  intensity. 

The  instruction  most  clearly  presented  by  the  combat 
of  Wissembonrg  is  that  henceforth  it  will  be  impossible 
for  a  force,  whatever  be  its  strength,  to  properly  estab- 
lish itself  upon  a  position  without  information  of  what 
is  going  on  at  least  a  day's  march  to  the  front. 

To  sum  up,  insufficiency  of  reconnaissance  service, 
lack  of  proper  proportion  of  field  guns,  deficiency  in 
their  power,  and  want  of  experience  concerning  the  con- 
ditions of  modern  war — such  were  the  defects  which 
this  unhappy  event  disclosed. 

But,  regarding  the  attack  of  frontiers,  it  suggests 
other  reflections.  The  III.  Army  had  profited  by  the 
numerical  weakness  of  our  forces  in  Alsace  to  effect  its 
concentration  within  a  short  day's  march  of  our  terri- 
tory.    Then,  as  soon  as  ready,  it  was  thrown  forward. 

Its  attack  of  the  frontier  was  an  exceptional  case. 
The  Germans  well  understood  the  inferiority  of  their 
adversaries  in  point  of  effectives  ;  their  leaders  had  only 
to  assemble  an  imposing  mass  and  set  it  in  motion. 


492  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

In  the  future,  circumstances  so  favorable  will  rarely 
present  themselves,  and  in  order  to  understand  the  proper 
character  of  a  frontier  attack  in  modern  times,  we  must 
revert  to  the  events  which  were  happening  upon  the 
Sarre  at  the  same  instant. 


v.— Attack  of  the  Sarre  Frontier  in  1870. 

1ST. — MARCH  OF   THE   II.  GERMAN  ARMY  IN    1870,  FROM   ITS   ZONE  OF 
CONCENTRATION   TOWARD   THE   FRONTIER. 

It  was  on  29th  July,  1870,  that  the  Prussians  began  to 
gather  from  the  situation  the  first  information  casting 
doubt  upon  our  offensive.  Then,  sensible  that  the  II. 
Army  was  cramped  in  its  cantonments  upon  the  right 
bank  of  the  Rhine,  it  was  resolved  to  move  some  of  the 
corps  to  the  front. 

This  army  represented  to  us  then  the  centre  of  a  group 
of  armies  which,  assembled  within  six  marches  of  the 
frontier,  was  about  to  move  upon  it,  while  holding  it- 
self in  readiness  for  an  encounter  with  the  opposing 
masses.  This  is  one  of  the  normal  conditions  of 
modern  war. 

On  July  29  the  II.  Army  received  a  telegraphic  order 
from  the  King  to  move  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine 
and  occupy  the  line  Alsenz-Golheim-Griinstadt.  This 
line  had  been  reconnoitred,  and  seemed  suitable  for  de- 
fense. It  was  upon  the  eastern  slope  of  the  Haardt,  and 
controlled  the  roads  traversing  this  extensive  plateau. 
A  defensive  position  had  even  been  selected  at  Mann- 
heim.     {See  Plate  XXIV.) 

The  order,  moreover,  directed  two  corps,  the  III.  and 
IV.,  which  were  nearly  completed,  to  be  moved  to  this 
line,  the  advanced-guards  to  be  sent  beyond  it,  and  two 
other  corps,  the  IX.  and  XII.,  to  be  pushed  forward  as 
rapidly  as  possible,  to  remove  the  pressure  from  the  can- 
tonments in  rear. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  493 

This  order  was  executed;  but  as  information  concern- 
ing the  enemy  was  the  first  requisite  even  for  the  least 
important  movements,  this  army  was  directed  to  dis- 
patch its  two  cavalry  divisions  as  soon  as  practicable 
along  the  frontier  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Sarre,  and  watch 
this  river  from  Sarrebruck  to  Bitche.  The  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  German  armies  at  the  same  time  gave 
orders  for  the  IX.  Corps  to  enter  the  first  line.  The  IT. 
Army  was  then  put  in  motion,  and  its  commander,  in 
order  to  cover  it  in  the  direction  of  our  forces,  indicated 
with  precision  to  his  two  cavalry  divisions  the  service 
they  were  expected  to  perform. 

He  ordered  them  to  move  to  within  a  short  march  of 
the  frontier,  that  is  to  say  60  kilometres  from  the  front 
occupied  by  the  French,  to  take  position  there,  make 
continual  reconnaissances  with  detachments  ranging  in 
strength  from  a  battalion  to  a  regiment,  feel  the  adver- 
sary, and  keep  in  contact  with  him. 

This  order  was  deemed  sufficient  to  determine  all  the 
movements  of  the  II.  Army,  the  two  leading  corps  of 
which  were  at  Fiirfeld  and  Kaiserslautern  on  the  31st, 
while  the  left  was  in  rear  upon  the  Rhine. 

On  the  same  day  the  reconnaissances  were  begun  in 
accordance  with  instructions  received  the  evening  before. 

The  5th  and  6th  Divisions  of  Cavalry,  under  General 
Rheinbaben,  formed  three  columns,  and  held  the  two 
high  roads  leading  into  Lorraine,  those  from  Mayence 
and  Mannheim  to  Sarrebruck.  To  the  right,  two  bri- 
gades marched  by  way  of  Baumholder  upon  Volklingen. 
To  the  left,  a  brigade  marched  by  Kaiserslautern  upon 
Homburg. 

A  detached  regiment  was  directed  upon  Pirmasens  to 
connect  the  II.  and  III.  Armies. 

The  strongest  column  occupied  the  principal  com- 
municating line,  that  of  the  Nahe. 

Each  flank  column  was  to  be  followed,  at  a  distance 


494  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

of  one  short  march,  by  an    infantry  division  charged 
with  supporting  it. 

On  this  day,  the  31st,  the  front  of  exploration  of  the 
two  cavalry  divisions  extended  from  Martinstein  to 
Diirkheim,  a  distance  of  63  kilometres  [39  miles]. 

The  movement  continued  during  the  following  day, 
and  the  front  of  exploration,  which  nearly  corresponded 
to  the  front  of  march  of  the  II.  Army,  was  reduced  to 
43  kilometres  [about  27  miles]. 

Reports  received  at  general  headquarters  went  more 
and  more  to  confirm  belief  in  our  defensive  attitude. 
From  July  24,  moreover,  the  German  generals  knew  ex- 
actly the  composition  of  our  army,  the  number  of  our 
effectives,  and  the  positions  of  our  various  corps. 

Notwithstanding  this,  the  forward  march  was  con- 
ducted with  the  greatest  prudence.  The  Germans  were 
satisfied  with  extending  their  detraining  stations  as  far 
as  Baumholder  and  Kaiserslautern,  in  the  centre  of  the 
Palatinate. 

On  August  2,  the  exploration  front  was  still  further 
reduced,  and  did  not  exceed  35  kilometres.  It  was 
pushed  but  28  kilometres  beyond  the  front  of  march. 
The  latter  front  was  very  much  compressed,  and  did  not 
exceed  29  kilometres.  The  cavalry  divisions  were  31 
kilometres  distant  from  our  frontier. 

Connection  was  established  by  this  army  with  the  I. 
Army  near  Tholey,  and  with  the  III.  by  the  arrival  of 
the  left  detachment  at  Pirmasens. 

It  held  its  front  upon  a  line  of  defense,  the  Lauter,  a 
tributary  of  the  Nahe,  and  was  on  the  point  of  entering 
the  long  defiles  of  the  wooded  zone  of  the  Palatinate. 

The  commander-in-chief  was  still  imperfectly  in- 
formed of  our  intentions;  he  believed  that  the  situation 
called  for  the  exercise  of  continual  caution,  and  issued 
his  orders  accordingly. 

In  case  there  was  any  indication  of  an  offensive  move- 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  495 

meiit  upon  the  part  of  the  enemy,  the  IT.  Army  was,  on 
the  2d  and  3d,  to  hold  itself  upon  the  line  Offenbach- 
Kaiserslantcrn. 

In  the  contrary  case,  it  was  to  make  a  short  march  of 
15  or  16  kilometres,  and  await  the  closing  up  of  all  the 
corps  to  within  half  a  day's  march. 

This  was  a  species  of  concentration,  with  a  view  to  be 
prepared  for  a  possible  forward  movement  on  the  part  of 
the  enemy;  and  although  the  forces  were  still  48  kilo- 
metres (2  marches)  from  the  frontier,  it  was  considered 
necessary  to  prescribe  it. 

'  From  this  time,  the  proximity  of  our  boundary  per- 
mitted Prince  Frederick  Charles  to  gather  daily  news 
concerning  our  movements,  and  to  govern  his  dispo- 
sitions accordingly.  We  have  only  to  recall  these  dis- 
positions in  order  to  follow  the  progress  of  the  II.  Army. 

The  events  of  2d  August  show  simply  a  more  marked 
contact  between  the  French  and  German  outposts. 

There  was  still  no  manifestation  of  the  offensive  on 
our  part. 

At  the  Prussian  headquarters,  it  was  concluded  from 
this,  that  the  second  part  of  the  plans  of  the  generalissimo 
could  be  carried  out.  It  was,  therefore,  ordered  for  the 
next  day,  that  the  leading  troops  occupy  a  new  position 
in  advance,  and  that  the  forces  on  the  left  close  upon  the 
main  body. 

We  see  that  up  to  August  3,  the  situation  was  still 
uncertain.  The  German  leaders,  notwithstanding  their 
exact  acquaintance  with  our  positions,  did  not  discern 
our  plans,  and  were  on  the  whole  inclined  to  believe  in 
our  offensive. 

But  as  the  general  aim  of  their  movement  was  to  seek 
our  principal  army  and  defeat  it,  they  did  not  hesitate 
to  push  their  corps  against  us,  while  at  the  same  time 
adopting  all  defensive  measures  required  by  the  situa- 
tion. Up  to  this  time,  therefore,  the  uncertain  and  the 
unknown  were  still  the  controlling  elements. 


496  PART   FIRST.  — STRATEGY. 

The  II.  Army  marched  deliberately  forward,  while 
accelerating  its  final  debarkments  and  seeking  informa- 
tion concerning  the  enemy.  After  3d  Angust,  thanks  to 
its  cavalry,  the  situation  became  clearer. 

The  movements  made  this  day  gave  the  following 
results: 

The  cavalry  extended  from  Biw^eiler  to  Guichenbach, 
Homburg,  and  Einod,  upon  an  exploration  front  of  34 
kilometres.  It  was  40  kilometres  (2  marches)  from  the 
army's  front  of  march,  and  very  near  the  position  pre- 
scribed to  it,  within  half  a  march  of  the  frontier. 
-  The  army  itself  was  echeloned  upon  two  lines.  In  the 
first  were  two  corps,  the  III.  and  IV.,  their  advanced 
divisions  at  Konken  and  Bruckmiihlbach.  In  second 
line  were  four  corps,  the  X.,  XII.,  IX.,  and  the  Guard, 
at  Fiirfeld,  Alzey,  Griinstadt,  and  Kaiserslautern  respec- 
tively. During  its  march  the  6th  Division  of  Cavalry 
had  received  information  of  the  combat  of  August  2  at 
Sarrebruck. 

The  measures  determined  upon  as  a  result  of  this  in- 
formation, are  worthy  of  being  recalled.  It  seemed  to 
indicate  an  offensive  demonstration  on  our  part  upon 
Volklingen,  Sarrebruck,  and  Sarreguemines.  After- 
wards the  retreat  of  our  columns  proved  that  this  de- 
monstration had  been  without  results.  The  staff  of  the 
6th  Division  might  have  looked  upon  this  movement 
as  without  particular  importance,  and  have  continued 
the  march  without  giving  itself  further  concern;  but  it 
took  a  wider  view  of  the  matter,  concluding  that  this 
information  was  useless,  except  so  far  as  it  taught  the 
expediency  of  procuring  still  further  information,  and 
that  to  this  end  it  was  necessary  to  reach  the  forces  that 
we  had  displayed,  with  the  utmost  speed,  and  by  all 
disposable  roads.  , 

In  consequence,  this  division  from  Klein-Ottweiler 
upon    the    Neunkirchen-Homburg    line,     dispatched    a 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS,  497 

squadron  upon  each  of  the  four  principal  roads  leading 
to  the  frontier,  wliose  duty  was  to  keep  in  contact  with 
us,  reconnoitre  our  forces,  and  study  our  movements. 

In  the  meantime,  the  commander  of  the  II.  Army 
was  apprised  of  the  combat  at  Sarrebruck  by  a  telegram 
from  the  generalissimo.  This  engagement  and  our  de- 
monstrations at  Sarreguemines  and  Volklingen,  were 
considered  as  indicating  our  intention  to  take  the  offen- 
sive. 

But  while  combinations  were  prepared  in  accordance 
with  this  hypothesis,  the  squadrons  sent  upon  recon- 
noitring duty  reached  the  frontier  and  attacked  our 
patrols.  Their  first  reports,  transmitted  at  once  to  head- 
quarters, set  the  facts  of  the  case  in  their  proper  light, 
and  served  to  correct  the  first  impression.  These  squad- 
rons, in  pushing  forward,  discovered  that  we  everywhere 
fell  back  when  approached.  They  even  took  prisoners, 
from  whom  valuable  information  was  obtained. 

Definite  conclusions  could  be  drawn  from  all  these 
collected  facts:  the  country  was  clear  as  far  as  the  Sarre 
and  the  Blies,  but  strongly  occupied  beyond.  In  the 
evening  a  telegram  from  the  generalissimo  confirmed 
this  judgment.  He  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  II. 
Army  would  be  able  to  deploy  beyond  the  wooded  zone 
of  Kaiserslautern.  He  no  longer  feared  an  attack  on 
our  part.  But  as  it  was  necessary  to  provide  for  every 
contingency,  he  ordered  the  I.  Army  to  be  held  in  read- 
iness to  protect  the  right  of  the  II.  Army  during  its  de- 
ployment, and  the  latter  to  occupy  in  case  of  necessity  a 
defensive  position  behind  the  Lauter,  faced  to  the  west. 
In  this  situation  the  two  forces  would  have  been  formed 
on  an  angular  front;  and  if  the  French  army  had  at- 
tacked, it  would  have  been  compromised. 

The  generalissimo  at  the  same  time  announced  that 
the  III.  Army  would  the  t^ext  day  attack  the  frontier 
upon  the  left,  and  stated  that  in  all  probability  it  would 

33 


498  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

be  possible  to  take  a  general  offensive  within  a  very 
short  period.  The  first  impression  produced  by  the 
combat  of  Sarrebruck  had  then  been  corrected  by  the 
reconnaissances  of  the  cavalry,  and  by  the  intelligence 
which  came  from  all  points  of  the  exploration  front: 
the  enemy'' s  columns  are  retirijig.  It  was  this  rectifica- 
tion of  ideas,  which,  joined  to  the  forward  state  of  the 
German  strategic  deployment,  led  to  the  resolution  of 
the  next  day  to  take  the  offensive  and  to  make  the  first 
passage  of  the  frontier.  On  this  day,  August  3,  the 
II.  Army's  front  of  march  did  not  exceed  28  kilometres. 
It  would  then  have  been  sufficiently  concentrated  to  fight 
had  not  some  of  the  corps  of  its  second  echelon  been 
beyond  a  day's  march  in  rear.  Moreover,  the  infantry 
divisions  marching  at  the  head  of  the  column  were  now 
more  than  a  day's  march  distant  from  the  cavalry  divi- 
sions which  they  were  to  support;  however,  an  order  from 
the  generalissimo  was  soon  to  diminish  this  depth. 

One  peculiarity  is  worthy  of  notice:  in  consequence 
of  closing  up  the  front  of  march,  the  right  reconnoit- 
ing  column  now  covered  the  front  of  the  I.  Army;  its 
squadrons  had  traversed  the  zone  of  the  latter' s  canton- 
ments. As  a  result  there  was  a  mixing  of  the  units  of 
the  two  armies,  and  the  beginning  of  a  conflict  of  au- 
thority between  their  commanders.  In  order  to  adjust 
the  difficulty.  Von  Moltke  prescribed  with  precision  the 
line  which  was  to  separate  the  zones  of  march  of  these 
armies.  It  would  seem  to  result  from  this,  that  a  de- 
marcation of  zones  is  indispensable  in  every  such  case. 

The  movements  executed  on  Aiigust  4  emphasized  the 
offensive  attitude  which  the  II.  Army  had  resolved  to 
take  from  the  day  when  it  became  acquainted  with  our 
situation. 

The  front  of  march  covered  only  24  kilometres,  but 
the  depth  was  still  great.  The  dispositions  were  nearly 
the  same  as  those  of  the  evening  before,  but  the  cavalry 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  499 

had  reached  the  points  prescribed  for  it  half  a  march 
from  the  frontier.  Soon  it  would  be  able  to  undertake 
reconnaissances  upon  a  grand  scale,  cover  the  systems 
of  roads  leading  toward  the  adversary,  penetrate,  thanks 
to  our  inaction,  to  within  reach  of  our  forces,  and  even 
strike  our  communications. 

It  is  then  especially  after  the  4th  of  August  that  the 
reconnaissance  service  of  the  5th  and  6th  Cavalry  Divi- 
sions merits  an  attentive  following.  The  left  wing,  the 
Bredow  Brigade,  was  at  Zweibriicken,  two  kilometres 
distant  from  our  frontier.  It  sent  forward  nearly  one- 
half  of  its  effectives, — five  detachments,  each  of  several 
squadrons, —  which  penetrated  our  frontier  between 
Sarreguemines  and  Bitche,  pushed  on  15  kilometres, 
witnessed  the  retirement  of  all  our  outposts,  and  thus 
viewed  our  camps  at  Rohrbach  and  Bitche.  It  was  the 
information  transmitted  upon  this  subject  to  the  leaders 
of  the  Prussian  armies  which  led  them  on  the  following 
day  to  give  the  order  to  keep  ns  active  on  this  side, 
in  order  to  prevent  the  arrival  of  reinforcements  in  Al- 
sace, and  which  caused  our  5th  Corps  to  remain  in  posi- 
tion during  the  fatal  action  of  August  6th. 

Upon  the  exploration  front  and  upon  the  right  wing, 
the  reports  were  simply  confirmatory   of  those   of  the 
evening  before.      But  they  possessed  the  advantage  of 
having  been  gathered,  so  to  speak,  in  the  midst  of  our 
positions. 

A  German  reconnaissance  was,  indeed,  pushed  as  far 
as  Emmersweiler,  three  kilometres  from  Forbach,  and 
more  than  eight  kilometres  in  rear  of  the  positions  then 
occupied  by  General  Frossard,  at  Sarrebruck.  The 
first  impression  of  the  officer  commanding  it  was  one  of 
astonishment;  he  could  with  difficulty  understand  how 
he  had  been  able  to  penetrate  to  our  encampments  with- 
out having  been  perceived.  From  the  point  where  he 
stood,  he  saw  one  of  our  columns,  followed  by  a  bag- 


500  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

gage  convoy,  moving  from  the  frontier  in  the  direction 
of  Rosbruck. 

This  information,  added  to  that  obtained  by  the  left 
wing  and  the  centre,  necessarily  induced  the  belief  that 
we  were  in  retreat. 

The  reports  of  the  Prussian  squadrons  expressed  more- 
over a  kind  of  amazement  at  the  inertness  of  our  cavalry, 
and  already  betrayed  the  excess  of  confidence  with  which 
this  attitude  inspired  them. 

It  was  the  sum  of  all  these  reports  that  definitely  fixed 
the  idea  at  general  headquarters  of  the  defensive  char- 
acter of  our  projects. 

After  this,  the  Prussian  plans  were  formed  with 
greater  clearness. 

The  III.  Army  having  entered  into  action  on  the  left 
wing,  the  opinion  at  headquarters  was  that  the  result  of 
this  army's  movement  should  be  known  before  further 
matters  were  decided  on. 

If  favorable,  the  I.  and  II.  Armies  were  to  advance  to 
the  Sarre;  the  III.  Army  was  then  to  join  them  and 
cover  their  left  flank. 

Thus  the  group  of  armies  would  always  be  concen- 
trated. But  it  was  now  clear  that  the  II.  Army  could, 
without  fear  of  attack,  emerge  from  the  wooded  defiles 
of  Kaiserslautern,  and  deploy  beyond;  and  orders  were 
given  accordingly. 

Their  aim  was  to  make  a  partial  deployment  of  the 
II.  Army  on  the  7th  of  August,  as  it  issued  from  the  de- 
files, so  as  to  permit  it  at  once  to  continue  its  march  to- 
ward the  frontier  and  to  be  in  readiness  to  give  battle. 
By  this  deployment  four  corps  were  to  be  placed  in  the 
first  line  upon  the  four  roads  leading  from  the  Neun- 
kirchen-ZweibriJcken  line  to  the  Sarre  and  the  Blies, 
namely: 

Neunkirchen  to  Sarrebruck; 

Homburg  to  St.  Jean,  via  St.  Ingbert; 


I 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  501 

Hoiiiburg  to  Sarreguemiiies; 

Einod  to  Rolirbach. 

Two  other  corps,  the  IX.  and  X.,  were  to  form  the 
second  echelon,  and  to  serve  as  general  reserves. 

The  11.  Army  would  thus  have  had  on  the  evening 
of  the  7th : 

The  III.  Corps  at  Neunkirchen,  with  an  advanced- 
guard  at  Sulzbach,  ten  kilometres  in  front. 

The  X.  Corps  at  Bexbach,  with  an  advanced-guard  at 
St.  Ingbert,  thirteen  kilometres  distant;  the  Guard  at 
Homburg. 

The  IV.  Corps  at  Zweibriicken,  1,800  metres  from  the 
line  of  the  frontier,  with  an  advanced-guard  upon  this 
line  itself. 

The  IX.  and  XII.  Corps  at  Waldmohr  and  Miihlbach. 

Thus  at  the  moment  the  II.  Army  arrived  within  the 
distance  of  a  march  from  the  frontier,  the  generalissimo 
concentrated  it  for  action.  The  front  of  march  was 
now  onlv  sixteen  kilometres,  the  dimension  of  a  line  of 
battle;  and  the  depth  was  reduced  to  ten  kilometres, 
scarcely  half  a  march. 

The  advanced-guards  were  moved  as  near  to  the  fron- 
tier as  possible.  One  of  them  was  even  pushed  to  this 
line  itself;  the  others  were,  on  an  average,  within  half  a 
day's  march. 

The  commander-in-chief  was  desirous  that  the  inva- 
sion should  be  made  by  all  the  heads  of  columns  at  the 
same  time. 

The  front  of  the  outposts  did  not  exceed  28  kilometres. 
Finally,  the  army,  as  we  have  said,  held  the  four  roads 
which  were  to  form  its  line  of  operations. 

These  dispositions  should  then  be  looked  upon  as  suit- 
able ones  to  adopt  for  the  purpose  of  crossing  a  frontier, 
when  it  is  known  that  the  enemy's  forces  are  imme- 
diately beyond,  and  when  ignorance  prevails  regarding 
his  intentions. 


502  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY, 

They  maybe  epitomized  thus: 

To  concentrate  the  army  within  half  a  day'' s  inarch 
of  the  frontier^  its  corps  upon  two  lines^  with  strong  ad- 
vanced-guards in  front ;  the  lines  near  enough  together 
to  permit  the  second  to  take  part  in  the  action ;  the  cav- 
alry jpoji  the  frontier  itself  pushing  its  squadrons  as 
far  as  possible  in  order  to  gather  information. 

The  execution  of  this  order  was  destined  to  receive 
only  a  beginning. 

Events,  which  some  are  pleased  to  attribute  to  chance, 
but  which,  in  reality,  were  but  the  logical  consequences 
of  the  dispositions  made  by  the  opposing  armies,  were 
to  deeply  alter  the  situation. 

However,  during  the  5th  of  August,  the  II.  Army 
conformed  as  far  as  possible  to  the  prescribed  measures, 
and  by  the  evening  of  this  day  had  already  modified  its 
dispositions. 

It  formed  then  three  echelons  of  two  corps  each,  at 
about  one  march  apart.  To  attain  the  formation  ordered, 
the  head  of  the  army,  which  was  already  very  near  our 
territory,  was  to  make  but  a  short  march. 

On  this  day,  the  5th,  information  furnished  by  the 
cavalry  confirmed  the  reports  of  the  evening  before  re- 
garding our  retrograde  movement.  But  the  general 
staff,  not  finding  the  intelligence  precise  enough,  ordered 
the  two  divisions  on  reconnoitering  service,  to  hold  them- 
selves in  direct  contact  with  our  army^  to  take  prisoners., 
and  to  more  closely  observe  our  retreat. 

Upon  the  right  of  the  German  line  an  incident  oc- 
curred, which  was  a  characteristic  result  of  the  general 
method  of  carrying  on  the  operations.  In  consequence 
of  the  entanglements  in  the  cantonments,  the  I.  Army 
received  orders  to  incline  to  the  right.  But  its  chief, 
fearing  to  be  deprived  of  the  honor  of  giving  the  first 
blows,  had  cleared  the  ground  by  pushing  his  troops 
upon  our  frontier.     In  consequence,  one  of  his  corps,  the 


I 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  503 

VII.,  took  measures  to  move  its  advanced-guard  upon 
Sarrebruck. 

The  result  was  that  two  corps  directed  their  forces 
iipon  the  same  point  of  the  frontier,  without,  however, 
expecting  a  combat. 

While  this  combination  must  be  accredited  in  great 
part  to  chance,  it  was  also  due  in  some  measure  to  the 
dispositions  for  marching  and  camping  prescribed  by 
Von  Moltke,  in  anticipation  of  the  first  encounters. 

The  march  of  the  II.  Army  from  its  zone  of  concentra- 
tion to  points  near  the  frontier  terminated  on  August  5. 

On  the  following  day  the  passage  of  the  frontier  and 
the  first  attack  were  to  take  place.  Circumstances  not 
entirely  within  this  army's  control  were  to  fasten  upon 
this  operation  a  character  of  extreme  gravity. 

If  we  look  at  the  main  elements  of  these  first  move- 
ments, we  see  that  while  no  absolute  rule  can  be  formu- 
lated, valuable  precepts  may  be  drawn  from  them: 

The  first  care  of  an  arniy^  after  its  strategic  deploy- 
ment^ should  be  to  send  its  cavalry  in  advance  to  keep  in 
contact  with  the  enemy  and  gather  exact  informatio7i  re- 
garding his  positions^  his  strength^  and  his  movements. 

In  its  marches  tozvard  the  frontier^  this  army  should 
be  concentrated  and  ready  for  action  as  soo7i  as  possible. 

In  presence  of  an  enemy  whose  designs  are  not  yet 
known,  it  appears  advantagous  to  adopt  formations  in 
echelon^  the  army  corps  moving  in  concentrated  order^ 
less  than  a  day''  s  march  apart  ^  occupying  the  routes  of  in- 
vasion^ and  the  cavalry  pushing  its  reconnaissances  as 
far  as  the  enemy''  s  masses^  each  division  of  this  arjny 
bei?tg  supported  by  a  division  of  infantry.^  which  follows 
it  at  a  distance  of  half  a  march 

In  order  to  understand  more  clearly  the  bearing  of  the 
II.  Army's  combinations  from  July  29  to  August  5,  1870, 
they  should  be  compared  with  those  made  by  us  during 
the  same  time.  It  is  well  then  to  explain  the  move- 
ments executed  on  our  side. 


504  .       PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

2ND. — MOVEMENTS   OF  THE   FRENCH   ARMY   ON   THE  SARRE   IN    1870. 

On  July  28,  1870,  Napoleon  III.  joined  the  army  at 
Metz.     On  this  date  it  was  distributed  as  follows: 

ist  Corps  at  Strasburg,  Haguenau,  and  Reichshoffen, 
with  its  cavalry  at  Soultz  and  Haguenau. 

2nd  Corps  at  St.  Avoid,  Forbach,  and  Bening. 

3d  Corps  at  Boulay,  Boucheporn,  and  Bouzonville. 

4th  Corps  at  Thionville,  Sierck,  and  Colmen. 

5th  Corps  at  Sarregueniines  and  Bitche. 

6th  Corps  at  Chalons,  Paris,  and  Soissons. 

7th  Corps  at  Belfort. 

The  Imperial  Guard  at  Metz. 

On  the  day  following  his  arrival,  the  Emperor  pro- 
ceeded to  St,  Avoid  with  the  chief-of-staff,  in  order  to 
examine  the  progress  of  our  formations. 

Could  he  march  forward  to  take  the  offensive?  Such 
was  the  question  which  presented  itself,  and  which  has 
often  been  discussed  since. 

Marshal  Leboeuf,  the  chief-of-staff,  believed  that  it 
was  impossible.  The  reservists  had  not  yet  arrived,  and 
the  administrative  services  were  not  organized. 

These  reasons  were  weighty.  But  from  other  points 
of  view,  this  was  the  situation: 

We  had  then  210,000  men  upon  the  frontier,  128,700 
of  them  between  Metz,  Forbach,  and  Bitche.  Of  these 
we  could  count  upon  at  least  100,000  combatants. 

In  pushing  this  mass  forward,  we  would  have  cleared 
the  ground,  found  provisions,  and,  on  July  29,  have  oc- 
cupied the  line  of  the  Sarre  with  five  corps.  The  Guard 
would  have  remained  in  reserve  in  rear. 

These  corps  could  have  been  distributed  thus: 

2nd  Corps  at  Sarrebruck. 

3d  Corps,  three  divisions  and  the  cavalry,  towards 
Volklingen. 

4th  Corps  near  Kreutzwald,  Bouzonville,  and  Teter- 
chen,  prepared  to  reach  the  Sarre  on  the  next  day. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  505 

5tli  Corps  at  St.  Ingbert  and  Bliescastel. 

Guard,  transported  by  rail  to  Forbach,  or  to  march  to 
Longeville-les-Saint- Avoid. 

On  the  30th,  our  army,  consequently,  would  have 
been  established  upon  the  line  Dilsbourg-St.-Ingbert- 
Bliescastel,  with  three  corps  in  first  line  and  two  in  rear 
upon  the  Sarre — the  4th  Corps  and  the  Guard. 

The  cavalry  would  have  been  sent  toward  Ottweiler 
and  Homburg.  Under  these  conditions,  we  would  have 
been  able,  on  the  31st,  to  hold  the  communications 
of  the  Palatinate  from  Ottweiler  to  Miihlbach,  with  our 
cavalry  in  advance  at  Kaiserslautern  and  Konken, 

This  movement  would  at  least  have  prevented  the  II. 
German  Army  from  debarking  from  its  trains  at  Baum- 
holder,  delayed  the  passage  of  its  corps  to  the  left  bank 
of  the  Rhine,  and  upon  the  right  bank  have  thrown 
obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  proper  support  of  its  troops 
and  of  its  concentration. 

On  this  day,  the  I.  German  Army  held  its  VII.  Corps 
at  Treves,  and  its  VIII.  at  Wadern  and  Hermeskeil. 
These  two  corps  were  yet  incomplete;  but  their  position 
upon  the  flank  of  our  line  of  operations  would  not  have 
allowed  us  to  neglect  them;  hence  the  necessity  of  mak- 
ing the  first  efforts  in  their  direction.  They  could  have 
been  reached  about  the  2d  of  August  in  the  vicinity  of 
Wadern  and  Losheim,  with  chances  of  success. 

An    advantage    gained    under    these    circumstances, 
would  probably  have  annulled  the  influence  of  the  I. 
Army,  and  given  us  free  control  of  the  left  bank  of  the 
■  Rhine. 

It  has  since  been  revealed  that  if  we  had  decided  to 
take  the  offensive  on  July  29,  the  II.  and  III.  German 
Armies  would  have  made  their  concentration  upon  the 
line  of  the  Rhine. 

They  would  undoubtedly  have  remained  there  until 
August  5  and  7,  respectively,  a  delay  necessary  to  com- 


506  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

plete  their  organization.  Now  at  this  date  we,  on  our 
side  were  in  condition  to  act.  We  would  have  been 
reinforced  by  about  150,000  men.  The  ist,  6th,  and  7th 
Corps  would  have  been  able  to  form  a  second  army  of 
110,000  men,  having  clear  ground  to  its  front  as  far  as 
Landan,  and  in  position  to  support  the  front  line. 

At  all  events,  in  thus  taking  the  initiative  of  the 
movements,  we  would  have  avoided  the  defeats  of  Wis- 
sembourg,  Froeschwiller,  and  Spicheren.  But  it  may  be 
said,  the  troops  were  not  yet  in  a  condition  to  move  for- 
ward. This  could  not  surely  apply  to  the  men  who  on 
the  2d  fought  at  Sarrebruck,  and  on  the  4th  at  Wissem- 
bourg.  It  is  true  that  the  corps  were  not  complete;  but 
on  July  28  they  had  food,  munitions,  and  artillery. 

Their  general  situation  will  be  made  clear  by  the  fol- 
lowing figures: 

The  ist  Corps  was  completed  on  August 
I,  with  an  effective  of 40,000  men. 

The  2d  was  nearly  completed  on  July 
28,  and  contained 28,000  men. 

The  3d  was  completed  on  July  23,  and 
numbered  on  28tli 34,000  men. 

The  4th  was  completed  on  July  29,  and 
contained 28,000  men. 

The  5th  was  not  completed  until  August 
3,  but  on  July  28  it  had    ........    27,000  men. 

The  6th  was  still  in  rear;  but  on  July 
28,  it  contained 30,000  men. 

The  7th  was  still  incomplete  on  August 
6;  but  on  x-Vugust  i,  it  contained         .    .    .    24,000  men. 

The  Guard  was  ready  to  march  on  July 
28,  and  was  completed  on  the  30th,  with  .     22,000  men. 

It  would  seem  then,  that  a  forward  movement  was 
possible. 

However,  the  impression  produced  upon  the  Emperor 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  507 

and  the  cliief-of-staff  on  July  29,   was  contrary  to  this 
idea. 

The  insufficiency  of  the  administrative  services  had 
a  decisive  influence  upon  their  decision. 

Moreover,  information  concerning  the  enemy  appeared 
to  them  too  incomplete  to  warrant  the  adoption  of  the 
offensive.  And  yet  it  was  quite  as  exact  as  the  enemy 
himself  possessed  regarding  us. 

We  knew,  indeed,  on  July  28,  that  the  VII.  and  VIII. 
Corps  were  concentrating  to  the  north  of  the  Sarre, 
behind  Sarrelouis  and  Sarrebruck,  under  orders  of  Gen- 
eral von  Steinmetz. 

The  assemblements  of  troops  belonging  to  the  VIII. 
Corps  at  St.  Wendel,  Ottweiler,  Lebach,  and  Dutt- 
weiler,  had  been  discovered. 

The  presence  of  a  brigade  of  cavalry  at  Sarrelouis  and 
Sarrebruck  had  been  made  known. 

Intelligence  was  received  of  the  march,  between 
Mayence  and  Kaiserslautern,  of  regiments  that  were  to 
form  part  of  th'e  III.,  IV.,  and  IX.  Corps,  to  be  included 
in  an  army  to  be  commanded  by  Prince  Frederick 
Charles.  Finally,  we  were  informed  of  assemblements 
in  the  grand-duchy  of  Baden  and  the  Palatinate,  to 
form  the  army  of  the  Crown  Prince. 

It  has  been  said  that  all  these  reports  were  not  known 
to  be  exact  at  this  date,  and  were  unverified  until  two 
or  three  days  later.  Whatever  was  the  state  of  the  case, 
more  precise  information  was  desired  regarding  the  posi- 
tions of  the  enemy,  and  to  this  end,  the  cavalry  divisions 
"were  given  the  following  instructions: 

"Impress  upon  your  troops  the  necessit)^  for  habitual 
watchfulness;  accustom  them  to  send  out  frequent  pa- 
trols, to  make  rec'onnaissances,  etc.  *  *  *  They  will 
soon  have  before  them  an  enemy  who  for  a  long  time 
has  been  particularly  applying  himself  in  times  of  peace 
to  guard,  outpost,  and  general  protection  service  relating 


508  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

to  camps,  bivouacs,  and  cantonments.  See  that  all  the 
troops  be  given  theoretical  and  practical  instruction  on 
these  subjects."  The  Marshal  renewed  his  recommen- 
dations after  the  affair  of  August  2:  "Put  forward  your 
cavalry;  it  must  take  a  wide  range  along  the  entire  line 
of  the  Sarre;  must  not  fear  to  advance  in  all  directions 
beyond  the  frontier,  observing  proper  precautions.  Let 
the  commanders  report  to  you  all  intelligence  gathered. 
Keep  me  well  informed."* 

The  chief-of-stafif  was  at  the  same  time  convinced  of 
the  necessity  of  making  an  advance  movement,  for  the 
purpose  of  satisfying  public  opinion. 

He  consequently  resolved  to  push  the  army  to  the 
frontier,  and  close  the  left  wing  upon  the  centre.  He 
informed  Marshal  Mac-Mahon  of  the  proposed  disposi- 
tions, adding,  "The  Emperor  has  no  intention  of  exe- 
cuting the  movement  before  the  end  of  a  week." 

On  July  30,  orders  were  issued  in  accordance  with  this 
plan.     Their  result  was  to  bring: 

The  2d  Corps  to  Mersbach,  Bening,  CEting; 

The  3d  Corps  to  St.  Avoid,  Boucheporn,  etc. ; 

The  4th  Corps  to  Boulay. 

The  positions  of  the  5th  Corps  and  the  Guard  were 
unchanged. 

In  brief,  the  effect  was  to  close  up  the  front  of  the  army, 
and  gain  a  little  ground  in  advance.  These  changes 
were  to  have  no  influence  upon  the  operations.  They 
were  accomplished  on  July  31  and  August  i.  {See 
Plate  XXV.) 

At  this  time  the  situation  had  materially  changed;  the 
German  cavalry  had  already  penetrated  to  the  heart  of 
the    Palatinate.     In   France,   the  public  mind   became 
more  and  more  disturbed.      It  was  necessary  to  quiet  it. 
To  this  end,  it  was  decided  to  attempt  an  offensive  re- 

*  Diary  of  an  Officer  of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine,  by  Colonel  Fay. 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  509 

connaissance  at  Sarrebnick,  supporting  it  by  demon- 
strations upon  Sarregiiemines  and  Volklingen.  This 
operation,  at  first  fixed  for  July  30,  was  put  off  until 
August  2.  Its  object  was  "to  oblige  the  enemy  to 
deploy  his  forces  and  disclose  his  plans." 

Three  corps  were  put  in  motion. 

The  combat  of  Sarrebrnck  was  the  consequence  ;  but 
it  was  without  influence  upon  subsequent  events. 

It  is  now  clear  that  the  measures  taken  then,  August 
2,  were  not  in  touch  with  modern  methods  of  warfare, 
and  that  in  presence  of  the  Prussian  mode  of  disposing 
their  cantonments  and  marching  columns,  these  efforts 
could  produce  no  useful  result.  Cavalry  reconnaissances 
alone  were  capable  of  procuring  for  headquarters  the  in- 
formation desired  there. 

After  the  combat  at  Sarrebruck,  there  were,  however, 
no  changes  in  the  positions  of  our  corps.  But  on  the 
day  following  this  action,  news  received  from  Paris  added 
to  the  perplexity  of  the  situation.  It  was  then  deter- 
mined to  order  the  4th  Corps  upon  a  reconnaissance  to- 
ward Sarrelouis,  while  its  cavalry  division,  moved  to 
the  region  between  Bouzonville  and  Boulay,  was  not 
farther  than  20  kilometres  from  that  place.  Information 
received  at  Metz  on  the  night  of  the  3d  had  the  effect  of 
modifying  this  project.  It  was  learned  that  a  corps  of 
40,000  men,  designed  to  act  upon  the  Sarre,  had  crossed 
at  Treves;  and  this  at  once  inducing  the  belief  that  an 
offensive  movement  against  our  left  flank  was  intended, 
a  counter  order  was  sent  the  4th  Corps. 

On  the  following  night  the  uneasiness  existing  at 
headquarters  was  still  further  increased.  All  the  reports 
received  during  the  day  excited  the  fear  that  attacks 
were  to  be  made  from  different  sides.  The  agitated 
thoughts  of  the  commander-in-chief  were  by  turns  di-' 
rected  upon  Thionville,  the  debouches  at  Sarrelouis  and 
Sarrebruck,  the  defiles  of  the  Vosges,  lower  Alsace,  and 
the  passages  of  the  upper  Rhine. 


5IO  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY, 

Hence  the  irresolution  which  assailed  him  at  a  time 
when  the  loss  of  an  hour  was  irreparable.  On  August 
5,  however,  a  conclusion  was  finally  reached.  It  was 
inferred  that  "the  affair  of  Sarrebruck  and  the  daily- 
reconnaissances  made  by  the  4th  Corps  had  decided  the 
enemy  on  his  part  to  make  an  offensive  movement  for 
the  protection  of  Sarrelouis. " 

This  estimate  of  the  German  designs,  notwithstanding 
its  strangeness,  sprang  from  the  peculiar  situation  of 
affairs  on  our  side.  In  the  uncertainty  which  prevailed 
regarding  the  proper  steps  to  be  taken,  an  attack  on  the 
part  of  the  enemy  under  conditions  favorable  to  us  was 
looked  upon  as  desirable. 

This  is  shown  by  a  dispatch  sent  to  General  Frossard: 

"It  is  possible  that  the  enemy  will  soon  attack  us 
upon  the  Sarre.  It  will  be  a  fortunate  thing  to  have 
him  offer  battle  with  40,000  men  upon  a  point  where  we 
have  70,000  without  counting  your  Corps."  * 

This  time  of  uncertainty  was  also  a  period  of  delay, 
profitless  even  to  the  troops.  These,  indeed,  exhausted 
themselves  in  continual  reconnaissances,  extending  three 
or  four  kilometres  from  their  encampments,  and  in  move- 
ments to  and  fro,  the  aim  of  which  escaped  them.  On 
the  4th  of  August,  for  example,  the  Guard  received 
orders  to  proceed  from  Metz  to  the  Sarre.  A  counter 
order  was  shortly  afterwards  received,  and  it  was  to  re- 
main at  Metz.  But  on  the  5tli  it  was  ordered  to  march 
in  the  direction  of  Sarrelouis,  and  occupy  Volmerange, 
21  kilometres  from  that  place.  While  on  the  way,  an 
order  was  received  recalling  it  to  Metz.  Immediately 
afterwards,  this  order  was  revoked  by  another,  assign- 
ing Courcelles-Chaussy  as  its  station.  It  was  late,  and 
hence  this  movement  was  postponed  until  the  following 
day. 

*  Diary  of  an  Officer  of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine,  by  Colonel  Fay. 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  511 

Durinof  the  march  a  teleo-rain  summoned  General 
Bourbaki  to  proceed  to  St.  Avoid;  a  counter  order  pre- 
vented him  from  doing  so.  Finally,  at  4:30  P.  M.,  an 
officer  arrived  from  Metz,  renewing  the  order  of  the 
morning.  The  general,  embarrassed,  wished  to  ascer- 
tain the  judgment  of  the  officer,  and  asked  him  the  aim 
of  the  movement.  The  latter  was  not  informed;  but 
satisfied  that  an  encounter  was  taking  place  upon  the 
Sarre,  he  so  stated  to  the  General,  and  the  Guard  at  6 
p.  M.  continued  the  movement. 

On  the  morning  of  the  preceding  day,  news  of  the 
battle  of  Wissembourg  had  reached  the  Emperor.  It 
sug-oested  to  the  chief-of-staff  the  idea  of  a  removal  of 
the  3d  and  5tli  Corps  toward  the  east.  Orders  for  this 
were  immediately  given.  It  was  their  execution  that 
led  the  Prussian  staffs  to  suppose  a  movement  of  retreat 
on  our  part.  At  all  events,  it  had  a  conseqiience  which 
might  have  enlisted  a  chance  of  success  in  our  favor — it 
was  the  means  of  distributing  the  four  divisions  of  the 
3d  Corps  upon  a  circular  front  of  28  kilometres,  within 
only  half  a  day's  march  of  Spicheren. 

The  4th  Corps,  on  August  5,  occupied  the  road  lead- 
ing from  Boulay  to  Sarrelouis,  and  was  thus  in  condition 
to  support  the  3d. 

On  the  same  day,  the  2d  Corps,  informed  of  the 
approach  of  strong  hostile  forces,  and  alarmed  at  its 
advanced  position,  asked  authority  to  withdraw.  This 
was  granted;  but  as  we  shall  see  later,  the  movement 
could  not  be  effected  until  night. 

Intelligence  was  received  at  Metz  that  the  army  of 
Steinmetz  was  making  dispositions  for  attack,  and  that 
the  forces  of  Frederick  Charles  were  between  Sarrebruck 
and  Zweibriicken,  ready  to  support  it. 

This  information,  joined  to  the  news  received  from 
Alsace,  decided  the  Emperor  to  divide  his  army  into 
three  groups,  but    for  operations  only  :    one   upon  the 


513.  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Sarre,  under  Bazaine;  one  in  Alsace,  commanded  by 
Mac-Mahon;  and  the  third  at  Metz,  under  his  own  im- 
mediate direction. 

These  dispositions  were  unfortunately  too  late  to  in- 
fluence the  grave  events  which  were  about  to  happen. 

Such  were  our  first  movements  from  July  28  to  Au- 
gust 5. 

They  clearly  show  forth  the  defects,  so  often  pointed 
out — a  list  too  long  to  review.  It  will  be  enough  to 
enumerate  the  most  striking,  the  recollection  of  which 
should  never  be  effaced. 

The  inactivity  of  our  army  at  the  commencement  of 
the  campaign  of  1870,  must  be  attributed  to  the  delays 
in  the  arrival  of  the  reservists,  the  imperfection  of  the 
administrative  services,  and  the  lack  of  supplies. 

The  want  of  decision  on  the  part  of  the  commander, 
was  caused  by  a  deficiency  of  information  regarding  the 
enemy.  This  resulted  from  our  ignorance  of  the  Ger- 
man military  organization,  and  from  the  narrow  range 
of  our  cavalry  reconnaissances. 

Finally,  the  dispositions  made  on  the  5th  of  August, 
were  not  conformable  to  the  principle  of  concentrating 
the  forces  before  battle.  The  intelligence  received  re- 
garding the  approach  of  the  enemy's  forces,  sufficiently 
indicated,  indeed,  the  necessity  for  this  concentration. 

From  a  tactical  point  of  view,  then,  two  general  mis- 
takes appear  in  these  first  measures: 

The  failure  of  the  cavalry  divisions  to  make  suitable 
reconnaissances,  and  the  lack  of  proper  concentration. 

The  consequences  of  these  dispositions  will  be  seen  in 
the  attack  now  preparing. 

3d. — BATTLE  OF  SPICHEREN,   AUGUST  6,    1870. 
POSITIONS   OF  THE  I.    AND   II.    GERMAN   ARMIES,    AUGUST  5. 

On  the  5th  of  August,  1870,  the  day  before  the  pass- 
age of  the  Sarre  frontier  by  the  Germans,  these  two 
armies  of  the  right  occupied  the  following  positions: 


THIRD   CHAPTKR. — OPERATIONS.  513 

I.  Army. — Two  corps  were  formed  in  first  line.  One  of 
these,  the  VII.,  was  at  Bettingen  and  Lebac]),  20  kilo- 
metres from  Volklingen,  on  the  Sarre.  The  14th  Divi- 
sion, at  Lebach,  had  its  advanced-gnard  4  kilometres  to 
the  sonth;  the  13th,  at  Bettingen,  its  advanced-guard 
at  Hnttersdorf 

The  other,  the  VIII.  Corps,  had  its  i6th  Division  in 
the  vicinity  of  Steinweiler,  20  kilometres  from  Sarre- 
.brnck.  The  15th  Division  occupied  Tholey  and  Mainz- 
weiler.  The  I.  Corps  was  more  than  a  day's  march  in 
rear,  at  Birkenfeld,  and  the  cavalry  between  Tholey  and 
St,  Wendel,  behind  the  first  echelon. 

On  the  date  mentioned,  General  Steinmetz  gave  orders 
to  commence  the  movement  on  the  following  day  toward 
the  Sarre,  and  according  to  his  instructions  the  VIIL 
Corps  was  to  proceed: 

The  13th  Division  toward  Puttlingen,  with  advanced- 
guard  at  Volklingen,  3' kilometres  from  the  front. 

The  14th  Division,  toward  Guichenbach,  with  ad- 
vanced-guard at  Sarrebruck. 

n.  Army.— This  army,  on  the  5th  of  August,  occupied 
the  following  positions: 

///.  Or/^.— The  6th  Division  at  St.  Wendel;  the  5th 
at  Neunkirchen,  20  kilometres  from  Sarrebruck. 

IV.  Corps. — The  8th  Division  at  Zweibriicken,  16 
kilometres  from  Bitche;  the  7th  at  Homburg,  27  kilo- 
metres from  Sarrebruck. 

The  X.  Corps  at  Cusel  and  Altenglan ;  the  Guard  in 
the  vicinity  of  Kaiserslautern. 

The  IX.  Corps  at  Otterberg,  and  the  XII  at  Miinch- 
weiler. 

During  this  same  day,  these  different  corps  received 
orders  to  assemble  on  the  6th: 

The  III.  at  Neunkirchen,  with  advanced-guard  to- 
ward Sarrebruck; 

33 


514  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

The  IV.  at  Zweibriicken,  with  advanced-guard  at  Neii- 
Hornbach ; 

The  X.  at  Waldmohr; 

The  Guard  at  Homburg; 

The  IV.  Corps  at  Landstuhl; 

The  XII.  at  Kaiserslautern. 

The  group  composed  of  the  first  two  German  armies 
had  then,  on  August  5,  three  divisions,  the  14th,  i6th, 
and  5th,  about  45,000  men,  at  a  distance  of  20  kilometres 
from  Sarrebruck;  three  others,  the  13th,  7th,  and  8th, 
at  distances  varying  from  25  to  30  kilometres  ;  while 
other  divisions,  the  15th  and  6th,  followed  closely.  It 
was  possible  then  to  concentrate  four  army  corps  and 
two  divisions  of  cavalry  for  action  upon  the  Sarre  in  a 
single  day.  Finally,  two  of  these  divisions,  forming  a 
mass  of  about  30,000  men,  were  marching  on  the  6th 
toward  the  same  crossing-point  of  this  river. 

POSITIONS   OF  THE   FRENCH   ARMY   ON   THE   5TH   OF  AUGUST. 

On  the  evening  of  this  day,  our  army  had  no  thought 
of  defending  the  frontier.  It,  however,  expected  early 
combats,  and  had  its  forces  distributed  as  follows: 

2,d  Corps. — On  the  morning  of  the  5th,  this  corps  was 
in  position  upon  the  heights  to  the  south  of  Sarrebruck; 
but  during  the  night  it  moved  to  the  rear.  The  3d 
Division  (Ivaveaucoupet),  about  9,400  men,  occupied  the 
heights  of  Spicheren;  the  ist  Division  (Verge),  about 
8,000  men,  Stiring  and  Forbach;  the  2d  (Bataille),  about 
9,000  men,  Oetingen.  The  headquarters,  the  cavalry 
division,  and  four  batteries  of  reserve  artillery,  were  at 
Forbach. 

There  was  thus  a  mass  of  29,000  men  in  position 
around  Spicheren,  upon  the  frontier  itself 

TJie  2)d  Coips  (Bazaine)  had: 

The  ist  Division  (Montaudon),  about  9,000  men,  at 
Sarreguemines,  12  kilometres  from  Spicheren; 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  515 

The  2cl  (Castaf^ny),  about  8,000  men,  at  Pnttclange, 
16  kilometres  from  Spicheren; 

The  3d  (Metman),  about  8,200  men,  at  Marienthal, 
also  16  kilometres  from  Spicheren; 

The  4tli  (Decaen),  about  9,500  men,  together  with 
headquarters,  and  the  Cavalry  Division,  at  St.  Avoid,  23 
kilometres  from  Spicheren. 

The \th  Coi'ps  (Ladmirault)  had: 

The  ist  Division  (de  Cissey),  about  8,000  men,  at 
Bouzonville,  25  kilometres  from  Volklingen.  It  was  to 
reach  Teterchen  on  August  6; 

The  2d  (Grenier),  about  8,000  men,  at  Boulay,  at  a 
distance  of  27  kilometres  from  Volklingen; 

The  3d  (de  Lorencez),  about  8,700,  at  Coume,  22 
kilometres  from  Volklingen; 

The  Cavalry  Division  and  headquarters  at  Bouzonville 
and  Boulay. 

The  2d  Division  was  to  move  on  the  6th  to  Bouche- 
porn,  and  the  remainder  of  the  corps  to  Boulay. 

Finally,  the  5th  Corps  had  two  divisions  at  Bitche,  one 
brigade  of  its  2d  Division  at  Sarreguemines,  the  other 
at  Rohrbach,  en  route  for  Bitche. 

In  brief,  on  this  day  we  had  29,000  men  upon  the 
frontier  near  the  point  where  the  German  troops  were 
to  make  their  attack  the  next  day. 

We  had  in  addition  three  divisions  of  the  3d  Corps 
(about  25,000  men)  half  a  march  distant;  and,  finall}-, 
the  strongest  division  of  the  3d  Corps  (about  9,500  men) 
scarcely  a  march  away. 

We  were  consequently  in  condition  to  concentrate, 
during  the  morning  of  the  6th,  nearly  55,000  men  upon 
the  approaches  to  Spicheren,  and  by  evening  to  increase 
this  number  to  64,000. 

Such  was  the  general  situation.  But  while  the  enemy- 
held  his  cavalry  divisions  upon  our  front  and  in  contact 
with  us  for  several  days,  ours  were  kept  in  rear  of  the 


5l6  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

infantry.  The  information  obtained  by  the  enemy  was 
therefore  exact,  while  ours  amounted  to  almost  nothing 
at  all.  He  knew  that  we  had  strong  masses  between  St. 
Avoid  and  Sarrebruck,  others  toward  Boula}',  columns 
en  route  from  Sarreguemines  to  Bitche,  and  troops  mov- 
ing to  the  rear. 

On  our  part,  we  knew  only  that  the  German  forces 
were  approaching  the  Sarre,  and  especially  Sarrebruck. 

It  was  under  these  conditions  that  the  attack  upon  the 
frontier  took  place. 

PRELIMINARIES   OE  THE  ATTACK. 

At  break  of  day  on  the  6th  of  August,  the  outposts 
of  one  of  the  cavalry  brigades  of  the  II.  German  Army 
perceived  that  the  heights  to  the  south  of  Sarrebruck 
had  been  evacuated  by  our  troops.  Immediately  a  cav- 
alry squadron  pushed  to  the  front  to  ascertain  their 
whereabouts  and  follow  their  movement.  {See  Plate 
XXVI.) 

It  came  into  collision  with  two  grand-guards  of  in- 
fantry that  we  had  placed  at  the  foot  of  the  heights  ot 
Spicheren  to  the  north,  then  with  a  squadron  and  four 
pieces,  between  these  guards  and  Stiring-Wendel.  It 
was  repulsed,  and  unable  to  do  more  than  ascertain  that 
we  were  apparently  making  a  retrograde  march. 

Other  reconnaissances  confirmed  this  impression,  and 
led  the  enemy  to  believe  that  our  army  had  begun  to  re- 
treat. He  supposed  that  the  detachments  which  had 
been  encountered  in  position  were  charged  with  cover- 
ing this  movement. 

Toward  ii  a.  m.  the  commander  of  the  Prussian  cav- 
alry divisions  transmitted  this  information  to  the  general- 
in-chief. 

The  latter  had  learned  during  the  same  morning  of 
the  evacuation  of  the  heights  of  Sarrebruck.      He,  there- 
fore, concluded  that  the  passages  of  the  Sarre  were  clear, 
and  that  the  first  move  was  to  seize  them. 


THIRD   CHAPTKR. — OPERATlOISrS.  517 

The  order  for  this  was  issued  at  8  A.  m.  Its  effect  was 
to  change  the  destinations  assigned  to  the  corps  of  the 
first  line  on  the  evening  before. 

Thus  the  III.  Corps,  instead  of  concentrating  at  Neun- 
kirchen,  was  to  reach  Sarrebruck  and  push  an  advanced- 
gnard  toward  Forbach. 

The  IV.,  in  place  of  remaining  at  Zweibriicken,  was 
to  gain  Neu-Hornbach,  and  move  forward  its  advanced- 
guards  to  Rohrbach  and  Bitche. 

The  X.,  instead  of  stopping  at  Waldmohr,  was  to 
push  on  to  St.  Ingbert,  thus  obliging  one  of  its  divisions 
to  make  a  march  of  36  kilometres. 

The  Guard  and  the  IX.  and  XII.  Corps  were  to  follow 
the  movement  and  proceed  to  Assweiler,  Bexbach,  and 
Homburg. 

While  these  instructions  were  being  dispatched,  the 
corps  and  division  chiefs  of  the  first  line,  on  their  own 
responsibility,  adopted  measures  having  the  same  effect, 
according  as  information  reached  them  regarding  our 
supposed  retreat. 

These  isolated  measures  and  their  results  are  worthy 
of  attention.  Thus  the  commander  of  the  III.  Corps, 
upon  learning  of  our  march  to  the  rear,  ordered  the  5th 
Division  to  push  on  to  Sarrebruck. 

In  the  VII.  Corps,  the  chief  of  the  14th  Division,  who 
was  marching  upon  this  place,  asked  authority  to  seize 
the  heights  upon  the  left  bank,  as  soon  as  he  was  in- 
formed of  their  evacuation.  The  corps  commander, 
although  at  a  distance,  left  hiin  entirely  free  in  the 
matter.  In  consequence,  he  ordered  his  advanced-guard 
to  occupy  these  heights. 

This  force,  in  order  to  reach  its  objective  in  presence 
of  the  enemy,  adopted  a  march  formation  very  different 
from  that  then  employed  by  us,  and  which  was  very 
favorable  to  the  successive  development  of  efifosts  during 
the  combat.     Experience   has  since  proved  how  great 


5l8  •    PART  FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

was  the  necessity  for  this  tactical  disposition,  on  account 
of  the  rapidity  of  fire  and  its  murderous  effects.  This 
formation  was  as  follows: 

Advanced- Guard.  —  The   general    commanding   the 
27th  Brigade; 
One  squadron; 
One  battalion  (39th); 
One  light  battery; 
Two  battalions  (39th); 
A  detachment  of  litter-bearers ; 
One  company  of  pioneers  with  light  bridge  equipage. 

Main  Body. — The  general  commanding  the  28th  Bri- 
gade; 

A  regiment  of  infantry; 

Three  batteries; 

Two  battalions  (53d); 

A  battalion  detached  to  support  the  artillery; 

A  regiment  of  infantry  (77th); 

Baggage  and  trains. 

This,  in  fact,  was  the  entire  14th  Infantry  Division, 
about  15,000  men,  which  was  marching  upon  Sarre- 
bruck. 

The  advanced-guard  crossed  the  vSarre,  and  deployed 
to  the  south  of  Sarrebruck,  between  ten  and  eleven 
o'clock. 

At  the  same  moment  the  commander  of  the  advanced- 
guard  of  the  5th  Division  (III.  Corps)  wishing  to  recon- 
noitre the  ground,  also  arrived  at  Sarrebruck.  He 
examined  our  positions  and  saw  French  columns  de- 
bouching from  the  direction  of  Stiring.  From  this  he 
concluded  that  the  14th  Division  would  not,  perhaps,  be 
strong  enough.  He  then  notified  his  colleague  of  his 
presence,* ordered  his  brigade  to  hasten  its  march,  and 
dispatched  reports  of  the  situation  to  his  superiors. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  519 

111  the  preliminaries  to  this  attack,  we  thus  find  the 
German  generals  putting  into  practice  two  principles  of 
grand  tactics  with  which  they  appeared  profoundly  im- 
pressed, and  which,  according  to  their  own  expression, 
they  have  knit  into  the  flesh  and  bone;  namely: 

is/.  When  the  enemy  retreats.^  he  jmist  be  immediately 
pursued. 

2d.  When  one  force  sees  another  engaged^  it  sJionld  put 
itself  in  condition  to  siipport  it  with  the  greatest  possible 
energy^  and  zvithont  zv  ailing  for  orders. 

It  is  certain,  indeed,  that  with  increase  in  the  masses 
and  extension  of  combat  fronts,  these  principles  were  a 
safeguard  against  defeat,  and  a  powerful  element  of  suc- 
cess. 

The  initiative  taken  thus,  on  August  6,  by  the  differ- 
ent Prussian  generals,  resulted  in  putting  in  motion  to- 
ward the  field  of  action  all  the  troops  that,  even  by 
forced  marches  and  by  rail,  could  reach  there  before  8 
p.  M. 

PREIvIMINARIES   OF   THE  DEFENSE. 

The  ground  taken  by  our  2d  Corps  was  less  a  combat 
position  than  an  outpost  line.  It  commanded  the  ground 
to  the  right,  and  was  in  turn  dominated  by  that  to  the 
left.  Upon  both  flanks  were  thick  woods  not  occupied 
by  us,  which  permitted  the  enemy  to  turn  the  line. 

The  combat  front  was  divided  into  two  parts  by 
wooded  and  abrupt  declivities  practicable  for  infantry 
only,  called  the  forest  of  Spicheren,  extending  between 
the  town  of  this  name  and  Stiring.  An  advanced  point, 
Bperon  [the  Spur],  celebrated  on  account  of  the  struggle 
there,  formed  a  salient  upon  this  front.  It  was  a  good 
post  of  observation,  too  narrow,  however,  to  permit  the 
deployment  of  a  large  force,  and  easily  turned  if  its 
flanks  were  not  strongly  occupied.  » 

Upon  the  heights,  the  woods  prevented  the  develop- 


520  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

meiit  of  the  fire  from  the  side  of  Sarrebruck.  In  order 
to  command  the  gronnd  in  advance,  it  was  necessary  to 
occupy  the  borders  of  these  woods.  On  the  plain  to  the 
left,  there  was  a  field  of  fire  of  only  about  1800  metres 
front. 

The  enemy,  on  the  contrary,  found  upon  debouching 
from  Sarrebruck  a  space  large  enough  to  permit  easy 
deployment,  shelter  to  prepare  his  attacks,  and  good  po- 
sitions Joy  artillery,  from  which  to  direct  converging 
fires  upon  us. 

A  vigorous  attack  upon  our  flanks  must  then  place 
the  2d  Corps  in  a  critical  situation.  Two  circumstances 
were  to  make  its  inferiority  still  more  striking:  the  efifi- 
cienc}^  of  the  German  artillery,  and  the  lack  of  tactical 
instruction  on  the  part  of  our  infantry  in  the  proper 
methods  of  occupying  and  defending  woods. 

Since  one  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  6th  our  troops 
were  distributed  as  follows  upon  the  Stiring-Spicheren 
position: 

jd  Division  (L/aveaucoupet),  formed  in  two  lines  upon 
the  plateau  of  Spicheren: 

First  line:  Micheler  Brigade,  to  the  north  of  the  vil- 
lage, with  two  infantry  grand-guards,  one  at  the  foot  of 
the  Spur,  the  other  in  advance  of  Gifert-Wald. 

Second  line:  Doens  Brigade,  with  artillery,  to  the 
south  of  the  village. 

ist  Division  (Verge) : 

Jolivet  Brigade  at  Stiring:  76th  Regiment,  Colonel 
Brice,  to  the  east  of  the  road;  77th,  Colonel  Fevrier, 
to  the  west. 

Valaze  Brigade,  at  Forbach,  a  kilometre  and  a  half  in 
rear. 

2d  Division  (Bataille),  at  Oetingen,  5  kilometres  in 
rear,  watching  the  roads  from  Sarrelouis. 

The  remainder  of  the  corps  at  Forbach. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  52 1 

Attack  and  Defense  of  the  Position. — At  daybreak,  Lieut. 
Colonel  Billot,  cliief-of-staff  of  the  3d  Division,  con- 
cerned over  the  situation  of  affairs,  moved  to  the  front 
of  the  position,  with  Commandant  Parraentier  of  the 
Engineers.  Upon  their  arrival  at  the  Spur,  the  Prus- 
sian squadron  was  arrested  by  our  grand-guards,  and  by 
the  fire  from  four  pieces  of  artillery  which  General  Joli- 
vet  had  placed  in  position  near  Stiring. 

At  this  time  the  battle  began  for  our  troops,  feebly  at 
first,  afterwards  becoming  very  spirited.  For  the  Ger- 
mans, who  had  taken  the  initiative  of  the  attack,  this 
on  the  contrary  was  but  an  outpost  engagement. 

General  Von  Rheinbaben  moved  beyond  Sarrebruck 
to  personally  ascertain  the  condition  of  affairs.  He  was 
accompanied  by  five  squadrons. 

The  fire  of  our  outposts  now  became  sharper,  and  our 
main  forces  took  their  positions  for  action.  Shelter 
trenches  were  dug  upon  the  Spur,  and  the  loth  battalion 
of  chasseurs  was  posted  there,  together  with  engineer 
troops  and  two  guns. 

Between  10  and  11  o'clock,  the  advanced-guard  of  the 
14th  Prussian  Division  moved  toward  the  heights  to  the 
south  of  Sarrebruck,  designated  under  the  names  Drill- 
Ground  Hill,  Reppertsberg,  Nussberg,  and  Winterberg. 
Another  hill,  the  Galgenberg,  was  between  Repperts- 
berg and  the  Spur. 

Upon  the  appearance  of  the  Prussian  sharpshooters 
the  action  seemed  to  take  on  a  definite  shape;  General 
Laveaucoupet  had  no  thought  however  except  to  act 
upon  the  defensive. 

It  had  not  been  decided  by  the  French  to  give  battle, 
in  the  sense  understood  by  the  Prussians.  The  struggle 
now  beginning  was  to  be  marked  at  the  outset  by  a  first 
period  of  engagements,  during  which  the  14th  Prussian 
Division  was  to  be  arrested  and  then  driven  back.  A 
decisive  period,  characterized  by  the  pushing  forward  of 


522  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

the  enemy's  supporting  troops  to  the  line  of  battle, was 
to  follow  this  and  lead  to  the  retreat  of  our  2d  Corps. 

Each  of  these  periods  offers  two  distinct  fields  of  ac- 
tion: one  upon  the  plateau  of  Spicheren,  the  other  near 
Stiring  on  the  plain. 

First  Period. — At  the  outset  the  Germans  placed  but  one 
battery  in  position.  This  was  sufficient  to  overpower 
our  two  pieces  at  the  Spur  and  the  four  pieces  on  the 
plain.  But  soon  all  the  artillery  of  the  14th  Division 
entered  the  action,  distributed  into  two  groups,  which 
were  placed  at  the  extremities  of  the  position,  in  order  to 
bring  a  cross  fire  to  bear  upon  the  defenders  of  the  Spur 
and  our  pieces  on  the  plain. 

Since  the  entrance  of  the  14th  Division  upon  the  scene 
the  action  was  directed  by  its  chief.  The  Spur  appeared 
to  him  the  decisive  point,  and  he  at  once  began  to  pre^ 
pare  the  way  for  its  attack  by  the  fire  of  artillery;  then, 
when  the  proper  moment  seemed  to  arrive,  he  ordered 
the  assault. 

The  infantry  attempted  a  double  turning  movement, 
the  forces  taking  advantage  of  all  shelter  afforded  by  the 
ground.  But  it  was  only  on  the  side  of  the  Gifert-Wald 
and  the  woods  of  Saint  Arnual  that  the  German  soldiers 
were  able  to  reach  the  plateau. 

Our  troops  of  the  first  line  received  timely  reinforccr 
ment,  and  the  enemy  was  repulsed. 

In  this  attack  the  fire  was  most  intense.  Our  generals 
were  obliged  to  constantly  expose  themselves,  and  it  was 
necessary  to  call  the  entire  Doens  Brigade  into  action. 

The  German  troops  were  thrown  back  in  disorder 
upon  Winterberg. 

To  the  left,  on  the  plain,  the  combat  was  not  less 
spirited.  Upon  the  appearance  of  the  Prussian  sharp- 
shooters the  Jolivet  Brigade  opened  fire  while  extending 
toward    Schoneck.      The    enemy  gained    the    woods  in 


THIRD  CHAPTER, — OPERATIONS.  523 

front  and  to  the  west,  but  his  first  attempt  was  too  weak 
to  succeed.  Soon  the  arrival  of  the  bulk  of  the  Prus- 
siani  Division  rapidly  increased  the  violence  of  the  fire. 
Our  guns  were  silenced  and  forced  to  retire.  The  enemy 
had  a  numerical  superiority  on  this  side.  General  Joli-^ 
vet  then  asked  for  reinforcements  from  Forbach.  The 
arrival  of  a  regiment  re-established  the  balance  of  affairs, 
and  the  position  was  maintained  with  advantage. 

The  combat  in  this  way  kept  up  until  3  P.  m.  To 
state  the  matter  in  brief,  the  Prussian  attack  had  been 
attempted  with  15,000  men,  against  13,400,  increased 
toward  2  o'clock  to  about  16,000.  It  had  been  pre- 
pared in  the  centre  by  24  pieces  of  artillery,  to  which 
at  first  responded  12  pieces  (afterwards  18  pieces)  and 
6  mitrailleuses.  The  attempts  of  the  German  infantry 
were  made  only  under  cover  of  the  woods,  whereas  our 
troops  fought  in  the  open  to  the  north  of  Spicheren  and 
the  factories  of  Stiring.  On  the  right  and  left  wings 
our  soldiers  maintained  the  struggle  in  the  woods,  but 
not  without  a  certain  hesitation. 

Under  these  circumstances,  notwithstanding  the 
marked  advantage  which  their  superiority  in  artillery 
gave  the  Germans,  we  resisted  successfully,  but  no  one 
thought  of  taking  the  offensive;  for  this  it  was  felt  that 
fresh  troops  were  required,  and  we  had  none. 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  Prussian  general  under^ 
stood  perfectly  the  bearing  of  his  movement,  while  on 
our  side  only  one  thing  was  known:  that  the  adversary 
after  having  attacked  had  received  reinforcements  and 
had  finally  been  checked. 

Beyond  the  field  of  battle  occurred  incidents  which 
interested  the  conflict  too  directly  to  be  passed  over  un- 
noticed. 

The  commander  of  the  2d  Corps  believed  up  to  2 
o'clock  that  the  action  was  simply  an  affair  of  outposts. 
Consequently  he  had  not  personally  visited  the  field,  and 


524  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

had  asked  no  assistance  of  the  3d  Corps  except  support  for 
his  wings.  But  at  2  o'clock  he  notified  the  commander 
of  the  latter  that  the  action  in  progress  was  a  real  battle, 
without,  however,  insisting  upon  the  forwarding  of  re- 
inforcements. Further,  up  to  the  middle  of  the  day, 
the  neighboring  divisions  awaited  orders  and  did  not 
move. 

2d  Period. — Issue  of  the  Attack. — The  Germans  have  in 
these  terms  summed  up  the  conditions  of  the  action  at 
3  P.  M. :  "The  situation  on  the  side  of  the  Prussians 
rendered  it  urgently  necessary  that  fresh  troops  enter 
the  line  in  aid  of  the  14th  Division,  in  the  unequal  strug- 
gle which  it  had  maintained  up  to  that  moment  upon  a 
front  of  nearly  six  kilometres.  It  was  in  constant  dan- 
ger of  seeing  the  enemy  profit  by  his  numerical  super- 
iority to  push  back  or  break  the  weak  line  of  battle 
which  it  opposed  to  him." 

Now  our  front  hardly  exceeded  from  3  to  4  kilometres, 
and  if  the  Prussian  front  was  more  extended,  it  arose 
from  tl\e  development  incident  to  the  turning  move- 
ments. At  all  events,  the  supports  which  were  thought 
so  necessary  were  not  slow  in  arriving. 

Toward  3  o'clock.  General  Von  Goeben,  commanding 
the  VIII.  Prussian  Corps,  proceeded  to  Sarrebruck,  ar- 
riving just  ahead  of  the  advanced-guard  of  the  i6th 
Division.  He  immediately  assumed  the  ,  direction  of 
affairs,  examined  the  ground,  and  decided  that  in  order 
to  carry  the  Spur  it  was  necessary  first  of  all  to  occupy 
the  heights  of  Gifert-Wald,  which  permitted  it  to  be 
outflanked  to  the  east. 

While  he  was  thus  deliberating,  the  generals  com- 
manding the  5th  Prussian  Division  and  the  III.  Corps 
reached  the  field  with  the  first  forces  they  were  able  to 
lead  thither. 

The    reinforcements    were    principally    in    batteries, 


THIRD   CHAPTKR. — OPERATIONS.  525 

which  had  the  immediate  effect  of  redoubling  the  inten- 
sity of  fire. 

Upon  the  plateau,  the  Laveaucoupet  Division  had  al- 
ready called  the  whole  of  its  reserve  into  action,  and  our 
troops  were  fatigued.  In  a  short  time,  the  enemy  seeing 
our  pieces  on  the  Spur  almost  reduced  to  silence,  made 
a  direct  attack  upon  this  point  at  the  same  moment  that 
fresh  troops  penetrated  the  Gifert-Wald.  This  new  effort 
made  against  weakened  regiments  succeeded.  The  Spur 
was  carried,  and  the  enemy  established  himself  upon 
this  point,  after  a  murderous  assault  which  cost  the  life 
of  one  of  his  generals.  Our  troops  withdrew  for  a  few 
hundred  yards  only,  and  continued  the  struggle.  Before 
the  Gifert-Wald  we  still  held  the  Prussians  in  check, 
although  with  much  difficulty,  when,  fortunately,  un- 
expected succor  re-animated  the  courage  of  our  men. 

General  Bataille,  hearing  the  cannon,  and  toward  the 
middle  of  the  day  appreciating  the  gravity  of  the  situa- 
tion, sent  the  Bastoul  Brigade  to  General  Laveaucoupet, 
and  accompanied  the  other  to  Stiring,  where  the  Verge 
Division  had  now  its  four  regiments  together.  The 
co-operation  of  this  brigade  arrested  the  enemy,  and 
appeared  for  the  instant  to  dash  his  enthusiasm.  There 
was  a  lull  in  the  action.  General  Frossard,  informed  of 
this,  reported  that  he  believed  the  combat  had  ended  for 
the  day,  but  would  be  renewed  during  the  night  or  on 
the  morrow. 

Upon  the  plateau,  however,  the  illusion  was  of  short 
duration,  for  new  columns  were  directed  upon  our  right. 
These  were  the  i6th  and  5th  Prussian  Divisions,  under 
General  Von  Zastrow,  commanding  the  VII.  Corps. 
The  latter,  in  his  turn,  had  assumed  control  at  about  5 
o'clock,  by  reason  of  seniority. 

The  arrival  of  these  assailants  brought  on  a  bloody 
struggle  upon  our  right,  in  which  General  Doens  and 
several  of    our  field   officers   heroically  gave  up  their 


526  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

lives.  Our  troops,  animated  by  their  leaders,  made  an 
energetic  resistance,  and  the  Prussians  were  not  able  to 
get  beyond  Gifert-Wald  and  the  Spur.  Their  generals 
then  determined  to  turn  the  plateau  toward  the  west, 
thus  separating  our  two  groups  at  Stiring  and  Spicheren. 

Their  constantly  increasing  artillery  soon  forced  us  to 
evacuate  three  houses  at  the  foot  of  the  plateau,  between 
the  heights  and  Stiring.  The  German  sharpshooters 
established  themselves  there,  and  wasted  no  time  in  out- 
flanking the  left  of  the  position  upon  the  plateau.  The 
artillery,  able  then^to  gain  the  Spur,  rendered  our  posi- 
tion critical.  However,  owing  to  a  change  of  front 
executed  by  Colonel  Zentz  under  fire,  our  troops  could 
face  both  north  and  west,  and  prevent  all  further  ad^ 
vance  of  the  enemy  until  nightfall.  The  latter  on  his 
part  seemed  exhausted. 

On  the  left,  the  action  was  not  less  destructive.  Upon 
the  arrival  of  the  Prussian  reinforcements,  our  soldiers 
recoiled  for  an  instant;  but  the  support  of  the  first  bri- 
gade of  the  Bataille  Division,  commanded  by  Colonel 
Haca,  communicated  new  vigor  to  them,  and  gave  a 
more  favorable  turn  to  the  situation.  Up  to  6  P.  M., 
the  attempts  of  the  enemy  were  without  effect.  Unfor- 
tunately our  troops  began  to  show  signs  of  exhaustion. 
The  arrival  of  a  regiment  of  the  5th  Division  permitted 
the  Prussians  to  extend  their  line  into  the  woods  to  the 
west,  where  they  outflanked  our  left  and  were  able  to 
bring  a  rear  fire  to  bear  upon  the  defenders  of  the  fac- 
tory. Our  soldiers  formed  then  a  crochet  on  this  side, 
and  the  combat  went  on  with  renewed  intensity. 

Things  were  in  this  state  when  General  Frossard  ar- 
rived. He  at  once  took  in  the  gravity  of  the  situation, 
and  perceived  that  without  strong  reinforcements  we 
would  no  longer  be  able  to  maintain  the  contest.  The 
intended  succor  sent  him  by  the  3d  Corps  consisted  only 
of  the  brigade  of  dragoons  under  General  Juniac,  which 


THIRD   CHAPTKR. — OPERATIONS.  527 

soon  became  an  encumbrance.  At  nit^htfall,  we  were 
obliged  to  give  up  Alt-Stiringen,  then  the  woods  to  the 
north  of  the  factory,  the  woods  to  the  west,  and  even 
one  or  two  houses  in  the  village. 

The  situation  on  this  side  had  already  become  serious, 
when  suddenly  the  sound  of  cannon  was  heard  in  our 
rear,  in  the  direction  of  Forbach.  It  was  the  artillery 
of  the  13th  Prussian  Division,  which  had  been  sent  in 
this  direction  after  having  crossed  the  Sarre  at  Volk- 
lingen.  It  fell  upon  a  feeble  detachment  of  dragoons, 
and  upon  a  party  of  reservists  that  had  reached  For- 
bach onlv  that  afternoon — forces  forming  the  sole  gar- 
rison  of  this  place.  Fortunately  the  energ}^  displayed  by 
these  troops  deceived  the  enemy,  who  dared  not  pass  the 
Kanichenberg,  nor  enter  Forbach,  which  he  believed 
strongly  occupied. 

But  at  Stiring,  the  troops  thought  themselves  turned 
by  the  south.  Then  General  Frossard,  no  longer  hop- 
ing for  succor,  and  fearing  a  disaster,  gave  orders  for  a 
retreat  upon  Sarreguemines,  assigning  to  General  Ba- 
taille  the  duty  of  covering  the  movement. 

At  the  very  outset  of  the  retreat,  the  enemy  threw 
himself  upon  the  village,  and  a  blood)'  struggle  ensued 
in  the  factory  buildings.  This  continued  far  into  the 
night,  by  the  lurid  light  of  burning  houses,  and  amidst 
the  crash  of  falling  timbers. 

Our  retreat  was  then  effected,  in  conformity  with  the 
order  of  General  Frossard,  and  the  exhaiisted  enemy 
attempted  no  pursuit. 

Results  of  the  Battle. — The  contest  was  over.  The 
losses  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  officers  included, 
reached  4,871  men  on  the  part  of  the  Prussians,  and 
4,078  with  us. 

The  proportion  of  field  officers  killed  and  wounded  on 
our  side,  far  exceeded  that  of  the  enemy.     They  were 


528  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

obliged,  indeed,  to  freely  expose  themselves  in  order  to 
sustain  and  encourage  their  exhausfed  troops. 

We  had,  in  the  beginning,  about  13,400  men  against 
16,000  of  the  enemy.  But  the  latter,  reinforced  by  fresh 
troops  which  after  3  o'clock  were  continually  arriving, 
numbered  upon  the  field,  at  the  end  of  the  action,  45,- 
000  men  and  108  guns. 

The  estimate  in  ratio7tnaires  gives  a  force  of  50,000, 
while  we  had  but  29,000  men  and  72  pieces,  18  of  which 
were  mitrailleuses. 

As  to  the  results  of  this  action,  they  were  of  great  im- 
portance. 

First  of  all,  the  frontier  had  been  forced. 

Then  the  entire  western  slope  of  the  Vosges,  with  all 
its  railroads  and  ordinary,  roads  had  fallen  into  the 
hands  of  the  enemy,  and  likewise  the  important  supplies 
assembled  at  Sarreguemines  and  Forbach. 

From  a  strategic  point  of  view,  our  army  lost  the  ini- 
tiative of  the  movements  and  its  most  favorable  chance 
of  taking  the  offensive.  Its  projets  of  operations  were 
nullified,  and  thenceforth  it  must  submit  to  those  of  the 
adversary. 

Respecting  the  morale^  confidence  was  shaken  in  our 
ranks,  and  stimulated  in  the  lines  of  the  enemy. 

Finally,  the  invasion  had  begun. 

Comments. — From  a  tactical  point  of  view,  the  success 
of  the  Prussians  was  due  to  the  following  considerations: 

ist.  The  dispatch  by  them  to  the  field  of  battle  by  forced 
Diarches^  and  in  every  other  possible  way,  of  all  troops 
found  within  reach; 

2nd.  Attentive  and  Judicious  stndy  oj  the  situation  be- 
fore engaging  their  troops; 

3d.  TlioroiigJi  preparation  by  their  artillery  for  the  at- 
tacks; 

4th.  Marked  supej-iority  of  this  arm  with  them,  in 
number,  range,  and  accuracy; 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  529 

5tli.  Use  of  na / II ral  shelter  by  their  infantry  in  advanc- 
ing; skill  in  utilizing-  it,  especially  when  fighting  in 
woods; 

6th.  Employment  by  thein  of  flanking  movements  upon 
the  wings^  while  the  front  appeared  to  be  occupied  only 
by  artillery; 

7th.  Finally,  lack  of  sitnilar  dispositions  on  oiw part^ 
notwithstanding-  the  devotion,  energy,  and  courage  of 
our  troops. 

To  complete  these  comparisons,  let  us  suppose,  for  an 
instant,  that  the  principles  put  in  practice  by  the  Prus- 
sians on  August  6,  1870,  had  also  been  applied  by  us, 
and  that  we  had  everywhere  acted  with  the  same  initia- 
tive and  the  same  energy  as  they. 

Here  would  probably  have  been  the  course  of  events: 

By  8  A.  M.,  the  commander  of  the  2d  Corps  would 
have  been  upon  the  plateau  of  Spicheren. 

At  10:30  the  Valaz6  Brigade  would  have  been  at 
Stiring. 

The  Bataille  Division,  having  5  kilometres  to  make, 
would  not  have  been  able  to  arrive  before  11:30. 

The  right  wing  being  covered  on  the  side  of  Sarre- 
guemines,  the  cavalry  would  have  been  sent  toward 
Volklingen  upon  the  left,  in  the  valley  of  the  Rosselle. 

Consequently,  during  the  first  few  hours  of  the  contest, 
we  would  have  had  a  marked  superiority,  even  in  artil- 
lery. Therefore,  it  is  permissible  to  conclude,  in  view  of 
the  vigor  of  the  action,  that  the  attacks  upon  the  Spur, 
Gifert-Wald,  and  Stiringer-Wald,  would  have  been 
checked. 

It  is  not  probable,  however,  that  the  commander  of 
the  2d  Corps  would  have  asked  assistance;  he  might 
even  perhaps  have  reported  that  he  counted  upon  a  suc- 
cess. Hence  without  reinforcements  he  was  still  ex- 
posed to  defeat  in  the  evening. 

But  if  our  troops  had  been  trained  as  the  Prussians 

34 


530  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

were,  to  march  in  the  direction  of»cannonading,  without 
waiting  for  orders,  we  would  have  seen  quite  different 
movements,  which  would  undoubtedly  have  been  a 
guarant}^  against  this  result. 

First  of  all,  the  Metman,  Castagny,  and  Montaudon 
Divisions  would  have  been  put  into  communication  with 
the  2d  Corps  at  daybreak. 

Then  they  would  have  been  informed  of  the  engage- 
ment towards  ii  o'clock.  They  would  thus  have  been 
dispatched  to  the  scene  of  action  by  noon,  either  on  the 
responsibility  of  their  respective  commanders  or  by  the 
order  of  the  commander  of  the  3d  Corps. 

The  Metman  Division,  having  14  kilometres  to  make, 
would  have  reached  Stiring  at  3:30;  the  Castagny  Divi- 
sion, 16  kilometres  from  Spicheren,  would  have  arrived 
upon  the  plateau  at  4  o'clock;  and  lastly,  the  Montaudon 
Division,  12  kilometres  distant,  would  have  reached  Spi- 
cheren at  3  o'clock. 

The  commander  of  the  3d  Corps,  then  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  2d,  3d,  and  4th  Corps,  notified  at  St.  Avoid 
at  10:30,  would  have  arrived  by  rail  at  noon,  and  at  once 
have  taken  direction  of  affairs,  imparting  thus  a  new 
impulse  to  the  troops. 

At  4  p.  M.  we  would  therefore  have  had  in  line  55,000 
men,  108  guns,  and  36  mitrailleuses. 

As  the  Prussians  have  since  admitted,  it  is  probable 
that  success  would  have  crowned  our  efforts. 

We  should  then  understand  that  the  custom  of  hasten- 
ing to  the  battlefield,  even  without  orders,  is  essentially 
practical.  Under  Napoleon  it  was  the  rule.  The  Ger- 
mans have  adopted  it,  and  other  armies  should  do  like- 
wise. It  is  certain,  moreover,  that  its  application  cannot 
in  any  case  lead  to  unfavorable  results,  while  upon  the 
field  of  action,  upon  the  decisive  point,  it  is  a  guaranty 
of  success. 

The  large  masses  designed  to  act  together  to-day,  the 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  53 1 

deep  formations  forjiiarch,  the  dispersed  and  extended 
orders  of  combat,  the  necessity  imposed  npon  armies  of 
picking-  their  way  when  crossing  the  frontier,  the  dis- 
tances separating  the  combatants,  and  the  difficulties 
preventing  the  generals-in-chief  from  finding  out  the 
strength  of  the  enemy's  position — on  account  of  all  these 
we  are  forced  to  admit  the  truth  of  the  following  prin- 
ciples: 

ist.  The  obligation  imposed  upon  each  iniit  to  be  con- 
stantly in  comnmnication  with  the  neighboring  units; 

2d.  TJic  obligation  resing  npon  each  unit  to  always 
inform  the  neighboring  units  of  the  combats  in  which  it 
is  eno^ao-i7io-- 

3d.  The  obligation  to  marcJi  in  the  direction  of  cannon- 
ading ivith  the  greatest  possible  speed. 

In  reality,  on  August  6,  1870,  the  Sarre  frontier  was 
crossed  as  a  result  of  the  general  offensive  movement, 
and  an  unexpected  battle  fought  without  the  direction  or 
participation  of  the  chiefs  of  the  two  armies  engaged. 
The  hypothesis  of  a  retreat  by  our  army  was  incorrect; 
for  this  name  did  not  apply  to  the  displacement  of  a 
part  of  the  2d  Corps.  The  combat,  on  the  side  of  the 
Prussians,  was  conducted  by  three  generals,  who  had 
succeeded  to  the  command  in  the  order  of  their  arrival 
upon  the  scene,  these  changes  producing  no  effect  upon 
the  course  of  the  battle.  Apparently  both  this  affair 
and  its  results  seemed  due  to  chance.  But  when  we  ex- 
amine things  at  the  bottom,  we  perceive  that  events  were 
brought  about  in  the  regular  way;  that  the  battle  was 
the  consequence  of  the  dispositions  made  by  the  two  ad- 
versaries, and  that  it  was  in  accordance  with  the  ordinary 
conditions  of  modern  war.  The  prominent  fact  is  that 
these  conditions  were  understood  by  the  Germans  and 
ignored  by  us. 

From  this  it  must  be  concluded  that  the  method  of 
tactical  instruction,  the  dispositions*  for  the  march,  the 


532  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

combat  tactics,  the  initiative,  the  activity,. and  the  ardor 
noticed  in  the  ranks  of  our  enemy  are  conditions  which 
will  henceforth  be  inseparable  from  hostile  manoeuvres 
and  encounters.  These  are  the  elements  of  success 
which  should  be  sought  on  every  hand. 

Finally,  if  our  cavalry  had  been  as  well  practiced  in 
reconnaissance  service  as  were  the  German  squadrons,  it 
is  certain  that  our  army  would  have  received  timely  notice 
of  the  march  of  the  enemy's  columns  upon  our  frontier. 
The  situation  then  demanded  that  we  should  make  dis- 
positions similar  to  those  of  the  adversary  in  his  first 
marches  in  August. 

We  should  not,  consequently,  have  remained  on  the 
extreme  limit  of  the  frontier  upon  positions  exposing 
our  flanks.  We  should  have  concentrated  the  largest 
possible  forces  in  a  good  defensive  position,  chosen  in 
advance,  and  so  organized  that  both  artillery  and  in- 
fantry fire  could  have  developed  their  maximum  effec- 
tiveness. This  is  the  identical  measure  recommended 
by  General  Frossard  in  1868.  Finally,  it  is  not  certain 
that,  in  profiting  by  the  tendency  of  the  enemy  to  throw 
himself  headlong  upon  the  troops  which  he  believed  in 
retreat,  it  might  not  have  been  possible  to  draw  him  into 
an  unfavorable  position. 

Generally,  we  may  conclude  from  the  preceding  facts, 
that  the  attack  and  defense  of  frontiers  will  henceforth 
require  a  most  vigilant  reconnaissance  service,  a  practice 
of  taking  the  initative  through  all  the  different  degrees 
of  the  command,  and  the  adoption  of  concentrated  form- 
ations such  as  are  prescribed  on  the  eve  of  battle. 

Are  there  more  precise  rules  applicable  to  this  first  act 
in  modern  campaigns?     Evidently  not. 

It  is  made  clear  by  the  lessons  of  history  that  chance 
plays  a  larger  part  in  this  period  than  in  any  other,  on 
account  of  the  uncertainty  prevailing  with  reference  to 
the  enemy's  positions  and   plans,  and  that  in  this  case 


THIRD   CIIAPTKK. — OPERATIONS.  533 

the  measures  taken  must  be  governed  by  circumstances 
as  they  arise. 

But  it  is  not  at  all  doubtful  that,  from  the  beginning 
of  the  assemblements,  provision  must  be  made  for  the 
first  combats.  It  is  necessary  then  to  think  of  approach- 
ing the  enemy  in  force,  upon  advantageous  ground,  and 
especially  with  resistless  energy,  and  an  unfaltering  de- 
termination to  conquer.  To  give  effect  to  this,  the 
forces  should  be  disposed  with  a  view  to  making  a  su- 
preme effort — the  attack  of  the  opposing  forces,  with  all 
disposable  troops,  with  the  greatest  possible  vigor,  with 
an  ardor  and  a  tenacity  which  have  but  one  object,  vic- 
tory. 

§5. — STRATEGIC   MARCHES. 

I.— Definition  of  Marches. 

Strategic  mai^ches  are  those  undertaken  bv  armies 
either  for  the  purpose  of  moving  from  their  bases  of  con- 
centration to  a  first  objective,  or  from  one  objective  to 
another. 

Under  this  title  are  also  included  the  movements  exe- 
cuted between  the  zones  of  concentration  and  the  enemy's 
frontier.  But,  as  has  already  been  said,  these  first  oper- 
ations borrow  from  the  present  conditions  of  war  a  spe- 
cial character,  which  requires  separate  study.  It  re- 
mains now  to  consider  strategic  marches  from  a  general 
standpoint. 

Their  importance  has  no  need  of  being  demonstrated: 
they  are  the  operations  .which  conduct  armies  to  decisive 
battles.  Consequently,  the  enemy  is  met  with  more  or 
less  advantage,  according  as  the  directions  of  these 
marches  and  the  dispositions  of  the  troops  at  the  time 
are  favorable  or  the  reverse.  Their  influence  upon  the 
results  of  a  campaign  is  considerable;  and  it  may  be  said 
that,  after  combats  themselves,  the}^  are  the  most  im- 
portant operations  of  war. 


534  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

One  cannot,  therefore,  examine  them  too  thoroughly, 
nor  investigate  with  too  much  care  the  principles  gov- 
erning their  execution. 

These  principles  have  undergone  few  changes  since 
the  commencement  of  the  century.  This  explains  how 
Von  Moltke,  in  his  combinations  of  1866  and  1870,  often 
seemed  inspired  by  the  rules  in  force  during  the  wars  of 
the  Republic  and  the  Empire.  For  us,  this  glorious 
epoch  still  offers  the  most  complete  instructions  in  this 
regard.  It  is  then  to  it  that  we  must  turn  when  de- 
sirous of  giving  the  subject  a  serious  and  practical 
consideration.  In  studying  afterwards  the  more  recent 
'campaigns  in  which  these  same  principles  have  been 
applied,  in  examining  the  results  following  their  observ- 
ance, and  those  arising  from  their  neglect,  we  shall  be 
almost  certain  of  having  presented  to  our  minds  the 
salient  features  of  war,  viewed  with  reference  to  marches. 

We  have  seen  that,  iipon  the  offensive,  an  army 
should,  after  its  concentration,  move  resolutely  forward, 
cross  the  frontier,  seek  the  enemy's  principal  force,  at- 
tack it  wherever  found,  defeat  it,  and  drive  it  back. 

But  what  will  be  its  task  on  the  day  following  its  first 
combat?  Should  it  pursue?  Should  it  march  upon  the 
capital  or  a  large  neighboring  city?  What  direction 
should  it  give  its  columns?  The  unknown  looms  before 
it,  and  the  ordinary  problem  of  war,  the  search  for  in- 
formation, imposes  itself  anew.  Often  contact  with  the 
enemy  will  be  lost,  and  in  order  to  give  direction  to  his 
plans  the  general-in-chief  puts  to  himself  a  question 
which  he  is  thenceforth  obliged  jiaily  to  repeat:  Where 
is  the  enemy  ? 

This  answered,  he  reverts  to  the  general  aim  of  the 
war,  which  is  the  destruction  of  the  adversary,  and  with 
this  object  before  him  marches  upon  the  latter  anew. 

After  Spicheren,  although  the  Prussian  cavalry  had 
not  lost  contact  upon  the  Sarre  as  it  had  in  the  Vosges, 


TIIIUI)   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  535 

the  intelligence  wliicli  it  fnrnislied  was  not  precise 
enough  to  enable  the  generalissimo  to  form  his  plans. 
It  was  not  until  August  9  that  he  came  to  a  decision. 
His  order  for  the  march  was  issued  at  once.  It  com- 
menced with  these  words: 

"The  information  gathered  leads  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  enemy  has  retired  behind  the  Moselle,  or 
at  least  behind  the  Seille." 

"The  three  German  armies  will  follow  this  move- 
ment," etc. 

This  order  shows  us  that  in  ever}^  march  of  an  army 
or  group  of  armies,  it  is  necessary  at  first  to  determine 
the  objective,  and  then  to  fix  upon  the  line  of  march. 
In  a  study  of  these  operations,  from  a  strategic  stand- 
point, it  will  be  proper  to  proceed  in  the  same  order. 

II.— March  Objectives  and  Directions. 

Nearl5^  all  the  wars  in  the  commencement  of  the  cen- 
tury gave  rise  to  well-combined  marches.  Among  the 
most  remarkable  are  those  of  1805  and  1806.  They 
are  so  well  known  that  a  brief  reference  to  them  here 
will  be  sufficient. 

1st. — Campaign  of  1805. — At  the  beginning  of  this  cam- 
paign the  arm}'  on  the  Channel  was  directed  upon  the 
Rhine,  while  the  corps  stationed  in  Holland  and  Han- 
over were  put  in  motion  toward  the  Main.  The  result- 
ing celebrated  marches  were  true  marches  of  concentra- 
tion, which,  however,  no  longer  correspond  to  the  con- 
ditions of  modern  war.  They  were  accomplished  under 
extremely  favorable  circumstances,  which,  we  should 
bear  in  mind,  are  not  to  be  met  with  to-day.  We  may 
then  neglect  them  and  pass  to  those  which  followed. 

As  soon  as  war  was  resolved  upon.  Napoleon's  first 
thought  was  to  ascertain  the   position  of  the    enemy's 


536  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

forces.  When  he  learned  that  the  Russians  were  still 
in  Moravia,  while  the  Austrians  had  moved  to  the  Iller, 
the  aim  of  his  future  marches  became  well  defined. 
The  enemy  had  made  the  mistake  of  dividing-  his  forces, 
and  this  was  to  be  turned  to  advantage.  With  this  in 
view,  Napoleon  endeavored  first  of  all  to  keep  up  the 
separation  of  the  two  masses,  then  to  seize  the  commu- 
nications of  the  nearer  force  without  uncovering  his 
own.  The  direction  to  be  given  his  columns  was  thus 
indicated.  The  march  objectives  answering  to  these 
combinations  were  to  be  the  points  of  passage  of  the 
Danube  by  which  the  armies  of  his  two  antagonists  mu- 
tually communicated,  and  at  which  the  Austrian  line  of 
retreat  could  be  directly  threatened.  These  points  were 
Giinzburg,  Ingolstadt,  Neuburg,  Donauwerth,  and  Rat- 
isbon.  Thence  ensued  those  wonderful  strategic  marches 
which  bore  the  grand  army  to  the  Danube  below  Ulm, 
and  which  enabled  it  some  days  later  to  execute  a  series 
of  manoeuvres  upon  the  rear  of  the  enemy,  leading  to  his 
capitulation. 

Campaign  of  1806. — The  aim  of  Napoleon  was  here  the 
same  as  in  the  preceding  year.  He  wished  to  cut  the 
enemy's  line  of  communications.  He  must  consequently 
reach  the  left  wing  which  covered  them,  and,  if  success- 
ful in  outflanking  it,  the  communications  would  fall  into 
his  power. 

It  was  then  this  left,  and  the  points  Jena,  Naumburg, 
Leipsic,  upon  which  it  rested,  that  were  to  serve  as  ob- 
jectives, and  to  indicate  the  directions  to  be  taken. 

Thence  followed  the  strategic  march  in  three  columns, 
directed  at  first  upon  Plauen,  Schleiz,  and  Saalfeld,  and 
afterwards  upon  Jena.  Then  came  the  celebrated  battle 
of  this  name,  in  which  our  troops  fought  upon  the 
enemy's  lines  of  retreat — a  combination  leading  to  de- 
cisive results,  which  form  an  integral  part  of  history. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  537 

Let  US  now  enter  into  the  details  of  one  of  these  cam- 
paigns of  the  First  Empire,  in  which  the  selection  of 
march  objectives  not  only  assured  success,  but  also  con- 
tributed to  retrieve  the  errors  committed. 

2d.— Campaign  of  1807.— After  the  battle  of  Eylau,  Na- 
poleon, in  order  to  cover  the  siege  of  Dantzic  and  repair 
his  army,  went  into  cantonment  upon  the  Passarge. 

Benningsen,  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  Russian 
army,  proceeded  to  take  post  at  Heilsberg  upon  the 
Alle.  He  protected  this  town  by  field  works,  and  made 
it  a  place  of  temporary  importance,  which  he  hoped  to 
utilize  soon  as  a  point  of  support  in  his  manoeuvres. 
But,  in  taking  this  position,  the  Russian  general  had 
uncovered  his  magazines  left  at  Koenigsberg,  while  his 
natural  line  of  retreat  lay  through  Gumbinnen.  More- 
over, he  was  separated  from  the  Prussian  corps  under 
General  Lestocq,  which  formed  his  right  and  was 
charged  with  covering  Koenigsberg.   {See Plate XXVI I.) 

The  French  army  was  cantoned  in  three  lines.  The 
6th  Corps,  under  Ney,  established  upon  an  advanced 
point  at  Gutstadt,  covered  its  front.  Benningsen,  tempted 
by  this  isolated  position, .  took  the  offensive  in  the  be- 
ginning of  June,  hoping  to  cut  the  6th  Corps  from  the 
remainder  of  the  army,  and  destroy  it.  Ney,  who  had 
but  17,000  men  against  60,000,  resisted  his  attacks,  gave 
time  for  the  nearest  troops  in  rear  to  come  to  his  assist- 
ance, and  retired  fighting  step  by  step  to  Deppen  upon 
the  Passarge. 

Napoleon  was  at  Finkenstein.  Upon  learning  of  these 
events  he  at  first  concentrated  his  army  between  Oster- 
ode  and  Deppen,  upon  a  front  of  about  20  kilometres. 
Then,  seeing  at  once  the  importance  of  Koenigsberg  and 
the  double  mistake  of  the  Russians  in  uncovering  their 
magazines  and  in  separating  from  the  Prussians,  he  re- 
solved to  move  directly  between  the  positions  Heilsberg 


538  PART  FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

and  Koenigsberg,  taking  for  march  objectives  the  points 
connecting  these  two  cities.  But  first  of  all,  it  was 
necessary  to  move  upon  the  enemy — the  immediate 
objective. 

On  the  8th  of  June,  profiting  by  the  state  of  inaction 
into  which  the  Russians  had  fallen  in  consequence  of 
Ney's  vigorous  resistance,  he  took  the  offensive. 

Thus  before  commencing  operations,  Napoleon  at  first 
determined  the  objective  with  precision  and  the  direc- 
tions to  be  taken  by  his  columns,  and  then  assumed  the 
initiative. 

He  ordered  the  ist  Corps  (Victor)  forming  the  left 
wing  upon  the  lower  Passarge,  to  drive  back  the  Prus- 
sians under  Lestocq,  by  extending  toward  Mehlsack, 
and  to  throw  them  upon  Koenigsberg. 

The  Emperor  himself  took  the  corps  of  Soult  (4th), 
Ney  (6th),  Lannes  (Reserve  Corps),  and  the  Guard,  with 
the  intention  of  falling  upon  Benningsen.  Finally  he 
directed  Davout  and  Mortier  (3d  and  8th  Corps),  who 
formed  the  centre,  to  move  in  echelon  toward  Eylau,  in 
order  to  outflank  the  Russians  from  the  side  of  Koenigs- 
berg. 

The  right,  commanded  by  him  in  person,  struck  the 
Russian  rear-guard  at  Glottau  on  the  9th  of  June,  drove 
it  back,  and  took  Gutstadt.  The  Russian  army,  thus 
repulsed,  retired  upon  Heilsberg  by  the  right  bank  of 
the  Alle,  while  the  French  army  followed  it  by  the  left 
bank. 

On  the  loth,  seeing  the  Russians  in  position  at  Heils- 
berg, Napoleon  resolved  to  attack  them,  while  his  left 
corps  endeavored  to  advance  upon  their  communications. 

In  consequence,  the  ist  Corps  received  orders  to  march 
upon  Koenigsberg  by  Landsberg;  Davout  and  Mortier 
were  to  follow  Victor's  movement  by  the  left  bank  of 
the  Alle,  and  cut  the  communications  from  Heilsberg  to 
Koenigsberg. 


TPIIRD   CHAPTER. — OrKRATlONS.  539 

With  the  corps  which  remained  to  him,  the  Emperor 
attacked  the  Russian  positions.  Unfortunately  our 
troops,  fatigued  and  inferior  in  numbers,  did  not  suc- 
ceed in  dislodging  the  enemy,  who  subjected  them  to 
serious  loss.  This  indecisive  combat  was  regarded  as  a 
repulse,  and  Napoleon  himself  expected  to  see  the  en- 
gagement renewed  on  the  following  day;  but  the  direc- 
tion of  his  other  columns  was  the  means  of  retrieving 
this  lack  of  success,  and  led  to  the  fall  of  the  defenses  of 
Heilsberg. 

Davout  on  the  evening  before  had  arrived  at  Grossen- 
dorf,  upon  the  road  from  Heilsberg  to  Landsberg.  On 
the  morning  of  the  nth  he  marched  upon  Eylau,  only 
14  kilometres  distant.  Ney  and  Mortier  followed  him 
upon  the  Grossendorf  road.  lyannes  with  the  Reserve 
Corps  occupied  a  point  between  Heilsberg  and  Lands- 
berg, and  closed  the  road  between  these  places  on  the 
evening  of  the  loth. 

Benningsen,  seeing  himself  cut  from  his  communica- 
tions, and  fearful  for  the  fate  of  Koenigsberg,  decided  to 
evacuate  Heilsberg  on  the  morning  of  the  nth,  by  the 
right  bank  of  the  Alle.  He  descended  the  valley  toward 
Bartenstein  and  Schippenbeil,  hoping  yet  to  gain  Koen- 
igsberg by  crossing  at  these  points,  'or  further  north, 
either  at  Friedland  or  Wehlau. 

Napoleon  moved  the  imperial  headquarters  to  Heils- 
berg on  the  evening  of  the  nth,  for  the  purpose  of 
asserting  his  success  by  the  occupation  of  this  place,  and 
on  the  1 2th  proceeded  to  Eylau. 

Once  at  this  point,  and  master  of  the  country  between 
the  Alle  and  the  sea,  he  directed  Davout  and  Murat  in 
echelon  upon  Koenigsberg,  and  then  concentrated  near 
Eylau  the  corps  immediately  under  his  eye,  in  order  to 
be  prepared  to  march  rapidly  either  upon  Friedland  or 
Wehlau.  Learning  then  that  the  enemy  had  retired 
from  Bartenstein,    and  moved    northward,    he  ordered 


540  PART  FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

lyannes  to  march  upon  Friedlaiid  with  the  Reserve  Corps, 
informing  him  that  Grouchy' s  cavalry  would  be  at  'his 
disposal,  and  that  Mortierwasat  Domnau,  ready  to  sup- 
port him.  Lannes'  instructions  were  to  prevent  the 
enemy  from  proceeding  beyond  Friedland.  The  remain- 
der of  the  army  was  assembled  near  Eylau  and  Domnau, 
prepared  to  concert  in  a  general  action. 

For  the  purpose  of  obeying  the  pressiiig  order  which 
the  Emperor  of  Russia  had  sent  him,  to  save  Koenigs- 
berg  at  any  price,  Benningsen,  after  having  precipitately 
evacuated  Heilsberg,  Bartenstein,  and  Schippenbeil, 
directed  an  advanced-guard  upon  Friedland,  by  forced 
marches.  It  reached  this  place  on  the  evening  of  the 
13th,  a  regiment  of  L-annes'  advanced-guard  having  al- 
ready occupied  it  for  some  hours.  This  force,  too  weak 
to  resist  the  efforts  of  the  Russians,  was  obliged  to  give 
up  the  place  and  retire  to  the  left  bank  of  the  AUe,  where 
the  enemy  at  once  followed  and  established  himself. 

On  the  following  day,  the  14th  of  June,  the  anniver- 
sary of  Marengo,  the  Emperor  won  the  victory  of  Fried- 
land, the  wa}^  for  which  had  been  so  well  prepared  by 
his  skillful  marches.  The  Russians  were  beaten,  with  a 
river  in  their  rear,  into  which  great  numbers  were  pre- 
cipitated. In  the  rout  which  followed,  they  hastened  to 
gain  the  crossing  of  the  Pregel  at  Wehlau,  and  hur- 
riedly retired  behind  the  Niemen.  Koenigsberg,  evacu- 
ated by  the  Prussians,  was  occupied  by  our  troops  on 
the  1 6th. 

The  peace  of  Tilsit  followed  quickly  these  brilliant 
successes,  and  assured  the  army  a  well-earned  repose. 

Comments. — One  of  the  characteristics  of  this  campaign 
is  the  influence  exercised  by  the  direction  of  the  marches; 
it  is  this  which  led  to  the  actions  and  assured  success, 
even  when  the  issue  of  the  combats  did  not  appear 
favorable.     On  the  side   of  the  Russians,   the  mistake 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  541 

committed  in  uncovering  their  line  of  supply  seemed  to 
be  the  primary  cause  of  defeat.  This  error  was  at  once 
perceived  by  their  formidable  adversary,  who,  in  conse- 
quence, immediately  decided  upon  the  march  objective. 
This  was  sufficient  to  lead  to  the  decisive  results  stated, 
even  though  one  battle  had  been  lost. 

The  choice  of  march  directions  in  this  campaign  was 
skillfull)'  combined  with  the  disposition  in  echelon  which 
permits  the  different  corps  to  support  each  other,  while 
depriving  the  enemy  of  the  means  of  discovering  the 
aim  of  their  movements  and  the  designs  of  the  comman- 
der. It  thus  also  largely  contributed  to  success,  and 
should  be  pointed  out  as  one  of  the  practical  methods  of 
executing  strategic  marches. 

General  de  Segur  has  set  forth  the  plan  of  the  Em- 
peror and  the  defective  movements  of  Benningsen  in  the 
following  terms  : 

"Two  principal  points  had  engaged  the  attention  of 
the  Emperor:  Heilsberg,  an  entrenched  camp  of  the 
Russians,  and  Koenigsberg,  their  grand  magazine.  It 
is  said  that  wishing  to  imitate  his  Jena  manoeuvre, 
that  is  to  say,  daring  to  uncover  his  line  of  operations 
in  order  to  throw  himself  upon  Benningsen's  left,  he 
had  at  first  thought  of  outflanking  the  latter  on  this 
side,  and  of  thus  forcing  him  back  toward  Koenigsberg 
while  anticipating  him  at  Wehlau,  which  would  have 
left  this  army,  cut  from  its  base,  with  only  the  sea  as  a 
retreat.  The  truth  is  he  had  been  forestalled  by  Ben- 
ningsen, and  hence  his  troops  were  not  in  a  favorable 
situation  to  attempt  this  manoeuvre;  and  either  this  fact 
or  prudence  decided  him  to  approach  in  front  at  Heils- 
berg, with  more  than  100,000  men,  while  pushing  50,000 
upon  Eylau,  between  this  camp  and  Koenigsberg,  to 
thus  force  the  Russians  to  abandon  to  him  both  their 
intrenched  position  and  their  magazine,  without  battle; 
after  which,  going  in  pursuit,  he  calculated  upon  reach- 


542  PART    FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

ing  and  defeating  them  at  the  crossings  of  the  Pregel  or 
the  Niemen. 

"On  June  lo,  a  sanguinary  combat  was  fought  at 
Heilsberg,  without  result.  This  aggressive  operation 
appeared  not  only  rash  but  ill-timed,  since  the  manoeuvre 
of  our  left  wing  towards  Eylau  was  to  drive  Benningsen 
from  his  redoubts.  Success  alone  could  excuse  it;  the 
actual  result  condemned  it;  we  were  repulsed  with  a 
loss  of  7,000  killed  and  wounded. 

"But  Benningsen' s  faulty  position  was  unchanged. 
His  resources  were  at  Koenigsberg;  this  was  the  subject 
of  his  most  earnest  thought;  it  was  moreover,  a  point 
of  honor  with  him  to  hold  this  place — the  last  capital  of 
his  all3\  Everything  then  urged  him  toward  this  grand 
magazine,  situated  on  the  sea  upon  his  right,  much  as 
he  might  have  wished  the  depot,  according  to  the  usual 
rule,  upon  his  line  of  retreat  in  rear.  Napoleon  profited 
by  his  opponent's  mistake.  Abandoning  Heilsberg,  he 
moved  toward  our  left  wing  at  Kylau,  where  he  at  the 
same  time  separated  Benningsen  from  Koenigsberg  and 
threatened  the  retreat  of  the  Russian  army  at  Friedland 
and  Wehlau. 

"Benningsen,  alarmed,  covered  his  force  by  the  Alle, 
and  moving  down  this  stream,  thought  only  of  retiring 
in  all  haste  bej'ond  Friedland.  But  once  there,  seeing 
his  communications  with  his  sovereign  assured,  and  find- 
ing himself  reinforced  by  28,000  men,  instead  of  moving 
beyond  this  town  and  establishing  his  army  behind  the 
Pregel,  the  spectre  of  Koenigsberg  began  to  torment  him 
anew,  and  not  being  able  to  abandon  the  idea  of  reliev- 
ing this  place,  he  stopped,  recrossed  the  Alle  at  Fried- 
land, and  decided  to  attack.  This  was  on  the  14th  of 
June.  Surprised  by  Napoleon  in  the  very  act,  and  with 
a  defile  in  his  rear,  he  experienced  a  defeat  which  put 
an  end  to  the  war."* 

*  Memoirs  of  de  Segur,  vol.  iii.,pp.  176,  177,  and  178. 


THIRD   CIIAPTKR. — OPERATIONS.  543 

Conclusions. — The  remarkable  operations  of  1807  show 
us: 

I  St.  That  in  general  an  army's  march  direction  should 
be  so  chosen  as  to  lead  to  the  enemy's  communications, 
and  that  this  becomes  a  positive  rule  when  the  adversary 
himself  uncovers  these  lines. 

2d.  That  one  means  of  facilitating  this  manoeuvre  is 
to  dispose  the  grand  units  in  echelon,  and  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  the  combats  that  arrest  the  enemy,  to  out- 
flank him  on  the  side  which  it  is  desired  to  threaten. 

The  application  of  these  principles  is  not  affected  by 
the  changes  of  time;  in  all  epochs  they  have  led  to  de- 
cisive results,  and  among  the  warriors  who  have  put 
them  into  practice  with  the  greatest  success,  we  cannot 
forbear  mentioning  the  Austrian  field-marshal,  Radetsky. 

In  this  connection,  his  campaign  of  1849,  ^^^  Lom- 
bardy,  offers  us  a  remarkable  example. 

3d. — Campaign  of  1849  in  Lombardy. — In  March  of  this 
year,  the  Sardinian  army  having  declared  the  armistice 
with  Austria  at  an  end,  and  placing  too  much  confi- 
dence in  rumors  of  the  retreat  of  the  Austrian  army,  was 
extended  along  the  Ticino  ready  to  invade  the  Milanese. 
It  comprised  6  divisions  and  2  brigades,  distributed  as 
follows:  * 

The  Solardi  brigade  at  Oleggio,  on  the  extreme  left; 

The  Perronne  division  at  Galliate; 

The  division  of  the  Duke  of  Genoa  opposite  Bufi'alora; 

The  division  of  the  Duke  of  Savoy  at  Novara; 

The  Bes  division  at  Vigevano; 

The  Durando  division  atMortara; 


■■> 


The  Romarino  division  before  Pavia,  guarding  the 
branch  of  the  Ticino  called  Gravellona  and  the  bridge 
of  Mezzano-Corte,  upon  the  Po.     {See  Plate  XXVIII.) 

The  Sardinian  army  was  made  up  of  118  battalions, 
47  squadrons,  and  156  pieces,  and  numbered  about  100,- 
000  men. 


544  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

The  Austrian  army  comprised  only  72  battalions,  44 
squadrons,  and  229  pieces:  in  all  70,000  men.  Notwith- 
standing its  numerical  inferiority,  however,  its  chief, 
Marshal  Radetsky,  resolved  to  take  the  offensive,  and  to 
move  upon  the  enemy's  communications.  The  two 
armies  being  very  near  together  and  parallel,  it  was  dif- 
ficult for  one  of  them  to  march  upon  the  other's  rear 
without  exposing  one  of  its  own  flanks  to  attack  and  un- 
covering its  line  of  retreat.  In  order,  therefore,  to  carry 
out  his  plan,  Radetsky  feigned  to  fall  back  upon  the 
Quadrilateral,  and  made  a  false  retreat  from  Milan 
upon  Lodi,  taking  care  to  secure  the  bridge  of  San 
Angelo  upon  the  Lambro.  Reaching  I^odi,  he  changed 
direction,  and  crossed  the  Po  at  Piacenza,  where  he  ral- 
lied the  detachments  called  up  from  the  lower  Po  and 
from  Brescia.  He  then  ascended  the  right  bank  until 
abreast  of  Pavia,  and  surprised  the  four  battalions  which 
General  Ramorino  had  charged  with  guarding  the 
bridges  of  the  Gravellona  and  of  Mezzano-Corte.  He  next 
gained  the  right  bank  of  the  Ticino  with  all  his  forces 
except  the  two  brigades  left  at  Bufifalora  to  attract  the 
attention  of  Charles  Albert,  and  which  had  orders  to  re- 
join him  upon  his  arrival  opposite  Berequardo.  He  then 
moved  up  the  Ticino,  successively  beating  the  Sardinian 
divisions,  and  finally  winning  the  famous  battle  of  No- 
vara,  which  forced  Charles  Albert  to  sign  his  abdication.* 

Comments. — By  his  skill  in  the  choice  of  objectives,  Ra- 
detsky was  able  to  take  the  Sardinians  in  flank,  then 
to  place  himself  with  superior  forces  astride  their  line 
of  communications,  which,  passing  through  Vercelli, 
led  to  Turin.  As  for  himself,  in  order  to  avoid  compro- 
mising and  uncovering  his  line  of  retreat  upon  Milan 
and  Lodi,  he  had  taken  the  precaution  to  have  it  pro- 

*  General  Pierron. 


THIRD    CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  545 

tected  by  the  brigades  left  at  Bnffalora  up  to  the  mo- 
ment when  his  movement  being  far  enough  advanced, 
he  decided  to  cliange  it  for  one  through  Pavia  and  Lodi, 
which  assured  him  a  shorter  direction. 

The  manoeuvre  of  Radetsky  was  then  executed  with 
great  audacity.  It  was  difficult,  but  owing  to  the  char- 
acter of  his  troops,  and  his  own  talent,  he  secured  the 
most  complete  results  from  this  combination. 

Conclusion. — When  an  army  placed  upon  a  front  parallel 
to  that  of  the  enemy  desires  to  move  upon  the  latter' s 
communications,  its  plan  should  be  to  at  first  attract  his 
attention  by  means  of  a  demonstration,  then  to  change 
its  own  line  of  communications,  and  outflank  one  of  his 
wings. 

In  our  time,  with  the  large  masses  of  which  armies 
are  composed,  combinations  like  those  made  by  Radetsky 
in  1849  ^^^  much  more  difficult  to  execute.  Among  re- 
cent campaigns,  that  of  the  Prussians  in  1866  gives  us  a 
very  correct  idea  of  the  difficulties  to  be  encountered  in 
the  future  in  choosing  march  objectives  and  directions. 
For  this  it  will  be  sufficient  to  study  the  movement  of 
their  three  armies  during  the  days  following  the  battle 
of  Koni^o-rsetz. 


'&&' 


4th. — March  of  the  Prussian  Armies  from  the  Elbe  to  the  Dan- 
ube in  1866. — After  the  terrible  struggle  of  the  3d  of  July 
in  this  year,  the  I.  and  II.  Prussian  Armies  and  the 
Army  of  the  Elbe  passed  two  entire  days  without  receiv- 
ing precise  information  concerning  the  direction  of  the 
enemy's  retreat.  Contact  had  been  lost,  and  the  Aus- 
trian army  had  slipped  away.  The  Prussians  knew  only 
that  it  had  crossed  the  Elbe  at  Koniggrsetz  and  Joseph- 
stadt. 

This  fact  indicated  a  first  aim  to  the  new  efforts  of  the 
Prussian  armies.     It  was  necessary  first  to  seize  the  pass- 

35 


546  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

ages  of  the  Elbe,  the  possession  of  which  cut  oflf  the 
.vanquished  from  all  communication  with  northern  Bo- 
hemia.    {See  Plate  XXIX. ) 

In  consequence,  on  July  5,  the  bridges  of  this  river 
were  occupied  from  Pardubitz  to  Kladrub;  then,  being 
in  ignorance  of  the  whereabouts  of  the  enemy,  the  Prus- 
sians took  steps  necessary  -to  provide  for  the  case  of  his 
continuing  in  the  vicinity,  their  troops  remaining  in 
close  cantonment  upon  a  space  23  miles  square. 

July  6. — On  this  day  the  victors  discovered  with  cer- 
tainty that  the  principal  Austrian  mass  had  retired  upon 
Olmiitz,  and  that  a  weaker  force,  composed  of  the  loth 
Corps  and  the  cavalry  divisions,  was  moving  upon 
Vienna. 

On  other  grounds  it  was  concluded  at  the  general  head- 
quarters that  Austria  would  undoubtedly  recall  to  Vienna 
all  available  troops  then  in  Italy.  The  Prussians  were 
therefore  constrained  to  move  the  bulk  of  their  forces  in 
the  direction  of  the  Austrian  capital,  for  the  purpose  of 
keeping  the  enemy's  two  groups  separated.  To  gain 
this  city  before  the  arrival  of  the  forces  from  Italy  would 
perhaps  bring  the  war  to  a  speedy  close. 

These  considerations  led  the  King  of  Prussia  to  adopt 
a  measure  always  more  or  less  hazardous.  He  divided 
his  forces  into  two  groups.  The  II.  Army,  forming  the 
left  wing,  was  to  follow  the  beaten  army  to  Olmiitz;  the 
remainder  was  to  march  direct  upon  Vienna,  and  seek 
to  end  the  campaign  with  as  little  delay  as  possible. 

Orders  were  issued  to  this  effect.  It  was  then  the 
enemy's  assemblements  that  indicated  the  objective  and 
the  line  of  march.  This  movement  had,  moreover,  a 
special  aim,  which  was  soon  to  call  for  the  exercise  of 
the  greatest  skill  on  the  part  of  the  commander-in-chief 
— the  keeping  asunder  of  the  adversary's  two  forces. 

July  7. — On  this  day,  in  consequence  of  decisions 
reached  the  evening  before,  the  principal  lines  of  march 
were  assigned  to  each  army. 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  547 

The  II.  had  only  general  directions;  it  was  to  follow 
the  beaten  army,  and  once  at  Olniiitz,  was  to  take  a 
position  toward  Littan-Konitz,  covering  Silesia. 

The  I.  Army  was  to  move  from  Chrodim  to  Policka 
and  Nenstadt,  by  the  roads  from  Skuc  and  Kreutzberg. 
The  Army  of  the  Elbe  was  to  follow  the  road  from 
Iglau  by  Deutsch-Brod.  These  two  armies  took  at  first 
the  direction  of  Briinn,  and  bore  toward  the  south-east, 
across  the  mountainous  region  separating  Moravia  from 
Bohemia. 

July  8. — The  first  march  objectives,  Policka,  Neustadt, 
and  Deutsch-Brod,  were  reached  on  this  dav,  and  new 
orders  prolonged  the  march  in  the  same  direction. 

The  I.  Army  was  to  move  upon  Briinn  by  Policka, 
Kunstadt,  and  Kreutzberg-Rosinka.  The  Army  of  the 
Elbe  was  to  march  upon  Iglau,  and  thence  to  Briinn  or 
Znaim,  according  to  circumstances. 

July  p,  /o,  and  11  —The  movement  continued  on  the 
9tli  without  incident;  but  on  the  loth,  the  cavalry  ot 
the  II.  Army  found  Benedek's  order  of  movement  in  a 
post-office  among  other  papers.  It  was  thus  learned  that 
the  Austrian  leader  had  reached  Olmiitz  after  a  very 
rapid  march,  44;^  kilometres  in  advance  of  the  I.  Corps, 
which  was  at  the  head  of  the  II.  Army. 

On  the  third  day,  July  11,  the  I.  Army  arrived  with- 
in a  single  march  of  Briinn,  and  the  advanced-guard  of 
the  Army  of  the  Elbe  entered  Iglau. 

A  change  then  took  place  in  the  general  situation. 
This,  when  it  became  known  to  the  Prussians,  led  to  a 
shifting  of  their  line  of  march. 

The  Austrian  government  had  resolved  to  concentrate 
the  greater  part  of  the  Army  of  the  North  at  Vienna. 
Benedek  had  already  given  the  necessary  instructions  to 
his  generals.  One  of  his  corps  was  to  remain  at  Olmiitz, 
in  order  to  cover  this  place,  and  to  screen  the  move- 
ment from  Prussian  scouts.   On  the  evening  of  the  nth, 


548  PART   FIRST.  — STRATEGY. 

the  transfer  of  troops  toward  Vienna  began.  The  3d 
Corps  was  moved  first,  and  the  Saxon  Corps  was  to 
follow.  The  March  railroad  was  given  np  to  their  use; 
while  along  the  roads  running  through  the  valley  of  the 
river  of  this  name,  and  by  the  towns  of  Goeding  and 
Malaczka,  another  portion  of  the  army  was  moved 
towarci  Vienna,  protected  by  cavalry  on  the  right  bank. 

On  this  day,  the  nth,  information  was  received  at  the 
Prussian  headquarters  from  the  II.  Army,  that  these 
forces  were  leaving  Olmiitz.  This  was  sufficient  to  ex- 
plain the  Austrian  combination,  and  led  to  an  imme- 
diate change  in  the  orders  previously  given. 

The  II.  Armv  was  informed  that  it  was  no  longer  to 
protect  Silesia,  but  that  it  would  concur  with  the  other 
two  armies  in  keeping  up  the  separation  of  the  enemy's 
masses.  The  King  did  not  hesitate.  He  decided  that 
this  arni}^,  instead  of  placing  itself  between  Littau  and 
Konitz,  should  be  established  upon  the  line  Prossnitz- 
Urtschitz,  and  that  it  should  take  the  country  to  the 
south  of  Olmiitz  for  its  march  direction,  instead  of  the 
'region  to  the  north. 

In  order  to  properly  define  this  new  objective,  instruc- 
tions were  sent  from  the  general  headquarters  in  the 
following  terms  :  "If  this  position  can  be  occupied  in 
time,  all  communication  between  the  Army  of  the  North 
and  Vienna,  by  the  right  bank  of  the  March,  will  be 
interrupted;  and  if  Prerau  can  be  occupied  or  the  works 
there  destroyed,  this  army  will  be  prevented  from  using 
the  railroad. ' ' 

Upon  receipt  of  these  new  orders,  the  II.  Army  caused 
its  heads  of  columns  to  move  by  the  right  flank.  These 
soon  came  upon  obstacles  of  the  ground  which  obliged 
four  corps  to  proceed  iipon  the  same  road.  This  neces- 
sitated very  short  marches,  and  it  was  not  until  the  15th 
that  the  prescribed  position  was  reached. 

In  the  meantime,  the  movement  of  the  I.  Army  and 
the  Army  of  the  Elbe  continued. 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPKRATIONS.  549 

On  the  evening  of  the  nth,  information  was  received 
at  the  general  headqnarters,  through  the  cavalry,  that 
Briinn  was  occupied  only  by  v^eak  detachments.  This 
was  an  important  objective;  it  was  expedient  to  seize 
it  at  once,  and  reach  the  country  beyond.  In  conse- 
quence, Von  Moltke  sent  the  following  instructions  to 
the  commanders-in-chief  : 

"From  information  received,  it  appears  probable  that 
we  shall  find  Briinn  feebly  guarded.  Consequently  the 
commander-in-chief  of  the  I.  Army  will  judge  on  the 
spot  whether  in  order  to  become  master  of  this  place  he 
should  concentrate  his  army  on  this  side,  and  how  far 
this  concentration  should  be  pushed,  or  whether  it  would 
not  be  more  advantageous  for  the  I.  Army  to  take  the 
Eibenschiitz  road,  in  order  to  facilitate  and  hasten  its 
own  deployment  and  that  of  the  Army  of  the  Elbe,  in 
in  rear  of  the  Thaya,  a  river  to  the  south  of  Briinn, 
upon  the  line  Znaim-Muschau. 

"The  commander-in. chief  of  the  I.  Army  wnll  at 
once  communicate  his  decision  in  this  regard  to  the 
commander-in-chief  of  the  Army  of  the  Elbe,  and  the 
latter  should  either  continue  his  movement  upon  Briinn 
by  Stannern  and  Trebitsh  with  one  part  of  his  forces, 
and  by  Meseritsch  with  the  other;  or,  in  case  he  finds 
there  is  no  necessity  for  a  concentration  before  Briinn, 
then  to  march  all  his  forces  upon  Znaim." 

This  order  shows  the  degree  of  initiative  which  it  is 
proper  to  leave  the  army  leaders  in  such  a  case.  It  is  to 
be  remarked  that  it  did  not  reach  the  commander  of  the 
Army  of  the  Elbe  until  the  afternoon  of  July  13,  two 
days  after  its  dispatch.  In  the  interval,  in  consequence 
of  previous  instructions,  a  mixed  division,  pushed  be- 
yond Briinn,  had  already  gained  the  points  Markvatitz 
and  Horry  with  its  advanced-guard. 

July  12. — On  this  day  the  advanced-guard  of  the  I. 
Army  occupied  Briinn  without  resistance. 


550  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

July  13. — The  King  reached  this  city.  The  ground 
being  clear,  a  still  further  movement  could  be  made  in 
advance,  and  accordingly  an  entire  corps  was  immedi- 
ately directed  toward  the  south,  while  the  Army  of  the 
Elbe  was  moved  upon  Znaim.  The  latter  was  thus  to 
form  an  advanced  echelon,  according  to  the  disposition 
usually  adopted  by  Von  Moltke  for  the  march  of  a  group 
of  armies.  Under  these  circumstances,  if  one  of  the 
group  should  be  attacked,  the  others  could  immediately 
support  it,  and  take  the  enemy  in  flank  by  a  simple 
wheel.  This  is  the  angular  formation  applied  to  armies 
on  the  march. 

The  Army  of  the  Elbe  had  anticipated  the  intentions 
of  the  generalissimo,  and  pushed  its  heads  of  columns 
beyond  Briinn,  according  as  the  shattered  Austrian  corps 
evacuated  the  ground.  Thus,  on  the  same  day,  the  13th, 
its  advanced-guard  reached  and  occupied  Znaim. 

Ten  days  had  elapsed  since  Sadowa.  The  Army  of 
the  Elbe  had  traveled  185  kilometres.  Put  in  motion 
on  the  day  following  the  battle,  it  had  marched  contin- 
uously for  these  ten  days  at  the  rate  of  iSi'o  kilometres 
[between  11  and  12  miles]  a  day.  This  army,  it  is  true, 
contained  only  four  divisions,  and  was  preceded  by  an 
advanced-guard  of  seven  battalions,  fourteen  squadrons, 
and  fourteen  guns,  which  assured  it  great  mobility. 

July  14. — On  this  day  the  right  group  of  the  Prussian 
armies  had  accomplished  the  first  part  of  its  march  upon 
Vienna.  Uj^  to  this  point,  nothing  had  arrested  or  re- 
tarded its  movement.  But  at  this  moment  certain 
doubts  arose  in  the  mind  of  Von  Moltke.  Ought  this 
march  upon  the  Austrian  capital  to  be  continued,  and 
the  line  of  the  Thaya,  already  reached  by  the  advanced- 
guard,  to  be  crossed  ?  Or  was  it  preferable  to  return 
against  the  remains  of  Benedek's  forces  and  crush  them? 

Which  was  his  true  objective?  News  received  of  the 
assemblements  at  Vienna  quickly  dispelled  all  doubt. 


THIRD  CIIAPTEP.. — OPERATIONS.  55  r 

"The  Austrian  government,"  says  the  work  prepared 
by  the  Prussian  general  staff,  "had  already  assembled 
its  forces  around  Vienna;  and  if  these  moved  forward  it 
would  probably  be  necessary  to  sustain  a  second  battle 
before  terminating  the  war,  and  we  were  at  this  time 
more  favorably  situated,  both  from  a  political  and  mili- 
tary point  of  view,  than  would  be  the  case  later,  if  we 
were  obliged  to  go  in  search  of  the  enemy.  It  was  a 
question  then  of  traversing  the  space  between  the 
Thaya  and  the  Danube  as  quickly  as  possible,  and  of 
preparing  means  of  crossing  the  latter." 

On  the  14th,  orders  were  issued  accordingly.  After  a 
rest  of  two  days,  the  I.  Army  was  to  continue  its  march 
upon  Vienna  by  the  roads: 

Eibenschiitz-Laa-Erntsbriinn  for  the  right; 

Diirnholz-Ladendorf  for  the  centre; 

And  Muschau-Nikolsburg-Gaunersdorf,  for  the  left. 

Upon  the  line  of  the  Thaya,  to  which  the  advanced- 
guard  of  the  Arm}^  of  the  Elbe  had  pushed,  and  near  the 
March,  was  a  place  of  great  strategic  importance.  This 
was  Liindenburg,  upon  the  Ferdinand  railroad,  a  junc- 
tion-point connecting  by  rail  with  Briinn,  Znaim,  Bud- 
weiss,  Olmiitz  via  Prera-u,  and  with  Presburg and  Vienna. 

This  became  then  an  immediate  march  objective. 

In  consequence,  the  generalissimo  ordered  the  I.  Army 
to  form  a  special  detachment  for  the  purpose  of  seizing 
it  as  soon  as  possible,  to  intercept,  thus,  all  communica- 
tion between  Vienna  and  the  Army  of  the  North,  and  to 
assure  the  means  of  utilizing  the  railroads  in  the  vicinity. 

The  Army  of  the  Elbe  had  two  roads  at  its  disposal: 

The  one  by  letzeldorf  and  Ober-Hollabrunn; 

The  other  by  Joslowitz  and  Entzersdorf-im-Thal. 

Marching  its  main  body  here,  it  was  to  send  a  detach- 
ment in  the  direction  of  the  Danube  above  Vienna  on 
the  side  of  Meissau,  to  make  a  demonstration  toward 
the  bridofes  of  Tulln  and  Krems. 


552  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

In  order  also  that  the  two  masses  should  always  be  in 
condition  to  support  each  other,  the  generalissimo  fixed 
the  1 7th  of  July  as  the  day  of  passage  of  the  Thaya  at 
Znaim  and  Muschau  by  the  heads  of  columns. 

At  this  time,  the  two  Prussian  armies  had  a  front  of 
march  of  only  39  kilometres  [about  24  miles].  Their 
formation  was  then  as  compact  as  if  they  expected  to 
encounter  the  enemy. 

On  the  same  day,  July  14,  the  Austrian  government 
began  moving  the  troops  in  Italy  toward  the  capital, 
while  the  Army  of  the  North  directed  two  of  its  corps, 
the  2nd  and  4th,  to  Tobitschau  and  Kojetein. 

The  latter  operation  now  became  difficult,  as  has  been 
observed  in  the  work  of  the  Prussian  staff,  several  times 
referred  to,  since  the  II.  Army  was  upon  the  right  flank 
of  these  forces.  If  they  had  been  able  to  take  the  offen- 
sive, their  objective  would  plainly  have*  been  this  II. 
Army,  and  Benedek  could  not  have  neglected  it  without 
running  the  risk  of  having  his  march  arrested.  This, 
indeed,  occurred  on  the  following  day.  It  was  on  July 
14  that  the  scouts  of  the  Crown  Prince  discovered  the 
Austrian  columns  in  retreat  toward  Vienna.  This  in- 
formation, sent  to  general  headquarters  at  Brunn  in  the 
evening,  excited  the  fear  that  Benedek  had  already  passed 
the  11.  Army,  and  was  now  on  his  way  toward  Goeding. 

This  was  serious  news;  it  still  further  modified  the  sit- 
uation, and  was  to  exercise  an  influence  upon  the  march 
directions. 

"The  reports  received  during  the  night  of  the  14th," 
says  the  account  of  the  Prussian  staff,  "made  it  apparent 
that  bodies  of  troops  in  considerable  numbers  had  for 
several  days  been  retreating  from  Olmiitz  toward  the 
south." 

"It  was  essential  that  the  I.  Army  should  be  directed 
upon  Liindenburg,  in  order  to  check  the  portion  of  the 
enemy  that  had  already  defiled  at  Prossnitz,  in  advance 


THIRD   CHAPTKR. — OPKRATIONS.  553 

of  the  II.  Army,  and  to  shut  it  out  both  from  the  Vienna 
and  Presburg  roads.  It  was  necessary  then,  to  abandon 
for  the  moment  the  direct  march  upon  Vienna,  as  pre- 
scribed in  the  order  of  the  evening  before,  and  incline 
toward  the  east." 

"If  now  the  entire  Army  of  the  North,  or  at  least  a 
great  part  of  it,  was  thus  proceeding  toward  Vienna 
along  the  March,  a  second  battle  was  to  be  expected." 

In  anticipation  then  of  meeting  the  enemy  in  force,  it 
was  advisable  to  concentrate,  and  Von  Moltke  accord- 
ingly ordered  the  II.  Army  to  come  to  the  support  of  the 
I.,  leaving  the  Vienna  road  to  turn  upon  Liindenburg, 
and  directed  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  likewise  to  draw 
near  the  I.  Army  by  Laa,  moving  as  far  as  Wulfersdorf, 
in  order  to  cover  it  from  any  attempt  that  might  be  made 
from  the  side  of  Vienna. 

The  immediate  objective  of  the  Prussian  armies  now 
became  the  enemy's  lines  of  communications,  and  they 
were  about  to  make  an  effort  to  seize  them  at  the  point 
nearest  their  heads  of  columns. 

July  IS- — On  the  morning  of  this  day  the  I.  Army 
*was  put  in  march  toward  Muschau  and  Vienna,  leaving 
one  division  temporarily  in  rear  at  Briinn.  All  the 
troops  had  been  set  in  motion,  when  the  commander-in- 
chief  received  the  new  order  of  the  generalissimo.  The 
question  was  how  best  to  conform  to  it  when  his  move- 
ment was  in  full  process  of  execution.  Prince  Frederick 
Charles  found  that  it  was  too  late  to  attempt  a  change. 
He  contented  himself  with  ordering  the  two  left  divi- 
sions to  incline  toward  the  east,  the  7th  upon  Auspitz, 
the  8th  upon  Klobauk.  The  latter  on  the  following  day 
was  to  occupy  the  bridge  of  Goeding,  upon  the  March; 
and  finally  the  5th  Division,  which  had  been  retained  at 
Briinn,  was  immediately  directed  upon  Moenitz  and 
Tellnitz,  in  the  vicinity  of  Austerlitz. 

Upon  his  ajrrival  at  Klobauk,  on  the  15th,  the  com- 


554  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

mander  of  the  8tli  Division,  not  wishing  to  put  off  the 
destruction  of  the  railroad  until  the  next  day,  at  once 
dispatched  a  detachment  of  cavalry,  150  strong,  and  a 
section  of  pioneers  on  this  duty.  These  reached  the 
railroad  at  6  p.  m.  After  seeing  two  train-loads  of  Aus- 
trian troops  pass,  they  hastened  to  tear  up  the  rails  and 
cut  the  telegraph  line.  While  thus  engaged,  a  third 
Austrian  train  came  in  sight,  but  was  obliged  to  retire. 
This  force  returned  to  Klobauk  at  midnight,  having 
accomplished  the  work  assigned  it.  It  had  traveled  96 
kilometres  [59  miles]  during  the  day. 

In  the  meantime,  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  not  having 
yet  received  the  new  orders,  still  remained  at  Znaim. 

The  appearance  of  the  Prussian  detachment  at  Goed- 
ing,  on  the  15th,  was  co-incident  with  the  discovery 
further  to  the  north  of  the  second  echelon  of  Benedek's 
army,  by  two  infantry  brigades  of  the  II.  Army.  This 
meeting  led  to  the  combats  of  Tobitschau  and  Rokei- 
nitz,  in  consequence  of  which  the  ist  and  8th  Austrian 
Corps  were  obliged  to  bivouac  at  Prerau,  while  the  first 
echelon,  formed  of  the  2d  and  4th  Corps,  was  at  Zdaunec 
and  Kremsier. 

The  news  of  the  arrival  of  the  Prussians  at  Goeding 
apprised  Benedek  that  he  was  cut  from  Vienna.  He 
was,  in  consequence,  obliged  to  abandon  the  project  of 
following  the  valley  of  the  March,  and  to  endeavor  to 
reach  the  Danube  by  the  nearest  route  to  the  east,  that 
of  the  valley  of  the  Waag,  leading  to  Comorn.  He 
hurried  his  corps  then  by  forced  marches  across  the 
mountains  which  separated  him  from  this  valley,  and 
again  eluded  the  Prussian  scouts. 

Upon  learning  at  Vienna  of  the  enemy's  arrival  at 
Goeding,  orders  were  given  the  brigade  guarding  the 
bridge  of  Liindenburg  to  immediately  withdraw. 
Thenceforth  the  ground  was  clear  in  front  of  the  Prus- 
sians from  Olmiitz  to  Vienna. 


THIRD   CHAPTF^R. — OPERATIONS.  555 

This  incident  is  an  example  of  the  extraordinary 
effect,  under  snch  circumstances,  attending  the  unex- 
pected appearance  of  a  weak  body  of  troops  boldly  com- 
manded, and  of  the  utility  of  always  occupying,  without 
a  moment's  delay,  every  point  in  the  theatre  of  opera- 
tions which  is  of  strategic  interest  to  an  army. 

July  16. — The  II.  Army  continued  its  march  toward 
the  east,  and  reached  Prerau. 

In  the  I.  Army  the  8th  Division  occupied  Goeding, 
and  also  Holisch  upon  the  left  bank  of  the  March.     The 
7th  Division   reached  lyiindenburg  by  the  left  bank  of 
the   Thaya,    while    the    advanced-guard    of  the    army 
gained  Kisgrub,  by  the  right  bank. 

July  17. — The  11.  Army  had  lost  contact  with  Ben- 
edek,  and  even  all  traces  of  him.  He  had  stolen  away 
by  forced  marches,  and  nothing  was  known  except  that 
his  army  was  directed  toward  the  mountains. 

This  turn  of  affairs  had  not  been  foreseen,  but  Von 
Moltke  concluded  that  the  disappearance  of  Benedek 
toward  the  east  could  have  but  one  object — to  gain 
Vienna  as  soon  as  possible  by  another  direction.  He 
therefore  decided: 

ist.  To  strongly  occupy  the  Lundenburg-Goeding 
region  for  the  purpose  of  shutting  Benedek  from  Vienna 
on  this  side; 

2d.  To  send  a  detached  corps  in  the  direction  of  the 
retreating  army; 

3d.  To  move  again  in  force  toward  the  Danube,  and 
cross  it  near  Vienna,  thus  holding  the  enemy's  two 
masses  asunder  in  this  direction. 

The  objective  and  aim  of  the  march  remained  then 
always  the  same.  The  direction  alone  changed,  and 
then  only  temporarily,  the  heads  of  columns  resuming 
their  march  toward  the  south. 

It  was,  indeed,  to  this  side  that  the  troops  were  mov- 
ing during  the  17th.  The  Army  of  the  Elbe,  pursuant 
to  its  orders  of  the  15th,  arrived  at  Wulfersdorf. 


556  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY'. 

J2ily  18. — The  II.  Army,  expecting  new  orders, 
awaited  their  arrival  before  moving.  They  were  re- 
ceived by  the  Crown  Prince  at  6  A.  m.  ,  informing  him 
that  the  generalissimo  having  as  yet  but  vague  informa- 
mation  concerning  the  enemy,  had  not  been  able  to 
definitely  fix  upon  a  new  objective;  but  that  thenceforth 
the  general  objective  would  be  Vienna  and  Presburg. 

In  this  view,  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  was  to  follow  the. 
route  from  Brunn  to  Vienna. 

The  I.  Army  was  to  move  upon  Vienna  by  both 
banks  of  the  March,  and  prevent  the  junction  of  the 
northern  forces  with  those  of  the  capital. 

The  II.  Army  was  to  support  the  movement  of  the 
other  two,  leaving  one  corps  to  pursue  Benedek;  and  in. 
order  to  permit  this  army  to  rejoin  the  others,  the  latter 
were  to  make  short  marches.  Finally,  in  case  of  en- 
countering the  enemy,  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  was  to 
concentrate  at  Wulfersdorf,  and  to  reinforce  its  ad- 
vanced-guard. The  I.  Army  sent  a  division  by  forced 
marches  to  seize  Presburg. 

The  group  to  the  south  composed  of  the  two  armies, 
was  to  hold  the  advanced  guards  abreast  of  each  other 
for  the  purpose  of  permitting  the  forces  to  arrive  simul- 
taneously upon  the  important  line  of  the  Danube. 

The  general  movement  in  the  new  directions  began 
on  July  18. 

During  this  time,  Benedek,  who  had  not  lost  an  in- 
stant, counted  upon  occupying  Presburg  on  the  22nd 
with  an  entire  corps,  notwithstanding  the  exhausted 
condition  of  his  troops. 

July  ig. — In  accordance  with  the  orders  of  the  evening 
before,  the  heads  of  the  Prussian  columns  arrived  on  the 
19th  to  within  two  marches  of  Vienna.  At  Prussian 
general  headquarters  there  was  no  knowledge  on  the 
subject  of  the  number  of  forces  which  the  enemy  had 
moved  to  the  east.     The  information  received  b\-  it  re- 


THIRD   CIIAPTKR. — OPERATIONS.  557 

gardiiio-  the  troops  at  Vienna  indicated  an  assemblement 
there  of  about  150,000  men,  furnished  by  the  Army  of 
the  South  and  a  reserve  army  recently  created.  It  was 
informed,  moreover,  that  important  works,  capable  of 
sheltering  a  large  army,  had  been  thrown  up  beyond  the 
bridoe  of  Floridsdorf,  to  the  north  of  Vienna. 

It  concluded  from  this  that  there  was  every  necessity 
for  the  different  armies  to  be  on  their  guard  and  to  re- 
main concentrated.  The  situation  appeared  to  it  of  such 
a  character  as  to  justify  the  dispatch  of  new  instructions 
to  the  commanders-in-chief  reg-ardingr  the  final  aim  of 
the  march,  the  project  of  crossing  the  Danube,  and  the 
disposition  for  attack  in  case  of  a  final  battle. 

These  instructions  were  as  follows  : 

"The  King  (generalissimo)  intends  to  concentrate 
the  forces  behind  the  Russ,  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  at 
Wolkersdorf,  the  I.  Army  at  Deutsch-Wagram,  and  the 
II.  Army  in  reserve  at  Schoenkirchen. 

"Once  in  this  position,  the  grand  army  should,  first 
of  all,  put  itself  in  condition  to  resist  attack,  should  the 
enemy  attempt  to  make  a  sortie  from  Floridsdorf  with  all 
his  forces,  which  amount  to  about  150,000  men;  and  in 
the  second  place,  it  ought  either  to  push  reconnaissances 
toward  the  intrenchments  of  Floridsdorf  and  attack 
them,  or  march  with  all  possible  promptness  to  the 
flank  upon  Presburg,  leaving  a  corps  of  observation  in 
front  of  Vienna. ' ' 

The  generalissimo  further  gave  orders  to  the  I.  Army 
to  endeavor  to  seize  the  Danube  bridge  at  Presburg 
by  surprise; 

To  the  II.  x\rmy,  to  march  directly  from  Nikolsburg 
to  Vienna,  and,  in  order  to  bring  together  the  largest 
possible  force  in  case  of  attack,  to  endeavor  to  recall  the 
corps  which  had  been  sent  after  Benedek; 

And  finally,  to  the  Reserve  Corps,  then  at  Prague  and 
Pardubitz,  to  rejoin  him  by  rail. 


558  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Upon  the  whole,  then,  such  measures  were  taken  at 
general  headquarters  as  provided  for  the  attack  of  the 
lines  of  Floridsdorf  or  for  the  passage  of  the  Danube, 
according  to  circumstances. 

These  dispositions  were  remarkable  from  several  points 
of  view. 

We  see  that  upon  receipt  of  the  first  news  of  the  ene- 
my's assemblements.  Von  Moltke  thought  only  of  or- 
dering a  concentration  of  his  forces. 

Then,  to  provide  for  the  contingency  of  a  second  battle, 
without  being  influenced  by  his  recent  victory  or  the 
weakening  of  the  adversary,  he  endeavored  to  win  all 
chances  of  success  to  his  side  by  assembling  the  largest 
possible  forces  upon  the  decisive  point.  His  instructions 
were  to  result  in  concentrating  upon  the  line  of  the  Russ 
the  I.  and  II.  Armies,  the  Army  of  the  Elbe,  the  Re- 
serve Army,  and  even  isolated  detachments  which  had 
been  charged  with  special  service.  There  would  then 
have  been  in  the  vicinity  of  Vienna  a  formidable  aggre- 
gation of  four  armies,  ready  to  operate  to  the  same  end. 

Finally,  in  order  to  assure  to  these  masses  an  unop- 
posed passage  of  the  large  river  upon  which  they  were 
arriving.  Von  Moltke  ordered  a  permanent  bridge  to  be 
forcibly  siezed,  choosing  a  point  which  intercepted  the 
communications  between  the  enemy's  two  forces. 

He  sought,  then,  under  all  circumstances  to  effect  a 
division  of  these  forces,  and  to  keep  up  their  separation. 
This  had  been  his  aim  since  first  crossing  the  Elbe, 

While  the  Prussian  army  leaders  were  making  skillful 
dispositions;  while  the  sovereign  was  preparing  to  com- 
mand in  person  the  decisive  battle  which  he  counted 
upon  delivering  under  the  walls  of  Vienna;  while  Bene- 
dek,  on  his  side,  was  meeting  with  success  in  his  attempt 
to  throw  sufficient  forces  into  Presburg  before  the  arrival 
of  the  Prussians,  an  armistice  signed  on  July  22,  at 
Nikolsburg,  put  an  end  to  hostilities. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  559 

One  incident  further,  however,  signalized  this  march 
of  the  Prussian  armies  toward  the  Danube.  It  is  worthy 
to  be  cited,  less  as  a  consequence  of  the  operation  than 
as  a  lesson  of  experience. 

The  march  of  the  7th  Prussian  Division  (Fransecky) 
upon  Presburg  ended  in  an  encounter  at  Blumenau  with 
the  Austrian  troops  that  had  just  disembarked  from  the 
railroad  trains  in  a  state  of  complete  exhaustion.  Gen- 
eral Fransecky  attacked  them  on  the  morning  of  the 
22nd.  Informed  of  the  armistice  at  the  beginning  of 
the  engagement,  he  yet  continued  the  conflict  even  be- 
yond the  hour  fixed  for  cessation  of  hostilities,  and  up  to 
the  moment  when  numerous  Austrian  truce-bearers,  sent 
from  different  sides,  insisted  upon  a  suspension  of  the 
action.  He  submitted  then  to  a  discontinuance  of  the 
firing,  and  renounced  thus  a  new  success  which  seemed 
assured. 

The  conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  this  study,  from  the 
standpoint  of  strategic  marches,  may  be  briefly  stated 
thus: 

The  aim  of  these  marches  is  always  to  weaken  or  de- 
stroy the  enemy. 

Their  objective  should,  in  consequence,  be  either  a 
position  which  separates  his  forces  or  threatens  his 
communications. 

While  keeping  these  results  in  view,  the  direction  of 
the  marches  should  be  modified  when  circumstances  re- 
quire it. 

Finally,  orders  relating  to  these  movements  should, 
so  far  as  possible,  be  given  without  hesitation  or  loss 
of  time. 

In  this  regard,  the  reconnaissances  of  cavalry  divisions 
can  alone  put  the  leaders  in  position  to  act  with  the 
necessary  decision  and  promptness. 


560  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

m. — Errors  of  Hirection  in  Marches. 

If  the  application  of  proper  principles  has  often  led  to 
important  and  advantageous  results,  their  neglect,  as  we 
know,  has  also  very  often  drawn  armies  to  their  ruin. 
Regarding  the  direction  of  marches,  it  will  not  be  with- 
out interest  then  to  study  the  campaigns  in  which  this 
neglect  has  been  flagrant,  and  to  reflect  upon  the  conse- 
quences. 

1st. — Campaign  of  1798  in  the  Roman  States. — It  this  year 
the  Directory  detached  from  fifteen  to  sixteen  thousand 
men  from  the  Cisalpine  army  to  act  in  the  Roman  States. 
General  Championnet,  the  commander,  had  been  obliged 
to  spread  them  out  in  order  to  insure  subsistence,  and 
also  for  the  purpose  of  guarding  the  country.  He  thus 
had  4,000  or  5,000  men  under  General  Casablanca  in  the 
province  of  Ancona;  2,000  or  3,000  under  General  Le- 
moine,  near  Terni,  upon  the  western  slope  of  the  Apen- 
nines; 5,000  under  Macdonald,  distributed  along  the 
Tiber;  and  a  feeble  reserve  at  Rome.     {See  Plate  XXX.) 

The  court  of  Naples,  pressed  by  the  English,  was  in- 
triguing against  us;  and  seeing  the  dispersion  of  our 
forces,  it  decided  to  commence  hostilities  at  the  end  of 
November,  supplying  the  place  of  a  declaration  of  war  by 
an  order  to  General  Championnet  to  evacuate  the  Papal 
States.     At  the  same  time  it  put  its  army  in  march. 

The  Neapolitan  troops  numbered  60,000  men,  20,000 
of  them  distributed  in  the  various  strongholds.  The  re- 
maining 40,000,  forming  the  armv  of  operations,  was 
commanded  by  the  Austrian  general  Mack,  who  wished 
to  profit  from  his  numerical  superiority  to  envelop  the 
French. 

With  this  in  view,  he  formed  his  forces  into  six 
columns: 

The  ist,  operating  beyond  the  Apennines,  along  the 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  561 

Adriatic,    was    to    move   toward   Ancona   by   the   road 
through  Ascoli; 

The  2d  and  3d,  operating-  upon  the  slopes  of  the 
mountains,  were  to  connect  with  the  preceding,  and 
march,  the  one  upon  Terni,  the  other  upon  Magliano; 

The  4th  and  strongest  column,  constituting  the  prin- 
cipal body,  under  orders  of  Mack  himself,  was  to  move 
by  Frascati  upon  Rome; 

The  5th  was  to  traverse  the  Pontine  Marshes  parallel 
with  the  sea; 

And,  finally,  a  6th  detachment,  embarked  in  Nelson's 
fleet,  was  to  land  at  Leghorn,  stir  up  a  revolt  in  Tuscany, 
and  cut  off  our  retreat. 

The  French  army  communicated  with  upper  Italj'  by 
three  roads  leading: 

The  first,  67  leagues  in  length,  from  Rome  to  Leghorn, 
by  Civita-Vecchia; 

The  second,  57  leagues,  from  Rome  to  Siena,  by 
Viterbo; 

The  third,  55  leagues,  from  Rome  to  Fano,  by  Bor- 
ghetto  and  Terni. 

If  Mack,  profiting  by  the  pronounced  salient  formed 
by  the  Neapolitan  frontier  in  the  north,  had  debouched 
from  Citta-Ducale  upon  Terni  with  the  bulk  of  his 
troops,  he  would  have  found  himself  four  marches  be- 
yond Rome,  in  position  to  threaten  our  communications 
with  Viterbo;  while  in  marching  upon  Rome  by  Frascati 
with  his  principal  force  he  reached  the  frontier  at  places 
twenty  leagues  distant  from  this  capital,  and  left  our 
communications  entirely  free,  the  detachment  directed 
upon  Terni  being  too  weak  to  arouse  the  least  uneasiness. 

Champiounet,  being  on  the  alert,  was  not  slow  in 
learning  the  directions  taken  by  these  different  columns. 
He  immediately  understood  the  situation,  and  abandoned 
Rome  in  order  to  concentrate  his  army  between  Civita- 
Castellana  and  Citta-Ducale  upon  his  principal  line  of 
36 


562  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

retreat,  leaving  two  detachments  upon  the  Ancona  and 
Terni  roads  for  the  purpose  of  observing  the  enemy's 
movements.  These  detachments,  soon  attacked  by 
Mack's  troops,  defeated  them  completely,  throwing  them 
back  upon  their  own  country. 

As  to  Championnet,  he  had  taken  a  strong  position  at 
Civita  Castellana,  from  which  the  Neapolitans  were  not 
able  to  dislodge  him.  Then,  seeing  them  retreat  after 
their  futile  attack,  he  resumed  the  offensive,  re-entered 
Rome,  and  pursued  them  into  the  Neapolitan  states, 
which  he  resolved  to  conquer. 

But  he  committed,  in  his  turn,  a  mistake  similar  to 
that  made  by  Mack,  dividing  his  army  into  four 
columns,  separated  by  accidents  of  the  ground,  which 
cut  off  all  lateral  communications. 

The  difficulties  of  the  march  were  still  further  aggra- 
vated by  the  hostility  of  the  inhabitants. 

Nevertheless,  thanks  to  the  weakness  of  his  adversa- 
ries, Championnet  was  successful.  * 

It  is  not  at  all  doubtful  that  the  repulse  experienced 
by  Mack  was  due  to  a  defective  choice  of  march  objec- 
tives. Notwithstanding  the  inferior  quality  of  his  troops, 
he  should,  with  his  immense  numerical  superiority,  have 
been  able  to  attain  success. 

Although  these  operations  may  be  considered  of  sec- 
ondary importance  when  we  take  into  account  the  small 
number  of  troops  engaged,  yet  Napoleon  thought  them 
worthy  of  attention  from  a  standpoint  of  march  direc- 
tions, expressing  himself  in  the  following  terms: 

"The  conduct  of  General  Mack  would  have  been  good 
with  Austrian  troops;  for  what  could  he  do  more  than 
engage  his  soldiers  in  a  contest  with  French  soldiers 
when  they  outnumbered  the  latter  two  or  three  to  one  ? 
But  the  Neapolitans  were  not  trained  troops,   and  he 

*  General  Pierron. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  563 

should  never  have  employed  them  in  attack,  but  have 
taken  np  such  positions  as  would  have  obliged  the  French 
to  become  the  assailants.  Military  men  are  very  much 
divided  upon  the  question  of  the  relative  advantage  of 
making  or  receiving  an  attack.  This  question  is  not  at 
all  doubtful,  when  upon  one  side  are  trained  veterans 
having  little  artillery,  and  upon  the  other  is  a  much 
more  numerous  force,  well  supplied  with  this  arm,  but 
with  officers  and  soldiers  little  inured  to  war. 

"If  Mack  had  been  at  Citta-Ducale  with  40,000  men 
on  the  day  when  hostilities  began,  had  pressed  on  to 
Terni  that  evening,  and  the  next  day  marched  in  the 
direction  of  Rome,  occupying  the  bridge  of  Borghetto, 
and  a  good  position,  how  would  the  French  have  been 
able  with  9,000  men  and  12  pieces  of  artillery  to  force 
back  an  army  five  times  more  numerous,  having  60  guns, 
and  protected  by  intrenchments?  Yet  they  would  have 
been  obliged  to  do  this  in  order  to  open  a  line  of  retreat 
for  themselves." 

Continuing,  the  Emperor  estimates  Championnet's 
march  from  Rome  to  Naples  in  the  following  terms: 

"  It  would  have  been  preferable,  no  doubt,  to  have  re- 
frained from  entering  the  kingdom  of  Naples,  and  to 
have  profited  from  the  consternation  of  the  enemy  to 
force  a  peace,  and  to  detach  him,  for  the  time  being,  from 
the  coalition.  But  once  the  decision  to  march  upon 
Naples  was  taken,  the  movement  should  have  been 
made  with  rapidity.  30,000  men  is,  however,  the  least 
force  with  which  such  an  operation  should  have  been 
undertaken.  These  should  not  have  been  marched 
along  four  distinct  routes  at  a  distance  from  each  other, 
separated  by  mountains  and  rivers,  and  in  the  midst  of 
hostile  inhabitants.  A  corps  of  30,000  men  should  al- 
ways remain  united.  This  was  the  strength  of  the  con- 
sular army.  The  Romans  always  camped  this  body  at 
night  in  a  space  330  toises  [about  700  yards]  square. 


564  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

"  Instead  then  of  four  lines  of  operations,  there  should 
have  been  but  one — that  from  Rome  to  Isola  and 
Capua."* 

Conclusion. — The  instruction  to  be  drawn  from  this 
campaign  is  similar  to  that  derived  from  those  which 
precede.  When  an  army  has  several  march  directions 
at  its  disposal,  it  should  always  take  that  which  most 
directly  threatens  the  enemy's  communications.  If 
one  of  them  offers  peculiar  advantages,  and  promises 
to  lead  to  a  decisive  result  with  little  delay,  it  should  be 
adopted. 

The  means  of  moving  upon  the  adversary's  communi- 
cations, by  a  judicious  choice  of  march  directions,  vary 
according  to  circumstances,  and,  in  each  case,  it  is  for 
the  commander-in-chief  to  discern  those  which  best  re- 
spond to  the  exigencies  of  the  situation. 

In  1866,  notwithstanding  a  great  numerical  super- 
iority, the  Italian  army  was  beaten  at  Custozza,  on 
account  of  having  neglected  the  principles  by  which 
strategic  marches  should  be  habitually  governed. 

2d. — Campaign  of  1866  in  Italy. — We  have  before  seen,  in 
the  study  of  projets  of  operations,  the  respective  posi- 
tions of  the  Italian  and  Austrian  armies  in  1866,  before 
the  commencement  of  hostilities;  and  it  has  already  been 
said  that  the  Italians  had  adopted  two  march  directions: 
one  for  the  army  of  the  King,  which,  leaving  L/ombardy, 
was  to  move  upon  Verona;  the  other  for  General  Cial- 
dini's  army,  which,  starting  on  the  lower  Po,  was  to 
operate  in  Friuli. 

The  movements  began  toward  the  middle  of  June;  the 
1st,  2d,  and  3d  Italian  Corps  moved  from  Lodi,  Cremona, 
and  Piacenza,  upon  the  Chiese,  between  Lake  Garda  and 

*  Military  Correspondence  of  Napoleon  /.,  Vol.  X.,  pp.  206-S-9. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  565 

the  Po;  the  4th  Corps  advanced  toward  the  lower  Po, 
and  took  position  above  Ferrara,  with  five  divisions  in 
first  line  and  three  in  reserve. 

War  was  declared  a  few  days  later,  on  June  20.  The 
army  of  the  King,  three  corps  strong,  advanced  from 
the  Cliiese  npon  the  Mincio,  and  extended  from  Pes- 
chiera  to  Mantua,  upon  a  front  of  35  kilometres. 

On  the  23d  the  two  armies  began  active  operations. 

Archduke  Albert,  in  conformity  with  one  of  the  ele- 
mentary principles  of  war,  first  of  all  concentrated  his 
forces  around  Verona.  Then,  in  order  to  inform  him- 
self upon  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  and  at  the  same 
time  conceal  his  own,  he  established  an  active  recon- 
naissance service  upon  the  one  hand,  and  upon  the  other, 
instituted  a  rigorous  guard  service  to  insure  himself 
against  surprise.  He  ordered  his  cavalry  to  preserve 
contact  with  the  Italian  patrols,  to  seize  prisoners,  to 
make  constant  reports,  and  to  close  the  roads  leading 
into  Italy.  Reduced  to  the  defensive,  he  determined  to 
give  it  the  most  active  character  possible,  and  on  the 
23d  crossed  the  Adige,  while  the  King  on  his  side  was 
passing  the  Mincio.  At  this  time  it  was  known  that 
Cialdini  was  stopped  on  the  lower  Po  by  the  floods,  and 
that  a  junction  with  the  army  of  the  King  was  impos- 
sible. The  Archduke  decided  then  to  take  position 
between  Rocca,  Zerbare,  and  Somma-Campagna.  {See 
Plate  XXXL) 

Thus  placed  apon  the  heights  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Tione,  he  could  take  the  King's  army  in  flank  and 
threaten  its  communications  with  Valeggio  and  Goito, 
if  it  marched  upon  Verona.  Or  if,  on  the  contrary,  it 
sought  to  move  from  the  side  of  Mantua,  he  could  take 
it  in  rear. 

The  Archduke  would  also  have  been  able  to  establish 
himself  between  the  King  and  Cialdini,  thus  making 
their  separation  more  complete,  and  giving  him  the  ad- 


566  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

vantage  of  an  interior  line;  but  in  adopting  this  plan  he 
would  have  uncovered  his  own  communications,  and 
run  the  risk  of  losing  them. 

While  the  Austrian  army  was  making  these  disposi- 
tions, the  King,  too  confident  in  his  numerical  super- 
iority, and  poorly  informed  regarding  the  enemy,  whom 
he  believed  in  a  defensive  position  behind  the  Adige, 
crossed  the  Mincio  on  the  23d  in  the  following  order: 

The  ist  Corps  from  Mozembano  upon  Castelnuovo  and 
Sona; 

The  3d  from  Goito  upon  Somma-Campagna  and  Villa- 
franca; 

The  2d  left  two  divisions  in  reserve  at  Goito,  and  sent 
two  to  Borgoforte  to  observe  Mantua. 

These  combinations  led  to  the  battle  of  Custozza. 

Since  we  are  considering  the  subject  of  marches,  it 
would  be  out  of  place,  perhaps,  to  examine  the  details 
of  this  action  here;  but  it  will  be  well,  however,  to  stop 
for  an  instant  to  reflect  upon  the  march  directions  and 
objectives  adopted  by  both  adversaries. 

Considerations. — The  situation  was  altogether  in  favor 
of  the  Austrians.  The  Italians  had  violated  the  princi- 
ple which  directs  a  concentration  of  forces  before  the 
combat.  They  had  left  a  corps  in  rear;  the  army  of 
Cialdini  was  not  within  supporting  distance;  and,  on  the 
day  of  battle,  two  of  their  divisions  were  not  yet  mobil- 
ized; as  a  consequence,  they  could  bring  to  the  decisive 
point  only  six  divisions  out  of  seventeen. 

The  Austrians,  on  the'  contrary,  had  all  their  forces 
assembled,  and  their  position  upon  the  heights  menaced 
the  flank  of  the  Italian  columns  as  soon  as  they  were  set 
in  motion.  Their  objective  was  the  communications  of 
the  enemy,|while  the  latter  directed  his  forces  upon  their 
position,  which  he,  however,  knew  to  be  very  strong. 

The  consequences  of  these  dispositions  could  then  be 
seen  in  advance. 


THIRD   CIIAPTKR. — OPERATIONS.  567 

Without  stopping  to  consider  them,  we  may  at  least 
inqnire  what  shonld  have  been  the  combinations  of  the 
Italian  army. 

In  this  connection,  two  qnestions  present  themselves 
at  the  ontset: 

ist.   Where  were  the  Austrian  communications  ? 

2d.   How  could  they  be  seized  or  threatened? 

The  answer  to  the  first  question  is  simple.  The  Aus- 
trians  had  two  lines  of  communications:  one  throuo;h 
Tyrol,  the  other  through  Friuli.  The  first  was  the 
longer,  the  more  difficult,  and  the  less  abundant  in  re- 
sources. The  second  was  the  more  important.  It  led 
to  the  heart  of  Austria.  It  was  this  that  the  Prussians 
had  pointed  out  as  the  true  march  objective.  To  seize 
it,  then,  was  the  aim  of  the  Italian  army. 

The  objective  being  determined  upon,  the  march  di- 
rection naturally  resulted  from  it.  It  started  on  the 
lower  Po,  and  followed  the  direct  route  from  Verona  to 
Vienna,  by  way  of  Vicenza. 

In  order  to  give  time  to  cross  the  Po  and  to  move 
to  the  Adige,  it  was  necessary  to  keep  the  enemy's 
forces  around  Verona.  To  this  end,  it  became  essential 
to  make  a  demonstration  upon  the  Mincio.  For  this  it 
would  have  been  sufficient  to  show  heads  of  columns 
upon  the  points  of  passage,  while  the  corps  obliquing 
to  the  right  could  have  passed  the  Po  at  Guastalla,  un- 
observed by  the  garrison  at  Mantua.  Once  upon  the 
right  bank,  the  Italian  army  could  establish  its  line  of 
communications  upon  Bologna  or  Florence;  then,  re- 
crossing  the  Po,  in  the  lower  part  of  its  course,  it  could 
move  rapidly  upon  Rovigo  and  Vicenza.  * 

This  operation  surely  presented  difficulties;  but  it  was 
reasonable,  and  undertaken  with  all  disposable  forces, 
would  have  given  hope  of  the  most  advantageous  re- 
sults. 

*  General  Pierron. 


568  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

The  project,  moreover,  was  that  formed  by  General 
Cialdini,  and  accorded  with  the  combination  advised  by 
Von  Moltke.  But  its  supporters  had  to  contend  against 
the  difference  of  views  which  for  a  long  time  had  existed 
upon  this  subject  in  the  Italian  army. 

The  most  influential  generals,  La  Marmora  and  Cial- 
dini, openly  expressed  antagonistic  opinions.  Since 
i860,  their  personal  views  on  the  subject  of  a  war  with 
Austria  had  given  rise  to  opposing  schools,  and  were 
warmly  defended  by  their  partisans.  The  former  wished 
to  attack  the  Quadrilateral  by  the  Mincio,  the  latter  to 
turn  it  by  the  lower  Po.    . 

The  plan  of  operations  actually  adopted  seems  to  have 
been  a  compromise  between  these  two  opinions. 

The  following  observations  show  the  stage  reached  in 
the  question  at  the  time  war  was  declared : 

"  According  to  some,  the  principal  attack  should  have 
been  made  against  the  enemy's  more  important  line  of 
communications,  extending  into  Friuli  by  way  of  Verona 
and  Vicenza,  first  of  all  taking  Rovigo,  then  Padua  and 
the  Euganean  Hills  as  objectives.  A  part  of  the  army 
should  have  drawn  the  enemy  through  the  Polesine  by 
demonstrations  either  upon  the  Mincio  or  between  Guas- 
talla  and  Brescia  upon  the  Po,  while  the  bulk  of  the 
army  would  have  crossed  the  latter  river  a  little  below 
the  Valli  grandi  Veronesi,  or  more  to  the  right,  between 
Ponte  Lagoscuro  and  Francolinetto.  Then  Rovigo 
would  have  been  besieged,  and  afterwards,  according  to 
the  movements  of  the  enemy,  there  would  either  have 
been  a  concentration  in  the  Polesine  in  order  to  pass  the 
Adige,  or  a  march  upon  Padua,  coupled  with  the  shut- 
ting up  of  Legnago  to  the  left,  at  the  same  time  that  the 
fleet  occcupied  the  defenders  of  Venice  to  the  right."* 

The  author  recurring  afterwards  to  the  same  subject, 
expresses  the  opinion  of  General  Cialdini  in  these  terms: 

*  Commandant  Lemoyne,  Campaign  of  18S6  in  Italy. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  569 

"In  advancing  by  the  lower  Po,  Mantua,  Legnago, 
and  Peschiera  would  be  taken  in  rear,  and  a  battle 
gained  near  Padua  or  Vicenza  would  deprive  the  Aus- 
trians  of  their  principal  communication  with  their  coun- 
try, and  oblige  them  to  shut  themselves  up  in  Verona, 
a  place  more  open  to  attack  from  the  east  than  the 
west,   ..... 

"This  disagreement  between  the  Italian  generals  re- 
garding the  most  advantageous  method  of  conducting  a 
war  in  Venetia  had  continued  since  i860,  when  General 
Fanti,  having  succeeded  General  La  Marmora  in  the  war 
ministry,  at  once  discarded  the  idea  of  fortifying  Cremona 
and  Lonato,  and  showed  a  strong  disposition  to  shift 
the  scene  of  Italian  defense  to  the  lower  Po. 

"The  matter,  however,  was  not  definitely  decided  one 
way  or  the  other,  either  by  General  Fanti  or  his  suc- 
cessors. 

"The  diversity  of  views  held  by  the  two  generals  who, 
after  the  death  of  Fanti,  in  1865,  were  looked  upon  as 
the  probable  leaders  in  a  war  against  Austria,  could  not 
fail  to  excite  serious  attention.  At  the  end  of  March, 
1866,  when  the  mutterings  of  approaching  war  were  be- 
coming louder  and  louder.  General  Pettitti,  one  of  the 
most  distinguished  members  of  the  permanent  commis- 
sion of  defense,  and  a  personal  friend  of  both  generals, 
sought  to  harmonize  their  views." 

The  combination  adopted  in  1866  was  the  result  of  this 
step.  It  was  a  half  measure.  It  retained,  in  fact,  the 
direct  attack  upon  the  Quadrilateral  by  the  Mincio, 
while  permitting  a  diversion  by  the  lower  Po.  The  re- 
sult, being  unfavorable,  has  justified  the  criticisms  to 
which  the  dispositions  made  by  the  two  forces  gave  rise. 

Upon  the  whole,  however,  it  is  perhaps  the  campaign 
of  1870,  after  all,  which  has  revealed  the  most  defective 
marches.  In  this  regard  the  march  of  the  Armv  of  Cha- 
Ions  upon  Sedan  will  always  be  to  the  French  army  a 


570  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

subject  for  study  aud  regret.  It  is  well  then  to  become 
acquainted  with  the  causes  leading  to  it,  and  the  influ- 
ence which  it  exercised  upon  the  final  catastrophe. 

3d. — March  of  the  Army  of  Chalons  upon  Sedan  in  1870. — On 
the  1 6th  of  xA-ugust  Napoleon  III.  arrived  at  Chalons 
from  Metz,  believing  at  the  time  that  Bazaine  would 
soon  join  him  with  his  army.  At  Chalons  he  found 
fresh  troops  that  had  assembled  in  haste,  without  yet 
knowing  their  destination. 

The  next  day  he  called  a  conference  at  the  Imperial 
headquarters,  which  was  attended  by  the  Prince  Napo- 
leon, General  Berthaut,  commander  of  the  corps  mobile 
of  the  Seine,  General  Trochu,  General  Schmitz,  chief- 
of-stafif  of  the  12th  Corps,  then  in  process  of  formation, 
and  Marshal  MacMahon,  who  had  just  arrived. 

The  results  of  this  consultation  were:  the  nomination 
of  Trochu  for  governor  of  Paris;  of  Mac-Mahon  for  com- 
mander-in-chief of  the  Army  of  Chalons;  of  Bazaine  as 
commander-in-chief  of  the  Imperial  armies;  and,  finally, 
it  was  unanimously  decided  to  lead  back  the  Army  of 
Chalons  to  the  walls  of  Paris. 

This  decision,  dispatched  to  the  Regent  by  Comman- 
dant Duperre,  deeply  agitated  the  ministerial  council, 
for  it  feared  the  influence  of  this  news  upon  the  people 
of  Paris. 

In  consequence,  General  Palikao,  Minister  of  War, 
sent  the  following  telegram  to  the  Emperor  on  the  even- 
ing of  the  17th,  which  had  the  effect  of  changing  both 
the  march  objective  and  direction: 

"The  Empress  has  made  me  acquainted  with  the 
contents  of  the  letter  in  which  the  Emperor  announces 
his  intention  of  bringing  the  Armv  of  Chalons  to  Paris. 
I  entreat  the  Emperor  to  renounce  this  idea,  which  has 
the  appearance  of  abandoning  the  Army  of  Metz,  at 
this  moment  unable  to  effect  its  movement  upon  Verdun. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  57  I 

The  Army  of  Chalons,  before  three  days,  will  reach 
85,000  men,  withont  including  Donay's  corps,  number- 
ing 18,000,  which  will  rejoin  within  three  days.  Can- 
not a  strong  diversion  be  made  with  this  army,  in  view 
of  the  fact  that  the  Prussian  corps  are  already  exhausted 
by  several  battles?" 

Such  was  the  first  idea  of  the  march  upon  Sedan.  The 
dispatch  suggesting  it  sprang  from  the  fear  of  seeing  the 
people  of  Paris  rise  in  rebellion  against  the  abandon- 
ment of  the  Army  of  Metz. 

The  telegram  sent  by  the  war  minister  supposed  the 
Prussian  corps  exhausted  by  their  combats,  which  was 
a  gratuitous  hypothesis  with  nothing  to  justify  it.  It 
indicated  a  diversion  as  the  aim  of  the  Army  of  Chalons; 
but  this  operation  was  not  in  accord  with  the  feebleness 
of  our  means  and  the  strength  of  the  enemy. 

The  Emperor  at  the  same  time  received  a  dispatch 
from  Blaine,  informing  him  of  the  battle  of  the  18th 
and  the  suspension  of  the  movement  upon  Verdun. 
This  news  increased  the  perplexities  of  the  sovereign 
and  the  commander  of  the  Army  of  Chalons,  and  the  dif- 
ficulties of  the  situation  continued  to  multiply  during 
the  18th  and  19th;  but  the  idea  of  retiring  upon  Paris 
still  strongly  prevailed. 

On  the  latter  date,  a  dispatch  was  received  from  Ba- 
zaine  in  which  he  said: 

"I  am  too  far  from  Chalons  to  indicate  to  you  the  op- 
erations that  should  be  undertaken.  My  suggestions 
would  be  without  value.  I  consequently  leave  you  free 
to  act  as  you  may  think  best." 

The  receipt  of  this  dispatch  did  not  bring  MacMahon 
to  a  final  decision.  His  army,  moreover,  was  not  yet 
completely  reformed,  and  the  remains  of  the  ist,  5th, 
and  7th  Corps  continued  to  rejoin  their  commands. 
During  the  20th,  however,  he  was  informed  that  the 
Uhlans    had  advanced    to  within  40  kilometres  of  his 


572  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

camp,  and  this  news  decided  him  to  move  toward 
Rheims, — a  direction  which  led  him  nearer  to  Paris 
without  removing  him  further  from  the  lower  Meuse. 

The  movement  was  executed  on  the  21st,  and  no  diffi- 
culties were  encountered  except  those  arising  from  the 
condition  of  the  roads.  But  the  number  of  stragglers 
left  in  its  train  bears  witness  to  the  weaknesses  prevail- 
ing in  this  army,  the  lack  of  cohesion  among  its  troops, 
the  commencement  of  disorganization  in  its  ranks,  and 
finally  its  inability  to  march  toward  the  enemy. 

After  his  arrival,  MacMahon  was  called  to  a  second 
consultation  at  Courcelles,  at  which  M.  Rouher  assisted. 
The  latter  had  been  sent  from  Paris  by  the  government 
to  advise  that  this  army  be  directed  upon  Metz;  but  his 
wishes  came  in  conflict  with  the  determined  will  of  the 
Marshal,  who  had  finally  decided  to  move  upon  Paris. 

Notwithstanding  contrary  views,  he  resolutely  held 
to  his  project.  He  consented,  however,  to  a  ♦delay  ot 
twenty-four  hours,  and  it  was  decided  that  the  march  to 
the  capital  should  begin  the  next  day,  if  in  the  mean- 
time no  new  instructions  were  received  from  Bazaine. 

MacMahon  had  beyond  all  doubt  the  power  to  act  as 
he  pleased ;  but  it  would  have  been  difficult  for  him  to 
have  refused  assent  to  a  delay  requested  by  one  of  the 
most  important  personages  in  the  country,  in  the  name 
of  the  government,  and  with  the  assent  of  the  sovereign. 

Nevertheless,  on  the  morning  of  the  2 2d,  the  order  to 
move  toward  Paris  was  sent  to  the  different  corps. 

While  this  was  being  circulated,  the  Emperor,  at  about 
9:30  A.  M.,  received  Bazaine' s  report  upon  the  battle  of 
Saint-Privat.     It  concluded  thus: 

"I  still  intend  to  make  my  movement  toward  the 
north,  and  afterward  change  direction  by  Monlmedy  to 
take  the  route  from  Sainte-Menehould,  if  this  is  not 
strongly  occupied.  In  case  it  is,  I  shall  continue  upon 
Sedan,  and  even  Mezieres,  in  order  to  gain  Chalons." 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  573 

After  having  seen  this  report,  MacMahon  changed  his 
orders  and  indicated  Stenay  as  the  new  march  direction. 
It  has  been  said  since  that  he  took  this  step  on  acconnt 
of  not  having  received  a  certain  dispatch  sent  by  Ba- 
zaine,  which  ended  in  these  words:  "I  shall  inform  you 
of  my  march,  if  I  am  able  to  undertake  it  without  com- 
promising the  army." 

However,  unprejudiced  researches  have  established 
the  fact  that  this  second  dispatch  was  received  by  the 
Marshal.  If  it  did  not  lead  him  to  change  his  last 
orders  and  return  to  his  jEirst  wish,  which  was  to  re- 
gain Paris,  it  was  because  he  did  not  desire  to  be 
charged  with  having  refused  to  march  to  Bazaine's  re- 
lief— a  fatal  resolve,  that  was  to  lead  to  the  catastrophe 
of  Sedan,  although  none  the  less  dictated  by  a  sense  of 
duty  worthy  of  respect.  The  misfortune  arose  from  the 
fact  that  the  direction  of  Montmedy  appeared  the  best 
for  the  fulfillment  of  this  duty,  when  in  reality  it  was 
the  worst. 

The  orders  to  move  upon  Stenay  were  dispatched 
then  on  the  afternoon  of  the  22d,  and  the  movement 
began  on  the  23d. 

On  the  latter  date,  the  respective  positions  of  the  two 
opposing  armies  were  as  follows: 

The  Army  of  Chalons  was  upon  the  Suippe,  faced  to 
the  north-east,  ready  to  march  in  the  direction  of  Vou- 
ziers,  Stenay,  and  Montmedy.      {See  Plate  XXXII.) 

The  III.  Prussian  Army  and  the  Army  of  the  Meuse, 
extended  from  Sivry-sur-Meuse  to  Saint-Dizier,  Their 
march  directions  were  upon  Paris  by  Verdun  for  one 
army,  and  by  Bar-le-Duc  and  Vitry  for  the  other. 

The  determination  to  move  upon  Rheims  resulted  in 
our  following  a  line  parallel  to  that  of  the  enemy,  but 
in  a  contrary  direction,  and  at  a  distance  of  scarcely  38 
kilometres.  It  was  a  question  then  of  moving  to  the 
flank,  and  at  a  distance  of  only  two  marches  from  the 


574  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY, 

German  masses,  wlio  Held  interior  lines  of  operations, 
while  we  were  extending  upon  an  exterior  line.  Finally, 
according  as  our  army  advanced,  it  uncovered  its  com- 
munications with  Paris,  without  threatening  the  adver- 
sary's, which  ran  through  Nancy. 

The  consequences  of  taking  this  direction  were  not 
long  in  making  themselves  felt. 

By  the  25th,  indeed,  parties  of  the  enemy's  cavalry 
were  seen  at  Dammartin-sous-Hans  and  in  the  vicinity 
of  Chalons.  Our  corps,  which  had  reached  Vouziers 
and  Attigny,  were  no  longer  able  to  cover  themselves  to 
the  rear. 

On   the   26th  the  German  forces,   having  learned  of 
MacMahon's  march,   were   directed  toward    the  north. 
Their  heads  of  columns  already  menaced  his  right  flank 
in  the  valley  of  the  Aisne,  and   his  communications  at 
Mourmelon-le-Grand. 

On  the  27th  the  roads  from  Vouziers  to  Stenay  were 
occupied  by  the  Germans,  and  the  Army  of  Chalons 
found  itself  assailed  upon  the  right  flank.  On  the  28th 
its  lines  of  retreat  upon  Rheims  and  even  upon  Rethel 
were  cut  by  the  enemy  at  Vouziers,  Voncq,  and  Attigny. 
Finally,  on  the  evening  of  the  31st,  the  roads  from  Mez- 
ieres,  along  the  left  bank  of  the  Meuse,  were  intercepted 
at  Flize,  and  our  unfortunate  army  found  itself  in  one 
of  those  situations  where  nothing  is  left  but  to  cut  a 
road  through  the  adversary  with  the  bayonet.  Its  ruin 
was  certain. 

It  is  needless  to  recall  here  the  details  of  those  sad 
events.  The  march  directions  alone  are  in  question, 
and  they  have  given  rise  to  various  observations,  which 
have  already  been  made  in  connection  with  lines  of 
operations. 

It  will  suffice  then  to  remark  that  a  junction  of  the 
Armies  of  Chalons  and  Metz  was  already  impossible  on 
August  23,  when  the  movement  began,  since  a  victorious 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  575 

and  numerically  superior  enemy  was  between  them.  It 
was  not  in  this  direction,  then,  that  a  solution  should 
have  been  sought. 

Perhaps,  as  has  been  proposed,  it  would  have  been  ad- 
visable to  first  of  all  draw  to  Paris  the  two  German 
armies  which  were  headed  in  that  direction,  in  order 
then  to  concentrate  new  forces  toward  Epinal,  with 
which  to  fall  upon  the  enemy's  communications  and 
move  upon  Metz.  This  combination  was  no  doubt  more 
in  conformity  with  principles,  and  would  at  least  have 
avoided  a  terrible  catastrophe. 

The  following  is  the  view  entertained  on  the  subject 
by  the  Prussian  general  staff: 

"The  surest  and  simplest  solution  of  the  first  question 
was  to  retire  to  the  vicinity  of  the  capital;  then,  aided 
by  its  defenses  and  its  immense  resources,  to  offer  battle 
under  the  most  favorable  conditions  possible.  Even  in 
the  event  of  a  reverse,  the  French  army  would  have  been 
in  condition  to  promptly  escape  from  pursuit;- and  as  to 
a  rigorous  investment  or  a  blockade  of  Paris,  such  a 
measure  could  not  be  thought  of  before  the  concentra- 
tion  under  its  walls  of  a  force  exceeding  100,000  troops 
of  the  line." 

Other  considerations,  moreover,  should  have  exercised 
a  controlling  influence  upon  the  measures  to  be  taken. 
The  strength  and  positions  of  the  Prussian  armies  were 
known  to  those  who  took  part  in  the  conference  at 
Courcelles.  Out  of  the  four  corps  composing  the  Army 
of  Chalons,  which  it  was  thought  to  oppose  to  these 
armies,  three  were  demoralized,  and  consequently  not 
in  condition  to  undertake  long  marches  or  give  battle 
before  having  re-established  tactical  coherence  and  re- 
stored confidence.  Experience  has  again  and  again 
shown  that  in  such  cases  neither  political  nor  strategical 
considerations  should  be  permitted  to  prevail. 

The  only  proper  measure,  then,  was  to  march  this 
army  to  Paris. 


576  PART  FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

IV.— Character  of  Orders  Relating  to  Marches. 

When  the  march  objective  and  direction  have  been 
determined  upon,  nothing  remains  but  to  give  the  orders 
for  the  movement. 

Are  there  in  this  regard,  as  in  case  of  the  various  dis- 
positions heretofore  considered,  principles  which  the 
commanders  of  armies  and  their  chiefs-of-stafF  should  feel 
bound  to  observe?  Examples  selected  from  modern 
campaigns  will  answer  this  question. 

In  this  connection,  if  the  true  value  of  the  measures 
adopted  by  the  commander  is  to  be  gauged  by  the  suc- 
cesses gained,  no  epoch  offers  us  more  perfect  methods 
than  the  Napoleonic  wars. 

1st. — Campaign  of  1806. — In  the  beginning  of  October  of 
this  year,  when  the  grand  army  was  to  enter  Saxony  in 
three  columns,  in  order  to  attack  the  Prussians,  Na- 
poleon, through  his  chief-of-stafF,  gave  the  following 
orders  to  the  two  corps  under  Soult  and  Ney,  composing 
the  right  columns: 

"WURZBURG,  October  5,  1806. 
' '  The  Chief  of  Staff  to  Marshal  Soult. 


u^ 


'The  Emperor  orders  you,  Marshal,  to  take  meas- 
ures to  enter  Bayreuth  at  the  earliest  possible  hour  on 
the  7th,  You  will  enter  in  force,  so  that  within  an 
hour  after  the  first  hussars  have  reached  the  place,  your 
entire  corps  may  be  there,  and  during  this  day,  may  be 
able  to  move  several  leagues  beyond  in  the  direction  of 
Hof  You  will  continue  your  march  during  the  8th,  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  have  your  corps  upon  the  heights 
of  Miinchberg  by  night. 

During  the  9th,  you  will  move  your  corps  to  Hof. 

I  acquaint  you  with  the  fact  that  Marshal  Ney  will 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  577 

be  half  a  march  behind  yon;  and  I  am  giving  him  or- 
ders to  keep  his  cavalry  an  hour's  march  in  advance,  so 
that  it  may  move  to  your  assistance  in  case  of  need. 

"  These  instructions  are  given  under  the  supposition 
that  you  meet  no  obstacle;  but  if  the  enemy  be  in  force 
at  Hof,  and  Marshal  Ney's  forces  joined  to  yours  be 
found  insufficient  to  defeat  him,  you  will  immediately 
inform  the  Emperor,  and  proceed  to  take  up  a  good  and 
strong  position. 

"  You  need  give  yourself  no  concern  about  the  castle 
of  Culmbach.  General  Wrede,  who  marches  in  rear  of 
Marshal  Ney's  corps,  has  orders  to  surround  and  take  it, 
provided  the  enemy  be  not  in  force  at  Hof. 

"  The  headquarters  will  be  at  Bamberg  on  the  6th,  at 
Lichtenfels  on  the  8th,  and  at  Kronach  on  the  9th. 

' '  You  will  be  careful  to  dispatch  an  officer  every  day 
to  headquarters  with  an  account  of  your  position,  and 
whatever  news  you  may  have  of  the  enemy. 

"  His  Majesty  relies  upon  your  prudence  and  military 
skill  to  keep  his  troops  from  engaging  except  in  cases 
where  you  have  maturely  examined  the  enemy's  posi- 
tion and  have  all  the  probabilities  of  success  upon  your 
side. 

"General  Legrand  will  proceed  to  Bayreuth  as  com- 
mander of  that  entire  section.  You  will  recognize  him 
in  this  capacity. 

"  His  Majesty  has  no  intention  of  issuing  a  proclama- 
tion ;  neither  are  you  to  issue  any ;  the  war  was  not  de- 
clared for  that;  the  troops  of  his  Majesty  the  King  of 
Prussia  having  entered  Saxony  and  menaced  our  flanks, 
the  occupation  of  Bayreuth  becomes  a  necessity  in  order 
to  support  our  right.  This  is  then  only  a  defensive  po- 
sition; but  you  will  none  the  less  have  the  Prussian 
coat-of-arms  removed  wherever  found,  but  without  scan- 
dal or  outrage. 

' '  If  truce-bearers   are    sent    you    from   the  Prussian 

37 


5/8  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

army  to  know  why  you  have  entered  the  territory  of  the 
King  of  Prussia,  you  will  answer,  '  Why  have  you  en- 
tered Saxony?'  You  will  say  to  them  that  you  have 
orders  to  commit  no  act  of  hostility,  but  to  occupy  the 
whole  of  the  territory  of  Bayreuth,  as  a  measure  neces- 
sary to  protect  our  right,  which  the  assemblements  of 
the  Prussian  armv  seem  to  threaten. 

"Upon  first  entering  this  country,  you  will  issue  an 
order,  which,  however,  shall  not  be  printed,  in  Mdiich 
you  will  enjoin  good  discipline  and  make  other  custom- 
arv  recommendations,  and  in  which  vou  will  further  sav 
that  we  are  marching  to  occupy  the  Bayreuth  country 
for  the  purpose  of  guarding  our  right  against  being- 
turned  by  the  Prussian  army,  and  that  wherever  the 
latter  opposes  himself  to  you,  you  rely  upon  the  courage 
of  your  troops  to  bring  him  to  terms. 

"  His  Majesty  is  assured  that  the  best  understanding 
will  exist  between  yourself  and  Marshal  Ney.  Should 
you  be  opposed  by  a  force  of  only  20,000  men,  his 
jSIajesty  yet  intends  that  Ney's  corps  shall  arrive  before 
you  attack;  not  that  his  Majesty  doubts  the  capability  of 
your  troops  to  overcome  an  equal  or  even  much  larger 
force,  but  that  by  far  outnumbering  the  enemy,  blood 
may  be  spared  and  more  decisive  results  obtained. 

"His  Majesty  would  have  sent  you  more  cavalry,  but 
the  Hof  country  is  so  cut  up  that  he  thinks  the  force 
given  3'ou,  taken  with  jNIarshal  Ney'.s,  will  prove  suffi- 
cient."* 

"WuRZBURG,  October  5,  1806. 

The  Chief-of-Staff  to  Marshal  Ncy. 

"]\Iarshal  Soult's  corps  will  enter  Bayreuth  on  the  7th, 
and  proceed  thence  by  forced  marches  upon  Hof,  in 
order  to  attack  the  enemy  there  and   to  advance  into 

*  Taken  from  the  Historic  Archives  of  the  War  Bureau. 


TiriRD    CIIAPTKR. — OPERATIONS.  579 

Saxony;  and  as  there  is  bnt  one  high-road  in  the  Bay- 
reuth  country,  his  Majesty  has  thought  proper  to  order 
you  to  be  at  the  city  of  Bayreuth  on  the  8th,  to  keep 
constantly  at  half  a  march  from  Marshal  Soult's  corps, 
and  to  unite  with  the  latter  in  attacking  the  enemy  in  all 
positions  where  such  concerted  action  may  be  necessary, 

"When  you  have  entered  Saxony,  his  Majesty  will 
make  known  to  you  the  part  you  are  to  take  in  that 
country. 

"General  Legrand  will  govern  the  Bayreuth  region. 
War  should  not  be  considered  as  declared;  and  your  lan- 
guage should  be  to  the  effect  that  the  Emperor  occupies 
Bayreuth  in  order  to  secure  his  right  wing,  menaced  by 
the  assemblement  of  the  Prussians  and  bv  the  invasion 
of  Saxony. 

"General  Wrede,  commanding  the  Bavarian  division, 
which  marches  in  your  rear,  has  orders  to  occupy  Culm- 
bach. 

"The  headquarters  will  be,"  etc.  (See  the  letter  to 
Marshal  Soult.) 

Conunents. — The  order  given  Soult  may  be  epitomized 
thus: 

ist.   Indication  of  march  objectives  for  three  days; 

2d.  Indication  of  the  bodies  which  are  to  follow  the 
same  route; 

3d.  Measures  to  be  adopted  in  case  of  encountering 
the  enemy; 

4th.  Indication  of  the  places  at  which  the  general 
headquarters  are  to  be  located; 

5th.   Special  recommendations. 

As  to  the  orders  sent  Ney,  they  are  the  consequence 
and  reproduction  of  the  foregoing. 

These  two  documents  are  distinguished  by  their  pre- 
cision. 

They  contain  no  directions  except  those  pertaining  to 


580  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

the  corps  in  its  action  as  a  unit.  They  prescribe  no  de- 
tails relative  to  the  march,  the  formation  of  columns, 
the  duties  of  the  divisions  or  of  the  cavalry.  They 
leave  then  the  entire  matter  of  the  initiative  and  respon- 
sibility to  the  corps  commanders. 

The  order  to  Soult  was  supplemented  by  instructions 
sent  him  the  same  day  direct  from  the  Emperor. 

Isntructions  to  Advance  into  Saxony ;  Movements  of  the 

Other  Corps. 

To  Marshal  Soult. 
"WuRZBURG,  October  5,  1806,  11  A.  m. 

"Cousin,  the  chief-of-stafT  is  at  this  moment  drawing 
up  your  orders,  which  you  will  receive  during  the  day. 
My  intention  is  that  you  should  be  at  Bayreuth  by  the 
8th. 

"  I  think  it  well  to  acquaint  you  with  my  projects,  to 
the  end  that  this  knowledge  may  guide  you  in  the  pres- 
ence of  important  situations. 

"I  have  occupied,  armed,  and  provisioned  the  works 
at  Wiirzburg,  Forchheim,  and  Kronach,  and  I  am  mov- 
ing my  entire  army  upon  Saxony  by  three  roads.  You 
are  at  the  head  of  my  right  column,  with  Marshal  Ney's 
corps  half  a  march  behind  you,  and  10,000  Bavarians 
at  the  same  distance  from  his  rear,  a  total  of  more  than 
50,000  men.  Marshal  Bernadotte  leads  my  second  col- 
umn, and  is  followed  by  Marshal  Davout's  corps,  the 
Guard,  and  the  greater  part  of  the  Reserve  Cavalry, 
forming  in  all  a  force  of  over  70,000  men.  This  column 
will  move  by  Kronach,  Lobenstein,  and  Schleiz. 

"The  5th  Corps  is  at  the  head  of  my  left  column,  and 
behind  it  is  Marshal  Augereau's  corps.  It  will  march 
by  Coburg,  Grafenthal,  and  Saalfeld.  The  total  strength 
of  this  column  exceeds  40,000  men. 

"On  the  day  of  your  arrival  at  Hof,  all  the  other 
columns  will  have  reached  positions  abreast  of  you. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  581 

*'Sofaras  possible,  I  shall  remain  with  the  central 
colnnni. 

''With  this  immense  snperiority  of  nnmbers,  nnited 
upon  so  narrow  a  space,  yon  will  nnderstand  that  I  need 
hazard  nothing,  yet  can  strike  the  enemy  with  a  force 
donble  his  own  at  whatever  points  he  may  make  a  stand. 

"If  the  enemy  appear  against  yon  with  less  than 
30,000  men,  you  can  join  your  forces  to  Marshal  Ney's, 
and  attack  him;  but  if  you  find  him  in  a  position  held 
for  a  long  time,  you  will  know  that  he  has  taken  care 
to  fortify  himself,  and  to  become  well  acquainted  with 
his  immediate  surroundings:  in  this  case,  act  with  pru- 
dence.    • 

''Having  arrived  at  Hof,  your  first  care  should  be 
to  establish  the  communications  between  Lobenstein, 
Ebersdorf,  and   Schleiz.     I  shall   then  be  at  Ebersdorf. 

The  information  that  you  receive  of  the  enemy  after 
your  advance  from  Hof,  will  lead  you  to  incline  a  little 
more  toward  my  centre  or  to  take  a  forward  position,  in 
order  to  be  able  to  march  upon  Plauen. 

"From  intelligence  received  to-day,  it  appears  that  if 
the  enemy  move,  he  will  direct  himself  upon  my  left, 
since  the  bulk  of  his  forces  seems  to  be  at  Erfurt." 

The  order  sent  Soult  by  Berthier,  notwithstanding 
the  interest  which  it  possesses,  will  not  be  sufficient  to 
give  an  exact  idea  of  the  conduct  of  marches  of  the 
grand  units  under  the  First  Empire;  for  this  we  must 
examine  the  orders  given  by  the  marshals  to  their  corps. 

Here  is  the  one  issued  by  Soult  to  his  division  com- 
manders on  the  afternoon  of  the  9th,  for  the  march  of 
the  following  day.  The  directions  cited  above  had  been 
carried  out  on  the  8th.  The  corps  had  marched  during 
the  8th  and  9th,  and  had  arrived  at  Gross-Zobern,  where 
the  headquarters  were  established.  It  was  marching 
upon  Plauen,  in  the  right  wing  of  the  grand  army. 


582  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 


((' 


"Gross-Zobert,  October  9,   1806, 
To-morrow,  the    loth  instant,  the  corps  will  be  di- 
rected  upon   Planen,   where  the  Marshal   commanding 
will  issue  further  orders  relating  to  its  subsequent  desti- 
nation. 

"To  this  end.  General  Margaron  will,  by  8:30  A.  M., 
assemble  the  division  of  light  cavalry,  and  the  battalion 
of  sharpshooters  of  the  Po,  which  is  temporarily  detached 
behind  Plauen,  and  will  move  a  squadron  upon  the 
Zwickau  high-road,  at  a  distance  not  to  exceed  half  a 
league,  in  order  to  cover  himself  while  in  this  position, 
and  another  squadron  upon  the  Greitz  road,  at  the  same 
distance. 

"General  Legrand  will  move  at  day-break,  also  taking 
the  road  for  Plauen,  where,  upon  his  arrival,  he  will  re- 
ceive further  orders. 

"General  Leval  will  follow  the  movement  with  the 
2d  Division.  He  likewise  will  receive  new  orders  at 
Plauen.  He  will  see  that  there  is  the  least  possible 
interval  between  the  divisions,  and  that  his  troops 
march  regularly  and  in  close  order. 

"General  Saint-Hilaire  will  move  the  ist  Division  at 
4  A.  M.,  directing  it  through  Gross-Zobern  and  Rosen- 
thal upon  Plauen,  where  it  will  rejoin  the  corps  and  re- 
ceive further  orders.  General  Saint-Hilaire  will  make 
the  movement  in  as  close  order  as  possible. 

"The  artillery  will  closely  follow  the  ist  Division, 
and  its  destination  will  also  be  Plauen,  where  new  orders 
will  be  given  it. 

"General  Saint-Hilaire  will  leave  the  55tli  regiment 
behind  to  cover  his  movement. 

' '  The  headquarters'  equipage  will  leave  Hof  at  3  A.  M. , 
for  Plauen.  General  Saint-Hilaire  will  kindly  furnish  a 
company  to  act  as  its  guard. 

"The  commissary  will  take  necessary  steps  to  collect 
as  much  bread  as  possible  at  Hof,  and  will  distribute 
the  same  to  the  and  and  3d  Divisions. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  583 

"The  sick  will  be  sent  by  Hof  to  Kronach  until 
further  orders. 

"The  marshal  commanding  requests  the  generals  to 
prevent  their  troops,  by  the  most  positive  orders,  from 
burning  the  straw  used  in  their  bivouacs  when  leaving 
them,  so  that  other  columns  which  are  to  follow  may 
find  their  camps  and  the  shelter  contrived  by  them,  and 
that  the  enemy  may  not  receive  the  slightest  intimation 
of  the  movements  and  intentions  of  the  corps. 

"The  proclamation  which  the  Emperor  addresses  to 
the  army  is  sent  to  the  divisions,  and  the  generals  will 
be  careful  to  see  that  it  is  read  to  the  different  companies. 

"General  Margaron  will  order  the  squadron  of  the 
i6th  chasseurs,  now  at  Elnitz,  to  leave  that  place  to-mor- 
morrow  for  Plauen. 

"The  squadron  of  the  nth  detached  at  Geffeld  and 
Schleiz,  has  received  separate  orders  from  the  marshal 
commandino-. " 

The  essential  features  of  this  order  may  be  thus  stated: 

ist.   Indication  of  the  march  objective; 

2nd.  Indication  of  the  exploration  service  to  be  per- 
formed beyond  the  front; 

3d.  March  directions  and  positions  in  the  column  of 
the  different  parts  of  the  corps;  namely,  the  infantry  di- 
visions, the  artillery,  and  the  equipage  train; 

4th.   Special  directions. 

It  is,  then,  like  the  preceding,  simple,  concise,  and 
practical,  and  in  accord  with  the  conditions  of  war. 

Upon  reading  the  three  orders  cited,  one  immediately 
forms  a  complete  idea  of  the  movements  to  be  made; 
and  all  the  important  details  are  easily  understood. 

It  will  in  this  connection  be  observed  that  sufficient 
latitude  is  given  the  generals  to  enable  them  to  adapt 
their  measures  to  circumstances  as  they  arise. 

2d. — Campaign  of  1870. — Notwithstanding  the  many  im- 


584  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

portant  wars  that  occurred  from  1806  to  1870,  no  new 
rule  was  brought  forward  to  change  the  practices  relat- 
ing to  orders  issued  for  the  conduct  of  inarches — prac- 
tices which  tradition  has  taken  upon  itself  to  transmit. 
Yet  in  several  comparatively  recent  wars,  carried  on 
under  circumstances  of  quite  an  unusual  character,  these 
have  been  subjected  to  changes.  The  campaigns  in 
Africa  and  Mexico  may  be  cited  as  examples. 

In  these  countries  the  troops  were  formed  in  weak 
columns,  each  of  whose  units,  even  the  smallest,  had 
sometimes  to  play  a  distinct  part.  During  the  move- 
ments incident  to  these  expeditions,  it  was  the  practice 
to  have  the  orders  include  instructions  upon  the  min- 
utest matters  of  detail;  and  it  seems  that  in  1870  this 
practice  was  followed  [in  the  French  army]  in  orders 
relating  to  the  march  of  grand  armies. 

Moreover,  in  Africa  and  Mexico  the  baggage  and  con- 
voys were  often  the  source  of  very  serious  difiScult)',  and 
the  recollection  of  this  appears  to  have  had  its  influence 
upon  the  orders  for  the  march,  both  lengthening  and 
complicating  them. 

To  illustrate: 

On  the  2d  of  August,  1870,  while  the  2d  Corps  of 
the  Army  of  the  Rhine  was  executing  its  offensive 
movement  at  Sarrebruck,  the  5th  and  3d  Corps  were 
charged  with  making  demonstrations,  the  one  to  the 
right  beyond  Sarreguemines,  the  other  to  the  left,  to- 
ward Volklingen. 

These  movements,  intended  for  reconnaissances,  had 
for  object,  as  has  been  said,  "to  oblige  the  enemy  to 
deploy  his  forces  and  disclose  his  plans." 

To  this  end,  the  following  order  was,  on  the  evening 
of  August  I,  sent  to  the  brigade  and  division  generals 
and  the  chiefs  of  special  services  of  the  5th  Corps. 


THIRD   CHAPTKR. — OPERATIONS.  585 

ORDER  OF  MARCH  OF  THE  5TH  CORPS  FOR  THE  MOVEMENT  OF 

AUGUST    2. 

"The  first  two  divisions  of  infantry  and  the  corps 
cavalry  will,  to-morrow,  the  2d  instant,  make  a  recon- 
naissance in  force  upon  the  right  banks  of  the  Sarre  and 
the  Blies. 

"The  movement  will  begin  at  5:30  A.  m. 

"The  5th  lancers  will  move  from  Rohrbach  in  the 
direction  of  Obergailbach,  where  it  will  connect  with 
the  troops  on  its  left. 

"The  3d  lancers  will  proceed  to  the  Visling  farm, 
thence  to  Bliesbriichen,  and  then  to  Rheinheim,  where 
it  will  cross  the  Blies.  From  Rheinheim  it  will  advance 
to  the  heights  overlooking  Gersheim  to  the  right. 

^'' First  Division. — The  6ist  regiment  will  leave  the 
Visling  farm  at  3:30,  proceed  to  Bliesbriichen,  and 
thence  to  Rheinheim,  where  it  will  await  the  lancers, 
permit  them  to  pass,  and  support  them  in  their  move- 
ment to  a  point  one  or  two  kilometres  north  of  Rhein- 
heim. One  battalion  will  remain  at  Bliesbriichen  as  a 
reserve.  Colonel  Flogny,  with  the  squadron  of  hussars 
of  the  ist  Division  and  the  squadron  of  the  12th  chas- 
seurs, will  take  the  Frauenberg  route,  pass  through  this 
village,  follow  the  Zweibriichen  road,  and  push  his  head 
of  column  as  far  as  Bebelsheim. 

"A  brigade  of  the  Goze  Division  will  proceed  to 
Frauenberg.  One  of  its  regiments  will  cross  the  Blies, 
and  take  position  upon  the  plateau  overlooking  this 
village,  at  a  distance  of  two  kilometres  to  the  north. 
This  force  will  be  accompanied  by  a  battery;  and  its 
advanced-guard,  at  least  a  battalion  strong,  will  be 
pushed  forward  beyond  the  wood  of  Neuwiederwald. 

"The  remainder  of  the  brigade,  attended  by  a  bat- 
tery, will  take  position  upon  the  heights  commanding 
the  left  bank  of  the  Blies. 

"The  other  brigade,  with  the  3d  battery  of  the  divi- 


586  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

sion,  will  move  upon  this  left  bank  to  a  point  above 
Bliesguersch  wilier. 

"It  will  not  cross  the  Blies. 

''''Second  Division. — The  Manssion  brigade,  preceded 
by  the  divisional  squadron,  will  take  position  above 
Auersmacher,  the -infantry  crossing  the  Blies  by  the 
railroad  bridge,  and  the  cavalry  and  artillery  by  the  pon- 
ton bridge  near  its  mouth.  After  this  brigade  has  been 
deployed  and  has  reconnoitered  the  village  of  Auers- 
macher, it  will  advance  and  take  position  upon  the  pla- 
teau extending  from  the  Blies  to  the  Sarre,  between 
Bliesguerschwiller  and  Kleinblittersdorf. 

"The  general  will  reconnoitre  Windringen  and  the 
village  of  Rauschbach,  upon  the  Fechingen  road  to  the 
north,  employing  the  divisional  cavalry  supported  by 
infantry. 

' '  The  Lapasset  brigade  will  not  cross  the  Sarre,  but 
will  take  up  position  fronting  this  river,  upon  the 
heights  to  the  north  of  Grossblittersdorf,  in  order  to 
protect  the  movement  of  the  2d  brigade  upon  the  right 
bank.  This  brigade  will  commence  its  movement  at 
4  A.  M. ,  and  will  be  supported  by  a  battery  which  will 
join  it  this  evening. 

"These  different  movements  will  be  made  in  such  a 
way  that  all  heads  of  columns  may  reach  their  destina^ 
tions  as  soon  after  7  p.  m.  as  possible. 

"The  field  artillery  reserve  will  follow  the  movement 
of  the  Manssion  brigade,  not  crossing  the  Blies  bridge 
until  the  ambulance  train  of  the  2d  Division  has  passed. 

"The  company  of  reserve  engineers  will  remain  at 
the  ponton  bridge  of  the  Blies.  The  engineer  troops 
will  carry  their  tools  on  the  march. 

"The  ambulances  will  accompany  their  divisions. 

"The  corps  baggage,  loaded  in  its  wagons,  will  re- 
main in  camp  with  a  guard. 

"  The  baggage  of  the  Manssion  brigade  will  be  parked 
at  Welferding. 


THIRD    CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  587 

"The  general-in-chief  authorizes,  for  the  march,  the 
use  of  one  wagon  for  each  general  officer,  and  assigns 
one  for  use  in  each  regiment. 

"The  baggage  will  not  be  moved  except  upon  the 
order  of  the  general-in-chief,  which  "will  be  given  only 
in  case  the  troops  remain  in  position  in  consequence  of 
the  presence  of  the  enemy. 

"The  nth  regiment  of  the  line  will  leave  a  battalion 
at  Sarreguemines;  three  companies  with  the  grand  artil- 
lery park,  which  will  furnish  a  guard  for  the  ponton 
bridge  of  the  Sarre;  three  companies  for  the  stone  bridge 
in  the  town  itself,  which  will  send  a  guard  to  the  ponton 
bridge  of  the  Blies  to  take  post  on  the  left  bank. 

"The  provost  service  will  hold  itself  in  readiness  to 
move  with  the  bao-o-age. 

"The  regular  train  will  be  ready,  but  the  horses  will 
be  left  unhitched. 

"The  auxiliary  convoy  will  not  be  moved. 

"In  all  these  operations,  one  side  of  all  streets  and 
roads  will  be  kept  clear,  so  that  circulation  may  be 
maintained,  and  that  orders  may  be  communicated. 

"The  Maussion  brigade  will  detach  a  half-battalion  to 
act  with  the  reserve  artillery.  The  detachment  will 
cross  the  railroad  bridge  with  the  brigade,  and  join  this 
artillery  to  the  north  of  the  Blies  ponton  bridge."* 

Comments. — The  first  impression  made  by  the  reading 
of  this  order,  is  that  it  is  drawn  up  with  care  and 
inethod,  but  that  it  is  impossible  to  at  once  seize  its 
bearing  or  general  scope.  This  results  from  the  multi- 
plicity of  details  which  it  contains. 

To  carry  it  into  execution,  each  chief  receiving  it 
would  be  obliged  to  neglect  the  directions  given  for  the 

*  Campaign  of  1870.     History  of  the  5tli  Corps.     Historic  Archives 
of  the  War  Department. 


588  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

movements  of  his  neighbors,  in  order  to  devote  himself 
to  the  task  of  divining  his  own. 

He  would  then  be  obliged  to  confine  his  attention  first 
to  the  transmission  of  the  exact  instructions  sent  him, 
defining  the  duties  of  most  of  his  subordinates,  and 
afterwards  to  the  control  which  he  exercises  over  their 
execution.  But  being  thus  bound  by  his  orders,  he  will 
not  be  able  to  make  provision  for  emergencies,  such  as  a 
sudden  encounter  with  the  enemy;  and  when  these  arise, 
will  naturally  feel  obliged  to  refer  the  matter  to  a  super- 
ior who  so  far  has  given  all  orders,  and  to  await  his 
further  instructions.  He  will  lack,  at  the  decisive  mo- 
ment, the  necessary  resolution  and  hardihood.  This 
order  of  march,  then,  suppresses  the  initiative  in  the 
highest  ranks  of  the  hierarchy  at  the  moment  when,  in 
modern  armies,  it  has  become  the  first  pledge  of  success. 

From  a  tactical  point  of  view,  it  is  to  be  observed 
that  the  exploration  service  prescribed  to  the  cavalry  in 
this  instance  does  not  exceed  a  distance  of  8  kilometres, 
at  the  same  time  that  the  enemy  sends  the  bulk  of  his 
cavalry  divisions  at  least  24  kilometres  in  advance,  and 
his  squadrons  of  mounted  scouts  from  35  to  40  kilo- 
metres. 

This  simple  comparison  of  the  limits  of  exploration 
suffices  to  show  that  this  reconnaissance  of  the  5th 
Corps  could  lead  to  no  beneficial  results. 

In  the  same  campaign  the  Prussian  orders  relating  to 
marches  have  quite  a  different  character. 

The  leaders  of  the  enemy's  armies  seemed  to  have 
been  inspired  by  the  campaigns  of  the  First  Empire, 
and  to  have  developed  a  respect  for  the  initiative  of  the 
generals,  and  a  breadth  of  view  which  allowed  the  latter 
the  greatest  freedom  of  action. 

3d. — German  Orders  in  1870. — The  order  sent  by  Von 
Moltke  on  August  9  of  this  year  to  the  three  armies  di- 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  589 

rected  by  him  has  been  often  quoted.  We  shall  there- 
fore not  reproduce  it  here,  but  content  ourselves  with  a 
summary. 

This  order  sets  forth: 

1st.     The  probable  position  of  the  enemy; 

2d.  The  general  direction  for  the  march  of  the  group 
of  armies; 

3d.     The  roads  to  be  followed  by  each  of  them ; 

4th.  General  instructions  relating  to  the  scope  of  re- 
connaissances beyond  the  front,  and  the  support  to  be 
given  the  cavalry  divisions; 

5th.   Special  recommendations. 

This  order  is  then  as  short  as  possible.  After  its  re- 
ceipt, the  commander-in-chief  of  the  II.  Army,  in  his 
turn,  addressed  an  order  to  his  corps  which  prescribed: 

"To  the  III.  Corps,  to  move  to  Faulquemont  on  the 
nth,  its  advanced-guard  regulating  its  march  by  that  of 
the  cavalry  which  it  is  to  support. 

"To  the  IX.  Corps,  to  reach  Bening-les-Saint-Avold 
and  Merlebach  with  its  heads  of  columns,  its  left  at 
Sarrebruck. 

"To  the  IV.  Corps,  to  occupy  with  its  head  of  col- 
umn, Harskirchen;  with  its  principal  force,  Saar- Union; 
with  its  advanced-guard,  the  line  Altwiller-Miinster- 
Marimont-la-Haute;  its  cavalry  exploring  the  ground  to 
the  south  of  Saar-Union,  in  the  direction  of  Fenestrange. 

"To  the  X.  Corps,  to  push  its  advanced-guard  toward 
Gros-Tenquin  and  Landrofif,  the  head  of  column  of  the 
principal  part  to  Hellimer,  the  left  to  Puttelange. 

"To  the  Guard,  to  move  its  heads  of  columns  to  Ins- 
ming,  its  left  to  Sarralbe. 

"To  the  XII.  Corps,  to  cross  the  Sarre  and  the  Blies, 
and  to  remain  upon  the  left  bank  of  the  former  river,  its 
heads  of  columns  at  Metzing  and  Dibling,  or  to  be 
pushed,  if  need  be,  as  far  as  Woustwiller. " 

This  order  in  its  turn  indicated  to  the  different  corps 


590  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

only  the  sites  to  be  occupied  by  their  principal  fractions. 
The  corps  commanders  transmitted  it  to  the  division 
generals  and  to  the  chiefs  of  special  services,  likewise 
limiting  the  directions  to  the  general  action  of  the  unit 
addressed. 

The  commander  of  the  IX.  Corps,  for  example,  issued 
the  followino;  order: 


'fc> 


(( 


'Headquarters,  Sarrebruck, -August  lo,  1870. 

"This  corps  will  move  upon  Paris  to-morrow  by  the 
main  road. 

"The  i8th  Division  will  advance  as  far  as  Merlebach 
and  Bening-les-Saint-Avold. 

"It  will  occupy  the  villages  of ,  the  divi- 
sion staff  at  Merlebach.     The  corps  artillery  will  proceed 

to The  25th  Division  will  occupy  the  vil- 

laofes  of It  will    make  use  of  the  Saint- 

Arnual   bridge,    and    afterwards    order   its   destruction. 
The  pioneers  will  then  be  cantoned  in  its  vicinity. 

"The  trains  will  move  to  Stiring-Wendel.  The 
corps  headquarters  will  be  at  Forbach. 

"In  order  to  avoid  misunderstandings,  attention  is 
called  to  the  fact  that  the  corps  is  to  extend  no  farther 
than  a  quarter  of  a  [German]  mile  (1850  metres)  to  the 
right  of  the  Paris  road,  and  no  farther  than  twice  this 
distance  to  its  left.  This  prescription  will  be  rigor- 
ously observed  in  matters  relating  to  requisitions,  which 
will  always  be  made  under  the  supervision  of  an  officer, 
and  so  far  as  possible,  of  an  administrative  clerk.  Re- 
ceipts will  always  be  given  when  asked  for. 

"  Following  are  instructions  relative  to  the  distribu- 
tions. 

"Signed:  VoN  Manstein." 

It  is  thus  seen  that  the  order  for  the  march  of  this 
corps  contained  no  instructions  upon  the  distances,  the 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  59I 

roads  to  be  followed,  or  the  dispositions  to  be  made.  It 
may  be  summarized  thus: 

ist.   Indication  of  the  general  direction  of  marches; 

2d.  Indication  of  the  points  of  cantonment  of  the 
large  units; 

3d.   Special  recommendations. 

Finally,  the  commander  of  one  of  the  divisions,  the 
25th,  in  his  turn  transmitted  this  order  in  the  following 
form : 

"Division  Staff,  SainT-Jean,  August  10,  1870. 

"The  division  will  cross  the  Sarre  to-morrow  by  two 
bridges.  The  49th  brigade  will  have  its  head  of  column 
assembled,  at  7  A.  m.,  in  the  market-place  of  Saint- 
Jean,  before  the  Old  Bridge,  ready  to  move. 

"The  25th  cavalry  brigade  and  then  the  divisional 
batteries  will  follow  the  49th  brigade. 

"The  50th  infantry  brigade  will  also  move  at  7  A.  m., 
and  will  cross  the  Saint-Arnual  bridge.  After  its  pas- 
sage, the  company  of  pioneers  will  destroy  the  bridge, 
and  will  then  locate  itself  at  the  Sophie  glass-works. 
The  munition,  ambulance,  and  baggage  wagons,  and 
led  horses,  will  alone  follow  the  troops. 

"The  other  wagons  will  keep  their  positions  in  their 
respective  columns. 

"In  each  brigade  a  mounted  officer  will  be  detailed 
to-morrow  to  take  charge  of  the  baggage. 

"The  convoys  and  trains  will  set  out  at  7  A.  m. , 
passing  through  Sarrebruck. 

"Signed:   Prince  Louis  of  Hesse.'' 

A  table  accompanied  this  order,  indicating  the  camp- 
ing sites  to  be  occupied  by  each  unit. 

It  is  then  in  the  orders  relating  to  the  march  of  divi- 
sions that  we  find  the  first  details  of  execution,  and  even 
here  they  relate  only  to  the  units  (brigades  or  artillery 


592  PART   FIRST, — STRATEGY, 

groups)  addressed.  There  was  thus  no  restraint  put  upon 
the  exercise  of  the  initiative  by  the  subordinate  leaders. 

Stated  in  brief,  the  order  of  march  of  the  25th  Divi- 
sion indicated  only: 

ist.   The  general  scope  of  the  movement; 

2d.  The  hour  of  departure  and  the  point  where  the 
head  of  column  was  to  assemble; 

3d.  The  positions  in  the  column  of  the  constituent 
units  of  the  division — the  infantry  brigades,  the  brigade 
of  cavalry,  the  divisional  artillery,  the  trains  and  con- 
voys.    The  camping  sites  were  indicated  separately. 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  in  the  German  army  all  the 
corps  did  not  act  in  the  same  way. 

The  commander  of  the  V.  Corps,  for  example,  issued 
to  his  troops,  on  the  3d  of  August,  on  the  eve  of  crossing 
the  frontier,  an  order  divided  into  two  parts.  The  one 
gave  the  normal  dispositions  for  the  march  of  a  corps 
along  a  single  road;  the  other  comprised  instructions 
relative  to  the  movements  of  the  following  day. 

After  this  time,  the  corps  commander  sent  his  subor- 
dinates a  simple  outline  of  the  distances  to  be  traversed 
and  the  places  to  be  reached. 

In  brief,  the  German  orders  for  marches  in  1870  are 
very  similar  to  those  of  the  campaigns  of  the  First  Em- 
pire. 

They  are  more  precise,  perhaps,  but  this  seems  to  have 
been  necessary  with  such  large  masses  and  so  many 
different  special  services. 

But  all  these  orders  have  this  characteristic,  that  in 
reference  to  operations,  they  respect  the  initiative  of 
the  chief  who  receives  them,  and  generally  contain  no 
details  upon  the  conduct  of  the  inferior  units. 

It  is  to  this  peculiarity,  to  this  custom  consecrated  by 
tradition  and  sanctioned  by  experience,  and  to  the 
spirit  which  animates  the  corps  of  German  officers,  that 
we  must  look  for  the  secret  of  this  assemblage  of  wills 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  593 

coiiciirrino-^  in  1866  to  1870,  with  unflagging  resolution 
and  ardor  to  a  common  end. 

We  must  conclude,  therefore,  that  orders  for  marches 
issued  to  armies  or  to  large  units  should  specify  the  aim 
of  the  operation,  the  directions  to  be  taken,  the  camping 
sites,  and  the  method  of  providing  for  the  troops;  that 
the  dispositions  for  the  march  should  be  considered  in 
advance,  and  that  each  chief  should  be  left  entirely  free 
in  regulating  the  movements  of  the  fractions  of  his 
command. 

It  remains  to  study  the  dispositions  referred  to. 

V. — Dispositions  for  the  March. 

To  conchide  the  study  of  marches,  we  must  investigate 
the  conditions  which  indicate  with  precision  the  extent 
of  the  fronts  and  zones  of  marches,  the  formations  to  be 
adopted,  and  the  means  of  protecting  the  movements. 

These  conditions  are  as  variable  as  the  events  which 
give  rise  to  them.  lyike  them,  they  are  subject  to  the 
general  law  of  the  unforeseen.  They  rest,  however, 
upon  a  principle  dictated  by  experience,  in  virtue  of 
which  armies  disperse  for  subsistence  at  a  distance  from 
the  enemy,  and  concentrate  for  battle  when  near  him. 

To  what  extent  is  this  principle  applicable  in  the  field 
to-day? 

The  investigation  of  facts  can  alone  inform  us. 

The  past  does  not  offer  more  absolute  rules  in  this  re- 
gard than  the  present,  but  simply  general  principles 
whose  applications  vary  according  to  circumstances,  and 
which  great  warriors  have  never  disregarded. 

On  January  12,  1806,  Napoleon,  wishing  to  advise  his- 
brother  Joseph  upon  the  conduct  of  the  marches  which 
the  latter  was  about  to  undertake  in  Italy  with  three 
corps,  in  order  to  gain  possession  of  his  kingdom  of 
Naples,  summed  up  the  principles  to  be  followed  in  these 
terms : 

38 


594  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 


u 


I  say  to  you  again,  do  not  divide  your  forces!  Let 
your  entire  army  cross  the  Apennines,  and  let  your 
three  corps  be  directed  upon  Naples,  and  so  disposed  as 
to  be  able  to  unite  upon  the  same  field  of  battle  in  a 
single  day." 

This  rule  is  always  true.  To-day,  as  then,  it  is  the 
basis  of  combinations  for  the  march.  But  when  it  is 
applied  to  armies  of  five  or  six  corps,  or  to  groups  of  two 
or  three  armies,  it  meets  with  new  difficulties. 

In  order  to  be  concentrated  in  a  day,  an  army  of  five 
corps,  with  two  divisions  of  cavalry,'  or  from  150,000  to 
180,000  men  in  all,  should  have,  as  we  have  already 
seen,  a  depth  not  to  exceed  the  extent  of  a  day's  march, 
and  a  front  not  in  excess  of  twice  this  distance.  In 
adopting  22  kilometres  [about  13.7  miles]  as  the  mean 
march  of  a  corps,  a  depth  of  22  kilometres  and  a  front  of 
44  kilometres  would  be  necessary.  Now,  a  corps  with- 
out parks  or  convoys  occupies,  in  column,  a  length  of 
from  20  to  21  kilometres.  In  order  to  apply  Napoleon's 
principles,  then,  each  of  these  corps  should  have  a  sep- 
arate road  at  its  disposal,  and  for  the  five  corps  the  roads 
should  not  be  farther  than  8  kilometres  apart. 

It  is  difficult  to  realize  these  conditions;  but  they  may 
be  met  with,  and,  in  Europe,  it  is  quite  often  possible 
to  make  use  of  five  roads  upon  fronts  of  from  40  to  48 
kilometres.  It  will  not  be  impossible,  then,  for  an  army 
be  disposed  thus. 

Experience  shows,  however,  that  for  its  security  it 
should  adopt  this  formation  only  when  it  has  absolutely 
nothing  to  fear  from  the  enemy.  Almost  always,  in 
order  to  secure  its  concentration  without  inconvenient 
delay,  it  will  be  forced  to  form  in  two  echelons,  half  a 
day's  march  apart,  with  three  corps  in  first  and  two  in 
second  line. 

However,  the  study  of  actual  circumstances  can  alone 
give  practical  views  on  this  subject. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  595 

Let  US  examine  at  first  the  theories  in  vog-ue  during 
the  wars  of  the  Republic  and  the  Empire.  After  the 
examples  already  cited,  a  single  case  will  no  doubt  be 
sufficient  to  illustrate  the  effect  both  of  a  neglect  and  an 
application  of  proper  principles. 

1st. — Moreau's  Campaign  upon  the  Danube  in  1800. — On  the 
loth  of  May,  after  the  combat  at  Biberach,  the  Austrian 
field-marshal,  Kray,  retired  upon  Ulm  and  Memmingen, 
behind  the  Iller.  Moreau,  who  had  just  beaten  him> 
followed  with  his  army  formed  in  three  columns,  which 
were  given  the  following  directions.  {See  Plate 
XXXIII.) 

Right  column  (Lecourbe)  upon  Memmingen;    - 

Central  column  (Gouvion  Saint-Cyr)  from  Biberach 
by  Lauf  heim  upon  Ulm ; 

Left  column  (Sainte-Suzanne),  from  Riedlingen  (left 
bank)  upon  Ulm; 

Reserve  (Delmas)  upon  Ochsenhausen. 

On  the  following  day,  the  nth,  in  consequence  of 
these  dispositions,  the  army  had  a  front  of  50  kilometres 
[33  miles],  occupied  by  two  columns,  the  centre  and  the 
reserve,  whose  effective  did  not  exceed  50,000  men. 
These  were  beyond  the  reach  of  assistance  by  Lecourbe 
and  Sainte-Suzanne  in  a  single  day.  Kray  could  de- 
bouch from  Ulm  by  Lauf  heim,  upon  the  left  bank  of  the 
Iller,  with  80,000  men,  and  overwhelm  the  first  column 
(St.  Cyr)  before  the  arrival  of  support.  If  he  had  taken 
this  resolution,  Moreau's  army  would  probably  have 
been  lost.  But  he  remained  inactive,  and  the  French 
had  the  good  fortune  to  escape  a  signal  danger. 

Having  reached  the  Iller,  Moreau  wished  to  continue 
to  threaten  his  adversary's  communications,  and,  to  this 
end,  prolonged  his  march  to  the  east. 

On  the  14th,  his  right  was  directed  upon  Mindelheim, 
his  reserve  upon  Babenhausen,  and  his  centre  upon 
Weissenhorn,  his  left  being  near  Ulm. 


596  PART   FIRST.  — STRATEGY. 

He  occupied  a  front  of  60  kilometres,  with  the 
enemy's  army  upon  his  left  flank. 

If  he  had  wished  to  concentrate  his  forces  on  this  side, 
two  days  would  have  been  required  for  the  movement. 
Moreover,  his  army  had  just  been  weakened  by  detach- 
ing 20,000  men,  on  the  12th,  to  reinforce  the  Army  of 
Italy.  His  situation,  then,  was  critical;  but,  fortunately, 
the  enemy  did  not  appear  to  suspect  it,  and  remained  in 
position. 

On  the  following  days,  from  the  15th  to  the  21st,  see- 
ing that  Kray  did  not  abandon  Ulm,  Moreau  formed 
the  design  of  manoeuvring  around  the  place  and  dis- 
lodging him.  He  then  drew  near  the  enemy's  forces, 
but  without  concerning  himself  about  the  extension  of 
his  front,  which  for  a  short  time  reached  80  kilometres 
[about  50  miles]. 

These  movements  exposed  his  army  to  great  dangers. 
Saint-Cyr  has  passed  jiidgment  upon  them  in  these 
terms: 

' '  If  the  Austrian  army  and  its  general  had  not  been 
discouraged  after  the  reverses  sustained  since  the  begin- 
ning of  the  campaign,  the  movement  which  the  central 
corps  was  ordered  to  make  on  this  day  (May  14),  would 
have  had  serious  consequences,  being  executed  in  pres- 
ence of  a  large  army,  and  without  possibility  of  receiving 
assistance  from  the  other  corps  on  account  of  their  re- 
moteness. The  centre  could  have  been  attacked  while 
in  the  act  of  defiling  across  the  Iller,  which  required 
four  hours,  during  which  General  Saint-Cyr  would  have 
been  obliged  to  oppose  the  enemy  with  only  a  part  of 
his  troops;  and  it  is  very  probable  that  he  would  have 
been  defeated  if  the  Austrians  had  debouched  from  Ulm, 
and  moved  up  the  right  bank  of  the  Iller  to  a  point 
opposite  the  bridge  of  Unter-Kirchberg. ' '  * 

*  Marshal  Gouvion  Saint-Cyr.    Memoirs,  Vol.  II.,  p.  243. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  597 

Napoleon,  who  has  left  detailed  observations  upon 
this  campaign,  expresses  himself  thus  concerning  the 
marches  from  the  nth  to  the  21st  of  May: 

"What  steps  should  the  French  general  have  taken 
in  order  to  dislodge  Kray  from  his  intrenched  camp? 
*  *  *  On  the  14th  of  May  he  should  have  crossed  the 
Iller,  put  his  forces  in  march  in  three  columns,  upon 
a  front  not  exceeding  six  leagues,  passed  the  Lech,'' 
etc.     *      *     *     * 

Kray  thoroughly  comprehended  the  irresolution  of  his 
enemy,  for,  at  the  moment  Moreau  was  directing  his 
heads  of  columns  upon  Augsburg,  he  wrote: 

"The  French  army  is  making  a  demonstration  upon 
Bavaria,  which  is  not  serious,  since  its  divisions  are 
spread  along  the  roads  as  far  back  as  the  Iller,  and  its 
line  of  communications  is  already  very  much  extended." 

Napoleon  afterwards  adds: 

"Moreau  three  times  within  forty  days  repeated  the 
same  demonstration,  but  on  each  occasion  offered  the 
enemy  opportunities  to  beat  his  isolated  divisions.  In- 
deed, the  French  army  during  its  manoeuvres  had  its 
left  upon  Ulm,  and  its  right  twenty  leagues  distant, 
threatening  Bavaria;  this  was  to  bid  defiance  both  to 
the  enemy's  army  and  to  fortune.  During  this  cam- 
paign, the  French  army,  which  outnumbered  its  adver- 
sary, was  always  inferior  in  numbers  on  the  field  of 
battle.  This  is  what  always  happens  to  generals  who 
are  irresolute  and  act  without  plans  and  without  regard 
to  principles." 

Such  are  the  dangers  arising  from  defective  marches. 
Such  were  the  principles  affirmed  by  Napoleon. 

Let  us  observe  now  their  application  in  the  case  of 
modern  armies. 

The  German  armies,  in  their  operations  of  1870,  offer 
us  several  examples  of  marches,  whose  study  should 
arouse  a  lively  interest.     The  most  remarkable  are  those 


598  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

of  the  first  days  of  August,  from  the  Sarre  and  the 
Vosges  to  the  Moselle;  then  the  march  of  the  III.  Army 
from  the  Moselle  toward  Chalons;  of  the  same  army  and 
the  Army  of  the  Meuse  from  Sedan  to  Paris;  of  the  II. 
Army,  from  Metz  to  the  Loire;  and  of  the  Army  of  the 
South,  from  the  Seine  to  the  Donbs,  etc. 

In  all  these  movements,  the  dispositions  are  similar. 
They  correspond  to  the  exigencies  of  the  moment,  as 
well  as  to  the  requirements  of  modern  military  art. 
Their  aim  is  to  assure  to  the  armies  the  means  of  support 
and  the  conditions  of  security.  The  combinations  de- 
pend upon  the  greater  or  less  proximity  of  the  enemy; 
hence  arise  differences  in  plans  and  results  with  which 
it  is  well  to  be  acquainted. 

2d. — Marches  of  the  IE.  Army  in  August,  1870. — At  this  time 
the  III.  German  Army  contained  five  corps,  an  addi- 
tional infantry  division,  and  two  divisions  of  cavalry. 

After  crossing  the  Vosges,  it  arrived  upon  the  Moselle 
on  the  15th. 

On  this  date  the  situation,  according  to  the  account 
of  the  Prussian  general  staff,  was  as  follows: 

"Definite  information  concerning  the  5th  French 
Corps  was  wanting;  but  it  was  supposed  to  be  in  retreat 
toward  the  south. 

"  It  was  known  that  considerable  forces  had  concen- 
trated at  Chalons,  and  as  to  the  French  masses  which 
had  re-crossed  the  Moselle  on  the  14th  and  15th,  it  was 
supposed  that  they  were  retreating  toward  the  same 
point. ' ' 

Hence  in  resuming  its  offensive  march,  after  a  short 
rest,  the  III.  Army  was  obliged  to  carefully  inform  itself 
about  events  in  its  front  and  upon  its  left  flank. 

It  was  to  execute  an  offensive  march  in  an  unfamiliar 
country,  and  in  the  midst  of  a  sensitive  people,  already 
wrought  up  to  a  high  pitch  of  excitement,  and  with  the 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  599 

enemy's  forces  upon  botli  of  its  flanks.  It  supposed, 
however,  that  its  right  flank  was  covered  by  the  II. 
Army,  and  therefore  concerned  itself  only  about  its  left. 

There  seemed  little  chance  of  an  immediate  encounter 
with  the  enemy,  but  it  was  thought  probable  that  one 
would  take  place  on  the  banks  of  the  Marne. 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  commander-in-chief 
of  this  army,  on  the  i6th,  sent  to  his  generals  a  schedule 
of  marches  for  the  17th,  i8th,  19th,  and  20th.  On  the 
last  date,  a  new  line  of  defense,  the  Ornain,  was  to  be 
reached. 

The  movement  was  regulated  thus: 

In  first  line,  three  army  corps  and  the  Wiirtemberg 
Division; 

In  second  line,  two  corps; 

In  advance  of  the  front  a  cavalry  division,  making  ex- 
ploration to  a  distance  of  one  or  two  marches.  [See 
Plate  XXXIV.) 

Upon  the  left  flank  a  division  of  cavalry  protected  the 
movement. 

The  extent  of  the  front  did  not  exceed  22  kilometres 
[about  14  miles].  There  was  then  a  certainty  of  being 
always  able,  in  case  of  an  unexpected  encounter,  "to 
concentrate  its  forces  upon  the  decisive  point  in  seasona- 
ble time." 

The  movement  commenced  on  the  17th;  but  on  the 
following  day  news  of  the  battles  fought  around  Metz 
and  the  pressing  back  of  our  army  within  its  intrenched 
camp  modified  the  situation. 

The  effect  of  this  was  as  follows,  shown  in  an  order 
sent  by  the  Crown  Prince  to  his  generals,  prescribing  a 
day's  rest  and  the  subsequent  continuation  of  the  march 
to  the  Meuse. 

"It  is  reported  that  two  divisions  of  Failly's  corps  are 
directed  southward  upon  Mirecourt;  the  camp  at  Chalons 
appears  to  be  strongly  occupied ;  an  army  is  in  process 


6oO  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

of  formation  at  Paris.  It  is  not  impossible  that  all  these 
forces  and  some  of  the  troops  from  Metz  will  succeed  in 
re-uniting.  The  III.  Army  must  then  expect  to  find 
itself  again  in  presence  of  the  enemy  in  a  few  days." 

In  consequence  he  gave  the  following  orders: 

"The  corps  of  the  first  line  will  always  have  their 
advanced-guards  at  from  half-a-day's  march  to  a  day's 
march  in  advance,  and  will  keep  their  fronts  cleared  by 
means  of  the  cavalry. 

' '  The  advanced-guards  will  bivouac.  The  troops  in 
rear  will  establish  their  cantonments  within  the  narrow- 
est possible  limits. 

"  Each  of  the  wing  corps  will  guard  its  exposed  flank. 

"One  of  the  cavalry  divisions  will  march  abreast  of 
the  second  line,  upon  the  left  flank,  in  order  to  explore 
the  country  to  the  south. 

"In  case  of  meeting  the  enemy,  the  advanced-guards 
are  to  halt  and  take  positions,  while  the  main  bodies  of 
their  corps  make  preparations  for  battle.  They  should 
refrain  from  taking  the  offensive,  that  the  army  may 
have  time  to  concentrate. 

"Finally  the  commanders  of  the  different  columns 
will  keep  in  constant  communication  with  each  other, 
and  give  reciprocal  information  regarding  the  incidents 
of  the  march." 

The  formations  ordered  on  the  i6th  were  still  pre- 
served. 

The  corps  of  the  first  line  formed  three  columns;  those 
of  the  second  but  two. 

The  movements  were  executed  in  conformity  with  this 
order. 

On  the  19th  the  contact,  which  had  been  lost  since  the 
third  day  after  the  battle  of  Froeschwiller,  was  recovered 
at  Chevillon,  upon  the  Chaumont-Chalons  railroad.  A 
cavalry  patrol  was  fired  at  by  a  group  of  infantrymen, 
who  at  this  point  were  protecting  troops  from  Alsace  in 
the  operation  of  boarding  their  rail  transports. 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  6oi 

On  the  following  day  this  army  reached  Ornain,  after 
having  made  daily  marches  of  from  i6  to  25  kilometres. 
The  positions  then  occupied  by  its  corps  give  quite  a 
correct  idea  of  the  scope  of  the  entire  movement. 

Exploration  Service  Upon  the  Front. — Positions  of  the  troops 
on  the  20th. — The  4th  Cavalry  Division,  which  had  been 
charged  with  exploration  service  upon  the  front,  had  its 
main  body  at  Stainville-sur-Saulx,  12  kilometres  distant 
from  the  front  of  march  and  from  the  heads  of  columns 
which  occupied  the  line  of  the  Ornain.  It  had  a  squad- 
ron of  scouts  at  Blesme,  an  important  junction  point 
upon  the  principal  line  of  communication  from  Sarre- 
bourg  to  Paris.  Blesme  was  34  kilometres  distant  from 
the  main  body  of  the  division  and  46  kilometres  from 
the  front  of  march.  The  patrols  of  this  division  ex- 
tended as  far  as  the  Marne,  at  Saint-Dizier.  They 
consequently  explored  the  country  to  a  distance  of  32 
kilometres,  or  a  march  and  a  half  from  the  front.  The 
division  pushed  out  scouts  upon  the  right  flank  also,  to 
a  distance  of  12  kilometres. 

First  Line. — In  the  first  line  was  the  II.  Bavarian 
corps,  which  formed  the  right  column,  with  its  advanced- 
guard  at  Ligny-en-Barrois,  upon  the  Ornain,  12  kilo- 
metres distant  from  the  4th  Cavalry  Division  and  20 
from  the  bulk  of  the  army  corps  which  was  at  Menil-la- 
Horgne,  This  distance,  although  exceptional,  was  not 
beyond  the  scope  of  the  orders  given. 

The  V.  Corps,  which  formed  the  central  column,  had 
its  advanced-guard  at  Hevilliers,  in  advance  of  the  line 
of  the  Ornain,  near  the  Saulx,  Its  main  body  was  at 
Treveray,  upon  the  Ornain,  11  kilometres  in  rear. 

The  Wiirtemberg  Division  (centre)  was  at  Houdelain- 
court,  7  kilometres  to  the  south  of  Treveray,  upon  the 
Ornain. 

The  XI.  Corps  (left  column)  had  its  advanced-guard 


6o2  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

at  Maiidres,  upon  the  Joinville  road,  lo  kilometres  in 
advance  of  the  main  force,  which  was  upon  the  Ornain, 
at  Gondrecourt  and  Dainville-aux-Forges. 

Second  Line. — In  the  second  line  were  the  I.  Bavarian 
Corps,  at  Void,  5  kilometres  in  rear  of  the  11. ;  and  the 
VI.  Corps  at  Pagny-la-blanche-C6te,  upon  the  Meuse, 
18  kilometres  from  the  XI.  Corps. 

Exploration  Service  upon  the  Flank. — Upon  the  left  flank, 
the  2d  Cavalry  Division  occupied  Saint-Elophe,  abreast 
of  the  second  line,  near  the  Meuse.  It  was  thus  22 
kilometres,  or  a  day's  march,  from  the  left  column,  and 
it  had  pushed  its  reconnaissances  in  the  direction  of 
Epinal. 

It  had  formed  a  flank  detachment  which  was  at  Neuf- 
chateau,  8  kilometres  distant  upon  the  left,  exploring 
toward  the  south. 

To  recapitulate  the  distances,  this  army  extended  in 
depth  from  Saint-Dezier  to  Vaucouleurs — where  the 
headquarters  were  established — or  60  kilometres  [about 
37  miles],  equal  to  three  marches.  However,  from  the 
advanced-guards  of  the  first  line  to  the  main  bodies  of 
the  corps  of  the  second  line,  there  was  a  mean  distance 
of  only  30  kilometres. 

The  front  of  march,  from  Ligny  to  Dainville,  did  not 
exceed  34  kilometres  [21  miles]. 

The  corps  of  the  second  line  occupied  a  front  of  only 
21  kilometres  [13  miles]. 

Finally,  the  exploration  service,  from  Savonnieres, 
upon  the  Ornain,  to  Neufchateau,  covered  a  space  of  65 
kilometres. 

Comments. — This  formation  for  the  march  provided 
against  all  surprises,  without  interfering  with  facility  of 
movement,  as  events  soon  demonstrated.  When  it  be- 
came necessary  to  change  direction  toward  the  north,  in 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  603 

consequence  of  information  received  regarding  the 
march  of  our  Chalons  army,  the  German  corps  had  only 
to  execute  separate  grand  wheels  to  the  right,  and  follow 
the  valleys  which  they  had  just  reached. 

In  general,  this  formation  shows  that  when  an  army 
on  the  march  through  the  enemy's  country  anticipates 
an  approaching  but  not  immediate  encounter,  it  may 
adopt  the  following  dispositions: 

Its  corps  in  two  lines,  the  first  in  three  columns,  and 
the  second  at  half  a  march  from  the  first. 

The  corps  of  the  first  line,  preceded  at  a  half-march 
by  strong  advanced-guards,  which  should  only  bivouac 
at  night;  the  cavalry  exploring  upon  the  front  and  the 
uncovered  flank;  the  main  bodies  of  the  cavalry  forces 
likewise  at  half  a  march,  their  patrols  of  scouts  pro- 
ceeding far  enough  to  keep  in  contact  with  the  enemy, 
if  possible,  and  if  not,  then  to  within  one  or  two 
marches,  according  to  circumstances. 

The  main  bodies  of  the  troops  camp  in  close  order, 
and  in  case  of  meeting  the  enemy,  the  advanced-guards 
content  themselves  with  resisting  until  the  arrival  of  the 
main  forces,  the  most  distant  of  which  should  be  able 
to  engage  in  the  impending  action. 

There  is  great  similarity  between  this  formation  and 
that  of  the  French  army  in  1806.  Napoleon  then  had 
Murat  at  the  head  of  his  cavalry;  Soult,  Bernadotte,  and 
Lannes  in  first  line;  and  Ney,  Davout,  and  Augereau 
in  second  line.  The  central  column  was  stronger  than 
the  others  by  one  corps,  that  of  the  Guard. 

In  continuing  the  study  of  the  marches  of  the  III. 
Army  up  to  the  moment  when  it  changed  direction 
toward  the  north,  we  shall  see  the  reconnaissances  of 
the  2d  Cavalry  Division  on  the  22d,  pushed  about  60 
kilometres,  or  two  marches,  to  the  front. 

On  the  same  day,  the  German  general  staff  finally 
gained  definite  information  regarding  our  positions. 


6o4  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 


u 


In  its  view,  the  considerable  distance  then  separat- 
ing the  German  masses  from  those  of  the  enemy,  per- 
mitted a  very  extended  front  to  be  still  maintained,  so 
as  to  ntilize  the  greatest  possible  number  of  roads." 
The  front  of  march  of  the  group  formed  by  the  III. 
Army  and  the  Army  of  the  Meuse,  reached  thus,  on  the 
22d,  a  distance  of  75  kilometres. 

The  movement  toward  the  west  was  executed  then, 
from  this  date,  by  the  two  armies  acting  in  conjunction; 
and  on  this  occasion  Von  Moltke  adopted  a  combination 
deserving  especial  notice. 

"In  continuing  their  movement,  the  two  armies  will 
act  in  such  a  way  that  the  III.  Army  may  preserve  an 
advance  of  one  march  from  the  left  of  the  Army  of  the 
Meuse,  to  the  end  that  if  the  opposing  force,  the  Army 
of  Chalons,  attempts  to  make  head  again,  it  may  be 
attacked  in  front  and  upon  the  right  flank,  and  driven 
northward,  away  from  Paris." 

Thus,  in  case  our  forces  had  moved  eastward  toward 
the  German  troops,  they  would  have  come  into  collision 
with  the  Army  of  the  Meuse,  and  during  the  contest  the 
III.  Army,  wheeling  to  the  right,  would  have  fallen  upon 
their  flank,  the  line  assuming  an  angular  form,  which 
seemed  so  much  in  favor  with  the  Prussian  chief-of-stafl", 
and  which  had  so  often  produced  decisive  results. 

These  marches  toward  the  west  were  arrested  on  the 
25th  by  the  intelligence  which  reached  Von  Moltke  con- 
cerning the  direction  taken  by  MacMahon's  columns. 

It  is  well  to  attend  the  German  armies  for  a  moment 
in  the  colossal  wheeling  movement  executed  by  them 
from  the  26th  to  the  31st. 

The  dispositions  for  the  march  made  by  the  III.  Army 
during  this  month  have  become  classic.  They  would 
not,  however,  harmonize  with  all  possible  situations,  and 
should  be  modified  to  suit  the  particular  circumstances 
of  a  given  case.     After  a  great  victory,  for  example,  and 


^  THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  605 

ill  the  event  of  the  total  absence  of  the  enemy,  it  would, 
of  course,  be  advantageous  to  expand  them  still  farther. 
A  situation  of  this  kind  presented  itself  to  the  German 
armies  on  the  day  following  Sedan;  and  although  it  was 
exceptional,  it  will  not  be  without  interest  to  study  the 
execution  of  the  movement  which  bore  them  from  the 
Meuse  to  the  Seine. 

3d. — March  of  the  German  Armies  upon  Paris  in  1870. — The 
character  of  this  march  has  been  defined  as  follows  by 
the  Prussian  general  staff: 

After  Sedan,  ' '  it  was  important  for  the  victor  to  make 
an  uninterrupted  march  upon  Paris  as  soon  as  possible. 

"  The  German  staff  felt  justified  in  believing  that  for 
some  time  at  least  it  would  meet  with  no  serious  resist- 
ance in  the  open  field.  ...  It  was  expedient  that 
the  large  forces  massed  around  Sedan,  should  be  sepa- 
rated in  order  that  they  might  be  reformed,  etc.  .  .  . 
To  this  end  the  III.  Army  was  to  commence  the  move- 
ment toward  the.  south-east,  so  that  the  Army  of  the 
Meuse  following  in  its  turn  could  take  its  place  as  left 
wing.      {See  Plate  XXXV.) 

On  September  3,  the  second  day  after  the  battle,  these 
masses  found  themselves  distributed  thus: 

Upon  the  left  bank  of  the  Meuse,  their  positions 
formed  a  curved  line  40  kilometres  in  extent,  which 
reached  from  Guignicourt  (Wiirtemberg  Division)  to 
Carignan  (the  Guard),  through  Poix  (2d  Cavalry  Di- 
vision), Malmy  (II.  Bavarian  Corps),  and  Raucourt  (IV. 
Corps). 

With  the  exception  of  the  forces  left  at  Sedan  during 
the  evacuation,  that  is  to  say,  with  exception  of  the  I. 
Bavarian  Corps,  the  XI.  Corps,  and  the  4th  Cavalry 
Division,  the  III.  and  IV.  Armies  (Army  of  the  Meuse), 
were  then  encamped  to  the  south  and  to  the  west  of 
Sedan. 


6o6  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

They  were  covered,  from  the  side  of  Paris,  by  the  VI. 
Corps,  which  had  one  division  (nth)  at  Juniville,  38 
kilometres  from  the  front,  with  an  advanced-guard  8 
kilometres  beyond  Juniville  at  Aussonce,  in  the  direc- 
of  tion  Rheims. 

Its  12th  Division  was  at  Rethel,  toward  the  right,  in 
the  direction  of  our  13th  Corps  (Vinoy),  which  it  had 
attempted  to  pursue.  It  was  connected  with  the  army 
by  the  6th  Cavalry  Division,  which  occupied  Attigny, 
and  which  was  thus  found  at  half  a  day's  march  (15 
kilometres)  in  rear  of  its  position. 

The  order  relating  to  the  removal  of  the  forces  from 
the  approaches  to  Sedan,  and  the  establishment  of  the 
front  of  march  of  the  two  armies,  was  issued  from  the 
general  headquarters  on  the  3d. 

With  a  view  to  keeping  up  regularity  of  supplies,  it 
directed  that  the  order  of  battle  of  the  two  armies  be  re- 
established by  inversion. 

It  then  announced  that  the  movement  was  to  be  exe- 
cuted upon  a  very  extended  front,  and  indicated  Dor- 
mans  as  the  march  objective  for  the  right  of  the  III. 
Army,  and  Laon  as  the  objective  of  the  Army  of  the 
Meuse. 

The  immediate  objectives  for  the  5th  were  the  Rethel- 
Attigny  line  for  the  III.  Army  and  the  Poix-le-Chene 
for  the  Army  of  the  Meuse.  Once  upon  the  line  Laon- 
Fismes-Dormans-Sezanne,  the  two  armies  were  to  ad- 
vance abreast  of  each  other. 

Such  were  the  instructions  which  enabled  each  of 
these  armies  to  establish  its  schedule  of  marches. 

The  movement  commenced  on  the  4th,  and  up  to  the 
12th  the  front  of  march,  the  depth  of  the  columns,  and 
the  zone  of  reconnaissance,  became  expanded,  with  a 
view  to  gathering  supplies  from  the  country,  and  gain- 
ing ground  to  the  front  as  rapidly  as  possible. 

On  the  8th,  the  III.  Army,  which  now  comprised  only 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  607 

three  corps,  a  division  of  independent  infantry,  and  a 
division  of  cavalry,  extended  from  Dormans  to  Chalons, 
upon  a  front  of  ^6}4  kilometres.  Its  cavalry  division 
preceded  it,  but  without  reconnoitering.  In  dej^th,  this 
army  occupied  a  space  of  38  kilometres.  But  after  the 
I2th,  when  the  right  had  arrived  at  Nogent  I'Artaud, 
three  marches  from  Paris,  the  dispositions  changed. 

The  III.  Army  had  just  entered  the  region  which 
seemed  to  have  been  indicated  by  the  instructions  from 
the  general  headquarters  as  the  boundary  of  the  zone  of 
action  of  the  enemy's  forces. 

From  this  time  the  columns  and  camps  were  nearer 
together.  But  the  dispositions  in  close  order  required  in 
case  of  a  probable  encounter  with  the  enemy  were  not 
yet  adopted. 

On  the  i6th,  this  army's  heads  of  columns  were  one 
march  distant  from  Paris.  It  was  known  that  there  was 
no  longer  reason  to  be  disquieted  on  the  score  of  the  new 
levies  which  France  was  endeavoring  to  assemble. 

The  following  were  the  positions  of  the  different  forces 
on  this  date  {See  Plate  XXXVI)  : 

The  VI.  Corps  had  been  at  Meaux  for  three  days,  with 
its  advanced-guard  at  Lagny,  15  kilometres  distant; 

The  V.  Corps  at  Tournan  and  Fontenay,  with  ad- 
vanced-guards at  Ozouer-la-Ferriere  and  Chevry; 

The  II.  Bavarian  Corps  at  Moissy-Cramayel,  with 
advanced-guards  15  kilometres  distant  toward  L-ieusaint; 

The  2d  Cavalry  Division  occupied  Brie-Comte-Robert, 
a  short  distance  in  advance  of  the  front,  and  its  patrols 
reconnoitered  the  country  up  to  the  very  gates  of  the 
capital. 

Upon  the  left  flank, — the  only  portion  of  the  advanc- 
ing army  needing  protection, — the  reconnaissances  ex- 
tended to  Melun,  11  kilometres  distant. 

The  front  of  march  reached  41  kilometres  [about  25 
miles],  and  the  depth  of  the  column  48  kilometres 
[about  30  miles]. 


6o8  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

From  this  time  the  situation  changed.  This  army 
was  now  to  move  •  to  the  investment  of  the  capital,  and 
its  columns  were  obliged  to  take  such  precautions  as 
the  presence  of  the  enemy  dictated. 

The  march  of  the  III.  Army  after  September  4  was 
executed  then  under  the  most  favorable  conditions. 

The  situation  was  exceptional,  due  to  circumstances 
which  rarely  present  themselves,  and  upon  the  recur- 
rence of  which  it  would  be  imprudent  to  rely.  In  reality, 
therefore,  the  movements  made  by  this  army  in  August 
between  the  Moselle  and  the  Meuse  give  the  clearest 
idea  of  modern  strategic  marches. 

We  have  in  the  preceding  pages  become  acquainted 
with  the  essential  operations  of  an  army  acting  on  the 
offensive.  The  marches  undertaken  by  it  (the  general 
principles  of  which  have  been  explained)  should  con- 
duct it  to  the  vicinity  of  the  enemy,  where  other  situ- 
ations present  themselves,  calling  for  other  dispositions. 
Thenceforth  tactical  rules  become  all  controlling. 
Their  importance  entitles  them  to  consideration  in  a 
separate  study. 

But  before  attempting  this,  it  is  necessary  to  consider 
in  its  turn,  the  second  part  of  the  strategical  role  devolv- 
ing upon  armies  in  the  field,  the  defensive. 


§  6. — The  Defensive. 
I. — Conditions  of  the  Defensive. 

The  disadvantages  of  the  defensive  have  already  been 
pointed  out.  They  have  led  to  this  conclusion,  that  a 
country  reduced  in  advance,  to  the  defensive,  would  be 
wise  to  avoid  the  hazards  of  war  if  possible. 

This,  however,  is  not  an  invariable  rule.  The  de- 
fensive is  not  without  its  chances  of  success  also,  and  it 
has  often  been  said  that  from  a  tactical  point  of  view 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  609 

the  increased  vohiiiie  of  fire  due  to  modern  improve- 
ments should  assure  it  the  victory. 

When  we  seek  for  the  truth  of  the  matter  among  the 
facts  of  the  case,  we  find,  indeed,  more  than  one  con- 
sideration presented  in  favor  of  a  good  defensive. 

Von  der  Goltz  says  on  this  subject: 

"At  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  offensive  will  have 
to  occupy  the  enemy's  frontier.  He  must  then  traverse 
a  system  of  frontier  fortresses  more  or  less  extensive, 
laying  siege  to  some  and  masking  others.  The  army 
daily  detaches  and  leaves  in  rear  small  bodies  of  troops 
to  assure  its  line  of  supply  stations;  at  the  same  time  it 
becomes  more  and  more  difficult  to  receive  reinforce- 
ments. There  thus  results  from  these  two  causes  a 
constant  consumption  of  men.  In  a  word,  the  advanc- 
ing armies  melt  away  like  snow  beneath  the  midday 
sun.  The  frontiers  are  passed  with  hundreds  of  thous- 
ands of  troops;  the  heart  of  the  enemy's  country  is 
reached  with  thoiisands  only. 

"In  October,  1805,  Napoleon  entered  German  terri- 
tory with  200,000  men;  but  notwithstanding  his  remark- 
able skill  in  economizing  his  forces,  he  could  place  only 
80,000  in  line,  on  the  2d  of  December,  for  the  decisive 
battle  of  Austerlitz. 

"The  aggressor  can  only  with  great  difficulty  main- 
tain the  transports  which  he  had  at  the  commencement 
of  operations.  Moreover,  at  the  very  moment  when  his 
aim  seems  to  be  reached  through  first  victories,  the 
necessity  of  placing  new  forces  in  line  in  order  to  retain 
his  advantages,  soon  shows  him  the  difficulty  of  repair- 
ing his  losses. 

"The  situation  of  the  defender  is  quite  otherwise. 
The  bringing  forward  of  men,  horses,  food,  and  material, 
and  the  satisfying  of  all  the  army's  wants,  are  much 
easier,  because  the  troops  are  not  far  distant  from  their 
centres  of  supply,  and  because  there  is  no  danger,  as  in 

39 


6lO  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

the  case  of  the  offensive,  of  having  the  communications 
interrupted. 

"The  defender  can  besides  put  himself  in  condition 
to  repulse  an  attack  with  more  troops  than  the  aggressor 
can  bring  against  him. 

"The  former  is  supported  by  the  garrisons  of  the  for- 
tified places  on  the  frontier.  These  compel  detachments 
from  the  enemy's  ranks,  if  only  for  the  purpose  of  ob- 
servation. The  aggressor,  on  the  contrary,  can  not 
utilize  his  garrison  troops,  because  he  has  left  them  as 
a  guard  for  his  own  fortresses,  and  because  he  must  not 
lose  sight  of  the  possibility  of  a  retreat.  Moreover, 
garrison  troops  are  usually  not  fitted  to  act  upon  the 
offensive.  The  defender,  on  the  other  hand,  can  employ 
all  kinds  of  troops  in  a  sheltered  country  or  in  strong 
positions.  And  finally,  he  can  utilize  levies  en  masse^ 
which  is  not  the  case  with  the  assailant. 

"The  aggressor  has  to  sustain  more  losses,  and  is  sub- 
jected to  more  hardships  and  privations.  He  is  obliged 
to  submit  to  the  disadvantage  of  seeing  his  force,  accord- 
ing as  he  advances,  diminish  more  rapidly  than  that  of 
the  defender. 

"The  extraordinary  measures  which  the  latter  takes 
to  procure  recruits,  arms,  and  money  are  justified  by  the 
character  of  the  war.  And  in  spite  of  a  discouraging 
beginning,  when  a  proud  and  strong  people  upholds  its 
army,  the  defensive  acquires  a  new  material' strength. 

"The  Northern  States  during  the  war  of  Secession, 
and  France  in  the  second  half  of  the  last  war,  have 
given  remarkable  examples  in  this  regard. 

"From  a  tactical  point  of  view,  the  chances  of  the 
defensive  are  not  less  real. ' ' 

Advantages  of  tlie  Defensive. —  "To-day,  on  account  of 
the  character  of  his  arms,  the  defender  can  sweep  the 
ground  to  his  front  to  a  distance  of  i,ooo  metres.     The 


THIRD   CHAPTKR. — OPERATION.S.  6ir 

assailant  must,  in  consequence,  traverse  a  zone  of  fire 
ten  times  as  broad  as  in  the  days  of  the  smooth-bore. 
The  protection  afforded  by  the  natural  features  of  the 
country,  fortified  positions,  and  all  other  artificial  means 
of  resistance,  is  to  the  advantage  of  the  defender.  In 
order  to  prepare  himself  to  receive  the  attack,  he  remains 
quietly  in  position;  his  fire  continues  without  inter- 
ruption, while  the  aggressor  must  often  cease  firing  in 
order  to  move  to  the  front.  The  latter  has  thus  to  en- 
dure fatigue,  dangers,  and  losses. 

"With  the  defender,  affairs  are  less  complicated. 
There  is  greater  unity  in  the  conduct  of  operations;  the 
subordinate  leaders  are  less  frequently  engaged  in  inde- 
pendent actions;  the  supply  of  ammunition  is  more 
easily  kept  up;  and  the  reserves  are  more  readily  brought 
into  line.  These  result  from  the  facts  that  but  one  line 
is  occupied;  that  no  forward  movements  are  made  lead- 
ing to  a  separation  of  the  troops;  that  a  definite  zone 
is  defended;  that  the  general  line  of  direction  is  not 
changed;  and  that  one  position  is  not  abandoned  for  an- 
other, as  required  by  a  good  offensive. ' ' 

The  defensive  is  then  a  mode  of  operation  which  may 
lead  to  victory.  It  is  necessary,  moreover,  without 
underrating  the  favorable  chances  of  the  offensive,  to  re- 
call that  a  nation  may  be  forcibly  drawn  into  a  defensive 
war,  or  menaced  by  the  sudden  aggression  of  its  neigh- 
bors. 

What  shall  such  a  nation  do,  then,  if  not  proudly 
accept  the  gage,  with  a  firm  determination  to  lay  down 
its  arms  only  after  the  liberation  of  the  country. 

In  modern  warfare,  the  circumstances  which  generally 
compel  a  nation  to  take  the  defensive  are: 

ist.   Inferiority  of  forces; 

2d.   Delays  in  assembling  its  armies. 

Numerical  inferiority  obliges  a  country  to  adopt  a  pe- 
culiar system  of  war,  and  to  shape  all  its  efforts  in  time 
of  peace  to  a  single  end — the  defense  of  the  territory. 


6l2  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

This  is  the  condition  of  the  minor  states.  Such  a  de- 
fense gives  rise  to  special  operations  interesting  to  study, 
but  which  would  take  us  away  from  the  subject  at  hand. 

Usually,  it  is  the  delays  incident  to  mobilization  and 
concentration  which  reduce  an  army  to  the  defensive. 
It  is  expedient  then  to  recur  to  these  operations. 

II, — Concentration. 

For  mobilization,  the  question  is  simple.  The  only 
duty  imposed  upon  the  defensive  in  this  regard,  is  to 
make  its  system  as  perfect  as  possible.  It  is  a  work  to 
be  executed  in  time  of  peace — a  work  in  preparation  for 
war. 

But  as  we  are  now  considering  the  side  of  the  defense, 
we  know  that  its  mobilization  will  be  less  rapid  than 
that  of  the  adversary.  How  to  effect  the  concentration, 
and  what  zone  to  choose?  Such  is  the  first  problem  to 
be  solved.  " 

Preceding  studies  have  already  answered  the  question. 

We  have  seen,  indeed,  that  in  1870  it  was  believed 
by  the  Prussian  general  staff,  at  the  opening  of  the  cam- 
paign, that  a  French  army  of  150,000  men  would  be 
ready  to  take  the  offensive  upon  the  Sarre  within  nine 
days  after  the  commencement  of  mobilization.  At  this 
date  the  concentration  of  the  Prussian  armies  had 
scarcely  begun.  They  were  thus  to  find  themselves  in 
a  defensive  situation;  at  least  such  was  the  supposition 
respecting  the  II.  Army,  which  was  at  this  time  de- 
signed to  act  upon  the  middle  Rhine  and  in  the  Palatin- 
ate. Thence  resulted  combinations  which  have  already 
been  described,  and  which  permit  us  to  consider  the  fol- 
lowing principles  as  applicable  to  defensive  operations: 

ist.  Troops  designed  to  act  on  the  defe7isive  should  not 
be  C07ice7itrated  up07t  the  zone  at  the  extre^nity  of  the  rail- 
road lines ^  but  i7i  the  interior  of  the  country  ; 

2d.    The  zone  of  cojicentration  should  be  far  enougJi  re- 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  613 

moved  frovi  the  enemy''  s  to  assure  the  security  of  the  as- 
semblcvicnts  and  to  permit  the  coiicentration  to  be  com- 
pleted be/ore  the  enemy  is  met. 

In  1870,  the  II.  Prussian  Army  was  certain  of  having- 
a  numerical  superiority  upon  the  fourteenth  day  of  mo- 
bilization; so  that  in  concentrating  itself  within  six 
marches  of  our  assemblements,  it  was  in  condition  to 
fight,  with  chances  of  success,  a  French  army  that  had 
taken  the  initi-ative  on  the  ninth  day.  Hence  the  selec- 
tion of  the  line  of  the  Rhine,  six  marches  distant  from 
the  Sarre,  as  a  zone  of  concentration. 

3d.  A71  army  in  danger  of  receiving  the  enemy''  s  shock 
upon  its  zone  of  concentration  should  choose  this  zojte  in 
rear  of  a  good  defensive  line^i  and  bring  all  its  forces  into 
play.  In  this  case  it  will  be  advantageous  to  have  for  ti-^ 
fed  places  as  points  of  support  upon  the  flanks  of  the 
zone  of  concentration. 

In  general,  the  principles  relating  to  concentrations 
on  the  part  of  the  defensive,  may  be  found  in  the  advice 
which  Napoleon  on  frequent  occasions  gave  his  generals. 
On  September  18,  1805,  he  wrote  to  Massena,  then  gen- 
eral-in-chief  of  the  Army  of  Italy: 

"  You  have  nearly  60,000  men,  which  is  a  third  more 

than  I  ever  had  under  similar  circumstances I 

cannot  advise  you    too  strongly  not    to  disperse    your 

forces I    caution   you    again    to   hold  all  your 

troops  together.  If  you  give  battle  with  50,000  men,' 
the  enemy  cannot  successfully  cope  with  you;  if  you 
engage  him  with  a  less  force,  you  will  experience  de- 
feat  I  commit  my  brave  Army  of  Italy  to  you; 

let  it  not  be  beaten  in  detail."* 

"Upon  all  occasions,"  says  General  Berthaut,  "Na- 
poleon held  the  same  language.  He  blamed  not  only 
the  dispersion  of  troops  belonging  to  the  same  army,  but 

'^Military  Correspondence  of  Napoleon  1.,  Vol.  IV. 


6 14  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

also,  in  certain  cases,  the  distribution  of  the  forces  into 
several  independent  armies  at  too  great  a  distance  from 
each  other  to  offer  mutual  support." 

"  'We  should,'  said  he,  'have  remained  upon  the  de- 
fensive in  Germany  in  1799,  since  we  were  not  able  to 
bring  together  forces  superior  to  the  enemy.' 

"  'At  all  events,  the  three  armies  of  the  Danube,  of 
Helvetia,  and  of  the  Lower  Rhine,  should  have  formed 

but  a  single  force The  40,000  men  composing 

the  Army  of  the  Danube,  joined  with  the  Army  of  Hel- 
vetia, were  sufficient  to  assure  the  possession  of  Switzer- 
land and  the  occupation  of  the  camps  upon  the  right 
bank  of  the  Rhine,  on  the  side  of  Schafifhausen  and 
Stein,  taking  the  mountains  of  the  Black  Forest  in 
rear.'  "* 

"  It  is  certain,  then,"  adds  General  Berthaut,  "that 
dispersion  of  the  forces,  for  any  reason  whatever,  is  a 
cause  of  weakness  to  the  defense,  and  will  probably  lead 
to  its  ruin;  that  in  order  to  retain  the  possibility  of 
making  an  energetic  and  successful  defense,  it  is  abso- 
lutely essential  to  concentrate  the  entire  army,  or  at 
least  the  bulk  of  the  forces,  upon  a  single  point  of  the 
threatened  frontier;  that,  moreover,  when  the  effectives 
are  so  numerous  as  to  oblige  the  formation  of  several 
armies,  it  is  necessary  that  these  armies  submit  to  the 
direction  of  a  generalissimo,  and  be  so  disposed  as  to 
operate  in  concert  and  to  have  the  power  to  support 
each  other  under  all  circumstances,  "f 

Protection  of  the  Frontiers. — During  the  period  of  con- 
centration, one  of  the  first  cares  of  the  commander  will 
be  the  protection  of  the  frontiers. 

This  operation  has  already  been  considered  in  case  of 


*  Military  Correspondence  of  Napoleon  I. ,  Vol.  II. 
t  Principles  of  Strategy,  General  Berthaut. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  615 

the  offensive.  The  principles  are  the  same  for  the  de- 
fensive.  It  is  not  necessary,  therefore,  to  retnrn  to  them. 

However,  it  will  be  in  order  to  recall  that  activity  on 
the  part  of  the  defensive  constitutes  its  principal  claim 
to  success,  and  that  this  activity  depends  above  all  upon 
the  accuracy  of  the  information  received  regarding  the 
enemy.  It  may  then  be  affirmed  that  vigilance  on  the 
part  of  the  troops  placed  upon  the  frontier  should  be 
still  greater  on  the  defensive  than  on  the  offensive. 

The  Archduke  Albert  in  1866,  upon  the  Mincio,  gave 
an  example  of  this,  which  has  been  several  times  noticed. 
His  vigilance  was  the  prime  cause  of  his  success. 

III.— Movements  after  Concentration. 

What  movements  should  be  made  by  an  army  upon 
the  defensive  after  its  concentration? 

History  shows  us  that  this  depends  upon  the  time  in- 
tervening between  the  end  of  the  concentration  and  the 
first  encounters.  Either  the  army  will  be  able  to  move 
forward  to  meet  the  enemy  and  undertake  an  active  de- 
fense, or  it  will  be  behindhand  in  its  preparations,  and 
in  consequence  obliged  to  await  the  enemy,  resigning 
itself  from  the  first  to  a  passive  defense. 

Military  men  of  all  times  have  laid  down  as  a  prin- 
ciple that  an  army  should,  whenever  possible,  resolutely 
and  energetically  adopt  the  active  defense.  It  should 
leave  its  encampments  and  march  toward  the  enemy. 

Jomini  says  on  this  subject: 

"The  principal  advantage  of  the  defensive  lies  in  the 
fact  that  it  is  able  to  select  its  own  theatre  of  war.  But 
it  cannot  draw  all  possible  advantages  from  the  situa- 
tion by  a  simple  passive  defense. 

' '  For  this  it  is  necessary  to  adopt  an  active  defense — 
now  holding  the  army  in  waiting,  now  seizing  a  favor- 
able juncture  to  make  an  attack.     The  best  results  are 


6l6  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

thus  obtained.  In  choosing  this  character  of  defense, 
the  advantage  of  having  a  theatre  of  war  prepared  in 
advance  is  united  with  the  initiative  of  the  movements." 

Napoleon  was  more  positive  still : 

"  Do  not  adopt  the  defensive,"  said  he  in  his  corres- 
pondence, "  when  it  is  possible  for  you  to  do  otherwise. 
If  you  are  reduced  to  this  sad  extremity,  let  it  be  to  gain 
time,  to  await  reinforcements,  to  form  your  soldiers,  to 
seek  alliances,  to  lead  the  enemy  to  a  distance  from  his 
base  of  operations  ;  but  have  an  eventual  offensive  as 
the  constant  aim  of  your  movements." 

-Again  he  defined  in  precise  terms  the  character  of  a 
good  defensive. 

In  1806,  writing  to  his  brother  Joseph,  then  King  of 
Naples,  to  indicate  to  him  the  means  of  defending  his 
kingdom,  he  thus  expressed  himself: 


u 


Saint  Ci.oud,  July  28,  1806. 

"As  soon  as  General  Reynier  is  extricated  and  has 
united  with  your  reinforcements,  you  should  dispose 
your  brigades  in  echelon  a  day's  march  apart,  on  the 
line  from  Naples  to  Cassano,  so  that  in  three  days,  four 
brigades,  numbering  from  ten  to  twelve  thousand  men, 
may  be  able  to  assemble. 

"  It  is  by  this  disposition  in  echelon  that  the  defensive 
is  prepared  for  all  emergencies,  so  that  when  it  is  desired 
to  take  the  offensive,  in  order  to  carry  out  a  particular 
aim,  the  enemy  having  seen  you  on  the  defensive  will 
not  be  able  to  find  you  out,  and  before  he  can  change 
his  attitude,  the  ten  or  twelve  days  required  for  your 
operations  will  have  passed.  I  am  not  at  all  certain 
that  I  have  made  myself  undersood.  Great  mistakes 
have  been  made  in  your  system  of  defense;  none  was 
ever  made  with  impunity.  The  experienced  soldier 
sees  them  at  a  glance,  but  the  effects  are  felt  two 
months  afterwards.     As  the  two  important  points  were 


THIRD   CIIAPTKR. — Ol'KRATIONS.  617 

Gaeta  and  Reggio,  and  as  you  have  38,000  men,  you 
should  have  formed  the  brigades  into  five  divisions, 
placed  in  dchelon  at  intervals  of  one  or  two  marches,  so 
as  to  be  able  to  support  each  other.  The  enemy  would 
then  have  found  you  in  such  a  position  that  he  would 
not  have  dared  to  make  a  single  move,  for  at  once  and 
without  loss  of  a  single  day,  you  could  have  united  your 
troops  at  Gaeta,  Reggio,  or  Santa  Eufemia.  Here  are 
the  dispositions  to  be  made  for  the  Sicily  expedition. 
You  must  in  starting  out  be  too  formidable  to  be  at- 
tacked. You  must  abandon  all  positions  in  your  rear 
except  those '  necessary  for  the  defense  of  your  capital, 
and  take  a  full  offensive  against  the  enemy,  who,  the 
descent  having  been  made,  will  be  powerless  to  attempt 
anything.  Such  is  the  art  of  war.  You  will  see  many 
who  fight  well,  but  no  one  who  understands  the  appli- 
cation of  this  principle. 

"The  whole  art  of  war  consists,  on  the  one  hand,  in 
a  well-planned  and  extremely  prudent  defensive,  on  the 
other,  in  a  bold  and  rapid  offensive." 

What,  according  to  this,  is  the  practical  rule  to  be 
followed  in  our  day  in  an  active  defense,  in  order  to 
move  toward  the  enemy  and  take  the  initiative? 

The  II.  Prussian  Army,  in  1870,  in  its  march  from  its 
zone  of  concentration  upon  the  French  army,  which  it 
expected  to  see  debouch  in  force  from  the  side  of  the 
Sarre,  will  answer  the  questio;i  for  us. 

The  dispositions  made  by  it  have  already  been  stated, 
and  it  will  suffice  to  briefly  recall  them: 

ist.  To  move  the  indepejiderit  cavalry  forward  to 
meet  the  enemy ^  in  order  to  take  the  contact  as  soon  as 
possible; 

2d.  To  advaitce  in  echelon^  in  close  order ^  ready  to 
engage  with  all  the  disposable  forces  ; 

3d.  /;?  case  a  meeting  with  the  enem.y  is  imminent^ 
to  halt  in  a  strojtg  defensive  position^  selected  and^  if 
need  be^  prepared  in  advance. 


6l8  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

The  controlling  pfinciple  in  this  species  of  operations 
is  activity  in  reconnoitering,  and  in  execnting  the  nec- 
essary movements. 

In  a  passive  defense,  on  the  contrary,  there  is  only  one 
combination  possible,  a  defense  in  position.  This  be- 
longs properly  to  the  subject  of  defensive  battles,  and 
will  be  considered  in  a  subsequent  study. 

It  is  seen  from  what  precedes  that  the  defensive  opera- 
tions of  an  army  at  the  beginning  of  a  campaign,  have 
no  other  aim  than  the  defense  of  the  frontier's. 

For  a  long  time  combinations  were  adopted  in  this 
connection  which  experience  has  rejected  as  unsound, 
but  which  may  with  profit  be  recalled  for  the  purpose 
of  indicating  at  once  their  defects  and  their  dangers. 

One  of  them  favors  the  distribution  of  the  troops  en 
cordon. 

This  system  is  condemned  to-day.  Napoleon  I.  had 
occasion,  in  1808,  to  express  himself  clearly  in  this  re- 
gard, in  a  letter  to  Berth ier,  referring  to  the  retrograde 
movement  of  our  armies  in  Spain. 

"August  16,  1808. 

"What  is  this  project  of  having  Marshal  Bessieres 
march  upon  Frias,  while  awaiting  the  arrival  of  his 
right  toward  Bilbao  or  Santander?  Does  it  mean  that 
the  cordon  system  has  been  adopted?  Is  the  object  to 
prevent  the  passing  of  contraband  goods  or  the  enemy? 
Is  it  not  known  that  from  Frias  to  Bilbao  and  Santander 
is  a  distance  of  from  four  to  five  marches?  Who  could 
have  advised  the  King  to  adopt  the  method  of  defense  by 
cordons  ?  After  ten  years  of  war,  are  these  stupidities 
to  be  revived  ? ' ' 

Under  other  circumstances,  armies,  at  the  opening  of 
campaigns,  have  adopted  concentrations  by  groups. 

Napoleon  has  likewise  shown  himself  the  enemy  of 
this  system,  and  his  views  on  the  subject  are  clearly  set 
forth  in  the  advice  given  Massena  in  1805. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  619 

The  campaigns  of  1866  and  1870  have  demonstrated 
to  what  dangers  armies  are  exposed  in  our  day  by  the 
adoption  of  such  a  system. 

It  may  then  be  said  that  on  the  defensive  still  more 
than  on  the  offensive,  the  assemblements  should  be 
effected  upon  a  single  zone,  and  in  concentrated  order — 
an  order  sufficiently  extended  to  secure  easy  supply,  but 
close  enough  to  maintain  the  army  in  readiness  to  fight 
with  the  greatest  possible  number  of  troops. 

IV. — Defensive  Operations  after  the  First  Encounters. 

Let  us  presume  the  army  on  the  defense  to  have  been 
beaten  in  the  first  encounters.  It  has  now  to  organize 
the  means  of  continuing  the  resistance.  The  most  crit- 
ical period  in  the  life  of  a  people  has  arrived,  and  an 
army  which  foresees  that  its  part  is  to  act  upon  the  de- 
fensive, cannot  too  soon  prepare  for  the  arduous  task 
devolving  upon  it  after  the  first  defeats. 

Napoleon,  upon  the  occasion  of  the  defense  of  Dal- 
matia  in  1806,  defined  in  part  what  should  be  done  in 
cases  of  the  kind  we  are  considering^: 


^& ' 


u 


Saint  Cloud,  September  3,  1806. 

"There  are  no  means  of  preventing  an  army  with 
double  or  treble  the  forces  which  I  have  in  Dalmatia 
from  effecting  a  landing  upon  any  point  whatever  of 
the  eighty  leagues  of  coast,  and  of  soon  obtaining  a  de- 
cided advantage  over  my  army,  if  its  organization  is  in 
keeping  with  its  numbers. 

"It  is  likewise  impossible  for  me  to  prevent  a  stronger 
army  coming  from  the  Austrian  or  Turkish  frontier,  from 
obtaining  advantages  over  an  army  in  Dalmatia. 

"  But  must  the  six,  eight,  or  twelve  thousand  men, 
whom  the  general  course  of  political  events  has  led  me 
to  keep  in  Dalmatia,  be  crushed,  and  deprived  of  their 


620  PART  FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

resources  after  a  few  combats?  Must  my  munitions, 
my  hospitals,  and  my  magazines  located  at  different 
points  in  Dalmatia,  fall  a  prey  to  the  enemy  as  soon  as 
he  has  proved  his  superiority  in  the  field?  No;  I  must 
provide  for  this  in  advance,  and  the  only  successful 
means  of  avoiding  it  is  to  organize  a  grand  depot  placcj 
which  shall  contain  my  hospitals,  magazines,  and  quar- 
ters for  troops;  a  place  where  my  Dalmatian  forces  may 
rally  and  reform,  either  for  the  purpose  of  defending 
themselves  or  of  again  taking  the  field  when  circum- 
stances shall  permit.  I  call  this  the  central  place.  So 
long  as  it  exists,  my  troops  may  lose  combats,  but  they 
will  thereby  sustain  only  the  ordinary  losses  of  war;  so 
long  as  it  exists  they  themselves,  after  having  rested, 
may  be  able  to  again  grasp  victory,  or  at  least  furnish 
me  the  two  advantages  of  holding  three  times  their 
number  in  the  siege  of  the  place,  and  of  giving  me  three 
or  four  months  in  which  to  reach  them  with  succor;  for 
so  long  as  the  place  remains  uncaptured,  the  fate  of  the 
province  is  not  decided,  and  the  immense  material  con- 
nected with  the  defense  of  so  great  a  province  is  not  lost. 
"It  was  asked  in  the  last  century,  if  fortifications 
were  of  any  utility.  There  are  sovereigns  who  have 
condemned  them,  and  in  consequence  have  dismantled 
their  strongholds.  For  myself,  I  would  put  the  question 
in  another  way,  and  ask  if  it  is  possible  to  make  all  the 
combinations  required  by  war  without  fortified  places, 
and  would  declare  that  it  is  not.  Without  fortified 
depot  towns,  good  plans  of  campaign  can  not  be  formed; 
and  without  what  I  call  field-places,  furnishing  shelter 
against  the  attacks  of  hussars  and  detached  bodies,  an 
offensive  war  can  not  be  properly  carried  on.  In  this 
connection,  several  generals  who  in  their  wisdom  did 
not  favor  fortified  places,  have  ended  by  deciding  that 
a  war  of  invasion  could  not  be  made.  But  how  many 
such  places  are  necessary?     We  are  persuaded  that  it 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  62 1 

is  the  same  here  as  with  the  rlistribittion  of  the  troops. 
Will  you  pretend  to  defend  an  entire  frontier  by  a 
cordon  ?  You  will  be  weak  at  every  point,  for  all  human 
means  are  limited — artillery,  money,  good  generals, 
good  subordinates — and  if  you  are  obliged  to  spread  out 
your  forces,  you  will  be  strong  nowhere.  But  let  us 
confine  ourselves  to  the  question. 

"A  central  fortified  place  once  selected,  all  the  plans 
of  my  generals  should  be  established  with  reference  to 
it.  Has  a  superior  force  of  the  enemy  been  landed  ? 
The  care  of  the  generals  should  be  to  direct  all  the  op- 
erations in  such  a  way  as  to  assure  their  retreat  upon 
this  central  place. 

"All  the  army's  magazines  will  be  concentrated  there, 
all  means  of  defense  accumulated  there  in  abundance, 
and  a  definite  and  certain  aim  be  given  to  the  operations 
of  the  generals.  Everything  becomes  simple,  easy, 
well-defined,  nothing  is  vague,  when  the  central  point 
of  a  country  has  thus  been  prepared  beforehand  by  super- 
ior authority. 

"If,  on  the  contrary,  I  am  at  war  with  Austria,  which 
is  the  most  probable  hypothesis,  Zara  offers  me  many 
advantages.  The  10,000  or  i2,o®o  men  which  I  have  in 
Dalmatia,  brought  together  at  Zara,  could  combine  with 
my  Isonzo  army,  and  thus  become  one  of  the  factors  in 
the  war.  The  Austrians  then  cannot  neglect  them,  but 
will  be  obliged  to  detach  an  equal  number  of  troops  to 
hold  them  in  check,  and  by  this  means  I  shall  not  be 
weakened  by  Dalmatia.  In  occupying  ^  great  deal  of 
territory  with  my  armies,  I  should  not  lose  sight  of  the 
fact  that  they  must  all  be  made  to  co-operate  in  the  gen- 
eral plan  of  campaign,  in  order  that  my  strength  may 
suffer  no,  or  the  least  possible,  diminution  through  any 
of  them. 

"But  does  it  follow  that  all  my  forces  should  be  con- 
centrated at  Zara?     Certainly  not.     My  troops  should 


622  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

occupy  the  positions  which  my  generals  may  judge  the 
most  proper  for  a  camp,  from  which  all  the  frontier 
points  may  be  reached.  But  the  situations  to  be  occu- 
pied by  these  troops  will  depend  upon  their  number,  and 
upon  circumstances  which  change  from  month  to  month. 
It  is  then  of  no  importance  to  attempt  to  foresee  what 
steps  will  here  be  suitable." 

Without  entering  more  at  large  upon  this  subject, 
which  the  study  of  facts  will  alone  profitably  develop, 
we  may  sum  up  as  follows  the  duties  incumbent  upon 
an  army  in  the  case  we  are  considering: 

ist.  Preparation  during  peace  of  the  means  of  resist- 
ance. 

2d.   Choice  of  the  most  advantageous  lines  of  retreat; 

3d.  Reconnaissance  and  preparation  of  defensive  posi- 
tions of  the  second  line  which  will  impede  the  enemy's 
march ; 

4th.  Preparation  of  the  means  of  resistance  designed 
to  divide  the  adversary's  forces; 

5th.  Dispositions  which  will  permit  the  offensive  to 
be  taken  when  a  favorable  opportunity  is  presented. 

After  this  rapid  exposition  of  the  general  principles 
relative  to  defensive  operations,  it  is  well  to  notice  their 
application  in  several  campaigns.  This  will  be  the  best 
means  of  understanding  their  practical  bearing  and  the 
chances  of  success  or  defeat  to  which  they  lead. 

Nothing  can,  in  this  regard,  interest  us  more  than  the 
defense  of  our  own  country.  It  was  the  opinion  of 
Napoleon,  and  experience  has  unfortunately  proved,  that 
of  all  the  countries  of  Europe,  it  is  our  own  with  whose 
defensive  resources  we  should  be  the  best  acquainted. 

In  a  letter  dated  Finkenstein,  April  19,  1807,  the  Em- 
peror wrote  his  minister  of  war  on  the  subject  of  a  pro- 
gramme of  military  instruction: 

" It  would    necessitate  a  knowledge  of  the 

various  plans  of  campaign  adopted  in  the  different  epochs 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  623 

of  our  history,  either  for  invasion  or  defense;  the  origin 
of  successes,  the  cause  of  defeats How  our  fron- 
tiers have  been  defended  in  different  wars  by  great  cap- 
tains  It  would  be  necessary  to  learn  how  to 

profit  by  the  mistakes  which  have  caused  reverses,  and 
to  appreciate  the  dispositions  which  would  have  pre- 
vented them."* 

Let  us  follow  this  advice  and  revert  to  the  past,  to  the 

most  critical  period  in  our  history,  to  the  wars  of  the 
First  Republic. 

v.— Defense  of  Argonne  in  1792.— First  Invasion. 

In  the  beginning  of  this  year  our  soil  was  menaced  by 
the  foreigner,  and,  in  anticipation  of  hostilities,  the 
government  formed  four  armies.  On  the  20th  of  April 
it  was  forced  to  declare  war,  and  on  the  nth  of  July  to 
proclaim  the  country  in  danger. 

We  had  then: 

ist.  An  army  of  the  North,  under  Lafayette,  compris- 
ing two  forces;  the  first  in  North  18,000,  and  the  second 
on  the  Meuse  20,000  strong. 

2d.  An  army  of  the  East,  under  Liickner,  composed 
likewise  of  two  forces;  one  on  the  Moselle,  with  an 
effective  of  18,000  men;  the  other  in  Alsace,  containing 
40,000. 

Our  forces  thus  reached  96,000  men,  who  were  poorly 
equipped,  poorly  organized,  undisciplined,  and  without 
confidence  in  their  leaders.  They  were  distributed  en 
cordon  along  the   frontiers  from  Dunkirk  to  Hiiningen. 

The  Allies  had  placed  on  foot  an  army  of  160,000  men. 

Their  numerical  superiority  seemed  to  assure  success; 
but  they  did  not  know  how  to  profit  by  it,  and  instead 
of  acting  together,  separated  into  several  groups,  the 
three  principal  being: 

That  of  the  centre,  60,000  strong,  under  the  Duke  of 
Brunswick,  general-in-chief; 

*  General  Pierron. 


624  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

That  of  the  right,  composed  of  20,000  Austrians,  com- 
manded by  Clerfayt;  . 

That  of  the  left,  with  an  effective  of  16,000  men, 
under  the  Prince  of  Hohenlohe-Kirchberg. 

In  addition  there  were  20,000  Anstrians  in  the  Nether- 
lands; a  force  of  25,000  men  upon  the  Rhine;  and  12,000 
hnigi^es  scattered  among  these  different  bodies. 

The  plan  of  the  Allies  was  to  pierce  our  centre,  and 
to  march  upon  Paris  by  Verdun  and  Chalons. 

With  this  in  view,  the  principal  army,  composed  of 
Prussians,  Hessians,  and  emigres^  was  to  move  by  way  of 
Ivuxemburg  upon  Longwy  and  Verdun. 

The  right,  under  Clerfayt,  was  to  cross  the  Chiers,  be- 
tween Montmedy  and  Sedan,  drive  back  Lafayette's 
army,  which  covered  these  two  places,  pass  the  Meuse 
between  Verdun  and  Sedan,  and  march  upon  Paris  by 
Rheims  and  Soissons. 

The  role  assio-ned  to  the  left  was  to  cross  the  Moselle 
between  Thionville  and  Treves,  and  successively  attack 
the  former  place  and  Metz. 

On  the  30th  of  July,  these  forces  began  the  march, 
and  moving  with  extreme  slowness  toward  our  frontier, 
reached  it  only  after  the  lapse  of  twenty  days,  its  dis- 
tance from  Coblentz,  however,  being  but  forty  leagues. 

The  first  invasion  commenced  on  the  19th  of  August. 
On  the  23d  the  intimidated  garrison  of  Longwy  capitu- 
lated, and  the  ease  with  which  this  success  was  gained 
increased  the  enemy's  confidence.  At  this  moment  our 
Army  of  the  North  was  signally  lacking  in  cohesion.  It 
had  just  lost  its  leader,  Lafayette,  who,  not  approving 
of  the  events  of  the  loth  of  August,  had  been  forced  to 
leave  France.  He  had  not  yet  been  replaced;  and  had 
the  Allies  moved  with  celerity,  this  force  would  have  been 
overwhelmed.  It  would  have  been  easy  for  them  then 
to  have  conquered  Liickner,  and  thus  opened  the  road 
to  Paris.     But  they  preferred  to  direct  themselves  upon 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  625 

the  capital  first  of  all,  without  perceiving  what  they 
learned  later,  that  200,000  men  were  necessary  for  such 
an  enterprise:  100,000  to  march  upon  Paris,  and  two 
armies  of  50,000  each  to  observe  the  fortified  places  and 
hold  our  forces  in  check,  while  covering  the  lines  of 
communications. 

On  the  30th  the  army  arrived  in  front  of  Verdun,  A 
portion  of  the  population  and  the  garrison  having  raised 
a  cowardly  revolt  against  the  commandant,  Beaurepaire, 
who  wished  to  defend  the  place,  the  latter  killed  him- 
self, and  on  the  2d  of  September  the  city  was  taken. 
There  was  now  only  one  stronghold  remaining  between 
the  enemy  and  Paris. 

The  situation  was  grave,  and  the  deep  feeling  which 
it  aroused  throughout  France,  has  left  indelible  traces 
upon  her  history.  The  Government  changed  its  gener- 
als. Dumouriez  was  appointed  commander  of  the  Army 
of  the  North,  and  Kellermann  was  given  command  of 
the  Army  of  the  East  in  place  of  Liickner. 

Upon  reaching  his  headquarters  at  Sedan,  Dumouriez 
found  his  army  distrustful  and  ill-disposed. 

He  immediately  assembled  a  council-of-war  to  fix  upon 
a  plan  of  defense,  and  at  the  same  time  to  discover  the 
views  of  his  generals. 

The  situation  was  as  follows: 

The  Prussian  grand  army  occupied  Verdun. 

Clerfayt  was  at  Stenay  and  Juvigny. 

The  left,  under  Hohenlohe,  had  invested  Thionville. 

The  Hessians  held  Longwy. 

The  Duke  of  Saxe-Teschen  covered  the  Netherlands. 

Other  troops  protected  the  line  of  the  Rhine. 

Our  armies  were  separated  by  the  forces  of  the  Allies. 

Dumouriez  had  only   23,000  men  at  Sedan.     Beur- 
nonville,  Moreton,  and  Duval  were  encamped  at  Maulde, 
Maubeuge,  and  Lille  with  30,000  men.     Kellermann  was 
40 


626  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY, 

at  Metz  with  20,000;  Custine  at  Landau  with   15,000, 
and  Biron  in  Alsace  with  30,000.     {See  Plate  XXXJ/I.) 

After  considering  the  condition  of  affairs,  the  generals 
were  of  the  opinion  that  in  order  to  defend  the  territory 
it  would  be  advisable  to  fall  back  to  the  Marne,  oc- 
cupy a  strong  defensive  position  there,  intrench,  bring 
together  the  armies  of  the  North  and  Bast,  and  await 
reinforcements. 

This  was  the  opinion  of  men  who  had  lost  confidence  in 
themselves  and  in  their  troops — men  who  could  foresee 
nothing  but  defeat,  and  whose  spirits  had  already  given 
way  to  discouragement.  Dumouriez  alone  was  of  a  con- 
trary mind.  In  his  eyes  Argonne,  with  its  forests,  its 
marshes,  its  numerous  streams,  and  its  five  defiles, 
formed  a  good  line  of  defense.  The  important  point 
was  to  occupy  it  before  the  Prussians,  and  to  hold  it 
against  them. 

The  enterprise  was  not  easy.  Our  army  was  at  the 
northern  extremity  of  this  chain. 

It  was  essential  to  at  first  seize  the  passage  at  Les 
Islettes,  which  opened  the  road  to  Chalons,  and  that  at 
Grandpre,  which  controlled  the  road  to  Rheims. 

This  operation  required  a  march  of  twelve  leagues  in 
close  proximity  to  the  Prussians;  and  to  effect  it  Dumou- 
riez resolved  to  deceive  them  by  an  offensive  demonstra- 
tion upon  their  right.  He  entrusted  this  to  Dillon,  who, 
with  a  strong  division  of  8,000  men,  threw  himself  upon 
the  enemy's  outposts  at  Stenay,  pushed  them  back  be- 
yond the  Meuse,  and  then  moved  to  the  right  and  occu- 
pied La  Chalade  and  Les  Islettes  without  molestation. 

The  remainder  of  the  army  having  followed  this  move- 
ment, our  troops  found  themselves,  on  September  4,  in 
position  upon  the  chosen  line  of  defense. 

Dumouriez  held  the  defile  of  Grandpre  with  15,000 
men.  His  troops  camped  upon  the  heights  rising  in  the 
form  of  an  amphitheater  between  the  Aisne  and  the  Aire, 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  627 

the  left  at  Grandpr^,  the  right  at  Marcq,  the  front  and 
both  wings  covered  by  a  bend  in  the  Aire.  A  strong 
advanced-gnard  nnder  Miranda  and  Stengel  was  to  the 
east  of  the  Aire,  the  right  at  Saint-Jnvin,  the  centre  at 
Verpel,  the  left  toward  BefFu  and  L-e  Morthomme.  This 
position  was  immediately  surrounded  by  strong  intrench- 
ments.  It  was  strengthened  by  that  of  La  Croix-aux. 
Bois,  which  was  defended  by  1,000  infantry  and  300 
dragoons. 

Finally,  the  passage  at  Le  Chene-Populeux  was  de- 
fended by  Dubouquet,  with  a  division  recently  organ- 
ized at  Rheims,  which  contained  4,000  men  drawn  from 
the  Army  of  the  North  and  a  force  of  1,800  national 
guards.     Total  strength  of  forces  here,  about  30,000  men. 

At  the  same  time  Dumouriez  ordered  Kellermann  to 
rejoin  him  with  22,000  men  by  Ligny  and  Bar-le-Duc 
in  the  direction  of  Sainte-Menehould  ;  and  Beurnonville 
to  bring  him  16,000  men  from  the  Army  of  the  North  to 
Rethel,  and  proceed  thence  to  Grandpre. 

The  first  dispositions  consisted  then  in  concentrating 
the  bulk  of  the  disposable  troops  upon  the  line  of  de- 
fense, faced  toward  the  enemy's  positions,  and  occupying 
all  the  passages  in  force. 

These  measures  were  completed  by  creating  camps 
of  instruction  at  Chalons,  Rheims,  and  Meaux,  and 
by  sending  thither  all  reinforcements  drawn  from  the 
volunteers  of  Paris.  The  Government  calculated  thus 
upon  bringing  together  100,000  men  between  the  Prus- 
sians and  the  capital.  Finally,  on  all  sides  workshops 
were  established  to  accelerate  the  manufacture  of  arms 
and  equipments. 

Brunswick  having  learned  of  the  arrival  of  Dumouriez 
in  Argonne,  resolved  to  prolong  his  front  towards  Lan- 
dres  in  order  to  gain  our  left.  He  caused  demonstrations 
to  be  made  upon  Romagne  and  Briquenay.  Dumouriez, 
deceived  by  these  movements,  and  thinking  that  Grand- 


628  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

pre  alone  was  threatened,  reduced  his  forces  at  La  Croix- 
aux-Bois  to  lOO  men.  This  mistake  came  near  com- 
promising the  success  of  the  campaign. 

Clerfayt  perceived  the  error  and  captured  this  defile  on 
T2th  of  September.  He  thus  cut  our  forces  into  two 
parts,  and  threatened  our  communications.  Dumouriez 
immediately  ordered  General  Chazot  to  retake  La  Croix- 
aux-Bois  with  two  brigades,  reinforced  by  two  battalions, 
six  squadrons,  and  four  pieces. 

Chazot  attacked  on  the  14th,  and  was  successful.  But 
Clerfayt  having  turned  his  right  obliged  him  to  re-cross 
the  Aisne  at  Vouziers,  separated  him  from  Dumouriez, 
and  recaptured  the  position. 

At  the  same"  time  Dubouquet,  assailed  by  the  emigj^es 
at  Le  Chene-Populeux,  was  also  cut  from  Grandpre,  and 
thrown  back  upon  Attigny  and  Chalons. 

In  a  few  days  the  situation  had  become  critical.  Re- 
duced to  16,000  men,  turned  upon  his  left  flank  by 
25,000  Austrians,  and  threatened  in  front  by  40,000 
Prussians,  Dumouriez  had  lost  the  left  of  his  line  of 
defense,  and  ran  the  risk  of  seeing  himself  shut  up 
between  the  Aire  and  the  Aisne.  The  decision  which  he 
took  under  these  circumstances  was  most  remarkable. 

He  still  resisted  the  advice  to  retire  behind  the  Marne, 
convinced  that  the  effect  of  this  movement  would  be 
disastrous,  and  that  in  a  level  country,  the  Allies 
would  draw  great  advantage  from  their  numerical  super- 
iority, which  in  cavalry  was  especially  marked. 

The  French  commander  decided  to  abandon  the  Cha- 
lons road  to  the  Prussians,  and  seek  only  to  guard  his 
communications  with  Vitry,  hoping  thus  to  menace 
those  of  his  adversaries. 

Then,  without  loss  of  time,  he  ordered  Beurnonville, 
who  was  at  Rethel,  to  move  up  the  Aisne  to  Sainte- 
Menehould ;  Chazot  and  Dubouquet  to  follow  him  ; 
Dillon   to  defend   La  Chalade  and   Les    Islettes  to  the 


TrilRD   CIIAPTKR. — OPERATIONS.  629 

last  extremity,  and  threaten  the  enemy's  left  wing  by 
Passavant;  General  d'Harville,  who  was  organizing  the 
recruits  at  Rheims,  to  proceed  with  a  small  force  to 
Pont-Faverger,  upon  the  Suippe;  and  General  Sparre 
at  Chalons  to  move  out  to  the  east  of  this  place.  The 
arrival  of  reinforcements  of  national  guards  rapidly 
raised  the  last  two  commands  to  10,000  men  each. 
Finally,  he  iirged  Kellermann  to  hasten  his  march  and 
rejoin  him  as  soon  as  possible. 

These  dispositions  made,  Dumouriez  broke  camp  on 
the  night  of  the  14th,  in  very  bad  weather,  crossed  the 
Aisne,  reached  Autry,  and,  notwithstanding  the  alarm 
raised  by  the  enemy's  rear-guard,  ascended  the  river  as 
far  as  Sainte-Menehould,  where  he  took  position  cover- 
ing the  Chalons  road,  his  right  on  the  Aisne,  nearly 
opposite  Neuville-au-Pont;  his  front  upon  the  heights 
in  rear  of  the  villages  of  MafFrecourt,  Braux-Sainte- 
Cohiere,  Valmy,  and  Dampierre;  his  left  supported  near 
the  Auve  upon  ponds  situated  between  this  river  and  the 
Aisne.     {See  Plate  XXXVII.) 

The  want  of  activity  on  the  part  of  the  Prussians  gave 
Beurnonville  and  Kellermann  time  to  effect  a  junction; 
and  thus,  on  the  19th,  Dumouriez  had  70,000  combatants 
at  his  disposal. 

The  army  of  the  Allies,  convinced  that  we  were 
beating  a  retreat,  was  set  in  motion  on  the  18th,  de- 
bouched by  Grandpre  and  Vouziers,  reached  the  road 
from  Suippes  to  Somme-Bionne  with  its  advanced- 
guard  on  the  morning  of  the  20th,  and  a  short  time 
afterwards  that  from  Sainte-Menehould  to  Chalons. 

On  the  evening  before,  Dumouriez  had  assigned  Kel- 
lermann to  position  on  the  heights  of  Gizaucourt,  to  the 
left,  authorizing  him,  in  case  of  attack,  to  occupy  the 
minor  heights  of  Valmy,  beyond  the  Auve.  The  latter, 
executing  his  march  during  the  night  of  the  19th,  moved 
upon  Valmy,  inclining  thus  to  the  right,  and  neglecting 


630  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

the  heights  of  Gizaucourt  opposite  those  of  La  Lune,  of 
which  the  Prussians  were  already  taking  possession. 
On  the  following  day  he  saw  the  defects  of  his  position, 
which  exposed  him  to  the  danger  of  being  thrown  back 
upon  the  marshes  of  the  Auve  behind  Valmy,  and  asked 
Dumouriez's  support.  The  resulting  movement  led  the 
Prussians  to  believe  that  a  retrograte  march  in  the  direc- 
tion  of  Chalons  was  being  attempted,  and  decided  them 
to  attack. 

In  the  meantime  Dumouriez  had  directed  Stengel  with 
a  strong  division  upon  Mont-Yvron  to  support  Keller- 
mann's  right;  Beurnonville  with  16  battalions  to  sup- 
port him  in  rear;  Chazot  with  9  battalions  and  8  squad- 
rons upon  the  Chalons  road  to  occupy  Gizaucourt,  and 
cover  the  left;  and  finally  Leveneur  with  12  battalions 
and  16  squadrons  upon  Virginy,  Z7z«  Berzieux,  to  menace 
the  Allies'  left.  Kellermann  had  reinforced  the  centre  of 
his  position  at  Valmy  by  numerous  guns. 

A  first  engagement  took  place  near  Gizaucourt  be- 
tween the  advanced-guards.  Our  soldiers  were  obliged 
to  give  way  before  superior  numbers,  and  Gizaucourt 
was  occupied  by  the  Prussians. 

Toward  ten  o'clock  the  fog  having  cleared,  the  action 
became  general.  The  enemy's  army  formed  in  two 
lines,  made  three  successive  attacks  upon  our  positions, 
well  prepared  for  and  supported  by  three  batteries.  At 
first  our  lines  were  shaken  by  the  cannonade,  and  recoiled 
in  disorder;  but  they  were  soon  reformed,  while  the  re- 
serve horse-artillery,  supported  by  other  pieces  near  a 
mill  which  was  on  the  line,  replied  to  this  fire. 

Shortly  afterwards,  the  Prussian  columns  moving  in 
regular  order,  advanced  upon  the  heights  of  Valmy,  the 
left  directed  upon  the  village,  the  centre  upon  the 
mill,  the  right  being  in  echelon  in  rear.  Kellermann 
immediately  formed  his  troops  into  battalion  columns, 
and  leading  them  forward  with  the  cry  of  "  TJie  nation 
forever!''''  ordered  a  bayonet  charge. 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  631 

This  movement  decided  the  battle.  Before  onr  ofTen- 
sive,  the  heads  of  the  enemy's  cohimns  hesitated,  then 
halted,  and  finally  retired.  The  Duke  of  Brunswick, 
fearing  a  reverse,  had  ordered  a  suspension  of  the  attack. 
At  four  o'clock  he  resumed  the  offensive,  but  nothing 
came  of  it,  and  he  finally  returned  his  troops  to  their 
positions. 

The  action  was  ended;  the  Prussians  were  beaten. 
This  engagement,  insignificant  as  a  battle,  was  charac- 
terized by  a  noisy  cannonade  and  by  offensive  move- 
ments which  scarcely  outlined  the  jDrepared  plan  of 
attack.  It  cost  each  army  only  from  800  to  900  men. 
Its  results  were  nevertheless  considerable.  It  above  all 
heightened  the  confidence  of  our  troops,  while  destroy- 
ing that  of  our  adversaries.  Dumouriez  profited  by  it  to 
arouse  his  ranks  to  new  exertions.  He  rectified  Keller- 
mann's  position  during  the  same  evening,  assured  his 
communications  with  Vitry  and  Bar-le-Duc,  and  held 
himself  in  readiness  to  repulse  a  new  attack. 

At  the  same  time,  the  Prussian  scouts  -had  appeared 
in  the  vicinity  of  Rheims,  and  the  Government, 
alarmed,  implored  Dumouriez  to  return  toward  Chalons 
in  order  to  cover  the  capital.  But  far  from  allowing 
himself  to  be  disturbed,  he  replied  that  the  national 
guards  at  Rheims  were  sufficiently  numerous  to  repel 
the  uhlans,  and  that  he  would  not  leave  his  post  on 
account  of  a  few  petty  cavalry  attacks. 

I    have    the    advantage    of    position,"    he    wrote, 

whether  our  enemies  continue  to  advance,  retreat,  or 
give  battle." 

On  the  3otli  of  September,  indeed,  the  Prussians  de- 
cided to  retire.  Their  army  was  suffering  severely  from 
sickness  and  lack  of  food.  Moreover,  the  King  had 
just  learned  that  the  Russians,  profiting  by  the  situa- 
tion, had  entered  into  an  arrangement  with  Austria  for 
the  invasion  of  Poland. 


632  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 


The  retrograde  movement  began  on  October  i,  and 
was  carried  on  without  molestation.  It  was  for  a  long 
while  believed  that  this  was  due  to  a  secret  convention 
between  Dumouriez  and  the  Kins^  of  Prussia.  How- 
ever  this  may  be,  on  the  21st  of  October  our  territory 
was  freed  from  the  foreigner,  and  our -army  resumed 
possession  of  the  places  that  had  previously  been  lost. 

Comments. — The  defense  of  Argonne,  idealized  by  leg- 
end, has  been  compared  with  that  of  Thermopylse,  and 
in  the  popular  mind  this  campaign  appears  as  a  heroic 
struggle  in  wooded  defiles  which  the  Prussians  had 
vainly  tried  to  force. 

The  truth  concerning  it  is  now  well  understood,  and 
it  remains  to  place  a  proper  estimate  upon  its  different 
incidents. 

The  study  of  the  defensive  operations  of  Dumouriez, 
taken  as  a  whole,  embraces  the  choice  of  a  position,  its 
occupation,  its  defense,  and,  finally,  the  results  of  the 
conflict. 

The  choice  of  position  has  set  in  clear  light  the  energy 
and  decision  of  the  commander,  who  persisted  in  his 
combination,  notwithstanding  the  contrary  advice  of  his 
generals.  His  idea  was  simple:  to  occupy  the  first 
natural  obstacle  lying  in  the  way  of  the  enemy,  and 
await  his  attack.  Dumouriez' s  skill  consisted  in  taking 
this  resolution,  notwithstanding  the  proximity  of  the 
opposing  army,  in  profiting  by  the  inaction  of  the  latter, 
and  in  employing  a  dexterous  manoeuvre  to  mask  the 
flank  movement  which  he  was  obliged  to  execute. 

But  the  first  occupation  of  the  line  of  defense  was 
defective.  It  was  not  possible  for  the  feeble  French 
force  to  hold  more  than  50  kilometres.  It  was  contrary 
to  principles  to  attempt  to  defend  all  the  passages;  and 
in  lieu  of  this,  simple  posts  of  observation  should  have 
been  established,  so  managed  as  to  furnish  seasonable 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  633 

notice  of  the  approach  of  the  enemy,  and  strong  enough 
to  oppose  sufficient  resistance  to  compel  his  deployment, 
and  thus  give  time  for  the  reserves  to  arrive.  The 
latter  should  have  occupied  a  central  position  in  rear, 
and  a  principal  reserve  should  have  been  so  established 
as  to  be  able  to  move  rapidly  to  any  threatened  point, 
in  order  that  the  enemy  might  be  struck  with  all  the 
disposable  forces. 

History  has  giveil  great  importance  to  the  evacuation 
of  the  defile  of  La  Croix-aux-Bois.  This  was  indeed  fol- 
lowed by  grave  consequences;  but  it  is  certain  that  one 
of  the  five  passages  of  the  Argonne  could  have  been 
forced  at  any  time,  if  the  enemy  had  concentrated  his 
efforts  there,  after  having  made  the  customary  demon- 
strations upon  other  points. 

Considered  in  this  light, the  central  position  taken  at 
the  outset  by  Dumouriez,  although  naturally  strong,  was 
less  advantageous  than  it  seemed  at  first  view.  It  could 
be  easily  turned,  and  as  has  been  said,  in  this  case  ex- 
posed the  forces  occup3nng  it  to  the  most  serious  dangers. 

It  was  quite  otherwise  with  the  combination  adopted 
by  the  Republican  general  when  he  moved  from  Grand- 
pre  to  Sainte-Menehould.  We  cannot  help  admiring 
the  high  qualities  of  the  warrior,  who,  seeing  himself 
outflanked,  threatened  upon  his  rear,  separated  from  a 
portion  of  his  troops,  and  importuned  to  beat  a  retreat, 
yet  preserves  his  coolness,  concentrates  his  forces,  steals 
away  by  a  night  march,  and  takes  up  a  good  defensive 
position  upon  the  flank  of  his  adversary's  line  of  opera- 
tions, at  the  same  time  changing  his  own  line  of  com- 
munications. 

The  cannonade  of  Valmy  showed  our  young  troops 
that  even  upon  the  defensive,  it  is  by  offensive  move- 
ments that  success  is  assured. 

As  to  the  operations  following  this  action,  they  were 
so  feebly  conducted  that  an  accusation  of  treason  has,  in 


634  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

consequence,  rested  upon  the  memory  of  the  victor. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  we  should  have  taken  the  offen- 
sive on  the  day  following  Valmy,  beaten  the  Prussians 
a  second  time,  pursued  them  without  relaxation,  antici- 
pated them  at  the  defiles,  then  at  the  bridges  of  the 
Meuse,  and  completed  our  success  by  decisive  results. 

But  yet,  France  was  saved,  and  after  the  terrors  which 
she  had  experienced,  every  one  rejoiced  to  extol  the 
conduct  and  the  talents  of  a  general  who  had  repelled 
the  invasion. 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  topography  of  the^  Argonne 
was  not  dissimilar  to  that  of  the  Vosges  in  1870,  and 
that  in  a  certain  measure,  a  system  of  defense  such  as 
Dumouriez  adopted,  could  properly  have  found  applica- 
tion at  the  commencement  of  our  last  campaign. 

In  the  years  following  Valmy,  the  Vosges  region  be- 
came our  theatre  of  defense,  and  our  soldiers  fought 
upon  the  same  points  as  in  1870.  The  defensive  opera- 
tions of  this  period  are,  however,  but  little  known. 
Habitual  success  upon  the  offensive  has  caused  them  to 
be  overlooked.  It  is  therefore  proper  to  return  to  them 
to-day,  and  seek  lessons  from  a  past  which,  though 
glorious,  was  not  entirely  exempt  from  mistakes. 

VI.— Defense  of  France  in  1793  and  1794. 

Campaign  of  1793. — In  this  year,  there  was  no  concord 
in  the  defensive  operations  of  our  armies.  It  was  the 
period  of  great  national  confusion.  Our  movements  were 
noted  for  their  feebleness,  and  also  unfortunately  for  the 
repulses  to  which  they  led.  Our  forces  were  scattered, 
and  not  in  condition  to  support  each  other.  We  suc- 
cessively lost  Mayence,  Valenciennes,  and  the  Palatinate. 

But  on  the  14th  of  iVugust,  Carnot  was  placed  at  the 
head  of  military  affairs,  and  immediately  impressed  upon 
them  an  impulsion  which  marked  him  as  a  man  of  wis- 
dom and  determination. 


THIRD   CHAPTKR. — OPKRATIONS.  635 

"The  most  simple  means,"  he  wrote  at  that  time  to 
the  Committee  of  General  Defense,  "of  making  art  sup- 
ply the  place  of  numbers,  so  far  as  may  be,  is  to  make 
a  war  of  masses,  that  is  to  say,  to  always  direct  upon  the 
points  of  attack  the  greatest  possible  number  of  men 
and  pieces  of  artillery,  to  require  the  generals  to  be  con- 
stantly at  the  head  of  their  troops  in  order  to  give  them 
examples  of  devotion  and  courage,  and  to  habituate  both, 
to  make  no  account  of  the  numbers  of  the  enemy,  but  to 
fall  suddenly  and  forcibly  upon  him  with  the  bayonet, 
without  thinking  of  making  a  contest  of  fire-arms, 
or  of  executing  manoeuvres  in  which  the  French  troops 
of  the  present  time  have  not  been  in  any  sense  exer- 
cised." 

Our  military  situation,  while  not  being  compromised, 
had  yet  at  this  time  absolute  need  of  an  enlightened  di- 
recting power. 

In  the  North,  the  Allies  had  divided  their  troops  and 
were  besieging  our  frontier  fortresses.  Their  efforts  on 
this  side  were  not  of  a  nature,  however,  to  awaken  our 
fears. 

In  the  East,  Mayence  having  succumbed  on  the  25th 
of  July,  after  an  honorable  defense,  our  armies  of  the 
Moselle  and  the  Rhine,  which  had  entered  the  Palati- 
nate, were  obliged  to  fall  back  upon  the  Sarre  and  the 
Lauter.  Their  effective  still  reached  60,000  men.  A 
camp  had  been  established  at  Neu-Hornbach  to  connect 
these  two  armies;  but  their  leaders,  left  to  themselves 
and  discouraged,  manoeuvred  separately  and  without 
reference  to  any  common  plan.  The  Prussians  under 
Brunswick  operated  against  the  Army  of  the  Moselle, 
and  the  Austrian  contingents  under  Wiirmser  were  op- 
posed to  the  Army  of  the  Rhine.  Together  these  two 
generals  had  100,000  combatants  at  their  disposal;  but, 
fortunately  for  us,  there  was  no  harmony  in  their  opera- 
tions, and  they  lost  precious  time  in  trifling  combats 
which  remained  without  results. 


636  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

On  October  13,  upon  the  order  of  the  delegates  of  the 
Convention,  the  troops  at  the  Hornbach  camp  took  the 
offensive  and  marched  upon  Pirmasens,  a  strong  cen- 
tral position  which  connected  the  two  principal  Allied 
armies. 

This  attempt  was  made  by  one  division  against  su- 
perior forces  upon  unfavorable  ground,  which  limited 
the  action  of  our  troops.  The  latter,  turned  by  both 
flanks,  were  routed  after  a  loss  of  4,000  men  and  22 
pieces. 

This  defeat  was  followed  by  grave  consequences;  it 
became  necessary  to  abandon  the  Hornbach  camp  and 
the  Wissembourg  lines.  The  Army  of  the  Rhine  retired 
upon  Saverne,  and  that  of  the  Moselle  upon  Sarre- 
guemines.  The  Allies  were  able  to  seize  Haguenau  and 
to  bombard  Landau,  while  a  plot  was  formed  to  deliver 
Strasburg  into  their  hands. 

Upon  receipt  of  this  news,  the  Committee  of  Public 
Safety  nominated  Hoche  to  the  command  of  the  Army 
of  the  Moselle,  and  Pichegru  to  that  of  the  Army  of  the 
Rhine,  ordering  them  to  raise  the  siege  of  Landau. 
This  combination  violated  the  principle  of  unity  in  com- 
mand, and  our  two  armies,  acting  separately,  were  in 
the  beginning  of  the  campaign  to  see  their  chances 
of  success  materially  diminish. 

After  his  victory  at  Pirmasens,  Brunswick  moved 
upon  Bitche;  but  not  succeeding  in  taking  it,  he  retired 
as  far  as  Kaiserslautern,  in  order  to  assume  an  advan- 
tageous position  and  one  suitable  for  the  cantonment  of 
his  troops.     {See  Plate  XXIV.) 

Hoche  having  received,  toward  the  middle  of  Novem- 
ber, the  reinforcements  which  he  was  awaiting  (eight 
battalions  furnished  by  the  department  of  the  Ardennes), 
moved  forward  from  the  Sarre  on  the  17th,  with  35,000 
men,  to  take  the  offensive.  His  project  was  to  attack 
Brunswick,  defeat  him,  and  then  move  quickly  to  the 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  637 

right  in  order  to  deliver  Landau  and  threaten  the  coni- 
mnnications  of  Wiirmser,  who  was  in  Alsace.  But  he 
lost  several  days  in  marches  and  countermarches  while 
seeking  and  reconnoitering  the  enemy. 

Finally,  on  the  28th,  he  directed  three  attacks  upon 
the  fortified  positions  which  Brunswick  occupied  near 
Kaiserslautern.  These  poorly  planned  and  disconnected 
attacks  miscarried.  Hoche  renewed  them  on  the  29th 
and  30th  without  success.  On  the  latter  day,  Bruns- 
wick succeeded  in  repulsing  our  columns  and  flanking 
our  left.  He  then  took  the  offensive  in  his  turn,  and 
obliged  Hoche  to  retreat;  and  notwithstanding  the  ex- 
haustion of  our  troops,  they  reached  Zweibriichen  and 
Horn  bach  in  good  order,  thanks  to  Brunswick's  inaction. 

The  Committee  of  Public  Safety,  appreciating  the 
energy  and  tenacity  of  the  new  general,  encouraged  him 
instead  of  removing  him  from  command.  This  confi- 
dence permitted  him  to  redeem  himself  and  to  immedi- 
ately repair  his  defeat. 

"Hoche,"  says  Jomini,  "convinced  that  his  efforts  to 
save  Landau  by  the  Kaiserslautern  route  would  be  inef- 
fectual, promptly  changed  his  plan,  and  results  showed 
the  wisdom  of  his  new  designs. 

"  Seeing  that  his  position  extended  very  much  beyond 
Wiirmser' s  right,  and  that  the  Army  of  the  Moselle,  re- 
duced to  the  defensive  upon  the  western  slope  of  the 
Vosges,  would  be  better  employed  by  acting  in  concert 
with  the  Army  of  the  Rhine  against  the  Imperial  army, 
upon  the  eastern  slope,  he  decided  to  send  General 
Taponier  there  immediately  with  his  own  and  the 
Bitche  division,  forming  together  a  force  of  12,000  men. 

"  However  wise  the  direction  given  these  forces,  this 
was  only  a  half  measure  and  a  simple  restitution  of  the 
reinforcements  previously  drawn  from  this  army.  We 
are  left  in  ignorance  of  the  motives  which  restrained 
Hoche  from  moving  his  entire  army  upon  Woerth,  since 


638  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

the  places  along  the  Sarre  and  the  Moselle  were  suffi- 
cietly  garrisoned,  and  by  leaving  seven  or  eight  thousand 
men  at  Sarrebruck  to  cover  his  principal  line  of  com- 
munications with  Metz,  he  would  have  been  able  to 
march  at  least  25,000  men  into  the  valley  of  Reichs- 
hoflfen. 

"  What  could  Brunswick  have  accomplished  upon  the 
Sarre  while  80,000  Frenchmen  were  crushing  Wiirmser 
between  Haguenau  and  Wissembourg? 

"Such,  no  doubt,  was  the  plan  of  the  Committee  in 
writing  Hochetojoin  Pichegru;  but  it  made  the  mistake 
of  only  suggesting  instead  of  ordering  the  manoeuvre." 

In  the  meantime  our  Army  of  the  Rhine,  urged  by 
the  delegates  of  the  Convention,  had  also  taken  the 
offensive  and  had  obliged  Wiirmser  to  fall  back  upon 
Haguenau,  where  he  re-established  his  line  behind 
the  Zintzel  and  the  Moder,  from  Reichshoffen  to  Bisch- 
willer.  The  attacks  of  our  troops,  commenced  on  the 
1 8th  of  November,  were  renewed  with  obstinacy  on  the 
24th  and  the  26th,  and  the  ist  of  the  following  month. 
On  the  next  day,  the  2d,  began  a  general  struggle  to 
dislodge  the  Austrians,  which  was  continued  on  the  4th 
and  8th.  Our  troops  had  yet  obtained  but  trifling  ad- 
vantages when  Taponier  debouched  by  Niederbronn, 
with  his  two  divisions  on  the  8th. 

The  struggle  re-commenced  on  the  14th  and  15th,  but 
our  efforts,  being  poorly  combined,  were  again  unavail- 
ing. Finally,  on  the  i8th,  profiting  by  the  bad  weather, 
which  made  the  enemy  hesitate  in  his  offensive  projects, 
Generals  Taponier  and  Hatry  succeeded  in  forcing  a 
part  of  his  positions,  between  Niederbronn  and  Froesch- 
willer.  Hoche,  moreover,  was  to  arrive  in  time  to  com- 
plete the  victory.  He  appeared  on  the  22d  with  three 
divisions,  attacked  General  Hotze  at  Reichshoffen, 
Frceschwiller,  and  Woerth,  captured  several  redoubts 
equipjDed  with  twenty  guns,  as  well  as  the  heights  of 


THIRD   CHAPT?:r. — OPERATIONS.  639 

Liebfraiienberg,  and  obliged  Wiirmser,  two  days  after- 
wards, to  retire  behind  the  Lanter. 

Hoche  then  assnmed  the  duties  of  commander-in- 
chief,  and,  although  the  Austrians  had  finally  succeeded 
in  brinoiiio-  their  movements  into  closer  connection  with 
the  operations  of  the  Prussians,  he  soon  pushed  them 
beyond  the  Wissembourg  lines,  then  forced  them  to 
raise  the  siege  of  Landau,  and  finally  compelled  them 
to  recross  the  Rhine. 

This  campaign  ended,  then,  by  brilliant  successes  on 
the  part  of  our  armies. 

Comments. — The  events  which  distinguished  the  latter 
part  of  the  year  1793  were  not  only  a  triumph  for  Hoche, 
but  also  a  brilliant  consecration  of  the  efforts  of  Carnot. 
On  the  whole,  the  latter  limited  himself  to  prescribing 
everywhere  an  active  defense,  avoidance  of  isolated  ac- 
tions, concentration  of  the  forces  upon  decisive  points, 
and  the  attack  of  the  enemy  in  such  a  way  as  to  menace 
his  communications.  The  combinations  adopted  were 
conformable  to  principles,  and  proved  that  by  well  or- 
dered Qiovements,  a  force  beaten  in  the  commencement 
of  the  year  1793  could,  at  the  end,  defeat  its  conquerors. 

The  attempt  made  upon  Pirmasens  in  October  would 
have  led  to  the  happiest  results,  if  it  had  been  under- 
taken with  sufficient  forces.  It  was,  indeed,  an  opera- 
tion similar  to  those  which  afterwards  distinguished  the 
campaigns  of  Napoleon. 

Our  columns,  starting  from  a  central  position  in  the 
Vosges,  followed  an  interior  line,  and  sought  to  divide 
the  enemies'  masses  in  order  to  overcome  them  ifi  suc- 
cession. But  to  succeed  in  this,  a  numerical  superiority 
was  required,  first  of  all  at  the  point  of  attack,  and  then 
over  the  particular  army  assailed. 

Hoche' s  repulse  at  Kaiserslautern  shows  the  import- 
ance of  this.     Aided   by  the  disposable  troops   of  the 


640  PART   FIRST. — STRATKGY. 

Army  of  the  Rhine,  the  chances  would  have  been  favor- 
able to  beat  the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  and  then  to  over- 
whelm Wiirmser.  Alone,  he  could  only  display  his 
activity  and  give  proofs  of  his  high  military  qualities. 

But  when  he  moved  into  Alsace  to  join  the  Army  of 
the  Rhine,  leaving  the  places  on  the  Sarre  to  be  held  by 
simple  garrisons,  he  drew  to  his  side  all  the  chances  of 
success.  Finally,  it  would  be  unjust  to  forget  that  at 
this  period  nothing  equalled  the  ardor  and  tenacity  of 
our  soldiers.  Beaten  one  day,  they  yet  attacked  the 
next.  Victory  must  sooner  or  later  come  to  recompense 
such  courage. 

The  system  adopted  at  this  epoch  for  the  defense  of 
the  Vosges,  thus  consisted,  we  see,  in  a  concentration 
of  the  disposable  forces  upon  a  central  position,  and  the 
assumption  afterwards  of  an  energetic  offensive  against 
the  opposing  army,  in  such  a  direction  as  to  threaten  its 
communications.  The  result  of  the  campaign  demon- 
strates the  wisdom  of  these  measures. 

But  we  should  not  forget  that  the  division  of  the 
forces  of  our  enemies,  the  dissensions  among  the  lead- 
ers, and  their  want  of  activity,  contributed  powerfully 
to  our  success.  With  an  enterprising  and  resolute  ad- 
versary, one  knowing  how  to  act  in  the  midst  of  dis- 
united forces,  Hoche  must  have  been  beaten  before 
having  had  time  to  effect  a  junction  with  Pichegru. 

Campaign  of  1794. — At  the  commencement  of  this  year, 
our  armies  of  the  North  and  East  were  operating  beyond 
the  frontiers,  and  under  conditions  quite  different  from 
those^which  characterized  the  campaign  of  the  preced- 
ing year.  Pichegru  had  taken  the  offensive  upon  the 
Meuse,  and  had  conquered  Belgium.  He  was  seconded 
upon  the  right,  between  Namur  and  Maestricht,  by 
Jourdan,  who  commanded  the  Army  of  Sambre-et-Meuse. 
On  this  side  we  were  soon  to  reach  the  line  of  the  Rhine. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  64I 

In  the  East,  in  the  middle  of  the  year,  our  Army  of 
the  Moselle  found  itself  distributed  on  both  sides  of  the 
Vosges  from  Sarrebrnck  to  Landau,  watching  the  move- 
ments of  the  Prussians,  who  extended  as  far  as  Germers- 
heim. 

In  July,  the  Committee  of  Public  Safety  ordered  the 
resumption  of  the  offensive.  Hoche  was  no  longer 
there,  and  the  operations  gave  evidence  of  the  fact.  A 
first  attempt  executed  upon  the  entire  Allied  front,  on 
July  2,  was  without  result.  Our  forces  had  not  been 
concentrated,  and  as  a  consequence,  the  attacks  were 
partial  and  isolated. 

Upon  the  advice  of  Carnot,  it  was  resolved  to  act  with 
greater  unity;  to  seize  the  dominating  heights  of  the 
Vosges  in  the  centre  of  the  enemy's  positions,  and  sep- 
arate thus  the  two  Allied  armies,  defeating  them  in  suc- 
cession. This  plan,  which  originated  with  Desaix,  then 
a  general  of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine,  was  to  prove  suc- 
cessful. While  the  right  wing  held  the  Austrians  on 
the  plain,  the  left  vigorously  attacked  the  troops  of 
Hohenlohe  upon  the  heights  of  Annweiler,  seized  these 
positions  and  forced  the  Prussians  back  upon  Mannheim. 

The  Army  of  the  Rhine  then  took  post  upon  the 
Speierbach,  while  the  Army  of  the  Moselle  seized  Treves 
and  then  returned  to  occupy  positions  in  the  centre  of 
the  Palatinate,  which  gave  it  command  of  the  country. 

Owing  to  these  successes  and  to  those  which  we  had 
just  gained  in  the  North,  our  armies  in  November  found 
themselves  masters  of  the  line  of  the  Rhine  from  Basle 
to  the  sea. 

The  period  of  defense  was  now  at  an  end.  Our  sol- 
diers, in  their  turn,  were  going  to  carry  the  war  into  the 
enemy's  territory,  and  until  1814,  we  were  not  again  to 
see  the  foreigner. 

At  this  latter  epoch,  the  defense  of  the  country  was 
attended  by  altogether  different  circumstances.     These 

41 


642  PART  FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

are  generally  well  known,  and  it  will  therefore  be  suffi- 
cient to  make  a  concise  statement  of  the  combinations 
which  assured  our  successes,  and  the  mistakes  which 
led  to  our  reverses. 

VII. — Defense  of  France  in  1814.— Second  Invasion, 

On  the  2ist  of  December,  1813,  the  Allied  armies 
again  crossed  the  Rhine,  and  the  second  invasion  began. 
The  formidable  forces  of  our  different  enemies  were 
divided  as  follows: 

Armies  of  Silesia,  Bohemia,  and  tiie  North 340,000  men. 

Contingents  of  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine  .    .    .    .  140,000  — 

Prussian  and  Austrian  reserves 160,000  — 

Anglo-Dutch  forces  operating  in  Belgium 25,000  — 

Austrian  army  in  Italy,  and  Murat's  army 100,000  — 

Siege  corps  for  places  on  the  Elbe  and  the  Oder    .    .    .  120,000  — 

Anglo-Spanish  armies 140,000  — 


ToTAi^ 1,025,000  men. 

The  weak  forces  at  Napoleon's  command  were  dis- 
tributed in  the  following  manner  to  resist  these  armies: 

Defense  of  the  Rhone  basin  (Augereau) 12,000  men. 

Defense  of  the  Rhine  from  Basle  to  Strasburg  (Victor)  12,000  — 
Defense  of  the  Rhine  from  Strasburg  to  Mayence  (Mar- 

mont) 10,000  — 

Defense  of  the  Rhine  from  Mayence  to  Coblenz  (Ney)  iS,ooo  — 
Defense  of  the  Rhine  from  Coblenz  to  Nimeguen  (Mac- 

donald) 13,000  — 

Defense  of  Belgium  (Maison) 12,000  — 

Armies  of  Italy  and  Spain 150,000  — 

Total 227,000  men. 

In  reality,  the  foreigner  was  about  to  invade  France 
with  500,000  men,  and  we  did  not  have  80,000  with 
which  to  meet  him.  Nevertheless,  Napoleon  boldly 
determined  to  repel  the  Allies,  and  displayed  a  resolution 
worthy  of  the  critical  circumstances. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  643 

It  was  not  alone  the  size  of  the  forces  of  our  enemies 
which  made  the  defense  difficult,  but  the  choice  of  lines 
of  invasion  also  contribnted  to  this  end.  From  the 
sources  of  the  Oise  to  those  of  the  Rhine,  all  the  high- 
roads were  to  be  occupied  by  the  enemy,  and  it  became 
impossible  to  cover  so  extended  a  line  of  frontier  with 
the  feeble  effectives  at  our  disposal.  Moreover,  time 
was  wanting  in  which  to  bring  together  in  the  East  the 
troops  still  dispersed  on  every  side — in  Germany,  Italy, 
and  Spain. 

The  gravity  of  the  situation  was  indicated  by  Napo- 
leon himself  in  the  following  terms: 


u 


Paris,  January  12,  18 14. 


(1 


It  appears  that  General  Biilow  is  at  Breda  with  a 
division  of  English  militia  and  a  cavalry  corps.  The 
aim  of  this  force  is  either  to  overrun  Belgium  or  to  take 

Antwerp It    appears    that  General    Bliicher, 

with  the  Army  of  Silesia,  has  debouched  by  Coblenz, 
moved  to  Luxemburg,  shelled  Sarrelouis,  crossed  the 
Sarre  at  Sarrebruck,  and  is  marching  upon  Metz.  .    . 

A  third  corps  has  advanced  by  way  of  Basle It 

is  apparent  then  that  the  enemy  is  preparing  three 
principal  attacks: 

"One  by  his  Army  of  the  North 

'The  second  by  the  Army  of  Silesia 

■The  third  by  the  Grand  Army,  commanded  by 
Prince  Schwarzenberg,  composed  of  the  corps  of  Giulay, 
Klenau,  Lichtenstein,  Colloredo,  and  Wrede,  and  the 
Russian  army  under  Wittgenstein." 

After  comparing  the  forces  of  the  Coalition  with  his 
own,  Napoleon  explains,  in  the  following  manner,  the 
defensive  combinations  which  seemed  to  him  to  corre- 
spond to  the  exigencies  of  the  moment. 

Defense  of  France. — "The  Duke  of  Taranto,  with  the 


ill 

u  > 


644  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

ist  Cavalry  Corps  and  all  the  other  troops  he  can  bring 
together,  is  to  move  npon  Liege  and  Charlemont  and 
threaten  General  Bliicher's  right  flank,  while  at  the 
same  time  guarding  the  Mense.  ,  This  marshal,  with 
General  Sebastiani,  should  be  able  to  bring  together 
10,000  men  with  40  guns,  and,  if  the  enemy  should 
march  upon  Paris,  he  could  arrive  there  before  him. 

"The  Duke  of  Ragusa  should  have  about  15,000 
troops  of  all  arms. 

"The  Duke  of  Belluno,  about  12,000  troops  of  all 
arms. 

"Finally,  the  Duke  of  Treviso,  who  is  at  Langres, 
about  12,000  troops  of  all  arms. 

"These  four  bodies,  after  retarding  the  enemy  and 
disputing  the  ground  should  he  make  a  decided  march 
upon  Paris,  will  be  able  to  precede  him  there  and  take 
up  a  position  in  his  front,  where  they  will  be  joined  by 
60,000  men — the  Guard  and  others.  We  shall  thus  have 
100,000  troops  around  Paris,  with  the  addition  of  20,000 
militia;  and  finally  there  will  be  in  Paris  in  reserve  suffi- 
cient arms  for  30,000  men. 

"We  shall  thus  be  able,  toward  the  middle  of  Feb- 
ruary, to  gather  an  army  of  120,000  men  before  the  cap- 
ital, and  at  the  same  time  have  a  garrison  of  30,000  men 
in  the  place  itself. 

"  In  every  view  of  the  case,  suitable  measures  of  pre- 
paration should  be  adopted,  and  under  no  circumstances 
should  the  thought  of  abandoning  Paris  be  entertained. 

"  It  is  necessary  then  to  locate  all  the  depots  between 
Paris  and  the  Loire,  so  that  they  may  be  completed  at 
Paris;  all  the  cadres  for  the  troops  of  the  military  equi- 
page trains,  and  also  the  artillery  material,  in  order 
that  we  may  have  a  great  superiority  over  the  enemy  in 
this  arm. 

"Discreet  engineer  officers  should  make  reconnais- 
sance of  all  the  heights  to-  be  occupied  around  Paris,  as 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  645 

well  as  the  bridges  of  tlie  Seine  and  the  Marne,  and 
should  study  the  proper  position  to  be  taken  by  the 
army.  By  this  means  the  militia  at  Paris,  with  sixty 
pieces,  would  be  able  to  assure  the  city;  the  militia  at 
Saint-Cloud  and  Versailles,  the  bridges  of  Saint-Cloud 
and  Sevres;  the  militia  at  Meaux,  the  Meaux,  Corbeil, 
and  other  bridges. 

"Resume. — To  make  no  preparation  to  quit  Paris,  but 
if  necessary,  perish  beneath  its  ruins. 

"To  direct  the  cadres  from  the  fortified  places  upon 
Paris,  in  order  to  fill  up  the  ranks  with  the  conscripts 
due  in  181 5,  and  all  others  who  may  arrive,  so  that  there 
will  remain  in  these  places  only  one  battalion  cadre  for 
each  800  men. 

"To  forward  to  Paris  all  the  men  designed  for  the 
places  of  the  Moselle  and  the  Ardennes;  and  to  establish 
at  Paris  large  workshops  for  the  manufacture  of  cloth- 
ing and  equipments,  so  that  great  numbers  of  men  may 
be  fitted  out  there. 

"To  bring  together  at  Paris  a  thousand  pieces  of 
ordnance,  two  or  three  hundred  thousand  rounds  of 
artillery  ammunition,  and  eight  or  ten  million  cart- 
ridges. As  soon  as  the  Committee  of  Defense  has  pre- 
sented its  defensive  project  for  Paris,  and  the  Emperor 
has  adopted  it,  there  will  no  longer  be  inconvenience  in 
accumulating  war  material  there. 

"The  same  thing  must  be  done  at  L-yons,  on  a  smaller 
scale:  declare  that  the  enemy  shall  never  enter  the  city, 
form  there  a  committee  of  defense,  draw  a  hundred 
guns  from  Toulouse  and  Toulon,  and  take  other  corres- 
ponding measures. 

"As  soon  as  the  plan  is  adopted,  the  Emperor  will 
make  it  known,  in  order  to  give  an  impulse  to  the  nation, 
and  that  each  one  may  be  convinced  that  every  necessary 
measure  will  be  adopted  for  the  defense  of  Paris  and 
Lyons. ' ' 


646  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

On  the  whole,  the  project  of  Napoleon  consisted  in 
renouncing  the  defense  of  the  frontier,  in  having  all  the 
distant  detachments  move  slowly  upon  Paris,  and  in 
assembling  all  his  disposable  forces  in  a  central  position. 

The  defense  of  France  was  then  to  be  centered  around 
Paris  and  I/yons.  This  combination  had  the  inconveni- 
ence of  abandoning  a  vast  territory  to  the  invaders;  but 
Napoleon  regarded  this  measure  as  a  necessity  exacted 
by  circumstances.  He  counted,  moreover,  upon  the 
resistance  of  the  capital  and  upon  the  patriotism  of  the 
provinces  to  lead  the  people  to  rise  in  rear  of  the  enemy 
as  soon  as  he  had  inflicted  a  defeat  upon  the  latter. 

While  these  dispositions  were  making,  the  invaders 
were  pressing  rapidly  forward. 

By  the  end  of  January,  the  Army  of  the  North,  formed 
of  the  corps  of  Biilow  and  Winzingerode,  had  re-taken 
Holland,  traversed  Belgium,  and  pushed  back  Mac- 
donald  by  Aix-la-Chapelle  and  Liege  upon  Namur. 
{See  Plate  XXXVIII.) 

The  Army  of  Silesia,  after  passing  the  Rhine  be- 
tween Mannheim  and  Coblenz,  had  invested  Mayence, 
and  directed  its  left  upon  Nancy. 

The  centre  had  obliged  Marmont  to  retire  to  the  Sarre, 
and  then  to  the  Moselle,  where  he  put  himself  into  com- 
munication with  Ney  and  Victor,  who  on  their  part  had 
been  repulsed. 

Schwarzenberg's  right,  under  Wittgenstein,  had 
crossed  the  Rhine  at  Brisach,  and  traversed  Alsace  and 
the  Vosges.  Victor  had  attempted  to  stop  it  at  Kpinal 
and  Saint-Die;  but  too  weak  to  effect  his  object,  had 
fallen  back  upon  Nancy,  where  he  joined  Ney.  Both 
then  retired  behind  the  Meuse  to  Vaucouleurs. 

The  centre  of  the  Allied  Grand  Army  had  advanced 
by  way  of  Neuchatel  upon  Besan9on,  Auxonne,  Dijon, 
and  Langres. 

Mortier,  at  the  head  of  a  division  of  the  Guard,  had 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  647 

endeavored  to  dispute  the  possession  of  lyangres  with 
this  army;  but  being  inferior  in  numbers,  had  been 
forced  to  evacuate  the  place  and  to  retire  upon  Chau- 
mont,  then  upon  Bar-sur-Aube,  and,  after  a  bloody  en- 
gagement, upon  Troyes. 

The  left,  commanded  by  Bubna,  had  advanced 
through  Switzerland,  occupied  the  Jura,  and  gained  the 
Saone. 

The  design  of  these  movements  was  to  effect  a  union 
of  the  forces  of  Schwarzenberg  and  Bliicher  upon  the 
Marne,  and  then  to  move  them  together  upon  Paris. 

It  is  well  known  how  Napoleon,  having  rallied  his 
marshals  at  Chalons  and  Vitry,  commenced,  between 
the  Seine  and  the  Marne,  that  series  of  brilliant  ma- 
noeuvres which  was  to  arrest  the  enemy  for  two  months 
and  to  inflict  such  severe  defeats  upon  him. 

On  January  27,  Bliicher's  centre,  being  isolated  from 
the  other  bodies,  was  beaten  at  Saint-Dizier. 

On  the  29th,  Bliicher,  attacked  at  Brienne,  was  forced 
to  retire  to  Bar-sur-Aube,  but,  nevertheless,  effected  a 
junction  with  Schwarzenberg  on  the  31st. 

On  the  following  day,  February  i,  Napoleon  fought 
the  desperate  battle  of  La  Rothiere,  with  36,000  men 
and  no  guns,  against  132,000  Prussians  supported  by 
280  guns.  Beaten,  he  retreated  upon  Troyes,  to  await 
a  favorable  opportunity,  which  the  armies  of  the  Allies 
were  not  slow  in  offering  him. 

Believing  that  they  had  destroyed  the  last  of  our 
forces,  these  armies  separated  within  a  few  days  after 
this  battle,  and  moved  upon  Paris  by  two  distinct  lines 
of  operations,  through  the  valleys  of  the  Marne  and  the 
Seine. 

Napoleon,  assuring  his  communications  with  the  cap- 
ital, stationed  himself  between  these  two  masses,  and 
successively  destroyed  three  corps  of  the  Army  of  Silesia: 
at  Champaubert  on  the  loth  of  February;  at  Montmi- 


648  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

rail  on  the  iitli;  at  Chateau-Thierry  on  the  12th;  and 
at  Vauchamps  on  the  14th. 

Retiring  then  in  order  to  unite  his  troops  with  those 
of  Victor  and  Oudinot,  whom  Schwarzenberg  had  thrown 
back  upon  the  Yeres,  he  resumed  the  ofiensive  against 
the  Russians  and  Austrians,  and  inflicted  upon  them  a 
succession  of  defeats, — at  Mormans  on  the  17th  of  Febru- 
ary, Montereau  on  the  i8th,  and  Mery  on  the  21st, — 
which  forced  them  back  upon  Bar-sur-Aube. 

In  the  meantime  Bliicher  had  rallied  his  corps  and 
moved  upon  Meaux.  He  was  with  great  difficulty 
checked  by  Mortier  and  Marmont,  who  succeeded,  how- 
ever, in  finally  pushing  him  upon  L^a  Ferte-sous-Jouarre, 
then  beyond  the  Marne,  and  in  stopping  him  upon  the 
Ourcq,  after  two  desperate  combats. 

Napoleon,  at  this  juncture,  left  Troyes  in  order  to 
rejoin  his  two  marshals,  by  Sezanne  and  La  Ferte- 
Gaucher,  and  ordered  the  resumption  of  the  offensive 
against  Bliicher,  who  retired  in  disorder  upon  Soissons. 
He  thought  to  throw  the  latter  back  upon  the  Aisne,  and 
destroy  his  army  under  the  walls  of  this  city;  but  the 
place,  being  poorly  commanded,  capitulated. 

This  act  of  weakness  on  the  part  of  the  commandant  of 
Soissons  decided,  perhaps,  the  fate  of  the  campaign.  It 
permitted  the  Army  of  Silesia,  already  vanquished  and 
decimated,  to  unite  with  the  Army  of  the  North,  which 
had  just  reached  Soissons,  and  thus  to  arrest  Napoleon's 
pursuit.  The  latter  was  then  obliged  to  modify  his  de- 
signs. He  sought  to  turn  the  left  of  the  new  force  before 
him,  and  threaten  its  communications  with  Belgium. 

Notwithstanding  his  numerical  inferiority,  he  defeated 
it  at  Craonne  on  the  7th  of  March,  and  pursued  it  as  far 
as  Laon,  where  he  was  forced  to  renounce  the  idea  of  tri- 
umphing with  30,000  young  soldiers  over  100,000  of  the 
enemy,  established  in  an  impregnable  position.  ]\Iar- 
mont,  upon  whom  he  had  relied  to  turn  this  position. 


THIRD   CIIAPTRR. — OPERATIONS.  649 

having  been  overcome  by  superior  forces  and  obliged  to 
re-cross  the  Marne,  the  Emperor  fonnd  himself  com- 
pelled, as  has  been  said,  to  give  up  all  thoughts  of  dis- 
lodging the  enemy  from  Laon.  He  moved  then  towards 
the  Marne  by  Rheims,  which  he  captured  from  a  Rus- 
sian division.  He  remained  at  this  place  for  a  short 
time  to  give  his  troops  much-needed  repose.  In  taking 
this  direction,  Napoleon  still  retained  the  power  of  ma- 
noeuvring upon  an  interior  line,  and  of  separately  striking 
whichever  of  the  enemy's  groups  exposed  itself  first  to 
his  blows.     Such  an  occasion  soon  presented  itself. 

Upon  learning  of  his  retreat  to  Rheims,  Schwarzen- 
berg,  who  for  ten  days  had  not  dared  to  pass  beyond 
Troyes,  resumed  his  march,  on  the  14th,  toward  Arcis- 
sur-Aube;  but  the  announcement  of  Napoleon's  approach 
was  sufficient  to  cause  him  to  fall  back  as  far  as  Brienne. 

After  six  weeks  spent  in  constant  struggles,  our  ene- 
mies were  but  little  farther  advanced  than  when  first 
reaching  the  Marne.  Unfortunately  for  us,  they  now 
became  aware  of  the  feebleness  of  our  effectives  and  the 
defects  of  their  own  combinations,  and  resolved  to  unite 
the  armies  of  Silesia  and  Bohemia,  and  then  resume  the 
movement  upon  Paris. 

The  rendezvous  was  to  be  Chalons  or  Vitry.  Schwar- 
zenberg  moved  in  this  direction  by  way  of  Arcis,  where 
Napoleon  arrested  him,  disputing  the  passage  of  the 
Aube.  Our  army  however  was  forced  to  retire  before 
the  largely  outnumbering  forces  of  the  enemy. 

Thenceforth  the  situation  underwent  a  change  ;  the 
Emperor  could  not  continue  his  system  of  defense  with- 
out being  shut  in  between  the  two  opposing  armies,  each 
with  a  telling  superiority  of  numbers.  His  victories, 
moreover,  had  begun  to  exhaust  him. 

It  was  then  that  he  conceived  the  audacious  project  of 
moving  by  Saint-Dizier  to  the  upper  Meuse,  assembling 
there  all  the  reinforcements  that  could  be  drawn  from 


650  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

the  garrisons  of  Lorraine  and  Alsace,  stirring  up  the 
population,  and  finally  cutting  the  enemy's  communica- 
tions. 

This  movement  was  commenced  on  March  22;  but  an 
intercepted  dispatch  betrayed  it  to  the  x'Vllied  sovereigns. 
The  latter,  confident  in  their  strength,  contented  them- 
selves with  leaving  a  corps  of  observation  in  front  of 
Napoleon,  without  modifying  the  direction  of  their 
march.  The  union  of  their  forces  had  now  the  effect  of 
separating  him  from  Marmont  and  Mortier. 

He  was  obliged  therefore  to  renounce  his  new  combi- 
nation and  assemble  the  remains  of  his  forces  at  Troyes, 
in. order  to  move  upon  the  left  bank  of  the  Seine,  and 
endeavor  still  to  dispute  possession  of  his  capital. 

Unfortunately  it  was  too  late.  Hardly  had  he  reached 
Fontainebleau  when  Paris  capitulated.  He  thought 
then  of  transferring  the  defense  to  the  Loire,  and  assem- 
bling there  the  troops  of  Soult,  Suchet,  Augereau,  and 
Prince  Eugene,  forming  thus  a  force  of  150,000  men 
with  which  to  manoeuvre  among  the  frontier  places 
against  the  communications  of  the  Allies,  until  they 
were  forced  to  retrace  their  steps. 

But  by  occupying  Paris,  they  had  broken  his  power. 
His  will  was  no  longer  recognized  as  supreme  in  the 
State.  The  campaign  was  ended.  The  offensive  of  the 
foreign  armies,  seconded  by  an  overwhelming  numerical 
superiority,  had  triumphed  over  the  most  skillful  defen- 
sive manoeuvres. 

Comments. — This  brief  statement  of  the  events  of  1814 
will  enable  us  to  estimate  the  causes  of  the  final  result 
of  this  campaign.  It  also  gives  us  an  opportunity  to 
judge  of  Napoleon's  methods  of  defense. 

He  has  been  blamed,  in  the  first  place,  with  having 
fallen  into  an  error  for  which  he  sometimes  reproached 
his  marshals — the  scattering  of  his  troops  into  isolated 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  65I 

groups  Upon  the  frontier.  But  when  his  correspondence 
is  read,  when  the  facts  of  the  case  have  been  thoroughly 
studied,  it  will  be' seen  that  this  measure  was  demanded 
by  circumstances.  How,  indeed,  could  he  have  had 
time  to  assemble  his  depot  troops,  the  divisions  in 
Spain,  and  the  feeble  resources  at  his  disposal,  if  he  had 
not  retarded  the  invasion  by  opposing  to  it  the  remain- 
ing fragments  of  the  old  armies?  It  was  the  situation 
existing  during  the  first  days  of  1814  which  undoubt- 
edly inspired  the  combinations  actually  adopted.  We 
may  to-day  sum  up  the  measures  adopted  for  the  defense 
of  France  in  this  inauspicious  year  as  follows: 

The  abandonment  to  the  enemy  of  the  frontier  zones 
and  the  lines  of  defense  found  there; 

The  slow  and  concentric  retreat  of  the  corps  of  obser- 
vation posted  upon  the  frontier; 

The  assemblement  of  the  forces  upon  a  central  posi- 
tion between  the  frontier  and  the  capital; 

Offensive  manoeuvres  upon  an  interior  line  of  opera- 
tions against  any  of  the  enemy's  corps  which  can  be 
assailed  with  advantage; 

Continual  and  energetic  attacks  upon  the  weakest 
points  presented  by  the  adversary; 

Rousing  the  inhabitants  of  the  country  in  the  enemy's 
rear; 

And  attempts  made  to  cut  his  communications. 

It  was  an  essentially  active  defense,  and  would 
probably  have  been  successful  had  it  not  been  for  the 
disproportionate  forces. 

VIII.-Third  Invasion,  1815. 

In  the  following  year  occurred  the  third  invasion. 
This  was  a  period  more  terrible  still.  The  defense  of 
France  was  limited  to  the  adoption  and  partial  execution 
of  certain  measures  and  to  two  battles,  one  of  which 
ended  in  victory,  the  other  in  disaster. 


652  PART  FIRST. — STRATEGY, 

In  connection  with  the  subject  we  are  considering,  the 
campaign  of  1815  offers  us  another  example  of  an  active 
defense.  The  initiative  of  the  movements  was  taken  by 
Napoleon  upon  his  northern  frontier;  and  everything 
leads  us  to  believe  that,  notwithstanding  his  feeble 
means,  he  would  once  more  have  been  successful  but 
for  a  tactical  error  which  deprived  him  of  an  entire  corps 
at  a  decisive  moment. 

As  to  the  measures  prescribed,  it  will  be  of  service  to 
recall  them.  Independent  of  the  organization  of  the 
forces,  they  comprise  : 

The  creation  of  three  committees  charged  with  organ- 
izing the  defense  of  the  Rhine  from  Landau  to  Hiiningen, 
then  of  the  Vosges,  and  finally  of  the  Jura  and  the  Alps, 

The  construction  of  fortifications  upon  all  the  frontier 
passages. 

The  protection  of  these  works  by  the  militia  on  the 
frontier. 

The  creation  of  four  armies:  of  the  North,  the  Moselle, 
the  Rhine,  and  the  Alps;  and  of  three  observation  corps 
for  the  Jura,  the  Var,  and  the  Pyrenees. 

The  preparation  for  defense  of  Langres,  Dijon,  Mau- 
beuge,'  La  Fere,  Soissons,  Chateau-Thierry,  Saint- 
Quentin,  Laon,  Rheims,  etc. 

The  formation  of  independent  bodies  in  the  frontier 
departments  designed  to  operate  upon  the  enemy's  rear, 
in  order  to  intercept  convoys,  couriers,  and  all  stray 
men. 

The  absorption  into  the  army  of  the  militia  of  the 
interior. 

The  occupation  of  a  position  in  lower  Alsace,  and 
another  near  Longwy,  Thionville,  or  Sarrebruck, — 
these  to  be  connected  by  Bitche. 

Finally,  the  defensive  organization  of  Paris  and  Lyons, 

These  measures  were  supplemented  by  instructions  in 
which  the  following  details  were  set  out: 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  653 

''''Instructions  for  the  geiterals  for  the   defense  of  the 
l''osges^  the  Argonne^  the  fura^  and  the  Alps. 


(( 


Paris,  May  9,  1815. 


<<, 


Cases  may  arise  in  which  the  Vosges  may  become 
a  retreat  for  the  Army  of  the  Rhine,  and  there  may  be 
others  in  which  they  may  threaten  the  rear  of  the  Army 
of  the  Moselle.  I  am  waiting  until  the  character  of  the 
war  to  be  waged  is  more  fully  determined.  The  same 
holds  true  regarding  the  forest  of  Argonne. 

"But  it  is  important  that  for  both  these  positions 
engineer  and  artillery  officers  be  charged  with  reconnoit- 
ering  and  fortifying  all  the  defiles. 

"General  Girard  should  then  personally  see  to  putting 
the  Vosges  in  a  state  of  defense;  General  Vandamme 
should  do  the  same  regarding  Argonne;  General  Rapp 
should  give  his  attention  to  the  establishment  of  re- 
doubts and  fortified  points  along  the  Rhine;  and  General 
Lecourbe  proceed  in  like  manner  respecting  Belfort  and 
all  the  passages  of  the  Jura,  etc. ' ' 

^'' Instructions  for  the  generals  commanding  territorial 
sections  and  the  militia. 

"Paris,  May  12,  1815. 
"The  lieutenant-generals  commanding  military  di- 
visions will  not  shut  themselves  up  in  fortified  places, 
each  of  which  should  have  its  own  commandant;  but 
it  is  designed  that  they,  together  with  the  marshals 
commanding  departments,  etc.,  hold  themselves  always 
within  the  limits  of  the  military  division,  taking  what- 
ever position  may  be  designated  by  the  general-in-chief, 
in  siich  a  way  as  to  hold  the  territory  to  the  last,  and  to 
remain  in  condition  to  rouse  the  inhabitants,  and  to 


654  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

otherwise  retard  the  progress  of  the  enemy  as  much  as 
possible. ' ' 


The  idea,  then,  was  to  conduct  the  defense  always 
and  everywhere  with  the  greatest  possible  activity, 
energy,  and  obstinacy.  Unfortunately,  the  defeat  at 
Waterloo  rendered  these  efforts  of  no  avail.  Neverthe- 
less, the  principles  which  were  to  serve  as  a  guide  for 
the  defense  of  the  country  were  clearly  defined,  and 
under  similar  cirsumstances,  we  had  only  to  apply  them. 
It  remains  to  be  seen  how  far  this  was  done  in  1870, 
in  this  still  more  unfortunate  period,  when,  after  six 
months  of  reverses,  France  was  forced  to  see  two  of 
her  most  precious  provinces  wrenched  from  her,  and  to 
submit  to  Prussian  occupation  for  four  years  following 
the  invasion. 

IX. — Defense  of  France  in  1870-71.— Fourth  Invasion. 

At  the  beginning  of  this  campaign,  the  idea  of  acting 
upon  the  defensive  was  not  entertained.  It  was  forced 
into  view  after  the  defeats  of  August  6,  and  found  itself 
confronted  by  a  defective  concentration  which  was  to 
exercise  a  fatal  influence  upon  the  course  of  events. 

We  have  seen  that  this  distribution  of  our  forces  in 
isolated  groups  upon  a  frontier  of  260  kilometres  [161 
miles]  was  the  result  of  neglecting  first  principles,  of  a 
false  estimate  of  the  duration  of  the  German  concentra- 
tions, and  of  an  absolute  error  regarding  the  merits  of 
the  mode  of  calling  out  our  reserves. 

We  have  also  seen  that  this  distribution  led  to  the 
successive  disorganization: 

At  Wissembourg  of  a  division  of 8,000  men. 

At  Froeschwiller  of  a  corps  of 45, 000    — 

At  Spicheren  of  a  corps  of 30,000    — 

And  to  the  demoralization  of  two  corps,  the  5th  and  7th, 

about 50,000    — 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  655 

It  was  thus  the  ruin  of  an  army  of  133,000  men. 

What  great  advantage  might  these  forces  have  been 
to  us,  had  they  been  properly  assembled! 

Unfortunately,  when  the  necessity  for  remaining  on 
the  defensive  became  apparent,  it  combined  itself,  in  the 
mind  of  Napoleon  III,  with  political  considerations,  no 
doubt  legitimate,  but  yet  unfortunate  for  the  army. 
From  this  resulted  the  project  of  falling  back  upon  Cha- 
lons, of  concentrating  the  disposable  forces  there,  and  of 
relinquishing  without  further  struggle  the  lines  of  the 
Vosges,  of  the  Moselle,  and  of  the  Meuse  and  the 
Argonne.  As  in  1814,  the  defense  of  Paris  seemed  to 
dominate  every  other  consideration.  But  the  circum- 
stances were  different ;  the  project  referred  to  was  aban- 
doned, and,  while  the  sovereign  was  moving  in  the 
direction  of  the  capital,  the  Army  of  Metz  was  left  upon 
the  Moselle  to  follow  its  own  course. 

Supported  by  an  entrenched  camp  which  formed  a 
double  bridge-head,  covered  by  a  line  of  defense,  with  a 
force  of  170,000  veterans  commanded  by  brave  and  exper- 
ienced leaders,  this  army  had  before  it  a  wide  and  bril- 
liant field  for  the  combinations  of  an  active  defense.  In 
keeping  up  its  communications  with  the  interior,  it  was 
sure  to  be  provided  with  reinforcements  and  supplies. 
In  attacking  the  enemy  with  vigor  and  obstinacy  and 
with  all  available  forces,  upon  one  or  the  other  bank  of 
the  Moselle,  it  was  certain  of  inflicting  sensible  loss  upon 
him  and  of  arresting  his  progress.  Being  free  to  select 
its  own  ground  and  to  choose  the  time  of  delivering 
battle,  it  might  have  aspired. to  success. 

But  it  confined  itself  to  a  passive  defense.  From  this 
followed  the  indecisive  battles  of  August  14  and  16,  our 
defeat  of  the  i8th,  the  investment  of  our  intrenched 
camp  at  Metz,  a  state  of  helplessness,  a  failure  in  our 
supplies,  and  lastly  capitulation. 

In  the  meantime  a  second  army  assembled  at  Chalons 


656  ^     PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

and  moved  thence  upon  Sedan.  In  appearance  this  was 
an  active  defense,  but  in  reality  the  majority  of  the 
soldiers  composing  this  army  had  not  for  some  time  been 
in  condition  to  take  the  field  at  all,  much  less  to  think 
of  attacking  the  enemy.  To  rejoin  Bazaine  while  avoid- 
ing the  German  forces  seemed  the  single  end  held  in  view; 
and  this  was  a  passive  role — a  role  no  doubt  enforced  by 
circumstances,  but  one  which  could  lead  only  to  a 
catastrophe. 

Up  to  the  defeat  at  Sedan  and  the  fall  of  Metz,  the 
system  of  defense  adopted  was  then  without  possible 
results,  for  it  violated  the  principle  of  concentration  of 
forces,  and  was  influenced  by  political  questions  at  the 
critical  moment  when  military  considerations  should 
have  been  all-controlling;  it  neglected  every  combina- 
tion of  active  resistance,  and  limited  itself  to  passive 
defense,  before  an  enemy  full  of  confidence  and  resolu- 
tion; and  finally,  it  prescribed  the  initiative  only  for  the 
purpose  of  attempting  an  operation  upon  an  exterior, 
excentric  line,  while  superior  hostile  masses  were  upon 
the  flank  and  rear  of  the  operating  army. 

After  the  fall  of  the  Empire,  the  defense  of  France 
centred  in  the  defense  of  Paris,  and  the  first  thought  of 
the  military  authorities  was  to  assemble  there  all  dis- 
posable contingents.  This  was  still  the  reverse  of  an 
active  defense. 

The  capital,  indeed,  was  about  to  be  invested,  and  to 
assemble  an  army  there  was  to  deprive  it  of  the  power 
of  movement. 

Napoleon  said  in  1815:  "Active  troops  should  not 
shut  themselves  up  in  fortified  places,  but  should  take 
up  such  positions  as  shall  permit  them  to  hold  the  terri- 
tory for  the  longest  possible  period,"  etc.  In  order  to 
retain  possession  of  the  forts  of  Paris,  it  should  have 
been  sufficient  to  employ  there  only  garrison  troops  and 
well-commanded  militia  with  siege  guns. 


THIRD    CHAl'TKR. — OPICRATIUNS.  657 

The  investment,  perhaps,  could  never  have  been  com- 
pleted, if  the  active  forces  in  Paris  had  kept  the  field. 

The  role  of  an  intrenched  camp  has  always  been  to 
serve  as  a  point  of  support  in  an  active  defense.  The 
neglect  of  this  principle  was  an  error,  and  one  aggra- 
vated by  the  determination  to  retain  the  seat  of  govern- 
ment there.  The  presence  of  the  latter  was  to. augment 
the  passivity  of  the  defense,  and  was  in  neglect  of  this 
lesson  of  experience,  that  a  besieged  city  is  only  a  fortress, 
which  should  have  but  a  single  chief,  a  military  com- 
mander furnished  with  the  absolute  powers  demanded 
by  a  state  of  siege. 

In  Paris,  the  application  of  this  rule  was  a  necessity, 
and  the  troops  shut  up  for  the  defense  of  the  city  should 
have  been  drawn  from  the  body  of  its  population.  A 
mass  of  two  million  souls  should  be  capable  of  self- 
defense,  not  only  behind  breastworks,  but  in  the  open 
field.  In  1870,  the  people  of  Paris  displayed  so  much 
good-will,  energy,  and  even  heroism,  that  the  most 
favorable  results  might  have  been  expected  from  their 
efforts  and  their  resistance.  Did  they  not,  without 
complaint,  submit  to  sufferings  which  raised  the  daily 
death-rate  to  6,000? 

The  principle  of  active  defense,  however,  had  its  sup- 
porters, and  it  was  under  their  impulsion  that  the 
attacks  of  Chatillon,  Champigny,  and  Buzenval  were 
made.  The  generals  who  so  fearlessly  exposed  them- 
selves to  danger  during  these  unfortunate  actions,  and 
who  led  their  improvised  soldiers  upon  the  German 
positions,  were  the  first  to  comprehend  the  obligation 
imposed  by  the  circumstances  of  the  case;  but  their 
efforts  were  unavailing  against  the  tactical  methods  of 
the  enemy,  which  were  better  suited  to  the  requirements 
of  modern  war.  This  is  a  question  to  be  examined  fur- 
ther on. 

While  Paris  was  opposing  a  resistance  to  the  enemy's 
42 


658  PART   FIRST.  — STRATEGY. 

forces  worthy  of  a  better  fate,  the  provinces,  aroused  by 
Gambetta's  proclamation,  dedicated  their  sons  and  all 
their  resources  to  the  service  of  their  country. 

Two  combinations  presented  themselves,  wrote  the 
War  Delegate — to  move  rapidly  to  the  East  and  endeavor 
to  cut  the  enem3''s  communications,  or  to  march  upon 
Paris.  This  was  a  return  to  active  defense,  and  opera- 
tions of  this  nature,  skillfully  prepared  and  directed  to 
a  common  end,  might  give  some  hope  of  success. 

Several  considerations,  however,  presented  themselves 
to  modify  these  projects.  With  the  untempered  levies  at 
command,  it  was  deemed  imprudent  to  attack  the  army 
of  Frederick  Charles,  which  had  just  triumphed  at  Metz; 
and  by  directing  the  troops  of  the  new  formation  toward 
the  Bast,  it  was  feared  that  Bourges  would  be  uncovered, 
and  also  Tours,  the  seat  of  the  Delegation. 

It  was  necessary  then  to  confine  the  efforts  of  this 
force  to  an  offensive  movement  upon  the  capital.  This 
resolution  taken,  one  portion  of  the  disposable  quota  was 
assembled  to  the  south  of  the  Loire,  hastily  organized, 
moved  upon  Blois,  and  thence  upon  Gien,  and  from  the 
latter  place  upon  Paris,  turning  by  both  wings  the 
Bavarian  corps  which  occupied  Orleans. 

If  the  principles  of  active  defense  were  observed,  the 
same  cannot  be  said  of  those  relating  to  concentration  of 
forces,  and  the  use  of  a  single  line  of  operations.  Never- 
theless the  numerical  superiority  of  our  young  army  was 
such  that  even  these  mistakes  were  not  sufficient  to  pre- 
vent a  success,  although  rendering  it  less  decisive. 

After   the  victory  of  Coulmiers,   General    d'Aurelle, 
notwithstanding   his  energy,   returned    to    the    plan   of 
passive    defense.     The    destitution    of    his    troops,    the 
feebleness  of  his  organization,  and  the  approach  of  Fred- 
erick Charles  influenced  his  determination. 

From  this  time  the  defense  in  the  provinces  was  lim- 
ited to  struggles  upon  the  Loire,  and  to  the  organization 
of  isolated  centres  of  resistance  in  the  North  and  East. 


THIRD   CITAPTER. — OPKRATIONS.  659 

After  the  recapture  of  Orleans  on  the  loth  of  Decem- 
ber, by  tlie  forces  of  Frederick  Charles,  it  seemed  that 
the  confidence  of  our  leaders  diminished.  The  project 
of  a  direct  march  upon  Paris  was  abandoned. 

The  Army  of  the  Loire,  instead  of  reforming,  was 
divided  into  two  parts,  one  designed  to  cover  Bourges, 
and  the  other  to  draw  the  victorious  enemy  toward  the 
West. 

The  Delegation  returned  to  the  idea  of  making  an  at- 
tempt upon  the  enemy's  communications,  combined 
with  the  project  of  attacking  the  siege  corps  at  Belfort. 
Thus  while  in  the  North  a  small  army,  skillfully  com- 
manded, executed  various  independent  movements  upon 
the  active  defense,  while  Chanzy's  army  in  the  West 
found  it  necessary  to  retreat,  the  15th,  i8th,  and  20th 
Corps  were  re-formed  and  directed  toward  the  East,  first 
of  all  to  re-take  Dijon  with  the  assistance  of  Garibaldi 
and  Cremer,  then  to  unite  with  the  Bressole  troojDS  com- 
ing from  Lyons  and  to  march  in  a  body  upon  the 
Werder  Corps  which  covered  the  siege  of  Belfort. 

This  was  undoubtedly  an  active  defense,  but  it  did 
not  take  into  consideration  conditions  of  time  and  place; 
it  made  cities  the  objectives;  instead  of  at  once  directing 
a  movement  upon  the  enemy's  masses,  it  decided  upon 
an  extended  march  toward  the  East,  without  preparing 
sufficient  means  of  supply  and  transport.  In  a  word,  it 
was  not  properly  contrived,  and  the  rigors  of  the  season 
in  a  difficult  country  were  sufficient  to  exhaust  the  forces. 

The  defeat  of  the  Army  of  the  East  has  been  attributed 
to  the  lack  of  order  and  rapidity  in  the  transportation  of 
its  troops  by  rail.  That  this  defect  existed  is  true;  but 
it  is  doubtful  if,  with  a  more  perfect  execution,  the  ex- 
pedition could  have  reached  more  favorable  results. 
Our  young  soldiers  had  conquered  at  Villersexel  and 
Chenebier;  this  was  doing  a  great  deal.  Yet,  from  a 
defensive  point  of  view,  was  the  raising  of  the  siege  of 
Belfort  the  first  end  to  be  attained  ? 


66o  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

On  the  other  hand,  should  the  generous  eflforts  put 
forth  by  the  armies  of  the  North,  the  Loire,  and  the  East 
have  remained  isolated?  These  questions  naturally  pre- 
sent themselves  when  we  study  the  history  of  the  last 
war. 

Upon  the  whole,  the  lessons  which  it  contains  may  be 
gathered  even  from  the  rapid  glimpses  already  given. 

This  war  presents  : 

At  the  outset^  a  general  neglect  of  the  principles  of 
concentration :  after  the  first  defeats^  the  failure  of  our 
Alsace  forces  to  retire  upon  their  supports;  the  abandon- 
ment by  the  Army  of  Metz  of  the  defense  of  the  Moselle, 
the  forfeiture  of  its  lines  of  retreat  and  its  freedom  of 
movement;  the  adoption  by  the  Army  of  Chalons  of  a 
faulty  direction,  without  protection  for  its  flanks  and  its 
communications;  in  a  word,  a  passive  defense  unex- 
ampled in  history:  in  the  second  part  of  the  war^  a  return 
to  the  principles  of  an  active  defense;  but  in  the  midst 
of  the  most  generous  efforts,  the  commission  of  new 
offenses  against  the  principles  relating  to  concentrations, 
to  simultaneity  of  efforts,  to  the  choice  of  lines  of  opera- 
tions, objectives,  etc. 

One  of  the  most  skillful  generals  of  the  National  De- 
fense, Chanzy,  had  vigorously  protested  against  these 
methods,  and  advocated  combined  action  on  the  part  of 
all  our  forces  against  the  armv  of  investment.  But  these 
movements,  directed  from  bases  situated  at  the  four  car- 
dinal points,  would  still  have  lacked  that  connection 
which  Napoleon  recommended  as  an  essential  condition 
of  success. 

These  considerations  give  us  an  idea  of  the  value  of 
our  defense  in  1870,  from  a  strategical  point  of  view. 
We  shall  see  later  that  these,  however,  were  not  the  sole 
cause  of  our  defeats,  and  that  our  tactical  methods  had 
perhaps  the  greater  part  in  the  continuity  of  our  re- 
verses. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  66l 

The  history  of  our  national  defense  is,  as  we  see,  full 
of  precious  instruction.  But  it  does  not  stand  alone  in 
this  regard.  Other  peoples  have,  like  us,  been  reduced 
to  the  defensive,  and  their  operations  also  afford  useful 
lessons  of  experience. 

In  this  connection,  the  struggles  of  Austria  in  1866 
merit  an  attentive  examination.  At  this  peripd,  her 
armies  made  two  defensive  campaigns,  which  led  to 
very  different  results. 

That  in  Italy  gave  rise  to  combinations  which  have 
already  been  considered. 

It  remains  to  examine  that  in  Bohemia. 

X. — Defense  of  Bohemia  in  1866. 

We  have  already  noticed,  in  referring  to  the  Austrian 
pi'-ojet  of  operations  in  1866,  the  military  condition  of 
this  power  at  the  beginning  of  March.  Although  war 
was  inevitable,  diplomatic  relations  between  the  future 
belligerents  were  still  maintained. 

Each  hoped,  in  acting  thus,  to  throw  upon  his  adver- 
sary the  responsibility  for  the  events  now  preparing. 
This  situation  led  to  the  assembling  of  a  council  of  war 
at  Vienna,  charged  with  considering  the  line  of  conduct 
to  be  pursued  relative  to  preparations  for  approaching 
hostilities.  The  resolutions  adopted  by  this  council  had 
such  an  influence  upon  the  operations,  that  it  is  proper 
to  recall  them. 

ist.  The  defensive  was  adopted  on  account  of  polit- 
ical considerations. 

2d.  The  concentration  of  the  Army  of  the  North  was 
to  take  place  in  Moravia  and  not  in  Bohemia,  because 
it  was  supposed  that  Prussia,  being  better  organized, 
would  be  able  to  penetrate  Bohemia  before  the  assem- 
blements  were  completed. 

3d.  The  I.  Corps,  already  in  Bohemia,  was  to  remain 


662  PART   FIRST. — STRATKGY. 

there,  in  order  to  connect  with  the  Saxon  army,  and 
the  ist  Light  Cavalry  Division  was  added  to  it. 

4th.  The  I.  Corps,  the  Saxon  Corps,  and  the  Cavalry 
Division  were  to  fall  back  upon  the  principal  army,  in 
case  the  enemy  entered  Bohemia  in  force. 

5th.  In  the  course  of  the  operations,  the  Bavarian 
army  was  to  unite  with  the  Austrian  army  near  Hof  and 
Erfurth. 

6th.  Finally,  the  VIII.  Federal  Corps  was  ordered  to 
concentrate  at  Mayence,  to  defend  the  Frankfort-May- 
ence  line. 

While  the  council  was  yet  in  session,  the  mobilization 
began. 

Mobilization  of  the  Army  of  the  North. — This  operation, 
decided  upon  before  the  rupture  of  diplomatic  relations, 
was  effected  in  three  periods. 

The  first,  from  March  2d  to  April  12th,  had  reference 
only  to  the  increase  in  the  garrisons,  especially  at  Vienna, 
Cracow,  and  Prague. 

The  second,  from  April  12th  to  25th,  was  marked  by 
the  mobilization  of  the  Army  of  the  South  and  the  field 
artillery. 

The  third,  from  April  26th  to  June  8th,  witnessed  the 
mobilization  of  the  Army  of  the  North,  the  organization 
of  the  war  effectives,  and  the  creation  of  the  fifth  bat- 
talions. 

This  mobilization,  in  reality,  continued  for  three 
months,  and  was  of  the  same  character  as  ours  in  1870, 
that  is  to  say,  the  reservists  were  directed  upon  the 
points  of  concentration  whither  their  regiments  had  been 
moved. 

This  tardiness  in  passing  from  the  peace  to  the  war 
footing,  was  not,  however,  the  cause  of  the  adoption  of 
the  defensive. 

The  mobilization  was,  indeed,  commenced  sufficiently 


THIRD   CIIAPTICR. — OPERATIONS.  663 

soon  to  have  permitted  the  assumption  of  the  offensive, 
if  this  had  been  desired. 

Concentration. — According  to  the  decree  directing  the 
formation,  the  Army  of  the  North  was  to  comprise  seven 
army  corps  and  five  cavalry  divisions.  {See  Plate 
XXXIX.) 

The  tables  relative  to  the  movements  were  dispatched 
to  the  different  authorities  on  the  nth  of  May. 

On  the  20th  the  transport  began. 

On  the  8th  of  June  it  was  ended,  all  the  corps  being 
completed,  and  assembled  upon  the  following  points  : 

1st  Corps Prague. 

2d  Corps Zwittau. 

3d  Corps Briinn. 

4th.  Corps Miiglitz. 

6th.  Corps Prerau. 

8tli  Corps Auspitz. 

loth  Corps Blansko. 

The  ist  Division  of  Light  Cavalry  was  at  Prague  with  the  ist  Corps. 
The  2d  Division  of  Light  Cavalry  was  at  Freudenthal. 
The  1st  Division  of  Reserve  Cavalry  was  at  Prossnitz. 
The  2d  Division  of  Reserve  Cavalry  was  at  Kremsier. 
The  3d  Division  of  Reserve  Cavalry  was  at  Wischau. 

The  corps  were  thus  at  distances  from  the  Moravian 
frontier  varying  from  three  to  seven  marches;  ten,  twelve, 
and  thirteen  marches  distant  from  the  Bohemian  frontier; 
and  three  or  four  from  each  other. 

This  was  then  rather  the  assemblement  of  the  corps 
in  the  region  to  the  south  of  Olmiitz,  than  a  concentra- 
tion. Consequently,  when  hostilities  were  about  to  be- 
gin, a  new  concentration  became  necessary. 

Protection  of  the  Frontier. — While  these  assemblements 
were  taking  place,  the  commander-in-chief  was  engaged 
in  devising  means  for  the  protection  of  the  frontier. 
From  the  southern  extremity  of  the  province  of  Glatz 


664  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

to  Cracow,  there  was  a  distance  of  200  kilometres  to  be 
guarded.  This  duty  devolved  upon  three  brigades  of 
infantry  and  five  regiments  of  cavalry,  to  which  was 
added  the  garrison  of  Cracow,  the  entire  force  amount- 
ing to  about  an  army  corps  and  a  division  of  cavalry. 

An  equal  force  was  charged  with  watching  the  Bo- 
hemian frontier  from  the  Elbe  to  the  province  of  Glatz, 
upon  a  nearly  equal  front. 

In  this  service,  each  brigade  and  each  regiment  of 
cavalry  had  the  guardianship  of  a  definite  zone,  but 
these  troops  were  forbidden  to  cross  into  the  enemy's 
territory. 

On  the  12th  of  May,  Benedek  took  command  of  the 
Army  of  the  North. 

On  the  19th,  he  was  warned  that  strong  forces  of  the 
enemy  were  already  assembled  in  the  vicinity  of  Gor- 
litz,  in  Lusatia.  The  I.  Corps  was  thereupon  ordered  to 
draw  near  this  province. 

In  consequence  of  the  issuance  of  this  order,  the  ist 
Cavalry  Division  was  sent  to  Turnau,  and  three  bri- 
gades out  of  four  of  the  I.  Corps  were  distributed  along 
the  frontier. 

On  May  27,  Count  Clam,  fearing  an  irruption  by  the 
Prussian  masses,  asked  permission  to  concentrate  at 
Miinchengraetz,  and  Benedek  complied  with  his  re- 
quest, placing  the  ist  Cavalry  Division  under  his  orders. 

As  a  consequence,  the  troops  occupying  Bohemia  as- 
sembled behind  the  Iser. 

Toward  the  8th  of  June,  however,  the  commander-in- 
chief,  having  decided  to  unite  his  forces  before  engaging, 
ordered  Count  Clam  to  take  position  along  the  line  of 
the  Iser  at  Jung-Bunzlau,  to  the  south  of  Miinchen- 
graetz, connect  there  with  the  Saxon  Corps,  and  then 
fall  back  upon  the  principal  army. 

These  instructions  led  to  new  movements  in  Bohemia, 
which  continued  until  the  19th,  the  date  of  commence- 
ment of  actual  hostilities. 


THIRD   CIIAPTKR. — OPERATIONS.  665 

At  this  time  the  Prussian  armies  were  echeloned  in 
three  masses  along-  the  frontiers  of  Saxony,  Bohemia,  and 
Silesia. 

The  Austrian  army  occupied  the  positions  already  in- 
dicated. It  was  in  readiness  to  take  the  field,  and  its 
effective  reached: 

In  combatants,  215,000  men,  22,800  sabres,  736  guns; 

In  ratioiinaires^  283,000  men  and  67,000  horses. 

The  operations  were  about  to  begin. 

First  Defensive  Operations. — During  the  first  days  of 
June,  Benedek  was  quite  well  informed  regarding  the 
positions  of  the  Prussians.  Conformably  to  the  plan  of 
operations,  he  had  resolved  upon  a  most  active  defense, 
and  intended,  as  soon  as  practicable,  to  make  a  close 
concentration  and  then  march  at  once  upon  the  enemy. 
Unfortunately,  the  supplies  were  still  incomplete,  and 
the  administrative  services  not  fully  organized. 

In  the  meantime,  the  Prussians  entered  Saxony,  and, 
on  the  1 6th  of  June,  took  the  initiative. 

The  Saxon  Corps,  in  consequence  of  the  system  of 
operations  adopted  by  its  ally,  was  forced  to  abandon 
its  country  and  retire  into  Bohemia.  It  effected  its  re- 
treat with  sufficient  rapidity,  and  on  June  20,  its  heads 
of  columns  marching  toward  the  Elbe,  had  reached 
Chlumetz,  between  this  river  and  the  Iser,  when  an 
order  from  the  commander-in-chief,  modifying  the  dis- 
positions alread}'  made,  directed  it  to  join  the  ist  Corps, 
and  take  position  between  Miinchengrsetz  and  Jung- 
Bunzlau. 

These  instructions  seemed  to  indicate  an  intention  on 
the  part  of  Benedek  to  defend  the  line  of  the  Iser.  At 
all  events,  they  occasioned  needless  counter-marches, 
which  increased  the  fatigue  of  the  troops,  and  delayed 
the  concentration  in  Bohemia  until  the  25th  of  June. 

To  understand  the  reason  for  this  change,  we  must 
return  to  the  principal  army. 


666  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

A  dispatch  received  the  i6th  of  June  from  the  Em- 
peror of  Austria,  directed  Benedek  to  act  without  delay. 
The  latter  responded  by  a  statement  of  his  projects. 
He  still  hesitated  from  lack  of  knowledg-e  reg^ardingf 
the  scope  of  the  Prussian  assemblements ;  but  was 
resolved  to  move  his  army  into  Bohemia  toward  Jos- 
ephstadt,  if  the  enemy  remained  between  Gorlitz  and 
Landshut.  Eleven  days  would  be  required  for  this 
movement.  If  the  enemy  concentrated  in  Silesia,  he 
could  bring  his  army  together  near  Olmiitz  in  four  days. 
He  had  prepared  for  the  march  on  the  first  hypothesis, 
and  given  instructions  for  a  preliminary  concentration. 
He  was  certain  of  being  upon  the  right  bank  of  the  Elbe, 
between  Koniginhof  and  Miletin,  within  thirteen  days, 
ready  to  receive  battle  or  take  the  offensive. 

On  the  same  day,  the  i6th,  the  concentration  was 
ordered.  It  was  to  be  terminated  on  the  20th,  and  the 
army  was  then  to  be  moved  toward  Bohemia. 

The  object  of  the  first  movement  was  to  establish 
three  corps  upon  the  railroad  from  Briinn  to  Zwittau: 

The  VIII.  at  Brunn,  the  III.  at  Zwitawka,  the  X.  at 
Zwittau. 

Three  other  corps  were  to  be  established  upon  the 
railroad  from  Prerau  to  Olmiitz  and  Trubau.  These 
were  the  VI.  at  Prerau,  the  IV.  at  Miiglitz,  the  II.  at 
Landskron. 

Between  these  two  lines,  at  Prossnitz  and  Kremsier, 
were  two  divisions  of  Reserve  Cavalry. 

Upon  the  whole,  this  change  was  of  little  consequence, 
but  it  nevertheless  cost  four  days. 

On  the  17th,  the  Government  apprised  Benedek  of 
the  invasion  of  Saxony,  announcing  also  that  the  enemy 
seemed  to  be  approaching  the  Elbe,  As  to  the  move- 
ments upon  the  Neisse,  they  were  so  far  only  a  demon- 
stration. 

Benedek  hesitated  no  longer.     Resolved  to  take  up  a 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  667 

position  upon  the  plateaus  on  the  ri<;ht  bank  of  the  Elbe 
as  soon  as  possible,  he  ordered  the  execution  of  the  flank 
march  which  had  already  been  projected  along  the  Sile- 
sian  frontier. 

The  circumstances  attending  this  operation  were  to 
place  him  in  one  of  those  critical  situations,  which,  es- 
pecially on  the  defensive,  decide  the  safety  or  the  loss  of 
an  army. 

The  March  from  Olmutz  to  the  Elbe. — The  army  was  formed 
into  three  columns,  of  the  following  composition  : 

Right  Column. 

ist  Division  of  Reserve  Cavalry  ; 
X.  Corps  ; 
•     IV.  Corps  ; 
VI.  Corps  ; 
2d  Division  of  Light  Cavalry. 

Itinerary  :  Miiglitz,  Landskron,  Senftenberg,  Reiche- 
nau,  Solnitz,  Opocno,  Josephstadt. 

Central  Colunin. 

m.  Corps  ; 
VIII.  Corps  ; 

General  headquarters  ; 
3d  Division  of  Reserve  Cavalry. 
Itinerary  :  Abtsdorf,    Wildenschwert,  Wamberg,   Tij- 
nist,  Smiritz,  and  Josephstadt. 

Left  Column. 

2d  Division  of  Reserve  Cavalry  ; 
Artillery  Reserve. 
Itinerary  :  Policka,  Leitomischl,  Holitz,  and  Smiritz. 


668  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

This  movement  was  covered  b}^  the  II.  Corps,  which, 
from  Landskroii,  moved  its  brigades  between  the  right 
column  and   the   frontier ;   then  by  the  ad  Division  of 
Light  Cavalry,  which,  after  the  26th,  was  to  follow  the 
right  column  and  rejoin  the  army. 

The  corps  were  warned  to  be  always  ready  for  action, 
to  connect  themselves  with  the  neighboring  corps,  and, 
in  case  of  need,  to  make  demonstrations  to  induce  the 
belief  that  an  attack  was  to  be  made  upon  Silesia. 

The  aim  of  this  movement  was  to  echelon  four  corps, 
by  the  20th  of  June,  upon  a  semi-circle  passing  through 
Josephstadt,  Schurz,  Koniginhof,  Miletin,  and  Horitz, 
with  a  division  of  cavalry  upon  each  wing,  and  place  a 
reserve  corps  at  Horenowes,  and  the  II.  Corps  upon  the 
defensive  en  crochet  to  the  north  of  Josephstadt,  faced 
to  the  east,  while  throwing  forward  two  cavalry  di- 
visions to  watch  the  frontier. 

Once  in  these  positions,  the  commander-in-chief 
counted  upon  having  time  to  rest  his  troops,  then  to 
move  them  to  the  Iser  and  take  the  offensive. 

It  was  with  this  in  view  that  he  left  the  Austro-Saxon 
troops  in  position  at  Miinchengraetz,  but  with  orders, 
however,  to  fall  back  if  attacked  by  superior  forces. 

On  June   24,   Benedek  completed  these  dispositions, 
giving  the  command  of  this  group  to  Prince  Albert  of 
Saxony,  and  marking  out  for  him  his  part  in  the  opera- 
tions:  "he  was  to  oppose  all  attacks  coming  from  the 
side  of  Gabel  and  Reichenberg. " 

The  commander-in-chief  thought  he  had  thus  pro- 
vided against  all  contingencies;  but  the  vigor  of  the 
Prussians,  the  rapidity  of  their  marches,  and  especially 
the  individual  initiative  of  their  leaders,  were  to  precip- 
itate events,  and  shorten  the  delays  upon  which  he  had 
counted.  At  this  moment,  an  invasion  could  no  longer 
be  opposed  by  Gabel  and  Reichenberg.  In  accordance 
with  the  first  orders  received,  the  Bohemian  troops  had 
given  up  these  two  points. 


THIRD  CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  669 

It  is  now  known,  however,  that  Benedek,  after  the 
20th,  was  acquainted  with  the  Prussian  movements. 

His  persistence  in  his  combinations  can  then  be  ex- 
plained only  by  his  absolute  confidence  in  the  superior- 
ity of  the  Austrian  army — a  confidence  shared  by  many 
others.  The  campaign  of  1864  in  Schleswig-Holstein 
had  not  opened  the  eyes  of  Prussia's  allies. 

But  the  events  now  about  to  happen  were  to  demon- 
strate the  danger  of  such  errors. 

Operations  upon  the  Iser. — On  the  23d  of  June,  the 
Prussians  entered  Bohemia.  On  this  day  Benedek's 
columns  arrived  at  Opocno,  Wildenschwert,  and  Kun- 
stadt.  Cavalry  patrols  watched  the  defiles  of  the  Riesen- 
gebirge. 

In  Bohemia,  the  Austrian  outposts  fell  back,  accord- 
ing to  directions,  before  the  heads  of  the  Prussian 
columns,  and  abandoned  thus,  on  the  25th,  one  of  the 
passages  of  the  Iser  at  Turnau.  It  was  at  this  time  that 
Benedek,  still  confident  of  the  success  of  his  plans,  sent 
orders  to  the  Austro-Saxon  group  to  hold  Miinchen- 
graetz  and  Turnau  at  any  cost.  This  counter-order 
contemplated  a  complete  change  in  the  situation;  and 
being  issued  after  so  much  delay,  its  execution  offered 
many  difficulties.  It  was,  moreover,  to  expose  an  im- 
portant fraction  of  the  army  to  an  unequal  contest  with 
two  of  the  enemy's  armies;  but  it  appeared  essential  that 
there  should  be  no  hesitation  in  the  attempt  to  retake 
Turnau. 

This  enterprise  led  to  the  defeat  at  Podol,  then  to  the 
combats  at  Miinchengraetz  and  Gitschin,  fought  by  the 
Austrians  under  unfavorable  conditions.  In  a  few  days 
after  these  events,  the  defensive,  on  account  of  miscal- 
culations as  to  times  and  effectives,  saw  itself  reduced 
to  a  passive  role  which  left  but  little  hope  of  success. 


670  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

Operations  upon  the  Elbe. — The  movements  of  the  II. 
Army  upon  the  Silesian  frontier  commenced  on  the  25th 
and  26th.  The  feeble  detachments  of  Austrian  scouts 
fell  back  and  gave  information  of  the  invasion.  From 
Trautenau,  Skalitz,  Reinerz,  and  Olmiitz,  numerous  dis- 
patches informed  Benedek  of  the  scope  of  the  movement 
and  the  force  of  the  enemy's  columns. 

But  nothing  was  able  to  shake  his  decisions;  he  simply 
concluded  that  he  must  arrest  the  demonstrations  an- 
nounced upon  his  right  flank,  and  that  forces  of  moderate 
size  would  be  sufficient  for  this  purpose;  hence  that  there 
would  be  no  necessity  to  suspend  his  march  on  this  ac- 
count. Evidently,  he  did  not  believe  in  the  appearance 
of  an  army  on  this  side. 

On  the  date  above  referred  to,  June  26,  when  the  11. 
Prussian  Army  entered  Bohemia,  the  Austrian  Army 
occupied  the  follovv^ing  positions  : 

Troops  of  Observation. — The  II.  Corps  and  the  2d  Light 
Cavalry  Division  at  Senftenberg. 

Troops  on  the  March. — The  III.  Corps  before  Koniggrsetz, 
upon  the  right  bank  of  the  Elbe; 

IV.  Corps  at  Lancow,  6  kilometers  to  the  east  of 
Miletin  ; 

VI.  Corps  at  Opocno; 

VIII.  Corps  at  Tijnitz; 

X.  Corps  between  Jaromer  and   Schurz,  upon  the 
Elbe; 

ist  Division  of  Reserve  Cavalry,  Dolan  and  Skalitz; 

3d  Division  of  Reserve  Cavalry,  Wildenschwert; 

2d  Division  of  Reserve  Cavalry,  Hohenmauth  and 
Cereknitz; 

Reserve  Artillery  at  Eeitomischl. 

The  greater  part  of  these  corps,  then,  were  within  a 
day's  march  of  the  defiles  of  the  Riesengebirge. 


THIRD    CUAPTlCR. — OPERATIONS.  67 1 

Upon  learning-  that  the  enemy's  colnnins  emerging 
from  these  monntains  were  qnite  strong,  and  were  men- 
acing his  right  wing,  Benedek  directed  the  VI.  Corps 
npon  Skalitz  and  the  X.  npon  Trautenan,  in  order  ''to 
cover  the  armv's  movement  of  concentration."  His 
directions  were  "to  march  npon  the  enemy's  forces  with 
energy,  if  the  occasion  presented  itself,  bnt  withont 
pnrsuing  them  too  far." 

He  sent  to  Vienna  the  following  explanation  of  this 
measnre: 

"This  disposition  is  but  a  momentary  suspension  of 
the  offensive  which  I  propose  to  take,  as  soon  as  the 
concentration  of  the  army  is  effected,  and  I  am  informed 
with  some  degree  of  certainty  of  the  position  of  my 
adversary,  which  I  hope  will  be  the  case  in  a  few  days." 

He  did  not  yet,  it  thus  appears,  suspect  the  location 
of  the  Prussian  armies.  The  urgent  dispatches  sent  him 
on  June  27th  were  not  able  to  move  him  to  a  modifica- 
tion of  his  plans,  and  even  the  first  combats  were  not 
sufficient  to  inform  him  of  the  true  state  of  affairs. 
The  defeat  of  the  VI.  Corps  at  Nachod  would,  perhaps, 
have  changed  his  manner  of  viewing  things,  if  the 
success  at  Trautenan  had  not  tended  to  confirm  him  in 
his  illusions. 

However,  the  divisions  engaged  demanded  assistance, 
and  Benedek  reinforced  them  by  parts  of  two  new  corps, 
the  IV.  and  VIII. 

Finally,  on  the  28th  of  June,  the  day  of  the  combats 
of  Soor,  Skalitz,  and  Miinchengraetz,  from  all  sides  his 
attention  was  called  to  the  exhausted  condition  of  the 
troops,  and  to  their  need  of  rest.  The  impossibility  of 
a  march  upon  the  Iser  and  of  a  subsequent  offensive,  at 
last  became  apparent. 

It  was  necessary  to  return  then  to  the  idea  of  assem- 
bling the  army  between  Miletin  and  Josephstadt.  The 
situation  would  no  longer  permit  any  other  attitude  than 
a  passive  defense. 


6/2  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

The  troops  which  were  falling  back  from  Bohemia 
upon  the  Elbe,  and  those  returning  from  the  defiles  of 
the  Riesengebirge,  were  in  reality  recoiling  before  the 
adversary's  columns.  These  were,  so  to  say,  marches  in 
retreat,  executed  toward  the  indicated  position  of  assem- 
blement.  But,  in  consequence  of  one  of  those  delusions 
so  often  current  during  a  campaign,  the  various  forces 
thought  themselves  simply  moving  to  the  points  of  con- 
centration. 

The  Army  of  the  North,  already  beaten  in  detail,  sub- 
mitted to  the  influence  of  the  initiative  taken  by  its  ad- 
versary. Forced  to  renounce  its  projects  of  active 
defense,  i-t  moved  to  a  central  position  which  offered  its 
enemies  a  point  of  junction  for  their  forces,  and  which 
obliged  it  to  accept  a  defensive  battle  near  Sadowa. 

Its  terrible  defeat  in  this  action  (known  as  the  battle 
of  Koniggraetz  or  Sadowa),  on  July  3,  dispelled  all 
illusions. 

Comments. — What,  now,  from  a  defensive  standpoint, 
were  the  causes  of  the  lack  of  success  in  these  opera- 
tions? 

The  numerous  researches  to  which  these  grave  events 
have  given  rise,  the  discussions  which  they  have  pro- 
voked, and  especially  the  views  published  by  the 
Austrian  staff,  permit  us  to  answer  this  question. 

1st. — Selection  of  the  Zone  of  Concentration. — The  region 
chosen  was  about  eight  marches  distant  from  the  line 
intended  to  be  defended,  and  twelve  from  the  Iser,  upon 
which  Benedek  hoped  to  commence  active  operations. 

These  distances  were  not  justified  by  the  necessity  of 
having  from  eight  to  twelve  days  before  him  in  which 
to  raise  the  army  to  a  war  effective;  they  were  simply 
the  result  of  a  desire  to  assure  to  the  assemblements  the 
protection  of  the  fortified   place  of  Olmiitz.      Now  the 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  673 

forces  had,  in  consequence,  to  make  a  long  flank  march 
near  the  menaced  frontiers,  and  thus  lost  the  advantages 
of  a.  rapid  concentration. 

The  Austrian  staff  should  have  reasoned  regarding 
the  Prussians  as  did  the  latter  themselves,  that  they 
would  be  obliged  to  assemble  on  two  frontier  zones,  the 
outlets  of  which  converged  toward  the  upper  Elbe.  It 
would  then  have  been  led  to  adopt  for  its  concentration 
a  central  position  in  rear  of  the  points  of  junction  of 
these  converging  lines,  and  within  reach  of  these  two 
frontiers. 

The  Elbe,  in  the  vicinity  of  Pardubitz,  offered  it,  in 
this  regard,  a  line  of  defense  protected  by  the  fortified 
places  Koniggraetz  and  Josephstadt.  An  army  assem- 
bled in  this  region  would  be  within  three  marches  of 
Silesia  and  five  of  Lusatia.  It  would  then  have  been 
ready  to  take  the  field  on  i6th  of  June,  as  events  proved, 
and  in  condition  to  make  a  timely  movement  in  force 
upon  the  threatened  points,  without  fatiguing  the  troops. 

2d. — Inforinatioii  Regarding  the  Enemy. — One  of  the  most 
serious  causes  of  the  lack  of  success  on  the  part  of  the 
defensive  was  the  unfortunate  interpretation  of  infor- 
mation received  on  the  subject  of  the  enemy's  move- 
ments and  designs. 

Upon  reading  the  series  of  dispatches  received  by 
Benedek  after  the  20th  of  June,  one  can  explain  his 
decisions  only  by  the  low  estimate  which  he  had  formed 
of  his  adversary. 

The  most  precise  and  complete  intelligence  reached 
him  by  way  of  Vienna;  and  yet  he  must  have  made 
it  subsidiary  to  the  information  received  through  his 
cavalry  and  other  troops  charged  with  watching  the 
frontiers.  Now  the  latter  had  orders  not  to  penetrate 
Prussian  territory;  they  could  not  therefore  secure  that 
contact  with  the  enemy  which  alone  could  give  value  to 

43 


6/4  PART   FIRST.  — STRATEGY. 

their  observation,  except  from  the  date  when  they  were 
attacked. 

But  even  then  the  Austrian  commander  did  not  form 
an  accurate  idea  of  the  movements  of  the  enemy's 
masses. 

On  the  26th  and  27th  June  in  particular,  he  was  cer- 
tain of  having  upon  his  right  flank,  and  within  a  day's 
march,  cohimns  strong  enough  to  beat  his  isolated  corps. 
The  proximity  of  these  columns  should  have  restrained 
him  from  continuing  his  march.  He  should  then  have 
turned  upon  this  new  enemy  with  all  his  forces. 

Upon  this  subject  it  has  also  been  made  clear  by  the 
Austrian  general  staff,  that  the  defiles  of  the  Riesenge- 
birge  should  have  been  occupied  by  detachments,  and 
fortified. 

It  is  not  at  all  doubtful  that  on  the  26th  June,  Benedek 
was  in  position  to  engage  the  II.  Army  under  the  most 
advantageous  conditions,  on  account  of  then  occupying 
an  interior  line  of  operations  with  respect  to  the  oppos- 
ing armies. 

3d. — Distribution  of  the  Forces. — The  Austrian  army  sev- 
eral times  violated  the  principles  relating  to  the  concen- 
tration of  troops:  first,  in  leaving  a  group  in  Bohemia  at 
the  outset,  and  in  posting  other  groups  so  as  to  require 
four  days  for  their  concentration;  then  in  its  march  to- 
ward the  west. 

At  the  time,  indeed,  when  the  Prussian  forces  were 
moving  across  the  Silesian  frontier,  and  when  Benedek 
thought  it  necessary  to  direct  against  their  heads  of  col- 
umns, first  the  VI.  and  X.  Corps,  then  the  VIII.,  his 
masses  formed  four  groups:  one  of  from  60,000  to  70,000 
men  upon  the  Iser,  one  of  three  corps  toward  the  out- 
lets of  the  defiles,  one  of  two  corps  upon  the  Elbe,  and 
a  fourth  made  up  of  the  II.  Corps  and  the  2d  Light 
Cavalry  Division.     These  various  groups  were  not   in 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  675 

condition  to  concentrate  for  battle  in  a  single  day, — a 
principle  which  is  absolute  in  its  application  after  ope- 
rations have  once  begun. 

4th. — Want  of  Activity  on  the  Part  of  the  Defensive. — We 
have  already  seen  that,  in  order  to  be  of  an  active  char- 
acter, the  defensive  ought  not  only  to  set  the  different 
parts  of  the  army  in  motion  at  opportune  times,  but 
above  all  it  should  be  characterized  by  rapidity  of  con- 
ception and  execution,  which  alone  can  counterbalance 
the  advantages  of  the  offensive. 

These  are  the  qualities  of  which  the  Archduke  Albert 
gave  such  a  remarkable  example  on  the  Adige  at  this 
same  period. 

The  Army  of  the  North,  on  the  contrary,  made  it 
evident  since  its  first  formation  that  it  was  far  from  pos^ 
sessing  them  in  the  same  degree. 

Although  the  corps  were  all  complete  by  the  9th  of 
June,  they  were  not  able  to  put  themselves  in  motion 
before  the  i6th,  losing  thus  seven  full  days  at  a  decisive 
period. 

Before  commencing  their  movement  toward  the  west, 
these  large  units  consumed  four  additional  days  in  tak- 
ing up  their  positions  for  the  march. 

Finally,  the  movement  toward  the  Elbe  was  to  occupy 
ten  or  eleven  days,  although  seven  should  have  been 
sufficient,  as  was  made  manifest  after  the  battle  of 
Koniggrpetz. 

If  these  losses  of  time  could  have  been  avoided,  it 
would  not  have  been  impossible  for  this  army  to  have 
taken  the  initiative  about  the  i6th  of  June. 

On  the  whole,  a  defective  plan  of  operations,  the  adop- 
tion of  the  defensive  when  it  was  possible  to  do  others 
wise,  the  choice  of  a  zone  of  concentration  too  remote 
from  the  theatre  of  first  combats,  a  dangerous  dispersion 
of  the  forces,  and  especially  a  lack  of  perception  in  inter- 


676  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

preting  information  received  concerning  the  enemy, 
such  were  the  general  causes  leading  to  the  failure  of 
the  defensive. 

XI. — Conclusions. 

It  cannot  be  demonstrated  by  the  history  of  contem- 
poraneous wars,  viewed  from  a  defensive  standpoint, 
that  there  exist  absolute  principles  governing  this  spe- 
cies of  operations.  As  with  the  offensive,  the  measures 
in  preparation  for  war  rest  entirely  with  the  military 
authorities.  Going  beyond  the  combinations  embraced 
in  this  preparation,  we  enter  the  region  of  the  unfore- 
seen; the  force  of  circumstances  is  now  all-controlling, 
and  in  order  to  take  measures  most  necessary  for  the 
safety  of  the  country,  the  leaders  are  forced  to  seek  in- 
spiration in  events  as  they  occur. 

There  follow,  however,  from  the  facts  which  have 
just  been  analyzed,  certain  general  ideas  whose  applica- 
tion seems  obligatory  on  all  occasions.  These  ideas 
may  be  summed  up  thus: 

On  the  defensive,  still  more  than  on  the  offensive,  it 
is  necessary  to  know  exactly  the  duration  of  the  mobili- 
zation and  concentration. 

The  protection  of  the  frontiers  should  be  assured  at 
the  moment  war  is  declared.  The  zone  of  concentra- 
tion should  be  so  chosen  as  to  offer  protection  from  the 
attempts  of  the  enemy;  consequently,  at  such  a  distance 
from  the  frontier  as  shall  permit  the  assemblements  to 
be  completed. 

The  defensive  should  concentrate  the  greatest  possi- 
ble mass  upon  this  zone,  while  avoiding  a  mixing  of 
units. 

When  the  forces  of  a  country  comprise  several  armies, 
it  is  advantageous  to  concentrate  them  in  echelon,  so 
that  in  case  one  mass  engages  in  front,  another  may. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  677 

within  a  clay's  march,  fall  upon  the  flank  of  the  enemy, 
reacliino^,  if  possible,  his  communications. 

The  lines  of  defense  should  be  organized  in  advance, 
with  a  view  to  making  the  most  energetic  resistance, 
and  to  taking  the  offensive  at  a  favorable  juncture. 

All  the  difficult  passages  should  be  fortified;  and  so 
far  as  possible  territorial  troops  should  be  employed  in 
guarding  and  defending  them. 

Defensive  positions  should  be  chosen  upon  the  lines 
of  invasion,  and  thoroughly  organized. 

The  defensive  should  always  be  active.  It  must  at- 
tack and  renew  its  attack,  even  after  repulses. 

Obstinacy  in  the  combat  is  more  necessary  for  it  than 
for  the  offensive.  Its  aim  is  no  longer  the  simple  defeat 
of  the  enemy,  but  his  extermination. 

An  army  upon  the  defensive  must  preserve  independ- 
ence in  its  movements,  avoid  shutting  itself  up  in  in- 
trenched camps,  utilize  strongholds  only  as  points  of 
support,  and  march  resolutely  upon  the  enemy  as  soon 
as  it  is  in  condition  to  do  so. 

It  is  by  concentrating  and  properly  echeloning  its 
forces,  and  by  accumulating  its  reserves  within  reach  of 
decisive  points,  that  the  defensive  may  aspire  to  success. 

It  should  have  but  one  line  of  operations,  but  if  pos- 
sible several  lines  of  retreat. 

Beyond  these  generalities,  is  it  possible  to  specify 
more  particularly  the  principles  to  be  observed  on  the 
defensive? 

Evidently  not. 

Passing  these  limits,  we  approach  the  uncertain  and 
the  unknown;  we  enter  the  domain  of  fancy. 

However,  since  the  events  of  1870,  some  in  France 
have  sought  to  go  further,  and  have  asked  what  would 
be  the  best  system  of  defense  to  adopt  in  a  new  Franco- 
German  war. 

There  is  nothing  to  indicate  that  in  such  an  event  we 


678  PART   FIRST. — STRATEGY. 

should  be  reduced  to  the  defensive.  Such  a  fate  could 
not  befall  us,  unless  our  mobilization  and  concentration 
should  prove  more  tardy  than  those  of  the  adversary. 
Now  these  operations  being  prepared  during  peace  with 
unlimited  freedom  of  action,  it  cannot  be  admitted  that 
their  execution  will  be  insufficient.  This  granted,  the 
problem  cannot  be  solved  without  giving  ourselves 
up  to  suppositions,  without  reasoning  upon  hypotheses. 
It  is  then  the  more  practical  course  to  hold  to  the  gen- 
eral principles  which  are  the  fruits  of  experience,  and 
which  have  been  herein  enunciated. 

Whatever  may  be  the  differences  of  opinion  in  the 
case,  however,  the  works  published  on  this  subject  are 
open  to  criticism. 

One  of  them  has  proposed  to  effect  the  concentration 
of  our  forces  as  follows,  in  case  of  a  defensive  war: 

ist.  An  army  upon  the  Meuse,  between  Dun  and 
Poix,  before  the  passage  at  Stenay; 

2d.  A  second  army  upon  the  borders  of  Lorraine,  from 
Dun  to  Hattonchatel,  upon  the  right  bank  of  the  Meuse; 

3d.  A  third  army  upon  the  Moselle  or  the  Madon, 
before  Point-Saint-Vincent  and  Epinal; 

4th.  Strong  reserves  upon  the  Aisne  at  Rethel  and 
Vouziers,  and  upon  the  Meuse  between  Dun  and 
Verdun.  * 

Our  forces  would  thus  be  distributed  upon  a  front  of 
180  kilometres,  divided  into  four  groups.  From  the 
right  to  the  left  would  be  a  nine  days'  march.  Should 
the  rapidity  of  the  enemy's  concentration  condemn  us 
to  a  passive  defense,  and  his  principal  effort  be  made 
upon  a  single  point  of  this  line,  a  part  of  our  groups 
would  be  isolated  and  unable  to  participate  in  the  strug- 
gle. 

In  case  of  an  active  defense,  in  order  to  march  within 

*  Essay  of  Major  X upon  the  North-Eastern  Frontier. 


THIRD   CHAPTER. — OPERATIONS.  679 

reach  of  the  enemy,  our  forces  would  be  obliged  to 
adopt  two  lines  of  operations,  and,  in  consequence,  be 
exposed  to  separation,  and  defeat  in  detail. 

This  operation  is  opposed  to  the  rules  of  experience. 
The  idea  of  forming  two  masses,  one  before  each  fron- 
tier opening,  with  an  intermediary  army,  is  natural. 
But,  if  this  plan  do^s  not  include  the  possibility  of 
these  forces  rendering  mutual  support  within  twenty- 
four  hours,  or,  at  the  furthest,  thirty-six  hours,  defeat  is 
still  to  be  feared. 

Yet  we  should  remember  that  all  public  discussion  of 
questions  relating  to  national  defense  is  a  danger.  It 
serves  but  to  enlighten  the  armies  of  our  neighbors,  and 
to  arouse  their  attention.  It  prompts  ideas  and  gives 
rise  to  projects  having  but  one  aim — the  enslavement  of 
our  country. 

Under  these  circumstances,  silence  is  a  duty. 


End  of  Part  I. 


SUPPLEMENTARY  NOTES. 

BY   THE   TRANSLATOR, 

ON  RECENT  CHANGES  IN  EUROPEAN  ARMIES. 


AUSTRIA. 
The    Landsturm,   organized  by  virtue  of  the  law  of 
June  6,   1886,  is  estimated  at  441,122  men,  officers  in- 
cluded, 

ENGIvAND. 

The  "Army  Estimates"  for  1877-8  provided  for  a 
regular  force  of  221,082  men,  officers  included,  organized 
into  148  battalions  of  infantry,  31  regiments  of  cavalry, 
228  batteries,  57  engineer  companies,  and  the  usual 
accessory  services. 

FRANCE. 

"  By  the  law  introduced  on  June  25,  1887,  by  General 
Ferron,  forty-five  battalions  have  been  added  to  the 
forces  actually  with  the  colors." — \The  Balaitce  of  Mili- 
tary Power  in  Europe. 

GERMANY. 

By  virtue  of  the  bill  passed  February  11,  1888,  the 
term  of  service  in  the  Eandwehr  has  been  extended  from 
the  forty-second  to  the  forty-fifth  year.  It  is  calculated 
that  this  law  adds  about  700,000  men  to  the  German 
war  forces, 

ITALY. 

Under  the  law  of  June  23,  1887,  her  forces,  officers 
included,  reach:  — 

Permanent  Army:  With  the  colors,  265,889  men; 
Reserves,  630,582.  Militia:  Mobile,  379,908;  Terri- 
torial, 1,313,793. 

(680) 


INDEX. 


Adjutant  General,  duties  of,  in  French  and  German  Armies,  145-6. 

Advanced-guards,  positions  of,  with  respect  to  the  main  forces,  513 
et  seq.  ;  composition  of,  518  ;  duties  of,  600  and  603. 

Albert,  Archduke  of  Austria,  in  a  brochure  attributed  to,  are  set  forth 
the  necessity  for  more  thorough  military  preparation  on  the  part 
of  the  States  bordering  on  Germany,  and  Ihe  methods  to  be  pur- 
sued in  such  preparation,  38-9;  his  projet  of  operations  in  1866, 
362  et  seq., — account  of  his  operations  in  this  year,  564  et  seq. 

Allied  armies,  the,  in  the  Crimea,  difficulties  of  exercising  command 
in,  58. 

Allies,  the,  difficulties  of  commanding  the  armies  of,  in  1813,  57, — size 
of  do.  in  this  year,  101-2 ;  they  take  Paris  for  principal  objective, 
in  1814,  instead  of  the  army  in  the  field,  206  ;  their  operations 
against  France  in  1792,  623  et  seq., — in  1793,  634  et  seq., — in  1794, 
640  et  seq. ;  combinations  adopted  by  Napoleon  to  meet  their 
attacks  in  1815,  651  et  seq. 

Alsace,  attack  of  the  frontiers  of,  in  1870,  475  et  seq. 

Alvinzi,  General,  defeated  by  Bonaparte  in  Arcole  campaign,  279-80, — 
and  in  Rivoli  campaign,  280-1. 

Ambulance  service  of  a  corps,  126. 

Ammunition,  amount  of,  carried  by  the  corps  munition  columns  and 
the  individual  soldier,  126;  supplies  of,  in  German  army,  128. 

Angular  attacks,  illustrated  by  wars  of  1866  and  1870,  227-8. 

Angular  bases,  advantages  of,  214  et  seq.  pass. — See  "Bases." 

Angular  frontiers. — See  "Frontiers." 

Angular  fronts,  advantages  of,  228  and  550 ;  troops  in  zone  of  concen- 
tration should  be  disposed  on,  451. 

Arcole,  battle  of,  Bonaparte  defeats  Alvinzi  at,  279. 

Argonne,  defense  of,  in  1792,  623  et  seq. 

Armies,  how  the  subject  of  their  organization  is  to  be  treated  in  this 
work,  4 ;  upon  what  their  power  rests,  28  ;  general  character  of, 
before  1866,  30,;  changes  brought  about  in  the  organization  of,  in 
our  epoch,  31  et  seq.  ;  results  of  these  changes,  32;  comparative 
strength  and  efficiency  of  the  different  European,  51  et  seq.  ;  diffi- 
culty of  commanding  those  composed  of  troops  of  different  nation- 
alities, 57 ;  formation  of,  88 ;  effective  strength  of,  88-9 ;  strength 
of  French,  in  1809,  94, — of  the  Grand  Army  of  1812,  ib., — of  the 

(681). 


682  INDEX. 

Army  of  the  Crimea,  ib., — of  tlie  Federal,  in  the  war  of  Secession, 
ib., — of  Prussian,  in  1866,  ib., — of  German,  in  1870,  95, — do.  in  a 
new  war  with  France,  ib.  ;  army  subdivisions,  96 ;  small  armies 
should  neglect  the  corps  partition,  96-7  ;  necessity  for  the  corps 
formation  in  case  of  large,  97  et  seq. ;  grouping  of,  in  general, 
100, — of  those  of  the  Coalition  in  1813,  101-2, — of  the  Federal, 
during  the  war  of  Secession,  102  and  107, — of  the  French,  in  1868 
in  anticipation  of  a  war  with  Germany,  103, — do.  in  1870,  103-4; 
necessity  for  separating  large  masses  of  troops  into  army  groups, 
105  ;  application  of  the  principle  of  combining,  ib.  ;  those  of  first 
and  second  line,  106  ;  grouping  of,  in  a  future  war  between  France 
and  Germany,  107, — of  the  German,  in  1870,  108  ;  influence  of 
modern  fortifications  upon  future  operations  of  invading,  194 ; 
connection  between  them,  protection  of  their  flanks,  229 ;  prin- 
ciples to  be  observed  in  manoeuvring  the  large  masses  of  modern 
times,  268  ;  strength  in  detail  of  the  German,  in  war  of  1870,  388 
et  seq., — of  the  French,  in  same  war,  428;  the  various  parts  of, 
should  be  in  constant  communication  and  keep  each  other  in- 
formed of  the  combats  engaged  in,  531  ;  character  of  orders  re- 
lating to  marches  of,  576  et  seq., — principles  governing  do.,  593; 
principles  controlling  dispositions  for  the  march  of,  593  et  seq. ; 
their  operations  on  the  defensive,  608  et  seq. 

Arms,  modern,  give  the  defensive  the  advantage,  theoretically ,  336 
and  370. 

Atlanta  campaign,  301  et  seq. 

Artillery,  amount  and  character  of,  in  the  German  army,  42-3  ;  in  this 
army  that  of  the  corps  comprises  from  6  to  8  batteries,  125, — man- 
ner of  employing  it  there,  ib., — Von  der  Goltz  on  its  influence  in 
battle,  ib., — the  front  taken  by  it  usually  indicates  the  line  of 
battle  of  the  entire  corps,  ib., — usually  under  the  eye  of  the  corps 
commander,  ib., — but  sometimes  placed  in  line  on  the  order  of 
the  chief-of-artillery  or  some  other  inferior  authority,  ib.,  with  ex- 
ample of  do.,  126  ;  the  amount  and  character  of  that  which  should 
accompany  independent  cavalry  divisions,  134-5  ;  duties  of  chief 
of,  148 ;  use  of,  in  executing  passage  of  rivers,  182  et  seq.  pass. ; 
should  thoroughly  prepare  for  the  attacks  of  the  infantry,  528. 

Austria,  strength  and  organization  of  her  army,  47-8  and  "Supple- 
mentary Notes"  ;  strength  of  her  corps,  118;  organization  of  her 
cavalry  divisions,  135  ;  her  campaign  against  insurgent  Hungary 
in  1849,  ss  illustrating  exception  to  rule  that  the  enemy's  main 
forces  in  the  field  should  form  the  principal  objective,  207  et  seq. ; 
her  failiire  to  take  advantage  of  Prussia's  double  line  of  operations 
in  1866,  286  ;  her  general />;v7;>/f  of  operations  in  1866,  357  et  seq., — 
her  projet  against  Prussia,  359  et  s^^.,— against  Italy,  362  et  seq.  ; 
her  defective  concentration  in  1805,  442  ;  movements  of  her  forces. 


INDEX.  683 

after  KSniggratz,  546  et  seq. ;  transfer  of  her  Italian  army  to 
Vienna,  in  1866,  552;  her  defeat  of  the  Italians  at  Costozza,  564 
et  scq.  ;  her  defensive  operations  in  Bohemia  in  1866,  661  et  seq. 

Baden,  Grand  Duchy  of,  her  war  forces  in  1S70,  391-2. 

Bake-house  equipment,  extent  of,  in  a  corps,  126. 

Bases  of  operations,  character  of,  to-day,  210  et  seq.;  those  of  the 
German  armies  in  1870,  214;  definition  of,  215;  the  principal 
magazines,  depots,  etc.,  are  to-day  located  upon  the  railroads  in 
rear  of,  ib. ;  influence  of  their  direction  with  respect  to  enemy's 
line  of  operations,  216;  importance  of  angular,  as  illustrated  by 
Napoleon's  campaign  of  1805,  216  et  seq., — do.  as  illustrated  by 
his  campaign  of  1800,  218  et  seq.;  the  Germans  in  their  treaties 
endeavor  to  secure  angular,  222-3  !  Germany's  base  in  case  of  a 
war  with  Russia,  223, — do.  with  France,  224 ;  their  extent,  224-5  ! 
formations  of  the  troops  upon  them,  225  ;  characteristics  of  a 
good  base,  225-6 ;  general  principles  relating  to  them  in  modern 
times,  226. 

Bassano,  battle  of,  Wiirmser  defeated  by  Bonaparte  at,  277. 

Battalion,  the,  strength  of,  in  German  army,  43. 

Battle-field,  the  custom  of  hastening  to  the,  even  without  orders,  in 
vogue  in  the  German  army,  530. 

Battles,  classes  of,  12. 

Bavaria,  her  war  forces  in  1870,  394  et  seq. 

Bazaine,  Marshal,  ill  consequences  of  disagreement  between  him  and 
his  chief-of-staflf  in  1870,  139  ;  he  is  appointed  commander-in-chief 
of  the  Imperial  armies,  570 ;  his  dispatches  to  the  Bmperor  after 
Gravelotte,  571-2. 

Beaulieu,  General,  operations  of  Bonaparte  against,  in  1796,  271-2. 

Belfort,  campaign  in  the  East  in  1870-1,  for  the  relief  of,  239  et  seq. 

Benedek,  General,  his  failure  to  appreciate  the  advantages  of  his  in- 
terior position  in  1866,  286, — his  failure  to  recall  his  covering 
troops  at  the  proper  time,  in  the  same  year,  450, — his  iu.structions 
for  movements  after  Koniggratz,  547, — details  of  his  defensive 
operations  in  Bohemia,  661  et  seq.  pass. 

Benningsen,  General,  his  concentration  in  1807,  in  illustration  of 
selection  of  zone  of  do.,  436, — his  operations  generally  during  the 
campaign,  537  et  seq.  pass. 

Berthaut,  General,  on  the  provisional  character  of  plans  of  operations, 
332  ;  on  the  necessity  of  remaining  concentrated  when  on  the 
defensive,  614. 

Berthier,  Marshal,  Napoleon's  instructions  to,  in  beginning  of  cam- 
paign of  1809,  431  et  seq. 

Bertrand,  General,  Napoleon's  instructions  to,  in  1805,  upon  the  recon- 
naissance of  prospective  theatre  of  operations,  155  et  seq. 

Besieged  city,  in  a,  the  military  commander  should  have  absolute 
powers,  657. 


684  INDEX. 

Bessi^res,  Marshal,  letter  of  Napoleon  to,  on  the  cordon  system  of  de- 
fense, 6i8. 

Bismarck,  Prince,  his  note  to  Austria  in  1866  on  the  Italian  arma- 
ments, 454-5. 

Blondel,  General,  on  obedience,  78 ;  on  the  military  and  martial 
spirit,  81 ;  on  the  art  of  governing  men,  86. 

Bliicher,  Marshal,  his  tenacity  of  purpose,  69 ;  his  operations  in 
France  in  1814,  646  et  seq.  pass. 

Blume,  Colonel,  on  the  influence  of  mountains  in  theatres  of  oper- 
ations, 187-8;  on  the  dangers  of  too  great  a  dependence  upon 
fortifications,  199,  200 ;  on  throwing  back  an  army  upon  a  neutral 
frontier,  201. 

Bohemia,  Austrian  defense  of,  in  1866,  661  et  seq. 

Bonaparte,  Joseph,  Napoleon's  instructions  to,  upon  the  lines  of  com- 
munications of  the  army  operating  against  Naples,  294 ;  letter 
of  Napoleon  to,  as  King  of  Spain,  upon  the  importance  of  pre- 
serving his  lines  of  communications,  295  et  seq.  ;  letter  of  Na- 
poleon to,  as  King  of  Naples  upon  the  means  of  defending  his 
kingdom,  616-17. 

Boundaries  of  theatres  of  operations,  200;  impassable  do.,  201. 

Bourbaki,  General,  difficulties  met  with  in  the  transport  of  his  army 
by  rail  toward  Belfort  in  December,  1870,  162 ;  his  campaign  in 
the  East  in  1871,  239  et  seq.  pass. 

Bridge  equipage,  amount  of  divisional,  126, — of  corps,"  127. 

Bridge-heads,  their  use  in  defense  of  rivers,  186  and  322, — in  protect- 
ing the  line  of  communications,  297. 

Bridges,  the  crossing  of,  during  operations,  184-5 ;  the  importance  of 
seizing,  by  the  cavalry  of  the  army  on  the  offensive,  178. 

Brigade,  the,  strength  of,  in  German  army,  43  ;  should  in  certain 
cases  be  composed  of  all  arms  of  the  service,  124. 

Brunswick,  the  Duke  of,  in  beginning  of  campaign  of  1806,  136  et  seq.; 
in  Valmy  campaign,  623  et  seq.  pass.;  in  campaign  of  1793,  634 
et  seq.  pass. 

Cadre,  the  term  explained,  43  note. 

Campaign,  use  made  of  railroads  by  the  French  during  that  on  the 
Loire  in  1870,  for  the  transportation  of  troops,  162  ;  that  of  1800 
in  Italy  in  illustration  of  choice  of  lines  of  operations,  232  et  seq.  ; 
that  in  the  East  in  187 1,  as  illustrating  do.,  236  et  seq.  ;  of  1795  in 
Germany  as  illustrating  the  principle  of  "unity  of  lines  of  opera- 
tions," or  the  advantage  of  employing  a  simple  line,  244-5, — of 
1796  in  do.  as  illustrating  do.,  245  et  seq., — of  1797  in  Italy  in 
illustration  of  do.,  253  et  seq., — also  of  1796  in  Italy,  270  et  seq., — 
the  Castiglione,  272  et  seq., — the  Autumn,  276  et  seq., — and  the 
Arcole,  of  this  year,  279-80,— and  the  Rivoli,  of  1797,  280  et  seq.  ; 
that  on  the  Sarre  in  1870,  in  illustration  of  attack  of  frontiers, 


INDKX.  685 

492  et  scq.  ;  of  1805,  535  6,— of  1806,  536,— of  1807,  537  et  seq.,— 
and  of  1S49  in  Lonibardy,  543  et  scq.,  in  illustration  of  proper 
directions  of  marches  ;  of  1798  in  the  Roman  States  in  illustration 
of  errors  of  directions  in  marches,  560  et  seq., — of  1866  in  Italy, 
in  illustration  of  do.,  564  et  scq.  ;  of  1806,  in  illustration  of  charac- 
ter of  orders  relating  to  marches,  576  et  scq. ;  of  Moreau  in  1800, 
in  illustration  of  faulty  dispositions  for  the  march,  595  et  seq.;  of 
1792  in  France,  in  illustration  of  defensive  operations,  623  et  seq., 
— of  1793,  634  et  seq., — of  1794,  640, — of  1814,  642  et  seq., — and  of 
1815,  651,  in  illustration  of  do. 

Canrobert,  Marshal,  letter  to  the  minister  of  war  upon  the  obstacles 
in  the  way  of  co-operation  among  the  allied  armies  in  the 
Crimea,  58. 

Capital  of  a  country,  the,  as  an  objective,  205-6,  209-10. 

Carnot,  minister  of  war,  letter  of  Bonaparte  to,  during  the  Marengo 
campaign,  234-5  ;  he  writes  to  the  Committee  of  General  Defense, 
in  1793,  upon  the  proper  method  of  making  war  at  that  time,  635. 

Castiglione,  battle  of,  Wiirmser  defeated  by  Bonaparte  at,  274. 

Cavalry,  organization  of,  in  German  army,  42 ;  utility  of  the  regiment 
of  divisional,  debated,  124, — disposition  of  do.  in  France,  125  ; 
bodies  of  reserve,  during  the  First  Empire,  129, — do.  in  1870, 
129-30;  Prussian  divisions  of,  in  1866,  130, — do.  in  1870,  131;  in- 
dependent divisions  of,  131  et  seq., — duties  of  do.,  132, — strength 
and  composition  of  do.,  133  et  seq., — organization  of  do.  in 
France,  Austria,  Russia,  and  Italy,  135  ;  its  duties  in  covering 
concentrations,  449  ;  the  effect  of  independent  divisions  of,  oper- 
ating against  the  enemy's  frontiers  on  day  following  the  declara- 
tion of  war,  449 ;  the  covering  forces  of  this  arm,  are  the  com- 
mander-in-chief's principal  source  of  information,  472  ;  the  first 
combats  of  future  wars  will  probably  be  between  forces  of  this 
arm,  ib., — qualities  requisite  in  leaders  of  these  forces,  ib.;  re- 
connoitring service  of  this  arm,  how  performed,  ib.  et  seq. ;  the, 
of  an  army  on  the  active  defense,  617. 

Central  administrative  services,  and  central  reserves  of  artillery,  engi- 
neers, etc.,  should  not  be  kept  at  headquarters,  148. 

Central  position,  how  to  employ  to  advantage,  269-70,  285,  and  367. 

Champagne,  review  of  campaign  of  1814  in,  642  et  seq. 

Championnet,  General,  commands  the  French  forces  in  the  campaign 
of  1798  in  the  Roman  States,  560  et  seq. 

Chanzy,  General,  writes  to  the  war  minister  upon  the  inconvenience 
of  permitting  bodies  of  troops  independent  of  the  commander-in- 
chief  to  operate  within  his  army's  sphere  of  action,  64 ;  on  the 
necessity  of  combining  the  movements  of  the  French  armies  in 

,  latter  part  of  the  Franco-German  war,  104 ;  his  criticisms  on  the 
operations  undertaken  for  the  relief  of  Paris,  and  his  proposal  of 
other  operations,  264  et  seq. 


686  INDEX. 

Charles  Albert,  King  of  Sardinia,  defeated  in  the  Novara  campaign, 
543  et  seq. 

Charles,  the  Archduke,  his  employment  of  the  Danube  as  a  base  of 
manoeuvres  in  1809,  177  ;  adopts  an  interior  line  of  operations 
against  Moreau  and  Jourdan  in  Germany  in  1796,  245  et  seq.  pass.; 
is  defeated  in  campaign  of  1 797  in  Italy,  253  et  seq.  pass. 

Cialdini,  General,  in  campaign  of  1866  in  Italy,  564  et  seq.  pass. 

Cities  as  obstacles,  193. 

Clausewitz,  General,  on  war,  25  et  seq. ;  favors  the  three  division 
system  of  corps  partition,  122;  speaks  ironically  of  a  congress 
called  to  direct  an  army,  136;  on  the  organization  of  Prussian 
headquarters  in  1806,  138;  on  the  proper  way  to  attack  France, 
340. 

Clerfayt,  General,  in  campaign  of  1795  in  Germany,  244;  in  the 
Valmy  campaign,  624  et  seq.  pass. 

Coalition,  size  of  the  combined  armies  of  the,  in  1813,  101-2. 

Colli,  General,  operations  of  Bonaparte  against,  in  1796,  271-2. 

Combining  armies,  the  principle  of,  105. 

Command,  illustrations  of  the  principle  of  unity  in,  53  et  seq. ; 
division  of  the,  in  case  of  the  Army  of  Italy  in  1796,  54, — in  case 
of  the  armies  in  Spain  and  Portugal  in  1812,  56;  difficulties  of 
exercising,  in  armies  composed  of  troops  of  different  national- 
ities, 57  ;  rivalries  in,  the  dangers  of,  62  ;  defective  organization 
of  command-in-chief  of  Army  of  the  Rhine  in  1870,  one  of  the 
causes  of  French  reverses,  ib.\  dangers  attending  the  doubling 
of  the  command-in-chief  by  sending  civil  commissioners  to  the 
armies,  63  ;  the  presence  of  bodies  of  troops  within  the  theatreof 
■war,  independent  of  the  commander-in-chief,  opposed  to  principle 
of  ' '  unity  in  command, ' '  63-4  ;  the  creation  of  the  office  of  second- 
in-command  also  opposed  to  this  principle,  64  et  seq.;  qualities 
essential  for  the  exercise  of,  65  et  seq. ;  two  of  these  qualities, 
decision  and  good  sense,  held  by  the  Germans  in  esteem  beyond 
all  others,  66 ;  stubbornness  also  an  essential  quality  in  the  com- 
mander, with  examples,  68  et  seq.  ;  difficulties  of  the,  in  our  time, 
74-5  ;  assistants  to  the,  75  ;  mode  of  exercising,  85. 

Commander-in-chief,  the,  should  exercise  command  upon  the  very 
theatre  of  war  itself,  57  ;  Napoleon's  views  on  the  qualities  requi- 
site in,  74 ;  general  scope  of  his  duties  and  those  of  his  staff, 
140-1 ;  the  officers  whom  he  should  retain  at  headquarters,  147 
et  seq.  ;  manner  in  which  he  is  principally  assisted  by  his  chief-of- 
staff,  151  ;  should  be  consulted  by  the  Government  upon  military 
questions  in  drawing  up  a  plan  of  war,  330 ;  his  responsibility  for 
proper  strategic  deployment  at  commencement  of  operations, 
450-1  ;  his  need  of  obtaining  information  of  the  enemy,  and  his 
agencies  for  same,  473-4. 


INDKX.  687 

Commissioners,  civil,  inconveniences  attending  the  doubling  of  the 
command-in  chief  by  sending,  to  armies,  63. 

Committee  of  Public  Safety,  the,  opinion  of,  on  the  necessity  of  mili- 
tary instruction,  15,  16. 

Communication,  necessity  of  constant,  between  the  various  parts  of 
an  army,  531. 

Communications,  lines  of,  should  be  covered  by  territorial  troops  or 
troops  of  the  second  line,  106 ;  strength  of  forces  required  to-day 
to  guard,  ib. ;  classes  of,  160, — use  of  railroads  in  war,  ib.,—ox' 
dinary  roads,  reconnaissance  of,  etc.,  166  et  seq., — rivers,  172  et 
seq., — use  made  by  Napoleon  of  the  Danube  as  a  means  of  trans- 
portation in  1805,  172, — points  to  be  observed  in  making  use  of 
rivers  as  a  means  of  transportation,  173, — restricted  use  of  rivers 
as,  by  modern  armies,  175;  definition  of,  294;  advantages  of  a 
successful  change  of,  illustrated  in  Austerlitz  and  Jena  campaigns, 
297  et  seq. ;  Napoleon's  projected  change  of,  in  1814,  299  et  seq.; 
conclusions  upon  changing,  301  ;  Sherman's  Atlanta  campaign  in 
illustration  of  the  emplo3'ment  of  railroads  as,  and  as  illustrating 
change  of,  ib.  et  seq. ;  of  the  German  armies  in  1S70 :  I.  Army, 
308-9,  III.  Army  and  Army  of  the  Meuse,  310  et  seq.,  II.  Army, 
312-13,  Army  of  the  South  and  XIV.  Corps,  313 ;  system  adopted 
by  the  Germans  in  1870  for  the  protection  of,  314  et  seq.  ;  present 
organization  of,  316;  the  importance  of  railroads  as,  in  our  day, 
317  ;  the  various  services  pertaining  to,  have  been  almost  every- 
where fixed  by  regulations,  317-18 ;  the  rail  communications 
should,  whenever  possible,  be  supplemented  by  depot  lines,  318 ; 
German  rail  communications  in  1871,  319;  proper  manoeuvres  for 
threatening  the  enemy's,   illustrated  by  the  Novara  campaign, 

543-4- 
Concentration,  on  the  defensive  the  zone  of,  should  be  chosen  in  rear 
of  a  good  line  of  defense,  339  ;  general  plan  of,  429  et  seq.  ;  prin- 
ciples governing  the  selection  of  zone  of,  generally,  430, — do.  il- 
lustrated by  campaign  of  1809  on  the  Danube,  ib.  et  seq. ;  pro- 
tection of  the,  435  et  seq., — Benningsen's  operations  in  1807,  in 
illustration,  436, — also  Napoleon's  early  operations  in  1815,  437 
et  seq., — and  those  of  the  ist  Army  of  the  Doire  and  the  Army  of 
the  North,  in  1870,  440 ;  scope  of,  at  present  time,  ib.  et  seq. ; 
consequences  of  a  defective,  442, — operations  of  the  Archduke 
Charles  in  1805  as  an  illustration,  ib. ;  the  character  of  the,  de- 
pends upon  whether  the  offensive  or  defensive  has  been  resolved 
on,  442, — that  of  French  forces  in  1870  in  illustration,  442-3  ;  com- 
prises the  transport  of  troops  and  their  strategic  deployment, 
444 ;  duration  of,  ib.  et  seq. ;  troops  on  zone  of,  should  be  dis- 
tributed in  echelon,  451  ;  of  the  Prussian  armies  in  1866,  452  et 
seq., — difficulties  of  the  situation,  452, — selection  of  zone  of,  456 


688  INDEX. 

et  seq., — transport  of  these  armies,  458  et  seq., — their  strategic 
deployment,  460  et  seq.  ;  of  the  German  armies  in  1870,  464  et  seq., 
— surveillance  of  the  frontier  by  a  defensive  screen,  465, — trans- 
port to  frontier,  466, — strategic  deployment,  467  et  seq.  ;  before 
battle,  the  principle  of,  violated  by  Italians  in  Custozza  campaign, 
566 ;  principles  governing  the  selection  of  zone  of,  on  the  de- 
fensive, 612-13  ;  movements  after,  on  the  defensive,  615  et  seq. ; 
of  the  Austrian  Army  of  the  North  in  1866,  663  et  seq. 

Contingent,  the  annual,  in  Germany  increased  by  granting  royal  fur- 
loughs, 40, — this,  contrasted  with  that  of  France,  ib. 

Cordon  system  of  defense,  the,  Napoleon  on  the  weakness  of,  272. 

Corps,  army,  composition  of,  113  ;  they  are  the  strategic  units  of  grand 
armies,  ib. ;  effective  of  French,  in  1806,  114, — do.  in  1870,  115; 
30,000  combatants,  the  normal  strength  of,  ib.  et  seq., — consider- 
ations governing  do.,  116;  length  of  road  occupied  by,  on  the 
march,  117;  strength  of  German,  ib., — of  Russian,  118, — of  Aus- 
trian, ib., — of  Italian,  119;  corps  subdivisions,  ib. ;  the  two 
division  system  probably  the  best  in  case  of  those  of  normal  size, 
— reasons  for,  120  et  seq.  ;  extent  of  daily  march  of,  120-1  and  594 ; 
corps  subdivisions  in  the  French  arm}'  in  1870,  121 ;  Major  Meck- 
el's opinion  in  favor  of  the  three  division  system,  121-2  ;  Clause- 
witz's  criticism  of  the  two  division  S5'Stem,  122  ;  corps  subdivisions 
in  Germany,  France,  and  Italy,  ib., — do.  in  Austria,  Russia,  Eng- 
land, Spain,  and  Belgium,  123  ;  corps  artillery,  125 ;  the  corps 
munition  columns  should  have  sufficient  ammunition  for  an  entire 
day's  battle,  126, — the  provision  columns  and  forage  convoys 
should  be  able  to  sustain  men  and  horses  for  five  full  days,  ib., — 
the  ambulance  service  to  care  for  2,400  wounded,  ib., — the  bake- 
house equipment  to  furnish  each  day's  bread,  aided  by  private  in- 
dustry, ib., — the  horse  depot  should  at  the  outset  be  supplied 
with  200  horses,  127, — the  accompanying  bridge  equipage  should 
permit  the  crossing  of  streams  125  metres  wide,  ib.  ;  normal  type 
of,  in  Germany,  127-8  ;  illustration  of  character  of  orders  for  the 
march  of,   589, — principles  governing  the  preparation  of  do.,  593. 

Courage  and  discipline,  all  military  virtues  embraced  in,  84. 

Crown  Prince  of  Prussia,  the,  arrives  on  Austrian  flank  at  Koniggratz, 
71  ;  his  orders  relative  to  piercing  the  French  frontier  in  1870, 
477-8  ;  his  march  after  Koniggratz,  545  et  seq.  pass.;  orders  of, 
for  the  march  to  the  Meuse,  in  August,  1870,  599-600. 

Custozza,  campaign  of,  564  et  seq. 

Dalmatia,  Napoleon  on  the  defense  of,  in  1806,  619. 

Danube,  the,  employment  of,  by  the  Archduke  Charles  in  1809  as  a 
base  of  manoeuvres,  177  ;  should  have  served  the  Turks  as  a  first 
line  of  defense  in  1877,  ib., — passage  of,  by  the  Russians  in  this 
year,  181  et  seq. 


INDEX.  689 

Decision  and  good  sense,  the  most  essential  qualities  for  the  exercise 
of  command,  in  the  eyes  of  the  Germans,  66  ;  remarkal)lc'  example 
of  decision,  given  by  Prince  Frederick  Charles  on  the  day  before 
Koniggriitz,  ib.  et  seq. 

Defense. — See  "  Twines  of  Defense." 

Defensive,  the,  usually  the  deln3'S  attending  mobilization  and  trans- 
portation that  condemn  an  army  to,  9;  "influence  of  a  proper 
organization  of  the  frontiers  upon  operations  on,  195  ;  character 
of  base  on,  211-12;  controlling  considerations  in  drawing  up 
projets  for  operations  on,  335-6 ;  with  modern  arms,  it  should, 
theoretically,  prevail,  336 ;  peculiarly  exposed  to  flank  attacks, 
337  ;  relation  of  frontiers  to,  ib.  et  seq. ;  danger  to,  of  undue  re- 
liance upon  fortifications,  33S  ;  compared  with  the  offensive,  368 
et  seq.;  the  conditions  of,  60S  et  seq., — Von  der  Goltz  on  do., 
609-10,  —  do.  on  the  advantages  of,  610-11;  circumstances  which 
compel  a  country  to-day  to  act  on,  611-12  ;  mobilization  on,  612  ; 
general  principles  relating  to  concentration  on,  ib.  et  seq.  ;  Na- 
poleon on  the  dangers  of  a  dispersion  of  forces  when  acting  on, 
613-14, — General  Berthaut  on  do.,  614;  protection  of  the  frontiers 
during  the  concentration  on,  614-15  ;  movements  of  an  army  on, 
after  concentration,  615  et  seq. ;  Jomini  on  an  active  defense, 
615-16  ;  Napoleon  on  the  proper  methods  of  conducting  opera- 
tions on,  616-17 ;  rules  to  be  followed  in  an  active  defense,  617  ; 
Napoleon  condemns  both  the  cordon  and  group  system  of  defense, 
618;  principles  governing  the  assemblements  on,  619;  operations 
on,  after  the  first  encounters,  ib.  et  seq.;  a  summary  of  the  duties 
devolving  upon  an  army  on,  622  ;  operations  on,  illustrated  by  the 
defense  of  the  Argonne  in  1792,  623  et  seq., — by  the  defense  of 
France  in  1793,  634  et  seq.,  in  1794,  640  et  seq.,  in  1814,  642  et  seq., 
in  1815,  651  et  seq.,  in  1870-1,  654  et  seq.,  and  of  Bohemia  in  1866, 
661  et  seq.;th.e.  subject  of,  discussed  generally,  676  et  seq.;  the 
dangers  of  a  public  consideration  of  a  country's  best  system  of 
defense,  679. 

Defiles,  advantages  of  controlling  the,  in  the  defense  of  mountain 
ranges,  187. 

Demonstrations  usually  made  in  executing  tbe  passage  of  rivers,  179 
et  seq. 

Desaix,  General,  at  battles  of  Rastadt  and  Esslingen,  248. 

Detraining  troops,  necessity  for  rapid  means  of,  162-3  \  stations  for, 
how  distributed  on  railroad  lines  in  zone  of  concentration,  225  and 

447- 
Director}',  the,  result  of  the  adoption  by,  of  exterior  lines  of  operations 

in  campaigns  in  Germany  in  1795,  244-5,  ^^id  in  1796,  245  et  seq. 
Discipline  and  courage,  all  military  virtues  embraced  in,  84. 
Discipline  and  subordination,  value  of,  82. 
44 


690  •  INDEX. 

Divisions,  strength  of,  in  German  army,  43  ;  extent  of  road  occupied 
b}',  on  the  march,  116;  composition  of  infantry,  123-4;  the  utility 
of  the  regiment  of  divisional  cavalry  debated,  124;  amount  of 
divisional  bridge  equipage,  126  ;  normal  type  of,  in  German  army, 
127  ;  of  Prussian  cavalry,  in  i£66,  131, — do.  in  1870,  ib.  ;  of  inde- 
pendent cavalry,  ib.  et  seq. ;  of  Austrian,  Riissian,  and  Italian 
cavalry,  135  ;  illustrations  of  character  of  orders  for  march  of,  590. 

Doua)',  General,  his  order  to  his  brigade  ccmmanders  before  the  com- 
bat of  Wissembourg,  484. 

Double  line  of  operations,  what  constiti:tes  a,  261-2. 

Ducrot,  General,  his  orders  for  the  occupation  of  the  ground  at  Wis- 
sembourg, August  3,  1870,  480. 

Dumouriez,  General,  in  Valmy  campaign,  625  ei  seq.  pass. 

Duties  of  officers  toward  superiors,  82, — do.  in  execution  of  orders  ib., 
— do.  toward  equals  and  inferiors,  84. 

Bchelon,  reasons  for  adopting  this  formation  by  troops  on  their  base 
of  operations,  or  zone  of  concentration,  225-6  and  451;  necessity 
of  having  the  large  masses  of  modern  times  so  disposed  on  the 
march,  292  ;  this  formation  to  be  adopted  when  advancing  toward 
the  enemy's  frontier,  503. 

Elbe,  the,  operations  upon,  in   1866,  670  et  seq. 

Electric  telegraph,  amount  of  such  equipment  in  each  German  army 
corps,  128  ;  duties  of  the  director  of  this  service,  149. 

Engineer  troops,  a  company  of,  with  bridge  equipage,  to  each 
division,  127  ;  a  separate  company  of,  with  bridge  equipage  at- 
tached to  each  corps,  ib. 

Engineers,  duties  of  chief  of,  149. 

England,  strength  of  her  army,  49  and  "  Supplementary  Notes  ;"  with 
her,  tenacity  is  a  national  virtue,  71. 

Envelopment,  stragetic,  a  double  line  of  operations  sometimes  adopted 
to  effect  a,  268  ;  measure  to  be  employed  against  an  enemy  at- 
tempting a,  269. 

Ersatz,  the,  in  Germany,  41. 

Etappen  troops,  German,  in  Franco-German  war,  309  ct  seq.  pass., — 
tabular  statement  of  number  of  do.,  316. 

Europe,  general  character  of  changes  brought  about  in  her  military 
systems,  in  consequence  of  the  battle  of  Koniggratz,  37  ;  the 
rivers  of,  rarely  identical  with  lines  of  operations,  175. 

Exterior  lines,  the  dangers  of  employing,  shown  in  campaign  of  1796 
in  Germany,  245  et  seq. 

First  encounters,  importance  of  gaining  the,  473. 

Forced  marches,  all  troops  within  reach  should  be  dispatched  to  the 
battle-field  by,  528. 

Formation  of  armies,  the  general  subject  discussed,  88  ei  seq.;  of  Ger- 
many in  1870,  109  et  seq., — of  France  do.  112. 


INDEX.  ■  691 

Forlifu-alious,  the  diffcrenl  classes  of,  in  modern  limes,  193  ;  influence 
of,  upon  llie  operations  of  armies,  194  ;  three  kinds  of  frontier 
places,  195  et  scq.;  the  new,  of  iM-ance,  German  opinion  on,  197-8  ; 
Bhime  on  the  dangers  of  too  s^reat  a  dependence  upon,  199-200, — 
Nai)oleon  on  do.,  200;  why  they  should  be  kept  in  a  complete 
state  of  readiness  in  time  of  peace,  337;  active  troops  should  not 
shut  themselves  up  in,  656. 

Forts  d'arrH,  their  use,  195  ;  on  railway  lines,  209. 

Flanking  movement,  effect  of,  shown  at  combat  of  Wissembourg,  486 
el  scq., — do.  shown  at  battle  of  vSpicheren,  526. 

Flanks  of  an  army,  the,  necessity  of  protecting,  229 ;  when  strategic 
movements  should  be  directed  against,  231. 

France,  primary  cause  of  her  reverses  in  1870,  vii.;  the  waj' pointed 
out  to  avoid  such  misfortunes  in  future,  ib.  et  seq.;  the  military 
system  adopted  by  her  in  1868,  37;  strength  and  organization  of 
her  army,  50-1  and  "Supplementary  Notes;"  grouping  of  her 
armies  in  186S,  in  anticipation  of  a  war  with  Germany,  103, — do. 
in  1870,  103-4;  formation  of  her  army  in  1870,  112  ;  strength  of  her 
various  corps  in  1806,  114,— in  1870,  115  ;  corps  subdivisions  in 
1870,  121;  disposition  of  her  divisional  cavalry,  125;  cavalry  re- 
serves during  the  First  Empire,  129, — do.  in  1870,  129-30;  organ- 
ization of  her  cavalry  divisions,  135  ;  influence  of  her  fortifications 
in  case  of  a  future  war  with  Germany,  194,  —  German  opinion  of 
do.,  197-S  ;  her  base  in  1870  after  the  first  defeats,  215-16;  she 
employs  a  double  line  of  operations  in  campaign  on  the  Loire  in 
1870,  263, — lack  of  unity  in  her  operations  for  the  relief  of  Paris, 
in  this  3'ear,  264  et  seq.;  Clausewitz  on  the  invasion  of,  340, — other 
plans  for  do.  ib.  et  seq.;  \\&:  projet  oi  ot^qxzXxows  in  1870,346^/ 
seq., — her  mobilization,  399  <?/  seq., — her  war  forces,  427  et  seq.;  her 
concentration  in  1809,  430, — do.  in  1815,  437  ;  dispositions  to  defend 
her  Alsacian  frontier  in  1870,  478  et  seq., — the  frontier  engagement 
at  Wissembourg,  482  et  seq.;  movements  of  her  army  on  the  Sarre 
in  1870,  504  et  seq., — the  battle  of  Spicheren,  512  et  seq.  ;  positions 
of  her  forces  on  August  5,  1870,  514-15  ;  character  of  orders  for 
marches  under  the  First  Empire,  576  et  seq., — do.  contrasted  with 
those  under  the  Second  Empire,  583  et  seq., — comments  on  the 
latter  faulty  orders,  587-8  ;  defense  of,  during  the  invasion  of  1792, 
623  et  seq.;  ■'Ca.Q.  operations  of  her  armies  in  1793,  634  et  seq,; — in 
1794,  (i\Q  et  seq.;  defense  of,  during  the  invasion  of  1S14,  642  et 
seq. , — of  1815,  651  et  seq., — of  1870-1,  654  et  seq., — general  defects 
in  her  mode  of  defense  in  the  last  war,  660. 

FVanco-German  War. — See  "France,"  "Germany,"  "Operations," 
and  "Moltke,  Marshal  Von." 

Francs-tireurs,  their  operations  against  German  communications  in 
1870-1,  311  and  313. 


693  INDEX. 

Fransecky,  General,  stubbornness  displayed  by  him  at  Koniggratz,  69 
et  seq.;  his  attack  of  the  Austrians  at  Blumenan  in  1866,  559, 

Frederick  Charles,  Prince,  remarkable  example  of  decision  in  the 
commander-in-chief  given  by  him  on  the  day  before  Koniggratz, 
66  et  seq.;  his  dispositions  for  attacking  the  Sarre  frontier  in  1870, 
495  et  seq.;  his  marches  after  Koniggratz,  545  et  seq.  pass. 

Frederick  the  Great,  his  employment  of  rivers  as  lines  of  communica- 
tions, 175;  on  the  value  of  proper  information  concerning  the 
enemy,  473, 

Frederick  William  III.  of  Prussia,  in  beginning  of  campaign  of  1806, 
12)7  et  seq.  pass. 

Friedland,  campaign  of,  537  et  seq. 

Froeschwiller,  battle  of,  cause  of  French  defeat  at,  191. 

Frontiers,  defensive  organization  of,  195;  of  neutral  states,  201; 
advantages  of  angular,  222  et  seq.;  relation  of,  to  the  defensive, 
337  et  seq.;  attack  of,  470  et  seq.;  combat  of  Wissembourg  as  an  il- 
lustration of  frontier  engagements,  482;  proper  dispositions  for 
crossing,  501-2;  principles  to  be  observed  by  an  army  in  its  march 
toward,  503;  attack  and  defense  of,  in  future,  532;  illustration  of 
the  advantage  of  angular,  561;  protection  of,  on  the  defensive, 
614-15;  Austrian  protection  of,  in  1866,  663  et  seq. 

Front,  an  army's  combat,  extent  of,  89  et  seq.;  its  march,  extent  and 
direction  of,  91  et  seq.  and  228,  Napoleon's  do.,  93;  of  opera- 
tions, defined  and  illustrated,  227  et  seq. 

Frossard,  General,  his  projet  of  operations  drawn  up  in  consequence 
of  the  Luxemburg  affair,  346  et  seq.;  his  defeat  at  Spicheren,  529 
et  seq. 

Future  Wars,  application  of  the  principle  of  combining  armies  in,  105 
et  seq.;  discussion  of  the  two  and  three  division  corps  S3'stem, 
1 2 1-2;  the  question  of  the  strength  and  composition  of  cavalry 
divisions,  131  et  seq.;  the  character  and  amount  of  artillery  that 
should  accompany  independent  cavalry  divisions,  134-5;  the  staff, 
140;  the  headquarters,  147  et  seq.;  the  use  of  railroads  on  the  of- 
fensive, 160, — on  the  defensive,  161-2;  the  necessity  of  a  more 
complete  railroad  service  in  armies,  166;  character  and  amoimt  of 
information  obtained  during  peace,  concerning  neighboring  states, 
167;  the  passage  of  rivers,  183;  the  selection  and  organization  of 
defensive  positions  during  peace,  191-2;  the  cities  that  would  be- 
come strategic  points  in  a  new  war  between  France  and  Germany, 
193;  fortresses  discussed,  ib.  el  seq.;  special  staffduties  during  peace, 
202-3;  the  selection  of  objectives,  210;  bases  of  operations,  ib.  et 
seq.;  German  base  in  a  war  with  Russia,  223, — ^with  France,  224; 
duties  of  governments  respecting  strategic  railroads,  225-6;  Ger- 
many's new  strategic  railroads  leading  to  the  French  frontier, 
226;  important  rule  to  be  observed  in  marches,  292;  influence  of 


INDEX.  693 

railroads  in  nio(lifyin<f  the  character  of  bases,  317  el  scq.;  the  pre- 
paration of  projefs  of  operations  during  peace,^330  ei  scq.;  jjrinci- 
ples  governing  the  character  of  operations  at  the  beginning  of 
war,  361;  the  offensive  and  defensive  considered,  370  et  scq.;  prin- 
ciples controlling  mobilization,  375  ct  scq. ;scope  of  concentrations 
at  the  present  time,  440  cl  scq.;  rail  transport  service,  444  ci  scq.; 
stragetic  deployments,  447  ci  scq.  ;  the  effect  of  making  extensive 
raids  into  the  enemy's  country  with  large  bodies  of  cavalry  im- 
mediately after  the  declaration  of  war,  449-50  ;  rapidity  of  mobili- 
zation, upon  what  dependent?  450  ;  attack  of  frontiers,  470  el  seq., 
490  el  scq.  ;  necessity  of  a  vigorous  reconnaissance  service,  4S9  ci 
scq.,  498  el  seq.  ;  important  principles  governing  dispositions  to  be 
made  when  approaching  the  enemy's  frontier,  502 ;  important 
principles  to  be  observed  when  in  vicinity  of  enemy,  531-2  ;  the 
degree  of  initiative  to  be  allowed  the  army  commanders  by  the 
generalissimo,  549  el  scq.  ;  the  angular  formation  applied  to  a 
group  of  combined  armies  on  the  march,  550  and  604;  principles 
to  be  observed  in  making  out  orders  for  the  march  of  the  large 
masses  composing  modern  armies,  592-3  ;  the  formation  to  be 
adopted  by  an  armj^  on  the  march,  603. 

Garrison  troops,  formation  of  the,  in  Germany,  383. 

General  staff,  the,  at  Berlin,  diities  of,  during  peace,  202-3. 

Germany,  forces  put  on  foot  b}'  her  in  first  eighteen  days  of  Franco- 
German  war,  and  those  transported  to  the  frontier  in  same  period, 
37  ;  her  military  organization,  39  el  seq.;  character  of  her  landwehr, 
40;  number  of  her  field  forces,  41  and  "Supplementary  Notes;" 
increase  in  her  active  army  by  the  "Septennate  Bill  "  of  1887,  41 
nole ;  composition  of  her  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery,  42; 
strength  of  her  tactical  units,  43  ;  her  army  of  field  reserve,  44, — 
of  garrison  reserve,  ib.;  the  two  principal  aims  held  in  view  in  her 
military  organization,  45  ;  grouping  and  strength  of  her  various 
armies  in  1870,  109  el  scq.;  strength  of  her  corps,  117  ;  normal  type 
of  her  corps  and  divisions,  127-8  ;  different  classes  of  headquarters 
in  her  army,  147  ;  passage  of  the  Moselle  by  her  armies  in  1870, 
180  ;  probable  effect  of  French  fortifications  upon  her  operations 
in  case  of  a  future  invasion  of  France,  194  ;  duties  of  her  general 
staff  during  peace,  202-3  ^  choice  of  objectives  b}'  her  armies  in 
1870,  204-5  ;  tier  supply  centres  in  1870,  212  el  scq.;  her  bases  of 
operations  in  1870,  214  ;  endeavors  in  her  treaties  to  sectire  angular 
bases,  222-3  ;  lier  base  in  case  of  a  war  with  Russia,  223-4, — do. 
with  France,  224  ;  formations  adopted  by  her  armies  on  their  base 
in  1S70,  225  ;  her  strategic  railroads  in  1870,  226  ;  her  choice  of  lines 
of  operations  in  1866,  and  in  campaign  in  the  East  in  1871,  236  el 
seq.  ;  the  principle  of  unity  of  lines  of  operations  observed  by  her 
I.  and  II.  Armies  in  1870,  262, — but  the  III.  Army  advances  for  a 


694  INDEX. 

time  upon  a  separate  line,  287  et  seq., — Von  Moltke  in  defense  of 
this  operation,  288  ;  her  lines  of  communications  in  1870  :  I.  Army, 
308-9,  III.  Army,  310  et  seq.,  XL  Army,  312-13,  Army  of  the  South 
and  XIV.  corps,  313;  system  adopted  by  her  in  1870  for  the  pro- 
tection of  her  lines  of  communications,  314  ei  seq.  ;  her  rail  com- 
munications in  1871,  319;  objectives  and  lines  of  operations  of  her 
I.  and  II.  Armies  in  1870,  324-5  ;  \\.&r  projet  of  operations  in  1870, 
339  et  seq.;  her  system  of  mobilization,  378  et  seq.;  her  mobiliza- 
tion in  1870,  384  et  seq., — her  war  forces,  388  et  seq., — her  concen- 
tration, 464  et  seq., — her  attack  of  the  Alsacian  frontier,  475  et  seq., 
— the  frontier  engagement  at  Wissembourg,  ^^2  et  seq., — her  at- 
tack of  the  Sarre  frontier,  492  et  seq., — the  battle  of  Spicheren, 
512  ei  seq.;  position  of  her  I.  and  II.  Armies  on  August  5,  1870, 
513-14  ;  movements  of  her  armies  upon  the  French  forces  march- 
ing toward  Sedan,  573  et  seq.;  the  marches  of  her  armies  in  August, 
1870,  in  illusti-ation  of  j^roper  dispositions  for  marches,  598  et  seq.; 
positions  occupied  by  her  III.  Army,  August  20,  1870,  601-2  ;  prin- 
ciples guiding  her  dispositions  for  the  march  in  1870,  602  et  seq.; 
march  of  her  armies  upon  Paris  in  1870,  605  et  seq. 

Goltz,  General  Von  der,  on  the  influence  of  artillery  in  battle,  125  ;  on 
the  organization  of  Prussian  headquarters  in  1806,  136  et  seq.;  on 
the  new  French  fortifications,  197-8 ;  on  the  comparative  value 
of  the  offensive  and  defensive,  369  ;  on  the  necessity  of  being  able 
to  recall  covering  troops  to  their  commands  in  time  for  decisive 
engagements,  450  ;  on  the  conditions  and  advantages  of  the  de- 
fensive, 609  et  seq. 

Gorgei,  General,  commands  the  insurgent  Hungarians  in  1849,  207. 

Governing  men,  the  art  of,  is  to  act  upon  them  through  their  impulses, 
86. 

Grade,  parity  of,  opposed  to  principle  of  "unit}'  in  command,"  59  ;  in- 
conveniences of,  shown  by  the  dissensions  in  the  Army  of  Portu- 
gal in  181 1,  ib.  et  seq. 

Grant,  General,  on  stubbornness  in  battle,  68-9. 

Gravelotte,  battle  of,  objectives  and  lines  of  operations  of  the  German 
armies  before,  326-7, — after,  328-9. 

Grouchy,  Marshal,  his  conduct  in  Waterloo  campaign,  in  the  light  of 
his  letter  to  Napoleon  on  day  following  the  battle,  79-So. 

Grouping  of  armies,  generall}',  ico-i  ;  under  Napoleon,  loi  ;  by  the 
Allies  in  1813,  101-2  ;  by  the  Federals  in  war  of  Secession,  102  ;  by 
the  French  in  1868,  103, — do.  in  1870,  103-4 ;  necessity  of,  in  case 
of  large  masses  of  troops,  105  ;  by  the  Germans  in  1870,  108  et  seq. 

Hainan,  General,  succeeds  General  Windischgratz  in  command  of 
Austrian  forces  in  Hungarian  war  of  1849,  207. 

Headquarters,  organization  of, — dangers  of  faulty  organization,  135 
et  seq., — example  of  latter,  in  case  of  the  Prussian  army  in  1S06, 


INDKX.  695 

136  cf  srq., — do.  in  case  of  the  French  army  in  iSjo,  13S-9  ;  more 
attention  to  organization  of,  necessary  to-day  than  formerly,  139, 
reasons  for  do.,  140  ;  different  classes  of,  in  German  army,  147  ;  the 
proper  composition  of,  ib.  el  seq.  ;  duties  of  commandant  of,  150  ; 
persons  who  .shonld  be  excluded  from,  151, — case  in  illustration, 
ib.  ct  seq. 

Hilly  regions  as  obstacles,  188-9. 

Hoche,  General,  in  campaign  of  1793,  636  ct  seq.  pass. 

Hohenlohe,  Prince,  in  beginning  of  campaign  of  1806,  136;  in  Valmy 
campaign,  624  et  seq.  pass. 

Honor,  admirable  pivot  for  great  actions,  86. 

Hood,  General,  commands  Confederate  forces  in  second  part  of  Atlanta 
campaign,  304  et  seq.  pass. 

Horse  depot,  corps,  equipment  of,  126. 

Hospitals,  field,  number  of,  in  German  army  corps,  128. 

Hungary,  campaign  of  Austria  in  1S49  against  insurgent,  in  illustra- 
tion of  choice  of  objectives,  207. 

Independent  against  combined  lines  of  operations,  illustrated  by  cam- 
paign of  1795  in  Germany,  244-5, — and  1796  in  do.,  245  et  seq. 

Independent  troops,  presence  of  bodies  of,  within  theatres  of  opera- 
tions, opposed  to  principle  of  "unity  in  command,"  63-4. 

Infantry,  organization  of,  in  German  army,  42  ;  length  of  road  occupied 
by  a  division  of,  on  the  march,  116;  composition  of  the  division, 
123-4  ;  effects  of  woods  on  the  action  of,  190. 

Infirmary  detachments,  strength  and  duties  of,  in  German  army,  128. 

Information,  necessity  of  having  such,  of  the  armies  of  neighboring 
states  in  time  of  peace  as  will  permit  calculations  of  their  mobili- 
zation and  concentration  periods  to  within  about  a  day,  356  ;  an 
army's  covering  cavalry  the  best  agency  for  obtaining,  in  time  of 
war,  472  et  seq.  pass. 

Initiative,  the,  German  idea  of,  shown  by  the  operations  of  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  at  Koniggratz,  66  et  seq,;  orders  of  superior 
should  not  curtail  it  unduly,  83  ;  extent  to  which  German  leaders 
exercise  it,  shown  at  Spicheren,  516  et  seq., — and  by  the  character 
of  the  orders  sent  them,  588  et  seq. 

Inspector-general  of  stations,  duties  of,  149. 

Inspectorship  of  depots  in  German  armies  in  1870,  314  et  seq. 

Intendance  department  explained,  143  note. 

Interior  lines  of  operations,  advantages  of,  shown  in  campaigns  of 
1795  and  1796  in  Germany,  244^/  seq.;  the  subject  discussed  at 
length,  and  illustrated  by  Napoleon's  campaigns  of  1796  and  1797 
against  the  Austrians,  269  et  seq.;  use  of  a  retarding  force  in  con- 
nection with,  291  ;  an  army  adopting  them  should  avoid  being 
drawn  into  too  restricted  a  space,  ib. — See  "Lines  of  Operations." 

Intrenched  camps,  those  of  the  present  day  require  the  free  disposition 


696  INDp;X. 

of  new  armies  upon  flanks  or  rear  of  the  operating  forces,  106  ; 
where  located  in  modern  systems  of  fortifications,  195  ;  the  proper 
office  of,  is  to  serve  as  points  of  support  in  an  active  defense,  657. 

Iser,  the,  operations  upon,  in  1866,  669. 

Ital}',  strength  and  organization  of  her  army,  45  et  seq.  and  "Supple- 
mentary Notes  ;"  strength  of  her  army  corps,  119  ;  organization  of 
her  cavalry  divisions,  135  ;  lines  of  defense  in  Northern,  320  et  seq.; 
her  operations  in  1S66,  in  illustration  of  faulty  directions  of  march, 
564  et  seq. 

Inundations,  their  use,  321-2. 

Jarras,  General,  chief-of-staff  to  Bazaine,  139. 

Jena,  campaign  of,  lines  of  communications  in,  298  et  seq. 

Johnston,  General  J.  E.,  commands  Confederate  forces  in  first  part  of 
Atlanta  campaign,  302  et  seq.  pass.;  his  operations  in  North  Caro- 
lina in  1865,  307. 

Jomini,  Baron,  his  definition  of  strategy  and  tactics,  4 ;  on  the  military 
power  of  a  state,  28-9  ;  on  the  importance  of  the  proper  organi- 
zation of  the  staff,  141— 2  ;  on  seizing  the  enemy's  communi- 
cations, 244  ;  on  simple  and  double  lines  of  operations,  267-8 ; 
general  principles  to  be  observed  in  deciding  upon  the  character 
of  lines  of  operations  to  be  selected,  291  ;  on  the  advantages  of  the 
offensive,  372-3  ;  on  an  active  defense,  615-16 ;  on  Hoche's  opera- 
tions in  1793,  637-8. 

Joubert,  General,  commands  a  retaining  force  in  campaign  of  1797  in 
Ital}^  254, — Napoleon's  instructions  to  him  in  same  campaign, 
256  et  seq.;  he  is  attacked  by  Alvinzi  at  Rivoli,  281. 

Jourdan,  Marshal,  in  campaign  of  1795  in  Germany,  244-5, — of  1796  in 
do.,  245  et  seq.  pass.;  in  campaign  of  1794,  640  et  seq.  pass. 

Kellermann,  General,  in  Valmy  campaign,  625  et  seq.  pass. 

Koniggratz,  battle  of,  changes  imposed  by,  36  et  seq. ;  dispositions 
made  by  Prince  Frederick  Charles  on  the  evening  before,  66  et 
seq.;  stubbornness  displayed  by  the  Prussians  at,  69  et  seq. 

Kl^ber,  General,  severe  measures  to  protect  his  retreat  in  Vendee  in 
1793,  78  ;  in  campaign  of  1796  in  Germany,  246  et  seq.  pass. 

Kray,  Marshal,  in  campaign  of  1796  in  Germany,  249, — of  1800  in  do., 
595  et  seq.  pass. 

Krismanic,  General,  h.\s  proj'et  of  operations  for  Austrian  army  in  1866, 
359  et  seq. 

La  Marmora,  General,  his  views  on  the  Italian  military  situation  in 
1866,  568. 

Landslurm,  the,  in  Germany,  41  and  "Supplementary  Notes;"  in 
Austria,  "Supplementary  Notes." 

Landwehr,  character  of  German,  40  ;  Austrian,  47. 

Landwehr  battalion  districts,  duties  of  the  commanders  of,  in  Germany, 
upon  the  order  to  mobilize,  3S0-1. 


INDKX.  697 

Lateral  coiiniiiiniralions,  necessity  of  good,  in  military  operations, 
229. 

Latonr,  General,  in  canipaijjn  of  1796  in  Germany,  248-50. 

Laws  of  war,  their  prohibitions,  23-4. 

Leipsic  campaign,  cause  of  Napoleon's  defeat  in,  291. 

Levies  en  masse  contrasted  with  disciplined  troops,  241-2. 

Line,  first  and  second,  ami}'  gronps  of,  ic6. 

Lines  of  defense,  employment  of  rivers  as,  177;  mountains  as,  1S7; 
definition  of,  and  views  of  Napoleon  on,  320  ct  scq. ;  general  con- 
ditions of  good,  from  a  vStrategic  standpoint,  323. 

Lines  of  operations,  defined,  230  ;  general  principles  governing  their 
direction,  231  ;  campaign  of  iSoo  in  Italy  as  illustrating  choice 
of,  232  ct  seq.;  choice  of,  in  1S07,  i£66,  and  1870,  236;  choice 
of,  by  the  Germans  in  campaign  in  the  East  in  1871,  ib.  etseq.; 
the  principle  of  unity  of,  244, — do.  illustrated  by  campaign  in 
Germany  in  1795,  244-5, — ii^'  1796,  245  et  seq., — by  campaign  of 
1797  in  Italy,  253  et  scq., — by  first  part  of  Franco-German  war, 
262  et  scq.;  the  principle  of  unity  of,  stated,  267, — violation  of  this 
principle  by  the  Turks  in  1878,  7'/^.;  Jomini  on  simple  and  double, 
267-8, — Napoleon  on  do.,  268  ;  double  lines  of,  sometimes  adopted 
to  accomplish  a  strategic  envelopment,  268-9, — the  combinations 
to  adopt  against  armies  attempting  such  an  envelopment,  269 ; 
interior,  defined,  ib., — principles  to  be  observed  when  emploj'ing 
do.,  270, — Bonaparte's  campaign  of  1796  in  Italy  in  illustration  of 
the  proper  method  of  do.,  ib.  et  scq.,  his  Castiglione  campaign 
against  Wiirmser  in  the  same  year  in  illustration  of  do.,  272  ct  scq., 
— also  his  Autumn  campaign  of  same  year,  276  et  scq.,  his  Arcole 
campaign  against  Alvinzi,  279-80,  his  Rivoli  campaign  against  do., 
280  ct  scq.,  and  his  campaign  of  1814  in  Champagne,  283;  the 
double  line  adopted  by  the  Prussians  in  1866,— Von  Moltke  in 
defense  of  same,  ib.  et  seq., — do.  on  the  proper  emploj^ment  of 
interior  lines,  285, — Benedek's  failure  to  profit  by  his  adversaries' 
use  of  double,  286  ;  an  interior  line  adopted  by  the  Prussians  after 
Koniggratz,  287  ;  i:se  of  double,  by  the  Germans  for  a  short  period 
in  commencement  of  war  of  1870-71,  ib.  et  seq.;  the  French  at  the 
end  of  August  1870,  manoeiivre  irpon  exterior  lines,  289-90  ;  prin- 
ciples to  be  observed  in  the  selection  of,  ic^oet  seq., — the  principal 
object  held  in  view  in  their  selection,  293  ;  those  of  the  I.  and  II. 
German  armies  in  1870,  324-5, — of  the  III.  German  army  do.,  325 
et  scq., — of  these  armies  from  the  Moselle  upon  Chalons,  328-9. 

Loire,  the  campaign  on  the,  in  October  1870,  use  made  of  railroads  by 
the  French  during,  for  the  transport  of  troops,  162  ;  the  French 
adopt  a  double  line  of  operations,  263  ;  protection  of  French  con- 
centration previous  to,  440. 

Lombardy,  campaign  of  1849  i'l)  543- 
45 


698  INDEX. 

Mack,  General,  Napoleon's  angular  base  against  him  in  1805,  216  ;  he 
attempts  an  enveloping  movement  against  the  French  in  the 
Roman  States  in  179S,  560  et  seq. 

MacMahon,  Marshal,  his  order  of  August  2,  for  the  defense  of  the 
frontier  at  Wissembourg,  479, — do.  of  August  4  to  General  Douay 
on  this  subject,  483-4  ;  he  is  appointed  commander-in-chief  of  the 
Army  of  Chalons,  570;  reasons  for  his  march  upon  Sedan,  571  et 
seq., — what  his  course  should  have  been,  575. 

MacPherson,  General,  commands  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  in  the 
Atlanta  campaign,  302  et  seq.  pass. 

Manteuffel,  General,  in  campaign  in  the  East  in  1871,  239  et  seq.  pass. 

Marches,  definition  of  strategic,  9, — after  battles,  they  are  the  most* 
important  operations  of  war,  533  et  seq.;  march  objectives  and 
directions  illustrated  by  campaign  of  1805,  535-6, — of  1806,  536, — 
of  1807,  537  et  seq., — of  1849  in  Lombardy,  543i?/5dY-! — by  the 
movements  of  the  Prussian  armies  from  the  Elbe  to  the  Danube 
in  1866,  545  et  seq.;  principles  relating  to,  559  ;  errors  of  direction 
in,  560  et  seq., — campaign  of  1798  in  the  Roman  States  in  illustra- 
tion, ib., — operations  of  the  Italians  in  1866,  564  et  seq.,  and  the 
march  of  the  Army  of  Chalons  upon  Sedan  in  1870  in  do.,  570 
etseq.;  principles  governing  dispositions  for,  593-4;  faulty  dispo- 
sitions for,  illustrated  by  Moreau's  campaign  of  1800,  595  et  seq.; 
proper  dispositions  for,  illustrated  by  those  of  the  German  armies 
in  August,  1870,  598  et  seq., — a  summary  of  the  principles  guid- 
ing the  dispositions  of  the  German  armies  at  this  time,  602  et  seq., 
— dispositions  for  the  march  of  these  armies  from  Sedan  to  Paris, 
605  et  seq.;  orders  relating  to,  character  of,  see  "  Orders." 

Marengo,  campaign  of,  in  illustration  of  advantageous  direction  of 
lines  of  operations,  232. 

Marmont,  Marshal,  letter  of,  to  Berthier,  chief  of  staff,  commenting 
upon  the  lack  of  unity  in  the  operations  of  the  armies  in  Spain 
and  Portugal  in  181 2,  56-7  ;  on  the  siibdivisions  of  a  small  army, 

97- 
Massena,  Marshal,  his  difficulties  in  exercising  command  in  the  Army 

of  Portugal  in   181 1,   59  et  seq.;    Bonaparte's  instructions  to,   in 

campaign  of  1797  in  Italy,  255-6. 
Meckel,   Major,   his  opinion  in  favor  of  the  three-division  system  of 

corps  partition,  121-2. 
Medical  attention,  how  assured  in  German  army,  128. 
Melas,  General,  Napoleon's  campaign  against  him  in  1800,  232  et  seq. 
Method,  general,  pursued  in  this  work,  4. 

Metz,  how  Bazaine's  forces  should  have  operated  around,  655. 
Military  history,  should  serve  to  demonstrate  the  principles  of  strategy 

and  grand  tactics,  2;  General  Von  Peucker  upon  the  importance 

of  the  study  of,  18. 


INDEX.  699 

Military  institutions,  existing,  general  principles  governing,  33  et  seq. 

Mobilization,  defined,  374-5;  scope  of,  at  present  time,  ih.;  advantages 
of  a  prompt,  376-7;  German  sj'stem  of,  il'^ct  seq.;  Gernum,  in 
1870,  384  cV  .Vd'^. ;  French,  in  1870,  y^<^  et  scq., — inconveniences  of, 
402  et  scq., — the  order  calling  to  active  service,  406  et  seq., — new 
formations,  408-9, — condition  of  affairs  at  the  depots,  410  et  seq., 
— formation  of  the  various  units,  413  et  seq.  ;  of  the  Austrian 
Army  of  the  North  in  1866,  662. 

Modern  industry,  effects  of  the  progress  of,  upon  war,  6. 

Modern  War,  the  new  processes  constituting,  vi. 

Moltke,  Count  Von,  his  views  on  the  proper  disposition  of  the  Ger- 
man masses  in  1870,  109  ;  his  choice  of  objectives  in  1870,  204-5  \ 
his  choice  of  lines  of  operations  in  1866,  1870,  and  in  campaign 
in  the  East  in  1871,  236  et  seq.;  in  defense  of  the  double  line  of 
operations  adopted  by  the  Prussians  in  1S66,  284-5  ;  01^  the  proper 
employment  of  interior  lines,  285  ;  he  adopts  an  interior  line  of 
operations  after  Koniggratz,  287 ;  in  defense  of  his  adoption  of  a 
double  line  during  early  part  of  war  of  1S70,  288-9;  on  the  pro- 
visional character  of  plans  of  operations,  332 ;  his  projets  of  ope- 
rations in  1870,  339  ^^f  seq.;  his  concentration  in  1870  in  illustration 
of  selection  of  proper  zone  of  do. ,  435  ;  his  order  for  the  attack  of 
the  Alsacian  frontier  in  1870,  476;  manner  of  disposing  his  troops 
for  passage  of  frontiers,  500-1  ;  his  orders  for  movements  after 
Koniggratz,  548-9 ;  his  dispositions  in  anticipation  of  a  battle 
near  Vienna  in  1866,  557-8;  summary  of  his  orders  of  August  9, 
1870,  as  indicating  the  principles  to  be  followed  in  making  out 
do.  for  marches,  589. 

Moreau,  General,  Napoleon's  instructions  to,  on  the  conduct  of  ope- 
rations in  Germany  in  1800,  219-20, — his  operations  of  this  year 
criticised  by  Napoleon,  221 ;  in  campaign  of  1796  in  Germany, 
245  et  seq.  pass.;  faulty  dispositions  for  the  march,  in  iSoo,  595. 

Moselle,  the,  how  it  should  have  been  made  use  of  by  the  French  in 
1870  as  a  line  of  defense,  177-8;  passage  of,  by  the  Germans  in 
1870,  180  ;  march  of  German  armies  to,  in  1870,  326-7. 

Mountains,  influence  of  ranges  of,  when  perpendicular  to  lines  of  in- 
vasion, 187, — when  parallel  to  do.,  ib.;  Blume  on,  187-8. 

Murat,  Marshal,  instructions  of  Napoleon  to,  for  reconnaissance  of 
certain  roads,  etc.,  170-1. 

Napoleon,  extracts  from  observations  of,  on  the  study  of  the  military- 
art,  14  ;  his  letter  to  the  Directorj'  leading  it  to  abandon  its  design 
of  dividing  the  Army  of  Italy  in  1796, — in  illustration  of  the 
principle  of  ''unity  in  command,"  54-5  ;  analysis  of  his  military- 
character,  by  Rocquancourt,  73 ;  his  opinion  on  stubbornness  in 
battle,  ib., — do.  on  the  qualities  requisite  in  a  commander,  74; 
grouping  of   forces  under,     loi ;  instructions  to    Bertrand  upon 


700  INDEX. 

reconnaissance  of  theatre  of  operations  in  1S05,  155  ;  instructions 
to  Savary  in  August,  1805,  upon  reconnaissance  of  certain  roads, 
etc.,  i(i'&  et  seq., — to  Murat  upon  do.,  170  eiseq.;  his  method  of 
employino;  rivers  as  a  means  of  transportation,  172-3;  on  rivers 
as  obstacles,  186  ;  at  what  point  in  his  plans  obstacles  were  taken 
into  consideration,  192  ;  on  the  dangers  of  excessive  use  of  forti- 
fications, 200;  his  angular  bases  of  operations  in  1S05  and  1806, 
216  et  seq.;  in  a  letter  to  his  brother  Joseph,  in  1806,  he  outlines 
his  plan  of  campaign,  and  predicts  the  coiirse  of  events,  217-18; 
his  employment  of  an  angular  base  in  campaign  of  1800,  218  et 
seq., — his  instructions  to  Moreau  upon  the  conduct  of  operations 
in  Germany  in  the  same  year,  219-20, — his  judgment  upon  the 
Operations  actually  undertaken  by  Moreau  in  this  year,  221  ;  his 
campaign  of  iSoo  in  Italy,  in  illustration  of  choice  of  lines  of 
operations,  232  et  seq. ;  his  choice  of  lines  of  operations  in  1807, 
236 ;  his  campaign  of  1797  in  Ital}',  253  et  seq., — his  reply  to  criti- 
cisms charging  him  with  adopting  a  double  line  of  operations  in 
this  campaign,  261  2;  on  simple  and  double  lines  of  operations, 
268;  his  campaign  of  1796  in  Italy  as  illustrating  the  proper  em- 
ployment of  interior  lines  of  operations,  270  et  seq., — his  Caslig- 
lione  campaign  against  Wiirmser  in  same  year,  as  an  illustration 
of  do.,  272  et  seq., — his  criticism  of  Wiirmser's  operations  in  this 
campaign,  274-5  \  on  the  orders  to  be  given  a  part  of  the  army 
necessaril}'  detached  from  the  main  forces,  276  ;  his  second  or 
Autumn  campaign  against  Wiirmser  in  1796,  as  illustrating  proper 
use  of  interior  lines,  and  his  criticism  on  opponent's  operations 
in  this  campaign,  ib.  et  seq., — his  Arcole  campaign  against  Al- 
vinzi,  in  illustration  of  do.,  279-80, —  also  his  Rivoli  campaign 
against  Alvinzi  in  1797,  2S0  ct  seq., — and  that  in  Champagne  in 
1814,  283;  employing  interior  lines  in  1813,  he  violates  the  prin- 
ciple that  an  arm\'  so  operating  should  avoid  being  drawn  into 
too  restricted  a  space,  291-2;  principles  laid  down  by  him  rela- 
tive to  lines  of  operations,  293  ;  on  the  importance  of  lines  of 
communications,  295  et  seq., — his  definition  of  do.,  296, — on  the 
changing  of  do.,  297, — his  change  of  do.,  in  Austerlitz  campaign, 
297-8,  — in  campaign  of  1806,  298-9, —  his  projected  change  of 
these  lines  in  1814,  299  et  seq.;  on  lines  of  defense,  especially 
those  in  Northern  Italy,  320  ct  seq.;  his  concentration  in  1809,  in 
illiTSlration  of  proper  selection  of  zone  of  do.,  430  et  seq.  ;  his 
early  operations  in  1815  in  illustration  of  proper  method  of  pro- 
tecting concentrations,  437  ct  seq. ;  his  campaign  of  1805,  535-6, — 
of  i8c6,  536, — and  of  1807,  537  et  seq.,  in  illustration  of  proper 
directions  of  marches  ;  his  criticisms  of  Mack's  operations  in  the 
Roman  States  in  1798,  562-3, —  of  Chamijionnet's  march  from 
Rome  to  Naples  in  same  year,  563-4  ;  his  orders  in  campaign   of 


INDEX.  701 

1806,  in  illuslralion  of  ])ropt'r  character  of  do.,  576  cl  scq.;  advice 
to  Joseph  upon  the  conduct  of  marches,  594;  on  Moreau's  dispo- 
sitions for  the  march  in  1800,  597  ;  on  the  dangers  of  a  dispersion 
of  troo])s,  613-14;  on  the  proper  method  of  conducting  opera- 
tions on  the  defensive,  616-17  ;  he  condemns  both  the  cordon  and 
group  system  of  defense,  61S;  on  the  defense  of  Dahnatia  in 
1806,  6\()  ct  scq.;  his  operations  in  1814,  642  et  scq., — the  defen- 
sive combinations  prescril)ed  by  him  in  this  year,  644  ct  scq., — a 
siunmary  of  the  principles  guiding  him  in  do.,  651  ;  his  plans  for 
the  defense  of  France  in  1S15,  ib.  ct  scq. 

Napoleon  III.,  defective  arrangement  of  his  masses  in  1870,  103-4;  at 
the  conference  at  Chalons  in  August,  1S70,  570. 

National  Defense,  Government  of,  during  Franco-German  War,  ope- 
rations in  the  East  under,  236  et  seq.;  resolves  to  take  the  offen- 
sive on  the  L,oire,  440. 

Neiitral  state,  the  advantages  of  throwing  back  the  enemy  upon  a, 
201. 

Ney,  Marshal,  his  experience  in  Portugal  in  iSii  in  illustration  of  the 
inconveniences  of  parity  of  grade,  59  et  seq.,  —  do  in  Ivusatia  in 
1813  as  illustrating  do.,  61  ;  his  stubborn  resistance  to  Benning- 
sen's  attack  in  the  beginning  of  campaign  of  1807,  537  ;  order  of 
Napoleon  to,  at  opening  of  campaign  of  1806,  iu  illustration  of 
proper  character  of  orders,  578-9. 

Niel,  Marshal,  his  plan  of  army  organization  in  France  in  1868,  in 
anticipation  of  a  war  with  Germany,  103, — his  projet  of  opera- 
tions in  this  year,  346  et  scq. 

Novara,  campaign  of,  543  et  scq. 

Obedience,  passive  and  reasoning,  compared,  76  et  seq.;  General 
Blondel  on,  78;  obedience  of  an  order  to  sacrifice  one's  life,  ib.; 
Grouchy's,  at  Waterloo, — his  letter  to  Napoleon  on  day  following 
the  battle,  79-80 ;  should  be  intelligent,  82-3. 

Objectives,  former  classification  of,  203  ;  at  the  present  time  they  are 
usually,  at  commencement  of  operations,  the  armies  of  the 
enemy,  instead  of  cities,  etc.,  with  examples,  204  et  seq.;  those 
successivel}'  chosen  by  the  invading  army  during  its  advance, 
205  ;  the  march  of  the  Allied  armies  upon  Paris  in  1814  an  excep- 
tion to  the  rule  that  the  enemy's  army  should  be  the  principal 
objective,  206, — also  the  Austrian  operations  against  insurgent 
Hungar}^  in  1849,  207  et  scq.;  railroads  centres  as,  209;  general 
principles  governing  choice  of,  210;  of  the  I.  and  II.  German 
armies  in  1870,  324-5;  of  the  III.  German  army  in  do.,  325  et 
scq.;  of  the  German  armies  after  Gravelotte,  328;  march  of  the 
Prussian  armies  from  the  Elbe  to  the  Danube  in  1866,  in  illustra- 
tion of  proper  selection  of,  545  et  seq. 

Obstacles,  the  two  principal  classes  of,  are  water-courses  and  moun- 


702  iNDp;x. 

tain  ranges,  176;  rivers  as,  177, — mode  of  crossing  do.,  179  etseq.; 
views  of  Blume  on  rivers  as,  \^\  et  seq., — Napoleon  on  do.,  186; 
mountains  as,  187  etseq.;  hilly  regions  as,  188-9;  woody  regions 
as,  189-90;  military  positions  as,  190  et  seq.;  those  in  the  theatre 
of  operations  interest  tactics  more  particularly  than  strategy,  192; 
artificial,  193, — populous  and  industrial  cities,  ib., — fortifications, 
ib.  et  scq. 

Offensive,  character  of  base  on  the,  211  ;  its  value  compared  with  that 
of  the  defensive,  368  et  seq.;  the  proper  time  to  decide  upon  tak- 
ing the,  373  ;  the  general  subject  of  operations  on  the,  374  et  seq. 

Officers,  use  of  patrols  of,  to  reconnoitre  the  enemy  on  the  eve  of 
battle  illustrated  at  Koniggratz,  67  ;  value  of  stubbornness  in, 
72-3  ;  influence  of  corps  of,  upon  the  success  of  operations,  76 ; 
qualities  essential  in,  ib.;  their  duties  toward  superiors,  82, — • 
toward  equals  and  inferiors,  84-5. 

Operations,  the  importance  of  studying  theatres  of,  5  ;  projets  of,  de- 
fined, 6;  offensive,  general  plan  of,  j  et  seq.;  German  combined 
movements  in  1870,  108 ;  mode  of  making  reconnaissance  of  a 
theatre  of,  under  Napoleon,  155  et  seq., — the  points  embraced  in 
a  study  of  do.,  159-60;  those  of  future  armies  of  invasion,  prob- 
able influence  of  modern  fortifications  upon,  194;  boundaries  of 
theatres  of,  200  et  seq., — strategic  value  of  do.,  203;  strategic 
points,  ib.  et  seq.;  strategic  lines,  bases  of  operations,  210  et  seq., 
— fronts  of  operations,  227  et  seq., — lines  of  operations,  229  et  seq., 
—lines  of  communications,  294  etseq., — lines  of  defense,  320  <?/ 
seq.;  projets  of,  defined  and  classified,  329-30  ;  offensive  and  de- 
fensive, compared,  369  et  seq.;  mobilization,  374, — German  system 
of,  378  et  j-^^.,— German  mobilization  in  1870,  3841?/  seq., — French 
do.  in  same  year,  399  et  seq,;  attack  of  frontiers,  470  et  seq., — 
character  of  this  operation,  470, — exploration  of  frontier  zones, 
471  et  seq., — attack  of  Bohemian  frontier  in  1866,  474-5, — do.  of 
Alsacian,  in  1870,  475  et  seq., — dispositions  of  the  French  at  the 
same  time,  478  et  seq.;  combat  of  Wissembourg  as  an  illustration 
of  frontier  engagements,  482  et  seq.;  attack  of  the  Sarre  frontier 
in  1870,  492  ^/' 5(fy.,— movements  of  the  French  on  the  Sarre  in 
this  year,  504  et  seq., — criticism  on  do.,  512  ;  battle  of  Spichereu, 
August  6,  1870,  in  illustration  of  frontier  engagements,  ib.  et  seq.; 
strategic  marches,  533  et  seq., — march  directions  illustrated  by 
campaign  of  1805,  535-6,— of  1806,  536,  — of  1807,  537  etsrq.,—oi 
1849  i"  Lombardy,  543  et  seq., — in  the  movement  of  the  Prussian 
armies  from  the  Flbe  to  the  Danube  in  1866,  545  et  seq.;  errors 
of  directions  in  mai'ches,  illustrated  by  campaign  of  1798  in  the 
Roman  States,  560  et  seq.,  and  the  campaign  of  1866  in  Italy, 
564  et  seq., — the  latter  campaign  an  illustration  also  of  the  viola- 
tion of  the  principle  of  concentrating  before  battle,  566;  march 


INDEX.  703 

of  the  Army  of  Chfiloiis  upon  Sedan  in  1S70,  in  illustration  of 
errors  of  direction  in  marches,  SJoel  srq.;  Moreau's  campaij^n  of 
1800,  in  illustration  of  faulty  dispositions  for  the  march,  595  et 
seq., — march  of  the  III.  German  Army  in  August,  1870,  in  illus- 
tration of  proper  dispositions  for  do.,  598  et  seq., — also  march  of 
the  German  forces  upon  Paris  in  this  year,  605  ci  seq.  ;  defensive 
operations  illu.strated  hy  defense  of  France  in  1792,  623  ^/ .^i^^^c.  ; 
in  1793,  634  et  seq.;  in  1794,  640  et  seq. ;  in  1814,  642  et  seq.;  and 
in  1870-1,  654  et  seq.;  defense  of  Bohemia  in  1866,  661  et  seq. 

Orders,  character  of,  in  case  of  a  part  of  an  army  necessarily  detached 
from  the  main  forces,  276 ;  proper  character  of  those  relating  to 
marches,  illustrated  by  orders  of  Napoleon  and  Soult  in  the  cam- 
paign of  1806,  $']6  et  seq.;  character  of,  and  criticism  upon  those 
of  the  French  in  the  early  part  of  the  war  of  1870,  583  et  seq., — 
those  of  the  Germans  in  this  year,  like  Napoleon's,  while  pi-ecise 
upon  measures  of  the  whole,  yet  do  not  curtail  the  initiative  un- 
duly, 588  et  seq.;  illustration  of,  for  the  march  of  a  corps,  590, — 
for  do.  of  a  division,  591-2  ;  principles  governing  the  preparation 
of,  for  the  march  of  corps  and  armies,  593  ;  those  of  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Prussia  for  the  march  to  the  Meuse,  in  August,  1870, 
599.  600. 

Organization  of  armies,  the  subject  treated  at  length,  21  et  seq.;  in 
case  of  German}^,  39, — of  Ital}',  45, — of  Austria,  47-8, — of  Russia, 
48-9, — of  England,  49, — of  Spain,  50, — of  France,  50-1. 

Osman  Pacha,  his  resistance  at  Plevna,  205. 

Parity  of  grade  a  serious  impediment  to  unity  in  command,  59. 

Passage  of  rivers,  method  of  executing,  with  examples,  179  et  seq.; 
the  open,  in  modern  times,  183. 

Peucker,  General  Von,  on  the  general  character  of  the  study  of  the 
militarj^  art,  16  et  seq.  ;  his  observations  on  the  study  of  tactics, 
17,  and  military  history,  18.     ' 

Pichegru,  General,  in  campaign  of  1795  in  Germany,  244-5;  "^  cam- 
paign of  1793,  636  et  seq.  pass., — of  1794,  640  et  seq.  pass. 

Pierron,  General,  sums  up  the  principles  relative  to  the  composition 
of  headquarters,  147  et  seq. 

Plan  of  Campaign.— See  "Projets  of  Operations." 

Plan  of  War.  -See  "War." 

Plevna,  as  illustrating  the  use  determined  troops  energetically  com- 
manded can  make  of  chance  positions,  192  ;  effect  upon  Russian 
movements  of  resistance  organized  here,  205. 

Po,  the,  passage  of,  by  the  French  army  in  1859,  179. 

Positions,  military,  the  previous  study  of,  indispensable  for  the  defen- 
sive, 190, — instances  of  such  study,  191 ;  the  case  of  Plevna,  192. 

Postal  ser\nce,  duties  of  the  director-in-chief  of,  150. 

Prague,  effect  of  treaty  of,  36.  ■ 


704  INDEX, 

Preparation  for  war,  the  subject  treated  at  length,  154  et  seq., — in- 
cludes a  study  of  topography  of  theatres  of  operations,  155  et  seq., 
— a  study  of  their  strategic  value,  203  ei  seq., — and  the  drawing 
up  of  projets  of  operations,  329  et  seq. 

Projets  of  operations,  definition  and  classification  of,  329-30 ;  their 
provisional  character,  330  1?/  seq..  Von  Moltke  and  General  Ber- 
thaut  on  do.,  332  ;  the  work  of  preparing  usually  intrusted  to  the 
chief  of  general  staff,  332-3  ;  data  necessary  for  drawing  up,  333  ; 
controlling  considerations  in  drawing  up  offensive,  ib.  et  seq., 
— do.  in  case  of  defensive,  335  et  seq. ;  that  of  the  Germans  in 
1868  in  view  of  a  war  with  France,  342  et  seq., — was  acted  apon  by 
them  in  1870,  345;  that  of  the  French  in  1868,  ■^Afi  et  seq., — in 
1870,  355-6 ;  Austria's  projet  of  the  whole  in  1866,  357, — that  of 
the  Army  of  the  North,  359  et  seq., — and  of  the  Archduke  Albert, 
362  et  seq. 

Protection  of  concentrations,  435  et  seq. 

Provost  marshal,  duties  of,  149. 

Prussia,  outline  of  the  military  development  of,  34  et  seq.;  grouping 
of  her  armies  in  1S70,  108  ;  her  cavalry  divisions  in  1866,  131, — 
do.  in  1870,  ib.;  the  staff  a  substantial  element  of  strength  in  her 
army,  146  ;  her  choice  of  principal  objective  in  1866,  204, — do.  of 
lines  of  operations  in  same  year,  236, — her  concentration,  452  et 
seq., — the  strength  of  her  forces,  463, — her  attack  of  the  Bohemian 
frontier,  474-5, — march  of  her  armies  from  the  Elbe  to  the  Dan- 
ube after  Koniggratz,  in  illustration  of  selection  of  march  objec- 
tives and  directions,  545  et  seq., — her  dispositions  in  anticipation 
of  a  battle  near  Vienna,  557-8. 

Quadrilateral,  the  Italian,  itifiuence  of,  in  the  Custozza  campaign, 
56S-9^fl'55. 

Qualities,  the  most  essential,  in  a  military  leader  considered  by  the 
Germans  to  be  decision  and  good  sense,  66 ;  do.  defined  by  Verdi 
du  Vernois  as  clearness  in  conception  and  energy  in  execution,  ib. 

Quentin,  St.,  battle  of,  use  of  railroads  in  forwarding  reinforcements 
to  take  part  in,  164. 

Radetsky,  Marshal,  his  success  in  Novara  campaign,  543  et  seq. 

Railroads,  duties  of  inspector-general  of,  and  stations,  149;  use  of,  in 
war,  160;  importance  of  their  direction,  161  ;  their  influence  upon 
the  movements  of  armies,  ib.  et  seq.;  their  employment  during 
the  campaign  on  the  Loire  in  October,  1870,  162;  reasons  why 
their  use  is  sometimes  of  diminished  value, — case  of  Bourbaki's 
movement  toward  Belfort  in  1870,  ib.;  examples  of  their  employ- 
ment in  enenn^'s  country,  163, — do.  on  eve  of  battle,  164;  their 
value  in  the  transjaortaLion  of  supplies,  165-6;  need  of  increased 
number  of  technical  troojjs  for  the  management  of,  166;  railroad 
centres  as  ol)jectives,  209;  the  base  of  operations  in  railroad  mili- 


INDEX.  705 

tary  service,  2r  1  ;  value  of  strategic,  226, — those  used  by  the  Cier- 
mans  in  1S70,  ib.;  use  of,  by  General  vShernian  in  1.S64,  method  of 
protecting,  etc.,  301  et  seq.  pass.;  use  of,  in  supplying  the  German 
armies  in  1S70-1,  308  et  seq.;  importance  of,  as  lines  of  commun- 
ications in  our  day,  317;  iM-ance  and  Germany  belter  provided 
with  railroad  material  than  other  Continental  vStates,  441  ;  influ- 
ence of,  upon  concentrations,  444 ;  yield  of  single  and  double 
track  lines,  446-7  ;  rail  transports  of  the  Prussian  armies  in  1866, 
458  ct  seq.;  effect  of,  in  changing  the  general  character  of  wars  at 
the  outset,  470. 

J^atio  una  ires,  their  number  compared  with  combatant  strength  of 
armies,  10^  et  seq.  pass. 

Readiness  for  war,  upon  what  dependent,  450. 

Reconnaissances,  manner  of  making,  under  Napoleon,  155  et  seq.  ; 
principle  governing,  159  ;  of  theatres  of  operations,  reasons  why 
they  should  now  be  made  in  time  of  peace,  id. . — points  embraced 
in,  159-60;  of  roads.  Napoleon's  instructions  to  Savary  in  1805  in 
illustration,  168, — do.  to  Miirat  in  do.,  170-1 ;  of  rivers,  points  to 
be  noted  in  making,  173, — special  points  do.  in  case  of  a  system 
of  rivers  parallel  to  communications,  175  ;  of  moiintain  ranges, 
187-8;  of  hilly  regions,  188;  of  woody  regions,  1S9-90;  of  mili- 
tary positions,  190  et  seq.;  the  study  of  the  large  cities  of  neigh- 
boring states  in  time  of  peace  an  essential  measure,  193, — do.  of 
the  fortifications  of  such  states,  194;  manner  of  making,  by  the 
cavalr)^  covering  an  army's  concentrations,  472  et  seq.  pass.;  em- 
ployment of  patrols  of  officers  in  making,  473  ;  that  made  by  the 
French  before  Wissembourg,  in  1870,  as  illustrating  faulty,  483; 
illustration  of  the  unfortunate  consequences  of  a  lax  reconnais- 
sance service,  4S9-90 ;  character  of  this  service  in  the  German 
armies  in  their  advance  into  France,  499  et  seq.  pass., — insuf- 
ficiency of  such  service  on  the  French  side  during  this  period, 
512;  positions  of  the  reconnoiteriug  forces  on  the  front  of  the 
III.  German  Armj^,  August  20,  1870,  601, — on  the  flank,  602. 

Regiment,  the  strength  of  in  German  army,  43. 

Reservists,  the,  mode  of  calling  to  colors  in  Germany,  381-2, — do.  in 
France,  401. 

Resources  of  the  enemy,  importance  of  studying  the,  6. 

Retaining  force,  use  of,  by  the  Archduke  Charles  in  1796  in  Germany, 
250 ;  by  Napoleon  in  Italy  in  1797,  254. 

Rhine,  the,  passage  of,  by  the  French  in  1796,  179. 

Rivers,  use  of,  as  a  means  of  transportation,  172  et  seq.;  points  to  be 
observed  by  an  army  following  a  sj^stem  of,  174, — do.  illustrated 
by  the  march  of  Schwarzenberg's  army  in  1813,  id.;  those  of 
Etirope  rarely  identical  with  lines  of  operations,  175;  restricted 
use  of,  by  modern  armies,  ib.;  their  employment  in  beginning  of 


7o6  INDEX. 

I^ranco-Geniiaii  War,  175-6;  when  parallel  to  lines  of  invasion, 
they  usually  serve  a^  points  d''  appui  for  a  wing,  177  ;  used  as  bases 
of  manoeuvres,  they  exercise  a  decisive  influence  upon  operations, 
ib.;  their  influence  as  obstacles,  ib.;  their  value  from  a  tactical 
point  of  view  when  perpendicular  to  line  of  march,  178, — mode 
of  effecting  a  crossing  under  these  circumstances,  ib.;  passage  of 
the  Rhine  by  the  French  in  1796,  179, — do.  of  the  Ticino  in  1859, 
ih.;  passage  of  the  Moselle  by  the  Germans  in  1870,  180;  passage 
of  the  Danube  by  the  Russians  in  1877,  181  et  seq.;  Blume  on 
rivers  as  obstacles,  184  et  seq., — Napoleon  on  do.,  186. 

Rivoli,  battle  of,  Bonaparte  defeats  Alvinzi  at,  281. 

Roads,  ordinary,  average  number  of  disposable,  in  Europe,  on  a  front 
of  50  kilometres,  92 ;  extent  of  road  required  for  the  march  of 
different  bodies  of  troops,  116-17;  have  not  diminished  in  im- 
portance in  modern  times,  166-7  ;  reconnaissance  of,  167  ;  necessity 
of  good  lateral,  229  ;  should  be  used  in  preference  to  railroads  for 
the  movement  of  large  bodies  of  troops  over  short  distances,  446. 

Roman  States,  the  campaign  of  1798  in,  560. 

Roquancourt  on  Napoleon's  military  character,  73. 

Russia,  strength  and  organization  of  her  army,  48-9 ;  strength  of  her 
corps,  118  ;  organization  of  her  cavalry  divisions,  135  ;  her  passage 
of  the  Danube  in  1877,  181  et  seq.;  her  armies  in  beginning  of  war 
of  1877-8  violate  the  principle  relating  to  choice  of  objectives, 
205,— the  effect  of  the  resistance  at  Plevna  upon  her  operations  in 
this  war,  ib.;  the  effect  of  her  assistance  of  Austria  in  the  Hun- 
garian war  of  1849,  209;  the  concentration  of  her  army  in  1807, 

436. 
Sardinians,  the,  operations  of  Bonaparte  against,   in   1796,  271-2, — of 

Radetsky  do.,  in  1849,  543  ^t  seq. 
Sarre,  the,  attack  of  this  frontier  in  1870,  492. 
Sarrebriick,  object  of  the  offensive  reconnaissance  of  the  French  at, 

on  August  2,  1870,  509. 
Savary,  General,  instructions  of  Napoleon  to,  for  the  reconnaissance 

of  certain  roads,  etc.,  168  et  seq. 
Schamhorst,  General,  chief-of-staff  to  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  in  1806, 

137- 
vSchellendorf,   General  Von,  on  army  subdivisions,  98  et  seq.;  on  the 

increased  importance  of  a  good  staff  in  armies  of  present  day,  142 

et  seq. 
Schofield,  General,  commands  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  in  the  Atlanta 

campaign,  302  et  seq.  pass.;  he  effects  a  junction  of  his  forces  with 

vSherman's  in  North  Carolina,  307. 
Schouardin,  comn\a.Wi\&x  oi  Saone-et-Loire  battalion  in  Vendee  in  1793, 

his  obedience  of  an  order  to  sacrifice  his  life,  7S-9. 
vSchwarzenberg,  Prince,  his  instructions  in  campaign  of  1813,  for  the 


INDEX.  707 

march  of  his  army  alonj^  a  system  of  parallel  streams.  174-5  I  his 
general  operations  in  eampaij^n  of  1814  in  France,  646  etscq.  pass. 

Scouts,  illustration  of  the  employment  of,  in  crossing  rivers,  179, — in 
distiirbint^  the  enemy's  rail  communications,  423. 

Sea  transports  well  fitted  to  actively  second  the  movements  of  armies, 
176. 

Secession,  the  War  of.  Federal  armies  during,  102. and  107. 

Second  line,  the,  duties  of  troops  of,  315-16. 

Sedan,  battle  of.  Von  Moltke  adopts  an  angular  front  at,  227-8. 

Segur,  General  De,  on  the  Friedland  campaign,  541  et  seq. 

Septennate  Bill  of  1887,  increase  in  German  army  by,  41  note. 

Shelter,  skill  in  utilizing,  by  infantry  when  advancing,  529. 

Sherman,  General,  the  first  period  of  his  Atlanta  campaign  as  an  illus- 
tration of  the  use  of  railroads  as  lines  of  communications,  and 
the  latter  period  as  illustrating  how  lines  of  communications  may 
be  changed,  301  et  seq. 

Soult,  Marshal,  orders  of  Napoleon  to,  in  beginning  of  campaign  of 
1806,  in  illustration  of  proper  character  of  orders,  576-7  and  580-1, 
— his  own  order  to  his  division  commanders  at  the  same  time  in 
illustration  of  do.,  582-3. 

South  German  States,  war  strength  of,  in  1870,  396, — do.  in  1866,  453. 

Spain,  strength  and  organization  of  her  army,  50. 

Spicheren,  battle  of,  transport  of  troops  by  rail  to  take  part  in,  164 ; 
the  character  of  frontier  engagements  illustrated  by,  512  ei  seq. 

Spirit,  the  military  and  martial,  contrasted,  80-1. 

Staff,  the,  its  co-operation  tnost  vital  to  the  exercise  of  the  command, 
75  ;  examples  of  defective  organization  of,  136  et  seq.;  Jomini  on 
the  importance  of  a  properly  constituted,  141  ;  General  Von 
Schellendorf  on  the  increased  importance  of  a  good,  in  armies  of 
to-day,  142  et  seq.;  classes  of  officers  of,  146;  duties  of  the  gen- 
eral staff  in  time  of  peace,  333  and  444. 

Staff,  chief  of,  proper  method  of  selecting,  and  scope  of  duties,  140 ; 
General  Von  Schellendorf  on  the  office  of,  143  et  srq.;  work  of 
preparing /ro/W  of  operations  usually  intrusted  to,  333. 

State,  a,  upon  what  its  strength  depends,  29. 

Statistical  resources,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  general  staff  in  time  of  peace 
to  gather  complete  information  on,  of  own  and  neighboring  states, 
202-3. 

St.  Cyr,  General,  on  the  art  of  war,  18 ;  his  criticism  of  Moreau's  dis- 
positions for  the  march,  in  campaign  of  1800  in  Germany,  596. 

Steinmetz,  General  Von,  commands  I.  German  Army  in  Franco-Ger- 
man war,  513. 

Strategic  deployment,  definition  of,  447-8  ;  how  protected,  449  et  seq.; 
responsibilit)^  for  proper,  rests  with  commander-in-chief  and  chief- 
of  staff,  451 ;  important  general  principles  to  be  observed  in  con- 


yoS  INDEX. 

nection  with,  I'b.;  of  the  Prussian  armies  in  iS66,  460  et  scq.;  of 
the  German  armies  in  1870,  467  et  scq.;  first  care  of  an  army  after 
its,  503. 

Strategic  front  defined,  227. 

Strategic  lines,  definition  and  classification  of,  210  et  seq.:  bases  of  op- 
erations, 210, — fronts  of  operations,  227-8, — lines  of  operations, 
22)0  et  seq., — lines  of  communications,  294  et  seq., — lines  of  de- 
fense, 320  et  seq. 

Strategic  points,  cities  as,  193  ;  definition  of,  203 ;  railroad  centres  as, 
209. 

Strategic  railroads,  the  value  of,  226. 

Strategy,  definitions  of,  3  et  seq.;  it  is  relatively  independent  of  the 
character  of  the  ground  in  theatre  of  operations,  192  ;  all  its  con- 
ditions fulfilled  bj^  the  maxim,  "Be  the  stronger  at  the  decisive 
point,"  243  ;  the  principles  of,  in  relation  to  enemy's  lines  of  com- 
munications, 244  ;  strategic  considerations  in  drawing  up  projets 
of  operations,  334. 

Stubbornness,  after  decision,  one  of  the  qualities  contributing  most  to 
success,  68  ;  General  Grant  on,  68-9  ;  the  display  of  this  quality 
by  German  officers  in  1870  a  conspicuous  cause  of  German  suc- 
cess, 69;  Marshal  Bliicher's  views  on  his  own,  in  1815,  ib.  ;  dis- 
played by  General  Fransecky  at  Koniggratz,  ib.  et  seq  ;  a  national 
virtue  with  the  English,  71  ;  General  Marbot  on  the  possession  of 
this  military  virtue  by  the  French,  72  ;  value  of,  in  an  officer,  ib. ; 
this  quality  possessed  by  Napoleon  in  a  remarkable  degree,  73  ;  his 
views  on,  ib. 

Supplies,  amount  of,  carried  in  corps  provision  columns,  126-"]  pass.  ; 
how  carried  in  German  army,  128  ;  employment  of  railroads  in 
transporting,  165  ;  sujoply  centers  of  the  German  armies  in  1870, 
212  ;  the  main,  are  to-day  accumulated  on  the  strategic  railroads 
in  rear  of  the  bases,  226  ;  method  of  providing,  by  General  Sher- 
man in  his  march  to  Savannah,  306-7  ;  they  are  transported  after 
the  troops  during  the  period  of  concentration,  445. 

Surgeon  General,  the  duties  of,  149. 

Tactics,  definitions  of,  3  et.  scq.;  of  the  Germans  at  vSpicheren,  519  and 
528. 

Tagliamento,  battle  on  the,  259. 

Telegraph. — See  "  Electric  Telegraph." 

Theatres  of  operations. — See  "Operations." 

Thomas,  General,  commands  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  in  the  At- 
lanta campaign,  302  et.  scq.  puss.;  covers  Sherman's  rear  during 
the  latter's  march  to  the  sea,  306. 

Ticino,  the,  passage  of,  by  the  French  in  1859,  I79- 

Topography  of  theatres  of  operations,  155;  points  embraced  in  a  stndy 
of,   159-60;  communications,  160;  uatiu-al  obstacles,   176;  artificial 


INDEX.  709 

obstacles,  193;  limits  of  theatres  of  operations,  200;  statistical  re- 
sources,  202. 

Transports,  the  general  staffs  and  the  railroad  companies  have  entire 
control  of  the  plan  of,  444;  influence  of  rail,  ib.  et  scq.\  princi- 
ples to  be  observed  in  connection  with  do.,  445  ct  srq.;  the  yield 
of  single  and  double  rail  lines,  446-7;  of  the  German  armies  in 
1870,  466-7. 

Traveling  service,  a,  for  foreign  countries,  167. 

Trochu,  General,  his  views  on  modern  period  of  warfare,  v. 

Turkey,  she  should  have  used  the  Danube  as  a  first  line  of  defense  in 
1877,  177;  violation  by  her,  in  1878,  of  the  principle  of  "unity  of 
lines  of  operations, "  267. 

Turning  movement,  a,  success  in  the  field  most  frequently  attained 
by,  200. 

"  Unit}'  of  lines  of  operations,"  the  subject  discussed,  244  et  seq.;  the 
principle  of,  stated  in  brief,  267. 

"Unity  in  command,"  the  principle  of,  53  et  seq. 

Valmy,  campaign  of,  623  et  seq. 

Vernois,  Verdy  du,  defines  the  chief  qualities  for  exercise  of  com- 
mand, 66  ;  on  the  organization  of  independent  cavalry  divisions, 

134- 

Veterinary  surgeon,  chief,  duties  of,  149. 

Victor  Emmanuel  in  Custozza  campaign,  564  et  seq.  pass. 

Vosges,  the,  method  adopted  for  the  defense  of,  in  1793,  639-40, — in 
1794,  640  et  seq. 

War,  what  the  preparation  for,  includes,  5  ;  necessit}^  for  having  a 
correct  idea  of  what  it  is  at  the  present  time,  21  et  seq.;  normal 
idea  of,  23  et  seq.;  views  of  Clausewitz  on  the  character  of,  25  et 
seq.;  details  of  the  work  in  preparation  for,  154  et  seq.;  the  plan 
of,  in  a  certain  measure  lies  within  the  province  of  the  Govern- 
ment, but  military  questions  should  be  intrusted  to  the  general-in 
chief  and  chief-of-sta£f,  330. 

War  strength  of  the  principal  European  powers,  a  comparison  of  the, 
^1  et  seq. 

War,  the  art  of,  what  a  treatise  on  should  constitute,  i  ;  difficulties  in 
the  way  of  preparing  such  a  work  in  modern  times,  ib. ;  what  ques- 
tions a  stud}'  of,  should  embrace,  2. 

Warteusleben,  General,  in  campaign  of  1796  in  Germany,  248. 

Wellinglon,  the  Duke  of,  letter  to  Marshal  Beresford  on  the  incon- 
venience and  inutilit}'  of  the  office  of  second-in-command,  64-5  ; 
letter  to  same  effect  to  Earl  Bathurst,  65  ;  in  letter  to  Lord  Clar- 
endon, in  181 1,  he  sets  forth  some  of  the  difficulties  met  with  in 
commanding  the  forces  in  Portugal,  and  the  necessity  for  great 
firmness  on  his  own  part,  71-2. 

Werder,  General,  in  campaign  in  the  East  in  1871,  236  et  seq.  pass. 


7IO  INDKX. 

William  I.,  Emperor  of  Germ.any,  his  re-organization  of  the  Prussian 

army,  34  et  seq. 
Windischgratz,   Prince,   commands   the   Austrians  in  first  campaign 

against  insurgent  Hungary  in  1849,  207. 
Wissembourg,  combat  of,  as  an  illustration  of  frontier  engagements, 

482  et  seq.;  causes  of  French  defeat  here,  489  et  seq. 
Woerth. — See  "  Froeschwiller. " 
Woody  regions  as  obstacles,  189-90. 
Wiirmser,  General,  in  campaign  of  1795  in  Germany,  244-5;  lie  adopts 

a  double  line  of  operations  in  the  campaigns  of  1796  in  Italy,  272 

et  seq. 
Wurtemberg,  her  war  forces  in  1870,  392-3. 


Date  Due                         i 

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I\?'h 

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